THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXIII • No. 1897 • November 3, 1975

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Secretary Kissinger Visits Canada

Secretary Kissinger visited Ottawa October 14–15. Following are remarks made by Allan MacEachen, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Secretary Kissinger upon Secretary Kissinger's arrival on October 14, their exchange of toasts at a dinner given by Minister MacEachen that evening, and the transcript of a news conference they held on October 15.

ARRIVAL, OTTAWA, OCTOBER 14

Press release 526 dated October 14

Minister MacEachen

Mr. Secretary: On behalf of the Government of Canada, and on my own behalf, it is a deep pleasure for me to welcome you and Mrs. Kissinger to Canada. This is your third visit to our capital in recent years, and in many ways you could not have picked a better time to come to Ottawa, bedecked as it is in the reds and golds of autumn.

In our meetings, Mr. Secretary, at various places throughout the world—in Europe, at the United Nations, in Washington—I have placed great value on the discussions we have had about matters of mutual interest to both our countries. I have profited from learning of your views on major issues facing our nations and our contemporary world. Our discussions have been very much in the tradition of the close communication which has existed between our two countries.

In this tradition, your visit to Ottawa will, I am sure, add further to our mutual understanding and enhance what I believe to be a unique bilateral relationship. Our discussions will, I think, be friendly and wide-ranging and of the kind that takes place between foreign ministers of countries which are old friends who know and respect each other.

During your all too short stay in Ottawa, Mr. Secretary, you will have an opportunity to meet the Prime Minister of Canada, a number of my colleagues in the Cabinet, members of the opposition, and Canadians from different parts of our vast land. I know that all whom you will meet will join me in welcoming you and in voicing appreciation for the indefatigable and constructive efforts you have made to enhance peace and stability in our troubled world. Bearing in mind the Bicentennial of your great nation, I want to express the profound admiration of Canadians for the achievements, creativity, vitality, and leadership which is so representative of the United States of America.

Thank you.

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Minister: On behalf of my colleagues and myself, I would like to express our great pleasure at being able to realize this long-held plan to visit Canada. I have visited Canada—this is in fact the third time in recent months—but this is my first official visit to Ottawa and I look forward to friendly, warm, and detailed talks with my colleague and with other Ministers.

The Foreign Minister has correctly characterized our relationship not as special, as has sometimes been said, but as unique. We have closer consultation with Canada than with any other nation. We share more common problems, and we share the need for parallel solutions on a whole range of issues.

Canada is no longer a junior partner, but a country which rightfully takes its place in the economic and political councils of the world—a country whose participation we think is crucial in the meetings of the producers and consumers and also at the economic summit that is being planned for Paris in November.

Beyond this, we have benefited enormously from the frequent, cordial, and informal exchanges of view that take place at all levels between all ministries and also at the highest levels. I look forward very much to my talks with my colleague here as well as with the Prime Minister and to the warm and cordial reception which I have already received and which I know is always characteristic of Ottawa.

Thank you very much.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, OCTOBER 14

Press release 532 dated October 16

Minister MacEachen

Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Kissinger: Your visit to Ottawa is the first occasion that I have of returning the hospitality you have extended to me in Washington—and also aboard your U.S. jet, which seems to have become your natural habitat! I welcome this further opportunity of exchanging views with you, an experience I found rewarding both on the ground and in the air.

This evening could have been devoted to a working dinner; but I felt it would be more useful to bring you in contact not only with Ministers and government officials, but also with members of the opposition and citizens from all the regions of Canada. Around this table we have a cross-section of the Canadian people involved in a variety of ways in the very close and diversified relationship that exists between our two countries.

During our talks tomorrow, we shall be exchanging views on the international situation. In this way we will be participating in the process of building a lasting structure of peace and security, the main aim of your foreign policy.

As a student of history, Mr. Kissinger, you are aware of the inherent instability of any world order which is too heavily weighted in favor of a given country. As a citizen of the United States, you recognize the need for pragmatism and flexibility in the conduct of foreign affairs—principles which, I hasten to recall in the spirit of your country's Bicentennial celebrations, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, each in his own way, made the cornerstone of the United States foreign policy.

What you seek to achieve, Mr. Secretary, was well described in a speech you made in New Delhi last October. Allow me to quote a few sentences from it:

> Our goal (you said) is to move toward a world where power blocs and balances are not dominant; where justice, not stability, can be our overriding preoccupation; where countries consider cooperation in the global interest to be in their national interest. For all that has been achieved, we must realize that we have taken only the first hesitant steps on a long and arduous road.

This goal, which induced the U.S. Government to recast its diplomacy in a multipolar framework, is very similar to our own. We do not emphasize the same elements in the evolving power structure; nor do we necessarily draw the same policy conclusions from the same elements. For we are distinct societies, each with its own history, array of national interests, and bevy of domestic constraints. But there is no doubt in my mind that the current evolution of the United States foreign policy allows Canada to implement its own policy of diversification—what we call the "third option"; that is, an attempt to develop further and deepen our relations with other countries of the world while moving on with our very close and valued links with your country, the first and the most important among all our partners.

Thus we hope to play a role on the world scene which corresponds to Canada's aspirations and resources. As you have stated many times yourself, leadership in the international community cannot be the burden of only one great power. I would add that leadership equally cannot be the exclusive prerogative of the great powers. Thus it should be considered quite normal for middle powers and even small countries to participate in the resolution of international problems or in the defusing of localized conflicts. This form of leadership sometimes carries risks; it is nonetheless necessary to assure humanity's constant progression toward the new political and economic order to which all peoples aspire.

On occasion we in Canada have been able

to play a leading role in world affairs. We have done so with your sympathy and understanding, and we are confident this will be so in the future. That a middle power bordering the world's strongest power can act freely and independently is high tribute to the maturity of our bilateral relationship and our conception of international relations.

Our shared heritage of North American development, our joint achievement of the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world, and similarities in our basic values have all contributed to our healthy and mutually beneficial relationship. That each government responds with different perspectives to different imperatives only serves to underscore the significance, and the soundness, of our mutual accomplishment in maintaining continued good relations. Indeed, the mutual respect, enormous good will, and undeniable benefits accruing to both countries as a result of the successful cooperation of our societies point up the unique importance of our relationship, no matter from whose perspective it is viewed.

As a Canadian, Mr. Secretary, I have become increasingly conscious of Canada's distinctiveness, as well as of her capacity and determination to chart and control her chosen course.

As a Member of Parliament and as a Minister of the Crown, I am particularly aware of the interests and priorities of the Government of Canada. I refer particularly to:

—Assuring stable economic growth and thus jobs for Canadians and adequate incomes for their efforts.

—Combating inflation so that these are not dissipated.

—Stimulating the development of our manufacturing sector, especially of those industries which have a high technological base.

—Assuring a rational development of our own energy resources so that long-term domestic needs can be met.

—Deriving significant benefit from foreign investments in Canada.

But as Foreign Minister, I am struck by the interdependence of the world's political and economic entities, by the need for nations to take reasonable account of each other's legitimate interests, and by the heavy burden upon us all to work unrelentingly for the elusive balance between safeguarding the vital interests of one's own nation and avoiding injustice and prejudice to the proper interests of other nations.

Canada and the United States, because of our complex and varied interrelations, inevitably and frequently make decisions which affect the interests of the other—perhaps now more than ever before.

The challenge we face, and constantly, is to keep abreast conceptually of the changes that have taken place or will take place in our relationship, so that mutual understanding is based on reality rather than fiction or emotion—past or present—so that this understanding effectively bears upon the resolution of bilateral issues.

It is with these thoughts in mind and in the spirit that has stimulated these thoughts that it is now my great privilege and distinct honor to propose a toast to the enduring friendship between Canada and the United States of America and to the continued health and prosperity of our esteemed guests, Dr. Henry Kissinger and his charming wife, Nancy.

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Minister, distinguished guests: First of all, on behalf of Nancy and myself, I would like to thank you for the very warm reception we have had here and to thank Allan for the occasion to let us meet so many old friends.

As I was preparing for this trip, it was called to my attention that after the War of Independence about half of the students of Harvard left the United States and settled in Canada. I could say many things about this, including the fact that it proves what a strong nation you are to have overcome so important a handicap. But then, of course, we were left with the other half, so we started from about the same position. [Laughter.]

Mr. MacEachen was nice enough to refer to American foreign policy at this moment.

It is true we have gone through an important period of transition in recent years. As events turned out, the late sixties and early seventies in the United States marked the end of the period that was inaugurated by the great acts of creation immediately following World War II. We had come to the end of the men, and maybe of the ideas, which had formed the immediate postwar period. In that period, American physical power was predominant, and the legacy of the New Deal created the belief that all problems in the world could be solved by a kind of social engineering. Economic aid by itself seemed to be the solvent of political instability. We thought for a while, and not unsuccessfully, that all problems could be dealt with by massive applications of resources and good will.

Now, this policy, which is often derided in the United States today, was, on the whole, quite successful. It took an element of naivete and faith to take a shattered continent and help build its self-confidence and its political consciousness. And it took an element of good will to deal with defeated enemies on the basis of equality and the consciousness of the need to rebuild an international order.

But the achievements of the forties and fifties brought with them a new world, in which other countries had to play an increasingly important role; and the shattering impact of Viet-Nam and of Watergate taught Americans that there were limits to what could be achieved, even with our resources, and that America, too, was not immune from the domestic turmoil that had afflicted other nations.

We are now in a period in which we must found our foreign policy on a more mature conception—one that oscillates less wildly between excessive idealism and excessive pragmatism, one that can be sustained by our public over an indefinite period of time. In this effort we face the challenge that we must deal on many fronts and in highly ambiguous situations.

We must improve relations with old adversaries—not because the ideologies have become less clashing, and not because the dangers have disappeared, but because in the nuclear age every leader has a preeminent responsibility to do his utmost to prevent the danger of nuclear war, and if he cannot prevent confrontations, to have demonstrated to his public beyond any question that he has used every means to avoid a catastrophe. So we must be strong enough to pursue a policy of relaxation of tensions without illusion and not to believe that good will alone can produce relaxation but also not to fall into the danger of mock-heroic rhetoric.

We must adjust our alliances to new conditions of equality and partnership and change old habits of preeminence to the new requirements of a global international system. We must change alliances based on defense against a common danger to the new challenges of our period in the relations between North and South and the necessities of interdependence.

We must deal with the problem of the relationship between the developed and the developing countries without sentimentality but also without arrogance. We do not favor the creation of a new bloc distinguished only by calling itself nonaligned, but we also believe that the developed countries have an obligation to help the developing countries to find a place in the community of nations in a manner in which they believe that their just aspirations are being met and that truly cooperative efforts can succeed.

I go into all this detail because it makes perhaps more meaningful the conventional pleasantries that one would otherwise say about the relationship between Canada and the United States. We used to speak of a "special relationship," and I agree that that no longer exists, if it ever did. On the other hand, we have a very close and very intimate relationship, and one that is peculiarly important in the period that I have described; because if we have to found a new international system that is built on justice and equality in which all nations participate because they feel it is partly their own, then the relationship of a rather powerful coun-

try with perhaps what is too modestly called a middle power in such close proximity becomes of crucial importance. We can deal with each other without complexes; we can found our relationship on the consciousness of interdependence; we can live with disagreements, recognizing the different origins, the different background, and the different domestic necessities. We also know that agreement is not pursued as an end in itself and that when we do agree—which we do, after all, on the vast majority of fundamental issues—that agreement is all the more meaningful for having been freely achieved.

In this sense, in striking the balance between national consciousness and international responsibility, between self-confidence and the necessities of interdependence, our two countries can set an example to many other parts of the world.

In no place in the world today is it possible for any one nation, no matter how powerful, to achieve its security or its prosperity by its own efforts. A few years ago the United States proposed the economic coordination of the policies of the major industrial countries. That was considered then a daring idea; it is today commonplace. When in a few weeks the economic summit meets, that will be one of its principal objectives. As I stated on my arrival this afternoon, the United States considers it essential that Canada participate in such an effort, because it is only through the free cooperation of friendly nations that the interdependence of the world can be vindicated.

This is why I was very glad to be invited to come here—to continue conversations that have been going on informally and easily over the months and years of our joint service and conversations that will continue over the years to come.

I told the Minister when I arrived that I don't really know how to handle the situation in which we would both have to try very hard to make the talks fail. [Laughter.] It is in this spirit that I look forward to our talks tomorrow.

I should like to propose a toast to the friendship between the Canadian and the American peoples and to our host, the Minister.

NEWS CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 15

Press release 530 dated October 15

Minister MacEachen: I want to begin by expressing our pleasure that Dr. Kissinger has been able to make this official visit to Canada and to have been able to spend the last day in discussions and talks with the Prime Minister, members of the government, and myself. We have had a good deal to say to each other about general and international questions, and we have talked on the whole range of bilateral questions, relationships between Canada and the United States. I believe the talks were extremely frank and cordial and in an extremely good atmosphere.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no country with which we have closer ties and better communication than Canada. We reviewed the whole range of world problems as well as bilateral issues between the United States and Canada, of which there are several, but none of them insoluble. The atmosphere was very friendly, very warm, and I found the talks extremely useful. And on behalf of my colleagues I would like to express my appreciation to Mr. MacEachen, the Prime Minister, and to all the others who have made our stay here so useful and at the same time so enjoyable.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you well know, there is legislation coming up in Parliament here affecting American publishing and television interests. We have heard that, particularly, American television interests have impressed on you the necessity of bringing their views before the Canadian Government. Have you discussed this issue in Ottawa, and do you have a position yourself on it at the moment?

Secretary Kissinger: Feelings on the issue of deletion of television commercials on Canadian cable television are rather intense in the United States. I receive a large volume of mail from influential Senators on that subject. I have brought that fact to the attention of the Canadian Government, and I

am told that this issue is before the courts in Canada at this moment, so we have to wait for the court decision. In the meantime, I have asked that no commercials of this program be run in the United States. [Laughter.]

Q. I do not know if we can comply with that.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, a number of reports have come out in recent months about activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in countries in which the United States has substantial interests. Given the fact that the United States has very substantial interests in Canada, it would seem reasonable that the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency would be somewhat in that proportion. I wonder, since you are chairman of that group of 40 that oversees the CIA activities, would you comment on the extent to which they do operate in Canada and, if so, what you learn that's interesting? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: Your assumption may be reasonable, but it isn't true. I am not aware that we are learning very much that is interesting, which may reflect the scale of activities here.

Q. That is not a very direct answer, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: The answer is that your assumption is incorrect.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, a question in the multilateral field: In Helsinki President Ford said that the results of that conference were to be judged not by the promises made, but by the promises kept. And he said that peace is not a piece of paper. I wonder if you could give us your assessment—it's a little bit early in the game—thus far of the degree to which those agreements reached at Helsinki are working, particularly in the area of better human contacts between East and West and the freer flow of information and peoples?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is too early to draw any conclusions; there have been some beneficial results in the sense of multiple-entry visas for journalists, and there has been some progress in reuniting families. But I think that it is too early to draw any final conclusions whether those represent isolated cases or a trend that is related to the Helsinki Conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Canadian policy in the past few years has been one of attempted detachment, or dissimilation from the United States, something called there the "third option." This has been particularly manifest in an attempt to get something we call a contractual link with Europe. I wonder what is the American response to this policy?

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out yesterday evening in my toast, we judge our relationship with Canada not by the other links that Canada may have nor by whether the motives are those of independence or so-called special relationship, but by whether on the fundamental issues we can achieve a certain parallelism of action. We believe that the international system will be most stable if the key countries in it, among which we count Canada, feel that it is in part their own.

Therefore we see no incongruity between an independent stance and close association with the United States. In fact, we would make the argument that a sense of independence makes the closer ties more meaningful.

Therefore we do not object to a contractual relationship between Canada and Europe, or to any other options that Canada chooses to develop, as long as opposition to the United States does not become a cardinal principle for its own sake, which we do not believe is the case.

I have found in practice that we can deal with Canada on the basis of equality on the specific issues that concern us and achieve a substantial area of agreement. Therefore I consider our relationships to be very healthy.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I wonder if I could trade on your reputation as a diplomat to give us an opinion on whether the umpire blew a call last night? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: That's really testing my reputation as a diplomat. I am a Red Sox fan, so I'm a little biased.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the word from Washington is that in the State Department you have not responded to the subpoena from the Pike committee [House Select Committee on Intelligence] for the memorandum on the Cyprus affair. Can you tell us, Dr. Kissinger, whether you informed Mr. Pike that you would not comply and whether you feel there is any possibility of a citation for contempt?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe you received some press reports that were somewhat premature. Quite frankly, my associates did not look at the subpoena in sufficient detail to realize that it had a time and not just a date on it. So we thought that we had all day in order to respond; in fact, shortly before noon I submitted a letter to the Pike committee in which I stated my views on the subject and made some proposals to the Pike committee on how the matter might be resolved. So we have responded in some detail to the request of the committee.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you state your views or give them to us in shorthand form and outline, perhaps, suggestions you may have made?

Secretary Kissinger: We plan to release the letter; but in shorthand form, our view is that any officer of the Department of State can testify as to facts available to him. Any policymaking officer of the Department of State, that is, any Presidential appointee, can testify as to the recommendations he received and recommendations he passed on; and I am of course prepared to testify as to the opinions I received and as to the opinions—recommendations I made. We are not prepared to attach the opinions we received to the names of officers at the middle and junior level, because we believe that this is contrary to the integrity of the policymaking process and that it is essential for the integrity of the Foreign Service that they can make recommendations that are not subject to later public scrutiny, and that those whom the President has appointed to policymaking positions bear the responsibility before the Congress and before the public. But we are prepared to state the substance of the opinions; we are simply not prepared to attach them to names.

Q. Mr. Secretary, for some time now we have been led to believe that the Canada-U.S. pipeline treaty is ready to be signed. Is there any reason for the delay? Also, I would like to ask you whether in your personal view you favor a trans-Alaska or a trans-Canadian route for Alaskan gas?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I have no personal view on that subject. I consider that a technical matter to be discussed. As to whether the treaty is about ready to be signed, I think we are making some progress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. MacEachen has spoken of the end of the special relationship between Canada and the United States; yet you said today that there is no country with which you have closer ties and better communication. You have also spoken of negotiating on the basis of equality. I wonder how these things can be reconciled in view of the fact that U.S. investment in this country is greater than that of any country in any other country in the world? How can we talk about equality and how can we talk about the end of the special relationship in the light of that?

Secretary Kissinger: I'll let Mr. MacEachen explain what he meant by the end of the special relationship.

Q. I have been trying to get him to do so for months. [*Laughter.*]

Minister MacEachen: Except that you endorsed that it ended, whatever it was, you agreed last night that it had ended.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right; I agreed last night and several Canadians have been pained with me ever since. It is apparently all right for Canadians to say it, but not for Americans. [Laughter.]

I would make a distinction between a claim to a special relationship and realities within which foreign policy has to be conducted. Inevitably, any Canadian government and any U.S. government will come up against the realities that you have described. But we make no claim to special treatment, and

we do not interpret what I have said as a claim to a preferential treatment.

We do believe that there is, for reasons of history and for reasons of close economic relationship, a natural affinity between our long-range national purposes that makes communication easy and the solution of fundamental problems in a common framework substantially necessary. But if that turns out to be wrong, then each country must go its own way according to its own convictions.

Minister MacEachen: I agreed with what you said last night. I agree with what you say today. I think what I have been saying about the special relationship, at least as I interpreted it, is that when we do discuss issues, normally we discuss them in the light of our own national interests. Where there is conflict, we attempt to harmonize the differences, or reduce the element of conflict; and where we reach an impasse, we recognize it as such and act accordingly in dealing with issues, which, from my point of view, can only lead to an even healthier relationship between our two countries.

However, in defining it in that particular way, a limited definition, I certainly agree with what Dr. Kissinger has described with respect to the kind of relationship that we do have with the United States, which I described last night as "unique"—and which someone told me today in the Webster dictionary was a synonym for "special"; so I don't know where that leaves us. The relationship is satisfactory, in any event.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with the scale of Canadian contribution to collective Western defense? Would you like to see Canada do more?

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed the problem of defense today. Our view is that as strategic weapons become more complicated, and as the defense of the North Atlantic area takes on a more differentiated character, that the role of conventional weapons and, at any rate, of substrategic options becomes more and more crucial; and that means that all of the members of NATO, and particularly those whose contributions primarily in the conventional field, have to look again at the assumptions that were formed in a period when American strategic predominance was the principal field of NATO. So it is in this sense and in this framework that our discussions have been conducted.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States and Canada signed an agreement in 1972 to clean up the Great Lakes, but the United States has been dragging its feet ever since and most of the American projects are far behind schedule. What is the United States going to do to live up to its part of the agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: We agreed that we have an obligation under this agreement and, regrettably, we are behind schedule. The Administration will make a major effort with the Congress to encourage it to allocate the funds that are needed and to prevent the diversion of funds that have already been appropriated that might cause further delays. We agree with the objectives. We recognize we have an obligation, and the Administration will do its utmost to live up to these obligations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a few days ago I was talking to Dr. Luns [Joseph Luns, Secretary General of NATO] in Brussels, and he expressed, shall I say, concern about Canada's contribution to NATO. A few moments after that, a gentleman who described himself as a senior NATO official—I must confess, a phrase that sounded vaguely familiar—went on to say that Canada's contribution was utterly contemptible and that Canada apparently had no concept of the importance of the problems facing NATO vis-a-vis Portugal and other sectors of the defense front. Would you like to comment on those rather high-ranking statements, and perhaps Mr. MacEachen would like to as well?

Secretary Kissinger: Was that an American NATO official?

Q. It was not an American. It was an official with a European accent. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I do not share these views. I had the opportunity to listen to your

Prime Minister at the NATO summit meeting, and I had the opportunity to talk to him at great length today, to your Foreign Minister and your Defense Minister. I think that the problem of the defense of the Atlantic is fully understood in Canada; and while we would, on the whole, prefer to see a larger effort in conventional defense by several of our allies, I do not believe that these adjectives were appropriate.

I have not had a discussion with any Canadian about events in Portugal, so I can give no judgment about this particular aspect. I find that [in] our philosophical understanding of the level of the approach to the problems of the Western world—I do not find any substantial difference between the U.S. Administration and the Canadian Government.

Minister MacEachen: I have just one comment on that. And I refer to the statement to which Dr. Kissinger referred made by the Prime Minister at the summit, at the recent summit in Brussels, in which he repeated our commitment to the alliance in terms which were, I believe, quite satisfactory and which indicated that the Canadian effort would be continued in a character that would be regarded as satisfactory by the other members of the alliance. And I believe that was certainly a very solid and fundamental commitment by the head of the Government of Canada. I would regard these comments to which you have referred as offensive.

Q. They were not made, Mr. MacEachen, by me.

Minister MacEachen: To which you have referred.

Q. Mr. Secretary, should there be a positive response in the United States and Canada to the appeal by the Russian-citizen Nobel Prize winner for a campaign in the West for more civil rights in the U.S.S.R.?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has repeatedly stated its concern on this subject in the European Security Conference and in certain bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union. We have, on the whole, believed that we could be more effective by making our appeal in a nondramatic way, but this is a question of method, not a question of principle.

Q. Have you any advice for other than governmental organizations on how they could respond to that appeal?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it would be appropriate for me to give that advice.

Q. Two questions, Mr. Secretary. You are one of the chief architects of détente. In his talks with [President of France Valéry] Giscard d'Estaing, Mr. [Leonid I.] Brezhnev has just reaffirmed the Soviet position that there is no such thing as ideology for détente; that it is out of the question. Do you think any other form of détente has any value and has any meaning without ideological détente?

The second question: Was there a trade-off between Eastern Europe and the Middle East in Helsinki?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the first question, what Mr. Brezhnev has said, both the President and I have also often said; namely, that we recognize that there are profound differences of ideology between the Communist and non-Communist world. The relaxation of tensions is not based on the assumption that differences of ideology have disappeared, but on the realities of the contemporary period in which nuclear superpowers confront each other and in which the necessity to prevent nuclear war and at the same time prevent aggression—those twin necessities have to be recognized, and we have to avoid the impression that the relaxation of tensions is a favor we grant or that we can withhold it as a punishment. It is a necessity of this period, and our problem is to have a relaxation of tensions without weakening the defenses of the West. We have to do both of these simultaneously.

With respect to the second question, of whether there was a trade-off of Eastern Europe for the Middle East, I do not consider that the European Security Conference sacrificed Eastern Europe or made concessions on Eastern Europe. The borders that were referred to had all been established by

treaties that antedated Helsinki. There were no borders that were recognized by Helsinki that had not been accepted previously.

With respect to the political influence in Eastern Europe, it has generally been accepted that the freedom of maneuver of the various countries is enhanced in a period of relaxation of tension, and it is precisely those countries most concerned with their autonomy that have also been the greatest advocates of a relaxation of tensions.

To answer your question specifically, there was no relationship whatever between what happened in the Middle East and what happened in Helsinki.

Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier this year both you and the President indicated that the United States may use military force in the oil-producing countries in the Middle East. In light of that, what would be the U.S. reaction to cutbacks of energy exports from Canada to the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we could get some excitement started if I do not answer that question very carefully. [Laughter.]

I was going to make history here by being the first Secretary of State to have visited Canada without calling attention to the "undefended frontier."

I would think that we will settle our energy problems between ourselves without recourse to force, and while we would not object to Canada increasing its defense expenditures, I don't think we would go to this extreme to get you to increase them. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of a major effort with the Congress on the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. We've been hearing of renewed efforts to meet American commitments for many years, and of course now the commitment is only a couple of months away. Was there any discussion in detail of this issue this week, and if so, how hard did the Canadian Government press you on this?

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed it this morning, and the Canadian Government pressed us with its characteristic eloquence and intensity. [Laughter.] As those journalists who have accompanied me there will tell you, it happens occasionally that this Administration gets defeated in Congress, and we will do our best to avoid this unhappy event.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could tell me whether or not the question of both coasts were discussed this morning in your talks with either Mr. MacEachen or the Prime Minister—the stands on the possible 200-mile jurisdiction zone for fisheries and resources and also whether or not the issue of tankers in the Puget Sound was discussed and Head Harbour passage on the other coast?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, both of these problems were discussed at great length. And our views on the subject of the law of the sea, as I understand our views, are very similar. We would prefer that the legislation, that the regime for the economic zones, be established by international treaty and not by unilateral legislation. We appreciate the fact that Canada up to now has resisted the temptation for unilateral legislation. We, of course, have our own domestic pressures in favor of unilateral legislation.

With respect to the tankers in the Puget Sound, that was discussed, but no final conclusion was reached.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Head Harbour passage?

Secretary Kissinger: That, too, was raised, and again no conclusion was reached.

Minister MacEachen: On the question of the law of the sea, I think we had Dr. Kissinger cover the ground four times since his arrival in Ottawa. I do not think he could have failed to realize the interest that various members of the government had in this particular question.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, we understand that you are proposing to transfer Ambassador Porter from Canada to Saudi Arabia and replace him here with Mr. Thomas Enders. Can you tell me what your timing is on that?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not think

any official announcements have been made. I do want to say that Ambassador Porter is of course a very old friend of mine and somebody whose judgment I respect enormously. Assistant Secretary Enders is also one of my most valued assistants, who has had a very major role in designing certain aspects of our economic policy. We are dealing here with two of the superior officers in the Foreign Service.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in response to the Pike committee, isn't this a bit of a surrender, and even though the names won't be attached, won't it have a chilling effect on dissenting views? After all, the junior officer's views are going to be conveyed to Congress even without his name. Wouldn't he be wiser to just go along and present a united front so at least his agency seems unified?

Secretary Kissinger: I think you should wait until my response is published. We will not submit documents, even without names. We may give a summary of all the dissenting views from all sources that were received. No officer's recommendations will be submitted, with or without names.

We are prepared to give a general summary of all dissenting views on a subject, but we are not going to segregate individual opinions.

President Ford Signs Legislation on Sinai Early-Warning System

Following are remarks made by President Ford on October 13 upon signing H.J. Res. 683, a joint resolution to implement the U.S. proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai (Public Law 94–110).

White House press release dated October 13

I am deeply gratified today to sign this important measure which was approved last week by an overwhelming majority of both Houses of the Congress. My signature reaffirms the commitment of the United States to work toward a just and lasting peace for all nations and all peoples in the Middle East.

The Sinai agreement, which American civilians will help support, is a significant step toward an overall settlement in the Middle East. But neither the United States nor Egypt nor Israel see it as an end to itself.

The war in October 1973 brought home to Americans just how dangerous another Arab-Israeli conflict would be, not only for the people of the area but for the entire world. It also brought home the pressing need for a just settlement of the problems which underlie the tension and instability in that part of the world.

As a result, for two years our government, with the government of the countries directly involved, has been engaged in vigorous diplomatic efforts to promote the prospects of peace on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 338 and 242.

With the help and the negotiating skill of Secretary of State Kissinger we have made great progress, in good part because of the trust placed in the United States by both Israel and its Arab neighbors. This confidence must be maintained if there is to be further progress and if the United States is to retain the mutually beneficial relationships it has established with Israel and the Arab states.

We must continue our diplomatic efforts with the parties in order to sustain the momentum toward peace generated by the Sinai agreement; and the United States must accept the responsibilities which flow from our stake in peace in the Middle East and from our bilateral relationships, which form the foundation for success in our diplomatic efforts.

I will soon consult Congress on what is required to sustain these bilateral relationships, just as the Administration has consulted Congress very fully over the past month on the latest diplomatic step, including the use of U.S. civilians to further the peace process.

We anticipate the same support and understanding by the Congress. The overall Middle East policy of the United States is founded upon the most basic reasons of na-

tional necessity as well as our desire to help bring peace to a region whose peoples have suffered too much already.

I reaffirm today that we will not accept stagnation or stalemate in the Middle East. The participation of the U.S. civilians in the Sinai early-warning system demonstrates that determination.

I appreciate very greatly the cooperation of the Congress in this important contribution to stability and peace.

President Ford's News Conference of October 9

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the Old Executive Office Building on October 9.[1]

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. President, it now seems pretty certain that Congress will approve sending American civilians to the Sinai. My question is: Will any of these Americans be drawn from the military establishment, CIA, or the intelligence agencies, and is recruiting underway now?

President Ford: I can only tell you that the American technicians will be American civilians. They are highly qualified, very technically oriented individuals who have to operate very sophisticated electronics equipment. The actual recruiting, I assume, will begin very shortly. I am certain they will not be in the military.

Q. Well, they may not be in the military after they go to the Sinai, but are they being drawn from that area?

President Ford: I can't give you the specifics on that, except that I can assure you that they are civilian technicians and will have no relationship to our military.

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. President, a two-part question: Is there any delay in the formal announcement of our negotiations with the Soviets on the wheat sale, and as a companion question, are we also negotiating with the Russians on the sale of their oil at a favorable price to us?

President Ford: We have coming out tomorrow, I think at 3:00 or 3:30, an announcement as to the status of our wheat, corn, soybean crop reports. When we put on the temporary suspension of the sale of these commodities overseas to the Soviet Union and to others, we said we would await that crop report. As soon as we get that report, I presume there will be some announcements as to further sales to one or more countries.

Now, we are negotiating right at the present time with the Soviet Union for a five-year sale of grain of an annual amount which is very substantial, with an option, perhaps, for them to buy more. It will be a very good agreement if some of the final details are worked out.

At the same time, there are some negotiations going on involving the purchase by the United States of Soviet oil. Whether or not the two will be tied together is not firmly decided yet. We are more likely to have one announced and then continue negotiations on the other. But on the other hand, it is possible that we will be successful in both.

Q. Mr. President, will the price, do you hope, be lower than the established price by OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]?

President Ford: Well, as far as grain is concerned, of course the Soviet Union will buy our grain in our open American markets at the market prices. You don't buy in an open market in the Soviet Union; you pay what the government decides. Now we hope that in the negotiations we can negotiate a favorable price, but we have not concluded those negotiations at the present time.

. . . . . .

[1] For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 13, 1975, p. 1146.

Secretary Replies to House Intelligence Committee Request for "Dissent Channel" Memorandum

Following is the text of a letter dated October 14 from Secretary Kissinger to Chairman Otis G. Pike of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, which was delivered to the committee on October 15.

Press release 536 dated October 20

WASHINGTON, *October 14, 1975.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have given much thought to the Select Committee's October 2 request that I provide it with a copy of a dissent memorandum, on the Cyprus crisis, sent me by a Foreign Service Officer in August 1974. After careful consideration I have decided that I cannot comply with that request. I respectfully request the Committee to work with me on alternate methods of putting before it the information relevant to its inquiry.

The "Dissent Channel," through which this memorandum was submitted, provides those officers of the Department of State who disagree with established policy, or who have new policies to recommend, a means for communicating their views to the highest levels of the Department. "Dissent Channel" messages and memoranda are forwarded to the Secretary of State, and are normally given restricted distribution within the Department. They cannot be stopped by any intermediate office.

Mr. Chairman, I take this position reluctantly, and only because I have concluded that the circumstances are compelling. I am convinced that I would be remiss in my duty as Secretary of State were I to follow a different course.

The challenges that face our nation in the field of foreign affairs have never been more difficult; the pace of events has never been so rapid; the revolutionary character of the changes taking place around us has seldom been more pronounced. If we are to prosper —indeed, if we are to survive—it will require the confidence of the American people and of the nations of the world in the wisdom of our foreign policy and the effectiveness of our foreign policy establishment. Basic to this sense of confidence, of course, is the quality and professionalism of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. And the strength of those institutions depends, to a critical degree, upon the judgment and strength of purpose of the men and women who serve in them. It is my view that to turn over the dissent memorandum as requested would inevitably be destructive of the decision-making process of the Department, and hence do great damage to the conduct of our foreign relations and the national security of the United States.

Since the founding of the Republic, every Secretary of State has been regarded as the principal adviser to the President in the formulation of foreign policy and in the conduct of foreign relations. If the Secretary of State is to discharge his obligations and duties to the President and the national interest, he must have the benefit of the best available advice and criticism from his subordinates; they in turn, if they are to give their best, must enjoy a guarantee that their advice or criticism, candidly given, will remain privileged.

As the Supreme Court has said: "the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect public

dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decision-making process."

As the Cyprus crisis evolved, I received many recommendations for various courses of action from my subordinates. Their views were freely offered and fully considered in the policy-making process. But the final choices of what policies to recommend to the President were mine, and they sometimes differed from the courses of action proposed to me by some of my associates. My decisions occasionally led to vigorous dissent, both during meetings with those of my colleagues who disagreed, and in written memoranda, as in the case presently before us. Should the Select Committee so desire, I am prepared personally to come before the Committee to describe in detail the dissenting views put to me, and my reasons for rejecting them.

But were I to agree to release the document requested, even on a classified basis, I would be party to the destruction of the privacy of communication which the Secretary of State must have with his subordinates regarding their opinions. Once the confidentiality of internal communications had been breached, it would be but a short step to public exploitation of the subordinate's views. The result would be to place Department officers in an intolerable position—at times praised, at times criticized for their views; at times praised, at times criticized for dissenting; at times praised, at times criticized for *not* dissenting.

Thus, my decision to withhold the document is not based on a desire to keep anything from the Select Committee with regard to the Cyprus crisis or any other subject. On the contrary, the Department and I are both prepared to cooperate with the Committee in the pursuit of its legislatively established purposes. The issue is not what information the Committee should receive; we agree on that question. Rather, the issue is from whom the information should be sought, and the form in which it should be delivered.

It is my strong belief that the Committee should look to the policy levels of the Department, and not to junior and middle-level officers, for the policy information they seek. It is my principal advisers and I who are responsible for policy, and it is we who should be held accountable before the Congress and the American people for the manner in which we exercise the authority and responsibility vested in us by the President and Congress of the United States.

In keeping with this principle I am prepared now, as I have been from the beginning, to do the following:

—Authorize any officer of the Department or the Foreign Service, regardless of rank, to testify before the Select Committee on all facts known by that officer about the collection and use of intelligence information in foreign relations crises.

—Authorize any policy level officer of the Department or the Foreign Service to testify before the Select Committee on recommendations received by him from his subordinates, but without identification of authorship, and any recommendations he forwarded to his superiors.

—Supply the Committee with a summary from all sources, but without identification of authorship, of views and recommendations on the Cyprus crisis, and criticisms of our handling of it.

—Appear personally before the Committee to testify as to the policy of the United States with regard to the Cyprus crisis, as well as the policy of this Department with regard to the accountability of junior and middle-level officers for their views and recommendations.

The issue raised by the request for the dissent memorandum runs to the fundamental question of whether the Secretary of State should be asked to disclose the advice, recommendations, or dissents to policy that come to him from subordinate officers.

That the nation must have the most competent and professional Foreign Service possible is surely beyond question. It must be the repository for the lessons learned over more than three decades of world involvement; the institution to which each new Administration looks for the wisdom garnered

from the past and the initiatives so necessary to cope with the future. It must be loyal to the President, no matter what his political persuasion; it must inspire confidence in its judgment from the Congress, no matter what party is in power there. The Foreign Service, in a word, should be America's guarantee of continuity in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

We now have an outstanding, disciplined, and dedicated Foreign Service—perhaps the best in the world. It is the continued strength and utility of this institution that will be undermined by revealing the opinions and judgments of junior and middle-level officers.

While I know that the Select Committee has no intention of embarrassing or exploiting junior and middle-grade officers of the Department, there have been other times and other committees—and there may be again—where positions taken by Foreign Service Officers were exposed to *ex post facto* public examination and recrimination. The results are too well known to need elaboration here: gross injustice to loyal public servants, a sapping of the morale and abilities of the Foreign Service, and serious damage to the ability of the Department and the President to formulate and conduct the foreign affairs of the nation. Mr. Chairman, I cannot, in good conscience, by my own failure to raise the issue of principle, be responsible for contributing to a situation in which similar excesses could occur again.

The considerations I have outlined relate to the broad question of testimony from, and documents authored by, junior and middle-level officers. The request for a specific dissent memorandum raises a particular issue within that broader framework. The "Dissent Channel," established by my predecessor, had its origin in the recommendations of special Task Forces made up of career professionals from the Department of State, the Foreign Service and other foreign affairs agencies. Two of these Task Forces recommended that improved means be found to transmit new ideas to the Department's decision-makers, to subject policy to the challenge of an adversary review, and to encourage the expression of dissenting views.

The very purposes of the "Dissent Channel"—to promote an atmosphere of openness in the formulation of foreign policy, to stimulate fresh, creative ideas, and to encourage a questioning of established policies—are inconsistent with disclosure of such reports to an investigative committee of the Congress, and perhaps ultimately to the public. Dissent memoranda are, by their very nature, statements of the author's opinions. If their confidentiality cannot be assured, if they are to be held up to subsequent Congressional or public autopsy, the whole purpose of the "Dissent Channel" will have been corrupted and the Channel itself will soon cease to be a viable instrument. Those whose legitimate purpose is to argue with a policy because they sincerely believe it to be ill-conceived, or because they have new but unorthodox ideas, will recognize the Channel for what it has become and cease to use it; those who care little about what the policy is, and even less about seeking to change that policy through the institutional processes open to them, will be encouraged to use the Channel as a tool for their own ends.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I cannot agree to the release of "Dissent Channel" messages—irrespective of their contents. I am, however, ready to supply a summary of *all* contrary advice I received on the Cyprus crisis, so long as it is not necessary to disclose the source of this advice.

Every Secretary of State has an obligation to his country and to his successor to build a professional, effective, dedicated, and disciplined Foreign Service. Were I to comply with the request before me I would have failed in that obligation. I would have been partly responsible for a process that would almost inevitably have politicized the Foreign Service, discouraged courageous advice and the free expression of dissenting opinion, and encouraged timidity and caution.

On another occasion when the State Department was under investigation my great predecessor, Dean Acheson, wrote that there is a right way and a wrong way to deal with the Department of State. "The right way," he said, "met the evil and preserved the insti-

tution; the wrong way did not meet the evil and destroyed the institution. More than that, it destroyed the faith of the country in its Government, and of our allies in us."

I am prepared to work with the House Select Committee on Intelligence in a cooperative spirit so that, for the sake of our country, we may jointly, on the basis of the proposals contained in this letter, find the "right" way to accommodate our mutual concerns. I am prepared to meet with the Committee at its convenience to search for a reasonable solution—a solution which will meet the needs of the Committee, protect the integrity of the Department of State, and promote the effective conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.

Sincerely,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

U.S. Relations With Latin America. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. February 21–28, 1975. 235 pp.

The Rhodesian Sanctions Bill. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part I; February 26–March 11, 1975; 114 pp. Part II; June 19, 1975; 31 pp.

U.S. Policy and Request for Sale of Arms to Ethiopia. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. March 5, 1975. 54 pp.

Legislation on the International Energy Agency. Hearing before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations. March 26, 1975. 79 pp.

Great Decisions in Foreign Policy. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the 1975 National Conference on Great Decisions in United States Foreign Policy. April 9, 1975. 26 pp.

Proposal To Control Opium From the Golden Triangle and Terminate the Shan Opium Trade. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the House Committee on International Relations. April 22–23, 1975. 290 pp.

U.S. International Energy Policy. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations. May 1, 1975. 189 pp.

The OECD Financial Support Fund ($25 Billion Safety Net). Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations. May 5, 1975. 68 pp.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. May 6, 1975. 52 pp.

War Powers: A Test of Compliance. Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. May 7–June 4, 1975. 136 pp.

Seizure of the Mayaguez. Hearings before the House Committee on International Relations and its Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs. Part I. May 14–15, 1975. 131 pp.

U.S. Antarctic Policy. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on U.S. policy with respect to mineral exploration and exploitation in the Antarctic. Executive hearing held May 15, 1975; made public July 6, 1975. 112 pp.

Issues at the Special Session of the 1975 U.N. General Assembly. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. May 19–July 8, 1975. 224 pp.

Food Problems of Developing Countries: Implications for U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations. May 21–June 5, 1975. 355 pp.

Law of the Sea. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on achievements of the Geneva session of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. May 22, 1975. 116 pp.

United States Embargo of Trade With South Vietnam and Cambodia. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations. June 4, 1975. 21 pp.

Romanian Trade Agreement. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance. June 6–July 8, 1975. 199 pp.

Japan-United States Friendship Act. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 824; S. Rept. 94–188; June 10, 1975; 6 pp. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H.R. 9667; H. Rept. 94–503; September 24, 1975; 6 pp. Conference report to accompany S. 824; H. Rept. 94–526; October 2, 1975; 10 pp.

United States Rejects Allegations in U.N. General Assembly

Following is a statement in exercise of the right of reply made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Clarence M. Mitchell, Jr., on October 6.

USUN press release 109 dated October 6

Mr. President, distinguished citizens of the world who have the honor to be here representing your countries: I know that you have had a long day. I know that many will consider that an extended speech would necessarily be an imposition. Therefore I advise you in advance that what I have to say is not long. I would hope to stay within the limitation of 10 minutes, which is what I understand to be our rule.

I want also to make it clear that what I say is not said so much in anger or rancor, because I think we have had too much of that. What I am saying is with the hope that we can set the record straight so that the world as it looks at us will have both sides of the problem which prompts my appearance here.

I am replying on behalf of my government to the statements made this morning by the Representative of Dahomey.

I was especially interested during that intervention to find that while Ambassador Moynihan was criticized for things he is quoted as saying outside this chamber,[1] there was not a word of reply to the report of the International Commission of Jurists of June 1974 concerning the deaths and disappearances of tens of thousands of Ugandans in the course of the Amin regime. This report and the findings of the report are the reality of the controversy. I might say a man is just as dead if he is killed by a black person as he is if he is killed by a white person.

In our country we believe the right of freedom of speech is sacred. We wish always to protect that right of our own citizens. We also want to protect it for our visitors, whether they be heads of mighty states, whether they be representatives of newly born nations, or tourists or immigrants who come to our country. In that spirit we listen with respect and will continue to give respectful attention to the views of all who speak in this chamber, whether or not we agree with them.

I have been here myself since early in the month of September. I have walked these aisles. I have shaken hands with the men and women who have spoken, not always because I have agreed with them but because I believe they had the right to be heard and I wanted to assure them by a handshake and a look into their faces that I was listening.

We accorded that kind of respect to the President of Uganda. On behalf of my country, I personally listened for the entire length of his presentation as Chairman of the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. I also listened to what began on page 9 of his printed text, which I have here with me. In item 39, he said this, and I quote, "I should now like to discuss a few points in my capacity as President of Uganda." What he said from that point on contains much that constitutes an affront to millions of citizens of the United States. In our country—and many of you who are here represent countries who were with us—we fought a long and costly war against one kind of racism. That racism had been inflicted on the world by a dictator who exterminated millions of humans because they were not members of what he called the "master race." Perhaps if we had been less courteous with that dictator in the beginning, immense hu-

[1] For an address by Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, made at San Francisco, Calif., on Oct. 3, see USUN press release 108 dated Oct. 5, 1975.

man suffering and loss would have been avoided.

Speaking as President of Uganda—and, I emphasize, not as Chairman of OAU—President Amin said on page 13, item 50, of his printed text, which I have here, and I quote:

> The United States has been colonized by the Zionists who hold the tools of development and power. They own virtually all of the banking institutions, the major manufacturing and processing industries, the major means of communication, and have so much infiltrated the CIA that they have proven a great threat to the nations and the people who may be opposed to the Zionist movement.

He then said, "They have turned the CIA into a murder squad to eliminate any form of just resistance anywhere in the world." That is the end of the quotation.

Further on he called for the extermination of the State of Israel, and there is also a gratuitous suggestion to the blacks of the United States that the conditions in which they suffer are of their own doing and that if they would just straighten themselves out, they would not have the kinds of troubles that they now suffer from.

It is interesting to note that in his remarks this morning the Representative of Dahomey further compounded this insulting and ludicrous type of address with this question, and I quote—he said of our leader of the delegation from the United States—"Is Moynihan representing Zionism or the United States? If he is representing Zionism he should go to Israel as soon as possible." It is ironic that in his very next statement the Representative of Dahomey appealed to Ambassador Moynihan to act "in a more responsible way."

It is also ironic that the remarks of the Representative of Dahomey are in sharp contrast to the fact that it was the OAU itself which at Kampala took the decision to look at the Israeli question in a moderate rather than an extremist way. Ambassador Moynihan in his San Francisco speech gave full credit to the OAU for this wise decision. And I say, with all the sincerity that I can command, I thank the OAU for whatever it has done constructively to bring moderation into this troublesome question.

The fact is that President Amin's words are the kind that have been used through the centuries to persecute minorities, particularly the Jews. Usually, such words are preceded by such utterances as "I like the Jews," or "Some of my best friends are black." As we find at the beginning of item 52 on page 13 of President Amin's speech, this is also the technique that he used. But we in our country are not deceived by fair-sounding language that is used to mask rhetoric that sows the seeds of hate. We will raise our voices against an attack on any of our people. Any assault on any segment of us is an attack on all of us. We are one people in the United States. When we are assailed with cruel and degrading words, we feel, and we are, free to express our indignation. That is what has to be done. It is my personal view that this is an occasion for pride, and not for apologies.

We will raise our voices not only in the defense of the Jews, but we will raise our voices in defense of the Arabs who are distinguished citizens in our land. We will raise our voices in the defense of persons of Asian ancestry, and we will even raise our voices in the defense of those with whom we do not agree politically, when they are attacked unfairly.

Mr. President, during the seventh special session the United States offered a plan for partnership. Through hard work and negotiation, that session was a success. And we thought—I still believe, my country still believes—that we were and are on the road to building a partnership in this world. This continues to be our real work.

We now have a choice: We can continue our arguments about President Amin or others who may say similar things, or we can turn, Mr. President and distinguished citizens of the world who are here, to the real problem at hand—improving the quality of life for all of the world's population; relieving children of the pangs of hunger; placing a roof over the heads of those who are in need of homes; assuring that talent is not wasted, because we give to those who have the ability an opportunity to learn—and above all, talking in a spirit of construc-

tive reason so that we do not end up at each other's throats but rather as men and women of good will, talking about our differences.

Surely we may not always agree, but if we are always rational, if we are always fair, if we are always willing to listen—and not, as some may do, walk out in pique rather than even listen—if we do these things, I believe that we have a great opportunity in this period of human history to begin building a world which we have always dreamed we could have, which would reflect, as this great chamber reflects, the hues of mankind, the political beliefs of mankind, and all of the things that have made this world a place where we have an opportunity to build something which may not be close to paradise but will be far better than anything we have done before.

U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of Papua New Guinea

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council on September 22 by U.S. Reprcsentative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

USUN press release 101 dated September 22

My delegation concurred wholeheartedly in the recommendation of the Council's Committee on the Admission of New Members, and we support with particular satisfaction the application of Papua New Guinea for membership in the United Nations.

My government was pleased to be represented at the Papua New Guinea independence celebrations in Port Moresby on September 16. We welcome the independence of Papua New Guinea and have established diplomatic relations. As a result of U.S. participation as a member of the Trusteeship Council in visiting missions to Papua New Guinea and in deliberations concerning that new nation here in New York, we have come to appreciate the warmth and hospitality of her people, the striking beauty of her land and seas, and the dedication and diligence of her elected leaders and their commitment to the welfare of their people.

If I may be pardoned a personal reference, Mr. President, it was my privilege to lead a U.N. visiting mission to Papua New Guinea in 1972 to observe the elections for the House of Assembly, a four-week electoral process which was carried off with smooth efficiency by the administering power and with the reasoned exercise of their free will by the people of Papua New Guinea. That electoral process has led on directly through a series of steps in the constitutional process to the recent ceremonies of independence in Port Moresby, which have resulted in our meeting here today. Great credit is due both to the people of Papua New Guinea and to Australia, the administering power under the trusteeship agreement, for this orderly process of self-determination.

Papua New Guinea begins its life as a new nation with excellent prospects. Its functioning representative democracy and Constitution fully debated by the people's representatives, as well as the admirable respect which the Papua New Guineans have shown for human rights and due process of law, bode well for the future. Papua New Guinea has cordial relations with its neighbors and enjoys rich natural resources and the elements of a sound and expanding economy.

In contrast to many new members of the United Nations, Papua New Guinea already has a wealth of firsthand experience in this organization through its participation in the deliberations of the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee. Among those who have been most active in Papua New Guinea's participation here in New York and for whom my delegation has developed great respect is Ralph Karepa, who has worked closely with the Australian delegation and who, I understand, will now be Papua New Guinea's representative in New York. We look forward to working with him and with his delegation during this session and during the years to come.

My delegation would also like to welcome to this chamber Senator Donald Willesee, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, and to express to him personally and to the Government of Australia our admiration for the exemplary manner in which Australia

has discharged its responsibilities as the administering authority under the trusteeship agreement.

Mr. President, the United States believes that Papua New Guinea will be a valuable and productive new member in the community of nations, and we warmly have supported its application for membership in the United Nations.[1]

Agenda of the 30th Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly [2]

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Algeria.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the thirtieth session of the General Assembly:
   (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
   (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of the Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. General debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
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14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Election of five members of the International Court of Justice.
18. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial Development Board.
19. Election of twenty members of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme.
20. Election of twelve members of the World Food Council.
21. Election of twelve members of the Board of Governors of the United Nations Special Fund.
22. Admission of new Members to the United Nations:
   (a) Special report of the Security Council (A/10179, A/10238);
   (b) Other reports of the Security Council.
23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
24. Scientific work on peace research: report of the Secretary-General.
25. Appointment of the members of the Peace Observation Commission.
26. Restitution of works of art to countries victims of expropriation: report of the Secretary-General.
27. Question of Palestine: report of the Secretary-General.
28. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General.
29. Strengthening of the role of the United Nations with regard to the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and security, the development of co-operation among all nations and the promotion of the rules of international law in relations between States: reports of the Secretary-General.
30. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
31. Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.
32. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
33. Preparation of an international convention on principles governing the use by States of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
34. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3254 (XXIX): report of the Secretary-General.
35. Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: reports of the Secretary-General.
36. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
37. Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

[1] The Council on Sept. 22 adopted unanimously a resolution (S/RES/375 (1975)) recommending to the General Assembly "that Papua New Guinea be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

[2] Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 19 (items 1–125) and Sept. 29 (item 126) (text from U.N. doc. A/10251 and Add. 1).

38. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3258 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).
39. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.
40. World Disarmament Conference: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.
41. General and complete disarmament:
    (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;
    (b) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
42. Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade: report of the Secretary-General.
43. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.
44. Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
45. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3262 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General.
46. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General.
47. Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
48. Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General.
49. Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: report of the Secretary-General.
50. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.
51. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.
52. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.
53. Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa:
    (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*;
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
54. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:
    (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
    (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
    (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
    (d) Report of the Secretary-General.
55. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: report of the Trade and Development Board.
56. United Nations Industrial Development Organization:
    (a) Report of the Second General Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization;
    (b) Report of the Industrial Development Board.
57. United Nations Institute for Training and Research: report of the Executive Director.
58. Operational activities for development:
    (a) United Nations Development Programme;
    (b) United Nations Capital Development Fund;
    (c) Technical co-operation activities undertaken by the Secretary-General;
    (d) United Nations Volunteers programme;
    (e) United Nations Fund for Population Activities;
    (f) United Nations Children's Fund;
    (g) World Food Programme;
    (h) Confirmation of the appointment of the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme.
59. United Nations Environment Programme:
    (a) Report of the Governing Council;
    (b) Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements: report of the Secretary-General;
    (c) Criteria governing multilateral financing of housing and human settlements: report of the Secretary-General.
60. Food problems:
    (a) Report of the World Food Council;
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
61. United Nations Special Fund:
    (a) Report of the Board of Governors;
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General;
    (c) Confirmation of the appointment of the Executive Director.
62. United Nations University:
    (a) Report of the Council of the United Nations University;
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
63. Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator: report of the Secretary-General.
64. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.
65. Mid-term review and appraisal of progress in

the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade.

66. Economic co-operation among developing countries: report of the Secretary-General.
67. Technical co-operation among developing countries.
68. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination:
    (a) Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination;
    (b) Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination;
    (c) Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General.
69. Human rights and scientific and technological developments: reports of the Secretary-General.
70. Human rights in armed conflicts: protection of journalists engaged in dangerous missions in areas of armed conflict.
71. World social situation: report of the Secretary-General.
72. Policies and programmes relating to youth: reports of the Secretary-General.
73. Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms: report of the Secretary-General.
74. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment.
75. International Women's Year, including the proposals and recommendations of the World Conference of the International Women's Year.
76. Status and role of women in society, with special reference to the need for achieving equal rights for women and to women's contribution to the attainment of the goals of the Second United Nations Development Decade, to the struggle against colonialism, racism and racial discrimination and to the strengthening of international peace and of co-operation between States.
77. Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights: report of the Secretary-General.
78. Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of political, military, economic and other forms of assistance given to colonial and racist régimes in southern Africa.
79. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance.
80. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
    (a) Report of the High Commissioner;
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
81. National experience in achieving far-reaching social and economic changes for the purpose of social progress: report of the Secretary-General.
82. Unified approach to development analysis and planning.
83. Freedom of information:
    (a) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information;
    (b) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information.
84. Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: report of the Secretary-General.
85. United Nations conference for an international convention on adoption law.
86. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 *e* of the Charter of the United Nations:
    (a) Report of the Secretary-General;
    (b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
87. Question of Namibia:
    (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
    (b) Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia;
    (c) United Nations Fund for Namibia: report of the United Nations Council for Namibia and of the Secretary-General;
    (d) Appointment of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia.
88. Question of Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
89. Question of Southern Rhodesia: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
90. Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in southern Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declara

tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

1. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations:
   (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
   (b) Reports of the Secretary-General.
2. United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa: report of the Secretary-General.
3. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General.
4. Financial reports and accounts for the year 1974 and reports of the Board of Auditors:
   (a) United Nations Development Programme;
   (b) United Nations Children's Fund;
   (c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
   (d) United Nations Institute for Training and Research;
   (e) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;
   (f) Fund of the United Nations Environment Programme;
   (g) United Nations Fund for Population Activities.
5. Programme budget for the biennium 1974–1975: report of the Secretary-General.
6. Proposed programme budget for the biennium 1976–1977 and medium-term plan for the period 1976–1979.
7. Review of the intergovernmental and expert machinery dealing with the formulation, review and approval of programmes and budgets: report of the Working Group on United Nations Programme and Budget Machinery.
8. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
9. Joint Inspection Unit: reports of the Joint Inspection Unit.
10. Pattern of conferences:
    (a) Report of the Committee on Conferences;
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
11. Publications and documentation of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General.
12. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.
13. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary organs of the General Assembly:
    (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
    (b) Committee on Contributions;
    (c) Board of Auditors;
    (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointments made by the Secretary-General;
    (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal.
104. Personnel questions:
    (a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General;
    (b) Other personnel questions: report of the Secretary-General.
105. United Nations salary system:
    (a) Report of the International Civil Service Commission;
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
106. United Nations pension system:
    (a) Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board;
    (b) Reports of the Secretary-General.
107. Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force: report of the Secretary-General.
108. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-seventh session.
109. Succession of States in respect of treaties: report of the Secretary-General.
110. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its eighth session.
111. Question of diplomatic asylum: report of the Secretary-General.
112. Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country.
113. Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Charter of the United Nations.
114. Respect for human rights in armed conflicts: report of the Secretary-General.
115. Implementation by States of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and measures to increase the number of parties to the Convention.
116. Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism.
117. United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law: report of the Secretary-General.
118. Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations:

(a) Resolution relating to the observer status of national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and/or by the League of Arab States;
(b) Resolution relating to the application of the Convention in future activities of international organizations.

119. Question of Korea:
(a) Creation of favourable conditions for converting the armistice into a durable peace in Korea and accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea;
(b) Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

120. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific.

121. Observer status for the Islamic Conference at the United Nations.

122. Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

123. Development and international economic cooperation: implementation of the decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its seventh special session.

124. The situation in the Middle East.

125. Question of Cyprus.

126. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.
Accession deposited: People's Republic of the Congo, September 2, 1975.

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Somalia, October 8, 1975.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720.
Accessions deposited: Kenya, September 12, 1975; Saudi Arabia, September 5, 1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109.
Acceptance deposited: Kenya, September 12, 1975.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London November 2, 1973.[1]
Accession deposited: Kenya, September 12, 1975.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: Kenya, September 12, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, October 10, 1975.

BILATERAL

Germany, Federal Republic of

Arrangement on cooperation in the field of nuclear facilities safety, with patent addendum. Signed at Bonn October 1, 1975. Entered into force October 1, 1975.

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[1] Not in force.

Name Index

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 13–19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*525	10/14	Rector and representatives of Moscow State University to tour U.S.
526	10/14	Kissinger, MacEachen: arrival, Ottawa.
*527	10/16	Study groups 10 and 11 of U.S. National Committee for CCIR, Nov. 5.
*528	10/16	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Nov. 12–13.
*529	10/16	U.S. and Malta terminate textile agreement.
530	10/15	Kissinger, MacEachen: news conference.
*531	10/16	Discussion of the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat), Oct. 17.
532	10/16	Kissinger, MacEachen: toasts, Ottawa, Oct. 14.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.