

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

December 12, 1974

*Handwritten initials/signature*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *(initials)*

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass the following report to you:

"NATO Meeting: I spent most of today in a "restricted" NATO Council session with all the other Foreign Ministers, several Defense Ministers and a minimum number of staff. By common consent this was the best NATO discussion in recent memory because there were no set-piece speeches but a lively give-and-take. The morning was largely taken up by my report on Vladivostok and answering questions about it. Support for the SALT agreement was unanimous and I think the allies now have a much sounder comprehension of what was accomplished. Regrettably, many of them had been under the influence of our press, especially as reflected in prejudiced articles in the Paris Herald Tribune. The French Foreign Minister finally gave a fairly lengthy account of their recent meeting with Brezhnev in which he sought to emphasize that France had not broken ranks on CSCE and other issues. I saw no point in entering into debate with him since his defensiveness made clear that he knew better and the other Ministers gave him little comfort.

"We then turned to economic and energy problems. I presented in quite firm terms our view that as far as we are concerned a consumer-producer meeting and dialogue can make sense only if there is prior consumer agreement on what positions to take as well as agreement on and an actual beginning of real consumer cooperation on practical steps such as conservation and financial measures. I had already gone over these points in polite but blunt terms in a breakfast with the French Minister this morning. I wanted to be certain that there was no French misapprehension, especially since the French have been portraying the situation as though the only issue between us is one of

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NBC Memo, 3/31/03, State Dept. Guidelines

By LR NARA, Date 4/30/10



timing. The NATO discussion, I think, persuaded the allies that our position on this is serious and substantive, not merely procedural. I pointed out that an open-ended conference with producers, based merely on agreed paper positions but not on real cooperation, will end in failure and leave the consumers worse off than before. From comments by other Ministers, I think they now see more clearly the trap in the French position which in its essence is intended to disrupt the new international coordination.

"My purpose was to set the stage for Martinique in such a way that Giscard can be under no illusion that he can obtain a procedural compromise without substance and make himself the spokesman for Europe and an arbiter between ourselves and the Arabs. He must now face the possibility of a meeting with you which must produce tangible results on the energy issue or be seen as a failure that is his responsibility. While the instincts of the other Europeans are to blur the differences, they must now realize that we will not play this game and that if there is not real, concrete cooperation among us, we are quite prepared to go it alone. This was illustrated by Callaghan who yesterday had sent me a letter urging a procedural compromise but at the end of today sent me a note that our course is the only one likely to produce results without leading to the kind of confrontation with producers which the Europeans fear like the plague.

"Cyprus: I was in touch throughout the day with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers to follow up on our conversations of yesterday. The Greek Foreign Minister sent word to me the first thing this morning that Caramanlis fully confirmed the Greek Government's willingness to enter immediately into serious and substantive conversations through the medium of the Clerides-Denktash talks. Bitsios also confirmed his government's willingness for me to send a letter to the Turkish Foreign Minister which would convey the Greek Government's commitment to the Clerides-Denktash talks. I told Bitsios that we would add to such letter the United States Government's parallel commitment to support the Clerides-Denktash negotiations and to use its full influence for the full implementation of an agreement if one should emerge from those talks.



"Later at the NATO meeting, the Turkish Foreign Minister told me that the Turkish Government was now also willing to have the Clerides-Denkash talks resume and would be prepared to receive the letter that I had discussed with the Greeks. Esenbel, whose salient feature is his blandness, displayed a slight trace of animation when he told me this. Usually his enthusiasm for most matters is well under control. Still later in the day I had a very brief meeting with Bitsios and showed him my draft letter. With his usual quickness he said the letter accurately stated the Greek views and he only made a slight change which, in fact, was an improvement. I shall see Esenbel late tonight to get his reaction to the letter. I do not plan to press for immediate agreement and, in any event, I doubt whether the Turks would be willing to make any immediate announcement about the resumption of the Clerides-Denkash talks when the question of military assistance to Turkey still remains in the balance.

"The Congressional action has continued seriously to hamper our efforts with the Turks. Many of our previous efforts to make progress have been thwarted by such action and if it were not for the renewed efforts in Congress to cut off aid to Turkey, I think we would have an agreement right now with the Greeks and the Turks to announce the beginning of substantive negotiations.

"My overall impression is that things are about where we expected them to be last summer: Caramanlis has decided to cut his losses and go for a quick settlement. The question now is whether the Turks can move quickly enough given their government - especially under Congressional pressure."