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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEETING WITH NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Thursday, May 29, 1975

4:30 p. m. (90 minutes)

Friday, May 30, 1975

10:00 a. m. (two sessions concluding  
at 4:30 p. m.)

NATO Headquarters

Brussels, Belgium

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

You will be meeting with the NATO Heads of Government in Brussels to reaffirm Allied solidarity, to discuss the challenges confronting the Alliance and to identify the steps required both to maintain the strength of the Alliance and to achieve priority NATO goals.

Your remarks to the May 29 session of the North Atlantic Council (at Tab A) will be the centerpiece of the meeting. Your NATO colleagues will look to you for: an assertion of personal leadership; a reaffirmation of U. S. dedication to the Alliance and to its deterrent and defensive aims; an expression of confidence in the essential soundness, resiliency, and adaptability of U. S. and basic Western policies since World War II; and a statement of what you expect from the Allies.

Your purpose at the NATO summit will be to:

-- state unconditionally that the United States remains true to its North Atlantic Treaty commitments;

-- review the political, economic and security challenges confronting the Alliance stressing the importance of maintaining the strength and solidarity of the West; and

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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/08, State Dept. Guidelines  
By Wm NARA, Date 4/18/12



-- call on the leaders of the Alliance to move ahead together with the United States to maintain a strong and credible defense, to preserve the integrity of NATO through the full participation of each member, to improve the process of consultation, to cooperate on the agenda for detente, to strengthen the West's democratic institutions and to pursue common approaches to complex international problems such as food, energy and raw materials.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: The NATO summit is not ritual. It occurs in a period of doubt and dissension. The West has not suffered such a convergence of adversity in thirty years and the American response is seen as central. Under your leadership, the Alliance will rededicate itself to the proposition that the security and welfare of each depends on the strength and cohesion of all. It will do so through what its leaders say to the public and by what is accomplished at this meeting in:

-- reasserting unequivocally their intention to maintain undiminished Western defense;

-- considering the status of East-West detente;

-- pursuing the resolution of political and economic issues confronting the West; and

-- undertaking to deal frankly with Alliance weaknesses.

While fundamental Western solidarity is not now in question, Allied governments and public opinion generally continue to reflect concerns about the effect on American attitudes toward Europe of events in Southeast Asia. Compounding these concerns are the situations on NATO's southern flank and in the Near East.



The Allies are apprehensive, too, about Soviet intentions. As the prospect nears of concluding at summit level the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), of moving closer to US-USSR agreement in SALT II, and of progressing in negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), West Europeans are weighing what will follow -- such as the future of detente -- when Brezhnev fades from the Soviet scene.

Less overtly expressed is the concern over eastern military dispositions -- especially the steady increase of Soviet defense spending at a time when the Allies for the most part are only holding to previous levels of defense spending in real terms, and when some, like the UK, feel forced to economize. There are profound European doubts about longer term political and economic prospects and -- most significantly -- about the ability of Western Europe to provide for its own security against a confident, tough-minded Soviet Union. The United States, then, remains as essential as ever to European security. The conviction by Europeans that U. S. steadfastness remains a constant in international affairs is essential to the stability of Western Europe.

The State of the Alliance. U. S. efforts have yielded significant success to date in preventing an erosion of defense spending despite inflation and increasing costs for modern weapons. The Defense Ministers' meeting May 22-23, a week before the summit, adopted ministerial guidance on a long range defense planning concept that stresses the need for cooperative programs, including rationalization of defense tasks, standardization of weapons systems, and flexibility in the use of forces. The new guidance will emphasize the need for strong conventional and nuclear defense and, consequently, the necessity for a sharper definition of priorities for NATO force improvements. The Defense Ministers' decisions will thus provide a basis for reaffirming at the summit the need to maintain effective Allied defense over the long term and the importance of cooperative programs as a means of conserving resources.

While we have no explicit indications that you will be asked about the maintenance of U. S. troop levels in Europe, your reassurances of U. S. fidelity to its NATO commitments will be taken as meaning that the U. S. has no intention of unilaterally drawing down its military strength in Europe.



Allied political concerns at the summit will center on developments in Portugal and those related to Greece and Turkey. With the Portuguese constituent assembly elections concluded, most Allies will incline to take a relatively optimistic view of trends there and will seek U.S. views on ways to live with the evolving Portuguese power structure and to sustain Portugal's association with NATO.

Allied leaders will attach importance also to U.S. views on prospects for a resolution on Cyprus, the key to a number of problems: Greece's continued association with NATO's integrated military structure, from which Greece announced its intention to withdraw almost a year ago; and the issue of military assistance to Turkey, whose restraint in the face of the U.S. aid cut-off helped in seeking alternate support from other allies. Progress in US-Greek negotiations has encouraged other Allies to anticipate similarly satisfactory results in talks on Greece-NATO military relations.

Energy and Economics. Energy issues and the Middle East are closely linked in West European preoccupations. The failure in April of the preparatory producer-consumer meetings, combined with uncertainties about next steps in the quest for peace in the Near East, have enhanced Allied awareness of the centrality of U.S. leadership in these areas. Allied leaders will expect your personal assessment of the situation in the Middle East -- especially on the eve of your talks with President Sadat -- and they will carefully heed your recommendations on energy policy, against the background of views expressed by ministers at the May 27 International Energy Agency (IEA) meeting in Paris. (These issues are covered in each of the briefing papers being prepared for your bilateral meetings while in Brussels.)

Allied leaders are also concerned that the disparity in positions between developed and developing countries may lead the latter, following the OPEC example, to seek to improve their individual and collective positions by destructive and self-defeating measures, such as withholding raw materials during periods of high demand. In the process, considerable political and economic harm would result. Accordingly, most of your colleagues will welcome the position we will have taken at the OECD that the United States is prepared to seek with other like-minded countries a new approach toward the less-developed countries.



East-West Relations. With the conclusion of CSCE in prospect, the Allies will expect your views on progress in the talks and plans for the summit finale. Although reassured by the U. S. intention to avoid addressing non-central systems in SALT II, the Allies will also seek an appreciation of progress in SALT II, especially as it promises to impact on Europe's defense and the future of US-Soviet relations.

The Allies will welcome, as well, your thoughts on prospects for MBFR, particularly on introducing an offer of U. S. nuclear systems reductions in exchange for Soviet tanks. Some Allies are concerned at MBFR's slow progress. Further, they will welcome any information you are in a position to provide on your plans for a personal meeting this year with Brezhnev.

Your colleagues thus will look to you to provide, in your interventions in the North Atlantic Council and in your bilateral and other discussions, a perspective on the current world scene and a reassertion of American purpose in its foreign relations. Above all, the Allies need to be reassured that the United States' commitment to NATO is unequivocal, unqualified and unchanged.

Apart from the assertion of your personal leadership in the formal NATO meetings and in your bilateral discussions, a main result of the meeting in public terms will be a strong joint statement issued by the Allies declaring their determination to sustain the Alliance and its purposes. Such a statement will aim to leave no doubt that, as NATO enters its second quarter century, the U. S. and its Allies are equal to the challenges of coming years and reinforced in their common purposes by recent events.

- B. Participants: BELGIUM - Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, CANADA - Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, DENMARK - Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen, FRANCE - Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues (President Giscard d'Estaing will participate in the Belgian King's dinner), FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, GREECE - Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis, ICELAND - Prime Minister Geir Hallgrimsson,



ITALY - Prime Minister Aldo Moro, LUXEMBOURG - Prime Minister Gaston Thorn, NETHERLANDS - Prime Minister Johannes den Uyl, NORWAY - Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli, PORTUGAL - Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves, TURKEY - Prime Minister Sulieman Demirel, UNITED KINGDOM - Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and NATO - Secretary General Joseph Luns.

- C. Press Arrangements: The NATO summit has been announced, and there will be full press coverage of events in Brussels.

III. TALKING POINTS

Your suggested remarks for the NATO Heads of Government meeting are at Tab A. (Your speech has been cleared by Paul Theis' office.)

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The accompanying briefing book contains:

- Tab A -- Memorandum from Treasury Secretary Simon on Economic Issues
- Tab B -- Memorandum from EPA Administrator Train on Environmental Issues
- Additional background papers prepared by the Department of State

