THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXV • No. 1938 • August 16, 1976

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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August 16, 1976
VOL. LXXV, No. 1938

The Department of State BULLET
a weekly publication issued by
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the public
interested agencies of the governm
with information on developments
the field of U.S. foreign relations
on the work of the Department
the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selec
press releases on foreign policy, iss
by the White House and the Dep
ment, and statements, addres
and news conferences of the Presid
and the Secretary of State and ot
officers of the Department, as well
special articles on various phases
international affairs and the functi
of the Department. Information
included concerning treaties and in
national agreements to which
United States is or may becom
party and on treaties of general in
national interest.

Publications of the Department
State, United Nations documents,
legislative material in the field
international relations are also lis

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15
Single copy 85 cents

The Secretary of State has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through January 31, 1981.

America and Asia

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

A little more than two weeks ago this nation celebrated its 200th birthday. In the process of that celebration, Americans learned that despite the agony, the turmoil, and the constitutional crisis of the last decade, we are still proud to be Americans and still proud of what America means to the world. We felt once again that our country is free and vibrant with life and change. We saw that tolerance and hope and dedication are far more a part of the American national character today than hatred, division, and despair.

To the generation that came to maturity in the late sixties or early seventies, these truths may have been apparent for the first time. For my generation, it was, rather, a reminder of basic verities about America which had been in danger of being obscured by the turmoil of a decade. But for all of us, of whatever generation, it was an uplifting experience.

Certainly the events of one celebration, however inspiring, cannot by themselves solve the long-term problems that our nation will face in its third century. But they illuminate the road before us as we enter our electoral campaign. They tell us that it is time to move away from the counsels of timidity, fear, and resentment which have done so much to corrupt our public dialogue.

Ours is not a nation bent on domination, as we were told four years ago. Ours is not a nation in retreat, as we have been told too often this year. Ours is a nation which understands that America cannot be at peace if the world is at war, that America cannot be prosperous if the world is mired in poverty, that America cannot be true to its heritage unless it stands with those who strive for freedom and human dignity. In short, we know that our lives, liberty, and pursuit of happiness depend on the world in which we live and that America's leadership is crucial to shaping what kind of world that will be.

We face today, as we have for several years, international conditions quite unlike those known by earlier generations of Americans. We have designed a foreign policy capable of mastering those new challenges, a foreign policy for the last quarter of the 20th century, based on four propositions:

—First, American strength is essential to the peace of the world and to the success of our diplomacy. We should not bemuse ourselves with false choices between defense or domestic needs, between security or social justice. Unless we pursue all these objectives we are likely to achieve none of them. Security cannot be the sole goal of our policy, but no other achievements can endure without it.

—Second, our alliances with the great democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Asia are the bedrock and the top priority of our foreign policy.

[1] Made at Seattle, Wash., on July 22 before a luncheon sponsored by the Downtown Rotary Club and the Seattle Chamber of Commerce (text from press release 351).

—Third, in an age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic balance, we have a moral as well as a political obligation to strive mightily toward the overriding goal of peace. We are ready to use our strength to resist blackmail or pressure; we must also be prepared to negotiate longstanding disputes, foster habits of moderation, and develop more constructive ties with potential adversaries. The American people and the people of the world ask for a peace more secure than a balance of terror constantly being contested.

—Fourth, security and peace are the foundations for addressing the positive aspirations of peoples. Prosperity, human rights, protecting the environment, economic development, scientific and technical advance, and cultural exchange have become major concerns of international diplomacy. In these spheres, the destinies of nations are interdependent and a world of order and progress requires new forms of cooperation among all nations, rich and poor, industrialized and developing.

We want our children to live in a world of greater peace and justice. We want them to have the opportunity to apply their own genius, in their own time, to the betterment of mankind. To enable them to do so we, in our time, must help shape an international order that welcomes the participation of all nations and responds to the deepest concerns of all peoples.

We have come a long way already. We are at peace for the first time in more than 15 years. Our collaboration with the great industrial democracies is steadily expanding into new fields, while its fundamental basis is stronger than it has been in years. We have made progress toward peace in the Middle East, and partly because of our unique role there, the elements for major new advances exist. In Asia, we have—as I will discuss in greater detail—solidified our ties with both our friends and our potential adversaries. Here in the Western Hemisphere we are building a new relationship based on equality and mutual respect. We have inaugurated a hopeful new policy in Africa. And with respect to th Soviet Union, we have combined a dete mination to resist expansion with a read ness to build relations on a more stabl and lasting basis—we are, and will b conciliatory but vigilant.

The people of the Pacific Northwe hardly need to be told of the strength c role of America. Yours is a region but r cently carved from a wilderness by me and women of courage and vision. Her the pioneer spirit that is so much a part c our history lives on, and from here Americ looks out across the Pacific toward the n tions—new and old—of Asia.

And it is America's relations with Asi that I would like to discuss with you toda

The Asian Dimension

No region in the world is more dynami more diverse, or more complex than Asi

—In the past generation, America have fought three major wars in Asia. W have learned the hard way that our ow safety and well-being depend upon pea in the Pacific and that peace cannot l maintained unless we play an active pa

—Our prosperity is inextricably link to the economy of the Pacific Basin. La year our trade with Asian nations exceed our trade with Europe. Asian raw mat rials fuel our factories; Asian manufa tures serve our consumers; Asian marke offer outlets for our exports and investme opportunities for our business communit

—Our ties with Asia have a unique h man dimension. For generations America have supplied an impulse for change Asian societies; Asian culture and ideas turn have touched our own intellectu artistic, and social life deeply.

American foreign policy has known bo great accomplishment and bitter disa pointment in Asia. After World War II v sought above all to contain Communist e pansion. We essentially succeeded. W forged a close alliance with a democrat Japan. We and our allies assisted Sou

orea in defeating aggression. We pro-ded for the orderly transition of the Phil-ipines to full independence. We strength-ned the ties with Australia and New ealand that had been forged as allies in vo wars. We spurred the development of e Pacific Basin into a zone of remarkable conomic vitality and growth.

By the late 1960's, however, old policies nfronted new realities: American disen-hantment with a war we would not win id could not end, acute rivalry between e major Communist powers, and above l, Japan's burgeoning power and pros-erity. It was becoming apparent that our mmitments in Asia too often dictated our terests, that we sometimes acted as hough our stake in our allies' security was reater than their own, that estrangement ith China no longer served either nation's terests or the cause of global stability, hat our economic dealings not infrequently sembled patron-client relationships.

Throughout the first half of this decade, herefore, we have been fashioning a new olicy for Asia. We have been bringing our mmitments into balance with our inter-sts. We have helped our allies and friends igment their own strength, while we have radually reduced our own military pres-nce in Asia by 130,000 men in addition to e 550,000 troops we withdrew from Viet-am. We have strengthened our relations ith Japan, begun a new relationship with e People's Republic of China, and earched for political solutions to Asian re-ional conflicts. We have encouraged Asian ations in their self-reliance and in their fforts at regional cooperation. We have elcomed Asian nations in new multilat-ral efforts to improve the global economic ystem.

While a great deal has been accom-lished, Asia remains a region of potential rbulence. The collapse of Viet-Nam last ear produced concern about a more gen-ral American retreat from Asia. Happily, uch fears have subsided, largely because merican policy has buttressed the inher-nt strength and resilience of the nations f Asia.

But there are no grounds for complacency. Soviet activity in Asia is growing. North and South Korea remain locked in bitter confrontation. Hanoi represents a new center of power, and its attitude toward its neighbors remains ambiguous and potentially threatening. Most developing nations remain afflicted by social and political tensions. And the scramble for oil and ocean resources raises the specter of possible future territorial disputes.

Much will depend on our actions and on the confidence of Asian nations in our steadiness. Indeed, all the strands of our global policy meet in Asia:

—Peace in Asia is crucial for global peace.

—The need to resolve conflicts and to ease tensions is nowhere more acute than in Asia.

—The effort to shape new patterns of international cooperation holds great promise in Asia, where the developing nations are among the world's most dynamic and self-reliant.

Let me now discuss each of these challenges in turn.

Asian Security

First, the problem of security in Asia.

All the world's major powers—the United States, Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Western Europe—have significant interests in Asia. All would be directly affected by conflict there. Yet the security of none of these powers is determined exclusively—and in some cases not even primarily—by events in Asia. Therefore no nation should believe that it can enhance its security by deflecting conflicts from one continent to another. If the European balance is upset, our security and the security of Asian countries will be affected. If the Asian balance is jeopardized, serious repercussions will be felt in Europe. Neither in Europe nor in Asia can we permit others to dictate our destiny or the destiny of those whose independence is of concern to us.

Security policy for Asia must therefore be formed in global terms. Yet its requirements are uniquely complex. In Europe two alliance systems face each other directly across a clear line drawn down the center of the continent. The principal danger is external attack by organized military forces. The strengths and weaknesses of both sides are relatively calculable.

In Asia the balance is more multiple and fluid. The focal point is not solely between East and West—it includes the contention between the two major Communist powers, and the threats are highly diverse.

In some areas, such as Korea, the principal danger lies in armed attack across an established frontier. In others, such as Southeast Asia, the more immediate threats involve insurgency. Governments confront the difficult challenge of nation-building. Most are burdened by complex social problems arising from religious, racial, and cultural differences. Virtually all must contend with armed dissidents who are frequently ready to accept outside assistance.

As President Ford stated in Honolulu last December, the linchpin of our Asian security effort must be a strong and balanced U.S. military posture in the Pacific. Only if we are perceived to be clearly capable of supporting friends can we discourage aggression against them. Only by showing that we understand the necessities of the regional balance of power can we encourage free countries to see to their self-defense.

To the extent that the nations of Asia achieve a margin of security, the political forces that stand for democracy and human liberty are encouraged. By the same token, unilateral withdrawals from Asia diminish our security as well as our influence even over the domestic evolution of friendly countries.

It goes without saying that an American commitment is vital only if it is perceived to be as much in the interest of our allies as of ourselves. No nation should conduct its policy under the illusion that it is doing the United States a favor by permitting us to contribute to its defense. Those who seek to adjust their defense relationships with us will find us prepared to accommodate their desires in a spirit of reciprocity.

At the same time let there be no doubt about this Administration's firmness with regard to our treaty commitments. Allies needing our support will find us constant; adversaries testing our resolution will find us steadfast.

It is not possible to enumerate all our security interests in Asia in one speech. Let me therefore discuss three areas of special importance or complexity: Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia.

Japan and Korea

No relationship is more important to the United States than our alliance with Japan. Mutual security remains fundamental to our collaboration; but in a new era we have extended our partnership to a broad range of common interests: easing tensions in Asia, solving regional and global problems, and combining our vast economic strength to spur stable and noninflationary world economic growth.

In the early 1970's, Japan and the United States passed through an inevitable period of adjustment from dependence and American predominance to equality and mutual responsibility. There were friction over textiles and monetary policies and over the timing of our essentially parallel China policies. But these difficulties have been overcome; they proved to be the growing pains of a more mature and equal relationship.

Today our relations with Japan are better than they have ever been. There are no significant bilateral disputes. We have developed a clearer common perception of our security requirements, which will be further enhanced by the recently formed Joint Committee on Defense Cooperation. We have injected greater balance and reciprocity into our economic relations. We have learned to identify and deal with potential difficulties before they become p

litically explosive. We have consulted with greater frequency and frankness and in greater depth than in any previous period. Both nations are displaying sensitivity to the intangibles of our relationship and have built a wide base of public support for closer cooperation.

Our relationship with Japan plays a central role in furthering stability and progress in Asia and the world. Our security relationship is crucial for the global balance of power. Japan is our largest overseas trading partner. Each of us seeks to improve relations with Moscow and Peking, to ease tensions in Korea, to encourage a stable political evolution in Southeast Asia. Each of us cooperates in the development of effective international efforts to promote stable economic growth, strengthen bonds among the industrial democracies, and shape more positive ties between the industrial and developing countries.

Japan and the United States share a common dedication to the principles of democracy. And so close consultation on key regional and global issues is at the heart of our respective policies. The United States will make every effort to strengthen these bonds.

Americans fought and died to preserve South Korea's independence. Our experience and our sacrifice define our stake in the preservation of this hard-won stability; treaty obligations of mutual defense define our legal obligations. Our support and assistance will be available where it has been promised.

In fulfilling our commitments we will look to South Korea to assume the primary responsibility for its own defense, especially in manpower. And we will continue to remind the South Korean Government that responsiveness to the popular will and social justice are essential if subversion and external challenge are to be resisted. But we shall not forget that our alliance with South Korea is designed to meet an external threat which affects our own security and that of Japan as well.

Southeast Asia

Difficult as the situation still remains in Korea, it is the friendly nations of Southeast Asia that, in the wake of Indochina, are facing the greatest adjustment to new conditions.

Nations which once looked almost exclusively to us for their security have been forced by events into greater self-reliance and broader cooperation with one another. The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore—are determined to preserve their independence by hastening the pace of regional consolidation. All face serious problems that are endemic to the process of development; all seek to sustain and expand their relations with us; all hope that we will retain an active interest in their destiny.

President Ford, in his speech in Honolulu last December and in his visits to the Philippines and Indonesia, affirmed our continuing interest in the well-being and safety of Southeast Asia. We shall encourage the efforts of the ASEAN countries to bolster their independence; we welcome Southeast Asian regional cooperation.

Clearly our effort cannot substitute for, but only supplement, regional efforts. But we are prepared to continue to provide military assistance, though with greater emphasis on cash and credit sales. We will, as well, maintain our military presence in the western Pacific, especially our mobile naval and air power. We are in the process of negotiating a new base agreement with the Philippines. We will promote new patterns of economic cooperation. And we will cooperate with ASEAN countries, consistent with their own initiatives and concepts.

Easing Tensions To Strengthen Peace

Second, let me turn to the problem of easing tensions.

In the thermonuclear age, we have no more important obligation than to push back the shadow of nuclear confrontation.

If crises occur, they must not result from any lapse of vision on our part. Accommodation without strength or principle leads to appeasement; but in the thermonuclear age, reliance on power—not coupled with a spirit of conciliation—can spell catastrophe for all of mankind.

Thus the United States, in concert with its allies, seeks to reach beyond security toward better relations—based on strict reciprocity and principle—with former or potential adversaries.

The People's Republic of China

No nation is more important to this process than the People's Republic of China. Together we have turned a dramatic new page, following a generation of mutual suspicion and hostility.

There have long been deep sentimental attachments between the American and Chinese peoples which have provided an important bond between our two nations even in the most difficult times. But it was mutual necessity that impelled us both to launch a fresh beginning in 1969. Our shared concern that the world remain free from domination by military force or blackmail—"hegemony," as we have described it in our various communiques—provided the strategic foundation for a new relationship. This mutual interest continues and is the basis for durable and growing ties.

Both sides derive benefits from constructive relations—improved prospects for maintaining a global equilibrium, reduced dangers of conflict in Asia, mutually beneficial trade and cultural exchanges, and expanded possibilities for cooperative or parallel action on specific global issues.

We have made significant progress in improving relations with China over the past several years. We have established liaison offices in each other's capitals. We have increased trade and promoted exchanges. Frequent and wide-ranging talks with Chinese leaders—including visits by two American Presidents and many congressional delegations—have deepened our mutual understanding. On some international issues there is substantial compatibility in our perspective, and where our interests diverge, we are diminishing the risks of miscalculation.

It is important to recognize that China's perception of the United States as a strong and resolute force in international events is an important factor in shaping our relations. We will keep Chinese views in mind in framing our approach to important international questions. But equally, if so subtle and complex a relationship is to prosper, the People's Republic of China must take our concerns and problems into account as well. We must deal with each other on the basis of equality and mutual benefit—and a continuing recognition that our evolving relationship is important for global stability and progress.

The new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is now an enduring and important feature of the international scene. We are determined to work to improve it further. While difficult issues remain, we intend to continue to move toward the normalization of our relationship in keeping with the principles of the Shanghai communique.

The Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, too, we are prepared to make serious efforts to ease tensions.

In recent years North Korea and its friends have mounted a major diplomatic campaign—especially in the so-called nonaligned forums and the United Nations—to alter the institutional arrangements of the armistice agreement which ended hostilities in Korea 23 years ago and helps to keep the peace today.

They insist upon unconditional dissolution of the U.N. Command, which, together with North Korea and China, is a signatory to the armistice agreement. They have gone so far as to claim that if the command is dissolved, the armistice agreement itself would cease to exist.

At the same time, North Korea demands the unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Korea. They propose that the issues of peace and security on the peninsula be discussed in bilateral talks with the United States alone, excluding the Republic of Korea, which represents two-thirds of the Korean population.

North Korea's proposals are designed not to promote peace but to isolate our ally, to precipitate unilateral American withdrawal, and to dissolve the existing legal arrangements into amorphous general negotiations.

The United States will never accept such proposals. No nation that truly believes in peace should support them; no country interested in genuine nonalignment should lend itself to so one-sided an approach.

We do not maintain that present arrangements in the Korean Peninsula must remain forever frozen. On the contrary, the United States favors new negotiations to promote security and to ease tensions there. We are prepared to discuss a new legal basis for the existing armistice. We are also ready to replace the armistice with more permanent arrangements.

But this Administration cannot, and will not, negotiate behind the back of our South Korean ally over issues which affect its very existence. Nor will the United States agree to terminate the U.N. Command without new arrangements which preserve the integrity of the armistice agreement—the only existing legal arrangement which commits the parties concerned to keep the peace—or which establish a new permanent legal basis. And the United States will not undermine stability and hopes for negotiation by withdrawing its forces unilaterally.

The U.S. position with respect to Korea is clear:

—First, we urge a resumption of serious discussions between North and South Korea.

—Second, if North Korea's allies are prepared to improve their relations with South Korea, then and only then, will we be prepared to take similar steps toward North Korea.

—Third, we continue to support proposals that the United Nations open its doors to full membership for South and North Korea without prejudice to their eventual reunification.

—Finally, we are prepared to negotiate a new basis for the armistice or to replace it with more permanent arrangements in any form acceptable to all the parties.

In this spirit, we proposed last September a conference including North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China—the parties most immediately concerned—to discuss ways of preserving the armistice agreement and of reducing tensions in Korea. We noted that in such a meeting we would be ready to explore possibilities for a larger conference to negotiate more fundamental and durable arrangements.

Today, President Ford has asked me to call again for such a conference.

Specifically, the U.S. Government is prepared to meet with South Korea, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China during the coming session of the U.N. General Assembly. We propose New York, but we are ready to consider some other mutually agreeable place. We are willing to begin immediate discussions on issues of procedure and site. Such a conference could provide a new legal structure for the armistice if the parties agree. It could replace it with more permanent arrangements. It could ease tensions throughout Asia.

We urge other parties to respond affirmatively. Any nation genuinely interested in peace on the peninsula should be prepared to sit down and talk with the other parties on ways to improve the existing situation.

Indochina

Southeast Asia, as much as Northeast Asia, requires our careful attention. Indo-

china, an arena of war for generations, has yet to find a positive and peaceful role. Viet-Nam has been unified by force, producing a new and strong power in the region, and Communist regimes have taken over in Laos and Cambodia. The relations of the Indochinese states with one another are unsettled and unclear, as are Hanoi's longer term ambitions. Our policy is designed to bolster the independence of our friends, encourage the restraint of former foes, and help chart a more constructive pattern of relations within the region.

We have said on many occasions that for us the Indochina war is over. We are prepared to look to the future; we are willing to discuss outstanding issues; we stand ready to reciprocate gestures of good will. We have conveyed our willingness to open discussions with the Vietnamese authorities, with both sides free to raise any issues they wish.

For us the Americans missing in action remain the principal concern. Let there be no mistake: There can be no progress toward improved relations with Hanoi without a wholly satisfactory accounting for these men. Nor will we yield to cynical efforts to use the anguish of American families to extort economic aid.

If the Vietnamese meet our concerns for the missing in action and exhibit restraint toward their neighbors, they will find us ready to reciprocate and to join in the search for ways to turn a new page in our relations.

New Patterns of Cooperation

Third, the problem of international cooperation.

Beyond security, beyond the imperative of easing tensions, lies a new dimension of international relations: to help shape a global structure that responds to the aspirations of peoples and assures our children a world of prosperity, justice, and hope. We must meet this challenge because:

—There cannot be enduring tranquillity in a world scarred by injustice, resentment, and deprivation.

—There cannot be assured prosperity in a world of economic warfare and failed development.

—There cannot be an enduring international order in a world in which millions are estranged from decisions and practices which determine their national well-being.

As the world's strongest economy, the United States has accepted responsibility for leadership in this agenda of interdependence. In many international forums over several years, we have put forth comprehensive initiatives to produce concrete progress on the most compelling issues of our interdependent world: food, energy commodities, trade, technology, the environment, and the uses of mankind's last frontiers—the oceans and outer space.

Nowhere are the possibilities and benefits of economic cooperation greater than in Asia. The record of developing countries in Asia is extraordinary. Most grew at annual rates of 6–7 percent a year for the entire decade prior to the 1973 oil embargo. Asian economies have flourished even in the face of global recession.

The secret of their economic performance is no mystery. Rich in natural resources, fertile land, and industrious people, East Asia—with few exceptions—is not burdened with massive overpopulation. Most countries in the area possess talented entrepreneurs and skilled administrators; most governments have rejected the confining straitjacket of statist economic practices; virtually all provide a hospitable climate for foreign investment.

If growth and vitality are a common feature, the developing nations of Asia otherwise reflect a considerable diversity. Some, despite abundant resources, remain among the world's poorest in terms of per capita income. Others are rapidly approaching the ranks of the advanced nations. Some export principally raw materials and foodstuffs, while others have joined Japan as industrial workshops for the world.

Although the impulse for regional integration is apparent, the Asian-Pacific market economy is open and accessible to the world. The United States, Japan, and others supply capital, markets, management skills, and technology. We in turn obtain from the developing countries of Asia reliable supplies of important raw materials, fair treatment of our investments, and expanding markets for our trade.

Economic development does not automatically insure tranquillity between states or within them. But it can enhance the ability of governments to obtain public support, strengthen the legitimacy of institutions, and consolidate national independence. These factors are of particular importance for Asian nations beset—as they often are—by the problems of nation-building and domestic dissidence.

Cooperative relations between the industrialized nations and the developing nations of Asia are both inescapable and vital.

The United States and the developing nations of Asia share important interests:

—We should both value an international economic system which insures steady, noninflationary growth and expands the opportunities of our citizens.

—We must both recognize that if economic development is to strengthen stability, it must enhance national self-reliance. The developing nations of Asia need concessional foreign assistance far less than support for their efforts to participate in the international economy on a more equal footing.

—We must deal with each other on the basis of parity and dignity, seeking responsible progress on issues, to liberalize trade, to expand investment opportunities, and to transfer technology.

—We must cooperate to improve the effectiveness of established institutions such as the Asian Development Bank. We must be ready to create new instruments, for example, the proposed International Resources Bank, to address the new range of issues in the field of commodities.

The nations bordering on the Pacific have an opportunity to usher in an era of cooperation which will enhance the prosperity of their peoples and give an impetus to the well-being of mankind.

America's Strength and Spirit

Three times in the past 35 years many thousands of American lives have been lost in wars on the Asian Continent. For us, World War II began and ended there. A blatant Communist attempt to conquer Korea was defeated there. And the tragedy of Viet-Nam, with its 50,000 dead and the wave of bitterness it created here at home, was played out there.

It must not happen again. It will not happen again if America's policy, profiting from the past, takes charge of its future, making aggression too costly to attempt and peace too tempting to reject.

Our greatest challenge abroad is to continue to act on the knowledge that neither peace nor prosperity—for ourselves or anyone else on our small planet—is possible without the wisdom and the continuing active involvement of the United States. Our size, our economy, our strength, and our principles leave us no alternative but to be concerned with events in the world around us.

Our greatest foreign policy need at home is steadiness, cohesion, and a realization that in shaping foreign policy we are engaged in an enterprise beyond party and not bounded by our electoral cycles. Today, Americans—of whatever party or political conviction—can have confidence that their country, as always, has the substance and the strength to do its duty:

—We have the military and economic power, together with our allies, to maintain the balance of stability upon which global peace must rest.

—We have the wisdom to see that an

enduring peace requires dedicated and realistic measures to reduce tension.

—We have the vision to fashion new relationships among all nations in an interdependent world, to work toward a true and lasting world community.

The bond between America's spirit and America's achievement, between her courage and her responsibility, was expressed by a great poet here in Seattle.

As Theodore Roethke said:

> I feel my fate in what I cannot fear.
> I learn by going where I have to go.

That is the American way. We are a people accustomed to, and capable of, forging our own destiny. We are ready, as Americans always have been ready, to face the future without fear. We shall go where we have to go. We shall do what we have to do.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Seattle

Press release 351A dated July 22

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my question is: In the light of the recent nuclear-weapons-making capability, please explain your position on the export of nuclear materials.

Secretary Kissinger: The danger of nuclear proliferation arises from the fact that, with the energy crisis, nuclear energy has become economical—in fact, essential—therefore a market for many countries that can produce nuclear reactors all over the globe. Most of these nuclear reactors, as a byproduct, produce materials that, either directly or through reprocessing, can be turned into fissionable materials.

Therefore the problem is how, short of prohibiting the export of nuclear reactors—which none of the nuclear suppliers seems to be ready to accept—one can establish safeguards that inhibit nuclear proliferation.

Now, this is a very difficult process. Our policy has been that we will not sell processing plants which will enable countries to reprocess the material that emerges from nuclear reactors into fissionable material suitable for explosives. Other countries have not followed this approach, and we have brought a considerable amount of pressure to prevent the spreading of reprocessing plants.

We have also created or invited countries to join a suppliers conference, in which countries that are supplying nuclear materials or nuclear reactors would agree on common safeguards so that the nations of the world do not compete with each other in easing safeguards in order to do nuclear business. This conference has made considerable progress, but the rate of the spread of these nuclear reactors is such that it becomes extremely difficult to prevent the capabilities of the countries receiving them in the nuclear field from growing.

It is a problem to which we have given the highest priority attention, in which we are making a major effort, in which we will continue to make a major effort, and which we hope we can get under increasing control.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, a decision of the State Department has resulted in an increase of $31 million in the annual natural gas bill for Washington State. The Canadian Government was ready to recognize different U.S. areas' dependence on their exports. Is there any possibility that your Department can reconsider its decision?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have had occasion to say this morning that it is moving for me to find that people outside of Wash-

ington talk of the State Department as a cohesive organization [laughter]—as a Department that has unified opinions. I can tell you when you sit where I do that I don't share that impression.

Second, I must tell you—which will be extremely discouraging for most of the audience here—I was not aware that this issue was particularly contentious until I arrived in Seattle. [Laughter.] Since then it is apparent to me that there is not complete unanimity on it. [Laughter.]

Our position was not aimed against the Northwest. Our position derived from the fact that we did not want to accept the principle that a foreign government could establish differential rates in the United States by its own unilateral action and to exercise in effect monopoly powers seemed to us to set an unfortunate precedent.

Now, I have heard so much about this problem since I've come here [laughter] that I will take another look at it when I get back [laughter]. But what I am aiming at primarily is to get out of town in one piece. [Laughter.]

I'll tell you another thing. The State Department may not have an extremely unified opinion, but it is extremely good in delaying replies. [Laughter.]

Relations With Canada

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow up on another question regarding our relationship with Canada. That relationship has undergone some drastic changes in the past several years—changes that have been inflicted on the people in this region by strains in the area of natural gas, Alaska oil shipments, construction of the Trident base, the pipeline, the flooding in the upper Skagit Valley, Columbia River compact, Point Roberts, and large-scale property purchases across the border. Leaders on both sides have expressed some deep concerns about this and one—Senator Jackson—recently suggested it would appear that these relations ought to be one priority in our foreign policy.

Now, why is it in such bad disrepair? And what plans, if any, are there to correct this?

Secretary Kissinger: I, first of all, do not believe that our relations with Canada are in such an acute stage of disrepair.

Secondly, one should not believe that problems which exist can always be resolved by hyperactivity.

It is inevitable that a country like Canada, which has such a powerful neighbor and such a great percentage of whose economy is tied to the United States, will try to develop an identity that is separate from the United States or that it becomes very conscious of its own identity. And I think we have to accept the fact that in Canadian politics a certain amount of ability to show that one is independent of the United States is not unprofitable. And this has not been lost on the various Canadian political leaders.

On the other hand, our ties economically are really so close that the practical possibilities of divergence between our countries are fairly limited.

There are a number of irritating problems, most of them growing out of the economic impact of the populations living along the border on each other. We are in the process of negotiating many of them. And it is one of the few cases where the public dialogue is more bitter than the private dialogue [laughter] because, usually, after the public controversy has been gone through, privately we manage to make some progress on these issues.

So I think we have to be mature about our relationship with Canada. We have to recognize that there will occasionally be voices that are not particularly pleasant to us. But we also have to recognize that on most fundamental issues Canada and the United States work together very well. And considering the interdependence of our two nations, and considering the extent to which our economies interact, I think we can keep these disputes to manageable proportions.

Controlling the Arms Race

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my question to you is: Beyond the limitations created by SALT on strategic-weapons delivery systems, what new initiatives can the United States take to reduce the global arms race? And second, how long can bilateral deterrence provide global security in an increasingly multipolar world?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, the most important negotiation is the one of strategic arms limitations that is now going on in Geneva, which attempts to put a ceiling on the strategic arms race and which, in its next phase, will attempt to turn it down and reduce the strategic armaments.

In addition, we are engaged in negotiations for the reduction of forces in Central Europe, which also attempt to ease the burden of arms in those areas.

The third area in which arms competition creates problems is in such areas as the Middle East, where there are large resources and many arms suppliers and on top of it many contentious parties—and parties whose own differences among each other seem to them to outweigh the requirements of global peace very often. Now, in that area, how to control the shipment of arms into an area like the Middle East is a matter to which we must give increasing attention.

I would point out, however, a number of serious problems here. The shipment of arms among Arab countries is relatively easy, while Israel has only one country from which it can acquire arms. So until about five years ago, it used to be thought that if the shipment of arms could be limited into the Arab states bordering Israel, one could get some through. But the fact of the matter is that arms now move with increasing ease among these various countries, as we have seen recently in Lebanon, and therefore the problem of controlling the international arms trade must reach all of the suppliers and all of the possible recipients and also those countries that could transfer arms among each other and therefore strengthen one of the sides in the region. That is an important issue to which we have to turn.

Impact of Viet-Nam War

Q. Mr. Secretary, the American war effort in Viet-Nam is justified by our government largely in terms of the various consequences accrued in South Viet-Nam held by the Communists.

Now that more than a year has passed since the fall of Viet-Nam, can you list the negative consequences of that event? And also, in your opinion, are those consequences of sufficient magnitude to justify the human and material cost of the American war effort?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, I think it is important to keep in mind—which is sometimes forgotten—that when we came to Washington there were 550,000 American troops in Viet-Nam and that some of those who most actively opposed the war were those who put the troops there. And it is a difficult problem—how to remove troops once a country's prestige is already engaged.

Secondly, you cannot measure the impact of an international event after one year. History moves more slowly than this, and the effect of any event can only be measured in a 5- or 10-year period.

The immediate effect of the collapse of Indochina has been the collapse of Laos and Cambodia, of course, following it—and the human cost in Cambodia has been dreadful. The deaths number in the hundred of thousands in one year, in addition to the incredible suffering that has been imposed on the population.

Thailand has moved toward a position of neutralism. The Philippines has begun to change its policy.

The impact on the perception of other countries of the American failure in Indochina will take many years to work itself out, and therefore I have to say no one should recommend to a country that losing a war is painless.

Whether the entry into the war was well considered—whether one should have made this move in the middle 1960's—is a different matter. But the consequences of the war in Indochina—the impact of our defeat there—will take many years to work themselves out; and they will not be favorable to us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is our foreign policy sufficiently broad based and bipartisan to allow for continuity of present long-range policies should there be a regrettable change of the Secretary of State? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the foreign policy of the United States has to be based on the permanent interests and permanent values of the United States, and those are independent of personalities.

And therefore I tend to believe the main lines of our foreign policy will be continued, regardless of Administration and regardless of the incumbent Secretary of State, hard as the latter is to imagine for me. [Laughter.]

Agricultural Exports

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I am Lawrence Peterson, a drylands wheat farmer from eastern Washington for about 40 years and—in view of the fact that we are now seeing the start of a surplus of grain products—wheat, corn, and that—I would like to ask this question: Do you believe in withholding food products as a diplomatic bargaining tool?

Secretary Kissinger: I will tell you the experience that I have had. When I travel around the United States, in most nonfarm states people come up to me and shake their fist and say: "Why don't you withhold food products, as a bargaining weapon against the Soviet Union or against other countries?" In the wheat-growing states, I get a slightly opposite reaction. [Laughter.]

I think we have to make a national decision. If we want to gain diplomatic benefits from our farm products, then we must have some mechanism by which the sale of these products is geared to certain foreign policy decisions. On the other hand, I understand the feeling of the farmers that they should not have to pay, themselves, for foreign policy initiatives.

The Administration has taken the position that we would not interrupt the sale of wheat and we would not interrupt the markets. But the practical consequence of this is that any foreign country can enter our market on the basis of equality and can use our free markets the way they operate, and then we cannot use it for that reason for foreign policy reasons.

I am not criticizing the decision of the Administration. I am simply pointing out what the consequences are. I support the decision of the Administration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, essentially what is U.S. policy on Taiwan? Do you think the United States will eventually recognize the People's Republic of China as the true representative government? If "Yes," won't that be a sharp departure from our past policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United States indicated in the Shanghai communique our view that the relationship between the mainland and Taiwan should be settled by peaceful negotiations between the parties concerned. This has been the stumbling block to progress on normalization. And we have not changed our view that these relations should be settled on a peaceful basis.

Trends in the United Nations

Q. Dr. Kissinger, as the current Secretary of State, based on your past background at the United Nations, do you think the United Nations has any real purpose now that the Council has again failed to only condemn terrorism—mostly the pro-Palestinians—the hijackings and the killings? Don't you think that this in effect gives the green light to further terrorism? And what does this mean to the future of the United Nations as you see it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, to us, as far as the United Nations is concerned, we have come to an interesting transformation in this country.

Until about two years ago, when one met with an audience like this, the general question was: "How can you strengthen the United Nations?" Now there has been a growing skepticism about the United Nations, which is justified in a considerable part by its performance.

There are many aspects of the United Nations to which we strongly object. We object to the automatic majorities. We object to the one-way morality. We object to the fact that more stringent criteria are applied to some countries than to others.

We will not submit vital interests to such procedures.

On the other hand, there is needed in the world some meetingplace where it is easy for parties to get together and where you can have an exchange of views which does not have to be especially organized. And therefore we believe that the United Nations as an institution still has important functions.

And we also believe that if the trend in the United Nations of recent years continues—the trend toward confrontation; the trend toward one-way voting; the trend toward automatic majorities, the tendency to get the so-called Group of 77, which is really more than a hundred nations, always voting together so that they constitute a bloc of their own—that then the political functions of the United Nations will become less and less relevant to the issues concerned.

Now actually, we think that the Security Council debate, while it did not condemn terrorism, marked a step forward, because they also did not condemn Israel. In fact, they withdrew their resolution condemning Israel.

And we had a majority for the condemnation of terrorism, but it was not the majority that is needed to pass something in the Security Council. So I believe that there are functions that are still necessary to be performed by the United Nations; but the United States will fight and not accept the sort of procedures that have become, unfortunately, too characteristic of the U.N. procedures.

And we hope very much that in the General Assembly this year, there will be some improvement. And if there isn't, we will certainly make our position very plain.

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday the West German press broke the scandal of the shipment of arms from U.S. bases in West Germany to the Phalange faction in Lebanon. The Soviets have been increasingly threatening nuclear—or rather, military—activity to defend the existence of the Palestinians. And many of our sources in the Ford faction in the White House point to the immediate danger of a global nuclear war from your global policies. Well, "Dr. Strangelove" [laughter], I'd like to ask if you don't think that a policy of debt moratorium is preferable to a global thermonuclear war.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I will make the daring assertion that I am against thermonuclear war. [Laughter.]

I am not familiar with that story in the German press that material has been shipped from Germany to the Christian groups in Lebanon. And if it has, I don't believe it was American equipment. It was certainly not done with our permission.

Q. This is in the Munich press in West Germany.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it could be. I am not familiar with it.

But I also believe that we cannot set up a false antithesis between the development—a debt moratorium is really just one way of encouraging development—between development and security.

Now there has to be security for development to be meaningful, and we have not the choice between security and develop-

ment. If we cannot do both, we cannot do either. So I am in favor of pursuing both courses simultaneously, as I have attempted to indicate.

There was somebody over there who still wanted to ask me a question, but he seems to have disappeared.

Q. How about a question from the gallery?

Secretary Kissinger: Do you want to have one question from the gallery? [Applause.] I will tell you after I hear the question, whether— [Laughter and applause.]

Q. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. It is a great pleasure [inaudible] in world affairs.

I would like to ask one question, if I may, but it calls for a statement first: It appears to me that the record will show that you have done everything to promote disarmament and the destruction of our defenses in America. You, in fact, have made the statement that the way of the future is the Communist-Moscow way of government.

I would like to know, if a man in your important position in America truthfully holds that view, why do you not resign and let a true American take your place?

Voices: No!

Secretary Kissinger: This is beginning to sound like a Washington press conference. [Laughter.]

I don't want to disturb the equilibrium of the questioner [laughter], but I hate to tell him that I have never said, nor do I believe, that communism is the wave of the future. I have said, and I have tried to conduct foreign policy on, exactly the opposite proposition.

Secondly, I have always believed, and I have said so in every public speech, that a strong defense is essential for an effective foreign policy. You cannot have an effective foreign policy without a strong defense.

At the same time, I believe that the American people have to understand this: That in the thermonuclear age, a nuclear war would mean the end of civilized life as we know it.

And therefore a responsible government official cannot engage in much tough rhetoric. He has an obligation to see what can be done to reduce the danger of nuclear catastrophe on the basis of reciprocal agreements, on the basis of unilateral American action.

And maybe this gentleman and the previous questioner can get together and check their perception, because I think they have slightly divergent views of what I stand for.

Letters of Credence

Argentina

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Argentine Republic, Arnaldo T. Musich, presented his credentials to President Ford on July 19.[1]

Cape Verde

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Cape Verde, Raul Querido Varela, presented his credentials to President Ford on July 19.[1]

Iceland

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Iceland, Hans G. Andersen, presented his credentials to President Ford on July 19.[1]

Liberia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Liberia, Francis A. W. Dennis, presented his credentials to President Ford on July 19.[1]

[1] For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated July 19.

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by Panel at Portland, Oreg.

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by a panel at a dinner meeting on July 22 sponsored by the Portland, Oreg., World Affairs Council. Members of the panel were Wanda McAlister, editor of the editorial page, Corvallis, Oreg., Gazette Times; Tom McCall, commentator, KATU-TV, Portland, and former Governor of Oregon; Kenneth Rystrom, editor, Vancouver, Wash., Columbian; Donald Sterling, Jr., editor, Oregon Journal, Portland; and Richard Nokes, editor, Portland Oregonian, moderator.[1]

Press release 354 dated July 22

Secretary Kissinger: The basic point that I would like to leave with you, ladies and gentlemen, is that we have been living through a revolutionary period of foreign policy—not because we want to, but because conditions in the world have changed.

Through all of American history until the late sixties the United States was physically predominant. We could choose to enter foreign affairs or withdraw, as we saw fit. We had such a margin of physical superiority over other countries that we could wait until dangers became overwhelming.

Now we live in a world in which there are other countries of roughly equal strength. And therefore we have to conduct foreign policy, no matter who is in office, with a sense of nuance, on the basis of permanence, the way other nations have had to conduct foreign policy throughout their history. That means that the relationship between the public and those who make decisions becomes extremely important—more important than in any previous period. Because when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is at a minimum, and when the knowledge is greatest, the scope for action has often disappeared.

In 1936, Hitler's Germany could have been stopped with very little effort. And if that had been done, people would still be arguing today whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination. But by 1941, everyone knew that he was a maniac bent on world domination. We had to pay for this knowledge—or the world had to pay for this knowledge—with 20 million lives.

So, when one acts in time, one has to do so on the basis of an assessment that one cannot prove true when it happens. And therefore there is a need for confidence and a need for restraint if one is to avoid harder decisions further down the road.

We have, in the thermonuclear age, complicated problems; on the one hand, of maintaining our military security, because no nation can make itself dependent on the good will of another nation. But we also have to realize the fact that in the thermonuclear age the question of war and peace takes on an unprecedented character. A nuclear war would mean tens of millions of casualties and the end of society as we have known it. Therefore no task is more urgent than the maintenance and preservation of peace, as long as it can be done honorably.

In addition to this, we live in a world in which there are a hundred or so new nations that have to be integrated into the community of nations.

[1] Introductory remarks by Mr. Nokes and by Perry Holland, president, Portland World Affairs Council, and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's remarks are not printed here.

So these tasks of security, of peace, of the construction of an international order, are the tasks that have preoccupied me while I have been in office, and preoccupied President Ford, and they will preoccupy anybody else who is in this position.

And it is for this reason that I welcome opportunities such as these to go out into the country, meet with concerned citizens, hear their questions, and try to respond to the best of my ability.

So, why don't we, with your permission, turn this over to the panel.

Mr. Nokes: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I decided that I had the right to ask the first question, and I am sure someone will ask it tonight, so I will ask it now and get it out of the way.

Mr. Secretary, three or four years ago, you were riding the crest of a popularity wave. You were on the cover of the news magazines, which called you "Super K." More lately you have been bruised by Democratic criticism in Congress, Republican criticism from Ronald Reagan's supporters, and a picket line in front of our building tonight.

Do you feel, in retrospect, that you should have quit while you were ahead [laughter], and is there any feeling on your part, or on the President's part, that you should leave your present position prior to the election in November?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, my father is of the view that—and he is an objective observer [laughter]—that this criticism is extremely unfair [laughter].

It is true that there has been some criticism. But I think this is inevitable in an election year. I have the impression that for the main lines of our foreign policy there is considerable support. I don't think it would be proper to leave to husband one's popularity. I think one has—if one is fortunate enough to have public support, that is something one should use to do constructive things and not something that one should attempt to bank and preserve. And in attempting to bank it, one will certainly lose it. Because the ultimate judgment is what people think of one's actions 5 or 10 years from now and not the fluctuations of day-to-day opinion.

But, on the whole, I think we have had the sort of support that makes policy possible.

I have no intention of leaving before the election. After the election, there are many applicants for my job. [Laughter.]

Mr. McCall: Two months ago, Mr. Secretary, I interviewed your boss, the President, and you had made the statement the day before that you planned to leave the Administration. And I said to Mr. Ford, "Aren't you going to wheedle him into staying and try to keep him there?" And he said, "I believe when you have a good man, you want to try to keep him." I am wondering if any amount of wheedling, either by President Ford or Jimmy Carter, might induce you to stay on as Secretary of State?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have seen the beginnings of three Administrations, and that is a rough period, while people adjust to each other. So, I would say that I would not think that I should begin with a new Administration again. But I would hasten to add that I don't have the impression that I will have to spend sleepless nights on that problem. [Laughter.] I couldn't break so many hearts of people who are already measuring the drapes in my office. [Laughter.] In case President Ford—or when President Ford is reelected, I don't think it would be proper for me to say now that I will not talk to him, and we will just have to wait until that situation occurs.

The Olympic Games

Mrs. McAlister: The Olympic teams are very much on people's minds on television these days. At one point, the United States threatened to boycott the games because of the Taiwan-China question. And now 29 or 30—I don't know how many—teams have walked out over the New Zealand team's tour of South Africa. And the whole future of the games seems very much up in the air.

I am wondering, as a foreign relations asset do the games really serve a constructive purpose, or has politicalization become too intense to warrant continuation of the games?

Secretary Kissinger: Our basic position has been that the Olympic games should be treated as a sports event in which the competitors are there because of athletic ability and not to make a political point.

We were in no position as a government to either enter a team or to withdraw a team. Our position was not geared to the merits of the issue of which of the governments that claimed to represent China should be represented at the Olympics.

Our position was that if the host government insisted on its political judgment over that of the International Olympics Committee, then in 1980, when these games are in Moscow, or in 1984, when they could be anywhere else, there would be a political test applied to each of the participants and the games would become totally politicized.

Our position was that whomever the International Olympics Committee certified should be free to appear and that the host government should act as a landlord rather than as a screening agency.

Similarly, we think that the participation of other governments, or of other countries, should not depend on their agreement with actions of one of the member countries whose individual team may have competed in a way that they didn't like.

So we hope very much that the Olympic games can be returned to the athletes and do not become an arena in which political tests are applied.

Illegal Immigration

Mr. Sterling: Sir, one of the issues that is of some concern here in the Pacific Northwest is the problem of illegal immigration, especially from Mexico. Is there anything the United States can do that it hasn't done to reduce that flow or to otherwise alleviate it?

Secretary Kissinger: The illegal immigration is produced by two pressures—obviously by pressures within Mexico which make it attractive for people to leave and work in the United States and by pressures in the United States to get cheap labor. In addition, there is a long frontier which is almost impossible to police.

We have attempted to—we have had negotiations with the Mexican Government on this subject. And the latest idea which we are attempting to explore is to see whether we can put the economic assistance, or the technical aid, that we give to Mexico in those farm areas from which the greatest exodus takes place, to create additional incentives for people to stay there. And many people think, and the Mexican Government believes, that this may be a promising approach, which we will be trying in the next year.

Q. Do you have the impression, sir, that the Mexican Government is doing all it can to discourage this illegal immigration?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a tough political problem for the Mexican Government. It is not using maximum force, which one can understand.

Conducting Foreign Policy in Election Year

Mr. Rystrom: Mr. Secretary, recently you said that Governor Carter's foreign policy basically was parallel to yours, his proposed foreign policy. And I was curious what was behind your statement. Were you trying to take the foreign poliey out of the fall campaign? Were you looking for a job next January? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: I have already said that I—

Mr. Rystrom: I know, you kind of stole my thunder on that one. [*Laughter.*] *But I still had to ask that question. But further, in what areas do you see your policy and his proposals as being parallel?*

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I suffer

from the fact that Governor Carter has pronounced himself on foreign policy only twice in general speeches. So there has not been excessive precision in his pronouncements. I was referring to the general philosophical outlines.

I do believe that the foreign policy of the United States should be approached on a nonpartisan basis. I do not believe it is healthy for our country and for other countries to have the impression that every four or eight years there can be a fundamental revision of foreign policy.

That doesn't mean that there cannot be tactical disagreements. Of course there can be. But the main lines of our foreign policy have to reflect the basic interests and basic values of the American people. And they don't change that frequently.

This is why I believe that if at all possible, debates on foreign policy should be conducted with great restraint. And my general hope is to keep the foreign policy issues on as high a level as possible.

I don't doubt that as Governor Carter spells out his program in greater detail my professorial instinct may run away with me. And undoubtedly disagreements will develop. And as I said at a press conference in Washington some weeks ago, there have been enough hints and indications in what Governor Carter has said on individual items in which we would not see eye to eye. But I will wait until they are spelled out more before we make any comment.

But I don't think, in any event, that it is the function of the Secretary of State to be a principal participant in a political campaign.

Mr. McCall: Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that the dialogue in the Presidential race has in any way influenced or impaired the conduct of American foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Inevitably in an election year, foreign governments are beginning to look at what may be ahead. Inevitably they will have to ask the question whether the government with which they are dealing—or the Administration with which they are dealing—is going to be able to carry out whatever commitments it is making in the negotiations. Which is one reason why it is important for foreign governments to have the sense that there will be substantial continuity for the main lines of our foreign policy no matter who is in office.

I cannot say that our foreign policy has as yet been impaired by the political campaign. I have the impression that foreign governments are getting more sophisticated in understanding what is being said in the pageant of the moment.

So, on the whole, and in fact rather surprisingly for me, I think we have been able to conduct foreign policy without any substantial impact by the election.

International Action on Terrorism

Mrs. McAlister: Terrorism, with all its trappings of political murders and skyjacking and all the rest, continues unabated and seems to be on the increase. Yet the United Nations can't even pass a resolution condemning terrorist acts.

Is there any hope that that organization can take effective action whatsoever to reduce terrorism? Or how do you propose that international terrorism can be controlled?

Secretary Kissinger: The difficulty with getting international action on terrorism is that there are always some governments that sympathize with the objectives of some of the terrorists even though they don't agree with their methods. There are other governments that are afraid of what the terrorists might do to them if they take drastic action. And therefore in the past it has not been possible to get international action.

Now it is becoming, however, increasingly apparent—I think more and more nations are coming to realize that terrorism is a blight on the human conscience and it is an offense to all civilized relationships among nations.

It is true we could not get the required

majority for the antiterrorism vote in the U.N. Security Council. But we did have six nations in favor and four nations opposed, and we were just lacking the three additional votes which it would have taken to make it a legal resolution.

But the other resolution, the one that was condemning Israel for its raid, was never brought to a vote at all, which is a considerable change over the mood in the United Nations a year or two ago.

We will reintroduce—or we will support the reintroduction of—an antiterrorism resolution, and particularly focused on the kidnaping of people, on the issue of the kidnaping of people and hijacking of airplanes, in which we hope that the international community of the United Nations will put some teeth into its provisions, and we will not understand if nations will not go along with trying to stamp out this blight.

Mrs. McAlister: What sort of "teeth" are you talking about?

Secretary Kissinger: For example—we are now working with several countries on this. But if, for example, there were international agreements to prevent hijackers from landing in an airport and if countries that permitted hijackers to land were then excluded from the International Civil Aviation Organization, I think some progress could be made.

We had a spate of hijackings with Cuba for a long time, and then an agreement was made, and since then there haven't been any. So we know it can be stamped out if there is decisive international action, if there is no haven to which the terrorists could go.

Lebanon and Middle East Peace Process

Mr. Sterling: Shifting to the Middle East, sir, what effect does the war in Lebanon have on your step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: First, let me explain with respect to our diplomacy. We were faced in 1973 with a situation in which there was an oil embargo. We had no diplomatic relations with any of the key Arab countries. The whole industrialized world was in increasing difficulties because of the impact of the Middle East war. The Soviet Union was backing the Arab countries and was the principal influence in several of the Arab countries.

Under those conditions, our immediate objective had to be to prevent the impact of this crisis from escalating further. We also thought that for nations who had made no progress toward peace for a generation, it was important above all to get to learn to deal with each other.

Under those conditions, the step-by-step approach was the most effective method to make progress, because it enabled us to reduce problems to manageable proportions —insofar as anything is manageable in the Middle East—and enabled the countries to take those steps on which they could agree.

We were also convinced that somewhere along the line the step-by-step approach would merge into an overall approach and that an attempt would be made to bring about a permanent peace on the basis of negotiations between the Arab countries and Israel. And we are approaching that point in any event.

Now, the impact of Lebanon on this process has been that for the time being the energies of almost all of the participants in a potential negotiation in the Middle East, and particularly of the Arab participants, is focused on their disagreements with respect to the evolution of Lebanon. And the Lebanese civil war has taken on these tragic dimensions because each of the factions—each of the Arab factions—is backed to a greater or lesser extent by some of the Arab countries.

So I would have to say that until the problem of Lebanon is resolved, it will be very difficult to get enough attention to [make] serious progress on the Middle East. And a degree of unity among the

Arab countries as to their political objectives is essential to make significant progress toward peace.

Mr. Sterling: As a followup, then, by your lights, what would be the happiest possible resolution of the Lebanese situation?

Secretary Kissinger: I think, however, that as the Lebanese situation develops and as it evolves, the experience of the various Arab countries with the crisis may bring about consolidations that would be quite favorable to peace.

Now, what the United States has always believed is that the outcome in Lebanon should be one in which the territorial integrity of Lebanon is preserved, in which the two communities—the Christian and the Moslem communities—can exist side by side without either of them attempting to impose its will on the other. And this will require some new constitutional arrangements from those that prevailed previously. And if the Lebanese parties are left to settle their disputes—and I believe that some formula can be found and will be found, in which these objectives can be achieved.

Mr. Rystrom: Are you prepared, Mr. Secretary, or are you willing to state whether the United States played any role at all in the rescue of the Israeli plane in Uganda, the gathering of intelligence, the role of the CIA, or any other type of activity?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, we would be glad to grab any little bit of credit that is available. And we have been known to do that. [Laughter.]

But even with the best will in the world, we can't claim any credit for the Israeli actions. We did not know ahead of time what they were planning or that they were planning anything. And we gave them no intelligence. They did this by themselves, and we were as surprised as anybody else when we were informed about it.

Mr. Rystrom: What does that then say about your intelligence? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: According to the accounts that have been published, this whole operation was conceived, planned, and carried out within a 48-hour period. And within a 48-hour period, it is extremely difficult to put together these various indicators that you can tend to get in retrospect that would give you these indications.

You have to remember that intelligence is composed of many bits and pieces, many of which are quite confusing when you get them. Afterwards, when the whole event has occurred, you can usually then understand what each little item meant. But this was something that in the nature of things we could have very little information about. And that would not be a failure of intelligence, because our intelligence is not specifically targeted on Israeli actions in Africa. [Laughter.]

U.S. Position on Korea Negotiations

Mr. Nokes: I wonder if the moderator might interject a question concerning the local area? Mr. Secretary, South Korea is extremely important in this area as a trading partner. Today in Seattle, you renewed a call for a four-party conference for the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and South Korea, to meet in New York to negotiate a reduction of tensions and create a permanent armistice in Korea. I believe you stated that old agreements are not the Ten Commandments.

Might this not be interpreted as a willingness on our part to write off our old friend South Korea as a part of the Communist world? What would the United States seek from such a conference? What would be our goals?

Secretary Kissinger: That was a rather eloquent phrase there that I wished I had used. [Laughter.] I must compliment the Associated Press writer, who is a lot more eloquent than I am. [Laughter.]

What I attempted to do in Seattle is to explain the proposals that the North Koreans and their allies and supporters have made in the United Nations. I pointed out that those proposals are absolutely unac-

ceptable to the United States. Those proposals are the unilateral withdrawal of American forces, the abolishing of the U.N. Command, and in effect the end of the armistice on a unilateral basis, and then bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea.

I pointed out that the United States would not negotiate with North Korea except in the presence of South Korea, that we would not negotiate over the fate of an ally without the participation of that ally.

Secondly, we expressed our general readiness to replace the existing armistice agreement by a more permanent arrangement, if a more permanent arrangement could be negotiated.

Mr. Nokes: A two-Korea arrangement?

Secretary Kissinger: A two-Korea arrangement, unless the two Koreas agreed to unify, which is up to the two Koreas, but not something that we will impose on them.

I think if you read my speech, you will find it a strong defense of our South Korean allies, a strong statement that we will not accept the Communist negotiating program but that we are prepared to meet in a forum in which there would be a representative of the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China to discuss other ideas.

The proposal that I made today had the strong and willing support of the South Korean Government, which has urged us to make some concrete proposal to indicate that we are prepared to have arrangements on the peninsula that do not depend simply on an armistice agreement. But under no circumstances will the United States negotiate behind the back of its ally.

And under no circumstances will we unilaterally withdraw our forces from Korea in the absence of a political arrangement.

Mr. McCall: I am looking at a copy or a clipping from the Los Angeles Times concerning your press conference of a recent Saturday, Mr. Secretary, and the reporter said you seemed to be more concerned with justifying past policies than urging new ones. Is that because you are looking forward to a new career in November, or is the situation so turbulent that you have to in diplomacy simply react rather than initiate? Are initiatives—what direction would some new initiatives take? Or are we just trying to combat yesterday's leftovers as far as problems are concerned?

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't read this particular story. It is in the nature of the format of a press conference that you are always justifying old policies. I don't remember that in a press conference anyone ever got up and said, "Have you thought of any new initiatives lately?" [Laughter.]

The press conference is not the place where you float new initiatives; and this, therefore, is a criticism that can be made of any press conference that any President or Secretary of State has ever had that dealt with foreign policy.

I think, over the past year, we have made a number of major initiatives in the field of our relations between the developed and developing countries, as in the special session of the U.N. General Assembly and at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. We have made major initiatives in the field of our relations with our allies. We are continuing initiatives with relation to the limitation of armaments.

But when we make proposals, we make them in formal speeches and not in answers to questions, because it might just happen that the right question isn't asked, and then we would be left sitting there and having the press conference. [Laughter.]

Preventing Race War in Southern Africa

Mrs. McAlister: Secretary Kissinger, after what has been called the "decade of benign neglect," the United States has suddenly and very conspicuously injected itself on the African scene. The war in Angola, with participation by the Cuban troops as the Soviet arm, seemed to precipitate this involvement.

First off, are there any indications in fact that Cuba will take its troops home from Angola? And, secondly, is the United States making some dent in convincing South Africa and Rhodesia to take more rapid steps toward eventual majority black rule?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the Cuban troops, we were given an indication, when I visited Sweden, by the Prime Minister of Sweden, who was speaking on behalf of the Cuban Government, that they would start withdrawing troops at a specified rate.

We have not been able to confirm this in any manner. It is true that Cuban troops are leaving Angola. It is also true that other Cubans, either troops or civilian personnel, are entering Angola. And what the net flow is has not been—we have not been able to determine conclusively.

In any event, the net flow is so relatively insignificant that it does not affect the basic situation of a massive Cuban expeditionary force in Angola that has imposed a government on Angola that could not have been achieved any other way. That is the basic factor to which we object.

Now, with respect to the United States in South Africa.

The United States has an interest in preventing a race war from developing in southern Africa, which will have a high potential of bringing in new outside intervention, which would then turn the African countries more and more toward violence and radicalism; and given the historical relationship between Europe and Africa, and between many parts of our population and Africa, such a consequence would have a major impact on the stability of the international system.

So, our attempt in Africa has been to see whether it was possible to settle these conflicts through a negotiation in which both communities in Rhodesia and Namibia especially, white and black communities, can continue to live side by side. And to do this before they get into a war that would take on new dimensions in which the outcome can only be a radical solution.

We are not injecting ourself into a situation that would not exist without us. If we do not act, then violence will become more and more widespread and coexistence will become impossible. And it is the judgment of everybody who has studied the problem, of all the experts, that sooner or later these minority governments, such as Rhodesia, will not be able to support themselves.

This is why we have strongly urged negotiated solutions. We are now in the process of exploring with black African countries and with South Africa a formula by which perhaps a negotiated solution can be achieved.

We do this in order to put an end to the violence, in order to put an end to the war, and in order to permit the white and the black communities to live side by side, to avoid a race war, and to avoid the radicalization of all of Africa.

We could do nothing, which is the tempting thing to do. Then, a year or two from now, we would face impossible problems. And just as Angola made the next case more difficult, so inactivity in Rhodesia and Namibia would make further evolution even more painful and even more difficult.

This is why we take this initiative. This is why we are making an effort. And we believe that there are possibilities of a solution in which the black moderate leaders and the white communities can coexist and with which a race war is averted, which is both a moral and political necessity.

Mrs. McAlister: And you are saying progress is being made toward this?

Secretary Kissinger: I think there is a possibility of progress. Passions are very high, and the differences between these people are very great. But we think that the possibility of progress exists.

Mr. Nokes: Before we come on to you, Don, may I ask those who have been selected from the floor to ask questions, approach the mikes and get ready, and now we have time for one more short question from Don.

Mr. Sterling: In the light of your ex-

pressed hope for a peaceful resolution in Africa, why do we continue to allow the recruiting of mercenaries in the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not aware that mercenaries are being recruited in the United States right now. And it is certainly not done with the connivance or agreement of the government. I am not exactly sure what the legal position is and what legal authority we have. But I want to make it absolutely clear that the United States does not encourage or support the recruiting of mercenaries for the wars in Africa.

Mr. Nokes: We are now ready to take questions from the mikes.

Withstanding Future Oil Embargo

Q. Mr. Secretary, my question is as follows: What are the chances of a second Arab oil embargo? And what should the U.S. response be to a possible second Arab oil embargo, if one should occur?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the possibilities —our relations with the Arab world have improved to a point where an oil embargo is not likely to be undertaken lightly. If there should be another Arab-Israeli conflict, I suppose that there will be several Arab states that will be tempted to do this.

Since 1973 we and the other industrialized nations have formed an agency, the so-called International Energy Agency, whose purpose it is to make it easier for the industrialized nations to withstand the impact of an oil embargo. We have built up our oil stocks so that most countries now have six to nine months of reserves. We've agreed to share available supplies; and we've brought about a situation where a selective embargo is no longer possible, because of the mutual support that the industrialized nations will give to each other. So an embargo would be a much more complicated matter.

And without going into details, it's not a matter which the oil-exporting countries should take lightly, because in the future the United States and its industrial allies would also—would look to their own economic means of resistance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to know: Will the United States take any action to try to reconcile the differences between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, both parties have maintained that we have no standing in reconciling these differences, and both parties have insisted that this is an essentially internal Chinese affair. We have stated publicly that we favor a peaceful negotiation of these differences and we would welcome any efforts to do this.

But this is a matter that may take awhile to work itself out, and it is a matter that we will leave primarily to the Chinese to negotiate—although, of course, you're aware of the fact that we have a defense treaty with Taiwan.

Situation in Cyprus

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel now that the State Department made a mistake in not intervening and to stop the Turkish nation to halt their invasion of Cyprus—as was done previously by President Johnson—and since the results of not intervening are what they are today, what are your plans and suggestions for a settlement of the Cyprus tragedy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, the State Department is—I'm always moved when I travel around and I'm asked about the State Department as if it were a monolithic organization. [Laughter.] It's not the impression of it where I sit. [Laughter.]

Secondly, those of you who know Washington know that the Pentagon doesn't necessarily do what the State Department asks it to do [laughter]—so these decisions are national decisions taken by the President.

Thirdly, if you look at the situation that existed at the time of the Cyprus crisis, the United States, if it had intervened militar-

ily, would have been intervening against an ally on behalf of a Greek Government of which we strongly disapproved and in defense of an action which had been started by that Greek Government. It is forgotten today that during the first week of that crisis, the week during which the Turkish invasion took place, the State Department was accused of siding with the Greeks and of not condemning the Greeks sufficiently. And this may have been true because we wanted to discourage a Turkish invasion.

Now—and if you will remember also the situation that existed in the United States in July 1974 in the last weeks of the Watergate crisis—to engage in a military action against an ally under those circumstances, on behalf of a government with which we were in strong disagreement, would not have been a simple matter. And therefore I supported—and still support in retrospect—the decision that was then made not to use the 6th Fleet in a military operation.

I must say also that one of the primary reasons why further progress has not been made is the intervention by the Congress, which has constantly legislated acts which have interrupted the negotiating process through the various embargoes which they have legislated—which have deprived both sides of the incentives to make concessions and which have brought about a situation where the status quo has lasted a lot longer than it should have.

I believe that progress can be made. The United States would strongly support and be willing to assist in the negotiating process.

We have stated publicly that we do not believe that the territory—that the settlement can be along the lines that now exist in Cyprus. We have stated publicly—and we are willing to back this up—that a settlement must take into account a sense of justice and self-respect of all of the communities, especially of the Greek community, which has been deprived of a great deal of its territory.

But it is not possible to conduct a serious negotiation when there are constant specific legislative proposals, because a negotiation has to be conducted over a sufficient period of time. It can only be conducted by a few people.

That is the basic reason why there have been difficulties in the negotiations in Cyprus, which we regret, and in which we would be prepared to make a major effort to bring about a just settlement.

Credits and Sales to the Soviet Union

Q. The question, Mr. Secretary, is: What is the basis for selling goods, technology, and making bank credits available to the Soviet Union, when these are helping the Soviet Union extend its worldwide policies against the interests and security of the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, as far as credits are concerned, the U.S. Government has made available only infinitesimal credits compared to what other nations have done. The governmental indebtedness of the Soviet Union to the United States is a few hundred million dollars. The credits given by Western Europe and Japan to the Soviet Union are close to $11 billion.

So what the United States has done is a rather small part of the total; and it is a pity that we have been deprived, again through legislative action, of the authority to do more—because we would be in a better position to negotiate specific political arrangements in return for credits than the weaker countries and the weaker economies of Western Europe and Japan.

With respect to both the credits and the food, we face this problem. This morning in Seattle I was asked the same question from exactly the opposite point of view. The question was put in terms of our interrupting the sale of grain to the Soviet Union for political objectives.

And the national decision we have to make is whether foreign countries can enter the American market simply on com-

mercial terms, regardless of the political circumstances, without the United States negotiating some political foreign policy benefit for itself or whether the United States will try to get some foreign policy benefits. If we try to get foreign policy benefits there will have to be some authority to interrupt the entering of our market.

Now, this is a question that in the case of the grain has been resolved in favor of permitting foreign countries to enter our market, essentially without restrictions. It has been a policy that I have noticed every Presidential candidate has affirmed and that also reflects our national decision. But in that case one cannot afterward complain that we are selling grain to the Soviets, because that has been the decision which has been produced by our democratic process.

Jewish Emigration From the Soviet Union

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my Jewish brothers and sisters are being tortured, enslaved, and murdered in the Soviet Union. In view of the Helsinki accord, is not the right of Jewish emigration of prime concern to this Administration?

Secretary Kissinger: When this Administration came into office in 1969, 500 Jewish people emigrated from the Soviet Union a year. We have taken the position—we took the position then—that we would not make any dramatic issues but that we would appeal to the Soviet Union quietly and using the general atmosphere of our relationship in order to make progress on emigration.

Between 1969 and 1973 the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union went from 500 a year to 35,000 a year. It was then made a public political issue and again the subject of attention. And the emigration went down from 35,000 to 12,000.

The question therefore is: What policy is most likely to bring results?

This Administration has never ceased urging an increase in emigration. We have repeatedly and successfully submitted lists of people in prison to the Soviet Union, and we have achieved the release of a large percentage of those lists that we have submitted. When we have been successful, we have not made any public claim for it, because we have thought that the saving of lives was more important than getting the credit.

It is our conviction that results are more likely if we do not turn it into a public confrontation on an issue that will be argued as being within the Soviet domestic jurisdiction. But it is a matter of profound concern—a matter which this Administration has strongly supported—and in which great progress has been made and in which we are prepared to continue to exercise a great deal of influence.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us the difference between your latest concept of foreign policy as differing from that of Professor [Zbigniew] Brzezinski, who likes to think of himself as your possible successor? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I've told my friend Brzezinski that there is no constitutional requirement that the Secretary of State must be foreign-born. [Laughter.] And one of the difficulties of being both a professor and a Secretary of State is that half of the professors in the country then get to think that they should also be Secretaries of State. [Laughter.] They can bear having a lawyer or a businessman in this office, but one of their own is more than their nervous constitution can tolerate. [Laughter.]

Now, as far as Brzezinski is concerned, I don't consider myself in competition with him. And he has been known to change his opinion at various times. Sometimes I've agreed with him; sometimes I haven't agreed with him. But he's a man of considerable ability and has written some outstanding books. And I wish him well in his academic career. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what in principle is the official U.S. proposal regarding the Panama Canal?

Secretary Kissinger: One of the amazing things of this Presidential campaign is that suddenly an issue was raised that gave the impression that new negotiations had been started on the Panama Canal.

The first thing to keep in mind is that the negotiations about the Panama Canal have been going on since 1964 in three Administrations and not necessarily commented upon by some of the most vocal critics of the Panama negotiations this year.

The issue of the Panama Canal is not whether the United States should accept the position of a "tinhorn dictator"—as the phrase went—in Panama. The issue is the relationship of the United States to all the countries of the Western Hemisphere. And what the United States has to decide is whether—if we can achieve guaranteed free and uninterrupted access through the canal—whether it is possible to change some of the other arrangements with respect to the canal.

We cannot make any concessions on the right of free, guaranteed, and neutral access through the canal. If that condition can be met, then there are serious issues having to do with the operation of the canal, issues having to do with the defense installations in the Canal Zone and having to do with the nature of the defense arrangements for the canal. Those are in the process of being negotiated, and not one line of an agreement has yet been put on paper. All our negotiations have been fully briefed to the congressional committees.

The procedure that we would undoubtedly follow if the negotiations were to make progress would be first to agree on a basic concept, to submit this to the Congress for discussion, and then when the basic concept has achieved general agreement, then we would negotiate a treaty. That treaty would again go to the Senate, where it could be blocked by a one-third-plus-one vote.

So there is no possibility of doing anything that does not have the overwhelming support of the American public. We are of course prepared to defend our rights for free and unimpeded access through the Panama Canal. But if we have to do this, we want to be able to look the American people in the eye and say, "We have made every effort to avoid such a contingency." And we do not want to risk all our relations with all of the countries in the Western Hemisphere without at least exploring whether it is possible to make an arrangement which guarantees our rights by other means.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, as Admiral [Elmo R.] Zumwalt suggested, do you believe that the United States in the future will lose its position of preeminent leadership in world affairs?

Secretary Kissinger: I've nominated Admiral Zumwalt for the Pulitzer Prize for fiction. [Laughter.] I don't think the good admiral has yet fully grasped the fact that in running for the Senate in Virginia his opponent is called Byrd and not Kissinger. [Laughter.]

I have never expressed the view that he ascribes to me, and I do not believe—I've never believed, nor do I believe today—that the United States is bound to become in a secondary position to any other country.

I do believe that there are changing circumstances in the world which we have to take into account, but under no circumstances will the United States accept second place, and under all circumstances must the United States maintain sufficient military power to make sure that no other country can impose its will on the United States.

Q. Secretary Kissinger, during the Kennedy Alliance for Progress era, a strong

U.S.-Latin America bond was beginning to form. What since has happened, and how can this pan-American bond again be recemented?

New Dialogue With Latin America

Secretary Kissinger: During the Kennedy period, the Alliance for Progress was a very imaginative approach to Latin America, but it is also true that it was no longer appropriate to the conditions that developed later. The basic premises of the Alliance for Progress—namely, that the United States could define for Latin America what its institutions might be and that the United States could develop a program made in the United States for Latin America—do not correspond to the realities of the late sixties and of the contemporary period.

We have tried to substitute for it something that we have called the new dialogue, in which we deal with each other on a more equal basis and in which we try to take into account the emergence in Latin America of many countries that are going to be within a generation among the most powerful nations in the world and whose rate of economic progress is very considerable.

This policy has made considerable progress. It is not as dramatic, because a long-range policy doesn't lend itself to great drama. But I think the foundations have been laid for close cooperation in the field of economic cooperation, in the field of transfer of technology, and in the field of restructuring the institutions of the Western Hemisphere that in the next year or two are going to show considerable result.

Arms Sales to Oil-Producing Countries

Q. Mr. Secretary, how can a rise in the price of oil by the oil-producing countries be prevented by other means than trading in armaments?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think that the trade in armaments is a device to prevent a rise in oil prices. I think it results from the rise in oil prices that has already occurred, because it gives the oil-producing countries enormously large resources with which to purchase either industrial goods or armaments—if that's what they choose. So the basic problem is not that we are trying to prevent a rise in oil prices by selling armaments.

The fact is that having already achieved such tremendous surpluses as a result of the oil prices that have occurred since 1973, the oil-producing countries can enter the international market and buy armaments. And if they don't get them from us, they get them from other countries. And it isn't in our interest.

Our purpose in selling arms, when we do, is not to prevent a rise in prices but in order to prevent other countries from gaining the position of influence that often comes with the sale of arms.

Scope for Greater Autonomy in Eastern Europe

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask if you believe that the Russians control the Eastern European nations. And do you think their dealings with the West continue, or are those countries becoming more independent in their dealings with us now?

Secretary Kissinger: Of the East European nations?

Q. Yes. The bloc of the East European nations.

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that many countries in Eastern Europe are making an attempt to achieve a greater degree of autonomy in their dealings with the West. At the same time, the scope of their independence is severely limited by the kind of economic ties that the Soviet Union has insisted upon and by the presence of Soviet troops in almost all of these countries and, finally, by the memory of what has hap-

pened in those countries that tried to make a decisive break.

So I would say that there is a greater scope for greater autonomy in Eastern Europe—a scope that we encourage. We do not accept the proposition that the Soviet Union has a right to dominance in Eastern Europe. But we also do not make promises we cannot fulfill.

But there is a greater autonomy—but there is not the degree of freedom that we would prefer.

Encouragement of Moderation in Africa

Q. Mr. Secretary, you recently went to Africa, and at the time the United States does not seem to want the physical involvement in Africa. Don't you think that this trip upsets the delicate balance of power currently existing in Africa and that the words in favor of the most radical black liberation movements will cause considerable trouble to the more moderate governments, black or white?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the purpose of going to Africa was to encourage and to strengthen the moderate governments in Africa. And the trip was especially welcomed by the moderate governments in Africa and was constantly attacked by the radical governments in Africa.

The purpose of the trip was to prevent the further radicalization of a situation that was already getting increasingly violent and increasingly threatened to get out of control. And therefore I would say, far from upsetting a balance, we're trying to bring about a balance. Far from encouraging the radical governments, we're trying to create situations in which the moderate governments would be able to have a program to which they can relate themselves. And far from trying to encourage one community against the other, we're trying to bring about conditions in which all communities can live under conditions of justice and progress.

Federal German Chancellor Schmidt Visits the United States

Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, made an official visit to the United States July 14–17. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington July 15–16. Following is an exchange of greetings by President Ford and Chancellor Schmidt at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on July 15, together with the text of a joint statement on mutual defense issues issued on July 17.[1]

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, JULY 15

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 19

President Ford

Mr. Chancellor, Mrs. Schmidt, ladies and gentlemen: I am delighted to welcome back to Washington a very steadfast ally, distinguished statesman, and an esteemed personal friend. Mr. Chancellor, the Federal Republic of Germany honors us through your presence in Washington as we celebrate our 200th anniversary of our independence.

Throughout the United States, the Bicentennial celebrations of 1976 have rekindled our traditional optimism, strengthened our national unity and our pride as a people, and generated a new spirit of confidence and inspiration as we look to the challenges of America's third century.

Mr. Chancellor, as the American adventure continues to unfold for us, we are ever more mindful that we live in an interdependent world. Accordingly, we attach the

[1] For an exchange of toasts by President Ford and Chancellor Schmidt at a dinner at the White House on July 15, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 19, 1976, p. 1165; for their remarks at a reception on board the German training ship *Gorch Fock* at Baltimore, Md., on July 16, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 26, 1976, p. 1172.

greatest importance to our international responsibilities. The United States takes immense satisfaction in having in the Federal Republic of Germany a true friend and ally who shares our deep commitment to liberty, democracy, and human freedom.

Just 30 years ago, the world had witnessed the development in Germany of a democratic state which stands as a model of stability, social justice, and economic well-being. Americans admire the achievements of the Federal Republic and the vital role that you play within the Atlantic alliance.

The close ties between our countries have this year been dramatically reaffirmed. On behalf of the American people, let me express to you, Mr. Chancellor, our heartfelt appreciation for the Federal Republic's generous participation in our Bicentennial anniversary.

We are especially honored that over 4,000 events devoted to America's Bicentennial are being held in the Federal Republic this year. The Federal Republic has given exceptional Bicentennial gifts to several American institutions. Among them is your establishment of the Albert Einstein Spacearium of the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum, which you will inaugurate this afternoon.

This new institution, dedicated to a great scientist, scholar, and humanist whose vision transcended national boundaries, is indeed a fitting symbol of humanity's progress.

Mr. Chancellor, your arrival today marks our eighth meeting over the past two years, underscoring the continuity of our consultations on both sides of the Atlantic. Since your first visit as Chancellor in 1974, the countries of the West have been working more closely than ever between ourselves.

At the NATO summit in Brussels, at the Helsinki summit last August, and in our conferences at Rambouillet and Puerto Rico, we have demonstrated new unity among the industrialized democracies, a new determination to achieve the objectives of peace and prosperity for all our peoples, and a new confidence that we will achieve these objectives. The progress over the past two years clearly indicates that we will succeed.

Mr. Chancellor, I look forward with great anticipation to our discussions. I bid a very hearty welcome to you, Mr. Chancellor, as well as to Mrs. Schmidt and to all the members of the German party.

Chancellor Schmidt

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, ladies and gentlemen: I thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words of welcome, which indeed have moved me deeply. I do attach special importance to this visit to the United States of America which, as you have reminded me, is my third as head of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Bicentennial anniversary of your great country, Mr. President, for us is a date of eminent significance. It is a date of eminent significance to all free and democratic countries in the world.

For the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany, it is a welcome occasion to reflect on the fundamental democratic values for which both our countries stand, as well as the close bonds of friendship that have developed harmoniously in the 27 years since the birth of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The German people do not forget the spiritual and material contribution of the United States to the development of the Federal Republic of Germany and hence to what it does represent today. But our recollection also embraces the participation of millions of immigrants of German stock in the fortunes of the United States in the course of its 200-year history, a fact which we Germans are commemorating this year with a large variety, as you have mentioned, sir, of functions and festivities.

During our stay here we shall, of course, not be concerned with festivities only. Our talks will be governed by a number of

problems facing both our countries, other countries as well, problems which can only be solved by joint effort.

The community of nations is still confronted with unsolved political problems which cause us concern—complex problems affecting the world economy, problems affecting the future of all of us—which demand our full attention, our entire energies, and the firm will of all concerned to cooperate with each other.

Your initiative, Mr. President, for talks in Puerto Rico was a valuable step in this direction, with valuable results. In your address you have rightly pointed out the importance of the Atlantic alliance, which has increased still more in the light of these problems. Along with European unification, the alliance is the bedrock of our foreign policy. We are resolved to continue making our contribution as before and not to lose sight of the common aims.

I can say without exaggeration, sir, that our bilateral relations could not be better. Our proven partnership is based on firm friendship. My country has deep confidence—and this also goes for my people—deep confidence in the United States of America.

Mr. President, my fellow countrymen back home in Germany and also this distinguished delegation of ours and myself, we wish your great nation happiness and success on its way into its third century.

Thank you.

JOINT STATEMENT, JULY 17 [2]

JOINT STATEMENT ON MUTUAL DEFENSE ISSUES BY PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT, JULY 17

The Chancellor and the President have agreed on a measure exemplifying the close German-American security relationship in Europe, one which strengthens considerably the force posture of NATO defenses. The Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to share as a single payment in the costs of relocating a US combat brigade into the northern area of the Federal Republic, near Bremen. The contribution to this effort amounts to DM 171.2 million ($68.48 million).

The Chancellor and the President have also been discussing, over a period of time, the general question of offset arrangements which serve our own and the Alliance's security needs. As is well known, the Federal Republic of Germany through the years has purchased substantial amounts of military equipment in the United States, and is expected to continue to do so. This procurement has, of course, benefitted the United States in the economic sense.

It should also be reiterated that since the Federal Republic of Germany became a partner in the NATO effort, it maintained its defense forces in a state of combat readiness equal to the tasks before it. At a time of extreme budgetary and political difficulties in the Alliance, it is reassuring to the US that the Chancellor intends to continue this highly positive and welcome attitude toward the Federal Republic of Germany's NATO commitment.

Given the recently introduced changes in the international monetary area, specifically flexible exchange rates, as well as the notably improved strength of the dollar and a more acceptable US balance of payments position, the President and the Chancellor consider that the traditional offset arrangements approach has lost its relevance.

[2] Released at the Department of State.

President Ford Addresses Convention of League of Families of MIA's

Following are remarks made by President Ford at Washington on July 24 before the annual convention of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated August 2

It is a very high honor and a very great privilege to meet once again with this courageous assembly of Americans whose loved ones remain unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. You have borne a very heavy burden with incredible courage. Every citizen in this country admires your bravery, your dignity, and your persistence.

Through long, long months and years of trial, you have been sustained by the love of your missing men and by your love of the country those men defended. I am proud of you, and I am proud of your men.

But my admiration is not enough. The

gratitude of this nation is not enough. You and your loved ones must be assured of a continuing commitment from your government to obtain a full accounting of those missing in action (MIA) or still listed as prisoners of war.

Let me reemphasize this, from me as well as from your government: This is a firm, unequivocal commitment; it is a longstanding commitment; it is still an active commitment; and for me, as I said a moment ago, it is a very personal commitment, and that is why I am here tonight.

When I came home from the Pacific roughly 30 years ago I joined—as many of us did—several veteran organizations. And then a short time later, I had the good fortune to become a Member of the House of Representatives. During my service as a Member of the House of Representatives, I can recall vividly working on MIA problems on an individual, a case-by-case basis during both the Korean and the Vietnam conflicts.

As a Congressman, as many of you know, I met with members of the National League of Families here in Washington and back home in my community of Grand Rapids, Michigan. I did not forget you then, and I have not forgotten you now. One of my very last meetings as Vice President was a meeting with your board of directors. A year ago, as President, I attended this convention and shortly thereafter met with your board of directors in the Cabinet Room in the West Wing of the White House.

Let me assure you we are employing every effective means to account for your loved ones. Let me assure you without any hesitation or reservation that I will continue that effort.

We must be honest with ourselves. This is a frustrating, painstaking, difficult process. It is a tragic fact—and it makes me, as well as you and millions and millions like you, very, very sad—that every missing man, or information concerning that individual, may never be available regardless of any superhuman effort by the most and the best in our government.

Furthermore, as all of you know, we are dealing with a government that has demonstrated very little concern for your feelings. The Vietnamese claim to have established agencies to search for the missing, but thus far they have withheld this information, totally without justification.

We have offered to carry out the searches ourselves or to enlist a neutral government or the Red Cross in this humanitarian search. Thus far, none of these offers have been accepted. But we will persist. We will keep trying as long as we have any hope whatsoever, and I promise you that.

We are willing to talk with the Vietnamese. At my direction, we have exchanged messages with them indicating our willingness to discuss outstanding issues in our two countries. We have made clear that our primary concern is to obtain an accounting for our servicemen who are missing in action. Without a satisfactory solution of the MIA issue, no further progress in our relations is possible.

I know that many of you are deeply concerned about declassification of information relating to MIA's. Several months ago I discussed in depth this problem with the members of my staff and directed that progress be made in that regard, and I have been informed that progress has been made. But let me reemphasize there will be continuing progress in this regard.

Everyone in this room has demonstrated a strength, has demonstrated a resolve, which makes you equal to the burdens that you are carrying. Your courage has been an inspiration to me and to millions of your fellow citizens. Your loved ones have not been forgotten. You have not been abandoned. I promise you I will not rest until the fullest possible accounting of your loved ones has been made.

Department Discusses Continuing Efforts To Account for Americans Missing in Indochina

Statement by Philip C. Habib
Under Secretary for Political Affairs [1]

I am glad to appear on behalf of the State Department to describe for the committee our continuing efforts to account for Americans lost in connection with the Indochina conflict.

As the committee knows from its personal contacts with Secretary Kissinger, the Secretary and all of us with responsibilities in this area share the concern that is so widely felt about the lack of accounting for our men. We have always approached this as an important humanitarian problem, and we will continue to do so. We value greatly the consideration and cooperation we have received from the committee, and we admire the committee's own vigorous efforts on behalf of our missing and dead in Indochina.

Already before the Paris negotiations began, we were conscious of the need to account for our men, because of the Communist side's refusal throughout the conflict to provide complete information on our prisoners of war as required by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. As a result, we knew we would have to do all we could by all available means to obtain information about our missing personnel.

I was a member of our negotiating team in Paris and thus can testify from personal experience on the importance that the release of prisoners and accounting for the missing had in these deliberations. For example, in one of the first lists of negotiating points put forward by the North Vietnamese, the Communist side bracketed the release of prisoners with what they described as "U.S. responsibility for war damage in Viet-Nam" in a single numbered point. Although humanitarian issues such as prisoners of war and missing in action (POW–MIA's) have been subjects of disagreement in the settlement of other past conflicts, I know of no instance in which an adversary so openly treated this humanitarian problem in this way. We thus recognized from an early date what we were up against and countered by making release of prisoners and accounting for the missing a basic element of our own negotiating strategy.

I might note that international law, as framed in the Geneva Conventions, does not permit the linking of humanitarian obligations to other issues in the way done by the North Vietnamese. North Viet-Nam is signatory to these conventions. The conventions are not predicated on bargaining or reciprocity, but are intended to provide basic standards that all countries should adhere to, regardless of their war aims and political and economic objectives. If this

[1] Made before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia on July 21. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

were not the case, the humanitarian standards in the conventions would themselves become subjects of dispute; and if that happened, the framework of international law in armed conflicts would rapidly be shattered.

The Paris negotiations culminated in January 1973 in an agreement which included specific requirements for the release of prisoners of war on both sides and cooperation in the search for the missing and the return of the remains of the dead. The release of prisoners was to be accomplished in a 60-day period under the supervision of a Four Party Joint Military Commission, to be succeeded by a Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) whose sole mission was the search for the missing and the return of the remains of the dead. This MIA-accounting requirement is the most explicit ever concluded, and I know of no previous case in which a special body was established by such an agreement specifically for this purpose.

This committee has already heard testimony about our efforts to make the FPJMT live up to its stated objectives and get on with the job of accounting for the missing. After prolonged negotiations, North Viet-Nam agreed in March 1974 to the repatriation of the remains of 23 Americans identified as having died in captivity in North Viet-Nam. Unfortunately, the sense of accomplishment produced by this was short lived, and the return of the 23 proved to be the only instance in which the FPJMT accomplished any of its stated mission.

I might note that in the early days of the FPJMT, the Communist side submitted lists of their own personnel missing or captured in South Viet-Nam. The Republic of Viet-Nam authorities responded promptly to these requests for information, in precisely the spirit called for in the Paris agreement. The Communist side soon stopped submitting such lists, apparently realizing the awkward contrast which would highlight their own nonfulfillment of this requirement.

Approaches to Hanoi Authorities

Supplementing the FPJMT, we continued our efforts through diplomatic channels to press the Hanoi authorities on this subject. In a sense, the Paris negotiations continued through 1973 and into 1974—and a major part of our exchanges concerned MIA accounting. When Dr. Kissinger flew to Hanoi in February 1973, on the eve of the first prisoner release, he took with him records on a number of our men on whom information was likely to be available in North Viet-Nam. We raised the MIA-accounting subject in each subsequent contact with the Hanoi authorities and pressed it in a number of formal diplomatic notes, one of which, dated July 29, 1973, was devoted solely to the MIA and return-of-remains question.

Our diplomatic efforts to obtain an accounting for MIA's did not end with the fall of Saigon. In July 1975 we approached the Vietnamese Embassy in Paris to request the return of the remains of three U.S. pilots whose names had been earlier broadcast. On August 9 the Vietnamese agreed to return the bodies. We expressed our appreciation and asked about specific arrangements. On August 13 the North Vietnamese withdrew the offer. We met with them again in September, but they refused to renew the offer. Subsequently, your committee visited Hanoi and the Vietnamese returned these remains to you.

The activities of your committee such as your visits to Paris and Hanoi last December helped to stress further to the Vietnamese the concern for an early resolution of this problem. Following your report to the President and your consultations with Secretary Kissinger, the Administration sent a message to the Vietnamese on March 26, 1976, stating that we were prepared to discuss with them issues outstanding between our two countries. In ongoing contacts we have had with the Vietnamese, and in our public statements, we have made clear that our primary concern in any

discussions will be obtaining an accounting for our missing men and the return of the remains of our servicemen killed in the war in Indochina.

Our initiation of this exchange demonstrates our policy of looking to the future rather than the past in our relations with Viet-Nam. We have no desire to refight the Viet-Nam war on the diplomatic front. We are prepared to talk to the Vietnamese; but as Secretary Kissinger has stated, without resolution of the MIA issue further improvement in U.S.-Vietnamese relations is not possible.

The Missing and Dead in Laos and Cambodia

We have also pressed this issue with the other countries of Indochina where American servicemen were killed or reported missing.

In Laos, the Lao coalition government formed in April 1974 undertook the obligation to account for the missing as provided in article 5 of the Vientiane agreement. The Lao Government established a subcommittee to implement this obligation. Our Embassy in Vientiane held repeated meetings with both Vientiane-side and Pathet Lao members of this subcommittee. We provided lists of our missing men to facilitate searches.

One American, a civilian pilot, was released on September 18, 1974, giving rise to hope that progress might be made on resolution of the approximately 320 MIA cases in Laos.

However, as the Communist side in the government gained strength in late 1974 and early 1975 and the coalition began to dissolve, momentum on the POW–MIA issue slackened. The Pathet Lao refused to permit American teams or teams from neutral countries or international organizations to visit crash and burial sites, some of which were readily accessible and which we knew contained recent and relatively intact wreckage.

We continued our efforts on the POW–MIA front after the coalition government was replaced by an openly Communist one in December 1975. The visit in late December by the select committee to Vientiane served as a stimulus to these efforts. Our Embassy, following up on the visit, has made several contacts with the Lao Government to convince them of our strong concern and to press for progress on an accounting. In formal approaches and informal contacts, members of our Embassy have sought ways to keep the issue before the Lao.

After all our approaches, as the committee itself knows, the Lao, while expressing interest in eventual resolution of this problem, have not undertaken any specific efforts to produce an accounting. They have claimed that they will search for all those missing in Laos, Lao as well as foreign, but they have made clear that other matters have a higher priority for them.

The Lao have available ample material, which we have provided, to investigate and produce an accounting on many of the crash and burial sites in their country. Except for the release of Emmett Kay in September 1974, there has been, unfortunately, no progress in the POW–MIA field.

With regard to Americans unaccounted for in Cambodia, we attempted, prior to the end of the conflict, to inquire about them through the North Vietnamese and the International Committee of the Red Cross. We have also supported the continuing effort of the International Professional Committee for the Safety of Journalists on Dangerous Missions to seek information about missing newsmen in Cambodia. Our Mission at the United Nations contacted the Cambodian Mission late last year and provided them with a list of Americans missing in Cambodia.

The Cambodians have consistently answered that there are no Americans and no foreigners in Cambodia, and they have

produced no information on any of our missing or dead.

Other Means of Seeking Accounting

In addition to these diplomatic efforts, we took action to account for our men by our own means. From our experience with returning prisoners during the conflict, we knew this was an especially good source of information; and elaborate preparations had been made to debrief all returning POW's. This information was systematically analyzed and correlated and remains to this day the most significant accounting we have had for our men.

Soon after the Paris agreement was signed, we established a Joint Casualty Resolution Center for the dual purpose of carrying out searches for the missing and compiling information from all sources on each of our men. Computer techniques facilitated the task of the resolution of each individual case. Although we made good use of these impersonal means, we never lost sight of the fact that we were dealing with the names and fates of real people whose wives, parents, and families desperately sought information about them.

I can assure this committee that the President, the Secretary of State, and the other highest officers of this Administration continue to feel keenly the obligation to press for the fullest possible accounting for all our men. Our efforts have applied, and will continue to apply, equally to those who have been declared dead and to those who are listed as missing.

In this regard it should be noted that in the few cases in which information has been forthcoming, as often as not it has applied to men previously declared dead. For example, two of the three whose remains were returned to this committee during its visit to Hanoi last December had previously been declared dead—one at the time his plane went down in North Viet-Nam in 1965; the other more recently, in 1973; with the third man listed as missing. However, the return of those remains helped the families of all three of those men to accept the fate of their loved ones.

What we mean by an "accounting" has sometimes been of concern. Clearly, we want to know what happened to these men. We understand of course that many were lost in circumstances which make it unlikely that any direct information about them will be recovered. Some were lost over water or in heavily forested or mountainous terrain where intensive search is virtually impossible. What we expect from the Communist authorities is that they will provide all the information in their possession on our POW's and MIA's and that they will carry out serious search efforts to ascertain the fate of others.

The North and South Vietnamese authorities told this committee and other visitors that they have established agencies to search for the missing. During the FPJMT talks they told us that they know where some of our men may be buried. We consider it unacceptable that the Vietnamese authorities should have such information and yet should withhold it, apparently in the belief that they can use it for bargaining purposes.

Proposed Protocol to Geneva Conventions

In this connection, I would like to report to this committee on the work of the Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, which recently concluded its third session in Geneva, which you, Mr. Chairman [Representative G. V. Montgomery], served as a valued congressional adviser.

The U.S. delegation at this session played a key role in gaining preliminary approval for a proposed new section on the missing and dead as part of the proposed draft protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on which the conference is working. Although the Geneva Conventions have provided generally for procedures on account-

ing for POW's and MIA's, this new section for the first time would establish the right of families to know the fate of their relatives as a new principle of international law. It spells out in specific detail the obligations of governments and parties to conflicts with regard to searching for the missing, providing information, and protecting of the remains of the dead.

We hope and expect that this section will receive final approval of the diplomatic conference during its final session in Geneva starting in April 1977.

The initiative for this section flowed from earlier actions at international meetings in which the U.S. Government also played a leading role. During the International Conference of the Red Cross in Tehran in November 1973, for example, our delegation helped draft and win approval for a resolution calling for accounting for the missing in armed conflicts. This was followed in November 1974 by a U.N. General Assembly resolution, also sponsored by the United States, which for the first time referred to the entitlement of families to information about the missing. The U.N. resolution concluded by calling on the diplomatic conference to act on this subject, and the conference has responded with the new MIA section of which I have just spoken.

Although the new Geneva Protocol does not apply to armed conflicts of the past, we believe that this section, in addition to breaking new ground for the future, helps underline the concern felt in the international community about the lack of accounting for the missing in past armed-conflict situations.

Steps Taken by United Nations and Red Cross

In addition to the resolutions to which I have referred, the United Nations and International Red Cross have also taken practical steps to help solve this problem.

This committee knows from personal experience the assistance that has been provided by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and his staff, both as a channel for communication and in arranging for the return of Americans from Viet-Nam. The UNHCR played a key role in the release of 14 U.S. and foreign prisoners from Hanoi in October 1975, shortly after this committee came into being. UNHCR representatives also assisted members of the committee in the repatriation of remains during your visit to Hanoi last December.

In line with its traditional responsibilities for POW's and MIA's, the International Committee of the Red Cross has made continuing efforts to help account for the missing. The ICRC's Central Tracing Agency provides a repository for POW–MIA information for the entire world.

The ICRC also is serving as a tenuous lifeline for Americans still in South Viet-Nam. Despite assurances given to this committee by North Vietnamese officials that all Americans would be free to leave, a substantial number are still stranded in Saigon. There were recent reports that another group of Americans would be coming out, but this has not yet happened. This is a matter of continuing concern to the State Department, and we have appreciated the committee's own efforts to expedite the departure of Americans from South Viet-Nam.

I wish to close this statement by expressing our thanks for this committee's own contribution toward resolution of this humanitarian problem. Secretary Kissinger and all of us in the State Department working on this subject appreciate the committee's determined efforts to make progress toward an accounting.

You have been resourceful and tireless, and your efforts have helped demonstrate to the Communist authorities the importance we attach to this subject. I can assure you our own efforts will continue as long as necessary to obtain the fullest possible accounting for our men.

Actions To Prevent Discrimination in Overseas Assignments Discussed

Statement by Carol C. Laise
Director General of the Foreign Service [1]

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the President's memorandum of November 20, 1975,[2] and the Department of State's implementation of the directive barring discriminatory practices in overseas assignments.

The President's memorandum of November 20 is a firm directive and statement of principle for all of the government and gives new force to the efforts which we have been making. As the committee is aware, the departmental directives barring discrimination in assignments go back to 1972. Our record in this regard was provided to the committee in the Department's letter of July 29, 1975. In particular, you will recall that over a year ago we instructed all Ambassadors to report any case of a foreign government excluding employees of any agency of the U.S. Government or its contractors on a discriminatory basis.

Since receiving the President's memorandum, we have taken the following additional actions:

1. The text of the memorandum has been given to our employees in a Department notice of December 2, 1975.

2. We have provided the President's statement to all Ambassadors as guidance in their dealings with foreign governments.

3. The Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs has assumed responsibility for coordination of requests for assistance in cases where visas are refused.

4. The heads of other government agencies have been asked to notify the Secretary of cases in which visas are denied.

5. Our internal regulations, although already consistent with the President's memorandum, have been reviewed and revised to incorporate the language of his statement.

Since your hearings in April of last year, only one case of discrimination against an employee of the U.S. Government or its contractors by a foreign government has so far been brought to the Department's attention. Congressman [Charles C.] Diggs and Mrs. Diggs, a Foreign Service officer traveling in a private capacity, were refused visas by the South African Government. Official representations and protests were made both to the Embassy here and to the Government of South Africa, but we were unable to reverse the decision of the government in the time afforded us. However, since the issuance of the President's memorandum, we have not had any cases in which visas were denied.

While the specific course of action in any future case can only be determined in the context in which the case arises and by the avenues open to us at the time to get effective results, we believe the President's memorandum, as a statement of national policy, will strengthen our position in dealing with foreign governments, who have now been put on notice that they will have to weigh the effects of their actions on our overall relationship.

We are mindful of the committee's concern that by some silent rule or established practice the language and purpose of the President's directive might be evaded, the principles for which our country stands could be eroded, and the career opportunities of our employees limited, by our own actions in deference to the discriminatory attitudes

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[1] Made before the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights of the House Committee on Government Operations on July 27. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] For text of a memorandum dated Nov. 20, 1975, from President Ford to heads of departments and agencies, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Nov. 24, 1975, p. 1306; for text of a statement by President Ford issued Nov. 20, 1975, see BULLETIN of Dec. 22, 1975, p. 898.

or practices of other governments. The law, the policy stated by the President, and our regulations prohibit discrimination in assignments, and I assure you that it is our intention to see that the attitudes and practices of the Department accord with these precepts.

The control of the Bureau of Personnel over all assignments has been strengthened by the Secretary of State, who on June 27, 1975, said: [3]

> . . . I have instructed the Director General to establish a more open, centrally directed assignment process. While the new procedures will take into account the legitimate interests of the individual, the bureaus, and the posts abroad, they can only be fair and orderly if they drastically limit the right of an Assistant Secretary or Ambassador to veto assignments . . . .

Under this directive, the right of Ambassadors and heads of bureaus to disapprove assignments has been limited to selecting their principal deputies and personal staff from a slate of candidates.

Further, we have made it possible for all employees, worldwide, to know of anticipated vacancies well in advance and to express their interest in assignment to any position. Employees' expressed interest is being considered by assignment panels in every case, and the decisions published.

It is, then, the active policy of the Department not to exclude any employee from consideration at any stage of the assignment process for any reason other than the relative merits of his or her professional qualifications for the position.

These measures have significantly improved our ability to comply in letter and spirit with the terms of the law and the President's directive, and we intend to work with our missions and other agencies to see that the intent of the President's memorandum is fulfilled.

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[3] For remarks by Secretary Kissinger made at the swearing-in ceremony for the 119th Foreign Service officer class on June 27, 1975, see BULLETIN of July 21, 1975, p. 85.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 2d Session

Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations. March 11–30, 1976. 277 pp.

First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Preserving Responsible Control. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. March 16–25, 1976. 246 pp.

United States National Security Policy vis-a-vis Eastern Europe (The "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine"). Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. April 12, 1976. 67 pp.

Twentieth Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the report. H. Doc. 94–469. April 27, 1976. 64 pp.

Nuclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy Implications. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H. Con. Res. 570. H. Rept. 94–1051. April 28, 1976. 7 pp.

International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. 0, 81st Cong., 1st sess. S. Ex. Rept. 94–23. April 29, 1976. 41 pp.

Duty-Free Entry of Carillon Bells for the Use of Smith College, Massachusetts. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 1386. H. Rept. 94–1058. April 29, 1976. 2 pp.

Exemption From Duty of Certain Components and Materials Installed in Aircraft Previously Exported From the United States. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 2177. H. Rept. 94–1060. April 29, 1976. 4 pp.

Duty-Free Treatment of Certain Aircraft Engines. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 2181. H. Rept. 94–1061. April 29, 1976. 4 pp.

Continuation of Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Horses. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 9401. H. Rept. 94–1063; April 29, 1976; 3 pp. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance to accompany H. Rept. 9401; S. Rept. 94–992; June 25, 1976; 3 pp.

Asian Development Fund. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 3103; S. Rept. 94–773; May 3, 1976; 17 pp. Report of the House Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing, together with dissenting views; H. Rept. 94–1145; May 14, 1976; 14 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975.[1]
Signatures: Austria, July 19, 1976; Sierra Leone, July 13, 1976; Spain, July 13, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Papua New Guinea, July 19, 1976.

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.[1]
Acceptances deposited: German Democratic Republic, July 13, 1976; Malta, July 19, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Belgium, June 22, 1976.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Surinam, July 26, 1976.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4, 1967; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Portugal, July 13, 1976.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 1974.[1]
Accession deposited: India, June 16, 1976.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1976.
Ratification deposited: India, July 9, 1976.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.[1]
Accession deposited: Colombia, June 16, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.
Ratifications deposited: Algeria, July 28, 1976; Barbados, July 26, 1976; Peru, July 27, 1976.

BILATERAL

Bermuda

Agreement concerning assistance to be rendered on a reimbursable basis by the U.S. Coast Guard in the event of major oil spills. Signed at Hamilton July 13, 1976. Entered into force July 13, 1976.

Kenya

Grant agreement relating to improvement of institutional capabilities to plan, implement and evaluate agriculture and rural development policies and programs, with annexes. Signed at Nairobi June 30, 1976. Entered into force June 30, 1976.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreements of December 11, 1974, as amended, and February 4, 1976, relating to the provision of support for Mexican efforts to curb illegal narcotics production and traffic. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico May 18, 1976. Entered into force May 18, 1976.
Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico June 30, 1976. Entered into force June 30, 1976.

Poland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with related notes. Signed at Washington October 8, 1974. Entered into force July 23, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: July 23, 1976.

Switzerland

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters with related notes. Signed at Bern May 25, 1973.
Ratifications exchanged: July 27, 1976.
Enters into force: January 23, 1977.

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[1] Not in force.

Name Index

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: July 26–August 1

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†356	7/27	U.S.-Mexico Mixed Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, July 19–20.
*357	7/28	Program for state visit of President Urho Kekkonen of the Republic of Finland.
*358	7/29	Philip V. Sanchez sworn in as Ambassador to Colombia (biographic data).
*359	7/30	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement, Aug. 30.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.