THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

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Building an Enduring Foreign Policy

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

I very much appreciate the very warm and friendly introduction of my friend Bob Griffin. I must say I have not heard as many such comments from the Congress in the last year. [Laughter.] In fact, before we came in here Bob said to me, "I know why you are going to China—because China doesn't have an extradition treaty with the United States." [Laughter.]

Bob Griffin has been a strong leader in the Senate, the key member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At a time when so many seem bent on perpetuating division, doubt, and with the disparagement of the past decade, he has been a force for reason and responsibility in our nation's interest. He has been a staunch supporter of the President, a good friend, and a wise counselor.

I come before you tonight to talk about what is right with America's foreign policy.

This nation, no matter how much some may cast doubt on it, is still seen as the land of hope by all the millions around the world who cherish freedom, the dignity of man, and peace. Without us there can be no security. Without us there can be no hope for progress.

America has been true to its responsibility. And I am here to say that it will remain so.

Out of the ashes of World War II, we and our allies built a new world. We had learned from bitter experience that America's safety and world peace, America's prosperity and the world economy, were inextricably linked.

In this spirit the United States promoted the economic and political recovery of Western Europe and Japan. We strengthened our defense and forged our first peacetime alliances; they have preserved the global balance of power for a generation. We pioneered in arms control so that the specter of global cataclysm might never become a reality. We and our partners built a cooperative global economic system so that growth, prosperity, and development could be the common heritage of mankind. We have mediated conflicts and helped settle problems from the Middle East to Berlin. The technological and managerial genius of this country has been the driving force of global change; our science and communications have circled the planet and stretched to the moon and beyond. The American people have reached out with generosity to their fellow men afflicted by disease, hunger, deprivation, natural disaster, war, and oppression. More than any other nation, we have taken in immigrants and refugees, fed the starving, and educated the youth of other lands. We owe the world no apology for what we have done. We have much to be proud of.

And a generation after World War II, with conditions radically altered and the postwar period of international relations at an end—partially as a result of the success of previous policies—the United States successfully adapted its foreign policy to a new era. At the beginning of this decade we faced a number of urgent tasks:

The military balance was being altered

[1] Made at Detroit, Mich., on Nov. 24 before a dinner meeting sponsored by the Economic Club of Detroit and other local organizations (text of the two introductory paragraphs from press release 578A; balance of address from press release 578).

by the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the acceleration of weapons technology.

We were bogged down in a war that we would not win and seemingly could not end.

For 20 years we had isolated ourselves from China; in other words, from one-quarter of the human race.

Our relations with the Soviet Union were characterized by constant tension and confrontation: on the access routes to Berlin, in the Middle East, and in the Caribbean.

Diplomatic relations with most Arab states were broken, and progress toward peace in the Middle East was stalemated.

The new strength and vitality of Europe and Japan required major adjustments in the practices and responsibilities of the previous two decades.

We have come a long way in the first half of this decade. American foreign policy has been transformed:

We brought peace to our nation for the first time in over a decade and a half.

We have ended our isolation from China and opened a growing relationship with the world's most populous nation.

U.S.-Soviet relations have entered a new period. In place of continual crises there are continuing negotiations—on arms control, economic relations, and international issues —which give both sides a stake in peace and have lessened the chances that great-power confrontation will lead to nuclear Armageddon.

In the Middle East we have restored diplomatic relations with all of the key countries of the Arab world. We have helped to move the area from stagnation to hope. Three major agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors have opened the path to peace, a path on which we are determined to persevere.

Our relations with Europe and Japan have been given new balance and impetus; as the recent economic summit demonstrated, they have never been better.

Above all, not only our country but the world is at peace. For the first time since the end of World War II, no nation anywhere is engaged in military conflict with another.

This is the true record of our foreign policy—not the debates, the innuendoes, and political wrangling that so often form the headlines of the day. It is the end result of the trips, the meetings, the summits, the agreements, the setbacks, and the achievements of the everyday conduct of foreign affairs. These are the building blocks of a dream all Americans share: the vision of a peaceful, just, humane, and progressive world.

We have had our disappointments, and we have made our mistakes. After the bitter experience of Viet-Nam, America has learned that it does not possess the power to right every wrong or to solve every problem. We know that our influence is finite, though the demands upon it and the injustices of the world often seem infinite. And we understand that America, like all human institutions, is fallible.

But the vast majority of Americans remain convinced—as your government is—that if we do not resist aggression, if we do not work for a better world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no nation will do it for us, at least no nation that shares our values.

I want to speak tonight about the broader vision of a lasting peace and how America is needed to turn that vision into a reality.

America and Global Peace

The allied statesmen who built the post-war international order would not recognize the international landscape we see today. The evolution that has taken place over 30 years has transformed the environment in which America lives. The world of the last quarter of the 20th century will be vastly different from that to which we have grown accustomed—but it is a world that we must help to shape.

These are the broad tasks of our foreign policy:

In an age of continuing peril and exploding technology, we must maintain and improve our national defense. In the aftermath of Viet-Nam, we have strengthened and modernized our military forces. This process will

continue. We know that peace requires an equilibrium of power, and this government will maintain it. No nation can remain great if it leaves its safety to the mercy or the good will of others. Any realistic hope of better relations with the Communist powers —and there is such hope—depends on a strong America which leaves other countries no realistic course except restraint and cooperation. So long as potential adversaries continue to expand and improve their forces, we will maintain a modern defense that cannot be challenged.

We will place our priority on our alliances with the great industrial democracies of the Atlantic community and Japan. In the new era, the industrial democracies have found that security involves more than common defense. We joined together out of fear; but we can stay united only if we find deeper and more positive common purposes. The moral unity of the democracies, in an era when their values are a minority in the world and buffeted by difficulties at home, is one of our greatest resources. A sense of solidarity in a turbulent world can help all of our peoples recover the confidence that their societies are vital, that they are the masters of their destinies, that they are not subject to blind forces beyond their control.

This is why the United States attaches so much importance to the economic summit just concluded in France. The agreement to cooperate in economic policy, energy, and development, the major progress made on monetary questions, could usher in a new era of unity and confidence among the industrial democracies. We will never forget that our most important relationships are with those nations which share our principles, our way of life, and our future.

We strongly support the words of the Declaration of Rambouillet agreed to by President Ford and the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Germany:

> We came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. Our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to democratic societies everywhere.

We will strive to transform the relationship with the major Communist powers. Foreign policy must be based on reality, not rhetoric. And today's reality is that we live in a world of nuclear equality. This has been imposed by technology; it could not have been prevented; it cannot be ignored or reversed by unilateral decision. It means that we must manage a fundamental conflict of values in the shadow of nuclear holocaust; we are striving to preserve peace while defending our essential principles and interest.

At the same time, the Communist monolith of a generation ago has fragmented into bitter rivalries, and many Communist countries have turned to the West for more constructive bilateral relationships. This provides the opportunity for a careful policy of relaxation of tensions. Future generations would not understand it if partisan controversy caused us to forget that in the nuclear age the relaxation of tensions is a moral imperative as well as a practical necessity. We will spare no effort in building habits of restraint and moderation among the superpowers.

But the easing of tensions cannot endure if we relax our vigilance. We must understand the need for both defense *and* relaxation of tension, both firm action in crises *and* willingness to resolve problems on a realistic and fair basis. We must be prepared for either course; the choice rests with our adversaries.

We cannot ignore, for example, the substantial Soviet buildup of weapons in Angola, which has introduced great-power rivalry into Africa for the first time in 15 years. This Soviet involvement is resented by African nations most of all. But the United States cannot be indifferent while an outside power embarks upon an interventionist policy—so distant from its homeland and so removed from traditional Russian interests. The Soviet Union still has an opportunity for a policy of restraint which permits Angolans to resolve their own differences without outside intervention. We would be glad to cooperate in such a course. But time is running out; continuation of an interventionist policy must inevitably threaten other relationships.

Nor can we ignore the thousands of Cubans sent into an African conflict. In recent months the United States has demonstrated, by deed as well as word, its readiness to improve relations with Cuba. We have cooperated with steps to ease the inter-American boycott against Cuba and to restore a more normal relationship between the nations of the Americas and Cuba. But let there be no illusions: a policy of conciliation will not survive Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico or Cuban armed intervention in the affairs of other nations struggling to decide their own fate.

To Cuba, as to other nations with whom our relations have been strained, I say this: the United States has no higher goal than to ease the conflicts that have torn the globe for nearly a generation. We will be flexible and cooperative in settling conflicts. But we will never permit détente to turn into a subterfuge for unilateral advantage. The policy of relaxation of tensions is designed to promote peace, not surrender; we will be flexible, but we shall insist on reciprocity and restraint.

We shall work to shape a prosperous and equitable economy. The productivity and economic strength of this country is one of our greatest assets. We have used it to help consolidate the vitality of the industrial democracies, to stabilize political relations with potential adversaries, and to fashion new ties with the developing countries.

The division of the planet between North and South, industrial and developing, is now becoming as pressing an issue as the division between East and West. Yet our economies are interdependent, and neither North nor South can long accept growing division without paying a costly and unnecessary price. International order and a thriving world economy can only be built on the basis of cooperation; economic warfare will mean decline for everyone, but most of all for the developing world. Therefore, at the U.N. General Assembly special session in September the United States put forward a practical program of collaborative endeavor on energy, food, trade, raw materials, and the needs of the poorest.

We will continue our efforts on all these fronts.

Cooperative solutions are our objective; but we will not accept the proposition that any group of nations, no matter what its temporary economic power, can exercise its strength arbitrarily to the detriment of the world economic system. The economies of the industrialized nations have been severely shaken by the rapid and exorbitant rise in energy prices; the balance of payments and development programs of the poorer countries have been undermined to a point that no conceivable aid program could compensate.

International peace and stability now clearly require an international economic system that embraces the aspirations and needs of *all* nations. The United States will come to next month's Conference on International Economic Cooperation, the consumer-producer conference, with every intention to help find cooperative arrangements just to all. But we cannot accept indefinitely placing our economy at the mercy of decisions made far away or being asked to redress hardships and meet deficits caused by the actions of others.

The Asian Dimension

Let me now discuss in some detail one part of the world of particular interest to all Americans: the continent of Asia.

Next week President Ford will travel to Asia to reaffirm our stake in that vast region's future and to strengthen important bilateral ties.

The United States is a Pacific power. Our history has been inextricably linked to Asia. No region is of greater importance to us. None is more dynamic. None merits more America's enduring interest and purpose.

The security interests of all the great world powers intersect in Asia. Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States have important stakes in the region; all would be affected by any major conflict there. It is an area vast in population, rich in culture, and abundant in resources. The United States has been involved

in three long and costly Asian wars in the past generation. We have learned, at painful cost, that equilibrium in Asia is essential to our own peace and safety and that no stable order in that region can be maintained without our active participation.

Through much of the postwar period, America engaged itself deeply in Asia to build up friendly nations and to contain Communist expansion. American policy achieved major and lasting successes: the emergence of a prosperous and democratic Japan in close alliance with us, the defeat of aggression in Korea, the continued independence and growing dynamism of the many small friendly nations in the region.

But by the late 1960's our policies needed to adjust to new realities. We were too directly committed militarily. At times America acted as if its stake in its allies' security was greater than their own.

Thus, throughout the first half of this decade we have sought to fashion a new Asian policy, a policy that gradually reduced our military presence and aimed instead at augmenting the strength and vitality of our allies. We sought to stabilize the region by fashioning a balance among the major powers, bringing our commitments into line with our interests.

American policy has had several basic objectives:

—To preserve the sovereignty and independence of our friends in Asia;

—To consolidate our alliance with Japan by giving our most important Asian ally a greater role and equal partnership;

—To open the door to constructive ties with the People's Republic of China;

—To reduce tensions and promote political solutions to Asian regional conflicts; and

—To encourage self-help and regional cooperation among smaller allies.

On all these fronts much progress has been made in the last few years. Our relations with both adversaries and friends have markedly improved. We have extended the range of our diplomacy without reneging on our commitments to our allies. We have adjusted our military posture to maintain a balance in Asia in the face of changing strategic requirements and political trends. We have expanded our economic relations in many countries.

Most importantly, the structure of Asian peace policy has proven strong enough to withstand the tragedy in Indochina. There was widespread initial apprehension that it might signal—or precipitate—a general American retreat from Asia and even from global responsibilities. Our policy since then has greatly eased those fears.

It is as clear as ever that no serious effort to resolve major problems in Asia can succeed without America's participation. The future of Japan and our other allies, the easing of tensions with potential adversaries, the problem of peace in Korea, the continuing independence of the nations of Southeast Asia—all depend significantly on a strong and responsible American policy.

This is why President Ford visited Japan and Korea a year ago on his first overseas trip. This is why he will leave for Asia again at the end of this week to visit the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

For the future we have set ourselves the following tasks:

We will maintain a continuing strong role in Asia. We know that military power alone will not guarantee security. National cohesion and social justice are essential for effective resistance against subversion or external attack. We know, too, that nationalism and self-reliance are the dominant trends in the region. But foreign policy begins with security, and a military balance remains fundamental to peace and the easing of tension. Given Asia's importance to our security and well-being, we owe it to ourselves and to those whose future depends on us to preserve a firm and balanced military posture in the Pacific.

We will continue to strengthen our partnership with Japan. Japan is our principal Asian ally and largest overseas trading partner; Japan's participation is essential to international efforts to promote economic recovery. Our hopes for a peaceful and prosperous Asia depend in large part on Japan's creative collaboration on many international

issues. Japan's experiment in political leadership without the attributes of military power is anchored in turn upon our security treaty, which threatens no one and is widely recognized as a pillar of regional stability.

In short, we regard Japan not as an occasional or temporary ally, but as a permanent friend.

In the early 1970's, in response to Japan's growing economic strength and some bilateral strains, we went through a period of adjustment in our relations. There were frictions, some avoidable by more thoughtful U.S. actions. But these tensions have been overcome by devoted effort on both sides. Today our relations are the best they have been in 30 years. We face no serious bilateral problems. We are collaborating on a vast agenda: to advance the prosperity of the industrial democracies, to ease tensions with the Communist countries, and to extend the new era of cooperation to the members of the less developed world.

Our bilateral relationship, which depends so much upon intangibles of conduct and understanding, has acquired a deeper quality. There have been important cultural exchanges, which have enhanced our sensitivity to each other's national style and values. The first visit by an American President to Japan last fall and the historic visit of the Emperor and the Empress to the United States—and the warm reception that each people extended to the other's leader—demonstrated the extaordinary depth and strength of this friendship.

We do not propose to rest on the accomplishments of the past.

—We will preserve the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security while continuing to adapt its practical arrangements to the changing military and political environment.

—We will strengthen our political consultation, in the full realization that we will not always pursue identical policies but that we have it in our power to assure compatible approaches and full understanding of occasional disagreements.

—We will harmonize even more closely our national policies to combat recession and promote economic expansion.

—We will continue to deepen the cultural dimension of our ties, which strengthens the bonds between our peoples.

In all our dealings we intend to honor a higher standard of concern and consultation than normally obtains even between allies—one that reflects the profound quality of our partnership.

We shall continue to advance our relationship with the People's Republic of China. For a generation our two great countries were separated by a gulf of suspicion and hostility. The reestablishment of ties in recent years has had a significance far beyond its impact on our two countries; it has transformed the international landscape.

There have long existed attachments of sentiment and high regard between the Chinese and American peoples, which we have never ceased to value. But the United States and the People's Republic of China came together again after two decades because of necessity. It was mutual interests that impelled us both—without illusions—to launch a new beginning. These mutual interests continue. They can be the foundation of a durable, growing relationship.

We and the People's Republic of China have parallel concerns that the world be free from domination by military force or intimidation—what our many joint communiques have termed "hegemony." We have affirmed that neither of our two countries should seek hegemony and that each would oppose the attempts of others to do so. Our commitment to this policy will not change. The United States will continue to resist expansionism as we have throughout the entire postwar period. But we will also avoid needless confrontations. We will not be swayed from our effort to improve relations with potential adversaries and to build a more stable international environment.

The United States and China have also agreed to pursue the normalization of our relations. The United States remains dedicated to the principles of the Shanghai communique. We do not challenge the principle of one China—a principle that is maintained by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. While time may yet be required to

resolve our remaining differences on this issue, the direction of our policy is clear.

Since we lack the full range of diplomatic links with the People's Republic of China, and since so much depends on our mutual perceptions of the world scene, exchanges of views on the international scene between the President and the leaders of China are essential and assume special significance.

President Ford's visit to China next week will be the first contact between a U.S. President and Chinese leaders in nearly four years. We can expect the talks to be marked by the scope and the directness which have marked our previous encounters and which best serve leaders whose societies are different but whose policies are rooted in realism.

Disagreements in ideology and national interests exist; there will be no attempt to hide them. It is inevitable, therefore, that each side will determine its own policies according to its own situation and perception of its national interest; these are not subject to the instruction of the other. Both of us are self-reliant; both of us understand the difference between rhetoric and action, between tactics and basic strategy.

This spirit of candor and mutual respect has infused our new relationship with the People's Republic of China from its beginnings over four years ago. On this basis we are prepared to make our relationship an enduring and constructive feature of the world scene.

We shall continue to strive to reduce tensions and promote more durable arrangements for peace on the Korean Peninsula. An atmosphere of confrontation, regrettably, persists on the Korean Peninsula. The United States has a major stake in maintaining the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. American forces are still stationed there in keeping with our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea. Our commitment to South Korea rests not only on our historic relationship with the Korean people, a bond forged by common sacrifice in war; it derives as well from the recognition that the security of Japan, our closest ally in the Pacific, is directly linked to the security of Korea. We will continue to work with our friends to preserve the balance. We will resist with determination any unilateral attempt to change or upset the equilibrium on the peninsula.

At the same time, we and the Republic of Korea are prepared to move to a more permanent solution. We have proposed a conference among North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China to discuss the dissolution of the U.N. Command while preserving the Korean armistice agreement. And in that context we are willing to consider other measures to reduce tensions, including a wider conference to negotiate more fundamental arrangements for peace in Korea.

We will not acquiesce in any proposals which would exclude the Republic of Korea from discussions about its future. And we will not allow our military presence, which derives from bilateral agreements, to be dictated by third parties. But we are prepared—now—to transform the armistice arrangements to a permanent peace. And we are ready to talk to any interested country, including North Korea, about the future of Korea, provided only that South Korea is present.

We shall seek a new structure of stability in Southeast Asia. This Administration inherited the conflict in Indochina and brought our involvement to an end. That chapter in our history, which occasioned so much anguish, is now closed. As for our relations with the new governments in that region, these will not be determined by the past; we are prepared to look to a more hopeful future. The United States will respond to gestures of good will. If those governments show understanding of our concerns and those of their neighbors, they will find us ready to reciprocate. This will be especially the case if they deal constructively with the anguish of thousands of Americans who ask only an accounting for their loved ones missing in action and the return of the bodies of Americans who died in Indochina. We have no interest to continue the Indochina war on the diplomatic front; we envisage the eventual normalization of relations. In the in-

terim we are prepared to consider practical arrangements of mutual benefit in such fields as travel and trade.

One of the basic purposes of our original commitment in Indochina was to provide a buffer of security and time for the *many* nations of Southeast Asia to enable them to develop their own strength and cohesion. In this regard our efforts proved successful. These nations have preserved their independence; they are assuming increasing importance. We have a substantial stake in the well-being of the Philippines and Indonesia, which President Ford will visit next week. We have important links with Thailand and strong ties of friendship with Singapore and Malaysia. And we have a longstanding association with our ANZUS partners, Australia and New Zealand.

These nations are preserving their independence through economic development, a serious effort to relax tensions, and institutions of regional cooperation. All of them are examples of self-reliance and national resilience. All of them also seek to maintain and broaden their association with us—and all of them wish the United States to remain actively engaged in Asia.

In short, the new Asia is an important pillar of the structure of global peace. It is a central element in the design of our foreign policy.

America's Responsibility

Thirty years ago, when we were first summoned to leadership, we were the only country to have survived World War II with its institutions and economy intact. In that era we were overwhelmingly predominant in nuclear weapons and in every measure of military and economic strength. The American people, with pride in their victory and fresh memory of the folly of isolationism, confidently assumed the responsibilities of world leadership.

Inevitably, with time, other nations—allies and adversaries—recovered and developed their strength. It was natural that decolonization and an expanding economy would produce new centers of economic power and political influence. And it was understandable that the American people would tire of the burdens of leadership and ask for another balancing of America's interests and commitments.

But history gives us no respite. To build peace, other nations must do more—but we must do our share. Today's foreign policy and today's international environment pose for us a novel psychological challenge. We can no longer overwhelm our problems with resources; we must learn foresight, tactical skill, and constancy. We can no longer expect our moral preferences to hold sway simply because of our power; we must possess patience and understanding. We cannot shape a new world by ourselves; we must elicit from others—friend and foe alike—a contribution to the arduous process of building a stable international order. America's challenge today is to demonstrate a new kind of leadership—guiding by our vision, our example, and our energy, not by our predominance.

Only rarely in history does a people have the chance to shape the international environment in which it lives. That opportunity is America's today. But we can meet the opportunity only as a united and confident nation.

In a world of thermonuclear weapons, shrunken distances, and widely dispersed power, we cannot afford disunity, disarray, or disruption in the conduct of our foreign affairs. Foreign policy requires authority. Our ability to maintain peace fundamentally involves the belief of other nations that our word counts, that we have a coherent policy, that we possess steadiness and resolve.

It is time, therefore, to end the self-flagellation that has done so much harm to this nation's capacity to conduct foreign policy. It is time that we outgrew some of the illusions that characterized the long-past period of our isolationism: the idea that we are always being taken in by foreigners; the fear that military assistance to allies leads to involvement rather than substitutes for it; the pretense that defense spending is wasteful and generates conflict; the delusion that American intelligence activities are immoral;

the suspicion that the confidentiality of diplomacy is a plot to deceive the public; or the illusion that tranquillity can be achieved by an abstract purity of motive for which history offers no example.

In the nation with the highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures in the world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the ideals of civil liberty and democracy, it is long past time to put a stop to self-doubt about our example and role in the world.

We have already gone through a traumatic period—with assassinations, resignations from our two highest offices, and a political climate still poisoned by the residue of the war and domestic turbulence of the previous decade. And we are now one year before our Presidential election.

But this country cannot have a moratorium on a responsible foreign policy. Let us never forget that there are many in the world who do not wish us well, that there are crises and challenges which will not wait for our elections.

We must keep in mind that in a world where totalitarian government can manipulate friendly political parties, there is a gray area between foreign policy and overt intervention which we deny ourselves only at grave risk to our national security.

The bitterness that has marked so much of our national discourse for a decade no longer has reason or place. A great responsibility rests upon both the Congress and the executive. Our foreign policy has been most effective when it reflected broad bipartisan support. This spirit of cooperation has never been more essential than today. Our free debate once again must find its ultimate restraint in the recognition that we are engaged in a common enterprise.

The decade-long debate over executive predominance in foreign policy is now a thing of the past; Congress' reassertion of its role and prerogative is now a dominant and important fact in our political life. In recent years congressional investigations have served the country well in correcting many abuses. We must discover the excesses of the past, overcome the abuses that are uncovered, and insure that they will never be repeated—this is the deepest strength of a free society. But it should be possible to cleanse our institutions without disrupting the conduct of our nation's business abroad and buffeting all the instruments of our policy. When the most confidential documents are spread on the public record as a matter of routine, there is a danger that rather than cleanse our government we will produce timidity and obfuscation in our bureaucracy and loss of confidence abroad.

We must resist the myth that goverment is a gigantic conspiracy. The truth is that the vast majority of public servants are serious, dedicated, and compassionate men and women who seek no other reward than the consciousness of having served their country well.

We need nothing so much as a restoration of confidence in ourselves. President Ford, a man of Congress, has conducted his Administration with an unprecedented commitment to cooperation and conciliation with his colleagues of the House and Senate. But he has some fundamental obligations to the national interest:

—We cannot allow the intelligence services of this country to be dismantled.

—We must preserve our ability to maintain the confidentiality of other governments' dealings with us and our dealings with them.

—We must maintain our defenses and a prudent program of economic and military assistance to other countries with whom we have productive political relations.

—We must achieve a rational division of labor between Congress' defining of broad national commitments and the executive's constitutional responsibility for tactics, the execution of policy, and the conduct of negotiations.

Ladies and gentlemen: It is the responsibility of Americans—of all political persuasions, in both branches of government, in the public and the press—to help shape a national policy in a positive and cooperative spirit. It is the responsibility of this nation to exercise creative leadership in a moment

of uncertainty, in a world that cries out for inspiration.

America is the only country whose destiny always seemed open, whose future always appeared more compelling than its past. We have been the hope of mankind, not only because we stood for freedom and offered a haven to the oppressed but because we have demonstrated time and again the resiliency and indestructible spirit of free men. We have not lost our understanding of our true interests or our humane concern for the fate of our fellow men.

This country's foreign policy is not a burden; it is a success and a promise. We have done great things. There are great things yet to do. If the American people stand together, we will leave as our legacy a more secure, prosperous, and just world than the one that we inherited.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Detroit

Press release 578B dated November 25

Q. Mr. Secretary, American investments in Spain are valued at more than $1.5 billion. We have major military bases there. What is our future there with the successors of General Franco?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States attaches very great importance to its relationship with Spain. We hope that Spain will join the Atlantic community as well as the European Community. We will do our best to cooperate in an evolution in Spain that will make that possible, and we will do our utmost to strengthen our traditional friendly relations with Spain.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why is Russian oil being discussed as part of future economic agreement terms with the Russians? Is it wise for us at this time to make ourselves dependent on Russian oil in military strategic terms, especially in terms of what's happened since we've been dependent on Middle Eastern oil?

Secretary Kissinger: The amount of Russian oil that is being discussed will not create any substantial dependence.

The basic problem with respect to energy is to increase the supply of energy available to the industrial nations. The high oil price is being maintained by cuts in production. The more additional oil can be brought on the market, the deeper the cuts in production will have to go among the members of the oil cartel, until a point is reached where they may no longer be willing to sustain it.

We will not make ourselves dependent on Russian oil to any significant degree, and the amount that we are going to purchase from the Soviet Union is of primarily symbolic significance at this point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what in your opinion is the most crucial problem facing America today? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I can only speak about foreign policy, because on domestic policy I am an arguer against universal suffrage. [Laughter.]

In foreign policy, our most complicated problem is to realize—that is, to gear our policies so that they can be sustained over the long term. We have had a record of oscillating between extremes of intransigence and extremes of conciliation. We have had a tendency to believe that we can reward countries by friendly relations and punish them by cruel relations. But what we need is a perception of our long-term interests—a realization that we can no longer impose our solutions on all parts of the world but that we have to work together with some cooperative relationships.

We have to resist expansion of the Com-

munist countries, but we have to do it by means that are more complicated and that are more suited to the ability to gain public support than has been the case in the immediate postwar period when we were so enormously strong in relation to the rest of the world.

Our biggest problem is to make the American people understand this need for a long-term policy. And this, frankly, is one of the reasons why I make all these trips around the country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, recent news articles state that Canada is planning to cut their oil exports to the United States. What is your reaction to this, and what effects do you think it will have on future U.S. oil requirements?

Canadian Oil Exports to U.S.

Secretary Kissinger: We have not been happy with this Canadian decision, and we have attempted to delay its implementation for as long as possible—above all, in relation to the refineries that have been built specifically to take care of Canadian oil. We are attempting to work out swap arrangements to reduce the impact of these cuts.

Basically, there is no solution to the American energy problem except a substantial program of conservation and a massive program of alternative sources of energy, which we should develop together with other consuming countries. Otherwise, we will continue to be at the mercy of decisions that are not made in America.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask the following question: Can the effectiveness of the CIA be restored after the damage inflicted by the Senate Select Committee?

Secretary Kissinger: If you give me a chance, I'll say something about the House committee also. [Laughter.]

I think that the events of the last year have had a serious effect on our intelligence agencies. I think it is high time that they be given the opportunity to go back to their business and not spend all their time defending themselves, explaining events that have happened five or ten years ago. And I believe that the new Director, George Bush, can do this.

Economic Summit Meeting at Rambouillet

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think I'm the token woman tonight, and I would like to ask you what function do you see summit conferences, such as the recent one held at Rambouillet, serving as far as foreign policy is concerned?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the summit conference at Rambouillet brought together the leaders of six industrial democracies, which between them control about 70 percent of the world trade. They met to discuss the recession that has come to all of their countries. But beyond that, they met to discuss the future of democratic institutions in the world.

The biggest problem that is faced in the democracies today is to give the people there the sense that they are not subject to blind economic forces outside of their control.

The recovery of none of these countries is possible without some cooperative action by the others. So the six leaders dedicated themselves to joint efforts at economic recovery. They made major progress in solving the monetary issue that had divided them. They had agreed to cooperate on questions of energy.

It can well be that this summit meeting, which was conducted in one of the most constructive and harmonious atmospheres that I can recall at any international meeting, could mark a turning point not only in the economic recovery of these countries but also in giving a new sense of vitality to the democratic institutions which are now under such heavy attack.

Settlement of Cyprus Question

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask the following question: What steps has the Secretary of State taken to stop the expulsion of Greek Cypriots and the colonization of many of the Turks to occupy the Turkish zone on Cyprus?

Secretary Kissinger: We believe very strongly that a just settlement of the Cyprus question is in the interest of Greece, in the interest of Turkey, and above all, in the interest of Greek Cypriots.

We believe that such a settlement must respect the dignity of the Cypriot population and must enable refugees to return to territories from which they were expelled. At this particular moment, most of the movement of Greeks out of the Turkish area has already occurred. It occurred nearly a year ago.

So we are putting all of our effort behind bringing about a negotiated solution as rapidly as we can. We are in close contact with the Governments of Greece and Turkey and with the Government of Cyprus and with the leaders of the various communities.

Unfortunately, the domestic situations in various countries have been complicated. And some of our own decisions have also added to these complications. But we hope that we can bring about a just settlement in the foreseeable future.

Trends in U.S. and Soviet Defense Expenditures

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday Mr. Schlesinger [James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense] said that if the United States is not second to the Soviet Union in terms of its defense posture, it is very close to being second. Would you please comment?

Secretary Kissinger: Secretary Schlesinger was talking about trends that concerned him. He was talking about the trend that the Soviet Union is spending about 15 percent of its gross national product for defense while we spend only about 5 percent of our gross national product on defense. And it is true that if these trends continue over an indefinite period inevitably the Soviet Union will gain militarily on us.

I think Secretary Schlesinger would agree that if we take the situation today in terms of strategic forces, in terms of high-technology weapons, in terms of the Navy, we are still superior.

The great Soviet advantage is in ground forces that can be introduced into regional situations. I would agree with Secretary Schlesinger that if we look ahead over a period of five years, we must strengthen the forces that can resist local aggression, and that if we do not, then many opportunities for blackmail will arise.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I noted in your discussion tonight, in the structure of the global peace—are South America, Mexico, and Canada being overlooked in our foreign policy?

Western Hemisphere Relations

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think you will ever find a Secretary of State who will admit that he has ever overlooked anything. [Laughter.]

Q. Not even slightly? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Not even slightly. [Laughter.]

When I was in private life, nothing used to infuriate me more than a government official who would arrive to tell me that all options had been considered and the best possible one had been chosen; and that if I only knew as much as he did, I wouldn't bother him with questions. [Laughter.]

Well, I am here to tell you that all options have been considered. [Laughter.]

In fact, I do not think that Mexico and Canada have been neglected. As far as Canada is concerned, I make more news at a dinner party there than most people make with formal speeches. [Laughter.]

The problem in our relations with Latin America is that, on the one hand, there is a desire for some spectacular event but, on the other hand, there is the reality that many of the Latin American countries see themselves pulled between their traditional relationships in the Western Hemisphere and their temptation to join some of the Third World activities. And there is a reward in many Latin American countries for taking a posture of confrontation with the United States.

But, still, we have started what is called a new dialogue with the countries of Latin

America, which, while it has not had spectacular results, has had the results which we think are achievable.

If an announcement by me of a trip to Latin America did not always produce an international crisis, I would say that I am planning to go there fairly soon. [Laughter.]

Investigation of CIA

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask the following question: What possible effect will the current investigations regarding the CIA have on current American foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think when calm returns to this country and people ask themselves what exactly it is that is alleged against the CIA—leaving aside some spectacular events—I think we will find that in a very complex situation, in many gray areas of national policy, it has served the country well.

I think that there is no intelligence service in the world that could survive the public exposition of all of its activities and the publication of all of its documents—or of so many of its documents—which is the case today. The impact on many foreign countries is unfortunate. I know some of these investigations have been conducted seriously and in an attempt to get at the truth.

But we also have to be able to get back to the business of government at some point, and the intelligence community has to go back to the business of conducting intelligence. This is the balance that must now be struck.

President Ford's Visit to China

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you cite some specific areas of trade between China and the United States that will be expanded as a result of President Ford's impending visit?

Secretary Kissinger: The basic purpose of President Ford's visit to China is to bring about a better comprehension on both sides of the major policy directions of the other. Growing out of this, there may be an improvement in trade, as was the case in 1972, but we are not going to China in order to negotiate a specific trade agreement. That will be done at other levels and in another manner. In our experience the Chinese have preferred to do their business deals through private channels rather than through government-to-government deals.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see a comparison between Prince Metternich leaving Vienna in 1848, ending the Metternich era, and the pressure you are presently under for ending the Kissinger era? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I'll tell you: When he got under pressure, he had been in office for 38 years [laughter]; so in the year of 1999 I will entertain this question [laughter].

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what changes do you foresee in U.S. foreign policy in light of the recent appointment of the new Secretary of Defense?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, if you do not tell it to the Pentagon, I will have to say that the foreign policy of the United States is not made at the Pentagon. [Laughter.] But Secretary [of Defense Donald H.] Rumsfeld is a long-term associate of mine and of course a close friend of the President, and I am convinced that this new team will work together harmoniously and effectively.

I do not believe that there will be any substantial changes in the conduct of foreign policy, because the basic decisions on foreign policy are made by the President and he has not changed his views. But the method of making them will work very well.

Relations With Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of Cuba's continuing propensity for international troublemaking—most recently in the United Nations on Puerto Rico and the anti-Zionist resolution, and on Angola—is it prudent to provide them with easier access to their Latin neighbors and the OAS [*Organization of American States*] *agencies, and shouldn't we actively oppose their membership or expansion of their involvement in Latin American affairs?*

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has been prepared to improve our relations with Cuba and not to stand in the way of those Latin American countries which for their own reasons have decided to improve their relations with Cuba.

The OAS decision on July 16th really ratified what the Latin American countries had been doing anyway—that is to say, it left each country free to establish whatever ties it wished to establish with Cuba—which is exactly what had been happening before the Cuba decision. This is why these are the safest decisions to make. [Laughter.]

But the United States, as I said in my prepared remarks, will not accept Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico or Cuban intervention in the affairs of other countries. Therefore the process of improving relations depends on Cuba conducting a responsible foreign policy. If it does not, we cannot continue the process we have started.

Reunification of Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you believe the political implications to be in the unification of Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, de facto, Viet-Nam has been administered as a single country ever since the Communist conquest of South Viet-Nam. There was a pretense of a separate administration in the South, but they never permitted foreign diplomats to be established there.

We expect that by next spring the unification of Viet-Nam is likely to be concluded. The impact on the neighboring countries of that step will not be so formidable. But the weight of Viet-Nam, a country with a population of over 40 million—with the enormous amount of military equipment, both what they acquired themselves and what they captured—is going to be very considerable.

And the test, again, is whether it will use its weight with restraint or whether it will engage in adventurous policies, and the possibility of normalizing relations with us depends on the external conduct of this unified Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what good and bad effects do the multinational companies have on our foreign policy?

Multinational Corporations

Secretary Kissinger: First, to take the positive effects, the biggest problem in development is the transfer of capital and technology. This becomes increasingly difficult through governmental sources because of the growing resistance to the use of public funds for development purposes. The multinational corporations are a much more flexible instrument for the transfer of capital and technology and, curiously, less of a political mortgage on the countries concerned.

On the other hand, at least in the past, the multinational corporations have not always been fully sensitive to the political conditions of the countries in which they operated, and they have been under increasing pressure from the point of view of expropriation and from political pressure.

We are attempting to develop a code by which multinational corporations might operate in foreign countries and to which foreign countries would agree so that they have some assurance against what they consider some of the abuses and the multinational corporations have some assurance against some of the pressures to which they have been exposed. We are discussing this now with the heads of several of the multinational corporations to see whether we can come up with an agreed document that we then would put before the United Nations or some other appropriate international forum to get a code of action for multinational corporations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you support Mr. Moynihan's [Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the U.N.] position at the United Nations on the Zionist resolution and his statement on the President of Uganda?

Secretary Kissinger: Pat Moynihan is an old friend of mine. And when one has a friend at Harvard, one holds on to him [laughter], as I did with him. I recommended that he be

appointed to this position after I had read an article of his in which he laid out in some considerable detail what he thought the appropriate strategy of the United Nations should be.

He has my full confidence and support and the full confidence and support of the President.

Pat Moynihan got a little bit upset last week because the British Ambassador to the United Nations attacked him. I must say that if I can ever reduce the attacks on me to foreigners, I'll celebrate. [Laughter.] He is a distinguished public servant. The President and I met with him this morning. We assured him of our full support. I am delighted to say that he has agreed to stay on and that he will continue in his calm, measured, and quiet way to do his job. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Detroit November 25

Press release 580 dated November 26

Q. Mr. Secretary, on April 29, 1965, President Ford, then a Michigan Congressman, issued a statement in which he condemned Turkey for the genocide of the Armenian people. Last December 13, 1974, the White House informed me that the President was sticking to his condemnation of the Ottoman Turkish Government of 1913.

On April 8, 1975, the House passed a resolution, voted overwhelmingly, to mark April 24 this year as a national day of remembrance of man's inhumanity to man, particularly in the massacre of the Armenian people. According to Congressman [David N.] Henderson of North Carolina, at the urging of the State Department the words "in Turkey" were deleted from that resolution because of delicate negotiations on the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece.

When that resolution passed the House and went to the Senate subcommittee chaired by Senator Hruska of Nebraska, the Associated Press reported on April 23, 1975, that time is running out, and the State Department has bottled the resolution, did not want the resolution out of Senator Hruska's subcommittee. According to Senator John Tunney—Jerry Hill, his chief aide—your office contacted Senator Hruska and said under no means should any resolution on the Armenians come out of that committee.

Could you explain to me why so much pressure on a simple resolution marking the observance of 60 years?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I am delighted to go to news conferences in which I learn some news, and the fascinating events which you have just described are all news to me. I cannot tell you how moved I am when I hear Congressmen and Senators report the intolerable pressures to which they are exposed by the Department of State which prevent them from passing legislation. I will quickly get in touch with those of my aides who have that tremendous influence so that they can use their pressure when it will do me some good. [Laughter.]

I have to tell you that most of the detailed events you described here are news to me. It is obvious that the United States attaches importance to its friendship with Turkey, a country with which we have a long relationship and which is in a very strategic position. It is also clear that in the face of the arms cutoff that was already taking place, we would not want to upset that relationship more than was necessary.

I did not personally involve myself in the discussions of the Armenian resolution. What happened to the Armenians 60 years ago was a great tragedy occurring in the Ottoman Empire, not in the present Govern-

ment of Turkey. But I think that the stories of that overpowering influence of my office on the congressional committees are, like Mark Twain's death, slightly exaggerated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the debate on foreign policy and the press, particularly during a campaign year, offers a chance for dialogue and dissent in the public. How does that affect your ability to conduct the foreign relations of the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Nobody should take the position that foreign policy cannot be conducted in the face of a democratic debate. In fact, it is the essence of a vital democracy that it can conduct a coherent foreign policy while debating the fundamental issues.

At the same time, the foreign policy of the United States deals with the permanent interests and values of the United States. These should not be determined primarily by partisan considerations. Therefore some restraint—some greater restraint—should be placed on the foreign policy debate by both sides than on domestic debate. The Administration in office should not claim that it is the repository of all wisdom and should remember, as we do, that there is a continuity in American foreign policy that includes the administrations of both parties. The opposition should keep in mind that we should not give the impression to foreign countries that the basic direction of our foreign policy in all categories is going to get changed every eight years.

So within these limits I think that debate should go on and can be fruitful, and as far as we are concerned, we will certainly welcome it.

Outside Intervention in Angola

Q. Mr. Kissinger, in your speech last night you talked about the lack of restraint shown by the Soviet Union and Cuba in intervening militarily in Angola. What, in practical terms, can you do about it for the United States? What reaction can there be?

Secretary Kissinger: Our primary concern at this moment is to put an end to it and to see whether an African solution can be found to an African problem; that is to say, whether the countries of Africa and the local forces in Angola can work out a solution without turning Angola into an arena for great-power rivalry.

Q. In other words, a coalition government?

Secretary Kissinger: We certainly favor the report of the Conciliation Committee of the Organization of African Unity which called for negotiation among all three groups and a possible coalition government, yes.

Continuing Middle East Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that you feel that step-by-step negotiations in the Middle East no longer are useful, and that perhaps you should move to a conference form of negotiations for a more permanent settlement of the question. Are those reports accurate? And why is step-by-step negotiation no longer useful? And also, what form of conference negotiations are you talking about?

Secretary Kissinger: I just glanced at such a report in one of our leading Eastern newspapers, and I am afraid to contradict them because then they will write an editorial against me. [Laughter.] That would be such an unusual event for them that I dare not do it.

Basically our view has always been that we are prepared to support the step-by-step approach if the parties want it. Specifically, we are prepared, and continue to be prepared, to support a negotiation between Syria and Israel with respect to the Golan Heights. And in that respect I do not agree with that particular report which I have seen.

However, if the parties would not be able to agree on a negotiation, we would be willing to encourage a Geneva-style negotiation or a Geneva negotiation based on the original participants and on the original letters of invitation. Failing that, we are prepared to have a preparatory conference to the Geneva Conference or an informal meeting again of the original membership. So we are

prepared to support any negotiating effort that the parties themselves are.

Q. But are step-by-step negotiations out, or—

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. They are not out?

Secretary Kissinger: They are not out.

U.S. and World Economies Linked

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night you referred to the need for a prosperous economy, the divisions of a planet between North and South, the rebirth of some of our former opponents after World War II, and you closed with the statement that our foreign policy is not a burden.

Secretary Kissinger: Is not a burden, yes.

Q. What would you say to the 8 million unemployed in this nation, particularly in a city like Detroit that has been hard hit by the recession, and to those citizens who are opposed to continuing foreign aid?

Secretary Kissinger: I would say to them that, first of all, the unemployment is not caused in any sense by foreign aid. Even technically, the money we spend for foreign aid is useful to the other countries only because they spend it here, and therefore it makes jobs rather than depriving people of jobs.

Secondly, I would say to the unemployed that they have to understand—and I would say to all Americans that they have to understand—that our prosperity and our security are now inextricably linked with that of the rest of the world. And as events in the past five years have shown, if the rest of the world collapses economically, whatever difficulties we have here will be greatly magnified, and if there is conflict, it will run major risks for the United States.

So I would say that our foreign commitments and our foreign involvement reflect not a favor to other countries and not an act of charity, but that they are an expression of the American self-interest and are in the interest of all Americans, including the unemployed.

Now, of course, we must reduce unemployment in America, and we must have a strong economic recovery. When the leaders of the industrial democracies met two weeks ago, this was recognized as the principal goal of all these countries—preeminently of ours. So I do not want to set up an opposition in which our people have to suffer for the sake of foreign policy. Our people have to understand that the economic difficulties in this country are not caused by our foreign policy and that they would be worse without a forward-looking foreign policy.

Extension of U.N. Force on Golan Heights

Q. Mr. Secretary, U.N. Secretary Waldheim is reportedly having difficulty in effecting a continuation of the so-called cease-fire on the Golan. Do you have any more encouraging word at this time, and what if the agreement is not continued after Sunday's deadline?

And since I am on the question of the United Nations, would you care to comment on whether there will be a censorship on [Daniel P.] Moynihan, [Clarence M.] Mitchell, and their associates at the United Nations against the brutal majority?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, with respect to the discussions that Secretary General Waldheim is conducting, I have not yet seen an official report by Secretary General Waldheim of what he was told in Damascus and in Jerusalem, though I expect to find this when I return to Washington today.

What is being discussed is not a continuation of the cease-fire, but a continuation of the mandate of the U.N. forces on the Golan Heights; that is to say, of the UNDOF [U.N. Disengagement Observer Force] group. We still believe that an extension of the mandate is essential and that an increase in tension on the Golan Heights would serve nobody and would create the most serious difficulties for all those who want to make progress toward peace, while not helping the more radical elements either.

With respect to Ambassador Moynihan, I have repeatedly stated that he has our full confidence. There is no question of muzzling him—for that matter, there is no physical possibility of muzzling my friend Pat Moynihan. [Laughter.]

But that has never been the issue. There has not been an issue. There has been no dispute. This is an invented crisis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Bill Leggit, writing in the current issue of Sports Illustrated, said that the proposed baseball trip by major league players to Cuba—governmental approval of that is imminent as late as this week. Can you comment on the status of that proposal?

Secretary Kissinger: It was imminent at one point; it is not imminent now.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I hate to digress from these important subjects of discussion here this morning, but you were to meet with some of our labor leaders and editors here this morning. I wonder if you could comment on what those discussions involved.

Secretary Kissinger: I met with the labor leaders last night and with the editors this morning. One of the purposes for me of these trips is to get a feeling for what is on the minds of the various concerned citizens in the areas that I visit, and therefore I usually schedule three or four groups of people of various professions and concerns and have a give-and-take.

In order to permit the frankest kind of discussion, I always have those off the record; so it would not be appropriate for me to discuss the content of these conversations. But I do want to say that I find these meetings extremely helpful in giving me, within the limited time available, a feel of what is on the minds of the leaders of the areas that I visit.

Q. Could you give us a broad overview, for instance, of what the chief concern is of most people?

Secretary Kissinger: I am afraid if I give an overview, they will give an overview, and then we will never hear the end of it. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night you described the success of American foreign policy. I believe that many would consider it not so successful, given events of the last several weeks—such as the Japanese proposals at Rambouillet calling for debt moratorium, a new international development and rapid development of thermonuclear fusion power. Also, you have similar proposals coming out of the UNCTAD Conference [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] at Geneva and Soviet discussions of the transfer ruble. You also have the revolutionary success in Angola, the unstoppable revolution in Portugal, and in the Middle East, where your policy has basically backfired with the hegemony now of the Communist Party in Lebanon. What makes you believe, with these international developments, and domestically the exposures of your and the National Security Council involvements in gunrunning, dopepushing and assassinations, that you will be able to, number one, escalate toward confrontations with the Soviets around Bangladesh, the Middle East, or Angola—or, number two, that you will be able to contain the growing influence of the U.S. Labor Party in the LaRouche-Evans presidential campaign?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I like the objectivity with which your questions are put to me [laughter], permitting an easy yes-and-no answer [laughter].

Of course I have to say my perspective is perhaps a little biased, but it is not exactly the same as yours. The United States cannot keep others from making proposals that we do not approve of. But the test of the policy is not whether these proposals are made, but whether they are accepted; and we were extremely satisfied by the results of the Rambouillet Conference, and we think that the results of it indicate that the industrial democracies are working more closely together than at any time in the postwar period.

The other items you raised are too complicated to deal with at this brief meeting.

Status of U.S.-Soviet Arms Talks

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said recently that the arms talks with the Soviet Union are stagnated.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. What is causing the stalemate, and what are the chances for breaking it? What will it take to break it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the stalemate has been caused basically by the issue of whether to count the so-called Backfire bomber and how to take into account the so-called cruise missiles in relation to the overall totals that had been agreed to at Vladivostok. These are complicated technical issues, and the status of the negotiations is such that if that deadlock is broken, it can be concluded reasonably rapidly after that in working out the details.

The prospects are hard to foretell at this moment. It is our position—we are prepared to review our position if the Soviet Union is prepared to review its position. We cannot make new proposals simply because the Soviet Union rejects our old proposals without offering any alternatives. If the Soviet Union is prepared to review its attitude, then we can see what can be modified in ours so that a mutually acceptable compromise can emerge.

At this point I cannot give you a judgment of the degree to which this is possible, because there have not been any detailed talks since my last press conference.

Q. Following up on that, Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether you consider it a possibility that you might be meeting with one or another of the Soviet leaders before the end of the year on that subject?

Secretary Kissinger: That possibility exists, but it is not yet absolutely firm.

U.S. and Canadian Concern on Oil

Q. Mr. Secretary, some Canadian sources are under the impression this morning that you are unduly critical of their own self-interest when it comes to their own oil. How do you see that again?

Secretary Kissinger: I was self-critical of their interests?

Q. Of Canadians' interests, preserving their self-interest when it comes to their oil.

Secretary Kissinger: You mean in answer to a question yesterday?

Q. Yes; apparently so.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have not seen these comments, and I was afraid there might have been a loose microphone around a dinner table again yesterday. [Laughter.]

We understand the Canadian concern with looking after their own interest with respect to their own oil. We have our own concerns with respect to the refineries in the Middle West that have been put there primarily because of the expectation of Canadian oil. Therefore we have to work out some arrangement by which both of these concerns can be met.

We consider our relations with Canada excellent and that these problems can be worked out amicably and in a cooperative spirit. So if my answer yesterday came across as critical, it was not intended that way. It was intended to state a problem which we both have and which we should both attempt to solve—and are attempting to solve.

Q. You foresee no difficulties?

Secretary Kissinger: I foresee difficulties, but I foresee that we will solve them.

Alleged Violations of the SALT Agreement

Q. Mr. Secretary, Aviation Week and Space Technology has accused you and the President of a deliberate policy of secrecy and deception at the SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. Do you have any response to that editorial?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a disgrace when the President and the Secretary of State can be accused of deliberately deceiving the American public with respect to alleged violations of our major adversary.

Serious people are bound to differ when you have complicated weapons systems on

both sides of great technological complexity. When there is a report of violation, it is investigated. That takes some time. Then representations are made. That may take some time.

But there has been no violation that has been reported that has not been brought to the attention of the Soviet Union and has not been energetically pursued—or, I should rather say, no allegation of a violation—and I think this is an unworthy editorial.

Q. Therefore, to follow up, they say the Soviet Union is building an irreversible Soviet military advantage. You say that is totally wrong?

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union is building up its strategic forces—but not on the basis of violations of the agreement, but on the basis of investment in its strategic forces.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union can build an irreversible advantage in strategic forces against the United States if we are on our toes. They will certainly not do it on the basis of violations of the SALT agreement. Whether they do it by being willing to spend more than the United States is another matter. But on the basis of violations of the SALT agreement, it is not correct.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is this continuation of sniping by forces in Washington that you will leave the Administration before the end of the year. Is that possible; is it probable? And could your congressional critics put you in a position where you just could not function?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no plan to leave the Administration. I received perhaps excessive praise at one stage. I may receive excessive criticism now—and I admit that I consider any criticism excessive. [Laughter.]

As I said yesterday, you cannot conduct foreign policy without authority, and if the authority of the government is constantly eroded, foreign policy will suffer. But I think that senior officials have to be prepared to take criticism as well as praise, and I am not complaining about it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, following that up, sir, are there any indications that the revelations of the Pike committee [House Select Committee on Intelligence] and the Church committee [Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities] have had specifically detrimental effects on foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not so familiar with the revelations of the Pike committee; I am familiar with charges of the Pike committee. On the whole, I think that the Church committee has attempted to do a serious job with a very difficult subject—with an assignment that it did not seek out but that was given to it. Nevertheless, even though the effort was serious, it was not helpful to the conduct of our foreign policy for the publication of all these documents to take place, and this is why the President opposed it.

Q. Could you expand on this point that you made in your speech last night that Russia's interventionist policy must inevitably threaten other relationships? You were speaking in reference to Angola. Could you expand more precisely on what you meant there?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I meant it is difficult to reconcile this with the principles of coexistence that were signed in 1972, and this would have to be taken into account by our policy if it continues.

U.S. Program To Help Developing Countries

Q. Could you elaborate on the policy of the State Department in response to the proposals that were made by Japanese Minister Miki at Rambouillet where he called for a worldwide economic development program to be facilitated by the establishment of a new economic—new monetary institutions, that called for a debt moratorium for the underdeveloped sector, and for international cooperation on rapid development of thermonuclear fusion power. And, secondly, could you explain why the contents of Minister Miki's offer had not been reported to the American press and instead are being confined to the chambers of the National Security Council?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if Prime Minister Miki made such proposals, it is his responsibility to put them to the American press if he wants them published. I, frankly, am not familiar—I may not have focused on his presentation, but I do not recall this degree of detail. But, at any rate, there is no reason, from our side, not to have Japanese proposals put forward—except a courtesy that the Japanese would put forward their own proposals, and not we.

Now, with respect to the specific proposals, the United States is opposed to debt moratorium because it would fall almost exclusively on us and because we do not believe that this is the right way of proceeding.

The United States strongly favors a major effort of the developed countries to establish a better cooperation with the developing countries. At the U.N. special session of the General Assembly, the United States put forward a very sweeping program in many categories of income maintenance, new investment, help to the poorest countries, food reserves, in which the industrial countries and the developing countries could cooperate and in which the United States could show greater flexibility.

The United States will support that program. That is our program. Other countries are free to put forward their program. Thermonuclear fusion—the peaceful uses of thermonuclear fusion have not even been solved yet, and therefore it is not the most immediate issue that is before mankind. But our proposal has been put forward—our position has been put forward in great detail on September 1 before the special session of the General Assembly.

Those are the programs that we support. Other countries have every right to put forward their proposals, but we do not necessarily endorse them.

Diplomacy and Narcotics Control

Q. Mr. Secretary, one time the United States was successful in stopping opium poppy production in Turkey, and it is our understanding now that the production of poppies is growing again. Has the United States given up totally on using diplomacy to try to limit the supply of heroin to this country?

Secretary Kissinger: No. We consider that the control of opium traffic is one of our most important objectives, and we have been working with the Turkish Government on the control of the poppy production. It is a very important domestic political issue in Turkey because the swing districts are also the districts in which poppy production is most widespread. But we have worked out with the Turkish Government a process of harvesting by which the so-called straw process, by which the poppy harvest is processed in governmental plants; and therefore the private sale of the opium is, to all practical purposes, eliminated.

This has so far worked rather well. And Representative [Charles B.] Rangel, who has been one of the chief advocates of this program, looked into it and found it extremely helpful.

Visit to Africa

Q. Mr. Secretary, when will you make a visit to black Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: I hope during the course of next year.

Q. Can you give us a specific date?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The dates depend on other international events; but I have talked to several African leaders, and I hope to visit there next year.

Q. Members of the congressional caucus have criticized you repeatedly for not going over to visit black Africa in the past. Can you comment on that?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have been in close touch with members of the Black Caucus, and they have worked together with us on a policy paper in which we want to take their views into account. I have been so heavily engaged in the Middle East problems that were more urgent, if not more important, and I have been out of the country so much on these other trips which were caused by immediate crises that I could not

take a trip to Africa. But I hope very much to be able to do it next year.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you see any indication that the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations will be contemplating oil increases for the United States this year or next year?

Secretary Kissinger: Price increases?

Q. Yes. And, if so, what can we do to negotiate on the basis of some of the foodstuffs that we ship to them?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is a meeting—the so-called consumer-producer conference is scheduled to meet in Paris on December 16, and we will get a clearer indication at that point of what the long-term policy of the oil-producing nations is.

Our impression is that there is no immediate risk of an increase in oil prices. But, as I said yesterday, it is a serious matter for all of the industrial countries, as well as for the developing countries, to have their domestic economies or their development programs made totally subject to decisions that are taken far away and which are entirely made without reference to their concerns. Therefore we hope very much that the OPEC nations will think very seriously before they contemplate another increase.

U.S.-Iran Relations: Cooperation and Shared Interests

Address by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.[1]

To put any discussion of Iran and our relations with it in perspective, I like to remind Americans that, while we take pride in approaching the 200th anniversary of our independence, we as a nation are still very young. Iran also celebrated an anniversary recently, but of a slightly different order of magnitude—in 1971 Iran marked the 2,500th anniversary of the establishment of its monarchy.

Although U.S.-Iranian relations began to develop early in this century, we first began to collaborate closely during World War II and in the tense postwar years in the face of Soviet moves to expand their influence and control to the south. As the U.S. Government accepted responsibility to assist free nations to maintain their independence, we found Iran a country of great strategic importance that had the will to resist the pressures of its powerful neighbor. On that basis was formed a partnership that has steadily developed. That partnership has been to an extent formalized by our association in the CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] alliance and by our numerous bilateral agreements in various fields. Its substance, however, does not rest only on formal documents but on the major interests which we share.

The interests which we share with Iran have until recently been primarily bilateral and regional: that the countries in the Persian Gulf region remain independent and free to choose their own courses of political and economic development, that this oil-rich and strategic region remain free from hostile external influence, that destabilizing and destructive radical movements not gain a foothold, and that the trade routes from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world remain open. Under the leadership of His Imperial Majesty, however, Iran has always taken a view of its interests and responsibilities far broader than the immediate region, recognizing the growing indivisibility of the world's problems and of the solutions to them. In the past few years Iran's success in developing its economic, social, and defense capabilities has given it the means to play a larger role on the world scene.

We have come to look to Iran as a stabilizing influence in its region. We see Iran as a country ready to use its influence for peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region and to cooperate with its neighbors in the interests of mutual security. Much is said in the press—at times critical—about the large arms purchases Iran is making and the

[1] Made before the 26th Kentucky World Trade Conference at Louisville on Nov. 18. Mr. Atherton is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

American role in Iran's development of its defense capabilities. It is natural, however, that a country of Iran's size and strategic location, and with its large population and high state of economic development, would wish to be able to defend itself against outside threats and to play a role commensurate with its interests.

Iran's ability to serve the cause of peace is well illustrated by the effective role Iran has played in support of Secretary Kissinger's efforts to bring about a lasting settlement in the Middle East. Iran shares with the United States the ability to talk with both Israel and the Arab countries. During the months of negotiations Iran gave quiet but steadfast support in various capitals to those governments seeking to pursue a course of moderation. Its efforts have been especially helpful to Egypt, with which it has developed very close relations during the last year. Iran's grant and loan commitments, permitting Egypt to rebuild its cities and develop its industry, have been of great significance. They have given Egypt tangible evidence that it can diversify its ties and its sources of external assistance.

I can say with confidence that, without Iran's encouragement, our efforts to promote a peaceful settlement would have been far more difficult. In addition to its diplomatic and financial contributions to the peacemaking effort, Iran has recently accepted the great responsibility of sending peacekeeping forces as part of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in the Middle East. Elsewhere in the region, Iran has readily shared its affluence with its neighbors; and large-scale economic arrangements have been made with Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

As Iran pursues its interests in the world, we will from time to time find that those interests do not always coincide with ours. That is only natural. I know of no family in which all members always agree; and it would be strange if independent countries with differing cultural, historical, and geographic backgrounds did not at times disagree. It is well known, for example, that we have differed with Iran on the issue of oil prices; but both our governments have determined that this difference should not stand in the way of cooperation in other areas to our mutual benefit.

World War II and the cold war brought us together. But the world changes; and while shared strategic perceptions are still an important part of our relationship, new issues are giving new dimensions to that relationship—the global issues of food, population, energy. Solutions for these issues are neither easy nor obvious, but will require the cooperative efforts of the world's best brains. In the various fora in which these issues are approached, we find Iran playing an active and leading role.

I have so far been talking of the broad scene and would now like to narrow the field a bit to look at the range of our interests in Iran. This conference has been focusing on trade with Iran. I will only note what a major market Iran has become for U.S. agricultural and industrial exports. In 1974 the value of our exports to Iran was $1.7 billion. In only the first nine months of 1975, our exports have totaled $2.4 billion, of which about two-thirds are civilian and only one-third military.

Iran is also, of course, a major area for American investment. Significant investment by American firms in Iran started about 30 years ago and has grown steadily until it is today at a level of well over a billion dollars. Its participants include many of our major firms, as well as some of our moderate-sized companies.

Because of wise policies of both the Iranian Government and of the investing companies, American investment in Iran has not been of the sort that has occasionally aroused accusations of exploitation in other countries. Rather, American firms have invested in Iran as part of joint ventures with Iranian entrepreneurs. As a result, American and Iranian skills and knowledge have worked together to bring ever higher technology into play in the Iranian economy in ways that serve the interests of Iranian development plans as well as the financial interests of the joint venturers.

The number of American employees in

Iran was kept at a minimum from the start, and Iranians have been trained to replace them as rapidly as possible. The spinoff of talented managers and workers has contributed to the rapid development of purely Iranian firms in advanced industrial fields. These firms have in turn become important customers for licensed American technology.

Concurrently with the development of joint American-Iranian business ventures, and in part because of it, has come the growth of perhaps the most important of our many cultural ties with Iran: the vast number of Iranians who have studied and are now studying in American institutions. The Iranian student body in the United States is roughly 15,000 in number, and it would be difficult these days to find an American college that does not have at least a few Iranian students. I understand that there are about 100 here at Louisville. Many senior Iranian officials have studied in the United States, including a number of Cabinet ministers, and, most notably, Ambassador Zahedi [Ardeshir Zahedi, Iranian Ambassador to the United States]. This greatly facilitates relations between our countries.

The multiplicity of the ties of economics, culture, and technical cooperation which bind the United States and Iran, and the importance which the United States attaches to Iran as a stabilizing and friendly influence in the Middle East, caused the two governments to agree, almost exactly one year ago, to establish a Joint Commission to expand and diversify the many aspects of our bilateral cooperation.

I will not talk at length of the work of the Joint Commission. I will simply note that under the Commission, there have been formed committees on agriculture, on economic and financial affairs, on manpower, on nuclear energy, and on science and education. Each of these committees has been active in developing new programs of cooperation in its special field. The work of these committees is largely in the governmental field, but a private sector affiliate has also been created—the Joint Business Council. Its chairman, Mr. John Logan, was your luncheon speaker today. I understand he is off to Tehran next week to consult with his Iranian counterparts.

In closing, I will say that our relationship with Iran is a very special one. A quality which characterizes it and is important to me as a day-to-day practitioner of diplomacy is our ability to talk out the problems that inevitably arise between dynamic governments. As Ambassador Zahedi has frequently said, these are problems within the family which can be resolved wthin the family. The ability to talk together frankly within the family is both a preventive and a cure for misunderstanding.

Building on our history of cooperation and our ability to talk together frankly, we expect our special relationship with Iran to continue to develop and expand into new areas and to bring ever-increasing benefits to both the American and the Iranian people.

Study of U.S.-Japan Relationships in Science and Technology Completed

Press release 554 dated November 5

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

A panel of distinguished experts has recently completed a comprehensive study of relationships between the United States and Japan in the fields of science and technology. Their report was signed in Washington on November 4. Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., formerly Science Adviser to the President, and Dr. Saburo Okita, president of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, were cochairmen of the binational panel. Other American members of the Executive Committee were Ambassador T. Keith Glennan, former NASA Administrator, and Dr. Robert W. Hiatt, president of the University of Alaska. Their Japanese counterparts were Dr. Tatsuoki Miyajima, Atomic Energy Commissioner, and Dr. Junnosuke Nakai, professor at Tokyo University.

Senior officials from a variety of departments, agencies, and ministries in the two governments also served on the review panel, which was established in accordance

with a 1973 agreement between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan. The conclusions of the group will now be presented to the two governments for their consideration. The full text of the report will be released at a later date.[1] The panel concluded that the benefits accruing to both countries from their scientific and technological cooperation during the past decade fully warrant extension of bilateral cooperative programs into additional fields. They pointed out that Japan and the United States face many common problems associated with high levels of industrialization and accordingly can improve the quality and decrease the cost of their scientific research and technological development programs by an enlightened interchange of ideas and by selected joint activities.

HIGHLIGHTS OF REVIEW PANEL REPORT

The panel of U.S. and Japanese experts which has just reviewed the programs of scientific cooperation between the two countries suggested a number of specific areas for expanded cooperation. These included, among others, such fields as environmental and occupational health, nuclear safeguards, solar and geothermal energy, gasification and liquefaction of coal, and hydrogen energy research. Other promising areas identified for increased attention in future cooperative programs included earthquake prediction, radioactive waste management, research on toxic substances in food grains, and alternative energy resources for transportation.

The panel also called for increased cooperation on germ plasm exchanges for food and forage crops, fast-breeder reactors, nuclear fusion, sea-bottom research, marine sciences, and the safety of new drugs and food additives. The range and diversity of cooperation between the scientific communities of the two countries is well illustrated by the final categories in which the panel recommended greater cooperation, covering such varied fields as the rehabilitation of handicapped persons, food sciences, climate dynamics, and space science and applications. While the panel's recommendations are advisory and do not yet represent commitments by the two governments to follow the courses of action proposed, it is anticipated that careful attention will be given to the report in both capitals as further programs for cooperation are developed.

The panel experts agreed that it would be desirable for the two governments to agree on one or more joint research and development efforts in which combined staffs from the scientific and engineering communities in both countries would work together on a specific major project, each contributing in manpower and money in relation to its interests and anticipated benefits. Under this arrangement both countries would be working together on a common project, rather than merely exchanging information on the status and results of their separate research and development programs.

In their final report, which the two cochairmen signed in Washington on November 4, the panel members noted that too frequently the program-oriented scientist or engineer sees international cooperation as an extraneous element to his essentially domestic goal—a diversion of limited funds, time, energy, and other resources away from their primary purposes.

They called for a broader "international mindedness" on the part of some of the responsible administrators, pointing out that it would be desirable to generate among these executives, as well as their technical colleagues, a better appreciation of the benefits of cooperation across national lines. The panel observed that "our problem is to develop an atmosphere in which the technical agencies appreciate that cooperation with colleagues in other countries can be a valuable enhancement—rather than a dilution—of their research and development efforts."

The group foresaw the possibility of avoiding costly duplication of effort by pooling the knowledge and the efforts of the scientific communities in the United States

[1] Single copies of the report are available from the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

and Japan working on common problems. They pointed out that each country can benefit from the experiences of the other and thus both can advance more rapidly (and more economically) toward solving the technological problems which beset both nations. In addition to the savings which flow from systematically sharing the tasks and avoiding unnecessary coverage of the same ground, the panel members anticipated a real improvement in the quality of scientific work. They noted the stimulating effect of association with the best scientific talent of another advanced society and the reciprocal enhancement of quality by the interchange of new ideas, differing points of view, and contrasting backgrounds.

In the concluding paragraphs of their report, the joint panel stressed the importance of continued cooperation:

> As conspicuous beneficiaries of our industrial successes, both countries must now learn to live with the problems which industrial progress has engendered. We cannot ignore the acute social and physical problems which have emerged in both countries: over-crowded cities, polluted air, contaminated water, congested traffic systems, and vulnerability to curtailment of essential imports. These afflictions of modern industrialized societies present both countries with the pressing imperative of utilizing scientific research and advanced technology to overcome the problems which have grown as our societies have developed their present characteristics.

The group concluded its review of the cooperative programs between the two countries with a "respectful recognition of the important results which have already been achieved and a sense of confidence that still more may be accomplished by further cooperation among our scientists and engineers." They foresaw abundant opportunities to pool research resources and technological talents to the mutual advantage of both nations. "The shared benefits will be measurable in terms of valuable scientific progress, useful technological development, and a reinforcement of the binational solidarity which results when key elements of our two societies work closely together in areas of recognized mutual interests."

Letters of Credence

Bangladesh

The newly appointed Ambassador of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Mustafizur Rahman Siddiqi, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 21.[1]

Guyana

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, Laurence E. Mann, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 21.[1]

Jamaica

The newly appointed Ambassador of Jamaica, Alfred A. Rattray, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 21.[1]

Malawi

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Malawi, Jacob T. X. Muwamba, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 21.[1]

Nigeria

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Edward Olusola Sanu, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 21.[1]

Saudi Arabia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ali Abdallah Alireza, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 21.[1]

Yugoslavia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dimce Belovski, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 21.[1]

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[1] For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Nov. 21.

U.S. Proposes Worldwide Amnesty for Political Prisoners

Following are texts of a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly on November 12 by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan, a statement made in the committee on November 21 by U.S. Representative Leonard Garment, who is counselor to the U.S. delegation, and the text of a U.S. draft resolution which was introduced on November 12 and withdrawn on November 21.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN, COMMITTEE III, NOVEMBER 12

USUN press release 144 dated November 12

My delegation rises to address the Third Committee in a matter which may be the most important social, cultural, and humanitarian proposal which the United States has made in very many years and which we regard as one of the most important which this committee will ever have had before it.

In an address on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the United Nations, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger took note that we are living at one of the rarest moments in the modern history of the world. For at this moment, in all of the world there is not a single nation-state engaged in war against another nation-state.

It appears to the United States that such a moment invites—calls for—not less extraordinary measures of reconciliation not only between nations but within them. To this end, the United States desires to propose a worldwide amnesty for political prisoners. It proposes a General Assembly resolution which

Appeals to all Governments to proclaim an unconditional amnesty by releasing all political prisoners in the sense of persons deprived of their liberty primarily because they have, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, sought peaceful expression of beliefs and opinions at variance with those held by their Governments or have sought to provide legal or other forms of non-violent assistance to such persons.

The United Nations has, in truth, already taken at this General Assembly at least two steps in this direction:

—A draft resolution in the Special Political Committee, entitled "Solidarity with the South African political prisoners," calls on "South Africa to grant an unconditional amnesty to all persons imprisoned or restricted for their opposition to *apartheid* or acts arising from such opposition . . . ." The United States voted for this resolution.

—A draft resolution in the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee, entitled "Protection of human rights in Chile," called for the government there to insure "The rights of all persons to liberty and security of person, in particular those who have been detained without charge or in prison solely for political reasons . . . ." The United States voted for this resolution.

Is there, however, any reason to stop there, to limit our concerns to only two members of the United Nations, when there are all together 142 members? The resolution on "Protection of human rights in Chile" declares, inter alia, that:

No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense under national or international law at the time when it was committed . . . .

It has to be noted that more and more inter-

national pronouncements of this kind declare that there are crimes in international law for which individuals may be held responsible. Similarly, it is more and more held that there are actions against individuals for which governments may be held responsible, at least in the sense that they are expected not to take such actions. The exact state of the law in this area is not one on which there will be universal agreement. Yet, clearly, something akin to common law rights is emerging in international law which protects individuals where "universally condemned" or "abhorrent" actions are involved. It is to these standards that Secretary Kissinger appealed in his address to the General Assembly earlier in this session, when he raised the issue of torture. Torture, he said, is

> . . . a practice which all nations should abhor. It is an absolute debasement of the function of government when its overwhelming power is used not for people's welfare but as an instrument of their suffering.

Now, it follows from these considerations that even as South Africa and Chile are obliged by certain standards concerning prisoners, for example, so equally are all other members of the United Nations. It is implicitly acknowledged, however, that it is for governments themselves to conform to international standards. And if some governments, then all governments.

Hence, at this moment, the singular appeal of amnesty. A moment of peace and of peacemaking, and a mode which allows governments to do what they ought without the appearance of coercion. All governments.

Universality in this matter is of special concern to the U.S. Government—and we would hope to all governments. There are two grounds for this concern which strike us with special force.

The first is that the selective morality of the United Nations in matters of human rights threatens the integrity not merely of the United Nations but of human rights themselves. There is no mystery in this matter. Unless standards of human rights are seen to be applied uniformly and neutrally to all nations regardless of the nature of their regimes or the size of their armaments, unless this is done, it will quickly be seen that it is not human rights at all which are invoked when selective applications are called for, but simply arbitrary political standards dressed up in the guise of human rights. From this perception it is no great distance to the conclusion that in truth there are no human rights recognized by the international community.

A generation ago the British poet Stephen Spender came to this perception in the course of visits to Spain during its long and tragic civil war. He had first come to Spain out of sympathy for one of the sides in that heartrending conflict. He had returned to England to report what he had seen of atrocities committed by the other side. Thereafter he made several trips to Spain, over the course of which he was forced to realize that atrocities were not a monopoly of one side only; they were indeed all too common on both sides. At which point, to his great and lasting honor, he wrote:

> It came to me that unless I cared about every murdered child indiscriminantly, I didn't really care about children being murdered at all.

This is what the U.S. proposal is about. Unless we care about political prisoners everywhere, we don't really care about them anywhere. It is something else altogether that is on our minds, something we conceal with the language of human rights, in the course of which we commence to destroy that language, much as George Orwell, who fought in the Spanish Civil War, saw that it would be destroyed.

Our concern about discriminatory treatment is not eased by scrutiny of the list of cosponsors of the draft resolutions on South Africa and Chile. These are, to repeat, resolutions calling attention to the plight of political prisoners. The South African draft resolution has 60 cosponsors. The Chilean draft resolution has 33.

The United States has broken down these respective lists according to "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," that great contribution to clear thinking and plain speaking which is the work of Freedom House, an American institution of impeccable creden-

tials, which traces its beginnings to the first efforts in the United States to win support for the nations then engaged in the mortal struggle against nazism and fascism in Europe.

The Comparative Survey of Freedom ranks the levels of political rights and civil rights in individual nations on a scale of 1 to 7, and then gives a general summary ranking "status of freedom," by which nations are classified as "free," "partly free," or "not free." One of the melancholy attributes of a nation judged "not free" is that, in the opinion of the distinguished political scientists who carry out this survey, the nation is one in which individuals are imprisoned for political beliefs or activities of a noncriminal nature—in other words, a nation with political prisoners.

What does the Comparative Survey of Freedom tell us about the cosponsors of these resolutions? It tells us that, in its judgment, no fewer than 23 of the cosponsors of the draft resolution calling for amnesty for South African political prisoners have political prisoners of their own. In the case of the draft resolution calling attention to the plight of political prisoners in Chile, it would appear that 16 of the cosponsors fall into the category of nations which have political prisoners of their own.

This leads to a particularly disturbing thought about the processes by which the United Nations has come to be so concerned about human rights in some countries, but not in others. This is that we tend to know about violations of freedom—know at the time and in detail—only in those countries which permit *enough* freedom for internal opposition to make its voice heard when freedoms are violated.

This is the case, is it not, in South Africa, where there are said to be over 100 political prisoners? For it is not necessary to *go* to South Africa to learn of violations of human rights there. One need only subscribe to the South African press, a press which while no doubt curbed in some ways, or even many ways, is nonetheless capable of frontal assault on the policies of the South African Government.

The Cape Times, for example, in its lead editorial of November 3 states, referring to an act that has been taking place here in the General Assembly by the U.S. Government:

> The controversy over detentions and opposition to apartheid between South Africa and the United States is unfortunate for it could harm the Republic's chances of establishing a firmer foothold on world opinion at a critical time. It also illustrates how indefensible the present system of detention is in South Africa. The fact is that unless Mr. Vorster is prepared to reveal reasons for detentions, he will be unable to answer convincingly the United States Government charge that people are detained whose only act is outspoken opposition to apartheid. To term this a "downright lie" as Mr. Vorster has, might sound impressive for domestic consumption, but it is not really satisfactory.

The editorial concludes, and I have the honor to be associated here with my distinguished friend Mr. Clarence Mitchell, about whom this editorial is being written:

> For a start, Mr. Vorster should abolish the iniquitous terrorism act if he wants to deal effectively with the U.S. charge. The act provides for indefinite detention incommunicado and without trial, on the mere say-so of a police officer. There are no effective judicial reviews or guarantees. While the system remains on the statute books, charges such as the recent U.S. delegate's remarks in the U.N. will persist; and they cannot be answered convincingly. South Africa, moreover, will remain in the dubious company of countries which bypass the due process of law as part of the ordinary routine.

Is it not also the case that the freedom of the press in South Africa—such as it may be, for we do not assert it to be complete—contrasts sharply with that of its neighbors? In the Monthly Bulletin of the International Press Institute of June 1975, Mr. Frank Barton, Africa Director of IPI, is reported as having told the assembly of that impeccably neutral and scrupulous organization:

> The unpalatable fact is—and this is something that sticks in the throat of every self-respecting African who will face it—is that there is more press freedom in South Africa than in the rest of Africa put together.

And what of Chile, that troubled land, where at least one estimate states that there are some 5,000 political prisoners and which is rated "partly free" by the Freedom House comparative survey?

One of the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution on Chile, for which the United States voted,

> *Deplores* the refusal of the Chilean authorities to allow the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights to visit the country, notwithstanding previous solemn assurances . . . .

This is true. But it is only part of the truth. The whole truth would include the fact that Amnesty International and the International Red Cross *were* permitted to visit Chile. Moreover, if the visit of the working group had gone through, it would have been the *first time in history* that any government had permitted such a visit.

Are we not forced to acknowledge the point made recently by Mr. Robert Moss, the editor of the (London) Economist's foreign report:

> If the military regime in Chile, following the example of all self-respecting Communist revolutionaries, had flatly decided to shut out all foreign reporters, [and] civil rights investigators . . . for a period of, say, six months after the coup, our diet of horror stories from Chile would have been meager indeed.

And are we not forced to take note of the report of Milton Friedman, the distinguished American economist, who recently visited Chile:

> . . . on the atmosphere in Chile, it is perhaps not irrelevant that at two universities, the Catholic University and the University of Chile, I gave talks on "The Fragility of Freedom," in which I explicitly characterized the existing regime as unfree, talked about the difficulty of maintaining a free society, the role of free markets and free enterprise in doing so, and the urgency of establishing those preconditions for freedom. There was no advance or *ex post facto* censorship, the audiences were large and enthusiastic, and I received no subsequent criticism.

It is not the purpose of this statement to be accusatory or to arouse ill feeling. But is it not the case that this year we have seen any number of regimes completely or almost completely seal off their countries, barring or expelling foreign newsmen, such that, at most, rumor reaches the outside world as to what is going on inside?

Simple justice requires that the United States, for one, acknowledge that while we have supported at the General Assembly resolutions critical of repressive practices of the governments both of South Africa and Chile, at this General Assembly we have done so in the company of nations whose own internal conditions are as repressive or more so.

And what of Israel, a country rated "free" by Freedom House, with high if not perfect scores in political rights and civil rights? Is it not enough to say that much of the case being made against Israel by other nations today is made in the first instance by the fully legal opposition parties within Israel, including Arab-based parties, many of which have been quite successful in electing members to public office, and that this opposition is given notable expression in the Arabic-language press in Israel, which has been described as the freest Arabic-language press in the world?

Thus we come to the second of the concerns which animate the United States at this point. This is the concern not only that the language of human rights is being distorted and perverted; it is that the language of human rights is increasingly being turned in U.N. forums against precisely those regimes which acknowledge some or all of its validity—and they are not, I fear, a majority of the regimes in this United Nations. More and more the United Nations seems only to know of violations of human rights in countries where it is still possible to protest such violations.

Let us be direct. If this language can be turned against one democracy, why not all democracies? Are democracies not singular in the degree to which at all times voices will be heard protesting this injustice or that injustice? If the propensity to protest injustice is taken as equivalent to the probability that injustice does occur, then the democracies will fare poorly indeed.

And it is precisely this standard which more and more appears among us, albeit in various disguises. In 1971, for example, the World Social Report presented to the General Assembly was virtually a totalitarian document—you know of which I speak. I was in this committee at that time, and I said so at that time. The fundamental

premise on which the assessment of social conditions in respective countries was made was that the absence of social protest indicated the absence of social wrong. Hence, without exception, the police states of the world were judged most in the right.

Americans, and those who have studied the history of the United States, will perhaps recall the memorable image which Abraham Lincoln once used in a speech given in 1858 which we have come to call his Framing Timbers Speech. He was protesting what he judged to be the overall purpose being served by many seemingly unrelated legislative measures of the time—the purpose of extending slavery into our western territories. (For the history of freedom in the United States is hardly without blemish.) Lincoln spoke of a "concert" of behavior:

> We cannot absolutely *know* that all these exact adaptations are the result of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places and by different workmen . . . and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortices exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too many or too few—not omitting even scaffolding—or, if a single piece be lacking, we can see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared to yet bring such piece in—in such a case, we find it impossible to not *believe* that . . . all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common *plan* or *draft* drawn up before the first lick was struck.

The United States makes no such assertion at this time. But it reserves the right to judge, in the months and years ahead, that there has indeed been a "*plan* or *draft*" involved in all the multifarious activities at the United Nations concerning human rights which, with nigh inhuman consistency, seem always somehow to be directed towards nations at least somewhat more free than most members of the United Nations, and which now most recently have been directed toward a democratic society that is unquestionably free. We reserve the right to learn that our worst suspicions have been confirmed. But in the hope that we will not be, we here and now declare what our suspicions are. Our suspicions are that there could be a design to use the issue of human rights to undermine the legitimacy of precisely those nations which still observe human rights, imperfect as that observance may be.

To those members of the United Nations who would allay our suspicions we make this simple appeal: Join us in support of our draft resolution calling for amnesty for all political prisoners. The list of known prisoners, a list assembled by organizations such as Amnesty International, is a sufficiently long and harrowing one. But there is far more horror to be felt at the thought of the names we do *not* know. It is time to free these men and women. The time for this amnesty is past due, and the path is long. Let us take the first step here and now.

STATEMENT BY MR. GARMENT, COMMITTEE III, NOVEMBER 21

USUN press release 157 dated November 21

When the United States introduced the resolution to grant amnesty to political prisoners throughout the world, we did so with some care for the differences of opinion, sometimes vast ones, that divided the members of the United Nations. We did not ask for much. We asked merely for the release of those men and women who have been imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their beliefs and opinions in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We did not ask that the United Nations solve every disagreement that exists, within countries or among countries of the world, over what may constitute a crime. We asked only that this body appeal to countries everywhere in the world to do what no one can deny to be right. We did not ask for much, because we wanted to ask only for something on which all the world must surely be agreed. And we did not even ask that the political prisoners of the world be freed as a matter of right; we asked only for amnesty, for the grant of their freedom as an act of grace.

We did all this with deliberation because

we wanted to be sure that we had presented this body with a measure whose words could not be interpreted as the words of political partisanship. If the United Nations was ever to reveal itself as universally concerned with human rights, we thought, it was inconceivable that it could refuse to deal honestly with this most fundamental of issues.

Our conviction was misplaced. For since we introduced this resolution, no fewer than 15 amendments to it have been submitted. Almost all of those amendments are formulated with farfetched analogies, lacking in minimal juridical sensibility, and designed to turn this resolution into a meaningless gesture or worse—certainly an act that has no place in the forum in which we are assembled.

Predictably, these 15 amendments are, in effect, but one—each pointing in the same direction as if the product of a common plan. Not one is primarily concerned with people held in prison merely for thinking or expressing thoughts discomfiting to their governments; indeed, almost all of them make absolutely no reference to such prisoners. These amendments are devoid of any concern for the danger faced by these men and women who are, like prisoners of war, captives in the hands of their enemies.

But our objection to these amendments goes beyond the fate of this particular resolution. It involves the fate and direction of the United Nations and must be stated directly. For we do not object to amending this resolution merely because we may be placed in a minority that finally votes against it.

There is a mistaken belief expressed by some these days. The myth is that the United States has become resentful of the United Nations because it has suddenly found itself in the unaccustomed position of opposing the majority's will. This change in the majority, it is said, has come about because of healthy changes in the shape of the world. Decolonization has increased the number of independent nations, and this increase has made possible a new coalition that cannot be counted on to support American interests. This independence is a sign of life, so the argument goes, and the United States is unhappy about this life simply because it is one that the United States cannot control.

Some may find this argument persuasive, and we can understand this. Most members of the United Nations are one-party states. It is altogether understandable that they would think that to be in the minority is a harmful—perhaps even a shameful—circumstance.

We do not feel this way. To be in the minority in an open political system, with two or more political parties, is not to suffer the least personal or social danger in our society. Our political system is one that educates its citizens to the necessity of being sometimes in the minority and continuing to behave in good faith toward the institutions of which one is a part. Being on the short end of a majority is not something surprising to us or something that the members of this delegation are accustomed to view with alarm.

What disturbs us is something more consequential. It is not the U.S. interest that may be violated today; it is the interest of the rule of law, to which we appealed in our resolution, and the interest of the central idea of the United Nations itself.

There is no need to introduce the members of this body to the principle of the rule of law or to the principle of civility which accompanies it. There is no modern state that can function without some measure of law that is general and disinterested. Some states have more of it than others, but none is totally without it. Yet we often lose sight of what the rule of law requires, and none of us can suffer from another reminder.

We all know what these rudimentary requirements are. A legal measure, properly conceived, is not selective. It does not name particular interests or objects. It applies universally within its jurisdiction to all offenders.

A body of law has consistency: each law fits into an existing and systematic body of legal precedent and is interpreted in a way that will make the whole coherent. A legislated matter has precision: it fixes names for what it prohibits, and anything not

named is not prohibited. And care with language is the most rudimentary qualification of lawyers the world over.

Most important, law is conscious of its own vulnerability. The rule of law depends not on brute force—for no force can be brutal enough to give weight to measures which have no other support—but on a widespread and freely given sense of obligation. In formulating a legal measure, therefore, one must always be conscious of the need to make it worthy of that sense of obligation, a sense that needs to be widely felt even if it is not universally observed in practice.

It is these standards that deny to all states the moral authority to hold political prisoners. It is these standards which must govern any attempt we make here to deal with the issue of political prisoners. And yet even such rudimentary standards are being abandoned by those who would amend this resolution.

We began with a call to the nations of the world to free prisoners of conscience; we could well end with a measure that asks amnesty for political terrorists—and *only* for political terrorists. We presented a measure that would have given individuals at least some small measure of protection against the states; we are about to be given back a document that states can use as an excuse to assume still more power over individuals. We asked this body to show its concern for human rights in every nation; but in response, some could not resist the temptation to use this measure as a weapon in their battles against particular enemies. We spoke of universality; we are given parochialism. We sought consistency and were presented with a radically inconsistent treatment of peoples and circumstances. We asked for precision and are answered with slogans.

So it is not surprising that the measure we seem about to end with today will lack as well the most important requirement for a proper law: it cannot command the respect, that sense of obligation, which is the only alternative to force among human institutions.

There are particular people who will continue to suffer because the United Nations has not proven capable today of demanding their release in words that command universal respect. Throughout the world today, men who led their countries to freedom are suffering in the jails to which they were committed by their political rivals. Men of distinguished careers in the service of their governments have been removed from society for no reason other than the threat they posed to the political security of their opponents; such men have been imprisoned or worse. Labor union leaders have been jailed for organizing workers. Religious leaders are jailed for speaking and teaching their doctrine. Writers and artists are in jail because they will not turn their work to the service of state propaganda. Leaders of opposition parties are in jail for the sin of posing an alternative to those who are in power. Huge numbers of citizens sit in jail after mass arrests that catch in their net those who hold only the vaguest connection with a country's active political life.

They are in jail, but that is not the worst of it. They are detained in prisons without being told why. They are held incommunicado. They are beaten and tortured to extract confessions or to instill terror among others or to provide even more perverse satisfactions. They are tried by courts which show not a shred of respect for the due process of law. They are sentenced to detention facilities that will kill them slowly; they are given food which will not sustain life; they are sent to psychiatric hospitals where the skills of medicine are used to increase the pain. They die prisoners, or worse—for there are those who do not reach prison at all.

It is a shame, but there is a shame which is perhaps even worse. It is that this body at this time seems not to care. It cares to condemn violations of human rights in those countries that it chooses to make pariahs; but it will not permit a universal, precise, consistent, and clear appeal to free political prisoners everywhere. It professes a concern for the rights of man, but it will not join in an appeal to give protection to people exercising these rights. It has given those

men and women sitting in the prisons of the world no cause for hope.

And so we are now withdrawing our motion contained in A/C.3/L.2175. It might have become a travesty upon the pain of political prisoners and upon the United Nations itself.

Yesterday this committee voted to cut off discussion on this matter. It decided, in a sort of Orwellian double-think, that the subject matter of this resolution was too serious, too important to be discussed further. Many delegations opposed this preposterous argument, and we are immensely grateful to them. But to those nations that contributed to this travesty we say this: The plight of political prisoners and attention to that plight will not die here. This issue will be raised again as long as there are political prisoners anywhere in the world.

When we took this step, we asked this body to join its voice in asking that the world open the doors of its political jails so that perhaps some day it will open the doors and break down the walls that keep men and women from enjoying life in places of their own choosing. As we withdraw this resolution, we do so not out of a sense of final defeat, but with the hope that over time this request will be answered. In that hope we will persist.

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION [1]

Amnesty for political prisoners

Noting with satisfaction that, in spite of continuing denial of the right of self-determination in certain areas, great progress has been achieved towards eliminating colonialism and ensuring the right of self-determination for peoples everywhere,

Believing that the lessening of international tensions makes even more promising renewed efforts to assist people to exercise their human rights,

Deeply disturbed that there are frequent reports that many persons, including members of national parliaments, writers and publishers, persons who have sought through peaceful means to express views at variance with those held by their Governments or to oppose racial discrimination and persons who have sought to provide legal assistance to persons in the disfavour of their Governments, are detained or imprisoned, and in many cases have been subjected to torture, arbitrary arrest and detention and unfair or secret trials in violation of rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Recalling that, pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1235 (XLII) of 6 June 1967, the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities have been authorized to examine information relating to such reports,

Noting with appreciation resolution 4 (XXVIII) (E/CN.4/SUB.2/L.635) adopted by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities with respect to the human rights of persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment,

1. *Appeals* to all Governments to proclaim an unconditional amnesty by releasing all political prisoners in the sense of persons deprived of their liberty primarily because they have, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, sought peaceful expression of beliefs and opinions at variance with those held by their Governments or have sought to provide legal or other forms of nonviolent assistance to such persons;

2. *Requests* the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to strengthen their efforts on behalf of political prisoners, including the establishments of working groups to conduct studies including visits, whenever necessary, to determine the facts relevant to the rights of political prisoners and the response of Governments to this appeal;

3. *Urges* all Governments to co-operate with the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in their efforts on behalf of political prisoners, including requests to make such visits as they may deem necessary for the purpose of investigating and reporting on the circumstances relating to the detention, trial or imprisonment of such persons;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to assist in any way he may deem appropriate in the implementation of this resolution, and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session with respect to the activities of the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in the implementation of this resolution.

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[1] U.N. doc. A/C.3/L.2175.

Department Supports Resolution on Northern Marianas Covenant

Statement by Robert S. Ingersoll
Deputy Secretary [1]

I welcome this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of State in support of H.J. Res. 549, a joint resolution to approve the "Covenant To Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union With the United States of America," as reported by the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.

The Northern Mariana Islands constitute the Mariana Islands District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The trust territory is presently administered by the United States under a trusteeship agreement which was concluded between the Security Council of the United Nations and the United States in 1947.

As provided in article 6 of the trusteeship agreement, the United States has an obligation to ". . . promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. . . ."

For more than 25 years the people of the Northern Mariana Islands have consistently expressed their wishes for a close political affiliation with the United States. They have made their wishes known to the United Nations and to the United States through repeated resolutions passed by their elected representatives and through many petitions of other representative bodies. The people themselves voted to become part of the United States in referenda which were held in 1961, 1963, and 1969.

The Trusteeship Council is the designated U.N. body to review progress and developments in trust territories. The United States is a member of the Trusteeship Council, and we submit reports annually on the trust territory.

The Trusteeship Council has in the past expressed the hope that the peoples of the trust territory would find it possible to remain in unity following termination of the trusteeship, and this has also been the desire of the United States. When the United States in 1969 entered into negotiations with the representatives of the peoples of the trust territory with a view to reaching agreement on a future political status that would make it possible to terminate the trusteeship, we sought to reach an agreement on a future political status for the trust territory as a whole. When it became clear that it would not be possible to negotiate a single agreement that would be acceptable to all the peoples of the trust territory, the United States agreed to the request of the representatives of the Northern Mariana Islands that the United States enter into separate negotiations with a view to negotiating a close and permanent union.

These negotiations, which concluded on February 15, 1975, with the signing of the covenant, were conducted by Ambassador F. Haydn Williams, the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, with the full support of the Department of State and other agencies concerned.

The United States has kept the Trusteeship Council informed of the progress of these negotiations and of the progress of

[1] Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Nov. 5. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

U.S. negotiations on the future political status of the other districts of the trust territory, which have not as yet been concluded.

The Trusteeship Council has acknowledged the requests of the Northern Mariana Islands for a separate status. At the invitation of the United States, the Council despatched a special visiting mission to observe the June 17 plebiscite, in which 95 percent of the registered voters went to the polls, of whom 78.8 percent expressed their approval of commonwealth status as set forth in the covenant. The United States took extreme care to insure that the plebiscite was held in a completely fair and impartial manner. To that end the President designated Mr. Erwin D. Canham, editor emeritus of the Christian Science Monitor, to administer the plebiscite.

The covenant provides that the Northern Mariana Islands would become a self-governing commonwealth under the sovereignty of the United States upon termination of the trusteeship agreement. We have informed the U.N. Trusteeship Council of our intention that the trusteeship agreement be terminated simultaneously for all areas of the trust territory and that we hope this will be possible by 1980 or 1981. We are doing everything possible to complete the negotiation of an agreement on the future political status of the other districts of the trust territory and to provide the peoples concerned the opportunity to express freely their wishes for their future political status in an act of self-determination which the United States will invite the United Nations to observe. At the appropriate time we intend to take up the matter of the termination of the trusteeship with the Trusteeship Council and the Security Council.

While the Northern Mariana Islands would not become a commonwealth under U.S. sovereignty until the trusteeship has been terminated, it is important that the covenant be approved by the Congress at the earliest possible time. Congressional approval is sought in order to confirm the willingness of the United States to enter into this union with the Northern Mariana Islands, with which we have been long and closely associated, and to implement those provisions of the covenant which can be implemented under the authority of the trusteeship agreement. These provisions would make it possible for the people of the Northern Mariana Islands to enjoy a much greater measure of self-government.

Congressional approval of the covenant at this time would help the United States fulfill its obligation under article 6 of the trusteeship agreement to promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward self-government according to the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned and would also reflect our traditional commitment to the principle of self-determination.

The granting of commonwealth status to the Northern Mariana Islands is consistent with the foreign policy of the United States. The United States has longstanding national interests and responsibilities in that part of the Pacific. Guam, which together with the Northern Mariana Islands forms the geographic entity known as the Mariana Islands, has been a part of the United States since 1898. The Federal Government will continue to be responsible for Guam's security regardless of the future political status of the Northern Mariana Islands. Under the trusteeship agreement the United States is now responsible for the administration and security of the Northern Mariana Islands as part of the trust territory.

If the Northern Mariana Islands are granted commonwealth status, they will become a part of the United States following termination of the trusteeship agreement and hence the Federal Government would continue to be responsible for their security. The establishment of a commonwealth under U.S. sovereignty with provisions for the lease of land for the construction of military facilities if future circumstances should require, would strengthen the capability of the United States to maintain peace and security in the Pacific in the years ahead, as a

complement to existing U.S. and allied defense arrangements in East Asia and the Pacific.

We believe that our allies and friends in the Pacific welcome the prospect of the Northern Marianas becoming a part of the United States, as an element of stability and as an indication that the United States intends to continue to play an important role in the maintenance of peace and security in this part of the world.

The Department of State fully supports this covenant as a major step in the fulfillment of the international obligations of the United States, and a step which is consistent with the national interests and foreign policy of the United States. We recommend that the Congress grant its approval of H.J. Res. 549 at the earliest possible time.

Eight Areas To Be Added to Lists for Generalized Tariff Preferences

Following is the text of identical letters dated November 10 from President Ford to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and President of the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller.

White House press release dated November 11

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) In accordance with the requirements of Section 502(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, I hereby notify the House of Representatives (Senate) of my intention to designate additional beneficiary developing countries and territories for purposes of the Generalized System of Preference (the "GSP") provided for in title V of the Trade Act of 1974. This is to be done by amending Executive Order 11844, of March 24, 1975 (enclosed at Tab A), in the manner described below.[1]

The following countries and territories are to be added to the lists of designated GSP beneficiaries set forth in section 1 of E.O. 11844:

Cyprus	Somalia
Hong Kong	Turkey
Israel	Christmas Island (Australia)
Romania	Cocos (Keeling) Islands

My intention to designate each of the countries and territories as GSP beneficiaries reflects the following considerations:

a. The expressions of their desires to be designated as beneficiaries;

b. Their levels of economic development, including their per capita gross national products, their general living standards as measured by levels of health, nutrition, education, housing, and their degrees of industrialization;

c. Whether or not other major developed countries are extending generalized preferential tariff treatment to them;

d. The extent to which they have assured the United States that they will provide the United States with equitable and reasonable access to their markets;

e. The legislative history of the Trade Act of 1974, including the Reports thereon by the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

The exclusionary provisions of the Trade Act would apply to some of the countries that are to be designated but for the factors described below:

Cyprus

The tariff preferences that Cyprus extends to the products of member countries of the European Economic Community ("E.E.C.") and the Commonwealth countries do not have, and are not likely to have, significant adverse effects upon United States commerce. Accordingly, the exclusionary provisions of section 502(b)(3) of the Trade Act do not apply to Cyprus.

Israel

I have received satisfactory assurances

[1] For text of the Executive order, see BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1975, p. 582.

that Israel will take action prior to January 1, 1976 to assure that, although Israel affords preferential treatment to products of other developed countries (those of the E.E.C.), there will be no significant adverse effect on United States commerce resulting from such preferential treatment.

In particular, the Government of Israel has provided satisfactory assurances that, for specified U.S. exports to Israel worth some $92 million (1974 data), Israel will reduce the applicable most-favored-nation (MFN) duty rates so as to eliminate, or in some cases virtually eliminate, the margin between such MFN rates and the preferential tariff rates being applied to the same products from E.E.C. countries. In addition, Israel will eliminate, at least during the life of the U.S. GSP, margins between the E.E.C. preferential tariff rates and the MFN rates whenever specified conditions are met for certain products. These products have been identified by the United States as important exports for which the U.S. and the E.E.C. countries are serious commercial competitors and for which tariff preferences, if applied, would be likely to affect adversely U.S. commercial interests. Israel will eliminate preferential tariff margins on these products whenever specific statistical criteria are met. Israel also will consult with the United States, at our request, concerning any other U.S. exports which may be affected adversely by its tariff preferences for products of E.E.C. countries.

For these reasons, Israel qualifies for the GSP under the terms of section 502(b)(3) of the Trade Act of 1974.

Romania

In view of (a) the U.S.-Romanian Trade Relations Agreement, signed on April 2, 1975, and entered into force on August 3, 1975, which granted non-discriminatory tariff treatment to Romanian products (b) Romania's status as a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its membership in the International Monetary Fund, and (c) the repeated manifestation of Romanian determination to pursue an independent foreign policy, Romania, although a Communist country, fulfills the requirements for GSP eligibility set forth in section 502(b)(1) of the Trade Act.

Somalia

Somalia is now taking steps to discharge its obligations under international law with respect to an investment dispute which had the effect of a nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure of U.S. property by Somalia. My Determination to this effect is set forth at *Tab B*.[2] This Determination makes Somalia eligible for GSP under the terms of section 502(b)(4) of the Trade Act.

Turkey

Turkey also is taking steps to discharge its obligations under the international law with respect to property questions in the Turkish-controlled area of Cyprus which could be considered as nationalizations, expropriations, or seizures of United States properties. My Determination at *Tab B* covers Turkey as well as Somalia, so that Turkey also is eligible for GSP under section 502(b)(4) of the Trade Act.

In addition, the tariff preferences that Turkey extends to the products of members of the E.E.C. do not have, and are not likely to have, significant adverse effects on United States commerce. This conclusion depends upon the continuance by Turkey of certain key government decrees. The Government of Turkey understands the importance of the maintenance of those decrees to Turkey's continued eligibility for GSP, and has acknowledged the desirability of consulting with the United States before changing its customs tariffs in a manner prejudicial to its status as a beneficiary country.

Hong Kong, Christmas Island (Australia), Cocos (Keeling) Islands

None of the exclusionary provisions of section 502(b) are applicable to these areas.

[2] For text of the determination, see H. Doc. 94–305.

In addition to the intended designations described above, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Surinam are to be moved from the list of dependent beneficiaries to the list of independent beneficiary countries, because they have become independent since Executive Order 11844 was issued last March 24. Anguilla will be deleted from Executive Order 11844 as a separate listing, but will continue to be a designated GSP beneficiary as part of "Saint Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla". These changes will not affect the status of the areas involved as GSP beneficiaries.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment to Products of Romania. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means, together with minority views, to accompany H. Con. Res. 252. H. Rept. 94–359. July 15, 1975. 29 pp.

Reassessment of U.S. Foreign Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the House Committee on International Relations. July 15–24, 1975. 183 pp.

Approving the "Covenant To Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America," and for Other Purposes. Report of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to accompany H.J. Res. 549. H. Rept. 94–364. July 16, 1975. 44 pp.

Foreign Investment and Arab Boycott Legislation. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. July 22–23, 1975. 413 pp.

Foreign Affairs Authorization Bill, Fiscal Year 1976. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 1517. S. Rept. 94–337; July 29, 1975; 24 pp. S. Rept. 94–337, part 2; September 8, 1975; 22 pp.

International Economic Policy Act of 1972 Authorizations. Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs to accompany H.R. 5884. S. Rept. 94–355. July 31, 1975. 6 pp.

Cuban Realities: May 1975. A report by Senator George S. McGovern to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. August 1975. 20 pp.

Direct Investment Abroad and the Multinationals: Effects on the United States Economy. Prepared for the Use of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Peggy B. Musgrave, Northeastern University; with foreword by Senator Frank Church. August 1975. 136 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.[1]

Acceptances deposited: Guinea-Bissau, Swaziland, November 18, 1975; Norway, November 14, 1975.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.[1]

Signature: Burundi, November 13, 1975.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.[2]

Accession deposited: Qatar, October 24, 1975.

BILATERAL

Iceland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital. Signed at Reykjavik May 7, 1975.

Ratified by the President: November 24, 1975.
Ratifications exchanged: November 26, 1975.
Enters into force: December 26, 1975.

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[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—$23.10; plastic binder—$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

United Kingdom	Cat. No. S1.123:UN34K	
	Pub. 8099	8 pp.
Vatican City	Cat. No. S1.123:V45	
	Pub. 8258	3 pp.
Zaire	Cat. No. S1.123:Z1/2	
	Pub. 7793	8 pp.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Malaysia amending and extending the agreement of September 8, 1970. TIAS 7999. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7999).

Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Honduras. TIAS 8073. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8073).

Finance—Contribution to the Multi-Purpose Special Fund. Agreement with the Asian Development Bank amending the agreement of April 19, 1974. TIAS 8074. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8074).

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8079. 18 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8079).

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles. Agreement with Singapore. TIAS 8080. 11 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8080).

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 8081. 12 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8081).

Finance—Consolidation and Rescheduling of Certain Debts. Agreement with India. TIAS 8082. 11 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8082).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Chile amending the agreement of October 25, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8083. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8083).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 8084. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8084).

Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Portugal. TIAS 8087. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8087).

Whaling—International Observer Scheme. Agreement with Japan. TIAS 8088. 16 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8088).

Organization of American States Privileges and Immunities. Agreement with the Organization of American States. TIAS 8089. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8089).

Satellites—Furnishing of Launching and Associated Services. Agreement with Japan. TIAS 8090. 11 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8090).

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles. Agreement with Malaysia. TIAS 8091. 21 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8091).

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: November 24–30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*577	11/24	Sayre named Inspector General of Foreign Service (biographic data).
578	11/24	Kissinger: Economic Club of Detroit.
578A	11/24	Carron, Griffin, Kissinger, MacDonald: introductory remarks (only Kissinger remarks printed here).
578B	11/25	Kissinger: questions and answers, Nov. 24.
*579	11/24	Saunders named Director of Intelligence and Research.
580	11/26	Kissinger: news conference at Detroit, Nov. 25.
*581	11/25	Advisory Committee for U.S. Participation in the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements (HABITAT), Dec. 16.
*582	11/26	Advisory Committee on Ocean Affairs, Nov. 26.
*583	11/28	Spain sworn in as Ambassador to Tanzania (biographic data).
*584	11/28	U.S. child development experts to attend seminar in U.S.S.R.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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