



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF APRIL 22 617

DEPARTMENT REVIEWS MAJOR ISSUES BEFORE FORTHCOMING MEETING  
OF UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

*Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Boeker 631*

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of April 22

Press release 186 dated April 22

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in January you gave a very optimistic report on the status of détente and SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. Since then it is evident that the situation has deteriorated. Can you tell us what happened and what are the prospects for improvement, if any?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The principal element in the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union is Soviet actions in Angola. We pointed out at the time, and we repeat, that we consider those actions irresponsible—inconsistent with the principles that govern the conduct between our nations—and the introduction of Cuban surrogate forces a very dangerous development.

On the other hand, the basic necessities of preserving peace in the nuclear age and of regulating the relationship between the superpowers remain. And therefore the United States will continue to pursue the dual policy that we have emphasized over recent months.

That is to say, first, we will resist irresponsible actions or the expansion of Soviet political influence by military power or the use of surrogate forces. Secondly, we remain ready to work for a more peaceful world and more just international arrangements on the basis of strict reciprocity. We will pursue both of these strands, and we remain ready to pursue both of these strands.

*Q. [Marvin Kalb, CBS News] Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the United States today is capable of resisting irresponsible action by the Soviet Union? Does it have that kind of unity and coherence?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Is it appropriate to welcome you back after a considerably extended absence.

The United States has the military capacity, and it has the political will to resist irresponsible actions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could I follow up the African part of that question? You and the President have been urging the Soviets to act with restraint in Africa. How do you define restraint? Does it require the removal of the last Cuban and Soviet military person?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Our basic view with respect to Africa is that African problems should be settled by African nations and that Africa should be kept free of great-power rivalry.

The United States is prepared to act according to this principle, and it hopes that other major countries will act in the same manner. The United States would be extremely concerned, as we have pointed out on a number of occasions, if the use of surrogate military forces, which could only take place with the support of a superpower, became an accepted pattern of dealing with issues in Africa.

Now, we will make clear during my visit what our position is with respect to southern Africa and our strong support for majority rule in southern Africa. We will also make clear our support for the development objectives of African nations. And finally, we will make clear our support for the unity of African nations.

We have no interest in splitting the African nations or lining them up into groups, some of which support one super-

power and others another superpower. But we believe, of course, that this requires restraint by all sides, and this must be our definition.

*Q. Specifically on that, how will the Soviets have to act to convince the United States that they are acting responsibly in Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* They would have to act to live up to these principles of not interfering with military force and/or large-scale military equipment in internal African problems. And we believe, of course, that Cuban troops should be withdrawn from Africa.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the Cubans and the Soviet Union doing at this particular time? Angola is now more or less over. Is there still a flow of Soviet arms? Is there still a replacement or continuing level of Cuban forces in Angola? And what is your perception of what the Cuban surrogate forces will be doing next?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The present level of Cuban forces in Africa, including all the countries, is in excess of 15,000. Our estimate of Cuban forces in Angola is 13,000 or 14,000. There has been some rotation. That is, some troops have been replaced by other, more technical personnel. But the total number of Cuban forces in Angola is roughly at the level at which it has been since the end of January.

We receive conflicting reports about what Cuban forces are doing in other parts of Africa or whether Cuban forces from Angola are being moved from Angola to other areas. We have had no confirmed reports, but we have warned repeatedly that the use of Cuban surrogate forces is going to increase international tensions enormously and is going to be incompatible with the relaxation of tensions and is going to be a very dangerous course.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to Mr. Freed's [Kenneth J. Freed, Associated Press] question, may we assume that the chances for a SALT agreement in the present political*

*climate for the foreseeable future are pretty much eliminated?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't want to disillusion you in the face of your frequent predictions on the subject.

As the President pointed out yesterday, we remain prepared to continue the SALT negotiations, and we believe that an equitable SALT agreement is possible and is desirable. We are not operating against an artificial deadline. We are studying the Soviet reply. We have had several meetings on the subject. And we will answer it in due course. I would not preclude the possibility that significant progress can be made this year.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, some observers have noted that there may be a contradiction in the American pledges of support for black majority rule in southern Africa and your warnings against Cuban or Soviet interference in that some of the black nations may be hoping or relying on Cuban or Soviet help in achieving the objective of black African rule. I want to ask you whether you feel on this trip you can make credible the American commitment to support black African majority rule.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course the achievement of African objectives has to be primarily an African problem, but I will be prepared to discuss with my African hosts the concrete policies that could be implemented to bring about majority rule. And I will be prepared to put forward what the United States in its turn is prepared to do or to support.

I do not accept the proposition that the use of extracontinental military force supported by one of the superpowers is the only way of achieving the aspirations of the black African countries. And it is indeed our belief that it is the way that leads to the greatest danger that Africa will become a part of the great-power rivalry.

So we recognize that this strong desire exists on the part of the black African nations, that it must be given a realistic per-

spective, and we believe that this is achievable.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that majority rule in Rhodesia is possible in the next decade?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, I do.

#### **Election Campaign and U.S.-Soviet Relations**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could we go back to détente for a moment? I would like to read to you and invite your comment on a question from a Tony Lewis [Anthony Lewis, New York Times] column last week. He's speaking—he's writing about your speeches across the country. He says: "The Kissinger roadshow has a desperate tone, and no wonder. For the Secretary of State is campaigning at the same time on behalf of a policy and of a President who has effectively abandoned that policy." How much is your own Administration responsible for the slow progress in détente at this point—leaving aside the Reagans and the Jacksons?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have noticed that the op-ed page of the New York Times is not unanimous in support of me. The policy that I have stated is of course the policy of the President. The statements about the objectives of the United States with respect to relations with the Soviet Union are the views of the President, as of course they are my own views. Therefore I cannot accept the particular statement that you have read.

We have, as I pointed out at the time—as a result of Watergate, of the aftermath of Watergate, of a series of congressional-executive disagreements—we have suffered from a lack of clarity in other countries' minds about what the United States can and will do in given circumstances. For this we have paid a price. This we are attempting to rectify. And this, any Administration will have to overcome.

But the basic objective of seeking to prevent Soviet expansion and at the same time to build a safer world than one that depends entirely on nuclear confrontation, those

objectives are fixed and will have to be pursued by any Administration.

*Q. A brief follow, if I may. But aren't you making any concessions on your own to the fact that there is a political campaign going on now? Isn't détente slowing down by U.S. desires—by Administration desires—to avoid a campaign problem?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The primary problem in relations with the Soviet Union has been the irresponsible Soviet action in Angola. The basic foreign policy of the United States depends on the national interests of the United States, and it is not a partisan matter.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you talked about Watergate. Going beyond Watergate, given the fact that we are now in the Presidential campaign with the inevitable attacks on foreign policy, are you finding that these attacks are affecting the perception of the United States abroad and affecting America's ability to operate in the international arena?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Inevitably, when the United States is described as second rate, when it is alleged that senior officials of the U.S. Government are resigned to getting the best deal they can from a nation that is perceived to be dominant—all charges which are wrong and irresponsible—inevitably this is bound to affect the perceptions of other countries.

On the other hand, I believe that other countries have seen enough of American political campaigns to know that candidates sometimes get carried away with the exuberance of their speechwriters, and therefore I think it will be seen in the correct perspective as the campaign—

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on your remarks about U.S.-Soviet relations, you said the United States has the military capacity and the political will to resist. Other than rhetoric, how has the United States demonstrated either of those capacities in the past few weeks?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* In the past few weeks there has been no occasion to demonstrate that capacity.

*Q. I am speaking more of will than military capacity.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I can only speak for the Administration. The Administration believes that we have the military capacity. And we certainly have the will to resist any expansionist moves, any irresponsible actions.

We believe also that, after an understandable readjustment in the executive-congressional balance, that within the Congress there is a growing realization that in times of crisis, decisive American action may be necessary. What the congressional reaction will be in specific circumstances can of course not be determined until the circumstances arise.

*Q. Well, one of the charges that's been leveled against the Administration is of an unwillingness to use some of the web of relationships that you've built up over the past couple of years with the Soviet Union—to withhold from the Soviets, for example, some of the scientific information, or the wheat, as in the grain deal. Can you give one instance where the United States, over the past few months, has implemented any of these tools?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The fact is that as a result of legislative actions, this web of relationships exists more in the imagination of some writers than in reality.

There are no technological exchanges of any significance that could have been interrupted. The only item of any significance that was available for interruption was the sale of grain.

As you know, the Administration is already being accused of having interrupted that for four months last year, and it is obvious that a major trading relationship cannot be interrupted every three months and still be available as a part of a fabric of the overall relationship.

Except for that, there are no significant exchanges in which the government partici-

pates that could have been interrupted. We did interrupt those items that were mostly of a discussion nature that were available to us to indicate our displeasure with the actions that had been taken. But—I repeat—the United States will use the tools it has available; and it would have used more tools had they been made available, in case there were irresponsible actions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you seeing any reaction whatsoever—in any positive form—to these warnings that you have been sounding since February? You have said that U.S.-Soviet relations cannot survive another Angola. Are you not having greater difficulty distinguishing between the validity of maintaining these two tracks than you have had before, if the weight that you are putting and you are emphasizing here is so heavy on the danger the Soviet Union is putting on the maintenance of the total relationship?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I'm not absolutely sure that I understand all the ramifications of the question.

*Q. Try any one of them.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* But as I understand the question, of course there haven't been any more Angolas since January. I would not consider that conclusive within any four-month period; and I believe that the Soviet Union is taking stock, just as we are, of the significance of recent events.

I can only repeat that the basic validity of our two-track approach remains in effect.

Of course, in specific periods it may be that one has to put more emphasis on one side rather than the other.

At this point, we have to warn against the dangers of irresponsible actions because there is a danger of irresponsible action. But we would also emphasize that we are prepared to work for a better relationship and the choice is essentially up to the Soviet Union.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if I can go back to an earlier question here and your answer about the American commitment to black majority rule in Africa—the Administration is on record as opposing the Byrd amendment but*

*doesn't really do anything to get it repealed. You made strong statements reaffirming the commitment to black majority rule only after the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened in Angola. And the only question was: How are you going to make credible now, in view of this past history, this commitment and this desire for change in southern Africa?*

### **Achievement of African Objectives**

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, that will be one of the problems on my African trip; and I think that the decision that will have to be made by African countries, as by us, is to what extent they want to continue discussions about the past or to what extent they are willing to turn to the future.

There have been periods, for example, in our Middle East policy when it would have been equally correct to say that the United States did not pursue an extremely active Middle East policy. When we decided that the time was right to move—for whatever reason—we became more active.

The same is true in Africa. I am going to Africa with an open mind and with the intention of working together with African nations to achieve those objectives which we share. It is now up, in part, to the African nations to see with what attitude they will respond.

We will certainly go with an attitude of good will and with an open mind and with some concrete ideas, which we are prepared to modify, of how these objectives—both in the political field and in the economic field—can be realized.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, President Kaunda [of Zambia] and President Nyerere [of Tanzania] have both advocated that war is probably the only solution for the racial problem. The leaders of the black African movement in Rhodesia have described your visit as an attempt to set up a puppet regime of Africans. Do you think you might be missing the boat on this one? Are you going in a little bit too late?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, that remains to

be seen. We certainly do not go to set up a puppet regime. It is beyond our capabilities, and it is beyond our intentions.

The only successful African policy is one in which African nations can achieve African objectives without outside intervention. Whether war is the only means available depends in part on the progress of negotiations between, especially, the Rhodesian regime and the black liberation movements in that area.

We have strongly supported the urgent resumption of negotiations. We have also supported the proposals put forward by the then British Foreign Secretary Callaghan.

So I believe that it may be possible to achieve these objectives by peaceful means, and that is certainly our preference.

### **Complex Situation in Lebanon**

*Q. Before you go ahead, may I ask three related Mideast questions?*

*First of all, has any compromise been reached on the transition funds for Israel?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* To the best of my knowledge, no.

*Q. Secondly, has there been any change in the U.S. position regarding whether Israel should negotiate with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No.

*Q. And, third, what's your current assessment of the situation in Lebanon and the number of Syrian troops now in Lebanon?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the situation in Lebanon remains precarious. You have many factions, with partially incompatible objectives. You have the total absence, at this moment, of a central authority with its own means of enforcing its directives. Now you have a precarious cease-fire. You have an attempt to work out a constitutional solution.

And over all of this hangs the threat of various kinds of outside intervention, some by countries in the area, some by countries outside of the area.

Now, we're attempting to assist the

parties in walking through this minefield, in avoiding outside intervention, in achieving a political solution that preserves a degree of autonomy for both of the communities and that preserves the integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon.

There has been some Syrian military intervention in the border areas. There has not been a massive military intervention in the key areas.

We are opposed to the military intervention of outside countries, and we have repeatedly pointed out the factual situation that there is a flashpoint at which events could become irreversible.

Up to now, we think that the general evolution in Lebanon has moved in the direction of a constitutional solution which preserves a position for both of the communities. And we believe also that the best way to prevent outside intervention is to bring about this constitutional solution within Lebanon as rapidly as possible.

I think we have announced that Ambassador [L. Dean] Brown—who has done an outstanding job—is returning for consultations. I'm meeting with him in London tomorrow night, and then he's coming back to the United States.

His assignment was always to be a temporary assignment. He will return briefly to Lebanon, and then he will be replaced by Ambassador Meloy [Francis E. Meloy, Jr.] in the first part of May.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could take us into your confidence and share some of your private thoughts with us. That is essentially the question that Barry [Barry Schweid, Associated Press] put to you before.*

*What are you not doing in order to accommodate to the political requirements of President Ford under attack by Senator Jackson and Governor Reagan? What areas of American foreign policy are now languishing—loitering, so to speak—because you find yourself hampered by political requirements?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, it would be

very difficult to answer this in absolute terms. There are no occasions when the President and I meet where he would say, "We cannot do this for political reasons."

On the other hand, it is clear that when there are so many candidates in the field, and when there's a possibility of being accused of political motivations in making a dramatic move, that there is a temptation—or a tendency—to defer dramatic moves that could be seen as being politically motivated until that particular element of discord is removed. And that is not so much because of any immediate controversy but because of the necessity that our foreign policy be seen as the foreign policy of a unified country and not as being inspired by partisan maneuvers.

So, on the whole, I think it is true that as foreign countries look at the United States every four years, there is a certain slowdown in new initiatives that can be carried out. This is part of the price we pay for our free political process. It seems to happen every four years. And it is unavoidable, to some extent—though compressing the political campaign would not hurt our foreign policy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, just a second ago, when you said that there was a threat of some outside intervention in Lebanon from countries outside of the area—not only from countries—were you referring to the Soviet Union?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not believe that there is any immediate threat of Soviet intervention in the area. There's the general danger that in case of a Middle East war that outside powers might be drawn in, at least, in the form of confrontations, as has happened in every other Middle East confrontation.

Jerry [Jeremiah O'Leary, Washington Star].

#### **Purpose of Visit to Africa**

*Q. With respect to your forthcoming trip to Africa, you state you're in favor of majority rule. Why hasn't the Administration*



*made a concerted effort to repeal the Byrd amendment? There was an attempt by some Congressmen to do that in the last two weeks, but they said they couldn't do it unless there was Administration support.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* In the last few weeks there was an attempt to hang a repeal of the Byrd amendment on another piece of legislation. I would expect that after my return from Africa we will take another look at the Byrd amendment, and we will make our position clear to the Congress insofar as it isn't clear today.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up that, is the United States ready to do anything to limit our economic relations with South Africa; and are we ready to give any kind of support, economic or otherwise, to any of the liberation groups, particularly Rhodesian groups?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the United States has already restricted its economic contact—its governmental economic contact with South Africa—but we will announce an integrated policy after my trip to Africa, after I've had an opportunity to meet with key leaders, and after I have had an opportunity to report to the President for any decisions that he may want to make.

*Q. Will it be any specific objective, Mr. Secretary, of yours on this trip to try to get negotiations between the Smith regime and the black nationalist government of—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would not say this is a specific objective by which you can measure the trip. We strongly favor the resumption of negotiations on Rhodesia at the earliest possible occasion. The primary objective of the trip is to establish with African leaders a community of concerns with respect to the problem of the political evolution of southern Africa and with respect to the problem of development which affects Africa more than any other region of the world, since all of its countries are really developing countries.

It's for this reason that I'm returning from Dakar clear across the continent to

head our delegation at the UNCTAD Conference [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] in Nairobi—to put forward what I hope will be considered constructive American proposals to the general problem of development.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in what country will you meet with the black leaders of Rhodesia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Probably in Zambia.

*Q. Mr. Nkomo [Joshua Nkomo, African National Council], and who else?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We will see as the trip develops. But certainly Mr. Nkomo.

### **MIA's and Normalizing U.S.-Hanoi Relations**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been nearly a year since the fall of Saigon. You have had an exchange of messages with the leaders in Hanoi. What is your evaluation of the prospects toward normalization?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The leaders in Hanoi developed certain patterns of dealing with us during the Vietnamese war which are not always conducive to improving relations between the United States and Hanoi. They have a tendency to proceed by the formulation of ultimatums and to suffer from the misapprehension that we need an improved relationship with Hanoi in order to affect the outcome of our elections. I have read this in various newspaper accounts in Hanoi.

As far as the United States is concerned, our principal interest is to get an accounting for the missing in action. And there is no possibility of improving our relationship without an accounting for the missing in action.

If Hanoi believes that we are doing this in order to affect the outcome of the election, we are perfectly prepared to wait for discussions until after the election and thereby remove this particular issue.

We have stated publicly that we are, in principle, prepared to have talks with Hanoi in which each side will be free to raise any issue that it wishes and that then the outcome of these talks can determine whether

there is a sufficient basis for normalizing relations.

As far as we are concerned, the absolute precondition is a complete accounting for the missing in action.

### Response to Cuban Attitudes

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to have been something of a disparity between your statements on relations with Cuba and the President's. The President said that it was all over in attempts to achieve some kind of normalization. You said it was interrupted. And the President said that Castro was an "international outlaw," and you didn't.*

*I ask now, in light of this apparent disparity, what has to be done to get some kind of attempt at normalization with Cuba going again? And how do you implement the hijacking agreement with a man who has been termed an international outlaw?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President has a more plastic way of expressing himself than I do—or I may have a more complicated way of expressing myself.

We, of course, are prepared to implement the hijacking agreement, and we do not approve of any activities that may be mounted from American territory against Cuban shipping.

There is no possibility of continuing any discussions with Cuba about normalization of relations as long as Cuban military forces are stationed in Africa, and as long as Cuba continues the attacks on America—on American policy in Puerto Rico and elsewhere.

So, unless there is a substantial change in Cuban attitudes, the process of improving relations can be considered suspended.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about the status of the Hawk missile deal with Jordan. Has it fallen through? Is it true that it is out of the question?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Hawk missile deal with Jordan, which was originally computed primarily on the basis of hardware, when the additional collateral costs became

evident went beyond what Saudi Arabia had originally promised to Jordan. There are now discussions going on between Jordan and Saudi Arabia and between the United States and Saudi Arabia to see whether Saudi Arabia would be prepared to support the additional costs that would be involved in the Hawk deal.

These discussions are still going on, and until we have a conclusive answer we cannot tell whether the Hawk deal can be implemented.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what did you mean when you said the President has a "plastic way" of expressing himself?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You are absolutely determined that I ruin myself before I get off to Africa. [Laughter.]

*Q. Plastic melts in heat. I don't understand the term.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not aware that plastic melts in heat. I think that the President's use of adjectives is more graphic than mine because, being from the Teutonic tradition, you cannot tell what a sentence of mine means until I place the verb at the end of it. [Laughter.]

### Perception of U.S. Policy in Election Year

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it a fair summary of your response to Bernie Kalb's question that there will be no new initiatives in dealings with the Soviet Union—what? Until the Republican Convention or until the election? Until Reagan is out of the way? What are you saying exactly?*

*Q. Mr. Secretary—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Wait a minute. Do you want to answer the question?

*Q. No. [Laughter.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I understood Bernie Kalb's question, it was in the great philosophical tradition of these press conferences.

*Q. Yes.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* And he asked me to give a brief political science lecture on the impact of political campaigns on the conduct of foreign policy, and I stated, as a general proposition, that those new initiatives that might be considered by the public as being motivated by partisan considerations would tend to be deferred until it is clearer that they are not motivated by partisan considerations—if they can be deferred.

On the other hand, there are many well-established policies, including SALT, which the President reaffirmed again yesterday, basic relationships with Western Europe, basic relationships with Japan and other areas, as well as new African policies, that will of course be pursued with energy and conviction during the campaign.

I simply responded in a philosophical way to a philosophical question, and you should not draw—

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can I strip my question of the philosophy now, and take you to the specifics? Can you itemize, for example, what initiatives might in fact be deferred because they might be perceived, as you suggest, as deriving from partisan consideration? What would you feel is being in fact put off until the election?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, I didn't say that matters would be put off until the election. I stated the fact that as far as foreign governments are concerned, the perception of the United States in an election year, with all the controversy that is going on about basic policies and our basic intentions, tends to be that in an election year there is a slowdown on great new initiatives.

There is no specific initiative, as I specifically pointed out, which has been deferred as a result of the electoral campaign. But it is obvious that the attention of key personnel is focused not exclusively on foreign policy. At least that is my impression.

*Q. To get less philosophical, isn't that—*

*Q. Assistant Secretary [for Inter-American Affairs William D.] Rogers called in*

*Chilean junta Ambassador Manuel Trucco to criticize the continuing violations of human rights in that country and particularly harassment of the Chileans who had met with U.S. Congressmen in Chile recently. This would seem to indicate Administration displeasure with the military regime's policies. But, at the same time, it has been announced that you plan to attend the OAS meeting in Santiago in June, and that possibility has been criticized by some as one that would legitimize that dictatorship's policies. Do you plan to attend the meeting, and could you please respond to the criticism?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The meeting in Santiago is a meeting of all the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere. It is a meeting of the OAS in Santiago. All other foreign ministers, with one possible exception, are planning to attend.

The purpose of my visit to this meeting would be to continue discussions about our Western Hemisphere policy with my Latin American colleagues. And when I go, if I go, which is highly probable, I would plan to visit those countries in Latin America, or most of those countries in Latin America, that I did not have an opportunity to visit on my first trip.

#### **Panama Canal Negotiations**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't the negotiation on the Panama Canal an example of the sort of thing that is being deferred until after the election? And in that connection, doesn't the controversy over the canal in a way help your negotiating position, to show how much opposition and how slowly you have to go?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't want to encourage any more of the statements which we have suffered with respect to the Panama Canal.

With respect to the Panama Canal, there are a number of key issues that have to be settled before we can be sure that an agreement is possible.

We believe that the basic issue is under

what conditions the free and open and neutral access through the canal, which is essential for the United States, can best be guaranteed, and under what conditions our relationships with the Western Hemisphere, with other nations of the Western Hemisphere, can best be preserved.

It is our judgment that the negotiations that are now going on are the best way of doing this. Their pace is importantly determined by the ability to settle specific issues, and the degree to which the current debate influences the negotiating process can be argued on both sides.

*Q. Mr. Secretary there is a recent report that the State Department not only knew of some overseas payoffs by American corporations regarding arms sales, but also in some cases the Department asked officials to assist in those arms sales. Ambassador Akins [James E. Akins, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia] is supposed to testify on that next month.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think those statements are absolutely irresponsible. The only case that has come to my attention, which was after it was published in a newspaper, involved a request to us by the Defense Department to clarify some requests that, in turn, had been made to the Defense Department with respect to some fees, not with respect to some payoffs.

We sent a routine cable, which was done at a very low level on a routine basis, to find out the Saudi perception of their legal obligations. It was quite the opposite of what has been alleged. It was not an attempt to bring about a payment, but to determine what the legal status of this particular incident was.

And I welcome Ambassador Akins testifying about this.

*Q. Why do you think he had a different perception of those cables than you do?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Because he has retired as Ambassador, and he has been going through his cables at a frantic rate. [Laughter.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, concerning your stop-over in Paris, will you be discussing with the French Government the proposal by a group of French parliamentarians that the French set up some kind of safeguarding peace force in Lebanon once the new government has been formed?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have no particular agenda to discuss in Paris.

Of course, France, with its long tradition of relationships in Africa, will—I would expect its leaders will want to discuss my impressions of the African trip.

Also, we are looking forward to the visit of President Giscard d'Estaing to this country, and I expect to discuss with him in general terms a possible agenda of his meeting with President Ford.

Finally, with respect to Lebanon, France again has had a historic relationship. There have been French missions to Lebanon. We have exchanged information during this recent crisis. I do not plan to discuss any particular solution or any particular French role in Lebanon or in the solution of the Lebanese crisis, but I will be prepared to discuss it if my French hosts would care to raise it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the President said, as I understand him, that his purpose in the Panama Canal negotiations is to retain U.S. rights to control, maintenance, and defense through the life of the pending treaty. Is that your perception of the negotiations? Is that the perception of the Panamanians, as you understand it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is substantially my perception of the negotiations. But in any event, the United States, regardless of control and defense arrangements, will insist on the permanent, free, and neutral and open passage of American ships through the Canal.

*Q. Is the United States willing to share control and maintenance during the life of the treaty?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is correct.

*Q. Since you are going to see black Rhodesian leaders on this trip, will you also see white Rhodesian leaders anywhere?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not plan to see white Rhodesian leaders on this trip.

I do not consider this trip to be the last word in our African policy. I expect it to be the basis from which an integrated African policy will be developed, and therefore we expect to be in contact with other leaders in both black African countries as well as in white southern African countries, or with southern African regimes, after I return to the United States.

*Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.*

## **Secretary Kissinger Discusses Situation in Lebanon**

*While en route to Africa, Secretary Kissinger met with Ambassador L. Dean Brown at London on April 23. Following are remarks to the press after their meeting.*

Press release 195 dated April 24

*Secretary Kissinger:* Ambassador Brown and I have had a very good, very helpful talk.

As you know, Ambassador Brown was sent to Lebanon four weeks ago, taking leave from his position as president of the Middle East Institute, and left with something like 24 hours' notice. At that time, the situation in Lebanon was chaotic, and the danger of outside intervention was very great. In the interval, partly as a result of his extraordinary efforts, we can now talk about the beginning of a restoration of constitutional government in Lebanon.

We discussed such things as the creation of a security force and the danger of the situation in Lebanon escalating into a Middle East crisis has been reduced.

We've repeatedly pointed out that it remains a delicate process and that it could easily be upset by irresponsible actions of

individuals, actions of outside powers. And the U.S. view is that all of the factions, all of the interested outside powers should continue to exhibit the constructive attitude that has brought matters to this point.

Ambassador Brown is going to return to the United States to report to the President. He will then return to Lebanon for a few days, and then he will have completed his mission with great distinction and as a great service to peace in the area—a great service to the foreign policy of the United States.

*Q. What do you mean by the "creation of a security force"?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as you know, the security force in the country—the military forces and the police—disintegrated under the impact of the civil war, and when a new President is elected and the government is reconstituted, one of the obvious problems it will face is how to create a force that is responsive to the government and that can interpose itself between the various factions. And there are some ideas on this subject that are now being explored and with which Ambassador Brown has also been helpful.

*Q. Will there be Lebanese forces or outside forces?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are talking about Lebanese forces drawn perhaps from some of the factions or separately recruited. We don't want to go into any of the details, but we are specifically talking about Lebanese security forces to deal with Lebanese problems.

*Q. Will there be indigenous Palestinians in that security force?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The composition of the security forces is one of the subjects that is under negotiation right now; and I don't think it is for us to speculate as to the elements, but obviously a security force to be effective must be acceptable to all of the parties there and all of the parties that feel threatened.

*Q. What kind of time frame are you talking about?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We, of course, do not control the time frame. Again I must stress the situation is tenuous and delicate, and it has been brought to this point through the constructive attitude of all of the parties. On the assumption that that continues, we would think that the election of a new President could be completed within a two-week period and that the beginning of a return to more normal processes should start immediately after that.

*Q. Has the danger of massive outside intervention been reduced?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is my impression from Ambassador Brown's report that the danger of outside intervention has been reduced. But, of course, if the situation in Lebanon should blow up again, the danger could return.

*Q. Are the Syrian troops still in there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't think there has been any significant change in troop deployment since I answered questions at a press conference yesterday.

*Q. Would the United States play any role—perhaps as a guarantor in case security forces were to be established?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Our basic position has been to avoid intervention by outside powers or to give outside powers the right of intervention, and therefore we would believe that the best solution would be one in which the Lebanese factions agree among themselves as to the creation of the security force.

*Q. What are the prospects for Syrians removing their troops from Lebanon?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, this is a question that will have to be negotiated between the Lebanese and the Syrians, but it is our impression that they are there as part of the immediate situation and not a permanent feature of the Lebanese scene.

*Q. What is the U.S. role in the creation of*

*the security force? Is Ambassador Brown trying to get factions to agree on the compositions or—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think it is fair to say that Ambassador Brown has been one of the very few people who has been in touch with all of the factions—and I say very few, probably the only person in Lebanon—and therefore he has been in a position to carry the views of the various parties to the others. My judgment is that he's played a very useful, in fact, almost decisive role in this diplomatic process.

And we will do as we indicated when we sent Ambassador Brown—he will be ready to do what the parties ask him to do and to help them to move toward common objectives. And when he leaves—in about two weeks—Ambassador Meloy [Francis E. Meloy, Jr.] will replace him to perform again whatever functions—

*Q. Ambassador Brown, did you have any direct or indirect contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization in your negotiations?*

*Ambassador Brown:* I did not.

*Q. Can I ask you something else, if I would, please? In Indianapolis early today, President Ford said there was no prospect the United States will extend diplomatic relations to North Viet-Nam. Some reporters out there sense a contradiction in what you said in the past. What are the prospects and is there any contradiction between your position and the President's?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* President Ford and I meet practically every day, and it is traditional that the foreign policy of the Secretary of State coincides with the foreign policy of the President—a tradition which is not going to be interrupted this year.

As I understand the President's statement, and I have talked to General Scowcroft [Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] in the interval, and I believe the President has spoken in this sense today as well, it was his assessment since—it was the President's

assessment that since we had not been given a satisfactory answer to the missing in action that he saw no prospect of normalizing relations. And therefore the policy of the Administration is as the President expressed it in Hawaii in December. As we've repeated since, we're prepared to talk to North Vietnam, but the absolute precondition before considering any other move is an accounting of the missing in action.

## **U.S. and Greece Initial Principles for Future Defense Cooperation**

*Following is the text of a statement of principles initialed at Washington on April 15 by Secretary Kissinger and Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitri S. Bitsios, together with the texts of a letter from Foreign Minister Bitsios to Secretary Kissinger dated April 7 and Secretary Kissinger's reply dated April 10.*

### **STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES**

#### **PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE FUTURE UNITED STATES-GREEK DEFENSE COOPERATION**

1. The Governments of the United States of America and Greece will complete as soon as possible a new defense cooperation agreement to replace the 1953 United States-Greek military facilities agreement and other related agreements. The United States Government will submit this Agreement to Congress for approval.

2. The new Agreement will be designed to modernize the United States-Greek defense relationship reflecting the traditionally close association between the United States and Greece and the mutuality of their defense interests in the North Atlantic Alliance.

3. This new Agreement will define the status and set forth the terms for operations of military installations in Greece where United States personnel are present. It will

be similar to the United States-Turkish Agreement and will embody, *inter alia*, the following principles:

(A) Each installation will be a Greek military installation under a Greek commander.

(B) The installations shall serve only purposes authorized by the Government of Greece. Their activities shall be carried out on the basis of mutually agreed programs.

(C) There shall be participation of Greek personnel up to 50% of the total strength required for agreed joint technical operations and related maintenance activities and services of the facilities and there shall be provisions for the training of such personnel for this purpose.

(D) All intelligence information including raw data produced by the installations shall be shared fully by the two Governments according to mutually agreed procedures. A joint use plan for the United States forces communications system in Greece shall be agreed upon.

(E) The Agreement shall remain in effect for four years and there shall be provisions for the termination thereof before its expiration, as well as for its renewal.

(F) Within this framework there shall be annexes to this Agreement covering each major installation (Nea Makri, Souda Bay, Iraklion), the United States element at the Hellenikon Greek Air Force Base, as well as annexes dealing with status of forces (SOFA), and command and control.

(G) The annex covering Souda Bay will be a revision of the 1959 Souda Bay Agreement. Meanwhile it is understood that United States operations at this airfield will be in accordance with the 1959 Agreement.

(H) It is understood that, pending the conclusion of the new Agreement within a reasonable time, United States operations now being conducted from facilities in Greece, which serve mutual defense interests, will be allowed to continue.

4. As an integral part of the new defense cooperation agreement, provision will be made for a four-year commitment to Greece of military assistance totaling 700 million

dollars, a part of which will be grant aid. This commitment will be designed to further develop the defense preparedness of Greece and meet its defense needs in pursuit of North Atlantic Alliance goals.

WASHINGTON, *April 15, 1976.*

## EXCHANGE OF LETTERS <sup>1</sup>

### Foreign Minister Bitsios' Letter, April 7

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you are aware, the signing of a new defense cooperation agreement between the United States and Turkey creates problems and raises serious apprehensions in Greece. In light of this development, I will want to discuss with you how we should deal with the status of American facilities in Greece.

Meanwhile, I would appreciate having your position on the United States attitude toward the resolution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and particularly on the danger of a serious deterioration in the situation in the Aegean. I would also like to know in what way the United States Government envisions its agreement with Turkey as contributing to the achievement of a speedy and just solution to the Cyprus question in light of previous assurances that the United States would make a major effort to this effect.

I believe your responses to these questions will assist my Government in formulating its policy. I hope they will be adequate to dissipate our concern to the benefit of both our countries and the Western Alliance as a whole.

DIMITRI S. BITSIOS  
*Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Republic of Greece*

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<sup>1</sup> Texts from press release 180 dated Apr. 15.

### Secretary Kissinger's Letter, April 10

DEAR MR. MINISTER: Thank you for your letter of April 7 in which you posed some questions regarding United States policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. I welcome this opportunity to make our position clear with regard to these issues.

You have asked about our attitude toward the resolution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and particularly in the Aegean area. In this regard I should like to reiterate our conviction that these disputes must be settled through peaceful procedures and that each side should avoid provocative actions. We have previously stated our belief that neither side should seek a military solution to these disputes. This remains United States policy. Therefore the United States would actively and unequivocally oppose either side's seeking a military solution and will make a major effort to prevent such a course of action.

I should like to re-emphasize, with regard to Cyprus, that the United States remains fully committed to the objective of an early and just settlement of this issue. As I said in my United Nations address, the present dividing lines in Cyprus cannot be permanent. There must be just territorial arrangements. We intend to contribute actively in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem that will preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

With regard to the defense relationship between Greece and the United States, I believe it would be useful if you could come to Washington to discuss this issue in detail. I would welcome an opportunity to discuss with you other subjects of mutual interest as well. At that time we could agree on the framework of a new defense cooperation agreement between the United States and Greece that would benefit both of our countries and contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.



## Department Reviews Major Issues Before Forthcoming Meeting of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

*Statement by Paul H. Boeker*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the fourth ministerial session of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV).

The UNCTAD Conference, to be held in Nairobi from May 3 to 28, comes at an important juncture in the course of relations between developing countries and industrial countries, particularly the United States. At the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly last fall, the United States offered a comprehensive, constructive program to address the critical developmental problems of the developing countries, which we pledged to pursue in a pragmatic step-by-step way if developing countries would join us in this effort. The developing countries accepted this challenge and in the consensus resolution of the seventh special session suspended the confrontational politics of the preceding period in favor of an era of negotiation of joint responses to the development problem.

Since last September, the United States and other countries have invested considerable effort to make this endeavor successful.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittees on International Resources, Food and Energy, on International Economic Policy, on International Organizations, and on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations on Apr. 26. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

We have done so because economic progress of developing countries fosters economic growth here, because we seek to strengthen their attachment to an international economic system that has served us well, and because we wish to encourage moderation and cooperation on the part of these countries in international relations generally.

Progress so far in implementing the program agreed at the seventh special session has been encouraging:

—In December 1975, the ministers of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation launched the North-South dialogue. Meetings of the commissions established at the ministerial meeting have been held monthly since February 1976 to prepare for a second ministerial meeting late this year.

—In January 1976, the finance ministers of the International Monetary Fund's Committee of Twenty set in place a series of measures promising strengthened economic security for developing countries in a turbulent era of international monetary relations. Responding to U.S. proposals, a very significant expansion of the IMF's financing for export earnings stabilization was endorsed, and a Trust Fund, financed through profits from IMF gold, was established for the poorest developing countries. Also, regular financing from the IMF was expanded by almost half. All of these measures were con-

cluded with the particular needs of the developing countries in mind.

—This spring, draft articles have been agreed for a new International Fund for Agricultural Development.

—The multilateral trade negotiations have been launched, with a particular focus on expanding trade opportunities for developing countries.

—The resources of several international development institutions have been increased or are in the process of being so.

### **Response to Developing Countries' Concerns**

The task of UNCTAD IV will be to carry this work further and to fill in the framework of the seventh special session program in those areas of particular concern to UNCTAD. As a universal forum and one created exclusively to address problems of development, UNCTAD is of special importance to developing countries. A poor outcome in Nairobi would thus affect the broader North-South dialogue in other forums. A poor showing at UNCTAD IV would also be a setback for efforts to find positive and constructive ways to promote growth and economic security among developing countries.

UNCTAD IV also comes at a sensitive time for our industrial allies. They are more dependent on the developing countries than we are for trade and for sources of critical raw materials. They feel perhaps more than we do an imperative to be responsive to the problems of the Third World. Yet they look very much to the United States for leadership, for without us global development cooperation cannot prosper. Therefore an element of our strategy for UNCTAD IV is to work with other industrial countries in formulating consensus programs to address the problems of economic security and growth of developing countries.

Equally important, we must continue to convince the developing world that it has both a stake in and responsibility for improving the functioning of the world economy.

We have contributed much since the Second World War to structure the international system in such a way that trade and fi-

nance would flow more freely between and among countries, that resources would be allocated primarily on the basis of comparative advantage. At present, there are strong underlying tendencies among countries to question the suitability of the international system built since World War II. More and more countries, not only developing countries, are arguing for greater government intervention in the allocative process in order to gain for themselves a greater portion of the benefits that have resulted from expanded trade and unimpeded financial flows.

The developing countries, in particular, do not feel that they have gotten a fair share of the benefits of the remarkable growth since World War II. Our choice is either to assist the developing countries in increasing their benefits within the basic system we have helped to build or to hope—with uncertain prospects—that a broad challenge to, and possible disruption of, that system by others will leave us unscathed. We have chosen the first option.

In preparation for this conference, the developing countries met in Manila in February and formulated what is referred to as the Manila Declaration and Program of Action. It lays out developing countries' perceptions of their problems and their approaches to resolving them.

The Manila Declaration emphasizes three major issues to be discussed at UNCTAD IV: commodities, debt, and transfer of technology. The declaration represents, of course, a political compromise. On substantive matters, there are significant differences in emphasis among developing countries. The Africans place the highest priority on commodity issues. The poorer developing countries, particularly South Asians, feel that debt relief is the most pressing problem. Finally, the Latin American countries, which in general are further along in the development process, want to focus on transfer of technology. Our presentation at UNCTAD IV will focus on these three issues.

We want to be as forthcoming as possible, consistent with our national interest, on the substantive issues of major concern to de-

veloping countries: commodities, debt, and technology transfer. We want to use the occasion of UNCTAD IV to frankly express our views on these problems and propose concrete action plans and programs to resolve them.

The United States cannot accept all the specific demands made by developing countries on these issues as enunciated in the Manila Declaration and Program of Action. But it is clearly in our interest to respond constructively to their general concerns, many of which we share. By presenting workable alternatives to developing-country demands which offer positive approaches to solving their fundamental problems, we hope to maintain U.S. leadership and industrial countries' unity in an international effort to achieve economic security and growth for less developed countries in an atmosphere of consensus and cooperation.

#### **Approach to Commodity Problems**

In commodities, the developing countries will seek acceptance of the integrated commodities program developed by the UNCTAD Secretariat. The central feature of this program is a common fund for financing international buffer stocks. The integrated commodities program contains many aspects which we can support, but the common fund strikes us as a very questionable allocation of capital for development cooperation. In a sense the common fund creates financing before agreement is reached on what is to be financed.

We believe that any comprehensive approach to commodity problems must be based on four fundamental elements: (1) producer-consumer consultation and case-by-case commodity negotiations, (2) earnings stabilization for commodity exports of developing countries, (3) adequate arrangements for resource development in developing countries to prevent erosion of their market position, and (4) improved market access for commodities and processed products of developing countries.

In the area of commodity consultation, the United States favors establishment of a

consumer-producer forum for each of the major commodities in international trade. While most would undoubtedly lead to forms of cooperation other than commodity agreements, the United States has indicated in a number of cases, most recently tin and coffee, that we are willing to participate in agreements we find meet our interests.

For most developing countries, however, arrangements for export earnings stabilization offer more direct benefits than price stabilization efforts. Because of the broader benefits of earnings stabilization, the United States has placed particular stress on this technique for addressing commodity earnings fluctuations of developing countries. We are gratified at the considerable benefits developing countries are deriving from the liberalized facilities of the International Monetary Fund, which the United States proposed.

To maintain and, if possible, improve their trade position in commodities, developing countries will have to invest heavily and attract investment in agricultural and natural resource production. Unfortunately the prospects here are not bright, and the trends are more in the direction of increased self-sufficiency for industrial countries in commodities and growing import dependence for developing countries, particularly for food. To help meet this problem, the United States has offered to support a new International Fund for Agricultural Development. We also hope new mechanisms can be developed to revive investment in mineral and energy resources in developing countries on a basis compatible with their political and economic aspirations.

To improve market access for developing countries we will take a number of steps in the multilateral trade negotiations. We have made a comprehensive offer on tropical products trade. We also plan a major attack on tariff escalation as it affects processed commodity products of developing countries.

In addition we are willing to address the problem of financing for buffer stock arrangements when these are found by producers and consumers to be a necessary part

of an agreed commodity arrangement.

A program containing these elements will respond constructively to the problems faced by less developed countries in the commodities field while still preserving the case-by-case approach to commodity arrangements that we prefer. This approach would also put greater emphasis on private-sector participation in new and expanded raw material production and in seeking firmer supply-access commitments from producers.

#### **Means of Reducing Need for Debt Relief**

In the broad area of balance-of-payments financing, the Group of 77 have focused their attention on one specific issue: debt problems. They are seeking generalized schemes for debt relief, including debt moratoria for the poorest and most severely affected developing countries, as a means of easing their balance of payments and, over the longer term, to enhance the flow of development assistance.

The United States cannot support generalized debt relief. We believe it would undermine creditor-debtor confidence. Where debt rescheduling is absolutely necessary, we have supported and will continue to support an examination of each situation on a case-by-case basis.

We feel that debt problems are best viewed within the context of a country's overall balance-of-payments financing problems. Taken from this perspective, we believe that the recent expansion of IMF credit facilities, coupled with the growing demand for developing-country exports spurred by economic recovery in industrialized nations, will do much to ease financing constraints and thereby reduce the need for debt relief.

For the poorest developing countries the basic problem is to provide more aid on highly concessional terms. We believe debt forgiveness is not the way to accomplish this. We will, however, support direct approaches to the problem of increased aid for the poorest, on the right terms. We have already led the way in this field by proposing the Trust Fund in the IMF for the poor-

est, by concentrating our bilateral aid on the poorest, and by providing substantial resources to various multilateral soft-loan funds, in particular the World Bank-International Development Association.

#### **Transfer of Technology**

In technology transfer, the less developed countries have placed major emphasis on the proposed code of conduct. The developing countries want to establish a legally binding treaty which clearly defines governmental responsibilities and authority over the technology-transfer mechanism.

The United States favors a system of voluntary guidelines. At UNCTAD IV, we hope to focus on the specific problem areas faced by developing countries and to respond to these problems with a coordinated comprehensive approach.

The technology transfer process comprises three basic stages: the research and development of technology, the transfer mechanisms through which developing countries acquire technology, and the local implementation and utilization of acquired technology. The developing countries perceive problems at each stage within this process, and we are prepared to respond with an action plan to facilitate the flow of technology through all three stages.

Efforts will be made to gear research and development programs more closely to developing-country needs and to adapt existing technology to the requirements of development. As a major conduit for technology transfer, the role of the multinational corporations must be addressed and new means explored for strengthening their contribution in the technology area.

Finally, to strengthen capabilities in developing countries for implementation and utilization of technology, we must explore a series of measures designed to improve their access to technological information, to expand local and regional training centers, and to provide technical advisory services to developing countries.

We are hopeful that U.S. approaches in

ach of these—commodities, financing, and technology transfer—will contribute to a constructive dialogue and conclusions on these important issues at UNCTAD IV. Our objective will be to work toward a result that extends and strengthens the era of constructive negotiation on development issues which the nations of the U.N. embarked upon last fall.

## Outer Space Registration Convention Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Ford<sup>1</sup>

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space, opened for signature at New York on January 4, 1975. For the information of the Senate the report of the Department of State concerning the Convention is also transmitted.

The Convention is designed to provide the international community with a central and public registry of objects launched into outer space. Pursuant to this Convention launching States would be required to submit certain information to the U.N. Secretary-General regarding objects which they launched into outer space. The Convention builds on the foundation of a voluntary system of notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by U.N. Member States of objects they have launched. That voluntary system has now been observed for more than a decade.

The Registration Convention is an appropriate addition to the Outer Space Treaty, the Astronaut Rescue Agreement, and the Liability Convention. The Senate gave its consent to these earlier treaties in the field

of space activities by unanimous vote. I hope that, at an early date, the Senate will also give its strong endorsement to this latest Convention.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 18, 1976.

### TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Aviation

Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933; for the United States October 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000.

*Accession deposited:* Kuwait, August 11, 1975.

*Notification of succession:* Papua New Guinea, November 6, 1975.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.

*Accession deposited:* Ireland, November 24, 1975.

#### Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

*Accession deposited:* Cyprus, April 14, 1976.

#### Law of the Sea

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. TIAS 5578.

*Notice of denunciation:* Senegal, March 1, 1976, effective March 30, 1976.

#### Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720.

*Extended by the United States to:* Midway, Wake, and Johnston Islands, March 18, 1976.

#### Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.

*Extended by the United States to:* Midway, Wake, and Johnston Islands, March 18, 1976.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Mar. 18 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. G, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and the report of the Department of State.

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>  
*Acceptance deposited:* Poland. March 15, 1976.

### Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.  
*Ratification deposited:* Tunisia. April 26, 1976.

### Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109.

*Extended by the United States to:* Midway, Wake, and Johnston Islands, March 18, 1976.

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.<sup>2</sup>

*Extended by United Kingdom to:* Belize, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Gibraltar, Gilbert Islands, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena and Dependencies, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the Island of Cyprus, effective April 1, 1976.

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* United Kingdom, April 2, 1976.<sup>3</sup>

### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284.

*Extended by the United States to:* Midway, Wake, and Johnston Islands, March 18, 1976.

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Belgium, March 19, 1976; Nauru, November 25, 1975.

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Yugoslavia, March 23, 1976.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>3</sup> Applicable to Bailiwick of Guernsey, Bailiwick of Jersey, Belize, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Gibraltar, Gilbert Islands, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Montserrat, Pitcairn Group, St. Helena and Dependencies, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the Island of Cyprus.

### Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

*Ratification deposited:* Togo. April 26, 1976.

### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force June 1, 1976, with respect to certain provisions; July 1976, with respect to other provisions.

*Accession deposited:* Malta, April 28, 1976.

## BILATERAL

### Syria

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of November 20, 1974. Signed at Damascus April 20, 1976. Entered into force April 20, 1976.

## PUBLICATIONS

### GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20401. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**United States Foreign Policy, An Overview/January 1976.** This pamphlet in the General Foreign Policy Series indicates the agenda for priority attention on major foreign policy issues and suggests the conceptual basis from which current foreign policy proceeds. Pub. 8814. General Foreign Policy Series 296. 48 pp. 95¢. (Cat. No. S1.71:8814).

**Trade—Meat Imports.** Agreement with Costa Rica. TIAS 8143. 9 pp. 50¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:8143).

**Claims—Relocation of Military Forces, Supplies and Equipment.** Agreement with France. TIAS 8146. 6 pp. 50¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:8146).

**Air Transport Services.** Agreement with Iran. TIAS 8149. 70 pp. \$1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:8149).

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**Checklist of Department of State  
Press Releases: April 26-May 2**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†203	4/26	Kissinger: departure, Dar es Salaam.
†204	4/26	Kissinger: arrival, Lusaka.
†205	4/27	Kissinger: address, Lusaka.
†206	4/28	Kissinger, Nguza: arrival, Kinshasa.
*207	4/28	Frederick Irving sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (biographic data).
†208	4/28	Joint U.S.-Zaire communique.
†209	4/28	Kissinger, Nguza: news conference, Kinshasa.
†210	4/28	Kissinger, Nguza: toasts, Kinshasa.
†211	4/30	Kissinger: remarks, Monrovia.
†211A	4/30	Kissinger: arrival, Monrovia.
†211B	5/1	Kissinger: departure, Monrovia.
*212	4/30	Study Group 1 of the U.S. National Committee for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee, June 2.
*213	4/30	Shipping Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Maritime Law, June 18.
†214	5/1	Kissinger: arrival, Dakar.
†215	5/1	Kissinger: toast, Dakar.
†216	5/2	Kissinger: departure, Dakar.

\* Not printed.  
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.