

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 010685

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
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COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEORANDA OF
CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER 3
FOLDER TITLE February 1, 1974 - Kissinger,
Schlesinger

DATE WITHDRAWN 01/31/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST LET

REDACTED

1/29/10

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 01-105 # 6

TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

050ltr 6/24/04; State ltr 2/15/06; CIA ltr 1/29/10

By del NARA, Date 3/9/10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General John Wickham, Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Friday, February 1, 1974
8:00 a.m.

PLACE: Secretary Schlesinger's Office
The Pentagon

Schlesinger: Ten quick subjects.

You talked to Clements about a visit to the Saudis.

Kissinger: No, no.

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Get a cable out on Korea -- keep Habib off their back on their domestic problems.

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



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Schlesinger: I want Rumsfeld for Secretary of the Navy. I would recommend Bruce Clark or Strausz-Hupe.

The Spratleys. Sullivan says we are obligated to the Philippines on the Spratleys.

Kissinger: I think the Philippines are withdrawing those forces.

Schlesinger: Maybe you should talk to the Chinese?

Kissinger: They are having internal problems, but they reacted quickly.

I have to testify on the JCS spying business. Symington is pushing. He wants to know why I was uncharacteristically unenergetic about finding out what was taken.

Schlesinger: Admiral Robinson did the same, but he didn't take papers -- he just briefed on the material. You should testify after March -- after the recess. I don't know what the Laird/Buzhardt angle is, but the Buzhardt report says that it was a two-way spying operation designed to bypass Laird.

Kissinger: They passed the JCS documents to us as part of official business. The President ordered it -- because it was a different relationship than we have. We couldn't find out what Laird was doing. Were DOD documents taken?

Schlesinger: I gather so.

Kissinger: It is a morally different position whether the JCS steals from the President or whether the President steals from the JCS.



Schlesinger: It may come out that this was a Kissinger-military conspiracy. Mel and Fred have the fish to fry in this. Moorer is getting a bum deal.

Kissinger: I have read the Young report. It is a report of a failure trying to make himself important. It is sick.

Schlesinger: The Buzhardt report is not sick -- it may be dirty, but not sick.

Kissinger: [Described discussion with Laird on his press conference.]

Schlesinger: Mel has a big set of documents which weave a web which he says shows the evolution of the statutory role of the Secretary of Defense. The documents don't show Moorer set it up but that he was knowledgeable. The report indicates you were getting material to which you were not entitled.

If it weren't for the climate, we would just say that Welander was working too hard to please.

How about Diego Garcia?

Kissinger: I haven't heard.

Schlesinger: How about the Carrier into the Indian Ocean?

Kissinger: I would like to have a gap of about two or three weeks.

Schlesinger: I may have a Japanese problem. We are thinking of using the Midway, home-ported in Japan.

Kissinger: Let me check on that.

Schlesinger: If we are going to have problems on home-porting and put conditions on it, we should know sooner than later.

What about the Paracels?

Kissinger: There is an internal debate going on. Either the leftists did it or Chou did it to show he was vigilant against Imperialists.

But North Vietnam is upset and thus it is not entirely to our disadvantage.



Schlesinger: I don't think there will be an offensive in Vietnam.

Kissinger: The Soviet Union and Chinese have said that, but we should still give them what they need.

Schlesinger: We are giving them TOW's, but they are loaded.

Kissinger: Well, we need to use this time to look after their defenses.

Schlesinger: The Hill is afraid about the embargo. They are asking me if we are giving our fuel to anyone -- especially the GVN. They have stopped us from giving fuel directly -- the next move will be to cut off AID funds which are being used now.

I think we can take out one A-1 squadron from Thailand earlier than April -- since there will be no attack.

Kissinger: I don't want to trigger an offensive. Let's wait until April.

Schlesinger: My idea is to signal the DRV that if they behave, we will continue their withdrawals.

Kissinger: Their strategy is simple. They will attack when they think it is right. They don't understand good behavior. They understand only power. A concession is a sign of weakness. When you sell the same concession five times, you are on their level.

Schlesinger: We need to keep some B-52s in Thailand and why don't we move some units out and put some back in -- to show it is a two-way street?

I would like to see Dobrynin after the SALT delegation leaves. I will tell him we support SALT and detente but we must have equity.

Kissinger: On SALT, your figures are your program.

Schlesinger: I believe in essential equivalents.

Kissinger: If you have 4.8, you have to have subceilings or no inspection. So either they have to build 3.5 SLBM which is ridiculous, or they have more ICBM throw-weight.



Schlesinger:are not counterforce.

Kissinger: That is my point.

Schlesinger: We must propose equivalents.

Kissinger: We are looking at a formula for reducingunits.

Another ridiculous idea is the block approach. We are better having cheating ofthan to have all the

Schlesinger: I agree. I earlier proposed to cut back

Can we have only Egyptian warships transit the Canal?

Kissinger: I will talk to Sadat. Contrary to our conversation, Sadat wants to build a new Canal.

We should freeze Yamani if he comes here again. We should deal with Saqqaf.

Schlesinger: I am not afraid to have Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean. It might scare the Arabs.

Kissinger: Yes. Sadat is prepared to open the Canal at the pace we want.

Schlesinger: I like the Canal open. It gives Egypt revenues and lessens their dependence on the other Arabs.

Kissinger: What about Georges Guay in Cairo? [Discussion]
Brent, check with Guay.

Schlesinger: Let Porter finish out on the Iceland deal.

Kissinger: Yes. Brent, put in my talker about Iceland and Soviets cutting off fuel. Put the evidence in my Dobrynin talker.

Can you do a study on how we can help if Egypt breaks with the Soviet Union and what we can do in electronic warfare?

Schlesinger: We have to get the SR-71 pictures to Cairo.



Kissinger: A carrier.

Schlesinger: We will talk to Walters and Colby. Helms destroyed all his tapes and Colby is getting blamed.

Kissinger: Hold on Galley until we see if Jobert comes over here for the energy conference.



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