

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: James D. Hodgson, Ambassador to Japan  
 Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 John J. Taylor, Staff Member, NSC

DATE, TIME July 1, 1976, 3:30 p. m.  
 AND PLACE: The White House

SUBJECT: U. S. -Japan Relations

General Scowcroft said that he thought the Miki visit had gone very well. Miki had exploited the visit for his own purposes but this was expected. The Ambassador said that after the Lockheed affair Miki and the Japanese felt that the United States owed Japan some special consideration. Because we responded appropriately, there will be a widespread feeling in Japan that the United States has a good appreciation of Japanese culture.

The Ambassador said that since Bob Ingersoll is no longer around, he has no one with whom he can talk on a personal basis about Japanese-U. S. relations and his own role. He hoped to be able to carry on this sort of personal communication with the General. General Scowcroft welcomed more personal contact with the Ambassador. The Ambassador hoped that if there were ever any question in the White House concerning U. S. relations with Japan or the conduct of his job, that the General would communicate directly with him. General Scowcroft said that the President in his talks with Miki had on his own initiative praised Ambassador Hodgson's performance. In part, the President had wanted to lay to rest any thought that because of the Ambassador's previous association with Lockheed Corporation there was any question about the President's confidence in him.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Rev. cw 3/13/04  
 BY ljk NARA DATE 7/27/04

The Ambassador raised the question about a pardon for Tokyo Rose. He said that he has the feeling that the Japanese Government is reluctant to raise the issue and that some persons are indirectly floating stories in order to bring the subject to attention. The Ambassador said a pardon would be viewed in Japan as a very gracious act and as underscoring the President's pronouncement in his Pacific Doctrine speech that World War II is behind us. If a pardon could be issued after the August convention, the Ambassador thought that it would have a good effect. General Scowcroft said he had not heard anything on the subject but that we would look into it.

The Ambassador asked if we could arrange for an inscribed photo of the President to be sent to the Japanese Chief of Protocol. The General asked Mr. Taylor if he would take care of this.

The Ambassador said that on security matters there is some interesting rethinking going on in Japanese circles. Some officials and politicians, as well as some academicians, believe that Japan's security situation is markedly different from that of a year or two ago. Factors affecting this change have been the U.S. withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia, the Congressional-Executive Branch standoff, America's "pulling in its horns" in Angola, and the buildup of the Russian fleet, which now has a two to one ton advantage over the U.S. Navy. The Japanese have noted that the Soviets term themselves not only an "Asian" but a "Pacific power." Some Japanese seem to realize that their previous policy of 100 percent reliance on the U.S. for security is no longer possible.

At the same time the public is opposed to an increase in defense spending, and the present government is too weak to take any important initiatives in this field.

The Ambassador thought there was an opportunity for us in this developing situation and that we should be working closely with those that share this concern. We should tell them that we also perceive the danger, and that our concern is reflected in an increased defense budget and an expansion of our naval forces. At the same time, we recognize that the U.S. dominance of the 1950s and 1960s will never return, and that Japan should realistically assess the situation. We should be very careful, however, not to try to push the Japanese into an expansion of their defense efforts, but should let them do it at their own pace. The danger was that elements in the Pentagon might over-react and attempt to move things too quickly.

General Scowcroft said he agreed that we should move very slowly. One thing that we could do was to rebuild Japanese confidence in us. The General said he would keep Defense under control.

General Scowcroft said he thought we had underestimated Miki all along. The Ambassador said that he believed that Miki would hang on through the elections although the Embassy Political officers thought Miki had only a fifty-fifty chance. The Ambassador said there was a new factor in politics in Japan, the public was much more critical of power playing and corruption.

General Scowcroft said he liked Miki personally and found him easier to communicate with than Tanaka. Ambassador Hodgson agreed and said Tanaka was cagey and did not conceptualize.

MEMORANDUM

3942

1b  
HH  
used

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

ACTION

July 22, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Your Conversation with the  
United States Ambassador to Japan James D.  
Hodgson on July 1, 1976

At Tab A is a memorandum of your conversation with United States  
Ambassador to Japan James D. Hodgson on July 1, 1976 at 3:30 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the memorandum of conversation with no further  
distribution to be made.

APPROVE           *TJB*          

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

WA 7/27/04

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
7	22	7	22	18	7603942	

INITIAL ACTION 0

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: SECSTATE \_\_\_\_\_ S/S \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT  
 SCOWCROFT X \_\_\_\_\_ SECDEF \_\_\_\_\_ LOU NO FORM NODIS  
 HYLAND \_\_\_\_\_ DCI \_\_\_\_\_ X REF \_\_\_\_\_ C EYES ONLY EXDIS  
 DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ STATE-EXSEC \_\_\_\_\_ S CODEWORD  
 OTHER Barner \_\_\_\_\_ TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Memocon of Scowcroft mtg w/ US amb to Japan James Hodgson on 1 Jul 1976

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	CONCUR- RENCE	COOR- DINATE	INFO		
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH						MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. .... ( )
STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES. .... ( )
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR. .... ( )
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION. .... ( )
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS						MEMO _____ TO _____ ( )
FAR EAST/ PRC						RECOMMENDATIONS. .... ( )
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO. .... ( )
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ( )
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? .... ( )
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE. .... ( )
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: _____
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN						

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
7/22				Swift X Decision (7/31)		
8/2				C Scowcroft approved recon		

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INDEXING: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE ROOMS

M/D 06 1976 BY \_\_\_\_\_

CRT ID: MK IF \_\_\_\_\_ NS DY \_\_\_\_\_

OPEN AGC WH SA FP \_\_\_\_\_

CLOSE \_\_\_\_\_ PA \_\_\_\_\_