

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Bhutto, Pakistan
Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defense
and Foreign Affairs
Agha Shahi, Foreign Secretary
Amb. Yaqub-Khan

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 10-113-#29
state rev 3/10/04; DOE 222 4/1/10
By dal NARA, Date 5/4/10

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Henry A. Byroade
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, February 5, 1975
10:30 a. m. - 11:45 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The press was admitted briefly for photographs]

President: I can remember when I first met Ambassador Byroade in 1953. I was on a subcommittee on foreign aid.

Byroade: I was Assistant Secretary for NEA.

President: You had just gotten out of the military.



I am pleased to have you here, Mr. Prime Minister, as well as your wife and your two children.

My whole career I have felt that American foreign policy has to look at the whole world and not just in its narrow interests. For us to lapse into the policy of the 1920's and 30s would be disaster. So we want to work with you and other countries for stability and progress. Our efforts -- and those of all the departments of our Government -- will aim at that.

~~SECRET~~/XGDS

~~TOP SECRET - XGDS (3)~~
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
Downgraded by 5/29/04

You have traveled recently. I would appreciate hearing your observations.

Bhutto: I wish to thank you for your hospitable welcome. I am sorry to impose on the American taxpayers. I was here just last year, but there are so many complex issues I thought we needed this opportunity to exchange views. Thank you for asking about my children. Ahmed thinks undergraduates should study at home and go abroad afterward. I disagree -- I went to Berkeley in 1947 and I learned much and I admire the vitality and strength of the United States.

For two decades, to those of us who live in the Middle East and South Asia, the American presence was thought to be omnipresent. Now the view is that the American presence is weakening. I think now this view is accurate. But if the pendulum swings too far, it is bad. We don't think the U. S. is exhausted and that after Vietnam, the U. S. wants to withdraw into a shell. We welcome your statements that the U. S. must play a strong role in the world. There are some basic factors on which we rely. For us -- especially after 1971 when we broke up. I was in New York and met Kissinger there.

Kissinger: The Prime Minister took over under very tragic conditions and behaved magnificently.

Bhutto: It was a painful experience, but the U. S. behaved very responsibly in stabilizing the situation and not letting it fall to pieces.

We don't understand India's objections to the relative stability of Pakistan. India's idea seems to be total security for India and total insecurity for Pakistan. We can understand her wanting to be recognized as the most powerful and most important power in South Asia, but she abuses that. It was India which previously dismembered us, with Soviet help. In Kashmir also, India behaved badly and now is maneuvering again.

India is not our only neighbor. We have good relations with all of them and are working to improve those with Afghanistan.

For the last three years -- and really since 1965 -- we have been discussing this [arms embargo] matter. We have not tried to add to your complications. Our attitude is of patience and understanding. But the international situation has become more complex and a policy change is now more imperative. If it is a matter of timing, I would like to give a thought or two. The situation may get more complex. With Congress, the Turkey matter is a tragedy. Congressmen think when they are elected they become foreign policy experts.



President: The Congress have put us in a very difficult situation with Turkey.

Kissinger: The Prime Minister knows Turkey well through his CENTO associations.

President: Congress is now very defensive on it. It is a matter of how they can extricate themselves and save face. We are working on it.

Bhutto: Ecevit had to take the action he did. His position was so tenuous, with the military, he had to do that. An embargo on allies, one after another, is not the best way to run a good alliance. So we think the passage of time may complicate this. Basically, the position of Turkey and Pakistan is the same. As time passes, the disenchantment between Pakistan and Congress increases.

As far as India is concerned, we have taken the Simla route. Now India, if the embargo is not lifted, will say she has won; if it is, she will say it is a slap in the face.

If on the merits -- the substance -- there is agreement, I am ready to talk about the timing.

Putting myself in your shoes, which I try to do, I think with the Congressional situation, the Simla process maturing, the Middle East, and so on, that now is the most valuable time to come. Chavan is coming next month. There will be much speculation. If it happens after that, India will be more aggrieved.

President: It is obvious that Henry and I have worked together very closely. Our views are identical. When he speaks, he speaks for me. Our views have matched. On the substance, you are correct -- we have decided to go along with the matter of sales. It is a matter of timing, so let's forget the substance.

I understand your interest in the revised announcement. We have some problems. Henry, why don't you explain.

Kissinger: We promised India we would give them a chance to comment before making a decision. That will take a few days, and we have to do it.



Next week, I and all my people will be out of the country if there is a Congressional uproar. If Chavan cancels his trip, that would compound the problem. So we have two options: To announce it in two weeks and take our chances on Chavan, or hold until after his visit. In either case, the decision won't change. We have created a climate for the change and we can probably manage. The choice is to do it the end of this month or in early April. The decision won't change. The question is how to proceed and what to say now.

President: Let me give you something which might be helpful in a decision. I decided Saturday on the PL 480 allotments. You know we promised you 100,000 tons; my decision allows us to provide you 300,000 more tons. We have not yet announced it, but we can do that any time.

Henry, do you want to say something on the Middle East?

Kissinger: Our plan is as follows: I don't plan to settle anything on this trip, but to tell Israel some facts of life. The chances of another settlement are about 60-40 by the middle of March. That will create a good climate for April, but we want your views.

Bhutto: I want to be candid and speak our point of view. With all due respect to Moynihan, he made a tempest in a teacup by agreeing with the Indian position. In the Algerian war, the French were doing barbaric things but always defended their position. They never flinched. To hear Moynihan support India -- which is music to their ears -- is an act of a simpleton. He has a simple face -- I didn't know his mind matched.

It is not a matter of an arms race. We can't match India. We didn't take exception to Kissinger's statement about India's being the principal state in the subcontinent -- though we don't agree. We kept quiet. The U.S. has chosen in the past to spoil India. But now, her position is so precarious -- there may be a few speeches in Parliament, and a few articles, but weighted in the balance it will be a tempest in a teacup. So I think it is better to do it before Chavan comes, so you don't have to argue it out with him and he goes back to say he failed. Putting it off I think makes it more complicated.

Kissinger: It shouldn't be before I return.

Bhutto: I accept that. But before Chavan.



Ahmed: I agree. But I am baffled by the limitation of \$25 million. Weapons are expensive. That is a slap in the face.

Kissinger: That was your figure. We wouldn't announce a figure, just cash sales. The important thing is the principle -- this would allow third-country sales. You must permit us to manage it here -- we will stress the defensiveness of your needs. We say it is not right to embargo a friend, and it's strengthening your defensive capability. Once it is lifted, the Congress would need an act to change it. We will emphasize the small size and the defensive character at first to minimize the reaction. If the weapons would be TOW rather than attack aircraft, that would help. We can work out a schedule.

Bhutto: I agree entirely. It should be defended on the basis of principle. An evolutionary process which starts the ball rolling is fine. We don't want to characterize it. We understand. But there is no limit in principle.

Kissinger: Your press will have to handle it so it so it doesn't sound like hundreds of millions.

Bhutto: I will do it so it doesn't upset the applecart. But if it is a fait accompli before Chavan comes, the storm will be over.

President: Let me discuss it with Kissinger.

Bhutto: You have other things to take up with him -- commercial credits, fertilizer, etcetera.

Second, on PL 480: We are very grateful. But I came all this way for scotch and soda and got a Coca Cola. The PL 480 is now more important than the arms, but it is a matter of presentation. We will have to make adjustments. So if you could announce it by the end of February, we would appreciate it.

President: I am not clear how you want the PL 480.

Bhutto: In low key.

Kissinger: We could put it in a joint statement.

If we could say to the Congress that we had discussed your nuclear program, that would help much. If we could say we achieved some nuclear



restraint for some help in conventional arms, that really would defuse the opposition. Because Hamilton said "what will you get for it? "

Bhutto: We are always frank in our relations. You know where we are on this -- you have your people there. We have made some progress. We have some good people and it is within reach -- not like some Arab states. We come after India in capability. I am not enchanted by the grandiose notion that we must explode something, no matter how dirty, if our security needs are met. I want to spend the money on something else. We will have a nuclear program, but if our security is assured, we will be reasonable.

Kissinger: If you could formulate something -- we can discuss it further this afternoon. Some sort of statement would really help. I think the Congress will consider it conclusive, and with all the other problems we have now, it would help.

We are not unrealistic about the facts of life. The Japanese could have weapons in six months, but in this time frame it would be useful.

Ahmed: Could the Prime Minister make this point with the Congress?

Kissinger: If he could say he had discussed both arms and nuclear development, that would be terrific.

President: Coming from you it would be better than from us and look good on the Hill.

Kissinger: It would make you look good in comparison with India. They lost a great deal by their explosion.

Bhutto: Yes, and they set theirs off right on our border and didn't expect us to react. The Indians also say that arms will upset the balance in South Asia and destroy Simla. If that is their attitude, it is better to find out. Simla works best if both sides have security. As the Indian Ambassador said.

Kissinger: He is your best friend in Washington. He has made so many enemies.

Bhutto: It's 60-40, you think? There is no difference between step-by-step and Geneva. You could finish the whole thing by the step process or go to Geneva and still keep the step process.



Kissinger: We feel we can go to Geneva after the next step. We can't leave Syria out. The question is whether it is better to attempt it at Geneva, or separately.

Bhutto: I agree you should not ignore Syria.

Israel is ready to give anything but the passes and oil field. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Yes. They will give up lots of sand. For the first time I am going out without knowing what they will give.

President: If the next step fails, what then?

Bhutto: I don't think either you or the Soviet Union wants more conflict. I don't think it will happen -- it is just a feeling, like at a cocktail party.

President: I hope you are right.

Bhutto: Since our dismemberment, we have focused more on the Mideast. It would be a great achievement if this could be solved. We wish you every success in this and your other heavy problems -- with energy, inflation, recession.

President: I think we are turning the corner. By summer or fall we are looking forward to some encouraging developments.

I am looking forward to coming to Pakistan.

Bhutto: Thank you for your decision.

President: We very much appreciate your courage.



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Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, February 5, 1975
11:30 a.m.

PLACE:

[This conversation took place after the President's meeting with Bhutto].

Kissinger: A nuclear statement by Bhutto is a lot of eyewash. But without our arms, they would go all out, so it will be marginally useful.

If we could get a statement that they wouldn't explode a weapon if their security is assured, that would help. It would be more devious, but I think it is better to hold off until after Chavan. Let me talk to Sisco and I will give you a recommendation tonight.


President: He was an impressive man.

Kissinger: He was great in '71. That was one of Nixon's finest hours. The Chinese Ambassador told me we were big cowards and if we went in they would.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, HANDBOOK, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state dev. ex. 23/10/04
BY: lsh, NARA, DATE 5/12/01

~~SECRET~~ XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



P/ Bhutta / Ahmed / Shahri / Khan
K/ Byrnie

5 Feb 75

(Pass photo)

P I am sure when I met Byrnie in 53, I
in a sense to see F-5 Grid.

Byrnie I was with Sir for NVA

P You had just gotten out of jail. Pleasure to have
you back, the NVA as well as your wife &
your 2 children - who I

My whole career I have felt that US F-5 needs
look at a whole world not just in its narrow
interests. For us to begin into working of 200 & 300
would be disastrous. So we want to work out
your & other countries for stability & prog. Our
efforts - of all depts - will aim at that. You
I have travelled recently. I would appreciate
your views.

P I wish to thank for your hospitable welcome.
Sorry to miss on US taxpayers. Was here just
last year, but there are so many complex
issues & that we needed this year to change
views. I thank you for asking about my children.
Ahmed thinks he should study at
home & go abroad afterwards. I disagree - I
want to be studying in 1947 & I learned much
to ethnic stability & strength of US.

For 2 decades ~~that~~ ^{the} ~~program~~ ⁱⁿ NVA F-5 Grid, a
US presence was unpleasant. Now a view
is that US presence is welcoming. I think
whether view is accurate, but if - perhaps
having to far, it is bad. We don't think US
is exhumable after NVA US wants to w/ draw
into a shell. We welcome your statements



that I must play strong role in a world.
There are some basic factors on which we rely.
For us - esp after 71 when we broken up, I was
in 44 + not a star.

K I've tried over months very tough conditions + behaved
very differently.

B It was painful experience but I behaved very
wsp. in strategizing out + not letting it fall
to pieces.

We don't understand I objection + whether
stability place. I think seems to be total security
for I + total insecurity for Pak. We can understand
her as most powerful + huge power in Asia,
but she abuses that. It was I which
primarily demonstrated us, w/ Sov help.
In Kashmir also, I behaved badly + now
is maneuvering again.

I is not our only objection. We have good
relations w/ all + are working to improve those
w/ Pak + Afghan.

For last 3 years - only since 65 - we have
discussing this matter. We have not tried
to add to your expectations - Our attitude is
of patience + understanding. That incl
but become more complex + a policy
change more expectations. If it a matter
of time, I would like to give a third 2.
Sit may get more complex. W/ Cong - the
Turkey matter is a tragedy. Cong think
when they elected they EP experts.

P There Cong have put us in a very difficult
sit w/ Turkey.

R PM from Turkey will then be associated.

B It is a tragedy - a catastrophe.

P Long is now very depressed on it. It matters of how they can lift it + some faces are working on it.

B Everett had to take a train to die. He is further was in Turkey, w/c rail, he had to do that. Embargo on the oil, one after another, it's not a best way to run a great alliance. So we think a passage of time may complicate things. Basically a portion of Turkey + Park is a sound. As time passes, disenchanted that P + Long increase. As per our command, we have taken a Soviet route. Now India, if enlarges not by that will say we she has won; if it is, she will say it's a victory for us.

A One wants - a substance - there is agreement, ready to talk things.

Putting myself in your shoes, which I try to do, I think w/ Long sit, Soviet motivation, RFE, etc, that now is a most valuable time to come.

Chances being next month. Much speculation will be by happens after that, I will be more aggressive.

P It seems that R + I have worked together very closely. Our views identical - when he speaks, he speaks for me. Our views have matched on substance, you are correct, we have decided to go along w/ the motion of others. It is a matter of timing, so let's forget a substance. I understand your interest in revised agreement.

We have some jobs. R, why don't you explain

K We promised I we would give them a substance



to commit before decision. That will take a few days & we have to do it. Next week, all of all my people will be out of a long period. If Chomsky cancels his trip, that would be a great job.

All a home 2 options. Chomsky is 3 weeks take courses on Chomsky, or hold till after his visit. In either case, decision must change. We have created a climate for change & we can probably manage. Choice is to do it end of this month or early April. Decision must change.

Q. What has had to be done & what to say now.

P. Something which might be helpful in a decision.

I decided Saturday on PH40. You know we promised 100,000 tons. My decision allows us to provide you 300,000 more tons. But right now we do that on time.

K. Our plan about NE is as follows. I don't plan to settle anything on this trip but to tell I some part of life. Chances of settlement are about 60-40 by middle of March. That will create good climate for April, but we want you views.

B. I want to be candid & speak our part of mind. W/ all these aspects to negotiation, he must target in terms by agreeing w/ Indian partner. In Algeria case, for always defended their evolutionary partner. To have Algerians support I is which is massive to their loss - is a huge tragedy. Has a single mind face - didn't know his mind matched.

It's not matter of arms race. We can't match I. We didn't take option to K statement about I financial state in subc. - This is



don't agree - we kept quiet but US has chosen
in part to avoid it. But now, the part is
so serious - there may be a few spots
in London & few articles, but we ought to
balance it with a target in Europe. So
I think it better before Chuman, so you don't
have to argue it out w/ him & he goes back
to say he's partial. Putting it off I think makes
it more explicit

K Shouldn't be type 2 return

B I accept that. But before Chuman.

Chuman, I agree. But I'm baffled by the limitation of
\$25 mil. It's a passive. That's a big issue.

K That was your figure. We wouldn't announce
a figure, just cash sales. The important thing
is a principle - this would allow 2nd country
to do. You must point us to management
here - we will stress depression. We say
it's not right to embargo a period & strengthen
depression cap. Once it's lifted, we would need
an act to change it. We will emphasize
a small size & depression character at 1st
to minimize a reaction. If 1st says we'll
be too rather than attack soft, that would
help. We can work

B I agree entirely. It should be defended on basis
of principle. An institutional process which starts a
ball rolling is fine. We don't want to characterize
it. We understand. But there is no limit on
principle

K Your press will have to handle it so it doesn't sound
like 100 of mil.



B I want to it so it doesn't require approval. But if it is a fact enough before the Commission, the system will be run.

P Let me discuss it w/ K.

B You have been other things to take up w/ him - coal credits, fuel, etc. 2nd on PL480. We are very grateful, but I came all this way for Scotch & Soda & got a corn note. The PL480 is now moving about the same, but it is a matter of presentation. We will have to make adjustments. So if you could announce by end Feb. we would appreciate.

P I don't know how you want to PL480

B In how key.

K We could put it in joint statement. You could say to a Com that we had discussed your nuclear prog., that would help much - if we could say we achieved some nuclear restraint for some helping conventional arms, that really would elicit cooperation. Cause Hamilton said what will you get for it.

B We always speak in our relations. You know you have your people there. We have made some prog. We have some good people & it is w/ in reach - not like some Arab states, they come after I asked in cap. I was embarrassed by questions when we must explain something & whether how dirty, if our security needs are met. I want to spend money on something else - we will have a nice prog. but if our security is secured, we will be reasonable.

K If you could formulate something - we can



changes further this option. Some sort of
statement would really help. I think - Com, will
consider it conclusive & w/all the other jobs are
done now, it would help.

We are not sure about the facts of the - jobs
Could have expressed more - but in this time
frame it would be useful.

Q Could you make this point w/c Com

K I don't think you had discussed both areas &
more clearly that would be terrific.

P Com, you would be better than some
& look good in a bill.

K It would make you look good in comparison
to E. They don't seem much by their system.

P Yes. And they set them off right in our hands
& don't expect us to react.

B I also hope some will report S. & S. balance &
elusive S. S. If that is their attitude it better
to find out. S. S. is best if both sides have
to work. A. S. S. is a bad one & - - -

K He is your best friend in Wash. Has made so
many enemies.

B 60-40, you think. There is no big bet step by
step & Com. You could unite - when they
by step process or get Com & still keep step
process.

K We feel it ~~is~~ we can go to Com or the right
top. A. S. S. is we can't have S. S. out,
A. S. S. is whether without Com or separately.

B I agree you should not ignore S. S.

I ready to give anything but justice with (maybe)

K Yes. They will give up lots of land. For 1st time



I going out w/o knowing what they will give.

P I want step back what?

B I don't think either you or I want more
conflict don't think it will happen - ~~don't~~ it
just a feeling, like at cocktail party.

P I hope you are right.

B Since commitment, we have forward more
on M.E. It be a great achievement if this could
be solved. We wish you every success
in this & you other heavy problems, into
energy, inflation, etc.

V I think we are trying a corner. By ~~some~~
a full some emergency, objectives
holding forward

Thank you for decision. We very much
appreciate your ~~concern~~.



✓ P/R

5 Feb 75 (post-Broatto)

K A nuclear statement ~~will~~ is a lot of eye work, but w/o arms, they would go all out, so it will be marginally useful.

If we could get a statement that they wouldn't explode a nuke if their security assured, that would help.

It would be more decisive, but I think better to hold off til after Chomsky lets me talk to Giani - I will give you access tonight.

P He is an impressive man

K He was great in '71. That was one of N's first houses. The PRC and ~~made~~ all the time we were big crowds + if we went in they would.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5

HSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state review 3/10/04

BY lha NARA DATE 5/13/04

