THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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The Industrial Democracies and the Future

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

I am glad to be here after recent events in Washington—in more ways than one. [Laughter.]

I am especially happy that Representative [H. John] Heinz is here, for many reasons—because he has supported the Administration on the recent Sinai agreement and other foreign policy matters, and also because that a Member of Congress should sit still and listen to me for a half hour is a pleasure I do not always have. [Laughter.]

I cannot come to Pennsylvania to discuss foreign policy without paying tribute to two of this state's great legislators whose stalwart efforts have been so important to America's place in the world today.

Senator Hugh Scott's career has been marked throughout by qualities of statesmanship, learning, and commitment to civilization's finest ideals. As Republican leader and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Scott time after time has played a critical role as the Senate has sought to strengthen the legislative underpinnings of our foreign policy. Today is his birthday, and we sent him our warmest good wishes and thanks for all he has done and will continue to do for our country.

I want to take this opportunity also to salute another great American. I and each of my predecessors as Secretary of State over the critical decades since World War II have benefited to an extent which can scarcely be exaggerated from the counsel and legislative leadership of "Doc" Morgan [Representative Thomas E. Morgan]. Without such wise and firm support, the U.S. foreign policy could not have exercised that leading role which was thrust upon us 30 years ago. Only Doc Morgan could have watched over the growth of America's greatness while finding the time to attend to the electorate of the 22d District.

I want to talk to you tonight about the central concern of American foreign policy: our relationship with the industrial democracies of the world.

For three decades we and our allies in the Atlantic community and Japan have been the engine of the global economy and the cornerstone of global peace. But fundamental change is now before us; the world we have known is in the process of transformation.

We must understand this change and help shape it. Thirty years ago the democracies banded together in the Marshall plan and peacetime alliance to overcome the chaos of the aftermath of the Second World War. Today a decade of upheaval impels us to make the cooperation of the industrial democracies as dynamic and creative a force in shaping a new world environment as it was a generation ago. The challenge is, above all, to our imagination and our vision.

Americans have learned several times in this century that their own security and global peace, their own prosperity and the global enonomy, are inextricably linked. In an age of intercontinental missiles and thermonuclear weapons, of global communi-

[1] Made on Nov. 11 at Pittsburgh, Pa., before a dinner meeting sponsored by the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council and 18 other area organizations (text of the five introductory paragraphs from press release 562A; balance of address from press release 562).

cations and a world trading system, events in other continents touch our lives directly and immediately. The 1973 Middle East war, oil embargo, and price rises—which cost the United States over 500,000 jobs and over $10 billion in national output—brought home to us that a breakdown of peace far away can have profound political and economic consequences here at home. If this self-interest determines America's involvement, our traditional moral concerns—for the survival of freedom, the relief of suffering, and the security of our friendships—produce the conviction to carry out our responsibilities.

We will not now fail the tradition which has made us a beacon of hope to millions around the world.

At the close of World War II, this country broke with its isolationist tradition and undertook a role of leadership in world affairs. In those 30 years America has achieved an extraordinary record. We have made our mistakes—but we assured the economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan; our alliances safeguarded the common security and maintained the balance of power; we built an economic system that has fostered unprecedented growth and prosperity around the world; we created international organizations to help keep the peace and to promote economic development; we have pioneered in arms control; we have mediated conflicts; we have fed the hungry, educated young men and women from other lands, and been a refuge and symbol for all those who resisted tyranny and oppression.

America since its birth has symbolized, above all, the power of free men to choose their future, to be masters and not victims of their fate. When we took the lead, others took heart; when we exerted ourselves for the common good, others were encouraged to redouble their own efforts. The American people can be proud of what they have done to safeguard the strength and well-being of the industrial democracies.

We now face different international challenges. The allied statesmen who shaped the postwar international order would not recognize the planet we inhabit today. The growth of nuclear arsenals and the proliferation of nuclear weapons give confrontation and conflict a perilous new dimension; multiplying centers of power and influence call for new approaches to international issues; interdependence has spawned a host of unprecedented social, ethical, and economic dilemmas. No government alone can resolve the range of problems before it. In the words of a famous Pennsylvanian, we must hang together or we shall surely hang separately.

In an age of undiminished ideological competition, America will never forget that its most important relationships are with those nations which share our principles, our way of life, and our future. It is for this reason that next Saturday President Ford will meet in Europe with the heads of government of Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan at what has come to be called the economic summit.

The immediate task of the summit is to deal with economic questions. But in a more fundamental sense, it is a step to confirm and consolidate allied cooperation in every sphere at a crucial moment in history. It will not resolve all problems, but it can set goals for common policies and chart a direction for common action.

Central Role of the Industrial Democracies

Clearly the postwar era of international relations is ended. No single upheaval marked this transformation in the way that two World Wars shattered the earlier structure of the international order. But the cumulative evolution of a generation has profoundly altered our world.

In the forties and fifties, the world was divided into rigid blocs locked in continual confrontation. Western Europe and Japan needed our military shield for security and our aid for reconstruction. Crises were frequent—in Greece, Berlin, the Taiwan Strait—and in Korea and Indochina there was war.

The industrial democracies responded with courage and imagination, building new institutions and relationships. America's nuclear supremacy and economic strength gave us the predominant roles in our alliances and in world leadership. We drew on our domestic experience of reform and organizing skill

in dealing with global issues. We mobilized vast material resources. The American people, with pride in victory and with fresh memory of the folly of isolationism, confidently assumed the responsibilities of an active foreign policy.

Today, as basic conditions have changed, so have our challenges. America's role is still crucial, but we can no longer overwhelm our problem with resources. Thirty years of exertion have distributed power in the world and require wider participation. We have reached a new stage of alliance relations, marked by greater equality and sharing of initiative and responsibility. Europe's unity has grown hand in hand with its economic and political revival. The European Community is heading toward political unity and a greater European role in both political and economic issues. Japan and Canada have made remarkable progress.

We welcome and support these trends. The unity of the industrial democracies is one of our greatest material—and moral—assets. Collective approaches to our common problems have become more and more indispensable:

—The military strength of our alliances is the foundation of the global balance of power that permits all nations to live in peace and security. A strong joint defense is the precondition for all other policies.

—There can be no durable progress in East-West relations unless we maintain our political cooperation. If the Soviet Union is permitted to play one ally off against another, the reduction of tensions becomes a tool of political warfare and not an instrument of peace.

This Administration has never had any illusion about the nature of the Soviet system or about some of its objectives. But neither must there be any illusions about how to deal with it. In the thermonuclear age, there is no alternative to coexistence. Rhetoric cannot remove the Soviet nuclear arsenal or reduce the risk of needless confrontation.

We will never give up our vital interests or those of our allies. But we must also seek to ease tensions and resolve conflicts. The principal challenge is to make coexistence compatible with our values and over time to turn it into a more constructive relationship.

In relations with Communist countries, therefore, all allied governments are challenged to maintain a steady course. We must pursue a strategy far more complicated than that of the past. Our peoples must understand the need for both strong defense *and* efforts to seek more constructive relations; we must vigilantly defend our interests *and* seek to negotiate solutions to the underlying problems. We must face up to this moral complexity, for it is the reality we face. If we cannot pursue *both* the course of conciliation *and* the requirements of conciliation, we will not be able to achieve either.

Together the industrial democracies have been the engine of global prosperity. We account for 65 percent of the world's production and 70 percent of its trade. The international financial and trading system depends crucially on our performance. Together we have led the global effort of assistance to developing countries and the fight against hunger and disease.

But the institutions and practices created at Bretton Woods in 1944, which fostered expanding trade and monetary stability for a generation, were founded on realities in the process of change: American preponderance, the exclusive participation of the developed countries, and the openness of the free market.

Today, fresh centers of economic power—in both the industrial and developing worlds—strain the system. New participants, practices, and demands have given rise to disputes over energy, food, raw materials, and rules for exploitation of ocean resources. Economic issues are now a central dimension of international politics.

The interdependence of all our economies—consumer and producer, industrial and developing—emphasizes the necessity of cooperative solutions. Only cooperative solutions can maintain and spread global prosperity; an era of economic warfare would spell common decline. The industrial democracies, as the wealthiest and most technically advanced, would best survive economic conflict; but we take no comfort in suffering

less when everybody will suffer. How these economic issues are addressed by the world community will determine the kind of world that our children will inhabit and the nature of international relations over the last quarter of this century.

The actions of the industrial democracies therefore are crucial to the peace and prosperity of the world. And the United States has most at stake.

In 1973, the United States called for a reaffirmation of the solidarity of our alliances with the Atlantic community and Japan. We emphasized the overriding need for a fresh, common approach to the interrelated issues of politics, economics, and security. We stressed the necessity of galvanizing our peoples with the challenge of new positive endeavors.

In the last two years, this need has been brought home by economic difficulties. All of our countries have been in the throes of recession and inflation more severe than at any time since World War II.

The European experience in the 1920's and 1930's teaches us the crucial relationship between economic vitality and the health of political institutions and global stability. Then, inflation and depression tore the fabric of democratic societies. Social and political divisions weakened the capacity of democratic governments to overcome economic and social problems. In some countries the confidence of people in free institutions eroded; the habits of accommodation that bind societies together gave way to extremism and mounting civil strife. Strains *within* nations spawned economic nationalism; increased tensions *between* nations led to war.

Similar economic problems, if of a lesser magnitude, have assaulted almost the entire industrialized world in the last few years—unemployment, loss of production, rapid inflation. The oil embargo and the quadrupling of oil prices dealt further severe blows; a central element of the price structure of our economies was now at the mercy of other countries whose interests were hardly identical with our own.

The deepest consequence is not economic but the erosion of people's confidence in their society's future and a resulting loss of faith in democratic means—in governmental institutions and leaders. Criticism degenerates into demagogy. In some countries public cynicism is reflected at the polls or in the weakening of traditional party loyalties; in other countries it spawns the resurgence of extremist political parties of left and right; in yet other countries, it leads to communal or ideological violence. In America, we suffered the additional tragedies of a divisive war and constitutional crisis, though our institutions have shown a resilience that is the envy of our partners.

In every one of the industrial democracies a new generation accustomed to freedom and military security questions the very values and institutions that have brought these conditions about. It does not remember the spirit of the late forties and fifties—the immediacy of the dangers that brought about our alliance or the enthusiasm with which we undertook the Marshall plan and collective defense.

Instant communications force the pace of events and expectations. Unwieldy modern bureaucracies become obstacles to creative government, making more difficult the tasks of political leadership. The technical complexity of issues challenges the capacities of leaders, legislators, the media, and the public.

Ironically, democratic ideals are most cherished in countries where they are least practiced by governments and most disparaged in the countries of their origin, where they too often are taken for granted. What we need now is the boldness and creative spirit that animated our response to crisis a generation ago; we must infuse our actions with an overriding sense of our common heritage and common future.

This worldwide crisis to the democratic process is the deepest challenge before the leaders at the economic summit. They meet to give their peoples the sense that they are masters of their destiny, that they are not subject to blind forces beyond their control.

I am confident that this test will be met. The industrial democracies will demonstrate,

as so often before, that the greatest force in the world today is the voluntary association of free peoples.

The Economic Summit

It is the economic issues which must be solved first. Since the Great Depression, the well-being of our citizens has been a fundamental goal of all our societies. High unemployment and the persistence of poverty have become politically and morally intolerable. Inflation, which eats away at the living standard and status of all classes of society, is rightly regarded as a social evil.

The striving for a share in national prosperity drives groups into sharper competition with each other. As competing sectors press for higher wages, more credit, increased Federal spending, or rising industrial or agricultural prices, the claims on the economy expand faster than its capacity to produce. A slackening of capital investment retards the growth of productivity. Budgets become chronically unbalanced. If these trends persist, all industrial democracies will be locked in a cycle of growing frustration—with raised but unfulfilled expectations and sluggish growth and continuing inflation.

In such a situation, the close and important ties among the industrial nations are imperiled. Trade is threatened by protectionist measures that attempt to shift the burden to consumers and other nations. Continued instability of exchange rates, swings in short-term capital movements, and periodic crises in the international monetary system—all these reflect and exacerbate instability in our economies.

Because of interdependence, no country's national programs for recovery can succeed fully in isolation. The economic summit springs from the conviction of all of the leaders of the industrial democracies that only by cooperative decisions can the trade and monetary system be adapted to changing conditions and yet be kept stable enough to stimulate the international flow of goods, services, and investment.

Cooperation among the industrial nations is also essential if we are to achieve greater self-sufficiency and less vulnerability in energy; if we are to maintain and expand the world's markets and supplies of food; and if we are to insure adequate supplies and market stability for other vital raw materials. Our relations with the developing world and the centrally planned economies are becoming increasingly important in the international system; we can meet this challenge effectively, and turn it into opportunity, only if we are conscious of our own common interests and move boldly and jointly in these new areas.

A special responsibility falls on the United States. We are the world's largest and most dynamic economy. We produce fully two-fifths of all the goods and services of the industrial democracies. Our leadership is essential in the trade and monetary negotiations. Our example is vital in the field of energy, food, and raw materials. The recovery of the other industrialized states depends importantly on our own. As President Ford said in his state of the Union message last January: "A resurgent American economy would do more to restore the confidence of the world in its own future than anything else we can do."

The United States intends to discharge its responsibility.

The Program Before Us

At the economic summit this weekend the leaders of the industrial democracies will concentrate on these specific tasks:

—First, to cooperate more closely on policies for recovery.

—Second, to look beyond this to common action to strengthen the basic structure of the international economic system for long-term stability, expansion, and prosperity.

—Third, to review their policies on trade negotiations, monetary questions, and our dialogue with the developing countries.

The first task, economic recovery without inflation, is of immediate concern to every

American. The industrial democracies are already on the road to recovery—partly as a result of cooperative actions over the recent period. At the beginning of the recession and the oil crisis, the United States joined other industrial countries in a pledge not to resort to restrictive trade practices to deal with payments deficits caused by excessive oil prices. We set up institutions and mechanisms to cope with financial emergencies and to guarantee emergency sharing in the case of any new oil embargo.

Last winter, in a fresh departure in allied collaboration, President Ford held a series of bilateral meetings with heads of government of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan to review the state of our economies and to determine whether new action was required. After these meetings, expansionary measures were adopted in several of the major industrial countries, including, most decisively, our own.

A strong recovery is well underway in the United States, as shown by the 11 percent increase (annual rate) in our national product in the third quarter of this year. Other nations—while our efforts cannot substitute for theirs—will feel their recovery reinforced by ours.

We intend at the economic summit to consolidate the cooperation of the industrial democracies. We plan to discuss common goals and agree on cooperative means to achieve them. The heads of government can assess the current situation, identify needs, and discuss measures that they should take in common.

In the U.S. view, the summit should set as our goal generalizing the recovery during 1976 among the major industrial countries. We should seek to restore vigorous, sustained expansion and high employment by 1977. We should aim to reduce inflation in our economy as a whole as well as disparities in our national inflation rates. And we should seek to restore vigorous growth in world trade as our domestic recovery proceeds.

The United States will propose that ministers of our countries responsible for economic policy meet periodically to follow up on policy directions set at the summit and to review what further decisions may be needed. The U.S. representative would be Treasury Secretary Simon.

In a climate of recovery and renewed confidence, the United States and its major allies must then lift their sights beyond the business cycle to the fundamental challenge of improving the structure of the international economy in order to foster stable growth and cooperation over the long term. Let me suggest some of the areas that the United States will submit for consideration.

Trade and Monetary Issues

World trade has been a major stimulus to our economic growth. Encouraged by progressive reductions in tariffs, it has increased at a rate twice that of domestic economic activity. The United States and over 100 other countries have therefore undertaken a new round of multilateral trade negotiations to continue trade expansion by reducing barriers. Congressional passage of the Trade Act in December of 1974—an impressive example of executive-legislative cooperation—gave the President the authority to participate and lead in this important process.

The present recession, with its high unemployment and large trade deficits in some countries, is now subjecting governments to domestic pressures to impose trade restrictions. Such restraints invite retaliation. Without a determined international effort, they could set off a cycle of barriers that would choke off trade generally. Protectionism raises prices to consumers; it jeopardizes jobs and incomes; it creates political frictions among allies; and it undermines our efforts to achieve other American objectives in the trade negotiations. It would weaken recovery.

The economic summit should therefore seek explicitly to expand world trade through joint efforts in economic policy. The President intends to propose that we reaffirm our common determination to avoid new barriers to trade as well as actions which provoke countries to erect them. We plan also to put forth specific goals for the trade negotiations. The industrial democracies should use

the summit to renew their resolve to pursue the multilateral trade negotiations to an early conclusion and to develop a forward-looking program.

The industrial countries have been moving toward a broad understanding on the contemporary requirements of the *international monetary system*. The summit should add to our progress. The United States believes that the system should foster, not restrict, policies for domestic growth and price stability. We believe that to achieve this goal, each country should be free to choose the exchange rate regime that best suits it, provided it respects international obligations to avoid trade and capital restrictions and competitive devaluations. By implementing policies for noninflationary growth at home, we can promote more stable exchange rates and more orderly foreign exchange markets.

Energy, Food, and Commodities

Because *energy* is at the heart of our industrial system, the recent dramatic changes in the price of oil are a direct challenge to all the industrial democracies. They affect the price level in all our economies, the standard of living in all our societies, and our freedom to determine our foreign policies according to our own objectives. We must not let our economic future remain indefinitely subject to decisions made by countries which cannot be expected to have our best interests at heart.

We can end our vulnerability to outside pressures and transform the conditions of the international oil market only by determined joint actions that give the industrial democracies a greater voice in economic decisions affecting their future.

In order to reduce their dependence on imported oil, the industrial democracies since 1973 have launched substantial conservation programs. We have undertaken to develop alternative sources of energy—by removing legal obstacles to exploration and production, by measures to sustain or guarantee return on investment, and by research and development on a large scale. The 18 countries in the International Energy Agency are now developing a detailed program of conservation and alternative sources for adoption by December 1.

The United States will urge the summit to recommit the industrial democracies to an even more forceful pursuit of the fundamental long-term goal of depriving the oil cartel of the power to set the oil price unilaterally. The U.S. effort would be powerfully reinforced by agreement on an energetic and far-reaching American program. Since all industrial democracies are profoundly affected by the energy crisis, joint action toward greater self-sufficiency will be a vital test of their ability to act and to cooperate.

The significant rises in *food* prices in the last few years have taught every American consumer that the international market in food now affects our economy directly and pervasively. The world faces the specter of chronic shortages of food. This means severe price fluctuations everywhere and the scourge of famine in the poorer countries.

Because of our central position in the world food economy—and because this crisis requires the contribution of *all* countries—the United States in 1974 proposed the World Food Conference, which met in Rome a year ago. We set forth a plan for international collaboration, based on the proposition that foreign assistance could only alleviate but not resolve the long-term problem of shortages. However important our food aid, any lasting solution requires an expansion of food production in the developing countries themselves.

Much of our plan is now becoming reality: a higher target for food aid programs by all the food-producing nations; a new fund to develop agricultural production in poor countries; and an international system of grain reserves to build stocks in good crop years and to alleviate shortages, mitigate price rises, and meet famine emergencies in poorer crop years.

The economic summit can spur joint action in each of these areas.

In the field of *commodities*, the industrial countries as a group already largely enjoy self-sufficiency. But many developing coun-

tries are critically dependent on earnings from their commodity exports to finance their development and feed their peoples. This instability of export earnings is one of the principal concerns of the developing nations, who comprise most of the world's 4 billion people and who seek responsible participation in the global economic system. At the seventh special session of the United Nations this past September, the United States proposed a new development security facility which would provide international loans, and in some cases grants, to offset such sudden shortfalls in export earnings.

The economic summit provides an opportunity to advance this proposal and to review other proposals to fashion mutually beneficial and durable long-term relationships with developing countries. The dialogue between the industrial and the developing nations is of crucial importance to the building of international order.

The industrial countries have common interests—and a conciliatory attitude. We shall resist tactics of bloc confrontation. But fruitful cooperation requires that both developed and developing countries—and especially the moderate developing countries—see a prospect for achieving some real progress. The forthcoming Conference on International Economic Cooperation between consumer and producer countries is a crucial stage of this dialogue. The United States intends to ask its partners at the summit to consider what programs and positions the industrial countries can take together in these efforts.

A Common Heritage and a Common Purpose

Ladies and gentlemen: For more than three decades America has been the dynamic force in the building of a just international economic and political system. We can take pride in what we have done. But our very accomplishments have produced new challenges. The institutions of the postwar international order depended upon the wisdom and vision of the United States; the course of the last quarter of this century depends upon American imagination and dedication even more.

Thirty years ago we were predominant; we could overwhelm our problems with our resources. Today we know our limits—perhaps too well. After a decade of war, two years of constitutional crisis, and an uncertain period of domestic recession, there are those who have come to doubt either the wisdom of further involvement abroad or even our moral right to lead.

But this cannot be the view of the great majority of the American people. Moral timidity never characterized America in the 200 years of its history; it does not characterize America today. We have not lost our perception of our interests—or our humane concern for the fate of our fellow men. We have expended great effort—and given lives—in the 30 years of our leadership because we knew that the cost of abdication—for ourselves, our children, and mankind—was far greater. Certainly we have made our share of mistakes, but we know that we have done great things, and we have great things to do now.

All of us want to pass on to our children a more prosperous nation and a more peaceful world. And this means that we and the other industrial democracies must dedicate ourselves to the agenda before us. This is not a goal that can be achieved by an America torn by self-punishment or by an impulse to escape from reality or to shrink from challenges.

Today the world needs most of all the optimism and confidence that America has always embodied. It needs our strong faith as a source of hope to others that the world *can* solve its problems.

America and her fellow democracies are called upon again to demonstrate our cohesion, our confidence, and our readiness for tomorrow. The belief in man and in freedom is the common heritage we hold in trust and the common promise we hold out to the world. This faith defines our duty and assures that we will be equal to it.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Pittsburgh Address

Press release 562B dated November 11

Q. Mr. Secretary, my question is, what further accomplishments would you most like to make as Secretary of State?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I have a lot of time, so I can plan ahead. [Laughter.]

Well, the thing I believe that any Secretary of State most likes to do is to be able to say that he made some progress toward peace. The area in which I have most recently been involved is, of course, the Middle East. I would like to make a contribution to bringing further progress toward a permanent peace in the Middle East.

The second area of profound concern has been the limitation of strategic arms. It is difficult for the average person to understand the enormity of the dangers of a nuclear war. The casualties involved, the extent of the devastation, mark this period as a break with any previous period in history. Therefore an attempt must be made to slow down the arms race, to reduce the level of nuclear arms, so that the world does not drift into a nuclear conflict from which civilization might not recover. So that is a second task to which I would like to make a contribution.

The third is to continue the process toward a world order in which all nations feel that they have a part and which they therefore consider just, because that is the only reliable guarantee for long-term peace.

So you see I have given myself an agenda for a long term in office.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on what I hope is a lighter matter—a number of us were wondering when you might deliver us a Cuban eigar? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, actually, to answer seriously, we were making progress earlier this year in improving relations with Cuba. But in recent months, Cuba has taken some actions, such as their pressure for the independence of Puerto Rico against the express wishes in plebicites of over 90 percent of the Puerto Rican population, and by its interference in conflicts in areas thousands of miles away, such as in Angola, that have given us some pause.

The United States is, in principle, prepared to improve relations on a basis of reciprocity. But Cuba must take a responsible international attitude.

Q. Mr. Secretary, my question is: In your opinion, how mueh influence should the President's assistants for national seeurity have in the making of foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, at this moment I am very much opposed to the Assistant for National Security having any influence. [Laughter.]

But to answer the question more objectively, I feel that there is too much concern with abstract bureaucratic structure. The relationship of the President to his Cabinet members—the relationship of the President to his assistants—depends very much on the personality and needs of the President. Given the enormous responsibilities of a President, he must be comfortable with these relations.

Now, with respect to Presidential assistants, they should, ideally, function as alter egos of their President. That is to say, they should not play, as long as they function as assistants, an autonomous role. And therefore it should not be possible to make a checklist of what it is that the assistants recommended and what the President implemented.

When I was only Assistant to the President, before I was appointed Secretary of State, I made it a practice never in interdepartmental meetings to state my own view

but, rather, to try to collect the views of others and then present them to the President as fairly as I could.

But inevitably, in the close association that exists between Presidential assistants and Presidents, no matter what organization charts say, no matter what the textbook says, an Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is bound to be very influential in the shaping of foreign policy, if only because he sees the President so often.

Visit of President Sadat

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment on the position of the United States was placed in by President Sadat's [Anwar al-Sadat, President of Egypt] recent visit to this country and also comment on today's U.N. action regarding Zionism?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to President Sadat's visit, I think it is important to keep in mind the very vital role that President Sadat has played in helping move the Middle East toward peace and moderation. From a position in which he was treated, by us at least, as completely dependent on the Soviet Union, he has asserted an independent national policy. He was willing to take individual steps toward peace which brought him much criticism in the Arab world but which I believe history will show represented necessary and important advances toward the goal of a permanent peace.

Now, during his visit here he made one or two observations with which we do not agree. But we also have to understand that he has many constituencies and many difficulties. On the whole we have to evaluate President Sadat's role in the Middle East as the most hopeful aspect of a move toward peace.

With respect to the U.N. vote, last July in a speech in Milwaukee, I warned against one-way morality, against bloc voting, and against the arbitrary use of the majority. The vote yesterday reflects all of these, together with some sentiments that do no credit to the United Nations or to the nations who voted this way.

The United States will ignore this vote, pay no attention to it, and the United Nations will damage itself if it continues on this road.

Proposals To Assist Developing Countries

Q. Mr. Secretary, in previous speeches, and you referred to it again tonight, you proposed some major new initiatives in our economic relations with less developed countries. But in view of the footdragging that we have seen in the Congress in the last few years and the apparent lack of public support for our existing commitments in this area, what likelihood do you see or what hope do you have that the Congress will grant the necessary authority to implement this wide range of proposals?

Secretary Kissinger: The proposals that we have made with respect to the developing countries are our attempt to avoid a confrontation further down the road and perhaps the necessity to make concessions under pressure that would then deprive these actions of any significance.

In a period of recession and in the light of the difficulties that we have had domestically, we have not been as successful as I would have wished to get our program through the Congress.

I think we have an important national task to return foreign policy to a nonpartisan basis and to have a national dialogue in which we can set our goals and then implement them over a long period of time regardless of what Administration is in office.

I understand the problems that exist in the Congress today. And given the frustrations and disappointments of the American people, I think that the Congress, on a whole, reflects the views of much of the public. But I think that those of us who are in positions of responsibility have a duty to put forward what we consider is right and to fight for it as long as is necessary, until we can get it implemented.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of your friendship with Vice President Rockefeller, was it a wrench for you to see him bow out of the political arena?

Secretary Kissinger: Vice President Rockefeller is a close friend of mine with whom I have been associated for 20 years. I regret his decision to withdraw his name from consideration for the Vice Presidential nomination. I know he will play a major role in our national life in whatever position he may occupy. And I regretted his decision very much.

Purposes of Detente

Q. Mr. Secretary, on what basis do you think détente will work?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let us get clear what détente is. There is an impression around that the United States is making wholesale concessions in order to gain the good will of the Soviet Union. That is emphatically not our policy.

The policy that has been called détente—which is a word I would like to forget—the policy that has been called détente is based on a number of propositions.

One, nothing can eliminate the fact that there are massive nuclear arsenals on both sides, and therefore the leaders of both sides have a responsibility to avoid unnecessary confrontation.

Secondly, the position of the United States in the seventies is not the same as the position of the United States in the forties. We are no longer in the same position of physical predominance. Therefore we have to construct our policy on a more long-term basis and with more complicated methods.

Third, we have to be in a position where, if there is a confrontation, our people are convinced that their government has used every means to explore every honorable alternative. Only in that manner can we sustain the public support that is necessary in times of crisis, and only in this manner can we avoid a repetition of the experience of the Viet-Nam war, where we got involved in a crisis and then did not maintain enough public support to achieve success.

Within this framework, we are prepared to make arrangements with the Soviet Union on the basis of strict reciprocity. Within this framework, we are prepared to agree to limitations of strategic armaments.

Under no circumstances are we prepared to accept an expansion or the threat of force by the Soviet Union. And under no circumstances will we permit détente to be used as a means of undermining the cohesion of the free countries.

Western Hemisphere Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you plan to direct more attention to Latin American affairs in the near future?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are certain myths that are very difficult to eliminate, such as that we do not pay attention to Latin America.

We consider Latin America and our relation with Latin America a crucial test of our ability to deal with the developing world. In fact, Latin America really is somewhere in between the developing countries and the advanced industrial countries. We share with Latin America a history of people coming vast distances to settle in new lands, we have a similar tradition of national independence, and we share many of the political values. It therefore would seem that our relations with Latin America should be fostered. On the other hand, in every Latin American country there is a certain tendency to achieve national identity by means of opposition to the United States.

Still, we are eager to have a serious dialogue with Latin America. We want to strengthen our relations with Latin America.

If it were not for the fact that every time I announce a trip to Latin America something terrible happens in the world to prevent it, I would say that I am going soon to Latin America. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, in somewhat the same geographical area, would you please give us an update on the Panama Canal negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: We should have stopped the question period right there. [Laughter.] All the experts on domestic policy, wherever I sally forth from Washington, warn me not to talk about Panama, because this is one thing in which the American people is united in opposition to my policy. [Laughter.]

But let me state my view on Panama. We believe that we should make a serious effort to negotiate a new treaty in which we can participate in the operation and share in the defense of the canal for a substantial period of time, because we believe that if there is no treaty, there is a great danger that we will face in the Western Hemisphere a series of confrontations which will gradually draw in all the other Latin American countries and which will produce a long confrontation between us and all the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

This is why we are engaged in serious negotiations to explore whether it is possible to develop a new treaty which will meet our essential defense and security needs.

We have not yet reached the point where we can make this determination. There is considerable opposition to it, and therefore we will stay in the closest contact with the Congress before we make any final decision.

But we feel we have an obligation to explore this, because otherwise 10 years from now we may face a guerrilla war in the Western Hemisphere.

Visit to People's Republic of China

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have recently returned from China. Therefore, why does President Ford have to go to China instead of remaining here attending to our current problems?

Secretary Kissinger: There is a school of thought that holds that he has to go there to clean up after me. [Laughter.]

But our relations with the People's Republic of China are very complicated, and they depend on the fact that here are two societies with different—indeed with hostile—ideologies that, on certain international issues, have parallel perceptions and that can therefore work in certain fields in a cooperative manner.

Now, in order to do this effectively, in a situation in which there do not even exist diplomatic relations, it is important that the top leaders of both countries have an opportunity to exchange views, at least at some intervals. No American President has talked to Chinese leaders since 1972. There has been a change in the Presidency here and a change in the operating responsibilities in China. We therefore consider it of considerable importance that an opportunity exists for the President to exchange personally his understanding of the international situation with the Chinese leaders to prevent any misunderstandings or misconceptions from developing.

U.S. Position on Angola

Q. Mr. Secretary, after Portugal's withdrawal from Angola yesterday, what is the position of our government relative to the recognition of the forces in control of the capital city of Luanda?

Secretary Kissinger: The forces in control of the capital city of Luanda achieved this position through a very substantial inflow of Communist arms, and 12 of the 16 district capitals are controlled by other forces. So the United States does not feel that it will recognize the faction that has managed to seize the capital city and has seized that capital city by foreign assistance.

We favor a negotiation among the three major groups there to attempt to create a transitional government that would permit the popular will to be consulted.

The United States has no national interest in Angola. But Angola is in a position in which the railways for Zaïre and Zambia—the outlet to the sea for these two countries—go through Angola. We would support any move that keeps outside powers out of Angola, and we would participate in such a move.

We would also support any move that permits the popular will to be consulted or that forms a transition government in

which all the movements that now exist in Angola cooperate. But we cannot recognize one group that seized the capital city with foreign assistance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what effects will the disappearance of the present Chinese leaders have in U.S.-Chinese relations?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, three weeks before going to a country I do not know how diplomatic it will be to speculate on the disappearance of their leadership. [Laughter.]

Regaining Independence in Energy

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming to Pittsburgh and reporting to us. Our question would be—since many of the oil countries are becoming so very rich—how long will we continue or are we continuing to give them our hard-earned American dollars? If we are, why are we?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, under present conditions, we have no choice but to give them our dollars, because we have to buy the oil. That is how they get them.

The essence of our energy program has to be to put ourselves into a position where we no longer have to import Middle East oil, or at least where the imports are substantially reduced.

If the combination of the need for imports of industrial equipment in the oil-producing countries and of the reduced imports of oil by the industrial countries produces a squeeze in which oil production can no longer be cut to sustain high prices, then our energy program will have been successful.

The reason the oil-producing cartel can at this moment maintain high prices is because they can reduce the production of oil to whatever level is needed to sustain whatever price level they set. Therefore, to the extent that we can bring new sources of energy on that market, to the extent that their own needs rise, to that extent they will lose their ability. That is the essence of our energy program, and this is why conservation in America and the development of massive alternative sources are absolutely essential for us to regain our independence in the field of energy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, my conception of the essence of your prepared remarks had to do with interdependence of various national entities and your reliance on that theme to achieve world peace. My conception of the Soviet posture is the antithesis of that—in essence, has to do more with the emergence of world communism as a way of life. How do you reconcile these two postures?

Secretary Kissinger: I think you are quite correct in your perception of our approach. I think you are substantially correct in your belief that the approach of Communist countries and the Soviet Union is to believe in the spread of communism.

These two conceptions are ideologically irreconcilable at this moment. And as long as they are maintained, they will remain irreconcilable.

The best we can do is to make certain practical arrangements that are in the common interest, without illusions and without believing that a fundamental change has arisen.

As history continues, it may be that changed perceptions will occur on the part of the Communist countries for a moderation of their world view. Then we can talk of a fundamental change. Right now we are speaking of limited practical arrangements produced by the common interests and common needs.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Pittsburgh November 12

Press release 566 dated November 12

Secretary Kissinger: Before I go to your questions, I want to make a brief comment about an announcement that we have handed out here. I know all of you have read my doctoral dissertation—which is more than I can say—and so you know that I have always been concerned with the relationship between public support and the conduct of foreign policy.

I have myself been in 11 cities in the last 10 months. And we have now started a program by which my colleagues will be going to various cities to discuss a variety of topics. The reason I mention it is because the first city that they will visit is Pittsburgh, next February.

They will be discussing such issues as the future of East-West relations, the United States and the Third World, the role of values in American foreign policy, and the interests which Americans would like their foreign policy to pursue abroad. This will be done in a series of workshops in which senior State Department officials will be meeting with interested citizens, at first in five cities throughout the United States, starting in Pittsburgh next February.

Now I will be glad to take some questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Senate is going to reevaluate the U.S. participation in the United Nations as a result of the resolution equating Zionism with racism. The President, although condemning the action, has made no such statement. You have said we will ignore it, pay no attention to it. Is verbal repudiation of the U.N. resolution the bitterswcet extent of any reprisals you would advocatc to the President and the Senate, or would you recommend reduced U.S. funding to the United Nations or economic sanction of the countries voting for the resolution?

Secretary Kissinger: It was a very large number of countries voting for the resolution, so that the decision to apply economic sanctions to them would be a major decision in our foreign policy.

We have to see the United Nations in some perspective. We went through a period in which the United Nations was described as the best hope of humanity. That was exaggerated. And last July, I called attention in a speech in Milwaukee to some of the trends in the United Nations which we deplored, like bloc voting and arbitrary majorities.

But we must not now swing to the other extreme, of not realizing some of the benefits that the United Nations—with all its failings—still has for the United States.

Therefore we will assess this situation. We have not made any final decisions, but I think we have to keep the American reaction in some balance.

Q. Mr. Seeretary, is it the position of the present Administration that criticism of Zionism is equal to anti-Semitism?

Secretary Kissinger: The position of the Administration is that the vote in the United Nations was really a form of moral condemnation of the State of Israel and not simply an abstract vote on Zionism and that the linkage of Zionism and racism smacked of some practices that it would be better for mankind to forget.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as a result of the so-called "Sunday massacre," do you feel that you have in any way been diminished in your rolc as Secretary of State by your removal as adviser for the National Security Council?

Secretary Kissinger: I said last week before the House International Relations Committee that a Secretary of State who cannot have his views heard has only himself

to blame. There is a great tendency to discuss these issues in terms of who has influence and who is up and who is down. But we all ought to remember: We are all in Washington not to have influence, but to do the nation's business. We will be judged after we have left office by whether a sound foreign policy was conducted and not by these vagaries which form the gossip of the day.

But to answer your question specifically, I do not feel that I have been diminished.

International Consequences of U.N. Vote

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the impact of the U.N. vote likely to be on the diplomatic situation in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the U.N. vote has certainly added to the tensions, to the rifts, and to the distrust. The U.N. vote was extremely unhelpful and highly irresponsible.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you associate yourself with the remarks made by Ambassador Moynihan about General Amin [Gen. Idi Amin Dada, President of Uganda], and can you tell us what the reaction to that has been?

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Moynihan makes so many remarks in the course of a day [laughter] that it is not easy to keep up with all of them. This one I kept up with.

I would share his displeasure with General Amin, though I might express myself in a more restrained manner, given the differences in our temperaments. I do not associate myself with identifying Amin with the Organization of African Unity. I believe the Organization of African Unity contains states that are attempting to pursue a responsible role, and therefore—his chairmanship reached Uganda by rotation—I would not consider him a typical representative of the organization.

Q. Mr. Secretary, speaking of Ambassador Moynihan, he said on television this morning that the countries which pushed through this Zionism resolution would suffer for it. Was he speaking of the afterlife, or do you —or did he—have anything concrete in mind?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am seeing Ambassador Moynihan later today, and I will find out exactly what he had in mind.

It is true that the countries that voted for this resolution have contributed to an international environment that will be less helpful, that will be less able to settle, especially, the differences in the Middle East. Therefore there are inherent consequences in the vote. We will have to consider the votes on an individual basis before deciding what specific action we will take toward various countries.

Q. Well, he mentioned one specific thing, though—a universal amnesty position—that the United States would now ask for universal amnesty for political prisoners everywhere. I don't know if that is a surprise to you—I don't imagine it is. But it sounds like the beginning of a program at the United Nations.

Secretary Kissinger: No. That is a program that we have been discussing and that we have been planning to put forward at the United Nations for the last two weeks. The timing of putting it forward has absolutely nothing to do with the Zionism vote. We do not put forward fundamental programs in a fit of pique and to punish other countries. So this is quite independent.

Interdepartmental Cooperation

Q. Dr. Kissinger—loaded with power now that I have read the current issues of Time and Newsweek—there is indicated in the current issues that the relationship between you and Donald Rumsfeld [Assistant to the President and Secretary of Defense-designate] is of a questionable nature. Maybe that is a little strong. My question would be, would you size up for us your feelings about Donald Rumsfeld and his qualifications for his new position, and what you think is now going to be the working relationship between State and Defense?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I think

it is inappropriate for me to give the impression that I am appointing Secretaries of Defense. The appointments of other Cabinet members are made by the President.

I have known Donald Rumsfeld for many years. He is highly intelligent. He knows the political process extremely well. He did a distinguished job as Ambassador to NATO, where he worked for me directly. We have had a good relationship over all these years. It is our obligation, as Secretary of State and Defense respectively, to conduct the nation's business and not to carry out feuds. I have every intention—and I am positive he has every intention—to work closely together.

We have very important national decisions before us, and they cannot be constantly evaluated in terms of personalities. The victories that are celebrated should not be personal victories, but victories of our national purpose. I feel very strongly that if there is one thing we cannot now afford, it is this constant public bickering between senior officials. Insofar as it is in my power, and I am confident insofar as it is in Mr. Rumsfeld's power, we are going to work together so that our people can feel that we are thinking of the national purpose and not of the Department of State or the Department of Defense. That will be my attitude.

Relationship With Developing Countries

Q. Obviously it is not possible to be specific, Mr. Secretary, but obviously your attitude toward the countries in the United Nations who have brought forth this resolution is cold, or cool.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Q. How is that going to affect the kind of proposals that you outlined last night in the way of economic cooperation between countries around the world?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that it is important in the present world situation to keep our eye on the fundamental issues that must be solved, and those issues will not go away. One of these issues is the relationship between the developed and the developing countries. We put forward at the special session of the General Assembly in September a sweeping program of how this relationship might develop.

We cannot have the world divided between those who have advanced industrial know-how and those who are living at the edge of poverty—and have all the conflicts of the world take on this form—because 10, 15 years from now we will find ourselves in a situation of chronic international civil war. Therefore we have to conduct our policy today, whatever the immediate irritations are, in such a manner that the possibility of a cooperative world remains open.

The objectives that were put forward at the special session of the General Assembly will be maintained. A serious effort will be made to work with all of the countries of the developing world but particularly with the moderate countries of the developing world. We will make every effort not to have an irreconcilable difference develop between ourselves and that part of the world.

We are disappointed by their votes. We ask them to keep in mind that a continuation of these votes must have an impact on our bilateral and multilateral relationships. But we also will keep in mind that we have long-term obligations and that we will not be driven by the emotions of the day.

Arriving at a Definition of "Detente"

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said last night in your question-and-answer period that you were beginning to wish you had never heard the word "détente," evidently because it is so widely misunderstood. What English word would you propose as a substitute for "détente" that we would understand better?

Secretary Kissinger: I was afraid you would ask me what German word. [Laughter.]

I think the best words to describe what we are trying to do is: to ease conflicts or to relax tensions but continuing to recognize that there is ideological hostility, continuing to recognize that we are going to have geo-

political differences in many parts of the world. Nevertheless, given the nuclear realities, we will attempt to ease conflicts, to settle those disputes that are amenable to negotiation. I think the words "relaxation of tensions" or "easing of conflicts" are more meaningful. But I do not know one word.

Q. How about "coexistence"?

Secretary Kissinger: "Coexistence." That is another good word for it, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, along those lines—

Secretary Kissinger: I hope the local press realizes that the Washington press here not only asks the questions but gives the answers. [Laughter.] What they really do at our press conferences in Washington is not so much elicit information but give me a grade, about how well I do. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that Chairman Mao Tse-tung's speech is impaired, if not totally gone. How is this affecting diplomatic relations with mainland China?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there have been many reports in the newspapers about the medical condition of Chairman Mao, about which it would not be appropriate for me to comment. I must say I saw him for an hour and 45 minutes a few weeks ago, and he managed to communicate his thinking with considerable precision, great vigor, and I must say, considerable profundity. So I do not think his medical situation affects the nature of our relationship.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think if the United Nations were to continue actions such as the recent one that the United States must deplore, that the day could ever come when the United States would withdraw from the United Nations?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not know what the United States would do. But if the United Nations continues this sort of action—this sort of arbitrary action—it is bound to have serious consequences for the relationship of the United States to the United Nations and for its viability as a world organization.

Nonpartisan Foreign Policy

Q. Mr. Kissinger, looking ahead a year from now, if a Democratic Administration is elected into office, what foreign policy changes do you see as being effected with that change, and do you see yourself as being adaptable to a Democratic Administration?

Secretary Kissinger: Some of the questions seem to imply that I may not survive to such an event. [Laughter.]

I believe very strongly that the foreign policy of the United States is and should be essentially a nonpartisan foreign policy. In my conduct of foreign policy, I do my utmost to work closely with the Democratic leadership of the Senate and the House. And I have received, on most of the policies, very substantial support from the Democratic leadership in the Senate and the House.

I would hope that if our basic policies are correct, they would be carried out also by a Democratic Administration in their main lines. I would certainly do my utmost, if there were a change of Administration, to support the foreign policy of the United States from the outside.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you regard Ronald Reagan as a threat to this country's foreign policy; and if so, would you campaign actively for the President?

Secretary Kissinger: First, I consider the office of Secretary of State to be a nonpolitical office. I believe that the foreign policy of the United States, involving our national security, our permanent interests and values, cannot be tied to a political party or to specific individuals. I will therefore not participate in the political campaign in any form. During the political campaign, I will conduct myself in such a way that so far as it depends on me, foreign policy will not be a partisan issue. Even less will I get involved in any primary campaigns.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I can pursue that. In your series of "town meetings" set for the spring of next year—it is about the same time that many Presidential candidates will be stumping the country making policy.

Might these town meetings then turn into expressions of you defending the Ford Administration, not only on foreign policy, but other matters?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not going to participate in these town meetings. These town meetings will be conducted by my junior associates, and they will be conducted as workshops. I do not believe that they will be seen in any relationship to the political process. To the best of my knowledge, nobody in the White House even knows that we have set these workshops up. These are a natural evolution. But I do not personally plan to be present at them, and I will cut down my own speaking program as soon as the political process becomes more active.

Possible Next Steps in the Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the next step in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: The next step in the Middle East depends, of course, importantly on the parties concerned. We have had a proposal from the Soviet Union to reconvene the Geneva Conference, which we are now studying and about which we will consult with all of the interested parties.

The major difficulty in the Soviet proposal involves the proposal that the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] participate. This enlarges the original membership of the Geneva Conference and proposes to introduce an organization which is in favor of abolishing one of the states that is a charter member of the Geneva Conference. So a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, with its original membership, is one way of proceeding.

Another way of proceeding would be negotiations between, for example, Syria and Israel, or any other negotiations that can be started on a bilateral or multilateral basis. We are openminded on this subject.

We are engaged in diplomatic exchanges with all of the parties. We have invited Prime Minister Rabin [Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel] to visit the United States, and we hope he will do so at an early opportunity for a further exchange of views. We are also in close touch with the leaders of Arab countries to see what diplomatic process can be generated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I follow up on that?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. Could you give some indication why you thought it necessary to give a pledge to Israel, in that eight-point memorandum of agreement, that the United States would not talk to the Palestinian Liberation Organization until it recognized Israel? Doesn't that ask the PLO to give up presumably its chief bargaining tool for winning itself an independent nation on the West Bank, say, and/or the Gaza Strip before the bargaining begins?

Secretary Kissinger: The publication of these documents has created many misleading impressions, partly because, separated from the general context of our overall relationship, they have acquired an impression of novelty and formality which, seen in context, they would not have necessarily had.

With respect to the Palestinians, we have said nothing to Israel that we have not said innumerable times publicly. We have said publicly on many occasions—and I repeat it here—the United States cannot ask any country to negotiate with an organization that is dedicated to its destruction. If the PLO accepted Security Council Resolution 242, for example, that would still leave as much room for bargaining as there is between the Arab states that have accepted 242 and Israel.

But to ask Israel to negotiate with an organization that has a program incompatible with the existence of Israel is extremely difficult.

Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Secretary, but that is not my question. My question is, why did you feel it necessary apparently to commit the United States not to talking, to not discuss—having any negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: What I said is in the document to which you referred. We have said nothing to Israel that we have not al-

ready said publicly. That is our position. That has always been our position.

Q. That we will not talk with the PLO—

Secretary Kissinger: Until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel.

Cooperation Among Industrialized Countries

Q. You have been talking about increased economic cooperation between industrial countries. I want to know what you think is the prospect for success in that endeavor and what do you think the industrial countries can do now that they couldn't do to make it successful—that we were not able to do at the height of the oil embargo in 1973.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the oil embargo caught all of the industrial countries by surprise and produced an extremely difficult situation which led to panicky reaction on the part of some of the countries concerned.

Now, since then, actually, cooperation among the industrialized countries with respect to energy has been one of the success stories of the recent period. Eighteen nations have formed the International Energy Agency, which has developed common programs of conservation and which has developed an emergency sharing program by which countries in case of an embargo will share the available oil according to particular formulas and follow specific conservation procedures —so that an embargo now would have a much less sweeping effect than previously.

At any rate, the means of self-defense exist. There has been created a financial facility to protect countries against rapid transfers of funds. Around December 1, we plan to have a complete program among these 18 countries for a rapid development of alternative sources of energy. So that the cooperation among the industrial countries in the field of energy has progressed very well.

With respect to coordinating policies on economic recovery, on trade, on relations to the developing countries, we are at an earlier stage of our cooperation. Two years ago, when the United States first proposed this, some of our industrial allies in fact rejected the proposition that economic cooperation should form part of our natural relationship. Today that is considered axiomatic, and every industrialized country agrees that isolated economic policies are no longer possible.

So I expect that the economic summit will not have any sweeping programs to announce but that it will begin the process by which cooperative economic policies are pursued with respect to recovery, with respect to trade, with respect to relations to developing countries, and that it will create a framework within which these programs can be jointly fostered.

Q. In your days at Harvard, did you ever dream that you would be Secretary of State; and also, what is there about your personality in this position that lends itself to this office? In other words, what does it take to become Secretary of State? Are there undue pressures and burdens, or are you at ease in the job?

Secretary Kissinger: When I was at Harvard, I did not think that I would become Secretary of State. And having supported Governor Rockefeller in three unsuccessful attempts to gain the Republican nomination, I thought it extraordinarily unlikely in 1968 that the newly elected President would look upon me for any role in his Administration. [Laughter.]

Now, with respect to my qualification for Secretary of State, you have to remember that I am surrounded by individuals in the Foreign Service who hold the view that the only way I could ever have participated in the foreign policy making of the United States was by what they call lateral entry—by getting in at my present position—that I probably would not have been qualified to be a Foreign Service Officer. [Laughter.]

So I face the normal obstacles that Secretaries of State confront in making their views felt among a strong-willed group of technical subordinates, whose relationship to the Secretary is something like that of the feudal rulers at the time the Magna Carta was signed. [Laughter.]

Now, what the qualifications are for a Secretary of State—I think it is a very per-

sonal matter. I believe that the basic qualification of the Secretary of State ought to be that he has some conception of where he wants the foreign policy of the United States to go—that he should not permit himself to be put into the position where he is simply ratifying the technical advice of his associates, but that it is his job to ask the difficult questions and to have some sense of direction and to impart the sense of direction to his colleagues. I think this is his major need in relation to the Department of State.

In relation to the President, it is his obligation to give the President the best judgment which he can generate and to help the President to the fullest extent possible in making the difficult decisions.

How well any Secretary fits these requirements is not for him to judge. I can say I am at peace with myself; but this may reflect many things, but not necessarily that I am well fitted for the job.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of November 10

Press release 560 dated November 10

Q. Mr. Secretary, a two-part question: Do you accept President Sadat's position that there can be no final peace settlement on the Middle East without a solution of the Palestinian problem, and if so, given the U.S. and Israeli refusal to deal with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], what steps are you taking to handle the problem of the Palestinian refugees and their representation at Geneva?

Secretary Kissinger: We agree with the proposition that any final peace settlement must include the interests of the Palestinians and a solution to the Palestinian problem. Our position with respect to the PLO has been that we cannot make a decision on how to deal with them until they have accepted the State of Israel and until they have accepted the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, particularly 242 and 338.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President said yesterday [in an interview on NBC's "Meet the Press"] that growing tensions in the Cabinet led to the dismissal of Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger and the other shakeups. Can you explain what led to those tensions, and what was your responsibility for the shakeup?

Secretary Kissinger: The President has pointed out repeatedly that he made the decision for the shakeup and that the decision was his. There were differences between Secretary Schlesinger and myself, as you would expect between two individuals of strong minds. I consider Secretary Schlesinger a man of outstanding ability and one of the best analysts of defense matters with whom I have dealt, and whom I have known for over a decade. The differences are partly due to the difference in perspective between the Department of Defense and the Department of State, and they will always exist. Some concern certain technical matters, usually having to do with the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations. None were as sweeping as I have seen described in the press. And no question, there were some personality disputes which neither of us handled with the elegance and wisdom that perhaps was necessary.

Arms Control Agreements With the U.S.S.R.

Q. Mr. Secretary, where does the shakeup and the Soviet rejection of the latest American SALT proposal leave the negotiations now?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as far as the shakeup is concerned and its impact on foreign policy, SALT and otherwise, the

foreign policy of the United States is not conducted on the basis of personality. It is related to the permanent interests and values of the United States. And while it is absolutely inevitable that senior advisers of the President will disagree from time to time, we have the machinery by which decisions can be made, and those decisions should not be seen in terms of the prevalence of a particular individual or be conducted in terms of personalities.

Therefore our SALT position will reflect the best judgment of the President and of his advisers of what is in the long-term national interest of the United States. We believe that a SALT agreement, if it is balanced and reciprocal, is in the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union and in the interests of world peace. And we will continue to pursue a SALT agreement.

Q. Is it now up to the United States to come up with a new proposal to present to the Soviets?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't believe that the mere fact that the Soviet Union has rejected an American proposal requires us to come forward with another one. We still are expecting some sort of reasoned response to our last proposal, and we cannot make a new decision until we see some modification in the Soviet position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in terms of the foreign policy you are talking about—the President's trip to China appears to be in some trouble; at least it is not going smoothly.

Secretary Kissinger: I read that in the press. It is not the case, but I don't want to contradict such a distinguished group.

Q. Well, it appears at least arrangements are not going smoothly. Your trip to China did not apparently go all that well. The summit with Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] appears deferred until next year at least. And in an election year there is some doubt about getting an arms control agreement at all with the Russians. Where does that leave the whole structure of foreign policy today?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I cannot accept your premises. I don't accept the premise that my trip to China did not go well within the framework of what was possible and compared to other trips that other leaders of other countries have taken to China.

Secondly, the trip by the President to China is on schedule, and the appropriate announcements will be made in due time.

With respect to arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, I do not believe that they should be accelerated because of elections nor should they be delayed because of elections. We will make those agreements that we consider in the national interest of the United States and without regard to the electoral process.

So I believe that the basic structure of American foreign policy is sound, that the essential elements are in place and will be continued to be pursued in the months ahead.

Situation in Angola

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you discuss with us in some detail the nature and volume of the involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola, which unexpectedly got its independence a day early? You mentioned this at a hearing the other day, and I would like to know if it is in manpower, dollars, et cetera —what you can tell us about it.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't have the figures here, and I cannot go much beyond what I stated the other day, which is that the Soviet Union earlier this year introduced a substantial amount of military equipment into Angola—substantial in relation to the balance of forces that then existed—that Cuba has also participated in the form of advisers and of military equipment.

We consider both of these steps by extracontinental powers a serious matter and really, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, not compatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions.

Q. Sir, we are also an extraterritorial power. What are we doing there?

Secretary Kissinger: Our interest in An-

gola, which is related to the fact that the access to the sea of surrounding countries goes through Angola, was basically generated by the intervention of other countries. The United States has no other interest except the territorial integrity and independence of Angola. We strongly support the call of the Organization of African Unity for a cease-fire and for negotiation among the three factions that are involved there to form a coalition government, and we have no U.S. interest to pursue in Angola.

Changes in President Ford's Cabinet

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have expressed your admiration this morning for Secretary Schlesinger, and you have also said that foreign policy is not made on the basis of personalities. Sinee you think so highly of Secretary Schlesinger, why in fact was he then let go if it was not due to personalities?

Secretary Kissinger: I have pointed out that I have very high regard for Secretary Schlesinger. I have also pointed out that there were differences. He was not let go by me, so this is a question that you must address elsewhere.

Q. Mr. Seeretary, did you ever ask or tell anyone that the President would have to choose between you and Mr. Schlesinger, including the President?

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely not.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President has said that you will be giving up your post as special adviser on national security affairs. How will this affect the way you do your job?

Secretary Kissinger: My job, as I understand it, is to help the President make decisions on foreign policy. This must be organized in a way with which the President is comfortable and within which the President can operate. It means that I will do my job, obviously, primarily from the Department of State. But I have never believed—and I have said so when I held the two jobs, and I continue to hold this view—that foreign policy making depends so crucially on a particular bureaucratic structure. I am confident that I have sufficient access to the President so that my views are heard, and that is all that a Cabinet member has a right to ask for.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are informed reports that you were upset by the timing of these changes in the government and that this might upset your own foreign policy timetable. (a) Were you consulted on this change; and (b) is it true, as these reports say, that you gave some consideration to resigning because of the timing?

Secretary Kissinger: I was informed about the change. I do not believe that the changes will influence the conduct of our foreign policy, for the reasons that I have given here. And I cannot comment every two weeks about stories about my resignation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you still confident that a SALT agreement can be reached before the political pressure of the conventions?

Secretary Kissinger: I have every reason to believe, on the basis of extensive conversations with the President, that we will proceed in negotiations toward SALT regardless of the political circumstances next year, influenced only by whether it is possible to work out a compromise with the Soviet Union that the President considers in the national interest.

Economic Summit Meeting in Paris

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are your priorities for the European summit later this week in Paris?

Secretary Kissinger: I am making a speech tomorrow in which I will deal with the European summit at greater length. But basically there are two aspects to the European summit. One is to deal with the problem of the economic well-being of the industrial democracies. The second is a more fundamental problem. That is to bring about a degree of cooperation among the industrial democracies that gives their people a sense that they are masters of their destiny and not subject to blind economic or other forces.

And therefore the President considers this economic summit of very considerable importance.

We do not expect that any major announcements will necessarily flow from the summit. The summit is designed to start a process by which the industrial democracies, which have been talking to each other on a bilateral basis over the last year in terms of their economic, political, and defense future, can now talk about their economic prospects but also about some of their political prospects as a group.

And it reflects what we had originally proposed in 1973: a greater degree of coordination among these countries, above all to enable them to set some goals and some directions that give them a sense of mastering the very complicated problems that they now face.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have known Don Rumsfeld [Donald H. Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President and Secretary of Defense-designate] for some period of time now, worked with him. What do you think his particular strengths are, relative to dealing with you and with defense matters? What specific qualifications does he have, in addition to being an aviation specialist?

Secretary Kissinger: You want me—we haven't had a brawl in this town for all of three days. [Laughter.]

I have known Mr. Rumsfeld for many years. I think he is a man who is very well attuned to the political process, very intelligent, very concerned with issues of national security; and I think he will do a good job as Secretary of Defense, and I intend to cooperate closely with him.

Q. Do you feel that there will be a better cooperation than there has been with Schlesinger? Do you have any special reason for the feeling?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe that—Well, I certainly hope that some of the difficulties that may have existed—that some of those difficulties can be eased and that everybody has learned, including myself, from recent events. But I repeat: I stand on what I said previously about Secretary Schlesinger.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does that mean you will have to share the President's time on defense matters with Rumsfeld and with Mr. Bush [George Bush, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, Peking; Director of Central Intelligence-designate], if he is confirmed?

Secretary Kissinger: Two years after we all leave town, no one will care who spent what amount of time in the President's office. The only amount of time that one needs in the President's office is the amount of time that is necessary to conduct the nation's business. That amount of time I am certain will be available. If the President wants others present when that is being discussed, that is his privilege and no derogation of anybody's position.

I have read all these stories. No one has yet told me about them. But it is quite possible that it will happen. If so, it is a triviality.

SALT, Detente, and U.S. National Interest

Q. Mr. Secretary, your responses on SALT suggest that there is a large chasm between our position and the Soviets'—so large, in fact, that we can't make another proposal until they modify their rejection. Could you elaborate for us exactly what went wrong? And wouldn't you agree that détente and SALT is in some crisis now?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I have said previously that I believe that 90 percent of the SALT agreement is substantially—or of the SALT negotiation—is substantially agreed to. The remaining 10 percent is of course of considerable significance. Now, it doesn't mean that the chasm is very wide or is unbridgeable. What it does mean is that when we make a serious proposal without getting a substantive response, we cannot establish the principle that all the other side has to do is to reject an American proposal in order to elicit another proposal.

I believe that the differences between us and the Soviet Union on SALT are bridgeable. I believe that an agreement on strategic

arms limitations is in the national interest and is in the world interest, especially if you compare it with the alternatives that the nation will face and that the world will face if an arms race continues unchecked. So I am confident that, with a serious effort on both sides, these differences can be bridged.

As far as détente is concerned, I can only emphasize again what I have said repeatedly in public statements. Détente is not a favor we grant to the Soviet Union. Détente reflects an assessment of the basic national positions—in which strategic arsenals exist on both sides capable of destroying humanity; in which the United States must be able to demonstrate to its own people that if a confrontation occurs we will have done everything on our side to preserve the peace; in which if we look ahead at the problem historically, we do not want to be in a position where millions of people get killed in a war and afterward no one will be able to explain exactly what produced it except mock rhetoric.

If the Soviet Union threatens our national interests or the national interests of any of our allies, the United States will resist. The United States will not hold still for any hegemonial aspirations, but the United States will also make an effort to transcend the conflicts and the controversies of the cold war in order to build a better future for the people of this country and for the people of the world. That policy will continue.

As it stands now, on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, there is the stagnation that I have described. It is a stagnation which we are prepared to break. We are prepared to look for an honorable compromise. But it is up to the Soviet Union to be prepared also to make a compromise.

Q. Mr. Secretary, had you ever considered resigning from your office as Secretary of State because of the differences that occurred that have been alluded to by both the President and yourself this morning?

Secretary Kissinger: Never.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may follow back that point, the President yesterday seemed to be hinting that he might be prepared to accept some sort of a compromise involving the Russian "Backfire" bomber. Would you discuss that, please?

Secretary Kissinger: The issue of the Backfire is a rather complicated technical issue which raises a number of questions. There is no dispute that the Backfire, on one-way missions, flying subsonically, can reach the United States from the Soviet Union. It is also a fact that the United States possesses many planes that are not being counted that on one-way missions can reach the Soviet Union. And therefore the problem concerns what categories—it falls into the issue of what categories of weapons should be counted, especially when we get into what one really has to call "hybrid" systems that are designed for one mission but are also capable of carrying out another mission.

That is an important subject that has existed in the negotiations in which we are trying to find a solution and are prepared to listen to reasonable proposals.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that it would require a meeting either between yourself and Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister] or Brezhnev and Ford to overcome the impasse itself. Is that under consideration, and would you conceive of a summit without a SALT agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: We do not conceive right now of a summit without a SALT agreement, certainly not a visit by Mr. Brezhnev to the United States without a SALT agreement.

Q. Would that mean that Mr. Ford would meet him somewhere else?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no such plan. But a meeting between Gromyko and me, when either side has something important to say, we are of course prepared to do.

U.K. Role in Middle East Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that Great Britain will now play a role in Mideast negotiations. If that is true, will you

work with them, or do you have any plans to relinquish your role in pressing for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan?

Secretary Kissinger: Those of you who have been on shuttles with me will know that anyone who wants to take over will have my enthusiastic cooperation.

If Great Britain were to play a more active role in negotiations, we would strongly support its efforts. We don't claim any exclusive right to conduct these negotiations, and we would support any promising effort, no matter who conducts it.

Relationships With People's Republic of China

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I just ask a question? You've said that—and the Soviets seem to agree—there should not be a summit without a SALT agreement in sight. On the other hand, President Ford is apparently going to China without any real substantive matters to be decided. Can you discuss why the President is going to China, and why not have a less dramatic summit agreement between Brezhnev and Ford, just to discuss world issues?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have—by mutual agreement incidentally—both sides have linked a visit by Brezhnev to the United States to an imminent SALT agreement, partly because one did not want to have it associated with the failure of a specific negotiation.

If a meeting between the General Secretary and the President would appear desirable, we are not going to make an issue of principle out of this at some point. It has not been discussed, and there is no such plan—no such plan exists at the moment—but I don't want to exclude it for all time.

With respect to our relationships with the People's Republic of China, those relationships have really concerned basically the orientation of both countries toward international affairs. We do not have that much bilateral business with the People's Republic of China that we must link visits or high-level meetings with the People's Republic of China to specific progress on specific issues.

It is important for us, however, to exchange views on fundamental issues of international events in order to see where our national interest coincides and where a certain parallelism in our policies exists. This makes it necessary to have occasional meetings at a very high level with Chinese leaders. This is why once a year I have gone to the People's Republic of China and why the President is visiting—for the first time in four years that an American President has been in Peking.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it possible under any circumstances to have diplomatic relations simultaneously with the governments of Taipei and Peking?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are some moves now for the early reunification of the two Viet-Nam states. What are your views on the subject, and would that be one of the points discussed in Peking?

Secretary Kissinger: I have only seen press reports, and we were not consulted before these discussions took place. It is my impression that if this unification should take place, it will make de jure what already exists de facto. I don't think it will change the real situation in Viet-Nam. I think it is a matter for the existing Vietnamese governments to decide. It will not affect our attitude particularly, and it is not a matter that we plan to raise in Peking; but if somebody asked our opinion, we might be prepared to give it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect to last out President Ford's term?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't answer my telephones on Sunday. [Laughter.]

U.N. and U.S. Observers in the Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions on the Middle East. First of all, what is your estimate of what Syria will do when the mandate for the U.N. emergency force expires at the end of this month? And secondly, what is being done to get the Sinai task force, or monitor volunteer force, in place?

Secretary Kissinger: Our Ambassador to Damascus is in Washington right now for consultation, and we will send him back with our full considerations, not only about the renewal of UNDOF [U.N. Disengagement Observer Force] but about the diplomatic evolution in the Middle East. We have not been told what the Syrian intentions are. And that is not unusual. They have in the past never told us until shortly before the decision was due.

We hope that Syria will agree to renew UNDOF because we believe, first, that Syria must participate in the diplomatic process leading toward a final settlement, and we are prepared to be helpful in this process; and, secondly, we do not believe that an exacerbation of tensions in the Middle East will serve anybody's purposes—and will produce a situation that is extremely dangerous for all concerned. So we hope that when Syria weighs its alternatives, and when it looks at the considerations we will put before it, that it will decide to renew UNDOF.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a question about the task force—

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, excuse me, the second question about the task force. We have completed an interagency study which is now before the President for his final decision on the organization of the observers in the Sinai. We expect that the President will make his decision within the next week or two, and we are certain that this force will be in place when it must be, on February 22, when the Israeli withdrawal from the passes will be completed.

Decisions on CIA Covert Operations

Q. Mr. Secretary, Congressman [Otis G.] Pike, a week ago, commented on the much-criticized covert activities of the CIA. He said it was not a rogue elephant operating on its own but that all of its activities had been approved by the Special Assistant to the President of the United States; that happened to be you during the last seven years. What do you comment relative to his accusation that you have, in fact, approved all of these criticized activities?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I don't consider it an accusation. I believe that the covert operations of the CIA with which I am familiar were decided upon by serious people in the national interest, in a world in which there is a gray area between overt diplomatic activity and military activity. And except for the fact that it is difficult to do internationally, I am prepared to justify every covert operation that the United States has engaged in with which I am familiar was in the national interest.

Secondly, the Special Assistant of the President acts for the President. I have testified that the covert operations were approved by the President. I chaired, when I was in my capacity as Special Assistant, the Forty Committee, and in that capacity I transmitted the recommendations of the Forty Committee to the President. I myself had no authority by myself to authorize covert operations. So it is quite true, as long as I have been in Washington, the Central Intelligence Agency, to the best of my knowledge, was under Presidential control. I see no reason to apologize for that.

Q. Congressman Pike made the statement further that in some instances the CIA did not want to engage in some of these activities and that orders, at least channeled through you, resulted in them carrying out activities that have since been criticized quite broadly.

Secretary Kissinger: They have since been criticized by Congressman Pike. That doesn't necessarily mean broadly.

The fact is that the Forty Committee exists in order to permit the views of the various agencies to reach the President. It is therefore very rarely possible that the President will disapprove recommendations from various agencies and go ahead with a covert operation even if the agencies concerned—even if one or two of the agencies opposed it.

In the particular instance to which you refer, the basis for the opposition was not a substantive opposition; it was the belief of the CIA that the operation could not be kept secret. And President Nixon decided that he was prepared to run that risk. It was not a substantive opposition; it was an opposition only based on the belief that it could not be kept secret. And it is entirely within the Presidential prerogative to make these decisions—even if—and I know of only one such case in the seven years that I have been in Washington. I know of no other case.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a number of press reports that you do not favor counting the Backfire bomber as a strategic weapon because it needs to be refueled in order to make a 6,000-mile run. Do you favor placing limits above the 2,400 that were placed at Vladivostok on strategic delivery systems on both the U.S. cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber?

Secretary Kissinger: I have read a number of reports about the alleged positions of both myself and Secretary Schlesinger, and I have seen, I would say, almost none that is accurate.

The last position that has been put before the Soviet Union, which included a provision regarding Backfires, was jointly worked out by Secretary Schlesinger and myself. It represented our joint position, and that is the only governmental position that exists, to which of course I subscribed and I have every reason to believe that Secretary Schlesinger subscribed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you giving up in addition, as you acknowledged, your chairmanship of the Forty Committee, your other chairmanship of the other NSC [National Security Council] subcommittees to General Scowcroft [Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, newly designated Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs]? And will you have some continuing role, though, as Secretary of State in the operations? I am thinking of such things as the WSAG [Washington Special Action Group].

Secretary Kissinger: I have discussed this with the President, after I have seen all these news stories. I believe that the chairmanship of all of these committees has been assigned by the President to the Assistant for National Security Affairs but has been assigned by the President years ago when these committees were set up.

I believe also that I will maintain some special relationship with the Verification Panel and the Special Action Group that deals with crises. But we will work out the precise nature of that within the next week.

I repeat, committees do not determine policy, and chairmanships of committees do not determine necessarily influence. Whatever arrangements are agreeable to the President, I will accept.

Middle East Issues

Q. Mr. Secretary, whenever you are asked about—or anyone else in authority—is asked about the PLO, there is usually a very short answer, which is, "Until they change their position on Israel"—and then it trails off. I wonder if you could go beyond that?

Secretary Kissinger: After they have changed their position on Israel, we will consider what to do.

Q. No, the question I am putting badly is, are we edging toward dealing with the PLO? Will it take any more than a simple statement by the PLO that there is a state called Israel, and then we are willing to negotiate with them to bring them into the Geneva Conference? And if I may ask a second part, are we setting up now—is the public being set up for—an Administration request for arms for Egypt at some foreseeable date?

Secretary Kissinger: Two closely related questions. [Laughter.]

Q. Well, Middle East and Israel is security.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the first question, I don't know what more we can say until the PLO has declared its intentions, because a great deal would depend

on the manner in which they declare their intentions and what they say with respect to their acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242 and their acceptance of the State of Israel as a fact.

With respect to arms for Egypt, we have stated that we have had general discussions. We have also stated that we have not before us a specific list, or a specific request from Egypt for individual items. When that is reached, then we will make a decision. That decision would have to be discussed in great detail with Congress, and of course, Congress would have a veto over it under the Nelson amendment.

So, the public is being told exactly what the situation is as of this moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your view, what political role, if any, should a Secretary of State play in a Presidential election?

Secretary Kissinger: The Secretary of State should play no political role in a Presidential election. I intend to stay out of the election completely. I consider the foreign policy of the United States, as I have said earlier, to reflect the permanent interests of the United States. It is not a partisan matter. I am asking for support for it on a nonpartisan basis, and I will conduct myself in a nonpartisan way.

U.N. Resolution on Zionism and Racism

Q. Mr. Secretary, the U.N. General Assembly this afternoon may take up a resolution under which Zionism is considered to be a form of racism. If that resolution is passed, what would your assessment of its significance be?

Secretary Kissinger: The President, myself, and—I have the impression—our Ambassador to the United Nations have expressed our views on this subject. We think that this is an example of the bloc voting, of the one-way morality, that has weakened the public support in the United States for the United Nations. We consider it an inappropriate resolution. We are opposing it. And it cannot help the attitude of the American public toward the United Nations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you clear up the reports of a distortion in—that there is a difference between the State Department and the Pentagon on Soviet strength and of Soviet compliance with the arms control agreement? You have alluded a couple of times to differences.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no disagreement between the State Department and the Defense Department about estimates with respect to Soviet strength. All of those are developed on an interagency basis, and a common position exists with all of them.

With respect to compliance issues, the only minor difference that existed months ago was the manner in which they should be brought to the Soviet attention. That has been resolved for nearly a year. There has been a united position in which the compliance issues have been brought to the attention of the Soviet Union in the Standing Consultative Commission. Many of the issues have been resolved. Some of the issues still remain to be resolved, but they do not exist between the State and the Defense Departments; they exist between the U.S. Government and the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any changes in the U.S. relations with post-Franco Spain, and will you push harder for Spain's admission into NATO?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, it depends on the evolution of post-Franco Spain, and I want to point out we are not in the period of post-Franco Spain. So it depends on the evolution of Spanish policy. But the United States has believed that it would be in the interest of the West for Spain, as soon as possible, to be more closely linked to Western Europe and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And we hope that the evolution in Spain will be such as to make that easier.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

President Ford Interviewed on "Meet the Press"

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of an interview with President Ford on the NBC television and radio program "Meet the Press" on November 9.[1]

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Lawrence E. Spivak, "Meet the Press" moderator: Mr. President, on the matter of relations with the Soviet Union, SALT Two seems to have been stalled. What I would like to ask you is that there is a sharp difference of opinion and considerable confusion in this country about the meaning of détente with the Soviet Union. Will you give us your definition of détente, tell us what it means to you and what it should mean to the American people?

President Ford: I am not sure that is the best word but that is the word that is being used. Détente means to me that two superpowers who are strong militarily and economically, who represent differing political and governmental views, instead of confronting one another can consult one another on a wide variety of areas of potential dispute, whether it is trade, whether it is military potential conflict, whether it is a number of other things.

Now, détente is not always going to mean that we solve every problem, because some of them are very complex and very controversial. It does mean it is a mechanism for the relaxation of tensions so that instead of glaring at one another and opening the potential of conflict, you can sit down and discuss differences of opinion and hope to accomplish a relaxation and progress without military conflict.

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George F. Will, National Review: Mr. President, the Vladivostok agreement limits the United States and the Soviet Union each to 2,400 strategic vehicles. That includes missiles and bombers. Studies done within our Government indicate that the Soviet Union's "Backfire" bombers are capable of taking off from Soviet bases and bombing U.S. cities. Is it your firm position that each Soviet Backfire bomber should be counted against that Soviet total of 2,400?

President Ford: I don't believe I should discuss one of the most controversial issues in the negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Backfire is a weapons system that has a potential, although there is a difference of opinion as to whether or not its primary mission is one of intercontinental bombing. It is a very difficult decision among several others and I don't believe that with the importance of those negotiations that I should make a categorical statement on this program as to how we might handle the problem of the Backfire.

Mr. Will: Is it a fair inference, from the fact that you won't take a firm position on that, that that is a position we are willing to negotiate away?

President Ford: There are a number of other issues of equal importance where there might be some trade-off—I am not saying there will be—but there are some very complicated problems and the Backfire is one of them. But for me to make a decision here and to make an announcement on this program, I think, would not be the proper way for a President to handle these very sensitive negotiations.

David S. Broder, Washington Post: Just to follow on that, Mr. President, is SALT negotiations in a state that you have had to give up your hope of having a summit meeting with Mr. Brezhnev this year?

President Ford: There is far less likelihood that we will have a summit meeting this year. We are continuously negotiating here and with the group of technicians, but the timetable doesn't look encouraging for 1975. I don't think that is necessarily bad.

[1] For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Nov. 17, 1975.

Under no circumstances do I feel under pressure to get an agreement at a date certain. I want a good agreement rather than to be pressured into having an agreement by a precise date, and it seems to me that we are making headway slowly—very complex, very complicated problems—and Mr. Will brought up one of the most difficult ones.

We have to work at it because a SALT Two agreement is in the best interest of this country and the Soviet Union and the world at large, but we are not going to be pressured to get a bad agreement by a date certain.

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Experimental "Town Meeting" Program Announced by Department

Press release 563 dated November 12

The Department of State and organizations in five American cities have agreed to cooperate in an experimental effort to strengthen communication between the private citizen and the public official about American foreign policy. The program was announced on November 12 at Pittsburgh by Secretary Kissinger.

The Department has selected four issues central to the future of the country's foreign policy. Principal sponsoring organizations in each city have undertaken to involve representative local groups in each community—women, labor, business, farm organizations, consumer groups, minorities, and others—in consideration of the issues. Senior officials of the Department will spend a day in each city participating in discussions of local views on the issues in a "town meeting" setting.

Secretary Kissinger has directed that a detailed summary of the sessions be prepared for him and other senior officials in the Department.

The cities, sponsors, and meeting dates are:

Pittsburgh; World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh; February 18, 1976.
Portland; World Affairs Council of Oregon; April 7, 1976.
San Francisco; World Affairs Council of Northern California; April 9, 1976.
Minneapolis; Minnesota World Affairs Center; April 29, 1976.
Milwaukee; Institute of World Affairs; April 30, 1976.

The issues on which the Department has indicated it wishes to have expressions of local public views are:

—The future of East-West relations, with particular reference to the Soviet Union.

—The United States and the Third World, and the manner in which this country reacts to the interests, needs, and demands of the developing world.

—The role of values in American foreign policy, a subject of inconclusive but important continuing discussion throughout the country's history.

—The interests which Americans would like their foreign policy to pursue abroad; economic, political, strategic, ideological. What *do* Americans want their diplomacy to achieve.

To assist in stimulating and structuring consideration of these issues, the Foreign Policy Association of New York City is independently preparing discussion kits for use in participating communities.

Japan-United States Friendship Act Signed Into Law

Statement by President Ford [1]

Almost a year ago, I had the great honor and pleasure to be the first American President in office to visit Japan. My trip convinced me more than ever that we Americans

[1] Issued on Oct. 21 (text from White House press release). As enacted, the bill (S. 824) is Public Law 94–118, approved Oct. 20.

can learn much from Japan's culture which will enrich the quality of our lives.

One week ago the Emperor and Empress of Japan completed a visit to the United States, the first such visit in history.

This exchange of state visits not only symbolizes the importance of our relations but also the value of the exchange of people and ideas between the two countries.

Several years ago, the Government of Japan established a Foundation to expand understanding of Japan among universities and other institutions in the United States and elsewhere in the world. Through the Foundation, the Government of Japan made a generous gift to 10 American universities to strengthen the study of Japanese history and culture. And this year, the Government of Japan announced the gift of an experimental theater to the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts as a Bicentennial present to the people of the United States.

Now it is our turn. The people of America genuinely desire to build closer relations with the people of Japan. This requires that we understand each other's arts, society, and history more widely and more deeply.

It was my pleasure to sign into law an act which will effectively further this important goal. Through the distinguished leadership of Senator Jacob Javits and Congressman Wayne Hays and many others in both Houses, the Japan-United States Friendship Act is now the law of the land.

The act provides for the creation of a Japan-United States Friendship Commission to administer a program of expanded scholarly, cultural, and artistic ventures between our two countries. The Commission will be composed of the 12 members of the United States Panel of the Joint Committee on United States-Japan Cultural and Educational Cooperation, the Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts, the Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, two members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker, and two members of the Senate to be appointed by the President pro tempore.

Because of the constitutional provision against Members of the Congress serving in any other office of the United States, the congressional members of the Commission will serve in an advisory capacity, as nonvoting members.

I am confident that the support made available under the act for expanded cultural relations will contribute importantly to the strengthening of understanding between the people of the United States and the people of Japan.

U.S. Consulate General in Angola Closed Temporarily

Department Announcement [1]

The Department of State has temporarily closed the Consulate General in Luanda, Angola. This action was taken due to the uncertain political situation and the general deterioration of the security situation in and around Luanda. The entire staff departed on November 3 aboard the last scheduled U.S.-chartered refugee relief flight to Lisbon.

American citizens in Angola earlier had been advised to leave the country, and we estimate not more than 20 remain in Luanda. In addition, there are about 20 American oil workers in Cabinda and a few missionaries in central and southern Angola who elected not to depart.

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[1] Read to news correspondents on Nov. 4 by Robert S. Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations.

U.S. Denounces U.N. Resolution Equating Zionism With Racism

Following are statements made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 3 and October 17 by U.S. Representative Leonard Garment, who is counselor to the U.S. delegation, and a statement made in plenary on November 10 by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on October 17 and by the Assembly on November 10.

STATEMENT BY MR. GARMENT, COMMITTEE III, OCTOBER 3

USUN press release 107 dated October 3

At ECOSOC, my government participated in the elaboration of draft resolution A on the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.[1] We gave our support to the adoption of that resolution and looked forward to being able to support its adoption by the Third Committee.

In our history my country has known the evils of racial discrimination; but more important, my government worked with the firmest resolve to eliminate this injustice. We have designed and implemented concrete and active programs, and we have achieved a significant measure of progress in reducing racial discrimination in our society.

We believe that this experience and commitment put us in a unique position to further the work of the Decade. To this end we have supported international efforts to promote the Decade's program, and we want to be in a position to continue to do so.

The U.S. delegation is strongly opposed to the suggested amendments to the resolution on the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination in A/C. 3/L.2157 that would declare that the General Assembly "considers zionism as a form of racial discrimination to be included in the Program for the Decade." The content of these amendments is not only unjust but ominous. It is ominous because it treats the word "racism" as if it were not the name of a very real and concrete set of injustices, but merely an epithet to be flung at whoever happens to be one's adversary. It turns an idea with a vivid and obnoxious meaning into nothing more than an ideological tool; it deprives us of our ability to see reality together and to deal with it together. And that, for an organization so dedicated to and so dependent upon the possibilities of reason and persuasion, can be nothing short of a tragedy.

It would seem to our delegation that such amendments can only serve to exacerbate group hostility and increase the tensions and passions which have for so long prevented the achievement of peace in so many troubled areas of our globe. They are, in our view, entirely incompatible with the pur-

[1] Resolution 1938 A (LXVIII), adopted by the Economic and Social Council on May 28, recommended to the General Assembly a draft resolution on implementation of the program for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination; ECOSOC Resolution 1938 B recommended a draft resolution on the world conference for action to combat racism and racial discrimination.

pose of the Decade for Action which the General Assembly has proclaimed.

However one views the particular issues in the Middle East conflict, to equate Zionism with racism is to distort completely the history of that movement, born of the centuries of oppression suffered by the Jewish people in the Western world and designed to liberate an oppressed people by returning them to the land of their fathers.

It is no service to the great goals of the United Nations and its commissions, committees, and agencies to ignore and to distort history in this fashion. The tragedy in the Middle East today stems from our failure, thus far, to find ways of protecting and accommodating the rights of all the groups in the area—those of the Jews and those of the Arabs, both with a long, proud history in the region.

Accordingly, if put to a vote, my delegation will vote "no" on the amendments contained in A/C.3/L.2157. The adoption of any of those amendments will cause the United States to cast a negative vote on the entire resolution.

I would like to state on behalf of my delegation that the tendency to jeopardize resolutions of primary importance which enjoy the strong support of *all* delegations by submitting amendments that can only sow discord in our committee is destructive of our capacity to further the objectives of this organization and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Mr. Chairman, it has been said that the accord reached at the seventh special session was a hopeful augury for the work of the 30th General Assembly. A significant start was made there on the framework and first steps toward accommodating complex economic differences with common human needs. In part that success resulted from the respect paid to language.

The agenda of this committee is filled with history and passion. It is an easy indulgence for individuals to use words which distort and divide, which inflict wounds and draw attention. It is our collective responsibility to use language enlightened by history, to use it precisely, to use it carefully—mindful of our differences but determined to overcome, not enlarge, them.

STATEMENT BY MR. GARMENT, COMMITTEE III, OCTOBER 17

USUN press release 118 dated October 17

My delegation has read the new proposal before us.[2] It is unusually straightforward. It asks to determine "that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."

As simple as this language is, we are concerned that what may not be fully understood is that this resolution asks us to commit one of the most grievous errors in the 30-year life of this organization.

This committee is preparing itself, with deliberation and foreknowledge, to perform a supreme act of deceit, to make a massive attack on the moral realities of the world.

Under the guise of a program to eliminate racism, the United Nations is at the point of officially endorsing anti-Semitism, one of the oldest and most virulent forms of racism known to human history. This draft explicitly encourages the racism known as anti-Semitism even as it would have us believe that its words will lead to the elimination of racism.

I choose my words carefully when I say that this is an obscene act. The United States protests this act. But protest alone is not enough. In fairness to ourselves we must also issue a warning. This resolution places the work of the United Nations in jeopardy.

The language of this resolution distorts and perverts. It changes words with precise meanings into purveyors of confusion. It destroys the moral force of the concept of racism, making it nothing more than an epithet to be flung arbitrarily at one's adversary. It blinds us to areas of agreement and disagreement and deprives us of the clarity

[2] The amendments contained in A/C.3/L.2157 were withdrawn on Oct. 15, and a new draft resolution (A/C.3/L.2159) was introduced on Oct. 16.

President Ford Deplores U.N. Vote Characterizing Zionism as Racism

Following is a statement by President Ford issued on October 24.

White House press release dated October 24

It has been a general principle of the United States to take grave exception to any action that weakens the United Nations as an effective forum for the peaceful resolution of international disputes.

We deplore in the strongest terms the recent vote in the Social Committee characterizing Zionism as a form of racism. Such action undermines the principles upon which the United Nations is based.

The spokesmen for the United States in the United Nations have expressed well and forcefully the views of this Administration and the American people on this issue.

of vision we desperately need to understand and resolve the differences among us. And we are here to overcome our differences, not to deepen them.

Zionism is a movement which has as its contemporary thrust the preservation of the small remnant of the Jewish people that survived the horrors of a racial holocaust. By equating Zionism with racism, this resolution discredits the good faith of our joint efforts to fight actual racism. It discredits these efforts morally, and it cripples them politically.

The language of this resolution has already disrupted our efforts here to work together on the elimination of racism, and it will continue to do so. Encouraging anti-Semitism and group hostility, its adoption would bring to an end our ability to cooperate on eliminating racism and racial discrimination as part of the official work of the Decade.

Once again our failure to reason together has encouraged some delegations to exploit our collective shortcomings and individual vulnerabilities and impede our attempts to further the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The United Nations, throughout its 30-year history, has not lived by the force of majorities; it has not lived by the force of arms. It has lived only—I repeat, only—because it has been thought that the nations of the world, assembled together, would give voice to the most decent and humane instincts of mankind. From this thought has come the moral authority of the United Nations, and from this thought its influence upon human affairs.

Actions like this do not go unnoticed. They do not succeed without consequences, many of which, while only imperfectly perceived at the time, soon become an ineradicable part of a new and regrettable reality.

Let us make no mistake: At risk today is the moral authority which is the U.N.'s only ultimate claim for the support of our peoples. This risk is as reckless as it is unnecessary. But it is still avoidable.

Accordingly the United States will support resolutions A and B. We support, without reservation, the work of the United Nations to combat racism and racial discrimination. We have taken part in these vitally important activities in the past and want to be able to do so without obstruction in the future. We will vote against the third resolution. We call upon other delegations to do likewise.[3]

On its adoption the third resolution becomes inseparably linked to the first two. Therefore, if all three are sent to plenary the United States will vote against all three at that time.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN, PLENARY, NOVEMBER 10

USUN press release 141 dated November 10

The United States rises to declare before the General Assembly of the United Nations, and before the world, that it does not

[3] The committee on Oct. 17 adopted draft resolution A, as amended, and draft resolution B by votes of 126 (U.S.) to 1, with 2 abstentions. Draft resolution A/C.3/2159 was adopted by a rollcall vote of 70 to 29 (U.S.), with 27 abstentions.

acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in, this infamous act.

Not three weeks ago, the U.S. Representative in the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee pleaded in measured and fully considered terms for the United Nations not to do this thing. It was, he said, "obscene." It is something more today, for the furtiveness with which this obscenity first appeared among us has been replaced by a shameless openness.

There will be time enough to contemplate the harm this act will have done the United Nations. Historians will do that for us, and it is sufficient for the moment only to note one foreboding fact. A great evil has been loosed upon the world. The abomination of anti-Semitism—as this year's Nobel peace laureate, Andrei Sakharov, observed in Moscow just a few days ago—the abomination of anti-Semitism has been given the appearance of international sanction. The General Assembly today grants symbolic amnesty—and more—to the murderers of the 6 million European Jews. Evil enough in itself, but more ominous by far is the realization that now presses upon us—the realization that if there were no General Assembly, this could never have happened.

As this day will live in infamy, it behooves those who sought to avert it to declare their thoughts so that historians will know that we fought here, that we were not small in number—not this time—and that while we lost, we fought with full knowledge of what indeed would *be* lost.

Nor should any historian of the event, nor yet any who have participated in it, suppose that we have fought only as governments, as chancelleries, and on an issue well removed from the concerns of our respective peoples. Others will speak for their nations; I will speak for mine.

In all our postwar history there has not been another issue which has brought forth such unanimity of American opinion.

The President of the United States has from the first been explicit: This must not happen. The Congress of the United States, in a measure unanimously adopted in the Senate and sponsored by 436 of 437 Representatives in the House, declared its utter opposition.

Following only American Jews themselves, the American trade union movement was first to the fore in denouncing this infamous undertaking. Next, one after another, the great private institutions of American life pronounced anathema on this evil thing—and most particularly, the Christian churches have done so. Reminded that the United Nations was born in the struggle against just such abominations as we are committing today—the wartime alliance of the United Nations dates from 1942—the United Nations Association of the United States has for the first time in its history appealed directly to each of the 141 other delegations in New York not to do this unspeakable thing.

The proposition to be sanctioned by a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations is that "zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination." Now, this is a lie. But as it is a lie which the United Nations has now declared to be a truth, the actual truth must be restated.

Term "Racism" Not Defined by United Nations

The very first point to be made is that the United Nations has declared Zionism to be racism—without ever having defined racism. "Sentence first—verdict afterwards," as the Queen of Hearts said. But this is not Wonderland, but a real world, where there are real consequences to folly and to venality.

Just on Friday, the President of the General Assembly, speaking on behalf of Luxembourg, warned not only of the trouble which would follow from the adoption of this resolution but of its essential irresponsibility—for, he noted, members have wholly different ideas as to what they are condemning. "It seems to me," he said, and to his lasting honor he said it when there was still time, "It seems to me that before a body like this takes a decision they should agree very

clearly on what they are approving or condemning, and it takes more time."

Lest I be unclear, the United Nations has in fact on several occasions defined "racial discrimination." The definitions have been loose, but recognizable. It is "racism," incomparably the more serious charge—racial discrimination is a practice; racism is a doctrine—which has never been defined. Indeed, the term has only recently appeared in U.N. General Assembly documents.

The one occasion on which we know its meaning to have been discussed was the 1644th meeting of the Third Committee on December 16, 1968, in connection with the report of the Secretary General on the status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

On that occasion—to give some feeling for the intellectual precision with which the matter was being treated—the question arose as to what should be the relative positioning of the terms "racism" and "nazism" in a number of the preambular paragraphs. The distinguished delegate from Tunisia argued that "racism" should go first because nazism was merely a form of racism. Not so, said the no less distinguished delegate from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For, he explained, nazism contained the main elements of racism within its ambit and should be mentioned first. This is to say that racism was merely a form of nazism.

The discussion wound to its weary and inconclusive end, and we are left with nothing to guide us, for even this one discussion of "racism" confined itself to word orders in preambular paragraphs and did not at all touch on the meaning of the words as such.

Still, one cannot but ponder the situation we have made for ourselves in the context of the Soviet statement on that not so distant occasion. If, as the distinguished delegate declared, racism is a form of nazism, and if, as this resolution declares, Zionism is a form of racism, then we have step by step taken ourselves to the point of proclaiming—the United Nations is solemnly proclaiming—that Zionism is a form of nazism.

What we have here is a lie—a political lie of a variety well known to the 20th century and scarcely exceeded in all that annal of untruth and outrage. The lie is that Zionism is a form of racism. The overwhelmingly clear truth is that it is not.

Racism Alien to Zionist Movement

The word "racism" is a creation of the English language, and relatively new to it. It is not, for instance, to be found in the Oxford English Dictionary. The term derives from relatively new doctrines—all of them discredited—concerning the human population of the world, to the effect that there are significant biological differences among clearly identifiable groups and that these differences establish, in effect, different levels of humanity. Racism, as defined by Webster's Third New International Dictionary, is "the assumption that . . . traits and capacities are determined by biological race and that races differ decisively from one another." It further involves "a belief in the inherent superiority of a particular race and its right to domination over others."

This meaning is clear. It is equally clear that this assumption, this belief, has always been altogether alien to the political and religious movement known as Zionism. As a strictly political movement, Zionism was established only in 1897, although there is a clearly legitimate sense in which its origins are indeed ancient. For example, many branches of Christianity have always held that, from the standpoint of the biblical prophets, Israel would be reborn one day. But the modern Zionist movement arose in Europe in the context of a general upsurge of national consciousness and aspiration that overtook most other people of Central and Eastern Europe after 1848 and that in time spread to all of Africa and Asia.

It was, to those persons of the Jewish religion, a Jewish form of what today is called a national liberation movement. Probably a majority of those persons who became active Zionists and sought to emigrate

to Palestine were born within the confines of Czarist Russia, and it was only natural for Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to deplore, as he did in 1948, in the 299th meeting of the Security Council, the act by Israel's neighbors of "sending their troops into Palestine and carrying out military operations aimed"—in Mr. Gromyko's words —"at the suppression of the national liberation movement in Palestine."

Now, it was the singular nature—if I am not mistaken, it was the unique nature—of this national liberation movement that, in contrast with the movements that preceded it, those of that time, and those that have come since, it defined its members in terms not of birth, but of belief.

That is to say, it was not a movement of the Irish to free Ireland or of the Polish to free Poland, not a movement of Algerians to free Algeria nor of Indians to free India. It was not a movement of persons connected by historic membership in a genetic pool of the kind that enables us to speak loosely but not meaninglessly, say, of the Chinese people, nor yet of diverse groups occupying the same territory which enables us to speak of the American people with no greater indignity to truth.

To the contrary, Zionists defined themselves merely as Jews and declared to be Jewish anyone born of a Jewish mother or —and this is the absolutely crucial fact— anyone who converted to Judaism. Which is to say, in the terms of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the 20th General Assembly, *anyone*—regardless of "race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin."

The State of Israel, which in time was the creation of the Zionist movement, has been extraordinary in nothing so much as the range of "racial stocks" from which it has drawn its citizenry. There are black Jews, brown Jews, white Jews, Jews from the Orient, and Jews from the West. Most such persons could be said to have been "born" Jews, just as most Presbyterians and most Hindus are "born" to their faith; but there are many Jews who are converts. With a consistency in the matter which surely attests to the importance of this issue to that religious and political culture, Israeli courts have held that a Jew who converts to another religion is no longer a Jew.

In the meantime the population of Israel also includes large numbers of non-Jews, among them Arabs of both the Moslem and Christian religions and Christians of other national origins. Many of these persons are citizens of Israel, and those who are not can become citizens by legal procedures very much like those which obtain in a typical nation of Western Europe.

Now, I should wish to be understood that I am here making one point, and one point only, which is that whatever else Zionism may be, it is not and cannot be "a form of racism." In logic, the State of Israel could be, or could become, many things—theoretically including many things undesirable—but it could not be and could not become racist unless it ceased to be Zionist.

Dangers to Cause of Human Rights

Indeed, the idea that Jews *are* a "race" was invented not by Jews, but by those who hated Jews. The idea of Jews as a race was invented by 19th-century anti-Semites such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Edouard Drumont, who saw that in an increasingly secular age, which is to say an age which made for fewer distinctions between people, the old religious grounds for anti-Semitism were losing force. New justifications were needed for excluding and persecuting Jews, and so the new idea of Jews as a race, rather than as a religion, was born. It was a contemptible idea at the beginning, and no civilized person would be associated with it. To think that it is an idea now endorsed by the United Nations is to reflect on what civilization has come to.

It is precisely a concern for civilization, for civilized values that are or should be precious to all mankind, that arouses us at this moment to such special passion. What we have at stake here is not merely the

honor and the legitimacy of the State of Israel—although a challenge to the legitimacy of any member nation ought always to arouse the vigilance of all members of the United Nations. For a yet more important matter is at issue, which is the integrity of that whole body of moral and legal precepts which we know as human rights.

The terrible lie that has been told here today will have terrible consequences. Not only will people begin to say—indeed they have already begun to say—that the United Nations is a place where lies are told; but far more serious, grave, and perhaps irreparable harm will be done to the cause of human rights itself.

The harm will arise first because it will strip from racism the precise and abhorrent meaning that it still precariously holds today. How will the peoples of the world feel about racism, and about the need to struggle against it, when they are told that it is an idea so broad as to include the Jewish national liberation movement?

As this lie spreads, it will do harm in a second way. Many of the members of the United Nations owe their independence in no small part to the notion of human rights, as it has spread from the domestic sphere to the international sphere and exercised its influence over the old colonial powers. We are now coming into a time when that independence is likely to be threatened again. There will be new forces, some of them arising now, new prophets and new despots, who will justify their actions with the help of just such distortions of words as we have sanctioned here today.

Today we have drained the word "racism" of its meaning. Tomorrow, terms like "national self-determination" and "national honor" will be perverted in the same way to serve the purposes of conquest and exploitation. And when these claims begin to be made—as they already have begun to be made—it is the small nations of the world whose integrity will suffer. And how will the small nations of the world defend themselves, on what grounds will others be moved to defend and protect them, when the language of human rights, the only language by which the small can be defended, is no longer believed and no longer has a power of its own?

There is this danger, and then a final danger that is the most serious of all—which is that the damage we now do to the idea of human rights and the language of human rights could well be irreversible.

The idea of human rights as we know it today is not an idea which has always existed in human affairs. It is an idea which appeared at a specific time in the world and under very special circumstances. It appeared when European philosophers of the 17th century began to argue that man was a being whose existence was independent from that of the state, that he need join a political community only if he did not lose by that association more than he gained. From this very specific political philosophy stemmed the idea of political rights, of claims that the individual could justly make against the state; it was because the individual was seen as so separate from the state that he could make legitimate demands upon it.

That was the philosophy from which the idea of domestic and international rights sprang. But most of the world does not hold with that philosophy now. Most of the world believes in newer modes of political thought, in philosophies that do not accept the individual as distinct from and prior to the state, in philosophies that therefore do not provide any justification for the idea of human rights, and philosophies that have no words by which to explain their value. If we destroy the words that were given to us by past centuries, we will not have words to replace them, for philosophy today has no such words. But there are those of us who have not forsaken these older words, still so new to much of the world. Not forsaken them now, not here, not anywhere, not ever.

The United States of America declares that it does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in, this infamous act.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION [4]

Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that "any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable [and] socially unjust and dangerous" and its expression of alarm at "the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures",

Recalling also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, *inter alia*, the unholy alliance between South African racism and zionism,

Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace, 1975 proclaimed by the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that "international cooperation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, *apartheid*, and racial discrimination in all its forms as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination",

Taking note also of resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary session, held in Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered "that the racist régime in occupied Palestine and racist régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being",

Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology,

Determines that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

[4] A/RES/3379 (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/10320, report of the Third Committee on agenda item 68, Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination); adopted by the Assembly Nov. 10 by a rollcall vote of 72 to 35 (U.S.), with 32 abstentions. On the same day the Assembly adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to 19 (U.S.), with 5 abstentions, the resolution on implementation of the program for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (A/RES/3377 (XXX)); the resolution on the world conference to combat racial discrimination (A/RES/3378 (XXX)) was adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to 18 (U.S.), with 7 abstentions.

United States Opposes U.N. Resolution Inviting PLO to Geneva Conference

Following is a statement made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan on November 7.

USUN press release 139 (corr. 1) dated November 7

Our discussion comes to focus again this year on one aspect of an overall settlement in the Middle East which is—especially in human terms—most sensitive and demanding.

The Government of the United States remains determined to exert its fullest efforts toward a peaceful achievement of this settlement, justly and durably dealing with *all* issues comprising the Arab-Israeli dispute. Let me quote what Secretary Kissinger told the General Assembly on September 22:

> I want to emphasize that the United States did not help negotiate this agreement in order to put an end to the process of peace, but to give it new impetus.
>
> President Ford has stated that we will not accept stalemate and stagnation in the Middle East. That was true before the Sinai agreement was signed; it remains true today. The objective of our policy is not merely to create another temporary truce, but to sustain the momentum of negotiations. The United States is determined to take every feasible step to help promote further practical progress toward final peace.

We recognize, in particular, that an equitable negotiated solution of the Palestinian problem must be an important element in such a settlement. As Secretary Kissinger said earlier this month, there will be no permanent peace in the Middle East unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. No one can disregard the Palestinians as an important element in the Middle

Eastern equation or denigrate their legitimate aspirations.

The Palestinian question has always been broader and more complex than the issues of humanitarian relief to refugees, crucial as that may be at this moment. Its aspects and ramifications have multiplied in recent years. No one can ignore this reality in the context of our current and future peace efforts in the Middle East. We shall not do so.

Peacemaking efforts are carried out within the framework established by the Security Council of the United Nations in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This framework has been agreed to by the parties to the Geneva Conference, has facilitated the notable progress that has been made in the last two years, and provides for the further progress for which we are now striving. We commend the effort to pursue Palestinian interests by means outlined in the charter. Nevertheless, because of our support for this framework, we must take issue with the working paper proposing to establish a committee.[1]

Last year, as you are all aware, the United States voted against Resolution 3236. Our reason was our reservation about the efficacy of meeting the interests and concerns of the Palestinians through resolutions of the General Assembly rather than through the give-and-take of the negotiating process. We believe also that the exhortation to exercise any Palestinian rights in Palestine creates a serious political and legal problem. Part of the geographic entity known as Palestine now constitutes the territory of a member state of the United Nations. Thus a claim to exercise rights in Palestine appears as a claim which, at least in part, involves internal jurisdiction of a member state.

Regarding the proposal to invite the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] to Geneva, we note that there are various views among the present parties to the Geneva Conference. We believe that this is the crux of the problem, and our policy is that any new participation at Geneva can only be the result of careful consideration, negotiation, and agreement among the parties. We are prepared to participate actively in such negotiations. Our own views on the obstacles to recognition of, or negotiation with, the PLO are a matter of public record.

President Ford has made it clear that the United States will assist the parties in any way it can, as the parties desire, to achieve a negotiated settlement within the framework established by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We are ready to encourage further negotiations between Syria and Israel. We are ready to discuss and consult with all the countries involved about the substance and form of a reconvened Geneva Conference. We are prepared to discuss how best to assure that legitimate Palestinian interests are brought into the negotiating process. We are ready to explore possibilities on one or several tracks. We are determined to persevere.

But we are not prepared to participate in or support changes by the General Assembly in the painstakingly negotiated framework for negotiations established by the Security Council and accepted by the parties.[2] Nor are we prepared to support rights for one group at the expense of rights of others. We are prepared, however, to encourage negotiation and the pursuit by peaceful means of the settlement we all desire.

It is in this manner that the legitimate interests of the Palestinians can be met, and they must be met for peace to prevail. The United States stands ready in that spirit to assist as best it can, and promote as it must, true peace in the Middle East.

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[1] The Assembly on Nov. 10 adopted by a rollcall vote of 93 to 18 (U.S.), with 27 abstentions, a resolution (A/RES/3376 (XXX)) establishing a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

[2] The Assembly on Nov. 10 adopted by a rollcall vote of 101 to 8 (U.S.), with 25 abstentions, a resolution (A/RES/3375 (XXX)) calling for the invitation of the PLO "to participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties . . ." and requesting the Secretary General "to inform the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East of the present resolution and to take all necessary steps to secure the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the work of the Conference as well as in all other efforts for peace."

Department Gives Position on Palestinian Issue

Statement by Harold H. Saunders
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs [1]

A just and durable peace in the Middle East is a central objective of the United States. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have stated firmly on numerous occasions that the United States is determined to make every feasible effort to maintain the momentum of practical progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We have also repeatedly stated that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiation of an Arab-Israeli peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves Palestinians.

The total number of Palestinian Arabs is estimated at a little more than 3 million. Of these, about 450,000 live in the area of Israel's pre-1967 borders; about 1 million are in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza; something less than a million—about 900,000—are in Jordan; half a million are in Syria and Lebanon; and somewhat more than 200,000 or so are elsewhere, primarily in the gulf states.

Those in Israel are Israeli nationals. The great majority of those in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Jordan are Jordanian nationals. Palestinian refugees, who live outside of pre-1967 Israel and number 1.6 million, are eligible for food and/or services from the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); more than 650,000 of these live in camps.

The problem of the Palestinians was initially dealt with essentially as one involving displaced persons. The United States and other nations responded to the immediate humanitarian task of caring for a large number of refugees and trying to provide them with some hope in life.

In later years, there has been considerable attention given to the programs of UNRWA that help not only to sustain those people's lives but to lift the young people out of the refugee camps and to train them and give them an opportunity to lead productive lives. Many have taken advantage of this opportunity, and an unusually large number of them have completed secondary and university education. One finds Palestinians occupying leading positions throughout the Arab world as professionals and skilled workers in all fields.

The United States has provided some $620 million in assistance—about 62 percent of the total international support ($1 billion) for the Palestinian refugees over the past quarter of a century.

Today, however, we recognize that, in addi-

[1] Made before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations on Nov. 12. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

tion to meeting the human needs and responding to legitimate personal claims of the refugees, there is another interest that must be taken into account. It is a fact that many of the 3 million or so people who call themselves Palestinians today increasingly regard themselves as having their own identity as a people and desire a voice in determining their political status. As with any people in this situation, they have differences among themselves, but the Palestinians collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there is to be a peace between Israel and its neighbors.

The statement is often made in the Arab world that there will not be peace until the "rights of the Palestinians" are fulfilled; but there is no agreed definition of what is meant, and a variety of viewpoints have been expressed on what the legitimate objectives of the Palestinians are:

—Some Palestinian elements hold to the objective of a binational secular state in the area of the former mandate of Palestine. Realization of this objective would mean the end of the present State of Israel—a member of the United Nations—and its submergence in some larger entity. Some would be willing to accept merely as a first step toward this goal the establishment of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza.

—Other elements of Palestinian opinion appear willing to accept an independent Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and Gaza, based on acceptance of Israel's right to exist as an independent state within roughly its pre-1967 borders.

—Some Palestinians and other Arabs envisage as a possible solution a unification of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. A variation of this which has been suggested would be the reconstitution of the country as a federated state, with the West Bank becoming an autonomous Palestinian province.

—Still others, including many Israelis, feel that with the West Bank returned to Jordan, and with the resulting existence of two communities—Palestinian and Jordanian—within Jordan, opportunities would be created thereby for the Palestinians to find self-expression.

—In the case of a solution which would rejoin the West Bank to Jordan or a solution involving a West Bank-Gaza state, there would still arise the property claims of those Palestinians who before 1948 resided in areas that became the State of Israel. These claims have been acknowledged as a serious problem by the international community ever since the adoption by the United Nations of Resolution 194 on this subject in 1948, a resolution which the United Nations has repeatedly reaffirmed and which the United States has supported. A solution will be further complicated by the property claims against Arab states of the many Jews from those states who moved to Israel in its early years after achieving statehood.

—In addition to property claims, some believe they should have the option of returning to their original homes under any settlement.

—Other Arab leaders, while pressing the importance of Palestinian involvement in a settlement, have taken the position that the definition of Palestinian interests is something for the Palestinian people themselves to sort out, and the view has been expressed by responsible Arab leaders that realization of Palestinian rights need not be inconsistent with the existence of Israel.

No one, therefore, seems in a position today to say exactly what Palestinian objectives are. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is recognized by the Arab League and the U.N. General Assembly as the representative of the Palestinian people, has been ambivalent. Officially and publicly, its objective is described as a binational secular state, but there are some indications that coexistence between separate Palestinian and Israeli states might be considered.

When there is greater precision about

those objectives, there can be clearer understanding about how to relate them to negotiations. There is the aspect of the future of the West Bank and Gaza—how those areas are to be defined and how they are to be governed. There is the aspect of the relationship between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to those Palestinians who are not living in those areas, in the context of a settlement.

What is needed as a first step is a diplomatic process which will help bring forth a reasonable definition of Palestinian interests—a position from which negotiations on a solution of the Palestinian aspects of the problem might begin. The issue is not whether Palestinian interests should be expressed in a final settlement, but how. There will be no peace unless an answer is found.

Another requirement is the development of a framework for negotiations—a statement of the objectives and the terms of reference. The framework for the negotiations that have taken place thus far and the agreements they have produced involving Israel, Syria, and Egypt has been provided by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In accepting that framework, all of the parties to the negotiations have accepted that the objective of the negotiations is peace between them based on mutual recognition, territorial integrity, political independence, the right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, and the resolution of the specific issues which comprise the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The major problem that must be resolved in establishing a framework for bringing issues of concern to the Palestinians into negotiation, therefore, is to find a common basis for the negotiation that Palestinians and Israelis can both accept. This could be achieved by common acceptance of the abovementioned Security Council resolutions, although they do not deal with the political aspect of the Palestinian problem.

A particularly difficult aspect of the problem is the question of who negotiates for the Palestinians. It has been our belief that Jordan would be a logical negotiator for the Palestinian-related issues. The Rabat summit, however, recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

The PLO was formed in 1964, when 400 delegates from Palestinian communities throughout the Arab world met in Jerusalem to create an organization to represent and speak for the Palestinian people. Its leadership was originally middle-class and relatively conservative, but by 1969 control had passed into the hands of the Palestinian fedayeen, or commando, movement, which had existed since the mid-1950's but had come into prominence only after the 1967 war. The PLO became an umbrella organization for six separate fedayeen groups: Fatah; the Syrian-backed Saiqa; the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the General Command, a subgroup of the PFLP; and the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front. Affiliated with the PLO are a number of "popular organizations"—labor and professional unions, student groups, women's groups, and so on. Fatah, the largest fedayeen group, also has a welfare apparatus to care for widows and orphans of deceased Fatah members.

However, the PLO does not accept the U.N. Security Council resolutions, does not recognize the existence of Israel, and has not stated its readiness to negotiate peace with Israel; Israel does not recognize the PLO or the idea of a separate Palestinian entity. Thus we do not at this point have the framework for a negotiation involving the PLO. We cannot envision or urge a negotiation between two parties as long as one professes to hold the objective of eliminating the other—rather than the objective of negotiating peace with it.

There is one other aspect to this problem. Elements of the PLO have used terrorism to gain attention for their cause. Some Ameri-

cans as well as many Israelis and others have been killed by Palestinian terrorists. The international community cannot condone such practices, and it seems to us that there must be some assurance if Palestinians are drawn into the negotiating process that these practices will be curbed.

This is the problem which we now face. If the progress toward peace which has now begun is to continue, a solution to this question must be found. We have not devised an "American" solution, nor would it be appropriate for us to do so. This is the responsibility of the parties and the purpose of the negotiating process. But we have not closed our minds to any reasonable solution which can contribute to progress toward our overriding objective in the Middle East—an Arab-Israeli peace. The step-by-step approach to negotiations which we have pursued has been based partly on the understanding that issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict take time to mature. It is obvious that thinking on the Palestinian aspects of the problem must evolve on all sides. As it does, what is not possible today may become possible.

Our consultations on how to move the peace negotiations forward will recognize the need to deal with this subject. As Secretary Kissinger has said:

> We are prepared to work with *all* the parties toward a solution of *all* the issues yet remaining—including the issue of the future of the Palestinians.

We will do so because the issues of concern to the Palestinians are important in themselves and because the Arab governments participating in the negotiations have made clear that progress in the overall negotiations will depend in part on progress on issues of concern to the Palestinians. We are prepared to consider any reasonable proposal from any quarter, and we will expect other parties to the negotiation to be equally open-minded.

[2] For Secretary Kissinger's statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Oct. 7, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1975, p. 609.

Department Testifies on Angolan Disaster Assistance

Following is a statement by Edward W. Mulcahy, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations on November 5.[1]

Mr. Chairman: On November 11, Angola is scheduled to receive its independence from Portugal. The nation is caught up in a tragic civil war among its three liberation movements, and the populace of all races has borne a terrible burden for the past several months. The vast majority of the estimated 10,000–15,000 deaths have been among black civilians, and untold tens of thousands have had to flee their homes in Luanda and elsewhere to avoid the fighting. An estimated 90 percent of the white population of 360,000 has fled Angola, 150,000 of them on a multinational airlift that has just been completed.

To help cope with the internal problems occasioned by civil strife, the United States has responded to requests from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Portuguese Government for assistance. In mid-August we made a cash grant of $200,000 from disaster relief funds to the ICRC to support its relief program in various parts of Angola. In addition, our Consul General donated $25,000 to the Portuguese High Commissioner for refugee assistance. In early September, in response to a request by the President of Portugal, General Costa Gomes, we agreed to provide two, and later four, U.S.-chartered civilian aircraft as part of a multinational effort to assist the Portuguese in evacuating their nationals from Angola before November 11. During this operation we transported about 31,600 people to Lisbon, at a total cost of approximately

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

$7.5 million. The airlift was terminated on November 3. On that day we temporarily closed our Consulate General and removed the entire staff to Lisbon on the last U.S. relief flight.

We are prepared to respond favorably to further requests from international organizations for contributions for relief and rehabilitation programs within Angola. We expect that a major multilateral relief and reconstruction effort will be called for in Angola when the fighting among the liberation groups ceases. Large numbers of operational personnel and sizable financial assistance will be needed to restore essential services, to repair war-damaged infrastructure, and to reestablish economic life.

In the present chaotic circumstances now prevailing in Angola, it is impossible for us to predict the dimension of the problem that will exist upon the termination of the fighting. For that reason, I would hesitate to provide you at this time with a figure on the magnitude of our ultimate contribution. I am sure you will agree, Mr. Chairman, that we must be as flexible as possible and be prepared to be as generous as our resources will permit. An amendment proposed by the Senate to the foreign assistance act for 1975, H.R. 9005, would give us the authority and flexibility we need to respond quickly to appeals for assistance whether bilateral or multilateral. We hope that you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the committee would express your support for the proposed amendment when it is under consideration in conference committee. I refer specifically to section 314(c) of the Senate version of the bill.

I am pleased to report that the assistance to the Portuguese and Angola has truly been multinational. The ICRC has been the prime mover within Angola. They have 31 officials in all three areas of the country, providing food and medical assistance to thousands of displaced Angolans. Governments which made donations to the ICRC appeal are Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States. Aircraft for the relief flights were contributed by Belgium, France, West Germany, East Germany, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States. Sweden has donated approximately $1 million to the Portuguese to pay for chartering aircraft. In addition various U.N. agencies gave over $400,000 for assistance within Angola, and other international relief agencies contributed food and blankets.

The group most seriously and adversely affected by the fighting has been, as I mentioned before, the Angolan civilian population. While there are no statistics on casualties, we believe as many as 10,000–15,000 people may have been killed in the past year. In addition tens of thousands more have been forced to flee their homes to escape the fighting. In the North, several hundred thousand Angolans who have lived in exile in Zaïre throughout the long war against the Portuguese have returned to their land, to face the shortages of food and a near total lack of medical help.

The three liberation movements and the Portuguese have provided some assistance to the new and returning refugees but, even with the ICRC effort, much remains to be done. Tragically, the widespread warfare has precluded any large-scale effort to assist these people, and effective help will have to await a lessening of violence and reestablishment of communications and security.

U.S. policy in the current Angola situation was stated by Secretary Kissinger on September 23 at his dinner for African Foreign Ministers and heads of delegations to the U.N. General Assembly. If I may quote from that statement:

> Events in Angola have taken a distressing turn, with widespread violence. We are most alarmed at the interference of extracontinental powers who do not wish Africa well and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence. We believe a fair and peaceful solution must be negotiated, giving all groups representing the Angolan people a fair role in its future.

We are encouraged by the initiative of the Organization of African Unity in attempting to end the fighting and bring the movements together. These are goals we endorse. It is our hope that a true government of national unity can soon be achieved. We would wish to then establish amicable relations with the new government, and we would want to make available to them generous assistance in rehabilitating their nation and assuming their long-sought rightful place in the international community. In this we feel sure we will have the support of the Congress.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Nicaragua, October 31, 1975.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Nicaragua, October 31, 1975.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris November 18, 1974.[1]
Notification of consent to be bound deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, October 20, 1975.

Expositions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, relating to international expositions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.[1]
Ratification deposited: Belgium, September 12, 1975.

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Greece, Monaco, November 4, 1975.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Venezuela, October 27, 1975.
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London, October 17, 1974.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Venezuela, October 27, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.
Accession deposited: Uruguay, October 31, 1975.
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Ratification deposited: France, September 4, 1975.[2]
Accession deposited: Uruguay, October 31, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of maritime pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975.
Ratification deposited: Canada, November 13, 1975.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Iraq (with a reservation), October 24, 1975.
Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force March 18, 1970; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Morocco, October 24, 1975.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14,

[1] Not in force.
[2] Applicable to the entire territory of the French Republic (European and Overseas Departments and Overseas Territories).

1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Iraq, October 21, 1975.

South Pacific Commission

Agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission. Signed at Canberra February 6, 1947. Entered into force July 29, 1948. TIAS 2317.
Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, September 25, 1975.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.[1]
Signature: Mongolia, October 30, 1975.

War

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;
Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.
Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, respectively.
Notification of succession: Bahamas, October 20, 1975.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Grant agreement relating to consultant services, technical assistance and training in furtherance of university development priorities. Signed at Brasilia August 22, 1975. Entered into force August 22, 1975.

Ethiopia

Loan agreement to finance certain costs of goods and services required for a malaria control program, with annex. Signed at Addis Ababa September 26, 1975. Entered into force September 26, 1975.

Haiti

Agreement modifying the agreement of March 13 and April 2, 1953, as modified (TIAS 2818, 7006), relating to guaranties authorized by sec. 111(b)(3) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince October 7 and 14, 1975. Enters into force on the date of the note by which Haiti communicates to the United States that this agreement has been approved in conformity with Haiti's constitutional procedures.

Philippines

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila October 15, 1975. Entered into force October 15, 1975; effective October 1, 1975.
Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with annex, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 21, 1967. Entered into force January 1, 1968. TIAS 6344, 6416, 6979, 7719.
Terminated: October 1, 1975.

Poland

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 6, 1975. Entered into force November 6, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol to the treaty of May 26, 1972 (TIAS 7503), on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: November 10, 1975.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—$23.10; plastic binder—$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Belgium	Cat. No.	S1.123:B41
	Pub. 8087	6 pp.
Colombia	Cat. No.	S1.123:C71
	Pub. 7767	7 pp.
Japan	Cat. No.	S1.123:J27
	Pub. 7770	10 pp.
Papua-New Guinea	Cat. No.	S1.123:P19/2
	Pub. 8824	8 pp.

[1] Not in force.

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles. Agreement with the Republic of China. TIAS 8033. 21 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8033).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Honduras. TIAS 8037. 30 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8037).

Finance—Foreign Exchange Costs of Commodities and Commodity-Related Services. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8039. 14 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8039).

Finance—Ashuganj Fertilizer Project. Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 8040. 29 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8040).

Narcotic Drugs—Provision of Mobile Interdiction Systems. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8041. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8041).

Economic Cooperation. Agreed minutes with Iran. TIAS 8042. 26 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8042).

Aerospace Disturbances—Transfer of Research Facility. Agreement with Australia. TIAS 8043. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8043).

Refugee Relief in South Viet-Nam and Laos. Agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. TIAS 8044. 9 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9 10: 8044).

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 8045. 8 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8045).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with Bangladesh amending the agreement of October 4, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8046. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8046).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland extending the agreement of March 30, 1973 as amended and extended. TIAS 8047. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8047).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Jamaica amending and extending the agreement of September 29, 1967, as amended and extended. TIAS 8048. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8048).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jordan amending the agreement of November 27, 1974. TIAS 8050. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8050).

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States-Israel Cooperation Agreement. Agreement with Israel and the International Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 8051. 10 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8051).

Extradition. Treaty with Italy. TIAS 8052. 24 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8052).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Thailand amending the agreement of March 16, 1972. TIAS 8053. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8053).

Launching and Associated Services for Indonesian Satellites. Agreement with Indonesia. TIAS 8054. 12 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8054).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bangladesh amending the agreement of October 4, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8055. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8055).

Weather Modification—Exchange of Information. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8056. 14 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8056).

Reciprocal Fishing Privileges. Agreement with Canada extending the agreement of June 15, 1973, as extended. TIAS 8057. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8057).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics amending the protocol of June 23, 1973. TIAS 8058. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8058).

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: November 10–16

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*558	11/10	U.S. and Poland sign textile agreement.
*559	11/10	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on ship design and equipment, Dec. 4.
560	11/10	Kissinger: news conference.
*561	11/11	Urban government specialists to tour U.S.
562	11/11	Kissinger: Pittsburgh World Affairs Council.
562A	11/11	Kissinger: introductory remarks.
562B	11/11	Kissinger: questions and answers.
563	11/12	Experimental program of regional foreign policy "Town Meetings."
*564	11/12	Study Group 4 of the U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), Dec. 3.
*565	11/12	U.S. and Philippines sign textile agreement.
566	11/12	Kissinger: news conference, Pittsburgh.
*567	11/12	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Dec. 11.
*568	11/13	Advisory Panel on International Law, Dec. 12.
*569	11/14	Kissinger: Foreign Operations Subcommittee of House Appropriations Committee; Security Assistance Program.
†570	11/14	Eighth U.S.-Japan Conference on Development and Utilization of Natural Resources.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Name Index