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*Cyprus*



# DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## Intelligence Appraisal

NOFORN

### CYPRUS: NEAR-TERM CHANGE UNLIKELY (U)

29 OCTOBER 1976



DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt  
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
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**CYPRUS: NEAR-TERM CHANGE UNLIKELY (U)**




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DE FACTO PARTITION OF CYPRUS IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE

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FIGURE 1



NO Objection to Declassification 2004/09/20 : NLF-NSU\_E\_C\_OA-3-9-0-0  
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## CYPRUS: NEAR-TERM CHANGE UNLIKELY (U)

Summary

(e/NOFORN) The Cyprus situation is stalemated on the diplomatic and military fronts. Near-term progress toward a settlement is hamstrung by internal political constraints confronting all parties to the dispute -- the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, and the respective mainland governments. International organizations, such as the United Nations, have been unable to induce movement through diplomatic efforts. Despite this impasse, the military situation remains relatively stable, primarily because of the strong Turkish Army position which inhibits Greek Cypriot adventurism. For the near future the situation probably will continue much as before, with each side becoming more firmly entrenched as a separate community, but with no significant movement toward either a settlement or increased instability.

Discussion

(e/NOFORN) There has been no significant movement toward a Cyprus settlement since Round V of the intercommunal talks in February 1976 (figure 1). Representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities have not met in formal intercommunal talks since. At present resumption of the talks is unlikely due to the wide gap between the basic positions of the two sides as well as the feeling among the leaders of both communities that they have nothing to gain from negotiations.

(e/NOFORN) Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios (figure 2) believes he needs significant concessions from the Turkish side before he can agree to a settlement and he sees little chance that the Turks are prepared to agree to such concessions. Makarios is also aware that in any settlement with the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot representatives he would have to accept

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
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ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS, PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS



FIGURE 2  
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their proposal for a Bizonal Federation and a weak central government. He opposes such acceptance because it would in effect legalize the existing partition of the island. It would also eliminate any chance of realizing his long-range goal of restoring a strong central government in which Greek Cypriots would predominate. Instead of negotiations, Makarios is emphasizing his "long struggle" policy, which consists of keeping the Cyprus problem in the international arena to increase political and economic pressures on Turkey. He is increasingly aware, however, that he can expect very little from his appeals to the United Nations (UN) and international public opinion. Makarios, therefore, believes that at present it is not possible to reverse the Cyprus situation and that his choices are either (1) to legalize the present status of the island in return for minor Turkish territorial concessions, or (2) to refuse a settlement on Turkish and Turkish Cypriot terms and keep the Cyprus question alive. The first choice would erode the Archbishop's political position and is therefore unacceptable. For want of better alternatives, Makarios is likely to continue his "long struggle" policy in hopes that something will eventually develop that will modify the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions. The resounding victory he won in the 5 September Greek Cypriot elections should strengthen his adherence to this policy.

(S/NOFORN) Makarios will probably remain in power for the foreseeable future. There is little threat to him from the right and the center-right. Their primary leader, Glafkos Clerides, garnered only 25 percent of the popular vote and his party failed to gain even one seat in the Greek Cypriot Parliament. Due to the weakening of the right, the leftist parties are becoming more influential. Nevertheless, Makarios remains the preeminent politician on the island and can continue to manipulate the left to his own ends.

(S/NOFORN) A similar disinterest in negotiations pervades the Turkish side. The Turkish Cypriots are haunted by memories of Greek Cypriot discrimination in

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
RAUF DENKTASH, PRESIDENT OF THE TURKISH FEDERATED STATE OF CYPRUS



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FIGURE 3

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
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the past and regard the present situation as a vast improvement. They control ample territory and now feel more secure than they have since the intercommunal fighting of the early 1960's. Although some see the need for concessions to advance a final settlement, most -- including Turkish Cypriot President Denktash (figure 3) -- are opposed. Elections in June conferred a new feeling of legitimacy on the Turkish Cypriot government. This has strengthened the defacto partition of the island and further hardened the Turkish Cypriot position.

(e/NOFORN) The Turkish government has considerable leverage over Denktash because of the presence of substantial Turkish military forces on the Turkish Cypriot-controlled part of the island and the provision of vital economic assistance. Policy dissensions within the Turkish Cabinet, however, limit Prime Minister Demirel's ability (figure 4) to pressure the Turkish Cypriots to undertake meaningful initiatives for a compromise settlement of the dispute between the two ethnic groups. Territorial and constitutional concessions extensive enough to satisfy the Greek side would be opposed by nationalist members of the government coalition, the political opposition, most of the military, and the general populace.

(e/NOFORN) A Turkish government willing or able to make major concessions on the Cyprus problem is not likely to evolve in the near future. Demirel will probably remain in control of his fractious coalition at least until the 1977 elections. Even if he is ousted, a change in government would probably not generate any new Turkish moves; a successor government would likely be subject to similar pressures and constraints.

(e/NOFORN) Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis (figure 5) is not interested in pressuring the Greek Cypriots to take the initiative. He realizes that to achieve any kind of compromise settlement the Greek Cypriots will have to make some serious concessions

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SULEYMAN DEMIREL, PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY



FIGURE 4  
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and he is reluctant to become tagged as the man responsible for yielding to the Turks over Cyprus. Any Karamanlis effort would also be constrained by his preoccupation with the Aegean problem as well as the limited ability of any Greek politician to influence Makarios.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ UN Secretary General Waldheim's attempts to find a basis for resuming negotiations have not been successful. He can push the two Cypriot communities into sending representatives to another round of intercommunal talks, but their participation would be primarily "window dressing" to avoid adverse world opinion. Waldheim's consultations with the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot representatives in mid-September did not advance prospects for intercommunal negotiations. The US, the UK, and the European Common Market continue various attempts to generate movement through the intercommunal forum, but to date they have also been unsuccessful.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The military situation on the island has been relatively stable despite frequent incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two communities. Much of this stability comes from the overwhelming Turkish military presence and rapid reinforcement capability, which inhibit Greek Cypriot adventurism. The Turks apparently believe the situation has stabilized sufficiently to warrant some unit withdrawals. From the peak strength of approximately 36,000, gradual reductions have brought Turkish troops down to the 28,000-30,000 range. The Greek Cypriots apparently also believe that the likelihood of renewed hostilities is fairly low. They have recently released some conscripts from active duty, decreasing National Guard strength from a peak of about 19,000 to about 12,000. Friction between the 2,900-strong UN forces and the Turks over the Greek Cypriot use of farmland in the DMZ has the potential to generate further incidents. Nevertheless, the UN presence continues to play a stabilizing role.




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CONSTANTINOS KARAMANLIS, PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE



FIGURE 5

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Outlook

(C/NOFORN) For the near future, the Cyprus situation is expected to continue much as before. The principal participants -- Greeks, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, and Turks -- will probably remain unwilling or unable to participate in or induce meaningful negotiations due to continuing internal political constraints. External parties -- principally the UN -- are not likely to have any more success in generating movement toward a settlement than they have in the past year. Even if intercommunal negotiations can be arranged in the near future, substantive progress toward reaching a settlement is improbable. In the meantime, the stalemate will serve merely to allow both sides to become increasingly entrenched as separate communities. Despite the expected lack of progress, the military situation will probably remain relatively stable, at least as long as the Greek Cypriots are disinclined to undertake adventures in the face of the overwhelming Turkish military position. (GDS-31 Dec 82)

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