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THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, March 30, 1975

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to you today in response to your communication of March 21, 1975.

I share your deep disappointment over the failure of the negotiations that were so tirelessly pursued by Dr. Kissinger. As I indicated to the Secretary, Israel remains ready to persist in the effort to reach an agreement with Egypt that will move our area closer to peace.

The approach our two Governments had long shared was that the step-by-step policy was clearly meant to achieve visible progress towards peace. With this as the goal, we proposed our withdrawal from the most strategic asset in Sinai, the western Passes, as well as the oil-fields, in return for fair Egyptian political commitments that would include an undertaking to terminate the state of war.

Once, however, Egypt rejected this approach and it became clear that it would not change its basic position, that the arrangement has to be of an essentially military character, we had no option but to give due weight to considerations of national defense.

Nevertheless, we demonstrated a readiness to compromise over those considerations as well, going far beyond our original intentions, short of surrendering the most vital security interests.

Gerald R. Ford
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

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We agreed to evacuate the western part of the strategic Passes in favour of U.N. control. We were even willing to consider a limited Egyptian military presence in the form of an alert system to be located within the evacuated sections. And this, in addition to our readiness to hand over the oil-fields to Egyptian control.

I want you to know, Mr. President, that throughout, my colleagues and I were acutely sensitive to the importance you and the Secretary of State attached to the achievement of an agreement for the sake of the American initiative. Indeed, this was one of the important considerations on our part in proposing concessions that were, for us, agonizing, entailing as they did grave military risks.

I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that we toiled arduously for the success of Dr. Kissinger's mission, leaving nothing unexplored and exhausting every possible avenue for a positive outcome. This we did both in our own interest and in the spirit of the deep ties of friendship that are the traditional hallmark of our relationship.

In this connection, may I say that I am personally very sorry that the contents of your letter leaked out to the press. As you know, I took the first public opportunity in the form of a press conference to react sharply to the reports and mollify their impact. I will not deny to you that leakages of this kind are a serious problem emanating from the acute public sensitivity and anxiety over all matters that relate to the relations between our countries. This has been especially true during the course of these past talks when leakages became particularly difficult to control.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to express my deep appreciation to you for all that you have done in support of the effort for peace. I, likewise, wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to the Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, for the conduct of a mission that was both difficult and strenuous and whose goals we in Israel yet hope to see materialize.



SECRET

It is my hope and wish that our joint efforts to achieve progress towards peace will continue within that relationship of understanding and trust that has, for so long, bound our two countries and peoples and which, I am confident, will continue in the future.

Yours sincerely,

J. Kabih Yitkhak Rabin



