

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Minister Mordechai Shalev,
Minister and Charge' of Israel
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft,
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, November 6, 1974
3:00 p. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: As you know, Secretary Kissinger is in the Middle East and will visit with the Prime Minister tomorrow. The whole situation is different from what we had expected and hoped. I am concerned that we could be faced with a united position of the Arabs, the Soviet Union and the Europeans against us. As you know from our talks, we had hoped we could resume negotiations with Sadat, Hussein and eventually with Syria. It is our judgment that if we had moved, that contingency [the Rabat outcome] could have been avoided. We fear that unless movement begins right away we will be in trouble.

As I look to October-November 1973, we had the embargo, a conflict which was very tough for Israel and costly for us, and a fairly close confrontation with the Soviet Union. It is not in your and our interest to have that recur. From the viewpoint of the American people, there were grave reservations at getting too close to the brink -- it was just after Vietnam and the American people were fed up. I hope you can communicate with the Prime Minister [to ensure] that there will be a real exploration with Secretary Kissinger to move quickly and have some substance. The potential danger of a united front is dangerous for both of us.

My past record of support for Israel is well known. I think we could have avoided Rabat, and I think we can avoid its consequences if the Prime Minister and Secretary Kissinger will sit down and explore all the options.

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted] DANGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Dep. review 8/10/04
BY [redacted], NARA, DATE 5/6/04

Shalev: The Prime Minister has said that Israel is ready to negotiate with Egypt and with Jordan, but not with the PLO. I believe it is in accordance with what you would want -- to negotiate with Egypt and Jordan. Prime Minister Rabin has said this in his speech to the Knesset. [He reads a page from it.] He made it clear that Israel is not prepared to negotiate with the PLO because they want to destroy Israel.

President: We understand your view of the PLO and we wish it were not so, but we need to move.

Shalev: I am not aware of any difference with the United States on steps toward a disengagement agreement. Rabat would have happened anyway.

President: My understanding is that we urged movement early, then Rabin came in and urged some delay. If there had been a negotiation underway, the Rabat outcome would have been different.

Shalev: We are on the receiving end. Our confidence in Sadat's wishes for peace are shaken. We think he is keeping his options open.

Egypt is taking some steps building bunkers on the eastern side of the Canal for anti-aircraft, which is prohibited. We will submit this to the UN.

On the Secretary's last visit with Sadat, he knew we would negotiate. I don't think a couple of weeks would have made a difference.

President: I think we now must move, and I want you to communicate this to the Prime Minister. A repeat -- or something even worse -- of 1973 we must avoid.

Shalev: Nothing is further from our minds than a delay of the negotiation. But we must have our security.

President: I agree. We will maintain our guarantee for Israel's security and existence.



P/Shulow

6 Nov 74

Transcribed ✓

P As you know Kim NIE & most of PM tomorrow
 article set is dry from what was expected & hoped.
 I concerned that we could be faced w/ a united front
 of Arab/S.O./E. was against us. As you know from
 our talks, we had hoped we could reach a target w/
 Sabot/Mission/Target & even w/ Syria.
 It was judgment if we had moved, that
nothing could have been avoided. Call it fact that
ambos movement begins right away we will
 be in trouble.

As I look to Oct-Nov '73, we had bombings,
 conflict which very tough for I & pretty for us, &
 fairly close cooperation w/ S.O. It was in
 Syria & our interest to have that scene.
 From viewpoint of Am people, there were
 great relations at getting too close to truth -
 it was just after OK & - U's people were fed up,
 Hope you can communicate w/ PM that
 there will be real explanation w/ K to
 remove quickly & have some substance.
 I'm interested danger of a united front
 is dangerous for both.

Any part - word for I is well known &
 Arab we could have avoided Sabot &
 I think we can avoid its consequences if
 Pat & K will sit down & explore allegations.

S PM said ready to target w/ E, Jordan, but
 not w/ P.O.

I believe it is in our interest w/ what you
 would write to target w/ E & J.
 (Lead from Robin ~~to~~ speak to K. result)
 He made clear I not prepared to target w/ P.O.
 because they want to destroy I.

P We understand your view of P.O. & are wish
 it were cut off, but we need to move

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *shulow* 10/10/04

BY *sh* MAPA DATE 5/6/04



S. I just worried of any dip w/ US on steps toward
disarmament. Robert ~~was~~ Robert would have happened

P. ~~and~~ My understanding is we urged ^{and} ~~waited~~
early, then Robert came in & we urged
some delay. If there had been night work
early, Robert ~~couldn't~~ ~~been~~ ~~at~~.

S. We are using land. We are important in S. lot
with a few small ~~are~~ ~~shakes~~. We think to being
his extra year.

E. He is taking some steps building bridges
on E side of canal for AA, which prohibited.
We ~~may~~ ^{will} submit this to VN

On Saigon last visit w/ S. lot he knew
we would negotiate. I don't think Robert a
couple of weeks would have made a day.

S. ~~and~~
P. I think we have met more & I want you
to communicate this to J. M. I expect
some word - of 1973 we must avoid.

S. Working further from our friends
than a day of night. But we have our
security.

V. Dazed. He will maintain our program
for I security & exist.

