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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at Annual Meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors

Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger, together with the transcript of a panel discussion and question-and-answer session with members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington on April 13. Members of the panel were James Thomson, Jr., curator, Nieman Foundation; Benjamin Read, chairman, Marshall Fund; Chalmers M. Roberts, former diplomatic correspondent, the Washington Post; and Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., the Washington Star. George Chaplin, vice president of the society and editor of the Honolulu Advertiser, was the moderator.[1]

Press release 174 dated April 13

The only point that I really want to make about the conduct of foreign policy is to stress the difference between the analysis of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign policy. The analyst has available any amount of time that he wishes. There is no overwhelming compulsion to write an editorial on any given day. And there are many days that would be happier if such compulsion that exists were resisted. [Laughter.] But the policymaker has to operate in a very limited time frame. His responses very often are closer to those of an athlete than to those of a thinker—in the sense that events crowd in on him very rapidly and he has to respond to them in a very limited time frame. And I would like to emphasize that the overwhelming aspect of decisions at a high level is the confusion as to the state of facts.

I mention this because there has lately been—in fact, over the last decade—an increasing problem about credibility as between the press and the government. And while no doubt the government has sometimes misled the press, either deliberately or unintentionally, I think it is important to keep in mind that sometimes by giving the best explanation and the best statement of events there is an inevitable element of confusion.

Secondly, the essence of policymaking is to project the future; and with respect to this, it is important to keep in mind that when the scope of action is greatest, the facts on which to base such action are at a minimum. When the facts are available, the scope for action has very frequently disappeared.

In 1936, one French division could have stopped the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, and we would today still be arguing about whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination. By 1941 we all knew what Hitler was, and it was a knowledge that had to be acquired at the cost of tens of millions of lives. So today when we argue about Angola or about Turkey or about other issues, we have to remember we are doing it on the basis of projections that cannot be proved true when they are made—which is in itself an invitation to demagoguery and which in any event adds an element of uncertainty to the debate.

And finally, some policymakers are responsible not only for the best that could happen but also for the worst that could happen. They do not have the luxury of projecting only the most favorable circumstances of certain events. They must keep in mind also what will occur if these events

[1] Mr. Chaplin's introduction of Secretary Kissinger and the opening paragraphs of the Secretary's remarks are not printed here.

do not turn out as was predicted.

I would apply this to the current debate about the advent of Communist parties to governments in Western Europe. It is not impossible to project favorable scenarios. But the policymaker does not have the possibility, after the event, of saying: "I made a terrible mistake, and I am now going to write another book or another editorial." His decisions are largely irrevocable.

Now, with respect to our foreign policy, I understand that it has been described as acrobatic rather than as architectural; and I noticed there are many people who are working on taking the safety net away, too. [Laughter.]

It goes without saying that I reject all such comments as biased, malicious, or one-sided—or all three put together. But if an acrobat may make an architectural comment [laughter], what we have attempted to do was to guide American foreign policy in a period of transition between a time when American strength was preeminent and a period when America will have to conduct foreign policy the way most nations in history have had to conduct it.

Through most of the postwar period, our decisions in foreign policy—and, to a significant extent, even in defense policy—could be made more or less unilaterally. We were not dealing with any country of roughly equivalent power, nor were we facing a situation where other parts of the world—such as Europe and Japan and the developing nations—were gaining in strength and self-confidence and had a desire to play a more significant role in the shaping of the international order.

And finally, America, after its tremendous exertions in the postwar period—the American public was reaching a point where the exclusive assumption by the United States of responsibility in the world was no longer acceptable.

So, for all of these reasons, we have tried to develop a policy which was geared less to cycles of confrontation and retreat—less to emotional commitments to favorite governments—but we have tried to develop a conception of permanent interests. And th is a difficult process for the United Stat because all of our traditions tend to ru counter to it—the idealistic tradition tha tends to unite us with like-minded peopl the pragmatic tradition that waits for problem to arise before we deal with it, th legalistic tradition that tries to deal wit issues in terms of the framework of inte national law.

But I believe that in East-West relatio we have had the problem of both containin the growth of Soviet power and keepin open the option of a future not exclusivel dependent on a balance of terror, constantl contested.

In relations with Western Europe ar Japan we have had to adjust—and I believ we have adjusted successfully—to the greater self-confidence and the necessity (their playing a greater role.

In relation to the developing countries, a the seventh special session [of the U.N General Assembly] and in other, forthcon ing meetings, on trips to Latin America ar Africa, we will lay out an agenda—all (which are building blocks. They cannot l completed in any one Administration. An if they are to be meaningful, they must l carried out by other Administrations over a indefinite period of time.

We are now in an election year; but v must not create the impression abroad th American foreign policy is subject to tot revision at regular intervals, because that itself becomes an element of instability. It essential that we have a debate, but it is al essential that the reality that the choices (a nation are not infinite be faced as well.

And finally, I would like to stress that believe that we have gone through a deca of national trauma and that sometimes i the relations between the press and the go ernment the attitudes are those of genera who endlessly fight old battles over and ov again. What we need in this country over th next decade or so, if we are going to complet the architectural task that is inevitable an that is necessary for world peace, is som confidence in ourselves, some compassion an

understanding of the complexity of decision-making.

And while I recognize that the relationship of the press to government is importantly and healthily an adversary relationship, as Americans we are also partners in a common task and we must never forget that the peace and progress of the world depends finally on American vision and on American constancy.

Relationship With People's Republic of China

Mr. Chaplin: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. There comes now a question-and-answer period, with questions by our distinguished panel here in the front of the room. And if there is time later, we will go to the floor for questions.

Just to start things rolling, I might ask the Secretary if he would comment on how much exposure he's had to the new Premier of the People's Republic of China and how long he thinks it might take for that situation to settle into some form of stability.

Secretary Kissinger: I have never met the new Premier of China, and I have had occasion to say previously that we really know very little more than is publicly available about the debates that are now going on inside China.

It is our impression that, as of now, the basic direction of Chinese foreign policy is not affected by the domestic changes that have taken place there. But we have had, on the governmental level, no contact with the new Prime Minister.

Mr. Thomson: May I answer, to follow up briefly on that question, by citing East Asian specialists, both outside the government and even inside the government, who are beginning to express a fear that we lost, as a nation, a precious opportunity to rectify our relations with China in a more final sense fulfilling the Shanghai communique—through recognizing Taiwan, through keeping a tacit defense agreement and establishing full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. All this to have been done while Chou En-lai was alive—if possible, certainly before Mao passes. Do you feel yourself, sir, some sadness about a lost opportunity in that regard, and do you think it could be retrieved?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that basically the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States is based on necessity. That is to say, we were brought together because international trends produced a certain compatibility of interest.

The issue of Taiwan is, of course, important; and the United States stated certain principles in the Shanghai communique with respect to the issue of Taiwan. But I believe that the dominant factor in the relationship has been the degree to which we have looked at certain problems in international affairs in a parallel manner.

The implementation of the Shanghai communique has faced problems because of domestic upheavals here and domestic upheavals in China. But the direction is clear, and it will be implemented. So I do not believe that that has been a major factor in U.S.-Chinese relations. And I believe that the trends that are taking place in China, and whatever questions there may exist in China, depend much more on their assessment of our capacity to conduct a global policy that understands geopolitical factors than it is tied to Taiwan.

Western European Communist Parties

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned Italy. You have been sounding some alarm bells in Western Europe about Communists getting into Western European countries. And Italy is the obvious instant problem, or almost instant. I wish you would tell us a little bit about what your policy is. And, especially, how do you answer this time the question—the reason, it seems quite evident here—that Italy is contemplating the entry of Communists into the government is that the Christian Democratic Party has run out of steam; it has become a disaster.

Now, in the old days, we used to ship several hundred thousand dollars through the CIA to CD politicians. This is pretty much

over. And, furthermore, it is very questionable whether it would do any good.

How do you bridge, in other words, the gap between what you would call the "conceptual approach," I guess, of not having Communists in the Italian Government and the necessity and the desire of the Italian people to get a government which will make the economic and political reforms that that country so desperately needs?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first I think we ought to be clear on what I said and under what circumstances it was said. I made a fairly considered statement on the subject a few weeks ago in Boston—which, due to the fact that it was not classified, received very little attention. [Laughter.]

I previously met with a group of Ambassadors in London in a session which was supposed to generate a free exchange of ideas—or, at least, a degree of free exchange of ideas as is possible when a Secretary of State meets his Ambassadors. But, at any rate, I made a number of extemporaneous remarks that were designed to generate comment. Those remarks have been very widely reported, and are usually taken as the text of editorials and other discussions. Nevertheless, I don't disavow what I've said or I would not have said them in this manner for publication and for purposes other than for getting a discussion started.

What is the problem with respect to communism in Western Europe? As Secretary of State, I have an obligation to make clear what I believe the consequences of certain events are, even if we cannot necessarily influence them. I believe that the advent of communism in major European countries is likely to produce a sequence of events in which other European countries will also be tempted to move in the same direction.

This, in turn, is going to produce governments with which the degree of cooperation that has become characteristic of Atlantic relations will become increasingly difficult, in which their own internal priorities are going to be away from the concern with defense, which will create new opportunities for outside pressures and toward a more neutralistic conception of foreign policy.

I therefore believe that the United State must not create the impression that it coul be indifferent to such developments. In man respects, we cannot affect it. And if any gov ernment, if any people, votes in a way tha will produce a Communist government o admits a major participation of Communist in that government, we will have to dea with that reality. But we should not delud ourselves that it would not mark a histori change that would have long-term and ver serious consequences.

Now, how you get social and political re form in any individual European country de pends somewhat on your conception. I 1948, faced with a similar situation, th Western countries got together with th United States and developed a program tha produced a social and economic change. I that does not happen in 1976, then perhap the present trends are inevitable. I do no believe they are inevitable. And if they ar inevitable, I do not believe that they ar desirable. And I do not believe that Ameri can leaders should engage in wishful think ing about it. So when I am asked about thi issue, I must point out the serious conse quences. If it happens, we will then have t deal with it; but it will certainly mark historic turning point in Atlantic relation ships.

Mr. Roberts: If my colleagues will forbea a minute, I would like to ask you what I thin is a corollary to that problem. For many year the U.S. Government, long before you got t Washington, was very blind to the Sino Soviet break, to the general change within th Communist world, and to the end of Kremli rule.

Aren't your remarks about Italian Com munists and Western European government based on an assumption equally open to chal lenge, whether one accepts the word of th leadership, for example, of the Italian Com munist Party today? Don't we have enoug experience in the development of the Commu nist world, socialism and Marxism and Lenin ism, or whatever term you want to use, t look at developments like the Italian Com

munist Party, the differenees, say, to the French, the Portuguese, and so on? Are we just reaeting? Are you basing your reaetion on a lot of old assumptions that might be open to challenge?

Mr. Thomson: And if I may just add to that, aren't you, in pushing wishful thinking as the enemy, giving forth what we might call "worst case" thinking?

Secretary Kissinger: I, of course, have to reject all these hypotheses as being based on an insufficient knowledge of the facts. [Laughter.]

But seriously, with respect to the first question: Are the Communist parties in Western Europe dependent on Moscow? My analysis does not depend at all on whether these parties are dependent on Moscow. I don't know whether they follow Moscow or not. Nor does anybody else.

It is impossible to determine what the real convictions are when public statements and electoral self-interest so totally coincide. My concern is that these parties reflect, first, a Leninist internal organization. Secondly, that they would come to power through a set of priorities that would certainly alter the domestic priorities of the country in which they are. And thirdly, at the very best they would conduct a kind of foreign policy that is different in character from the pro-Western foreign policy that has characterized Atlantic relationships.

In the sixties France was governed by President de Gaulle, who was sometimes extremely difficult for the United States to deal with. But nevertheless there was never any question that in moments of crisis De Gaulle was emotionally and substantively a man of the West.

A Communist leader in Western Europe, even if he is technically independent of Moscow, would be in quite the reverse position. He might be extremely difficult for Moscow to deal with, but I doubt whether in a moment of crisis his attitude toward Moscow might not be very similar to that of De Gaulle toward Washington. That is a change of nuance, but that is of great importance.

Secondly, it makes a great deal of difference whether there is an independent Communist government in Eastern Europe or an independent Communist government in Western Europe.

And thirdly, about the "worst case" hypothesis. We are dealing here with one of the situations that I described earlier. Nobody can prove what the tendencies will be. What I predict is my best judgment of what is likely to happen over a historic period—not in the first six months, maybe not even in the first five years. But if you look ahead over a 10-year period, I believe the result of what we are discussing here would be that there will be a Western Europe in which many countries will be in a different moral relationship to the United States than has characterized the entire postwar period.

Now, it is not impossible for the United States to defend countries like this, too. But we would have to do it strictly on balance-of-power grounds, on those grounds which are most foreign to our national genius. And if it is true, which I believe it is, that the United States must have ties to at least one part of the world that go beyond mere balance of power, then I think that this would mark a major change. And I would say this even though I recognized the merit of what you have said, that there may be nothing we can do about it, if the people in Italy or any other country choose to go a different route.

Approaches to Economic and Social Problems

Mr. Read: Mr. Seeretary, absent a Marshall plan or anything like it, and absent a perception of common danger, which was the thread of U.S.-European relations in that earlier phase, do you see anything that could be done, that isn't being done at this stage, that might be called international approaches to domestic problem solving?

It occurs to me that there are in these metropolitan societies which are now in plaee in Europe and here, with the degree of affluence that does exist despite economic ups and downs, that the similarity of problems and

the lessons that can be learned in domestic area after domestic area that we usually think of as having no international tie, would benefit enormously from some of the problem-solving techniques that have been evolved in housing, in transport, in cities, in administration of justice, and in a gamut of domestic problems.

My concern is that we seem to be very badly structured as a government to realize any such opportunities. The large Embassies in West Europe with all of the defense, intelligence, and commercial attachés have no one that perceives his role as following such affairs, not even as reporting on them—the science attachés to a very small degree, but then they do not know the urban scene here. None of the great domestic agencies of government have a single permanent person in Europe—HUD [Housing and Urban Development], Transportation. Can the State Department respond to this, or does it require a new approach in kind?

Secretary Kissinger: First, let me say that I completely agree with you that the economic and social problems that are facing Europe are soluble. Secondly, that the institutions in many respects exist through which they could be approached as the Common Market moves toward political unity. As these many institutions for cooperative action, including the Energy Agency, begin to bite, there will be many opportunities to deal with the economic and social problems. But it is also true that the significance of the economic and social changes and the scope of creative actions are not always fully understood by governments, including our own government.

The State Department is organized to deal with diplomatic exchanges and with—to the greatest extent possible, excluding the Secretary of State from any significant decisions. [Laughter.] But the basic thrust of the State Department, as of any big governmental agency, is to answer day-to-day problems that are generated in the Embassies or here.

Now, how one can get a government organized to deal with the important in addition to the urgent—that I think is a ver valid concern. And I have to tell you can didly I do not believe we are sufficiently we organized to deal with the range of issue that you have raised. When we do deal wit them, we are better organized to deal wit them with relation to developing countrie than with relation to developed countries And we have managed to come forward wit a number of initiatives in the North-Sout dialogue, and we will come forward wit more in May at the UNCTAD [U.N. Confer ence on Trade and Development] meetin But I have to agree that this is an area tha requires greater consistent attention.

Middle East Diplomacy

Mr. Yoder: Mr. Secretary, it seems to m the most striking thing about the things sai by your distinguished opposition critics thi morning, or the most striking premise, wa that the United States was still in a situatio in which it can define problems in the worl and then present its definition for discussio as an agenda. And to this end, on the questio of the Middle East, it was said that generall your diplomacy, your step-by-step diplomac in the Middle East, had taken the proble at the wrong end. What should be done, as understood the proposition, was that th United States should put forward a plan tal ing into account the very long-distance, lon run objectives for a stable peace in that are and then say to the potential belligerents- active or potential belligerents in that case- "Here it is, let's have your remarks on th solution of the problem." Could you commen on that?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. First of all, th difference between our views and those c our critics very significantly concerns th question of timing. We have always recog nized that at some point in the peacemakin process there would have to be a comprehen sive approach rather than a step-by-step ap proach.

The difference between my views an those of my distinguished presumptive suc cessors [laughter] is their retrospectiv

iew that we should have done this in 1973. Now, it can, of course, never be proved what would have been the right policy in 1973. But if you look at the conditions of 1973, in which all of the Arab countries, including Egypt, were considered to be substantially in the Soviet side, in which there were Israeli armies at the outskirts of Cairo and Damascus, in which Western Europe and Japan were suffering and we were suffering from an oil embargo, in which there was a great danger that the war might flare up again and the economic dislocations that had already occurred might become unmanageable.

We thought that it was, above all, important to get the peace process started, to deal with those Arab countries that were willing to take a risk for peace, and then as the parties gained confidence in the process of peace, to move toward progressively bolder steps.

If we had put forward a comprehensive scheme—at least that was our judgment under the conditions that then existed—you must remember also the domestic difficulties that existed in the United States at that period. We thought that the danger of its failing would sharpen the embargo, increase Soviet domination of the countries concerned, and enhance the radicalism of the area.

So we thought it was important to take the specific steps that have been taken and that, while of course they have not solved the problem, have given us the time in which to work on a more comprehensive solution.

I think it is now generally agreed, and Israel agrees, too, that the time for individual steps with individual countries is probably over and that we now have to work on a wider canvas. And I think as events in Lebanon have proved, we are still the country toward which most of the parties in the Middle East look for constructive solutions to the problem.

A year or so down the road, whatever disagreement I may have with the distinguished panel of this morning as to the specifics they would put forward in a comprehensive solution, I think the basic strategy will begin to emerge, so we are only really debating whether that strategy should have been adopted in 1973 and whether time was lost or not. I believe that if we had adopted it in 1973 the danger of a blowup would have been outweighed by anything that could have been achieved at that period.

Mr. Chaplin: I am afraid I have to cut in. The Secretary has a tight schedule, and I think it is only fair to go to the floor for a few minutes and give members an opportunity to ask questions.

I remind you of the rule that members only may ask questions. You should use the mikes which are scattered around the aisles of the room, and kindly identify yourself and your paper, please.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that I am not an expert on anything, I will have to ask this question necessarily briefly. [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: I have trouble with people with accents. [Laughter.]

Q. I don't. [*Laughter.*]

Mr. Secretary, this morning some of your articulate and presumptuous successors had some comments to make about the Middle East, Russia, and Panama. In your judgment, which of those take priority as overriding problems for this country?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe that we can really choose among our problems. I think the relationship between us and the industrial democracies is essential to having a constructive diplomacy; that the relations between us and the Soviet Union are essential for any long-term peace. And I believe that the Middle East is sufficiently explosive so that it could make all other policies fail. And I fear that we cannot set priorities here and that unless we can deal with all of these issues simultaneously, we may not be able to deal with any of them effectively.

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation

Q. Mr. Secretary, a few weeks ago you testified before the Government Operations

Committee, and Senator Ribicoff expressed concern over nuclear proliferation. As I recall, it was his concern that the United States was not working with the Soviet Union to prevent such countries as France and West Germany from peddling nuclear material to terrorist groups and to emerging nations. And I don't think at that time that you fully answered the Senator's questions. Could you answer them today?

Secretary Kissinger: I feel that I answered fully, maybe not satisfactorily.

Q. Could you try again?

Secretary Kissinger: If I remember Senator Ribicoff's proposition, it was that the United States should work with the Soviet Union to impose upon our West European allies certain restraints by making a joint agreement to withhold nuclear materials and, in effect, establishing a U.S.-Soviet condominium.

I pointed out at the time that during the period when the Administration is being attacked for being too conciliatory to the Soviet Union and neglecting our allies, it was not the most self-evident proposal that we should now impose a form of nuclear condominium on our Western European allies together with the Soviet Union. And I pointed out, and I repeat it today, that this would be an extremely fateful step that we are not prepared to take.

Q. How do you propose to prevent the other nations from getting the nuclear materials which Senator Ribicoff wants to keep out of their hands?

Secretary Kissinger: We are working with seven nuclear suppliers at this moment on establishing by agreement, including the Soviet Union but including also the West European countries—we are working with them to establish certain rules for the transfer of nuclear technology. And we have made enormous progress in that respect.

There is only one area in which the West Europeans and we have not reached full agreement yet. And we are going to resum discussions in June. That area is the estab lishment of reprocessing plants in othe countries. We hold the view that they shoul be under multinational control. They ar satisfied if they are under binational contro We have agreed, however, on the kind c safeguards that should be established Therefore I believe that with negotiation resuming in June, with very great progres having already been made so that there ar now agreed safeguards, and so that there i no longer competition between the seven nu clear suppliers about the degree of safe guards, we are not prepared to take the fate ful step of making a bilateral arrangemen with the Soviet Union to bring pressure o our West European allies.

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions, sir. Woul you, on a scale of one to ten, relate to th audience the degree in which President Nixo and President Ford have accepted the wisdo of your counsel? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: I can't do it on scale of one to ten. And besides, I am nc reckless. [Laughter.] And I don't kno whether Rogers Morton will get a recordin of what I am going to say. [Laughter.] Bu in the relationship between either an A sistant to the President and the Presiden or the Secretary of State and the Presiden Dean Acheson made a very wise commer to the effect that this relationship can wor well as long as the Secretary of State alway remembers who is the President.

And the discussions rarely take the forr of an issue in which the President has t give a yes or no answer. Much more fre quently the decisions are shaped over man days and weeks of discussions in which it i very hard to say whose idea dominated a any given moment. I worked very closely o foreign policy matters with President Nixon and I have worked very closely, perhaps ever more frequent contact, with President Ford And I really find it very difficult to rate i on a scale of one to ten.

King Hussein of Jordan Visits Washington

King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made a state visit to Washington March 29–April 1, during which he met with President Ford and other government officials. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and King Hussein at a dinner at the White House on March 30.[1]

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 5

PRESIDENT FORD

Your Majesties and honored guests: It was in 1959 that President Eisenhower had the honor of welcoming you, Your Majesty, to the White House on your first visit to Washington, D.C., and to our country. Fifteen years later, it was my great privilege to greet you as the first chief of state that I had the honor of having at the White House in my administration.

In that time span, the world political scene has changed very profoundly. Yet throughout this process of change, there have been reassuring elements of stability and constancy in the relationship between countries and the peoples of the world. A particularly noteworthy example is the friendship and the very great mutual trust between the United States and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Your Majesties, our people share many, many goals. Together we aspire to economic as well as overall well-being of our fellow countrymen, to the universal betterment of human kindness and conditioning, and to closer cooperation between states. We aspire to the ideals of freedom and dignity for the individual.

But there is one very special, particular goal which we look upon, we both deeply wish to attain—it is a just and a very lasting peace for all nations and for all peoples in the Middle East. Our two countries are determined to work together to overcome all obstacles that stand between us and that end.

I believe that Americans are most fortunate to have you as a very staunch and steadfast friend. I know that you share our hopes for peace as well as freedom. You have demonstrated outstandingly your willingness to join us in facing very squarely the great challenges of our time not only in the Middle East but elsewhere.

I was extremely pleased to discuss at length some of the most complicated and controversial issues which both our countries face in the Middle East. His Majesty and I agreed that in addition to the progress that peacemaking efforts have achieved so far, much, much more remains to be done.

We are both very conscious of the many difficult problems that must be overcome to secure a just and a lasting peace. These problems will not be solved tonight or even tomorrow in our meeting in the morning, but we know that they must be solved, and we will double and redouble our efforts in that regard.

We are jointly committed to persevere in the pursuit of peace. We are more than ever determined that the negotiating process must continue. A settlement must be obtained that will fulfill the aspiration of all states and all peoples of the Middle East for peace, stability, and human progress. Certainly the United States could not hope for a more able and honored associate in this historic task than His Majesty King Hussein.

Your Majesty, your determination, your courage, your dedication to the cause of peace in the Middle East are so well known to all of us that any repetition on my part of your distinguished accomplishments is totally unnecessary.

You are no less famed for your personal courage, your forthrightness, your dedication to the welfare of your people, and for your loyalty to your friends. I am proud to salute

[1] For an exchange of greetings between President Ford and King Hussein on Mar. 30, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 5, 1976, p. 512.

you tonight not only as a statesman and a leader, but also as a close personal friend and as a friend of our country.

I must say that I take very special pleasure in welcoming another outstanding representative of Jordan, Her Majesty the Queen. She was once in our country as a student, and we are delighted to welcome her as a gracious queen whose charm captivates us as it does the Jordanian people.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to rise and join me in a toast to His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan, a partner in the search for peace, a distinguished leader, and a true friend of the United States, and to Her Majesty Queen Alia.

KING HUSSEIN

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, distinguished guests: Thank you, Mr. President, for the thoughts you have expressed so eloquently. The welcome and hospitality you and Mrs. Ford have so graciously extended to me and my wife are deeply appreciated. We feel very much at home, which is fitting for friends.

The friendship between Jordan and the United States is indeed unique. It stems from common values which we both hold dearer than life—freedom, equality, honor, and human dignity. It has grown during a most difficult period in the lives of both countries. Friendship deserves a more serious consideration of those who enjoy it. When there is joy, you call upon friends to celebrate. When there is sorrow, friends come to comfort you. When there is a task to be done, friends join together in common effort. There is honor and pride in true friendship, as is evident here tonight.

Mr. President, our visit with you comes at a time of both joy and sorrow—joy in being here to celebrate the 200th anniversary of this great nation, sorrow in the knowledge that difficulties in our part of the world have multiplied and intensified.

Friends share, as we do with you, most of the same goals and aspirations, the same principles and values. Friends share their expectations, too.

I bring with me on this journey the e: pectations of the people of Jordan and th entire area that steps can be initiated ar quickened to achieve the goal which ha eluded us for many more years than on would wish to remember—peace in the Midd East. We who enjoy the common bond o friendship must make every effort to reac this goal while it is still attainable.

We also share with you an unusual fac the names of our founding capitals. Phil delphia was the birthplace of your indepen ence. Philadelphia was as well the ancie name of our capital, Amman. The meanin of both was the same—brotherly love.

It is a custom among Arabs to call the closest friends brothers. We would like t share this custom with you and to conve the best wishes and warmest greetings fro the people of Jordan to you, Mr. Presider and Mrs. Ford, and to all of your fello citizens.

Ladies and gentlemen, may I ask you t join with me in a toast to the President o the United States and Mrs. Ford.

U.S. and Philippines Hold Economic Talks

Joint Statement [1]

Representatives of the United States an Philippine Governments met in Washingto D.C. March 29 through April 9, 1976 in pu suance of the Joint Communique issued las December by President Ford and Presider Marcos. The Communique called for resump tion of talks aimed at enhancing economi cooperation between the two countrie through measures that would modernize th terms for conducting their economic an commercial relations, taking account of th end of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, an giving due consideration to the requirement for the development of the Philippin economy

The Philippine delegation presented nev

[1] Issued on Apr. 12 (text from press release 169)

drafts, on trade and on investment respectively, in response to a draft treaty of economic cooperation and development proposed by the U.S. panel in July 1974.

The two delegations discussed the main points of these drafts and indicated their respective positions.

The negotiations achieved significant progress and provided important clarification of the interests of each side.

The two delegations agreed that the tradition of friendly ties between the Philippines and the United States would remain as the foundation of close and mutually beneficial economic relations. They expressed their confidence that these relations will be maintained and expanded in a manner that will contribute significantly to the welfare of both nations as new patterns and needs evolve reflecting their growing relations and the increasing complexity of the world's economy.

Both delegations agreed that negotiations are to be resumed later this year.

The Philippine delegation was led by Ambassador Wilfredo Vega, Philippine Representative to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as Chairman, and Ambassador Pablo Suarez, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Department of Foreign Affairs, as Co-chairman. The delegation included officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Tariff Commission, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Investments, the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, the National Economic Development Authority, and the Philippine Embassy in Washington.

The United States delegation was led by Deputy Assistant Secretary Lester Edmond of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State. Trade discussions were led by Mr. Stephen Lande, Assistant Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and investment talks by Mr. Richard Smith, Director of the State Department Office of Investment Affairs. Other members of the delegation included officials of the Department of State, of the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations of the Executive Office of the President, and of the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.

U.S. and Philippines Open Talks on U.S. Use of Military Bases

Joint Statement [1]

General Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, met with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger today [April 12] to begin negotiations regarding new arrangements between the Philippines and the United States for the use by the U.S. armed forces of facilities in Philippine military bases.

Following a luncheon given by Secretary Kissinger for General Romulo, they met with their advisers for a discussion of the general principles which should govern the negotiations. At this session, the initial views of both governments were expressed in a cordial atmosphere. The U.S. side presented a draft agreement for consideration. The Philippine delegation proposed and it was agreed that negotiations should be continued in Manila in early June after each side has had an opportunity to study the comments made at this opening meeting.

[1] Issued on Apr. 12 (text from press release 172).

U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Nuclear Age

Address by Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Counselor of the Department [1]

At the dawn of the nuclear age, Albert Einstein remarked that: "The unleashed power of the atom bomb has changed everything save our mode of thinking. . . ."

That did not apply to James Forrestal, who deeply understood, and struggled to make others understand, the fundamental principles of international relations in our time—that peace and freedom depend in large measure upon the wisdom, confidence, and power of the United States; that this power must be ready and usable for all forms of conflict; and that the attainment of our country's goals requires of Americans a new understanding of the crucial relationship between military power and foreign policy.

The relationship between power and policy has been demonstrated time and again throughout our history by the U.S. Navy—from the blockade of Tripoli in 1804 to the quarantine of Cuba in 1962 and in the crucial peacetime presence of our fleets around the world today. As Under Secretary and later Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal saw that, in the words of Churchill: "the Navy has a dual function. In war it is our means of safety; in peace it sustains the prestige, repute, and influence . . . ."

As Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal was one of that handful of farseeing Americans who, in the early years after World War II, shaped the American policies which brought a new world order from the chaos of war, which promoted a new level of economic prosperity, and which helped sustain freedom around the globe.

Today I want to talk to you about the challenge which confronted Forrestal and the American leaders of his generation. I want to explore how and why America found itself thrust into a global contest with the Soviet Union, how we responded to that challenge, and how the relationship between the two superpowers has evolved over the last three decades.

America's sudden preeminence on the world scene and its deepening rivalry with the Soviet Union were not events for which Americans had planned, or prepared. Few in this country, or indeed in any other, had looked into the future with the insight of that most perceptive social and political observer, Alexis de Tocqueville, who as early as 1835 had written:

> There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and while the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly placed themselves in the front rank among the nations, and the world learned their existence and their greatness at almost the same time.

One hundred and ten years after Tocqueville wrote these lines, American and Russian soldiers met in Central Europe, ending a war which had seen the collapse of nearly every other major world power. Long before this event, however, there were forces at work shaping American and Russian societies which would in large measure determine the shape of the confrontation to come.

Comparison of the historical development

[1] Made at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., on Apr. 6 as part of the Academy's James Forrestal Lecture Series (text from press release 171 dated Apr. 12).

of the United States and the Soviet Union reveals some striking, if partial, similarities. Both countries developed on the periphery of European civilization. Both had, for most of their history, open frontiers; and both channeled much of their national energy and ambition into the move across a great continent—we westward, they to the east. As these two nations expanded to transcontinental proportions, the societies of both were transformed by the inclusion of peoples of widely varied race, religion, and culture. For the people of both societies, their distance from the centers of European culture was accompanied, and perhaps compensated for, by a widely felt sense of historic national mission—a conviction that they were the repository of unique virtues and values to be preserved and promoted.

Fifty-nine years ago today the United States declared war on Imperial Germany and so entered irrevocably into its new role as a great power. President Woodrow Wilson, in the message to Congress in which he recommended this war as necessary to make the world "safe for democracy," also paused to take note of the great revolution then sweeping Russia:

> Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? . . . Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor.

Thus it seemed for a brief time that the parallel growth of these two great transcontinental nations would culminate in development of similar political institutions and social values. But alas, the many actual and seeming parallels in the growth of Russia and America which I have noted were outweighed by even more profound divergences, which in the end frustrated the efforts of those who sought to bring democracy and individual liberty to Russia.

Thus, while both nations had grown to encompass peoples of varied race, religion, and culture, America had done so by the choice of those millions who had flocked to its shores, while Russia incorporated other peoples by force—through conquest. America lay on the western fringe of European civilization and drew upon the intellectual and technological resources of the most vigorous and advanced nations of Western Europe, even as it profited from immigration from the eastern part of the continent, whose people contributed their own diverse talents and their passion for freedom. Russia, on the other hand, had only distant and precarious contact with the West. Western influence seldom permeated beyond a thin layer of intellectuals and aristocrats.

In consequence, America, the transplanted colonial society, was more mobile and open than even the most liberal nations of Europe, while Russia, the traditional, largely peasant society, became, over the years, more stratified and rigid than that continent's most conservative nations.

In America, that sense of historic mission I have referred to took many forms, from "know-nothing" isolationism to Manifest Destiny. But whatever its form, the American people's sense of national purpose was derived from a deep commitment to liberty and democracy. This devotion to personal freedom at home has insured that when called upon to play a world role, Americans would seek to lead by example and persuasion rather than coercion.

The Russian sense of unique national destiny has also served historically to justify both isolationism and expansionism. In either case, however, there has been a strong element of mystic and visionary Messianism, in which the traditional Russian virtues of faith, order, and obedience have been emphasized over those of freedom, debate, dissent, or inquiry, though these latter could never be eradicated entirely. Marxist-Leninist ideology, which imbues its adherents with an almost religious conviction that they are part of a historical process whose triumph is scientifically determined, has reinforced the traditional Russian sense of destiny and mission.

Lest it be thought that I am commenting on Soviet and American historical development only on the basis of hindsight, let me once again cite Tocqueville, who closed the

first volume of his observations on American democracy, published in 1835, as follows:

> The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the citizens; the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm: the principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

The growth of new powers on the peripheries of older societies, and their struggle for leadership, is a familiar feature of world history even if it takes various forms. Rome and Carthage vied to the death over the succession to Greek civilization; Christian and Moslem societies fought to divide the remnants of the Roman Empire. In this perspective, competition between the United States and the Soviet Union takes on a certain inevitability.

Historical parallels are imperfect, but there is one fundamental difference between the current rivalry and those which preceded it. Today, for the first time in history both sides have the capacity to visit almost instantaneous devastation on each other, and on most of mankind in the process. Thus, if this rivalry follows the historical pattern of eventual open warfare and is settled by force, it will be our own, and history's, most catastrophic contest.

For more than 30 years American leaders have had to deal with the Soviet Union within the growing constraints of this nuclear dilemma.

Initially, at the close of World War II, we sought to avoid the coming confrontation and to build on our wartime cooperation. Our hopes were based on an overly optimistic assessment that shared interests would dominate our relations.

American policymakers and the American public were at that time only beginning to realize that the total, if temporary, collapse of continental Europe as an independent source of power and decision held enormous implications for global stability. We failed to foresee that Soviet security concerns in Eastern Europe—a mixture of ambition an of a historic fear vastly magnified by th trauma of World War II—would impel Mos cow to establish a satellite empire in tha region. Our understanding of Soviet be havior was clouded by the misconceptio that in using terms such as "democracy and "independence" to describe their pos war intentions toward Eastern Europe, th Soviets meant what Americans understoo those terms to mean. They did not.

The Policies of Containment

America's efforts to extend cooperatio with the Soviet Union into the postwar er had little prospect of success once it becam apparent that the Soviets were determine to create a chain of rigidly controlled clien states along their western border, servin not only as a buffer against presumed for eign hostility but as a potential springboar for further expansion.

America's response was to begin erectin barriers to further Soviet expansion aroun the Soviet periphery. Our earlier efforts t increasingly draw the U.S.S.R. into th international arena—through the United Na tions, for instance—were frustrated and t all intents and purposes suspended. Contain ment replaced cooperation as the focal poi for our relations with the Soviet Union. W sought to isolate and quarantine, to impe the spread of its ideology, and thereby t generate pressures throughout the Commu nist world for a more moderate and libera izing evolution of its societies.

Containment as a strategy for dealin with the growth of Soviet power and th threat of its expansion yielded many lastin benefits. With our assistance, Japan and th nations of Western Europe were econom cally, politically, and socially reborn. Th Atlantic alliance was formed and the NAT structure put in place. The world's grea industrial democracies achieved a degree c common purpose and action unparalleled i history. Soviet expansion was successfull blocked in both Europe and Asia.

Over the years the hoped-for evolution within the Communist world occurred to a legree, but far less than had been wished. Those nations in a position to reject Soviet lomination, such as China and Yugoslavia, lid so. Within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe some of the worst abuses of Stalinist yranny were moderated, and in the latter 'egion impulses toward greater national dentity were reawakened.

he End of an Era

But while the strategy of containment ould restrain the extension of Soviet con- rol over new geographical areas, these poli- ies could not remove or fundamentally ransform the Soviet system nor prevent the ontinued growth of Soviet power and the nfluence which accompanied it. Thus, over period of 30 years the Soviet Union built he sinews of strength and accumulated the aval, air, and strategic nuclear forces neces- ary to project its power beyond the Eura- ian landmass. Internally, the Soviet leader- hip, while instituting certain reforms, has aken care to maintain its control over all spects of Soviet national life.

By the late 1960's, after more than two ecades of cold war confrontation, it was vident that the policies of containment were y themselves no longer adequate to deal 'ith this vastly more powerful Soviet Union perating in a vastly more complex world. hus, for many years after 1945, the power alance was essentially bipolar. By 1965 it 'as still largely so in the military sense but ad become more diverse in other respects. lot only had China split with the Soviet Inion, not only had Western Europe and apan gained new vigor; but the process of ecolonization had also transformed most f the world's Southern Hemisphere, more ıan doubling the number of actors on the ıternational stage—and creating new cen- ers of power and influence.

By and large, these new nations recog- ized the dangers of Soviet expansionism nd rejected the Soviet domestic order as a model. But they also saw significant advantages in contacts with the Soviets. Many sought what they considered temporary arrangements to obtain Soviet support in conflicts and disputes with former metropolitan countries and others, and the Soviets moved to exploit these opportunities.

In any case, most of the new nations did not regard the maintenance of the global balance of power as something they could or should do much about. Their peoples, in many instances, shared little of the West's political tradition, social values, or economic prosperity. Their leaders were for the most part not prepared to participate in efforts to isolate the Soviet Union or to prevent the expansion of its influence by aligning themselves with the West.

By the latter half of the 1960's the Soviet Union—after nearly 50 years of industrial growth under a regime committed to the accumulation of military strength—was finally approaching nuclear parity with the United States. With strategic forces in rough equilibrium, the importance of other forces took on a new importance. The maintenance of the local balance of power in places of potential confrontation became increasingly significant to the global equilibrium.

Another consequence of effective nuclear parity was that for the first time both the United States and the U.S.S.R. had objectively acquired essentially reciprocal incentives to avoid a nuclear war; to minimize, or at any rate control, the confrontations which created the risk of such a war; and to find ways that might build some limitations into the buildup of strategic arsenals. The Soviet leaders indicated their readiness to pursue these interests with us through negotiations, which have been in progress for several years now.

Changes within the Communist world also presented new challenges and new opportunities to Western policymakers. As Communist economies became more advanced and their societies more complex, they became more open to outside influence and needful

of outside technology, resources, and markets. Pressures for national independence and identity, always present below the surface, asserted themselves more insistently.

Beyond Containment

The evolving circumstances I have outlined—the impossibility of effectively isolating the Soviet Union in a world of over 100 nation-states, the imperatives of the new nuclear equation, and the apparent Soviet desire, if not indeed necessity, to put relationships with the West on a more secure and rewarding footing—these changes militated for an updating of Western policies.

In reexamining their approach to East-West relations, Western governments realized that their basic problem remained the continued growth of Soviet power, as well as the fundamental difference in values and systems between East and West. They understood that the capacity to balance Soviet power with our own was an essential prerequisite for the conduct of any effective policy. But Western leaders also saw that changes within the Communist world and in the world at large required that a second dimension be added to the West's strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union, a dimension based upon limited yet concrete cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

This second dimension complemented, but in no sense replaced, the maintenance of a properly balanced power relationship. In fact, as I have said, its success depended upon the maintenance of such a balance. But provided that the West kept its defenses strong, this second dimension offered opportunities to forge links based on mutual interest which could over the long run engage the Soviet leadership in a network of more cooperative relationships with the West and thus provide incentives for restraint.

Throughout this decade Western governments have pursued these two tracks, maintaining and, when necessary, employing our power on the one hand, while we simultaneously sought through negotiation and agreement to fashion a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union.

The United States has engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations designed to convert the incentives for restraining open-ended competition in military programs into practical arrangements that will help maintain a stable nuclear balance. So far this has resulted in an agreement limiting antiballistic missile defense on both sides and an interim agreement placing temporary limits on offensive strategic weapons. Negotiations on a follow-on agreement to put more permanent equal numerical ceilings on these forces continue.

The United States has also sought to respond actively to the desire of the Eastern European peoples for greater independence and more constructive ties with the rest of the world. Since 1969, we have thus instituted new economic, political, and cultural contacts with those countries, at a pace and in forms adapted to the particular conditions prevailing in each. Through high-level visits such as those of President Ford last year to Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, we have encouraged movement toward normal relations based on national sovereignty and independence.

At the same time we have worked to reduce other longstanding sources of tension. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin has defused a flashpoint which periodically threatened the peace of Central Europe—and the world—for 30 years. The Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, has taken a leading role in forging new relationships with the nations of Eastern Europe, reconciling old differences and improving the human condition for Europeans, East and West. This is of course an objective we support and work toward also.

With our NATO allies we have entered into negotiations with several Warsaw Pact governments to reduce conventional force levels in Central Europe. Given the disparities in types and numbers of forces, and the different distance involved in any withdrawals of U.S. and Soviet troops, the problem we face in arriving at a mutually acceptable formula for balanced force reductions is formidable. Our objective is to establish a

common ceiling on Eastern and Western forces.

The United States also joined with 33 nations of Europe, East and West, and with the Soviet Union, in the negotiations leading to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki last July. As a precondition for even entering these negotiations, the West obtained progress on Berlin.

In the conference's Final Act it was established that human rights are a legitimate matter for international discourse; Eastern participants gave specific moral and political commitments to make improvements in this area. In addition the West received Eastern recognition, for the first time, of the principle of peaceful change of frontiers in Europe. And the occasion of the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki gave our President and other Western leaders the opportunity to address all the peoples of Europe—West, East, and neutral—with the message that we seek freedom, independence, security, and a decent life for all of them.

These various negotiations have been accompanied by a gradual expansion of economic, scientific, social, and cultural contacts with the East. If pursued on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit, these can over time provide greater scope for independent action for the countries of Eastern Europe while they create a web of constructive contacts that can give new incentives for more responsible Soviet behavior internationally.

The process of creating a more stable and constructive relationship with the East is neither simple nor easy. We have missed some opportunities.

In the economic area, for instance, there has been a tendency in Western countries to let the legitimate quest for commercial advantage in Eastern markets overshadow the need to develop and pursue a purposeful strategy. This has tended to undercut the influence which the economic strength of the Western industrialized world could exert.

In our own case, the failure of various agreements in the trade field to enter into force has inhibited our ability to conduct an East-West economic policy which could maximize our long-term influence. At the same time, the ability of the American businessman to compete for Soviet business on an equal basis has been reduced. But the link established between trade relations and human rights issues also failed to advance the latter effort. In fact, earlier encouraging trends in emigration from the Soviet Union were reversed.

The Soviet Union has recently created new obstacles to the creation of a firmer, more constructive, and more enduring relationship with the West. In considering the aftermath of the Soviet decision to intervene directly and by Cuban proxy in Angola, the West must ponder the effects of having helped to create the power vacuum which opened in Angola last year and which the Soviets then moved to fill. The Soviets exploited this local conflict for unilateral advantage, an action inconsistent with any effort to foster mutual restraint and more cooperative relations between our two countries.

But these events also illustrate the time-tested truth that one's interests will not be respected unless they are defended. We should not ignore that lesson.

This Administration has taken steps to insure that the Soviets realize that their present intervention in Angola is unacceptable and that its repetition in other areas of Africa or the world will be met with determination.

The Challenge Before Us

In the early years after World War II, the American public's attitude toward the Soviet Union swung from the extremes of hopeful trust to profoundest fear and suspicion. In subsequent years, many again began to hope that the elements of moderation which had started to characterize the East-West competition would at some finite time lead to the end of rivalry and permit drastic reductions in our efforts. Today, opinion has again reverted to concern over the state of the balance of power, though, as the Presi-

dent has made clear, our power is in fact enormous, varied, and fully adequate to safeguard our security interests.

America can no longer afford these swings between extremes. After 30 years of dealing with the Soviet Union as a competitor and as a superpower, American policy and American perception must, above all, exhibit consistency and determination. There must be a clear recognition that we will be obliged to cope with the problem of Soviet power for as far ahead as we can see. Decisions made and strategies devised today must transcend more transitory moods and purposes so that they can help us shape the years ahead in conformity with our values and interests.

As we pursue our national debate, we should not lose sight of certain basic propositions, on which I would hope all Americans would agree. No matter what policies we adopt, we should realize that the United States and the Soviet Union will be engaged in a wide-ranging geopolitical and ideological competition for the rest of our lives and for those of our children. Each side will retain the ability to wreak vast nuclear destruction on the other, but only at the cost of suffering catastrophic destruction itself. The Soviet Union will continue to build its power and its ability to project its influence in the world.

If we are to preserve our way of life for the long haul, the United States and its allies will have to retain the capability and the will to resist probes in many areas. Never must we allow ourselves to fall behind in the power to defend our interests or permit the impression to be created that we have lost the collective will to make the decision to use it. Yet at the same time our continuing rivalry with the Soviet Union will go forward in a constantly shrinking world, one in which our ever more interacting economies, environments, and societies will give us opportunities—if not indeed compel us—to seek common solutions to common problems.

America's challenge is to work within these ongoing and basically unchangeable elements. If we are to succeed in this long-term task of constructing a more reliable structure for peace, we are going to have to expand our thinking about the U.S.-Soviet relationship beyond the black and white categories which have characterized America's debate on this issue since it became an issue.

Friend-enemy, trustworthy-faithless, cooperate-confront—these are the stark alternatives which of course still pervade relations, but beyond which we must set our sights. Americans must grasp the reality of the Soviet Union as a permanent competitor—an adversary—and yet also sometimes a partner. The Soviet Union, like most nations, follows its perceived self-interests.

America must be prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union when this advances common interests, confront it when we have to—working always toward an overall relationship which, in accordance with our highest values, insures a peace that is stable and just and gives freedom an ever-growing scope. Our policies must over the long run seek to establish and maintain a balance of risks and benefits that will place a premium on restraint. We must insure that any irresponsible and adventurous efforts to obtain unilateral gain and so to tip the power balance are subject to tangible penalties.

The Soviet Union for its part must also conduct its continuing economic, political, and ideological competition with the West within the framework of the imperatives of a nuclear age. It must perceive and adhere to certain written and unwritten guidelines for the conduct of our relations. It must know that failure to do so will reverse the process on which we have been working for several years now and will greatly increase both the burdens and risks for both sides.

The task America faces today, that of confronting another global superpower and of structuring our relationship within all the constraints of a nuclear age, is a challenge without historic precedents. Yet there seems to me little doubt that a nation which conducted the modern world's first successful experiment in democracy, which ad-

vanced the frontiers of human liberty and dignity further than any other, which broke the secrets of the atom, which helped build a new world order out of the ashes of World War II, which reached the moon, and which now enters its third century of freedom—that this nation will continue to demonstrate the judgment, the diplomatic skills, the moral constancy, the realism but also the idealism and the essential unity needed to forge a firmer basis for a just world peace.

Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad Established

Following is a statement by President Ford issued on March 31.

White House press release dated March 31

Recent disclosures that American-based corporations have made questionable payments during the course of their overseas operations have raised substantial public policy issues here at home.

The Federal Government is already undertaking a number of firm actions to deal with this matter. Full-scale investigations to determine whether U.S. laws have been violated are currently underway in the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, and elsewhere. In addition, I have directed my advisers in the areas of foreign policy and international trade to work with other governments abroad in seeking to develop a better set of guidelines for all corporations.

To insure that our approach to this issue is both comprehensive and properly coordinated, I am today establishing a Cabinet-level Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad.

The task force will be chaired by the Secretary of Commerce, Elliott Richardson, and it will include among its members the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, as well as the Attorney General and other high-ranking members of the Administration.[1]

I have directed the task force to conduct a sweeping policy review of this matter and to recommend such additional policy steps as may be warranted. The views of the broadest base of interest groups and individuals are to be solicited as part of this effort. I have also asked that periodic progress reports be submitted to me during the course of the review and that a final report be on my desk before the end of the current calendar year.

The purpose of this task force is not to punish American corporations, but to insure that the United States has a clear policy and that we have an effective, active program to implement that policy.

To the extent that the questionable payments abroad have arisen from corrupt practices on the part of American corporations, the United States bears a clear responsibility to the entire international community to bring them to a halt. Corrupt business practices strike at the very heart of our own moral code and our faith in free enterprise. Businesses in this country run the risk of ever greater governmental regulation if they illegally take advantage of consumers, investors, and taxpayers.

Before we condemn American citizens out of hand, however, it is essential that we also recognize the possibility that some of the questionable payments abroad may result from extortion by foreign interests. To the extent that such practices exist, I believe that the United States has an equal responsibility to our own businesses to protect them from strong-arm practices. It is incumbent upon us to work with foreign governments to curb any such abuses.

From the facts at hand it is not clear to me where true justice lies in this matter, and that issue may never be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. The central policy

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[1] Other members of the task force are the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy.

question that needs to be addressed today is rather how we can arrive at clear, enforceable standards to prevent such questionable activities in the future. That is the key issue to which this new task force will direct its attentions.

Expansion of Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Announced

Statement by President Ford[1]

Two weeks ago, I announced to the nation a comprehensive program to strengthen the foreign intelligence agencies of the U.S. Government. My actions were designed to achieve two basic objectives:

—First, to insure that we have the best possible information on which to base our policies toward other nations; and

—Second, to insure that our foreign intelligence agencies do not infringe on the rights of American citizens.

Today, as an additional part of this effort, I am announcing the expansion of my Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This Board was set up in 1956 in order to provide independent, nonpartisan advice on the effectiveness of the intelligence community in meeting the intelligence needs of the President. Since 1974, the Board has been composed of 10 members, all of whom are private citizens.

I am announcing today that I am expanding the Board to 17 members, and I am appointing the following members to the Board:

Stephen Ailes
Leslie C. Arends
Adm. George W. Anderson
William O. Baker
William J. Casey
Leo Cherne
John B. Connally
John S. Foster, Jr.
Robert W. Galvin
Gordon Gray
Melvin Laird
Edwin H. Land
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Clare Boothe Luce
Robert Murphy
Edward Teller
Edward Bennett Williams

I am announcing my decision to have Leo Cherne serve as the new Chairman of the Board.

The intelligence needs of the seventies and beyond require the use of highly sophisticated technology. Furthermore, there are new areas of concern which demand our attention. No longer does this country face only military threats. New threats are presented in such areas as economic reprisal and international terrorism. The combined experience and expertise of the members of this Board will be an invaluable resource as we seek solutions to the foreign intelligence problems of today and the future.

In developing the nation's offensive and defensive strategy to conduct foreign policy and provide for the national security, we must be able to deal with problems covering the broadest spectrum of activities.

By strengthening the Board as I have done today, and by giving the Board my full personal support, I fully anticipate that the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board will continue its indispensable role in advising me on the effectiveness of our foreign intelligence efforts.

[1] Issued on Mar. 11 (text from White House press release).

Department Urges Approval of Appropriations for International Financial Institutions

Statement by Paul H. Boeker
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development [1]

The current international political and economic climate makes these hearings on appropriations for the international financial institutions particularly important. At present we are engaged in an extensive North-South dialogue with the developed and developing countries. Discussions are underway on all forms of economic cooperation and development. Our support of the international financial institutions is a major part of our commitment to international economic cooperation.

This new era of cooperation began with the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly in September 1975. In contrast to the confrontational conclusion of the sixth special session, the seventh special session negotiated and adopted a meaningful consensus resolution. This session was an important turning point in the relations between developing countries and the industrialized nations, especially the United States. Three months later, in December, ministers from 27 countries met in Paris to initiate the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.

The focus of both these meetings was the need for greater cooperation to improve the international economic system. A central issue in this system is the achievement of economic development.

More than 2 billion of the world's poorest people living in over 100 developing countries look to assistance, including that from the United States, to augment their own efforts to attain an acceptable level of economic progress. The developing nations need our skills and capital resources to help feed their people, assist in training human resources, attain an equitable participation in the benefits of growth, and develop their natural resources. The other side of this issue is the economic and political impact of these developing countries on the United States. The United States, for example, has increasingly close relations with these countries. From them we seek:

—Cooperation in finding international solutions to complex world problems—food, energy, population, environment, et cetera.

—Opportunities for mutually productive and profitable investment of capital and technology.

—Markets for the products of U.S. enterprises—the developing countries now buy nearly a third of U.S. exports and supply two-fifths of U.S. imports—which create jobs for workers on both ends of the trade pattern.

—Raw material imports to meet the needs of American industry and American con-

[1] Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on Apr. 8. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

sumers; the United States buys from 50 to 100 percent of its requirements of major minerals such as tin, bauxite, and manganese from the less developed world.

The international financial institutions are vital instruments in helping us achieve our political objective of developing a stable international structure. The funds we have requested are urgently needed if these institutions are to carry out these programs to foster economic development.

Each of the institutions for which we are requesting funds has a unique role to play in the process of international economic development. The World Bank Group is designed to address global problems, while the regional banks are structured to deal with specific regional aspects of development. Each one is a specific instrument designed to deal with particular problems.

The International Development Association

One of the most serious development problems we face is the dilemma of the poorest developing countries. In the past few years the plight of the poorest has worsened. The rising prices of imported petroleum, fertilizer, and food; the slackened demand for their exports to developed countries; and the erosion by inflation of the real value of development assistance—all have dealt severe blows to the growth aspirations of the poorest nations. These nations, with a population of 1 billion and incomes averaging less than $200 per capita, on the most likely set of assumptions will suffer an actual decline in their per capita incomes over the next few years. The effect of this on the already marginal condition of life of the poorest 40 percent within these countries is an appalling prospect.

No coherent foreign policy can ignore the over 900 million people living on the edges of our modern society with incomes under $75 a year. This is a problem that transcends regional differences and which calls for the combined efforts of all concerned countries. The poorest developing countries desperately need additional assistance on concessionary terms.

The institution designed, at U.S. initiative, to deal with the problems of the poorest is the International Development Association. IDA is our principal instrument for channeling assistance to the poorest segments of the world's population, and as such it serves an important foreign policy interest.

During the negotiation of the fourth replenishment, the U.S. share was reduced from 40 percent to 33 percent of the total. Given this reduction in our share, it is important that the Congress appropriate the funds requested so that we can participate in this institution in a manner consistent with our foreign policy objectives.

From our national point of view, IDA encourages development in the poorest countries along lines which are both effective and compatible with our own economy. IDA stresses the role of market forces in the effective allocation of resources, the development of outward-looking trading economies, the critical role of private enterprise, and the importance of spreading development benefits to the poorest people.

The United States is already a year behind most other donors in contributing to the fourth replenishment, and the fiscal year 1976 appropriation fell $55 million short of our agreed-upon payment for that year. Such shortfalls call into question our support for IDA and unless redressed could endanger IDA's ability to carry out its full program. We feel the IDA serves an important and necessary function in the framework of an interdependent economic system and urge support for the full Administration request. It is the Administration's intention also to seek in fiscal year 1977 the $55 million which was cut in fiscal year 1976.

The International Finance Corporation

Another aspect of development which requires a global approach is the need for increased access to capital markets.

In his address to the seventh special ses-

sion, Secretary of State Kissinger highlighted the importance of assisting the developing countries' capital markets as a means of accelerating their economic growth. To help stimulate this process, he proposed a fourfold increase in the capital resources of the International Finance Corporation. The final resolution of the seventh session gave recognition to the importance of capital-market access and to a replenishment of the IFC's resources.

U.S. support of the IFC is based on the premise that a vigorous private sector is generally a critical element in the process of economic development. High levels of private investment have been a common factor for rapidly growing developing countries; for example, in Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Within the World Bank Group, the IFC is the institution focused primarily on the private sector and the only institution able to make equity investments and to lend without government guarantees. The IFC needs a substantial capital replenishment, however, if it is to play an appropriate catalytic role in an expanded effort at private-sector development.

Another area where increased IFC involvement will be possible only with increased capital is in the minerals sector. Tight supply problems and soaring prices for a large number of critical industrial raw materials during 1973–74, the example set by the oil cartel, and the imposition of unilateral export controls on selected commodities have caused every government to focus on commodity issues. Adequate and sustained investment is a key element in assuring reasonable prices, smoothly functioning commodity trade, national economic development, and in general a diffusion of the growing politicization which more than ever characterizes resource issues. With an increased capital base, the IFC can use its technical managerial and financial expertise to bring together foreign private investors and host governments in this important sector.

The IFC and IDA are global institutions designed to deal with global problems of considerable foreign policy interest to us. However, there are regional problems as well, and the various regional banks have been specially tailored to meet these unique needs.

The Inter-American Development Bank

In fiscal year 1977, we are seeking appropriations for the first tranche of the recently approved replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which includes funds for the ordinary capital as well as the Fund for Special Operations. We also intend to seek the $50 million which was not appropriated in fiscal year 1976.

The IDB has always been of particular interest to the United States because of our special ties and common heritage with Latin America. These links were underlined in Secretary Kissinger's recent trip to the region. The Americas have been partners in cooperative ventures almost from the time of independence. Together we have led the world in building international organizations for both collective security and economic progress.

The economic ties between the United States and Latin America are a common bond. Nearly a fifth of our imports and exports take place with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Of basic commodities we obtain from abroad, we look to this area for 34 percent of the petroleum, 68 percent of the coffee, 57 percent of the sugar, 47 percent of the copper, 35 percent of the iron ore, and 96 percent of the bauxite. Last year we exported over $17 billion worth of U.S.-made goods to the region, much of it paid for by the long-term improvements in Latin American foreign exchange earnings, some of it through loans obtained from sources such as the IDB. Official borrowing remains important in view of the area's enormous need for capital goods, supplies, and the like.

The United States, in addition, has more than 17 billion dollars' worth of direct private investment in this part of the hemi-

sphere. A prospering Latin America can benefit the United States. A stagnant Latin America would damage substantially our interests.

As Latin America advances and develops greater global interests, the importance of hemispheric cooperation actually becomes more essential. A keystone of that cooperation is the Inter-American Development Bank.

The IDB today is the single most important source of official development capital for the nations of this hemisphere. Our participation in the IDB is a litmus test of our sincerity in proclaiming our interest in Latin American economic development.

I should also note that the authorization legislation provides for the expansion of the IDB's membership to include a number of nonregional donor countries. We welcome this development which provides for increased burden sharing in this important institution.

The Asian Development Bank

Just as the IDB underlines our support for economic progress in Latin America, so the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has become an increasingly important aspect of our relations with Asia.

The United States is a Pacific power, and our history has been inextricably linked to Asia. President Ford underlined the importance of Asia to the United States during his visit last year.

The security interests of four of the great world powers intersect in Asia—Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. All have important interests in the region. All are affected by economic and political changes in other countries of the area. It is an area vast in population, rich in culture, and abundant in resources. The United States has been involved in three long and costly Asian wars in the past 35 years. We have learned at painful cost that equilibrium in Asia is essential to our own peace and safety and that no stable order in that region can be maintained without our active participation.

Today more than ever the continent of Asia has become an important element in the economic strength and progress of our own country. Several East Asian countries have become major trading partners of the United States. U.S. investment in the region has grown rapidly in the past decade and has further potential. Asia is also an important and stable supplier of our raw materials, providing nearly all of our natural rubber, tin, and coconut oil, and has become a stable alternative source of a portion (8 percent) of our petroleum imports.

In order to maintain our political and economic interests in this important part of the world, a fundamental U.S. foreign policy objective over the years has been to support the establishment of a stable political situation. Essential to that equilibrium, however, is a reduction in historical animosities through the development of common interests and better communication among the nations of the area. Acute population pressures and the effects of the energy crisis and the recent worldwide recession must be met. External threats, insurgency, and subversion must also be faced by several countries. In this atmosphere we deem it essential that sustained economic growth and progress be maintained. Regional institutions like the ADB can do much to promote such growth.

Providing assistance through the ADB contributes to the dual U.S. objective of helping the neediest people to help themselves and to maintain peace and stability in the region through economic and social progress. But beyond that, the fullest possible support of the ADB represents an important signal of American commitment to continued political and economic presence in an area of the world of longstanding importance to us. Such support of the ADB is

clearly in accord with the principles of our policy in the Pacific enunciated by President Ford in his Honolulu speech and will be an effective demonstration and confirmation of the shared interest between the United States and the nations of Asia.

In fiscal year 1977, we are seeking appropriations of $120.6 million for the third installment of the first ADB ordinary capital replenishment, $24.1 million of which is to be paid-in and $96.5 million of which is callable.

In addition, the Administration will request $50 million for the first installment of the Asian Development Fund replenishment, as well as a budget amendment for $25 million, the portion of the fiscal year 1976 ADF request which was not approved.

The African Development Fund

The newest of the three concessionary development funds is in Africa. We are extremely pleased that both Houses have acted favorably on our request for authorizing legislation which would enable the United States to join the African Development Fund (AfDF), and we hope the conference committee will be able to resolve the few differences shortly.

Our relations with Africa have become an increasingly important aspect of our over-all foreign policy. Twenty-five years ago there were only five independent African states. Today African countries comprise more than one-third of the membership of the United Nations. Africa's numbers and resources and the energies of its peoples have given Africa a strong and important role in world affairs.

Africa faces enormous political problems. In Africa, the Portuguese African colonial empire has come to an abrupt end. The effects of that are now being strongly felt in Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia, and other areas of southern Africa. To the north, the future of the Spanish Sahara has created another source of political instability.

Africa faces severe economic problems as well. The effects of the recent world recession, exacerbated by the rises in the price of oil, have limited the progress of African nations in achieving their own development goals. In Africa, the job of nation-building and regional political stability are inseparable and must be facilitated with all appropriate means.

In this regard, the importance of the legislation to support the African Development Fund cannot be overemphasized. Our primary purpose in seeking to join the African Development Fund is to take our place with other donors in providing the financial resources required by an institution already proven effective in the African development effort.

The AfDF is complementary to our participation in the World Bank Group, which also lends to Africa. The World Bank concentrates on larger, more complex projects, while the AfDF focuses on small-scale basic infrastructure projects and calls on the first-hand knowledge and African experience of its staff to meet problems unique to Africa.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the international financial institutions are becoming increasingly important in an interdependent world. They will, if adequately supported, play an increasing role in supporting international development and cooperation. They hold promise as institutions that can contribute significantly to more effective relationships between the industrialized countries and the developing world and to solving economic problems beyond the scope of individual nations or private companies.

In short, the international financial institutions, if adequately supported, can serve as an important instrument to provide economic and social development worldwide, an objective of long-term importance and deep significance to America.

Southern Rhodesia Developments Reviewed by Department

Following is a statement by James B. Blake, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations on April 13.[1]

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you in connection with the committee's examination of resources in Rhodesia and the current Rhodesian situation.

I understand the Department of Commerce has provided you with an overall survey of the major resources of Rhodesia. I will therefore confine my remarks to a brief overview of the current situation in that country.

Developments within the last month have greatly reduced the prospects for a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem.

Negotiations between nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo and the Smith regime, aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement, broke down on March 19 over the basic issue of majority rule and the establishment of fully representative government in Southern Rhodesia.

In an attempt to revive these talks, the United Kingdom on March 22 through Mr. Callaghan (then Foreign Secretary, now Prime Minister) stated its willingness to assist Rhodesia to achieve legitimate independence and to provide financial, educational, and developmental assistance under certain conditions. The conditions were acceptance by the Smith regime of the principle of majority rule and agreement that elections would be held within 18–24 months, no independence before majority rule, and no long drawn-out negotiations.

As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, the United Kingdom remains legally responsible for Southern Rhodesia, still a British colony, which unilaterally and illegally declared its independence in 1965.

With the breakdown of the settlement talks and Smith's quick rejection of the British proposals on March 23, the Rhodesian nationalists and their independent black African supporters increasingly regard armed struggle as the only way of attaining the goal of an independent majority-ruled Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe.

Even before the collapse of the settlement talks, nationalist guerrillas, now located in Mozambique along that country's 800-mile common border with Rhodesia, had begun to step up their cross-border incursions into Rhodesia. These have so far been more of a harassment than a serious threat to the regime. However, they can now be expected to increase in both frequency and intensity, thereby posing a growing security problem for Ian Smith's forces.

In this connection we estimate that the nationalist guerrillas now number some 4,000–6,000, in various stages of training and readiness. Although they are probably not yet sufficiently organized or equipped to mount a major guerrilla threat inside Rhodesia, they already have, as noted earlier, a capacity to launch short-term cross-border incursions.

Within the next 6–8 months these forces supplemented by additional trained guerrillas, may well be in a position to mount and sustain a long-term guerrilla war inside Rhodesia. According to a recent statement by the Rhodesian Minister of Defense, some 700–1,000 guerrillas are currently operating inside Rhodesia at any given time.

Although surrounded by hostile neighbors and by South Africa, which has encouraged Smith to reach a negotiated settlement, the Rhodesian regime seems confident of its ability to contain and deal with the current insurgent challenge. However, the spread of guerrilla activity along the length of the Mozambican and Zambian borders or a significant quantitive increase in guerrilla numbers could pose a severe strain on Rho-

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

lesia's manpower resources and on the limted equipment the security forces possess.

Smith seemingly still assumes that if the afety of Rhodesian whites is seriously eopardized, South Africa at least would ome to his aid—despite South African Prime Minister Vorster's repeated statements that it will not. (Smith may also still ope—again, despite clear statements to the ontrary from the United Kingdom and the United States—for British and U.S. assistnce because of economic interests, assumed acial affinities, or concern over allegedly xpanding Communist influence.)

Barring a sudden and, for the present at east, unexpected change in the white reime's opposition to majority rule, or a hange of leadership in Salisbury, the prosects for the immediate future in Rhodesia re for an escalation of insurgency along the order areas and occasional deeper forays nside Rhodesia. The possibility of urban unest and disturbances cannot be excluded as he armed struggle grows.

These developments will inevitably place ncreasing strains on the Rhodesian econmy, and at some point the Smith regime nay be forced by economic as well as miliary considerations to reconsider its negoiating position on majority rule.

Although the U.N. economic sanctions ave not had the hoped-for effect on the Rhoesian economy, they have had a cumulative ffect, reflected by the regime's present poor oreign exchange position. The Mozambican ction on March 3 in imposing full sanctions gainst Rhodesia will further intensify the conomic pressures on Rhodesia. At the time Rhodesia's rail access to Mozambican ports f Beira and Maputo was cut off, it was estinated that some 40–50 percent of the reime's imports and exports went through Mozambique—including most of its raw nineral ore shipments. Although Rhodesia nay try to divert part of this through its lirect rail link with South Africa, it is not lear how much additional Rhodesian traffic South Africa will be able, or willing, to absorb.

The growing isolation of Rhodesia, combined with increasing security and economic pressures, has not yet caused a major disaffection within the white population. There are, however, some signs of growing unease. Over the past two years, white emigration-immigration statistics have shown increases in emigration and decreases in immigration. Last year, for example, there would have been a net loss in the white population had it not been for the influx of white Portuguese settlers following Mozambican independence.

U.S. policy toward Rhodesia has been consistent. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we continue to recognize British sovereignty over Rhodesia. We do not recognize the illegal regime in Rhodesia; and we have supported efforts of the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and others to encourage a peaceful negotiated transition to majority rule. Both the President and the Secretary have clearly and recently reiterated our unequivocal commitment to majority rule in Rhodesia. The Secretary has also emphasized that the United States is not supporting and will not support the minority regime in Rhodesia.

Consistent with our long-term policy, we have supported and voted for the Security Council sanctions against Rhodesia. We cosponsored the extension of sanctions April 6.

In this regard it also should be noted that, with the exception of chrome and other strategic materials which are imported only because of the Byrd amendment, we have fully observed and enforced these sanctions and have investigated all cases of alleged violations that have come to our attention. In the most recent case involving alleged violations, four persons in California were prosecuted and fined on March 29 for having imported Rhodesian African art falsely labeled as being of South African origin.

Since the imposition of sanctions, there has been no direct U.S. investment in Rhodesia. Residual U.S. investment at that time was estimated at about $45–$50 million, mostly concentrated in mining activities.

Union Carbide and Foote Minerals were the major investors. Since the imposition of sanctions these investments have been under the control of the Rhodesian regime, and the U.S. investors receive no benefits from them.

As you also know, the Administration has supported efforts by concerned Members of the Congress to repeal the Byrd amendment. It is a grave violation of our international obligations and has been a constant irritant in our relations with independent black African nations.

Mr. Chairman, there is one aspect of U.S. policy toward Rhodesia which is sometimes overlooked in the discussion of military forces, economic sanctions, and legal questions. Since the early 1960's the United States has provided educational and training opportunities for black Rhodesians of all nationalist parties. To date approximately 200 black Rhodesians have received university training at both the graduate and undergraduate level in the United States. An additional 300 have been trained at the secondary and postsecondary level, including vocational training, in various countries of independent black Africa—especially Zambia.

We believe this aspect of our policy is as important as all of the others because it looks to the future of Rhodesia when, hopefully, its black and white populations will be able to live together, secure in their rights under a government truly representative of them all.

Third Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to Public Law 94–104, I am submitting a further report on the progress of Cyprus negotiations and the efforts this Administration is making to help find a lasting solution to the problems of the island. In two previous reports, I detailed the Administration's major effort to encourage th resumption of negotiations between th Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot commu nities. My most recent report, submitted i February, indicated that the two sides ha agreed to resume the intercommunal nego tiating process later that month. That roun of talks did, in fact, take place.

The Greek Cypriot negotiator and hi Turkish Cypriot counterpart met in Vienn February 17–21, 1976, under the aegis c UN Secretary General Waldheim. The meet ings concluded with agreement by the tw sides to exchange proposals on the key sub stantive Cyprus issues—including control c territory—within six weeks. Moreover, th parties agreed to meet again in Vienna fo lowing the exchange of written proposal for the purpose, according to a joint an nouncement made on February 21, of estab lishing a common basis before the pro posals are submitted to mixed committee which will function in Cyprus during re cesses in the Vienna-level talks.

The commitment of both sides to introduc negotiating proposals on the key territoria and constitutional issues must be viewed a a significant advance. Until the recent V enna meeting, the two sides had never bee able to agree on a procedural formula whic would allow the exchange of their respectiv positions on these key issues of the Cypru problem. That obstacle has now been ove come.

At the recent Vienna talks, the Gree Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiator also agreed to resume talks in Nicosia o humanitarian considerations. To date, si meetings have been held which have dea with the problem of missing persons, amon other issues, and the situation of the Gree Cypriots living in the Turkish sector. Ther is evidence that these talks are producin concrete results. For example, according t a United Nations communique issued at th conclusion of the March 27 Nicosia meetin nine schools will be reopened in the Turkis

[1] Transmitted on Apr. 9 (text from White Hous press release).

ector on the island to provide for the educational needs of the Greek Cypriot population that has chosen to remain in that area.

The United States continues to remain alert to any opportunity to assist the negotiating process more directly. During the recent visit to Washington of Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, I emphasized the need for both sides to negotiate in good faith so that progress on the Cyprus problem can be realized as expeditiously as possible. Secretary of State Kissinger also addressed the Cyprus question in his discussions with the Foreign Minister. It was clear from our conversations that Foreign Minister Caglayangil believes these negotiations should be sustained so that the entire spectrum of issues can be considered.

In sum, we are encouraged that the negotiating process has been resumed and that a procedure has been developed whereby the critical issues can finally be subjected to serious negotiations. An important threshold has been crossed. Equally encouraging is the impetus that has been created to work out the humanitarian problems. Now we must all work to maintain and increase momentum. We are ourselves again reviewing the situation to see what more can be done to complement the efforts of UN Secretary General Waldheim and the parties, now that the stage has been reached where proposals are being exchanged. We will give serious consideration to any initiative or action—consonant with the wishes of those involved—which would provide greater impetus to the process that is now underway. In the weeks ahead, we will be in touch with the parties to explore such possibilities.

For the moment, we urge that the two sides engage in realistic and statesmanlike discussions on the major issues such as territory. For our part, we shall continue to devote our energies and resources to finding a just solution to the problems of Cyprus.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *April 9, 1976.*

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Discriminatory Arab Pressure on U.S. Business. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations. March 6–December 11, 1975. 233 pp.

Indochina Evacuation and Refugee Problems. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part I: Operation Babylift and Humanitarian Needs; April 8, 1975; 134 pp. Part II: The Evacuation; April 15–30, 1975; 257 pp. Part III: Reception and Resettlement in the U.S.; May 13, 1975; 145 pp. Part IV: Staff Reports; June 8 and July 8, 1975; 191 pp. Part V: Conditions in Indochina and Refugees in the U.S.; July 24, 1975; 245 pp.

U.S. Trade Embargo of Cuba. Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Trade and Commerce and on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. May 8–September 23, 1975. 653 pp.

Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on multinational corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on political contributions to foreign governments. Part 12. May 16–September 12, 1975. 1175 pp.

Priorities for Peace in the Middle East. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Priorities for Peace. July 23–24, 1975. 217 pp.

The International Legal and Institutional Aspects of the Stratosphere Ozone Problem. Staff report prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. August 15, 1975. 143 pp.

U.S. Foreign Energy Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy of the Joint Economic Committee. September 17–19, 1975. 75 pp.

The Palestinian Issue in Middle East Peace Efforts. Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations. September 30–November 12, 1975. 293 pp.

Nuclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy Implications. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. October 21–November 5, 1975. 506 pp.

Negotiation and Statecraft. Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Part 4. With Panel on the International Freedom To Write and Publish. November 18, 1975. 149 pp.

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976. Middle East Security

Assistance Program. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. November 20–December 16, 1975. 145 pp.

Human Rights in Chile. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. December 9, 1975. 36 pp.

Women's Political Rights Conventions. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. D, 81st Cong., 1st sess.; and Ex. J, 88th Cong., 1st sess. S. Ex. Rept. 94–20. December 18, 1975. 7 pp.

Restrictions on Assistance to Angola. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S.J. Res. 156. S. Rept. 94–584. December 18, 1975. 6 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Supports Further Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative William W. Scranton on April 6, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON

USUN press release 43 dated April 6

This is the first Security Council meeting since 1973 convened specifically on the question of Rhodesian sanctions. I welcome this meeting because it provides an opportunity to further strengthen those sanctions. It offers an opportunity as well to reaffirm our strong opposition to the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia and to express the Security Council's full support for the urgent transfer of power in Rhodesia to the majority of Rhodesia's citizens.

For these reasons, the United States was pleased to join other members of the Council in cosponsoring and adopting unanimous the resolution that is before us. We suppo fully the extension of sanctions against th illegal government in Rhodesia to include i surance, trade names, and franchises.

The United States has scrupulously e forced sanctions against Rhodesia, exce with regard to the importation of Rhodesia minerals under the so-called Byrd amen ment. The United States reports to the S curity Council's Sanctions Committee in d tail every shipload of these minerals in ported into the United States under th domestic legislation.

From its very first days in office, the A ministration of President Ford has supporte the repeal of the Byrd amendment. This co tinues to be U.S. policy. We wish once aga to be able to say that the United States is full compliance with U.N. sanctions.

We recognize the need to repeal the By amendment not only for the intended effe in Southern Rhodesia but also in the intere of upholding our international obligation In the same spirit, my delegation urges th governments of those nations whose maj violations are less well publicized to take a appropriate steps to tighten their admini tration of the sanctions imposed by Securi Council Resolution 253 (1968).

The United States remains firm both support of U.N. resolutions which have co demned the illegal Smith regime and in ou commitment to the implementation of th principles of self-determination and majori rule in Rhodesia. The position of the Unite States on this matter was stated most r cently by President Ford in Chicago [o March 12 in an interview for the Chicag Sun-Times] when he said: "The Unite States is totally dedicated to seeing to it tha the majority becomes the ruling power Rhodesia." And then the President adde this: "If we believe in the right of the ma jority to rule in that situation, there has t be a change in the power as far as the go ernment is concerned."

Mr. President, the unanimous adoption of this resolution by the Security Council must constitute a signal to the Smith regime that it cannot expect support from anyone in the international community in pursuing a policy which is morally and politically wrong.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION [1]

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 and 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970,

Reaffirming that the measures provided for in those resolutions, as well as the measures initiated by Member States in pursuance thereof, shall continue in effect,

Taking into account the recommendations made by the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia in its special report of 5 December 1975 (S/11913),

Reaffirming that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that all Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territories do not insure:

(a) Any commodities or products exported from Southern Rhodesia after the date of this resolution in contravention of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) which they know or have reasonable cause to believe to have been so exported;

(b) Any commodities or products which they know or have reasonable cause to believe are destined or intended for importation into Southern Rhodesia after the date of this resolution in contravention of resolution 253 (1968);

(c) Commodities, products or other property in Southern Rhodesia of any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Southern Rhodesia, in contravention of resolution 253 (1968);

2. *Decides* that all Member States shall take appropriate measures to prevent their nationals and persons in their Territories from granting to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Southern Rhodesia the right to use any trade name or from entering into any franchising agreement involving the use of any trade name, trade mark or registered design in connexion with the sale or distribution of any products, commodities or services of such an undertaking;

3. *Urges*, having regard to the principle stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution.

[1] U.N. doc. S/RES/388 (1976); adopted by the Council unanimously on Apr. 6.

PUBLICATIONS

Department Releases 1976 Edition of "Treaties in Force"

Press release 104 dated February 27

The Department of State on February 27 released "Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1976."

This is a collection reflecting the bilateral relations of the United States with 167 countries or other political entities and the multilateral relations of the United States with other contracting parties to more than 375 treaties and agreements on 92 subjects. The 1976 edition lists some 300 new treaties and agreements including the biological weapons convention; the 1925 protocol on poisonous gases; the convention on ocean dumping; the international energy agreement; the world heritage convention; the statutes of the World Tourism Organization; the extradition treaty with Italy; the tax conventions with Iceland and the U.S.S.R.; the consular convention with Bulgaria; and the fisheries agreements with Poland and the U.S.S.R.

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are arranged by country or other political entity, and the multilateral treaties and other agreements are arranged by subject with names of countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

This edition includes citations to volumes 1 through 12 of the new compilation entitled "Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America" 1776–1949 (Bevans).

"Treaties in Force" provides information concerning treaty relations with numerous newly independ-

ent states, indicating wherever possible the provisions of their constitutions and independence arrangements regarding assumption of treaty obligations.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in "Treaties in Force," is published weekly in the Department of State BULLETIN.

The 1976 edition of "Treaties in Force" (461 pp.) is Department of State publication 8847 (GPO cat. no. S9.14:976). It is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for $6.90.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. Done at Washington January 15, 1944. Entered into force November 30, 1944. TS 987.
Adherences deposited: Barbados, February 17, 1976; Trinidad and Tobago, March 3, 1976.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975.
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, March 22, 1976.[1]
Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, December 12, 1975.

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.
Accession deposited: Senegal, March 10, 1976.

Defense—Reciprocal Assistance

Protocol of amendment to the inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance of September 2, 1947. Done at San José July 26, 1975.[2]
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, February 18, 1976.

[1] Applicable to West Berlin.
[2] Not in force.

Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Signature: Mali, April 9, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Gabon, April 1, 1976.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.[2]
Signature: Czechoslovakia, April 5, 1976.

Telecommunications

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.
Ratification deposited: United States, with declarations, April 14, 1976.
Entered into force for the United States: April 14, 1976.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.
Ratification deposited: United States, with declarations, April 14, 1976.
Entered into force for the United States: April 14, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Tunisia, April 13, 1976.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Loan agreement relating to expansion and improvement of agricultural research capability in non-rice crops and cropping systems, with annex and related letter. Signed at Dacca March 29, 1976. Entered into force March 29, 1976.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 11, 1975 (TIAS 8191). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca March 30, 1976. Entered into force March 30, 1976.

Pakistan

Agreement regarding consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to the United States, with annexes. Signed at Washington March 4, 1976. Enters into force upon notification by each government that certain legal requirements have been met.

Name Index

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: April 12–18

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
169	4/12	U.S.-Philippines economic negotiations: joint statement.
*170	4/12	Advisory Committee on Law of the Sea, June 4–5.
171	4/12	Sonnenfeldt: U.S. Naval Academy, Apr. 6.
172	4/12	U.S.-Philippines negotiations on military bases: joint statement.
*173	4/12	Foreign affairs experts from 10 Latin American countries to participate in seminar beginning Apr. 19.
174	4/13	Kissinger: American Society of Newspaper Editors.
*175	4/14	Thomas S. Gates, Jr., sworn in as Chief of U.S. Liaison Office, Peking, People's Republic of China (biographic data).
*176	4/14	David S. Smith sworn in as Ambassador to Sweden (biographic data).
*177	4/14	Kissinger: Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations.
*178	4/14	U.S. and Korea amend textile agreement, Mar. 24.
*179	4/14	Advisory Committee for U.S. Participation in the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat), May 10–11.
†180	4/15	Principles To Guide Future U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation, initialed Apr. 15; Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios' letter of Apr. 7 and Secretary Kissinger's reply of Apr. 10.
†181	4/16	Kissinger: Downtown Rotary Club, Phoenix, Ariz.
*181A	4/16	Moss, Goldwater, Kissinger: introductory remarks.
†181B	4/16	Kissinger: questions and answers.
*182	4/16	U.S. and Haiti sign textile agreement, Mar. 22.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.