



# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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## FURTHERING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

*Toast by Secretary Kissinger 581*

## THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: OUR COMMON FUTURE

*Toast by Secretary Kissinger 584*

## PRESIDENT LOPEZ OF COLOMBIA MAKES STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES 588

## DEPARTMENT REVIEWS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

*Statement by Assistant Secretary Rogers 596*

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*For index see inside back cover*

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXIII, No. 1895

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*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Furthering Peace in the Middle East

*Toast by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

It is a pleasure to welcome you. Seeing so many relaxed and happy faces, I know that you must be delighted to be here among friends in quiet, peaceful New York—far from the tensions and conflict and bitterness of Vienna.

I am especially pleased by this opportunity to reciprocate at least in part the warm hospitality offered to me so often by several of the Arab countries represented here. My wife, Nancy, feels neglected when several months go by without my offering her an opportunity to visit the Middle East. So, for personal as well as high policy reasons, I am obliged to remain actively engaged in helping negotiate a settlement.

It was almost two years ago today that I first met as Secretary of State with the representatives of the Arab League here at the United Nations.

I remember saying then that I recognized that the situation in the Middle East was intolerable for the Arab nations; I pledged that the United States would involve itself actively in the search for a just and lasting peace.

And in the days that followed, in private meetings with some of you and with some of your predecessors—we remember with affection [Saudi Arabian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs] Umar Saqqaf, whose passing grieved us all—I gave my personal promise to make a special effort to begin concrete steps toward peace.

While those talks were still going on, war broke out. The costs—political, economic, human—were tragically high.

Tonight I would like to reflect with you briefly on the distance that we, the United States and the people of the Middle East, have traveled together in these two years.

### **The Middle East at a New Crossroads**

For centuries, men have seen the Middle East as the crossroads of three continents. Long ago, when armies and caravans moved on foot, and when trade first began to move through the Suez Canal, that statement had strategic meaning.

Today the Middle East stands at a new crossroads—not only of geography but of issues and concerns that affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people in all corners of the world.

The Middle East today is an area where mankind's effort to build a peaceful, equitable, and prosperous world will be tested.

Little did we know two years ago what our active involvement in the search for peace would mean in effort and anguish, nor to the relationship between the United States and the peoples and leaders of the Middle East.

I have made 11 trips to the Middle East, amounting in time to almost one week out of six over this two-year period. And two Presidents of the United States have met with many of the area's chiefs of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers.

More important than these statistics has been the dramatic evidence of new policies, attitudes, and our ability to work together.

<sup>1</sup> Given on Sept. 29 at a dinner at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in honor of the heads of delegations and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of member nations of the Arab League (text from press release 506).

Our political and economic ties have been restored; we have organized new efforts of collaboration for economic development; we have worked closely together in the diplomacy of Middle East peace.

There is no longer any doubt today of the United States' irrevocable commitment and active involvement in furthering peace and progress in the Middle East. The American people are conscious of this new approach and support it. Important changes have taken place in the American people's attitudes. This is irreversible—and of tremendous importance for the future.

The United States, when it approached this problem in 1973, did so with the philosophy of realism and evenhandedness. Both sides in the area would be called upon to contribute reciprocally to the process of settlement. We launched, as you know, the step-by-step approach, as the most promising avenue to implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Therefore, first of all, it should be obvious that no interim agreement has been or can be an end in itself. The only durable solution is a just and comprehensive peace. The United States remains committed to that objective. Each step taken or to be taken by any country is intended to make that goal more achievable and is therefore a step for all. We have always intended that the step-by-step approach would merge at some point with discussion of an overall settlement.

Second, we recognize that peace in the Middle East is not divisible. Each nation and people which is party to the Arab-Israeli problem must find some fair satisfaction of its legitimate interests. It is in the nature of compromise that extreme solutions cannot be realized. It is in the nature of a lasting peace that partial solutions will not endure. The United States has no interest or purpose in dividing the Arab world. On the contrary, only a united Arab world can make a final peace. The United States is prepared to make the same effort for any Arab state that it has already made on behalf of some.

Third, it is in the nature of gradual movement toward peace that it must address all

the key problems in a balanced way at each step. The questions of territory, borders, and military deployments cannot be dealt with unless at the same time the issues of political and economic settlement are given equal attention. If we are to move forward we must move evenhandedly on both sides of the equation.

Fourth, any step taken must be judged in the light of the alternatives that were faced. Each party has the right to judge the gains and compromises that are possible for it at any given stage as it accepts or rejects partial steps toward peace. I believe that the agreements reached have achieved Arab objectives as well as mutual objectives and have created conditions for further movement more effectively than any available alternative. They have been steps forward. No other methods have worked. War would have been a futile step backward. At the end of such a conflict, we would all have found exactly the same problems which confront us today—and perhaps more, infinitely more, complicated conditions.

Last March, after the suspension of our negotiations, it was the governments in the area, on both sides, that pressed upon us that another, early, step toward peace must be the first priority. That is why we made a renewed effort to help Egypt and Israel achieve the interim agreement signed in Geneva September 4.

That agreement was not a peace agreement. It was taken to give further momentum toward peace. It was taken to accelerate the process of movement. It was taken in full understanding on all sides that steady progress toward peace must continue. The challenge now is to build on the progress that has been made.

President Ford has asked me to say to you here on his behalf that the United States remains just as energetically committed to progress now as it has been for the past two years. We will not rest until we have achieved the goal of a just and lasting peace—unless the parties themselves decide to abandon their effort.

What the next step will be of course will depend on the judgment of the parties to



the negotiations. We have suggested several alternative procedures, and we are open-minded. The object of our consultations in the days immediately ahead will be to determine how to proceed between Israel and Syria, if the parties desire; to begin considering how the negotiations for an overall settlement can be organized; and to refine our thinking on how the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people can be met in an overall peace.

To this effort we pledge our continued energies, and in this effort we count on continuing to work closely together with the leaders of the Arab nations.

### **The Middle East and the World Economy**

We and our friends in the Middle East, of course, have other common concerns beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the Middle East, as elsewhere in the world, the United States seeks to help build a durable framework of peace that will free the energies of peoples to pursue the great social, economic, and human objectives of mankind.

Central to this is the global dialogue on the interdependence of the world economy, in which we and the Middle East countries are important participants. This dialogue is well begun.

The Middle East has a unique position and a unique responsibility. At a time when many countries, particularly developing countries, face problems of inflation and stagnation, slackening production and growing unemployment, balance-of-payments deficits, and great uncertainty about prospects for foreign borrowing and investment, the oil-producing countries of the Middle East have reaped great benefits from sharp increases in oil prices. But they have done so at a heavy cost to all other countries.

I want to express the appreciation of the American people to those Arab countries which at the recent OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] meeting tried to assert a sense of global responsibility.

Cooperation is a two-way street. The

United States is willing to assist you in the achievement of your development goals, but we hope that you will in turn show understanding of the needs of the rest of the world. Inflation hurts us all. In your region it is exacerbated by manpower shortages, transportation bottlenecks, and other factors which impede the rapid achievement of impressive industrial and agricultural goals. We and other industrialized countries have cooperated and will continue to cooperate in meeting these extraordinary needs. We have made practical proposals before the seventh special session. We look forward to the forthcoming producer-consumer conference to work out these issues in a cooperative spirit.

We are natural partners, not adversaries. Consumers must have reliable access to oil supplies at reasonable prices. To invest their new oil wealth, the producers must become major participants in the global financial and economic system. And to convert their new wealth into goods, they must become major importers of our products. We are ready to cooperate with the countries of the Middle East in linking our economies on equitable terms.

Our interdependence is a fact, and the Middle East has a great responsibility in the global economy. Unilateral actions to advance national interests will serve no nation's interest if the results are to weaken the world economy. All of us must conduct our policies with the objective of fostering global growth and stability. The United States has attempted to wield its power in this spirit.

### **The United States and the Middle East**

The important changes in our relations in recent years, which have brought our peoples and our governments closer together, are irreversible.

As old patterns of thought change and dramatic new events take place, it is not surprising that searching questions are asked and conflicting voices are heard. This is true today in the Arab world, and it is true in this country; for changes of percep-

tion never come easily or proceed smoothly. The present debate in the Middle East over the latest step toward peace has its counterpart today in my country. The American people are now increasingly conscious of both the complexities and importance of our interests and involvement in the Middle East.

The statesmanship and demonstrated commitment to peace of leaders in the Middle East have played an important, indeed a decisive, role in this process. The progress that has been achieved and the progress that will be made is due to their realization that Arab goals can best be achieved in the framework of U.S.-Arab cooperation, and not by confrontation. The United States will not shrink from its responsibilities—unless our efforts are rejected by the countries in the area.

I believe also that the discussion now going on in our Congress and in our country as

a whole attests to the seriousness with which we approach our responsibilities. When the vote is taken in the Congress, it will be clear that we will not abandon our effort nor will we abandon those in the Middle East who have long sought our support. But neither will we interrupt our quest for peace nor cease our efforts to improve relations with the Arab world.

The end result, I am convinced, will be the forging of an even sounder foundation, based on national consensus, for U.S. relations with all of the countries in the Middle East. And I hope that the time will come soon when we who are assembled here will look back at this time as the period when we took the turn toward a final peace.

Therefore let us raise our glasses to cooperation between the United States and its Arab friends and to the fulfillment of the aspirations of the Arab nations, and of all nations, for peace, justice, and well-being.

## The Western Hemisphere: Our Common Future

*Toast by Secretary Kissinger<sup>1</sup>*

This is the third year I have enjoyed the considerable honor as Secretary of State of the United States of meeting with you for lunch at this Center for Inter-American Relations. I do so this time, as before, as an expression of the importance that we, the people of the United States, attach to our friendship with our fellow nations of the Western Hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere has for centuries represented the hope of mankind. And so it does today. The United States is

convinced that if we and our Latin American friends, with whom we have a tradition of political cooperation, can solve the pressing problems of the modern age we can once again be a beacon to humanity.

It makes a difference to the people of the United States that the nations of the hemisphere share a common heritage. We were born in the same struggle against foreign domination and colonial tyranny. We have a proud history of mutual support in time of trouble. We have a generation of successful practical experience with mechanisms of cooperation on our political and economic challenges.

Two years ago I suggested that we begin a dialogue for a more creative cooperation on

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<sup>1</sup> Given at a luncheon at the Center for Inter-American Relations at New York on Sept. 30 honoring Latin American Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations (text from press release 507).

the basis of mutual respect to meet the new challenges in this age. This was not a slogan or a momentary shift of mood. Our purpose was, and must be, to transform the affairs of the nations of the Americas for the decades to come. The road ahead will be long. Deep-seated change is never easy. But the spirit which the nations of the hemisphere have brought to the effort gives me great hope and gives us all a bright prospect.

Our initiative has had two objectives:

*First*, as I said at the outset two years ago, it was right that we should put aside the bitterness of old political disputes. The proposal was a way of saying that we must break with the mutually misdirected monologues which so often marred our relations in the past and move forward in a new spirit to address our common problems.

*Second*, our effort had to be inspired by a broader and positive vision of the future of this hemisphere. It was, and is, clear to all that the goals we share in this era—peace, prosperity, and justice—call for a new intensity of cooperation; hence our mutual effort will require regular and candid consultation.

Let me touch on what we have done in these two areas since we met the first time.

*First, to eliminate the political vestiges of the past:*

—We have modified the Rio Treaty to make it more responsive to the will of the majority. We have applied the modified principle to the issue of collective sanctions against Cuba, thereby removing a divisive issue from our agenda.

—The United States and Panama have made good progress toward a modernized canal treaty which will accommodate the interests and aspirations of both countries. We have no doubt that these negotiations should proceed to a successful conclusion based on justice and equality. I am convinced that the balanced treaty that we and Panama will achieve will be approved by the overwhelming majority of the American people.

—Disputes over control of the seas are another traditional problem in our relations.

We are beginning to make headway on this as well. The discussions that will begin shortly among interested governments can lead to a regional agreement on a regime for tuna fishing in the eastern Pacific and defuse what has been a longstanding and needless complication to hemispheric cooperation.

—At the same time we wish to work with Latin America on the overall shape of the future international law of the sea. Two months ago in Montreal I set forth a comprehensive U.S. position for the next phase of this crucial negotiation. We look forward to substantial and concrete progress at the next law of the sea session in March. This is a matter of fundamental political importance to the nations of this hemisphere and around the world.

—Another important issue has been the rights and obligations of foreign investors in your economies. There are differing perspectives on this issue, naturally, arising from our respective interests and histories. These differences cannot be expected to disappear magically at the first attempt at a solution. But as I pointed out before the seventh special session [of the U.N. General Assembly], the United States believes there are vast resources available in the channel of private investment and our common aims should be to work out agreed principles of conduct on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual respect, and national dignity. The United States is prepared to have intensive consultations on this subject within the OAS and to discuss the issue as well in international forums. Meanwhile, we will deal with individual cases as they arise, in the light of our complementary interest in increasing the flow of capital and technology to Latin America through all available means. And the United States will work with the attitude that we should not permit these individual problems to disrupt our important overall relationships.

But beyond these specific steps forward, we are pleased at the remarkable improvement on both sides in the spirit and tenor of our discussions. In the many forums where



our work together is carried out, and perhaps most notably the OAS, it seems to me that the character of our deliberations has markedly changed. Ritualistic invocation of empty abstractions has given way to serious, informal, and frank discourse about concrete issues. Ideological sloganeering has subsided; the overheated rhetoric of North-South confrontation has diminished. Procedures have been adapted to solve problems. We have thus been able to clarify our differences and find realistic solutions where our interests converge.

*Let me now turn to the second area of our common endeavor, our cooperation for economic and social progress.*

The dramatic evidence of our global economic interdependence in the past two years has complicated our regional relationship. Many issues important to that relationship, such as commodity agreements and access to markets, can be resolved effectively only in a global forum in the context of the current discussion of relations between the developed and the developing countries. We must find these solutions. We in the Western Hemisphere can work to shape these new global arrangements so that they are responsive to our common needs.

Latin America's needs and opportunities are unique in the developing world. By and large, your countries are among the most advanced of the developing world. But this higher stage of development has its own difficulties. Because you are more industrialized and have created more complex and more open economies, your countries are perhaps more vulnerable to fluctuations in export earnings, to sudden increases in the cost of imported intermediate goods, and to the ebb and flow of private capital.

The arbitrary oil price rises and the world recession have damaged the economic prospects of every nation. The world community has shown some awareness of the needs of the very poorest countries, and the industrialized nations have put in place some emergency measures to meet those needs. It is time now that the world community address itself to the problems of development pe-

culiar to Latin America and that it enlarge the opportunities for growth of the economies here in this hemisphere which are embarked on the experience of industrialization.

It was for these reasons that in our initiative at the special session I stressed measures which are particularly relevant to Latin America:

—I recommended creation of a \$10 billion development security facility within the International Monetary Fund to address what is the single most historic impediment to Latin America's development efforts: the violent fluctuations in export earnings which have distorted and unbalanced even the best laid of Latin America's development plans.

—I also supported the creation of a regional Latin American safety net to help cushion particular balance-of-payments emergencies within this hemisphere.

—I reiterated the importance of improved access to private capital markets and proposed an International Investment Trust. This is of particular importance for Latin America, since several nations of the hemisphere are on the threshold of being active competitors for funds in capital markets, which would be of great benefit to the prospects for growth.

—I also proposed the organization, on a case-by-case basis, of new methods of producer-consumer cooperation with respect to specific commodities. Because of its historic dependence on commodity exports, Latin America has been in the forefront of the effort to develop commodity arrangements. We are prepared to discuss these issues.

—I was pleased to announce the forthcoming implementation of our generalized tariff preferences scheme, which was designed from the beginning with Latin America's needs in mind.

The U.S. Government is gratified that these proposals were received in the special session in a serious and constructive way. We look forward to further discussions of the details. We are prepared to have special consultations with our Western Hemisphere partners before negotiations in wider forums.



These will be the attitudes and hopes we will bring to our relations with your countries in the months ahead. But we are more and more aware that no single policy can take into full account the rich complexity of Latin America and the Caribbean. However helpful the regional concept may be, it is in the end an abstraction. We do not conduct relations with abstractions. We conduct relations with distinct nations.

We will continue to do so in this hemisphere, guided by the common challenge and the cooperative attitudes toward all which I have described. But we will not forget that each of your countries is different. Each is worthy of our respect and attention. Each has its own problems and its own national values and aspirations. I pledge to you our best efforts to try to understand, and to be as responsive as we can, to each distinctive set of national interests. We will not surrender to a single formula our desire for warm and productive relations with each nation in the hemisphere.

Excellencies and friends: In this, the Western Hemisphere, we share a legacy from the past; we share the anguish of the present; we share a promise for the future. The world has entered a challenging era. But nowhere on this planet is there a better prospect that mankind can master the future than here among the family of American nations. We are diverse, and we cherish our identities; yet we share a common heritage, and our destinies depend on our collaboration. The Americas are synonymous with hope. The dream that has inspired our peoples for five centuries must be rekindled by our generation. What we do here in the Western Hemisphere has a meaning not only for ourselves but for a world that needs some proof of

what free peoples working together can accomplish. It is in our power to fashion a common vision for the future.

During the coming year, the nations of this hemisphere will be celebrating the 150th anniversary of their first inter-American conference, called by Simón Bolívar, and the 200th anniversary of the United States. There is no more fitting time than this to rededicate ourselves to the dream of the Americas.

Excellencies and friends, please join me in a toast to the peoples of the Western Hemisphere and to our common future. May we strengthen our collaboration in the pursuit of a freer, more just, and more generous world.

## **U.S. and Spain Set New Framework of Cooperative Relationships**

### *Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Cortina today concluded a series of meetings held over the past two weeks in New York and Washington by agreeing to a new framework agreement governing cooperative relationships between the United States and Spain. The new agreement would replace the one which was negotiated in 1970 and which expired on September 25. The two Ministers also agreed that the working groups will now resume their activities on the supplementary documents which will have to be completed before the new agreement can be brought into effect.

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<sup>1</sup> Issued at Washington on Oct. 4.

## President Lopez of Colombia Makes State Visit to the United States

*Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, President of the Republic of Colombia, made a state visit to the United States September 24-27. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington September 25-26. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and President Lopez at a welcoming ceremony in the East Room of the White House on September 25 and their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening, together with the text of a joint communique issued on September 26.*

### REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY

White House press release dated September 25

#### President Ford

Mr. President: It is a great pleasure and privilege for me to welcome you to the United States for this state visit.

The President of Colombia, His Excellency Dr. Alfonso Lopez Michelsen and his wife, the distinguished First Lady of Colombia, Cecilia: President Lopez is no stranger to the United States. As a young man he studied here briefly. Also, I am told he and Mrs. Lopez spent part of their honeymoon in Williamsburg, Virginia.

During his long and distinguished service in his country, he has frequently visited the United States in various important official capacities. His election as President was one of the largest votes in Colombia's history.

It is indeed a great personal pleasure for me to welcome him to the United States once again. This time the United States honors him as a chief of state of Colombia, the first Latin American chief executive I have had the privilege of welcoming to Washington for a state dinner.

President Lopez represents a nation with a long tradition of democratic government. Colombia's friendship with the United States is characterized by the mutual respect each of our two nations has for the independent ideas and sovereign integrity of the other.

As a respected intellectual, author, and statesman, Dr. Lopez has been a champion of the idea that relationships between nations must be based on the rule of law, nonintervention, and respect for national sovereignty.

He voiced that conviction in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in January of 1974 when he said, and I quote:

For a country like ours, there is only one guarantee for survival: the effective application of international law, a deep sense of human solidarity, and the principle of self-determination of nations.

Your visit, Mr. President, is timely indeed. The nations of the world face pressing issues in international trade, in monetary policy, and the challenges of explosive scientific and technological progress. The problems of peace, justice, hunger, inflation, and pollution can no longer be solved by each nation alone.

Each of us now is caught in the same tide of world events—consumer and producer, rich and poor, powerful and weak. We must therefore work together for the solution of our problems. We must step up our efforts to modernize and strengthen our hemispheric relations.

The nations of Latin America share the same intricate web of social, political, and economic elements which comprise the civilization of the Western world. At the same time, they share the problems of developing societies elsewhere in the world.

All of these circumstances provide an important bond linking our two nations which

have a long, long tradition of friendly relations based on respect for each other's sovereignty and independence.

That is why I have invited President Lopez to visit Washington. We have much to talk about. I look forward to our frank and candid discussions. We expect to examine carefully our bilateral relations and their probable future course. We will review together the issues of current concern in the inter-American system and the alternatives that open into the future. We will discuss world issues of particular concern to our two countries.

I know that the intellect and statesmanship of President Lopez will further our common quest for constructive solutions and mutual understandings.

And so, as you say, Mr. President, *bien venido*.

#### **President Lopez**

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford: The warmth and friendliness of this welcome does not take us by surprise. It is a reflection of the nature of the relations between Colombia and the United States, which, during the last quarter of this century, have remained untarnished.

Of course, our points of view have occasionally been different on certain matters of continental interest. But this has only contributed to strengthening our friendship on the basis of mutual respect. We have become accustomed to the practice of agreeing to disagree, abiding by the rules in order to resolve our conflicts.

Our presence here on the same site so often visited by prominent statesmen has a special significance on this occasion. The White House is not a palace. Its name derives from its occupants, men who seek to interpret the will of the people they rule.

We evoke the memory of patricians, soldiers, statesmen, thinkers, and popular leaders who embody the collective aspirations of their times. Despite their difference in character and background, they have honored the North American tradition of democratic government without yielding to authoritarian temptations.

The system they have contributed to create has proven strong enough to withstand the most serious crisis. In these troubled times, there is something both comforting and old-fashioned in your manner that is reminiscent of your early predecessors. Even though you preside over one of the most powerful nations in the world, making daily decisions which bear on the destiny of mankind, you continue to be the same straightforward unassuming citizen who as a Congressman won the respect of his colleagues and who has earned the affection of the people of the United States, symbolizing today the essence of what the Founding Fathers of this country wanted their nation to be. They wanted their leaders to be model citizens of a democracy, unencumbered by the falsity of royalty.

I am witnessing today in this place and surroundings that the wishes of the American people have been fulfilled.

President Ford's human touch greatly contributes to insure that this meeting will be patterned as a sincere exchange between friends. This is the proper way to deal with common problems. The nature of the challenge confronting us today and the above-mentioned circumstances make me look forward to the conversations we are about to begin and the confidence that the outcome will be of mutual benefit for our two countries.

#### **TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER**

White House press release dated September 25

#### **President Ford**

In proposing a toast to you, Mr. President, and to the great Republic of Colombia, I think it is fitting to note that your state visit to the United States coincides with the 150th anniversary year of the first treaty between our two countries.

Soon after Colombia won its independence in 1819, the great liberator, Simón Bolívar, sent one of his first diplomatic representatives to this country—Don Manuel Torres. As head of the Colombian mission, he became the first accredited envoy of a Spanish



American power in the United States. As early as 1820, Mr. President, Manuel Torres was instructed to negotiate a commercial treaty with the United States on the basis, and I quote, of "equality and reciprocity." That treaty was proclaimed on May 31, 1825. Thus, Mr. President, the roots of our friendly relations are long and deep.

This relationship was furthered by an illustrious former President of Colombia, Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, whose distinguished son honors us with his presence here tonight. During his inaugural address in 1934, President Lopez Pumarejo said, and I quote:

Our foreign relations in the future must not be based on that formal reciprocity of soulless diplomatic notes that travel from chancery to chancery. We shall try to take advantage of every opportunity to invigorate the ties of cooperation and active friendship with all nations but, above all, with those of our hemisphere.

How well this distinguished leader and—permit me to add, Excellency—his distinguished son have succeeded in that very high purpose. Our mutual relations today are born of a very precious common heritage forged out of the travail of wars of independence. Both of our nations paid with the blood of patriots to achieve the dream of freedom, both in your country as well as in ours.

That common experience, I think, gives us common aspirations. Both of our nations desire to see the rule of law apply to our relations and to those among all nations. Both seek equality and reciprocity among nations. Both share the common knowledge that in the complex world of today nations bound in historic friendship and traditions must depend very directly upon one another.

Your country is renowned for its moral and intellectual leadership, for its moderation, for its keen sense of justice, and for its dedication to greater progress and social justice for your people and the peoples of our hemisphere. We of the United States admire these goals you have set not only for yourselves, but we appreciate them as great objectives for all of your people.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask that you join me in a toast to His Excellency the President of Colombia, to Mrs. Lopez, and to the people

of Colombia. May our two countries always walk together in a mutual confidence and respect and may our historic friendship contribute to the achievement of these noble goals of mankind—justice, peace, and freedom.

### President Lopez

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Rockefeller, Mr. Secretary of State, distinguished Members of the Senate and the House, ladies and gentlemen: Six years ago, a few hours before man first set foot on the moon, another President of Colombia, Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, then the guest of President Richard Nixon, had the honor of speaking in this very room. The dream cherished for centuries by poets and fiction writers was brought to reality by American science and technology. We had evidently reached a landmark in the history of mankind.

Today, when the United States is preparing the Bicentennial celebration of the Declaration of Independence, it seems fitting to ask which of the two events constitutes a greater contribution to Western civilization. The Declaration of Independence had a decisive influence on the process that led to the French Revolution. It carried the seeds of the Constitution of Philadelphia, which has been so often imitated over the last two centuries.

The space feat, repeated later by other nations, is a source of controversy surrounded by ever-diminishing admiration. Few would disagree, however, that the Constitution of Philadelphia has been one of the key elements in the spiritual and material progress of this great nation.

In the view of the distinguished English historian James Bryce, the two outstanding achievements of the human spirit in the field of political organization are the written Constitution of the United States and the unwritten set of rules known as the British Constitution. Both have withstood the test of time.

In an era when people's admiration tends to be easily captivated by material accom-

plishments and much emphasis given to the gap between the pace of technological progress and the slow pace of social and human science, it is worth noting the foresight of the Founding Fathers. With profound insight into the legal matters of their day, they created the framework for the development of a different world which could not have been foreseen.

Those of us who believe in freedom and equality will be with you in spirit during the commemoration of the Declaration of Independence. A rendezvous—to be present on that historical occasion—would be perhaps out of order. The opportunity given to us by the encounter should transcend the formalities of protocol.

We should reflect upon the achievements of the past and meditate upon freedom in general and the state of freedom in our continent in particular.

The future of humanity is intimately linked to the question of freedom. The history of civilization, as we have known it, is one of continuous ascent toward attainment of that freedom—religious freedom, freedom of dissent, freedom to assemble, freedom to claim for better working conditions, and in recent years, freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom from unemployment.

These values, which have become commonplace, have ceased to be commonplace at a time when liberty suffers an eclipse within our own continent. But just listing them, we can see how difficult it is to disentangle the knot of very often contradictory rights; for economic freedom is not always compatible with the freedom from poverty or from unemployment, and an unlimited freedom to employ will tend to hinder labor's conquests.

Very often other economic systems led people, particularly the young, to believe that freedom as a value must give way to the demands of economic life. Without forgetting the obvious difficulties, we must double our efforts to see that the next generation will not have to barter freedom of spirit for shelter from economic hardship.

This is at least the case of my country. Although it is true that we don't cling to any

specific form of social system and even less to any foreign model and that we are ready to seek a better redistribution of our income through the implementation of programs such as tax, agrarian, and educational reforms, there is nonetheless something upon which we cannot compromise. That is the quality of our life and therefore the right to think our own thoughts and dream our own dreams.

I am confident, Mr. President, that this meeting will bring about a better understanding which I already anticipate between our two countries, also that we will find a sense of partnership within a legal system based on impersonal and abstract rules within which there will always be the right to dissent.

I have spoken on other questions about our own joint duties and responsibilities in this hemisphere. Going further now, I bring to your attention something that has been outlined in the past but which has recently acquired growing importance; namely, that the responsibility for maintaining a world of spiritual freedom is a task which demands economic sacrifices. The sacrifices concern everyone equally but mainly those who can make them.

Colombia has recognized this not only with words but with deeds. We have given, for example, preferential treatment to Bolivia and Ecuador, relatively less developed countries within the subregional Andean Pact. We have promptly approved the increase in our share of the capital subscriptions for the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. We have also made a contribution to the Caribbean Development Bank in order to provide financial support for the former European possessions in the area.

In every international forum, we have sought an understanding between producers and consumers, trading off sometimes, as in the case of coffee and sugar, windfall gains for permanent stability.

As of the next U.S. fiscal year, we will forgo any further loans from the Agency for International Development. Considering the fact that our export earnings are sufficient for our balance-of-payments requirements,



we feel that the resources released thereby can be more useful to needier countries.

This contribution, however modest, is in accordance with our means. It is, nonetheless, tangible evidence that Colombia is ready and willing to bear its share of its humanitarian obligations, following thus the example set by the United States in the postwar era when, for the first time in the history of mankind, massive resources from one nation were destined to benefit nonnationals.

The Marshall plan turned the defeated into victors with the help of the country which, having suffered less material damages, was in a position, if so desired, to impose its will upon the rest of the world.

From a Latin American point of view, the new Trade Act of the United States is not without shortcomings, among other reasons, because of the discriminatory treatment given to Ecuador and Venezuela. Nevertheless, it contains positive provisions that favor a lowering of tariffs, which should benefit the developing countries. Let's hope that it will be implemented in the spirit of liberalization of trade rather than that of narrowminded protectionism.

Colombia has applied for membership to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and hopes, also, that these negotiations will provide a new scope for our foreign trade. Not in vain did we treble our sales of goods and services to the world in the last five years through the diversification of our own exports and the widening of markets for Colombian products in Latin America, Europe, and the United States.

Although I am not here as a spokesman for other Latin American nations, this is an appropriate occasion to underline some of the conclusions which we have reached at so-called summit meetings among neighboring countries and add a few of my own vintage.

In the past, the relationship between our two subcontinents has tended to reflect an American campaign slogan or a unilateral definition of policy, suitable perhaps for domestic political purposes but totally unrelated to Latin American aspirations.

Neither "the big stick," nor "the good

neighbor," nor "the low profile," nor "the benign neglect" satisfy us, because of their one-sided connotation. What is required is a new relationship between the United States and Latin America jointly formulated by both parties according to their needs and aspirations.

For this we already have a forum at the Organization of American States and an organization to present coherently our common points of view through the recently established Latin American economic system, SELA.

We are convinced that a nation which, through the years, has been capable of organizing the American Union, starting with states so dissimilar in their origin as were the Thirteen Colonies and latecomers such as Hawaii and Alaska, must have an equal capacity to conciliate with the inter-American system, a community of forces, without disregarding the particular features of each state and their freedom to select their own economic structure.

It would be a tragedy for our continent that while Europe is creating instruments of economic cooperation that don't imply political obligations, such as the Lomé Convention, we should still stumble on the same difficulties or perhaps more serious ones than those we encountered 40 or 60 years ago.

This is the reason why Colombia sponsored the lifting of the embargo against Cuba, regardless of our ideological differences. The record of failures of this type of measure is still fresh in our minds—Ethiopia, Spain, Rhodesia, and others—while we cannot recall any example which has been successful.

In the case of Cuba, where the sanctions were not applied, neither by European nations nor by some countries of this hemisphere, we would have been fooling ourselves if we pretended to continue believing in their effectiveness, when the United States itself was allowing its multinational corporations located in countries which were not pledged to sanctions to supply the Caribbean island with the capital and the know-how for products which we ourselves were already producing.



It has been a realistic step on the part of President Ford's Administration to adopt its own line of conduct toward Cuba while abstaining from the attempt to influence the decision of others on this matter.

A treaty that binds Colombia and the United States guarantees free passage through the Panama Canal to the warships and supply vessels of our navy. We don't overstep any boundaries when we raise the issue of the isthmus here or elsewhere. Colombia has a vital interest in the area based on geographical as well as historical considerations which have been recognized both by the United States and by Panama.

Taking a long-time view, we consider the canal question as something of continental and worldwide interest. The far-reaching policy of understanding at the hemispheric level cannot survive if permanently jeopardized by transit incidents, military maneuvers of one side or the other, student protests, and symbolic gestures that could very well one day start a bonfire in the continent.

With due respect for the position of the United States, it is necessary to recognize realistically and impartially that the considerations that prevailed at the beginning of this century are irrelevant in 1975.

The preservation of unjust situations can never be our ideal. We are conscious of the spirit which moves the American Government to remove causes of friction. In 1972 we reached an agreement concerning the Roncador and Quita Sueño and Serrana outcroppings in the Caribbean, thus putting an end to the *modus vivendi* established between the United States and Colombia in 1928.

Recently, Under [Assistant] Secretary of State Rogers has insisted before the U.S. Senate on the ratification of this treaty. If the intention is to terminate this *modus vivendi*—admitting that reason assisted Colombia, owners of Spanish titles, before the argument of a so-called exploitation of guano invoked during the American Civil War—we cannot see the reason for consulting the International Court of Justice to determine if third-party rights exist.

A transitory *modus vivendi* is ended by defining the claims of subscribing parts, not

by having one of these become a spokesman for the interests of third parties which, not having been part of the initial pact, are not affected by the new one.

We have noted with satisfaction that the need for a consensus in international relations is now being discussed. This is also our policy. This consensus may seek to maintain the status quo or to help to bring about a new order. We don't believe that under the present circumstances the first of these alternatives could be conceded. At present, countries which only 5, 10, or 15 years ago were politically dependent now have their own seats at the bargaining table. They come either on their own behalf or on behalf of other countries afflicted by similar problems.

Is there anything improper in the emergence of this new bargaining power? Colombia does not have atomic weapons, exportable fuel supplies, or large stockpiles of grain to enter national negotiations. Yet we are not surprised when nations that dispose of such assets such as these use them to increase their bargaining position.

Certain historical similarities exist between the postwar era in which we live and the period of reconstruction of Europe after the Napoleonic wars. The French Emperor had been at war with a coalition of powers dissimilar in their ideologies, populations, economic and military strength. Two European statesmen brought forth different viewpoints in their attempt to build a lasting peace. Whereas Metternich endeavored to maintain the status quo through the Holy Alliance, Canning moved in the direction of change by recognizing the independence of the newly created Latin American Republics and their right to self-determination.

Am I wrong in assuming that the great turn we are seeing in American foreign policy leans toward Canning's philosophy? His experience of liberalization didn't turn out to be so unfortunate. Its aftermath coincided with the Victorian era, which marked the epitome of the influence of the British Empire.

On the other hand, the Austrian Empire soon after Metternich was gone became the "sick man" of Europe, and his policy of the

spheres of influence and balance of power began to crack down, giving way to the coming crisis.

Mr. President, the whole world, and America in particular, is eager to see whether the great powers are willing to undertake or accept new initiatives without freezing past injustices under the name of peace.

Colombia, with its modest resources, is ready to support the United States in sponsoring changes and in acknowledging new realities. Let's preserve what is worth being preserved, and let's recognize that obsolescence of what has to be replaced. For these we claim our rights, but at the same time, we are ready to undertake our responsibilities and our commitments.

A toast for the prosperity of the United States. Mr. President and Mrs. Ford.

## TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated September 26

The State Visit of President and Mrs. Alfonso Lopez Michelsen to Washington at the invitation of President and Mrs. Gerald Ford provided an opportunity for serious discussion and exchange of views with respect to international, regional and bilateral topics of interest.

Accompanying the President during the September 25-26 visit to Washington were Colombian Ambassador and Mrs. Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, Minister of Finance Rodrigo Botero, Minister of Agriculture Rafael Pardo, Minister of Economic Development Jorge Ramirez, Minister of Public Works Humberto Salcedo, the Mayors of Bogotá and Cali, and the President's two sons, Felipe and Alfonso Lopez. Several of these officials were accompanied by their wives. The visit provided an opportunity to meet with their United States counterparts for discussion of problems of mutual interest.

President Lopez, in his conversations with President Ford, Vice President Rockefeller, and Secretary of State Kissinger examined world economic and political issues in detail. They discussed prospects for improved international economic cooperation in light of the achievements of the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly. They discussed the special problems faced by Colombia and other developing countries in the hemisphere, which, because they are in a more advanced stage of development and are integrated into the world economy, are

also greatly affected by changes in the international economic conditions. They agreed that representatives of their governments would consult further as the initiatives stemming from the Seventh Special Session unfold.

The Presidents also reviewed global problems of security and opportunities for peace.

Western Hemisphere issues were examined in depth and with equal frankness. President Lopez explained to President Ford the position of Colombia on a number of points. He emphasized his interest and that of Latin America in general in a favorable outcome to the present Panama Canal negotiations. President Ford assured President Lopez of the desire of the United States to pursue the negotiations now underway with Panama in good faith in an effort to reach an agreement which would accommodate the interests of both countries in the Canal. President Ford confirmed U.S. recognition of the validity of Colombia's rights in the Canal under the Urrutia-Thomson Treaty. He expressed determination to consult with Colombia at an appropriate point in the negotiating process regarding the future status of those rights.

The two Presidents and their advisors also discussed the United States Trade Reform Act of 1974, noted that technical discussions were recently held on the Act in Washington, and that further high-level conversations will take place in the near future with regard to the implications of the Act for Colombia and for Latin America in general. President Lopez stressed the importance to Latin America of greater access to the United States market.

With regard to ratification of the Quita Sueño Treaty, the two Presidents noted that the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee has just held public hearings, and President Ford assured his visitor of continuing Administration support for early ratification.

Multilateral negotiations looking toward an international coffee agreement were discussed by the two Presidents and they agreed as to the importance of continuing efforts in this direction.

The AID program of bilateral assistance to Colombia was also discussed. The substantive achievements of the collaborative program over prior years were noted with satisfaction. It was mutually agreed that, as Colombia has become less dependent on concessional external financing, the AID bilateral program could be brought to an orderly phase-out, and that appropriate agencies of the two governments would work out a plan for such an orderly termination of AID assistance.

The visit provided an opportunity for review of the status of completion of the Inter-American Highway through construction of the Darien Gap segment in Colombia. Progress toward related control of hoof-and-mouth disease in Northern Colombia was exam-



ined, and attendant problems were reviewed. It was agreed that a high-level consultative group would meet shortly to consider questions related to the Inter-American Highway in the region of the Darien.

International narcotics control was also discussed, with both Presidents emphasizing their recognition of the menace posed by international trafficking. The leaders of both countries committed themselves to reinforced joint efforts to combat and eradicate this evil.

President Ford informed President Lopez that funds have been requested to reestablish a United States Consulate at Barranquilla on the North Coast of Colombia and that he would pursue this matter as necessary with the Congress. President Lopez expressed his agreement and pleasure.

In conclusion, the two Chiefs of State and their advisors noted the increasing degree of interdependence which characterizes our modern world and agreed that Colombia and the United States—two democratic nations which share many values and goals—should seek means of ever greater cooperation on the bilateral, regional and international planes.

## **President Welcomes Passage of Bill Modifying Turkish Arms Embargo**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I welcome the passage by the Congress of S. 2230, which provides for a partial lifting of the embargo on U.S. arms for Turkey. This action is an essential first step in the process of rebuilding a relationship of trust and friendship with valued friends and allies in the eastern Mediterranean.

The congressional vote reflects a cooperative effort with the Senate and House of Representatives on the difficult question of Cyprus and the vital task of restoring stability and security along NATO's strategically important southern flank.

With the partial lifting of the embargo,

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Oct. 3 (text from White House press release).

I intend to take action in four broad areas in the weeks ahead:

*First*, we will seek to rebuild our security relationship with Turkey to underscore that Turkey's membership in the Western alliance and partnership with the United States serve the very important interest of both nations.

*Second*, we will make a major effort to encourage resumption of the Cyprus negotiations and to facilitate progress by the parties involved—Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus—toward a peaceful and equitable settlement of this dispute. In this connection, we will fulfill whatever role the parties themselves want us to play in achieving a settlement acceptable to all. In accordance with S. 2230, I will submit to the Congress within 60 days of enactment a report on progress made in reaching a solution to the Cyprus problem.

*Third*, the Administration will intensify cooperation with appropriate international humanitarian agencies to find ways to alleviate the suffering of the many people displaced as a result of the 1974 hostilities. The plight of these unfortunate people makes progress toward solution of the Cyprus problem all the more important.

*Finally*, the Administration intends to provide support to the democratic government of Greece. In that regard, we will pursue efforts to help that country overcome its current economic and security problems. Also, in compliance with S. 2230, I will submit within 60 days my recommendations for assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.

Our goals in the eastern Mediterranean in the months ahead—to help the parties involved achieve a Cyprus settlement, to rebuild a relationship of trust and friendship with both Greece and Turkey, to alleviate the suffering on Cyprus and to meet Greece's needs for assistance—are objectives on which we all can agree. Let us now join in working together to achieve them.



## Department Reviews Recent Developments in U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

*Statement by William D. Rogers  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I appear before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce and the Subcommittee on International Organizations to testify on developments in the evolution of our Cuba policy since my last appearance before you, on June 11 of this year. It is a pleasure to be here.

Let me lay down a few general principles:

—We are ready. We are prepared to improve our relations with Cuba. Hostility is not a permanent and unalterable part of our policy.

—We are willing to enter into a dialogue with Cuba. But the dialogue must be on a basis of reciprocity.

—The process to this end must be direct discussion between the parties. We will not bargain through the press or through intermediaries.

—We are prepared to engage in such direct exchanges without preconditions or ultimatum.

—Resolution of the problems between us will not be easy and will not be furthered by calculated offense to the other party.

—We cannot put aside the interests of a half-million Cuban refugees to whom we

have given asylum. The human dimension of our relations with Cuba is at the top of our agenda.

—Nor can we ignore the substantial claims for compensation held by U.S. nationals.

—In all events, our negotiations toward these ends must be sober and businesslike.

This afternoon I would like to begin by reviewing the events of significance in U.S.-Cuban relations since my last appearance here. These are: the termination of mandatory OAS sanctions against Cuba at San José (which you may want to pursue with your former colleague, Ambassador Bill Mailliard, who is here with me), our lifting of third-country restrictions, and various developments in the world affecting the emergent U.S.-Cuban dialogue, as well as U.S. and Cuban official statements and gestures.

I discussed at length the multilateral constraints on trade with Cuba during my last appearance before your subcommittees. At that time I said we wanted to clear the multilateral decks of this issue in order to remove a divisive issue and restore the integrity of the Rio Treaty. This was accomplished at the end of July in a manner reflecting a healthy consensus of opinion within the OAS.

A Conference of Plenipotentiaries was held July 16-26 in San José, Costa Rica, to consider amendment of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce and the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on Sept. 23. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Treaty). A protocol of amendment was signed on July 26. The key amendment was the provision that a vote to rescind sanctions against a state would be taken by a vote of an absolute majority rather than by a vote of two-thirds as is required by the existing Rio Treaty. These amendments are of course subject to ratification and will be submitted soon to the Senate for its advice and consent.

As a result of a resolution of the OAS Permanent Council meeting held in San José on July 26, the OAS Representatives met at the 16th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on July 29, serving as Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty. The delegations of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela cosponsored a draft resolution which solemnly reaffirmed the principle of nonintervention and left parties to the Rio Treaty freedom of action in deciding whether or not to continue to desist from trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The action at San José removed an anomaly—the anomaly of mandatory sanctions which were no longer acceptable to a majority of the OAS members. The United States saw the San José result as a practical diplomatic, as well as legally sound, means of restoring the integrity of the Rio Treaty. Therefore we gave our support to the resolution and voted in favor of it along with 15 other OAS members.

Those who voted against were Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Brazil and Nicaragua abstained. All the other nations—16 in all—voted for the resolution. It is now in effect. The member states have freedom of action either to continue the suspension of or to reinstitute commercial and diplomatic ties with Cuba.

### **Lifting U.S. Third-Country Constraints**

As a logical and practical corollary to the termination of mandatory OAS sanctions the U.S. Government on August 21 announced modifications of those aspects of our Cuban

denial policy which affect other countries. These modifications were:

—To grant licenses permitting transactions between U.S. subsidiaries abroad and Cuba for trade in foreign-made goods when those subsidiaries are operating in countries where local law or policy favors trade with Cuba. Specific licenses continue to be required in each case, and they will remain subject to regulations concerning U.S.-origin parts, components, strategic goods, and technology.

—To permit bunkering in the United States of ships of third countries which have carried goods to or from Cuba.

—To end the denial of U.S. bilateral assistance to countries which allow their ships or aircraft to carry goods to and from Cuba.

In addition, the Administration has expressed its support for the provision in H.R. 9005<sup>2</sup> which gives the President broader waiver authority to provide Public Law 480 title I food sales to countries which trade with Cuba. Section 664 of the Foreign Assistance Act already provides the necessary authority to waive section 620(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act, and that authority has been exercised for all countries that trade or may wish to trade with Cuba.

This action did not resolve and was not put forward as the resolution of a bilateral issue with Cuba. As Secretary Kissinger has made clear, bilateral issues, including our own direct-trade ban, will be subject to negotiations with the Cubans on the basis of reciprocity. This was basically a measure to remove a recurrent source of friction between the United States and friendly countries both in this hemisphere and overseas which, for reasons of their own, have engaged in trade or never ceased to trade with Cuba. The termination of the mandatory aspect of the OAS sanctions at San José made it inconsistent for us to continue to

<sup>2</sup> A bill to authorize assistance for disaster relief and rehabilitation, to provide for overseas distribution and production of agricultural commodities, to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

apply our own restrictions to third countries that trade with and ship to Cuba.

### U.S.-Cuban Bilateral Relations

While our vote at San José and lifting third-country sanctions were aimed at removing multilateral problems flowing from our Cuba denial policy, they were favorably received by Cuba.

On our side Secretary Kissinger has said that we are prepared to start a dialogue with Cuba on the basis of reciprocity. Once such a dialogue is in progress, we can better judge what possibilities there are for improving our relationships.

As I testified last time, the Administration does not commend H.R. 6382.<sup>3</sup> We do oppose it because it would dismantle our bilateral trade constraints automatically, with no quid pro quo in return. The executive branch already has the power and discretion to drop the U.S. trade ban. We can do so when it is timely. We do not need additional authority from Congress.

Would some other legislation, however, be appropriate as a prelude to executive branch negotiations with Cuba? As I have indicated, we do favor a broader waiver authority under P.L. 480, title I; this is now in H.R. 9005. We trust that legislation will commend itself to the Congress.

Beyond that we see no particular need for Congress to go. It would not be helpful for the Congress, either in this case or generally, to attempt to lay down binding negotiating instructions to the executive branch which would provide for a particular sequence which the two sides must follow in ironing out their differences. This is the vice of the draft legislation which would provide that the trade ban be automatically dropped the moment we have assurances that the Cubans are prepared to "enter into direct negotiations" on compensation. Such a formula is too precise. In addition, it fails to take into account the important human di-

mension of our interest in Cuba.

If the Congress is determined to speak to the issue, we suggest that it do so in a fashion which makes clear it agrees that the process of improving relations must be reciprocal. It should not prescribe a particular sequence of steps and actions. And it should not fail to take into account the totality of interests we will bring to the table, including family visits, just compensation for the American citizens whose property has been confiscated by the Government of Cuba, and a variety of other complex questions inherent in the process of improving relations.

### Cuban Support of Revolutionary Activities

Mr. Chairman, you asked me to provide information and analysis of Cuban involvement in terrorist and revolutionary activity in Europe, particularly Portugal and France.

Cuba has developed a highly professional intelligence system—DGI, or the Directorate General of Intelligence. It works outside Cuba. Our best estimate is that it is ultimately controlled by the Cubans themselves, but there is good reason to suppose that this service cooperates closely with the Soviet KGB, as do the intelligence services of other Communist countries allied with or heavily dependent upon the U.S.S.R.

As to Portugal, it is clear that Castro would like the Communist Party in Portugal to succeed. In a superficial sense it would give him some company—the company of those who achieved power themselves and then threw in their lot with Moscow, like Mao Tse-tung and Tito. And although Mao Tse-tung and Tito have adjusted their posture differently toward Moscow, they—as well as Castro—did start out by shaping the revolution their own ways. One can speculate that Castro envisages a leftist or "Socialist" Portugal veering toward communism as giving him a Latin comrade in the "Socialist" world; but as demonstrated by the elections last April and by the more recent anti-Communist demonstrations, popular support for a Cuban-style regime is low.

As for France, the "Carlos affair" in Paris

<sup>3</sup> A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 with respect to Cuba, and for other purposes.



and the subsequent expulsion of three Cuban diplomats from France, I can only say that it is a murky business. I doubt if I can make any useful new comment. But lest the Carlos affair be given undue significance, I should state as a general proposition that we do not think that Cuba is playing a major, or even significant, role in encouraging terrorism in Europe. Cuba's conclusion of an understanding with the United States against hijacking implies a commitment against terrorism as an instrument of political struggle, however useful terrorism may have seemed at an earlier stage. The hijacking agreement was an important step forward. Cuba has carried it out scrupulously.

### **Cuba and Puerto Rican Nationalism**

I suggested earlier that one of the major problems to the reciprocal improvement of relations with Cuba at this stage is the achievement of mutual respect and obligation. This is a phrase used with deliberation and care in Secretary Kissinger's speech in Houston on March 1 of this year. If I can elaborate on this statement, I would say that if Cuba wants to normalize its relationship with us, Cuba should indicate this in deeds as well as words.

There is the matter of Puerto Rico. The people of Puerto Rico have freely chosen to organize their own government in association with the United States. Millions of Puerto Ricans live in the continental United States. A few of the people of Puerto Rico would like to be independent; most would not.

Why does Cuba continue to agitate for Puerto Rican independence and lobby for it at the United Nations when the people of Puerto Rico have rejected it by a free vote, in the full exercise of their right of self-determination? It has been said that the "Cuban George Washington," José Martí, once described Cuba and Puerto Rico as two wings of the same bird. The implication of this is evidently that as goes Cuba, so goes Puerto Rico.

But the cases are not the same. The

United States and Puerto Rico have created a new association, by free choice. We do not believe that merely because both Cuba and Puerto Rico were separated from Spain at the same time that Cuba has any special rights or responsibilities to advise the people of Puerto Rico about their true aspirations three-quarters of a century later. Rather, we regard this as unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the United States and of Puerto Rico and an effort to substitute the will of Havana for the free choice of the people of Puerto Rico.

In closing, I would like to state again that we have put a policy of permanent hostility behind us. We are ready to begin a dialogue with Cuba. Because of the complexity and delicacy of the issues that must be resolved, the support and understanding of the Congress and the American people is particularly important. Let us see what emerges from the coming dialogue. The Administration, in turn, will continue to consult with Congress on developments in our Cuba policy.

### **Guidelines Explained for Testimony to House Intelligence Committee**

*Statement by Lawrence S. Eagleburger  
Deputy Under Secretary for Management*<sup>1</sup>

I welcome this opportunity to appear today to explain the guidelines that have been established for officials of the State Department in giving testimony to this committee or its staff.

In a memorandum which I signed on September 22, a copy of which is available to the committee, I set forth three requirements. They are:

—State Department officials are to decline, by order of the President, to discuss classified material.

<sup>1</sup>Made before the House Select Committee on Intelligence on Sept. 25 (text from press release 504). The transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

—The Department of State insists that a State Department representative be present during the interviews. Should the interviewees wish to be represented by their own legal counsel, the State Department representative will be in addition to that private legal counsel.

—The interviewees are to decline, by order of the Secretary of State, to give information which would disclose options considered by or recommended to more senior officers in the Department of State.

Let me first address the question of classified material. As the committee is aware, the President has directed that, pending resolution of the dispute between the executive branch and this committee over the responsibility for declassification and release of classified information, members of the executive branch are prohibited from furnishing classified information to the committee. Naturally, all officials of the Department of State are bound by this decision.

The other two conditions imposed by the Department are based on principles of the utmost importance to the employees and operations of the Department. It is not, at this point, clear to me that we in the Department and the members of this committee disagree on these principles. If there is disagreement, I want to be sure that we clearly understand the issues over which we are at odds.

Let me therefore state at the outset what we believe those principles to be.

First, it is the responsibility of the Secretary and myself—as it was with our predecessors—to protect the integrity of the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. These people constitute a highly professional organization, an organization that must have a sense of cohesion and loyalty. And that loyalty runs down from the Secretary to all of his subordinates, just as it runs upward.

Second, it is also our responsibility to oppose steps that would imperil the ability of the Department of State effectively to formulate and conduct foreign policy.

As to the first point of principle—the

confidential and orderly operation of the policymaking process itself—it is our belief that for this process to operate, all relevant officials must have unqualified freedom to discuss, debate, develop, and recommend various policy options. Secretary Kissinger has repeatedly emphasized this both as a matter of principle and as essential to an effective policy-formulation process.

But this process cannot work in practice if it has to take place in public or if those involved must expect that their advice and recommendations will be scrutinized and criticized after the fact. Under these circumstances candid advice cannot be assured; the policymaker will have to discount opinions to the extent he believes they are tailored with a view to public exposure. Nor can we permit a situation to develop in which officers of the Department are reluctant to express opinions freely because they fear that they will be subject to public criticism, ridicule, or punishment for advocacy of a course of action which might at the moment be unpopular but which they believe to be in the long-range national interest. Nor can we permit a situation to develop in which others would be tempted to play to the grandstand by advocating policies simply because they have popular appeal.

This is far from a hypothetical issue. To cite a single example, the Foreign Service and the Department of State were torn apart in the late 1940's and early 1950's over an issue that raised some of the same concerns that are before us today: the ability of Foreign Service officers to give to the Secretary and their other superiors their candid advice, secure in the knowledge that this advice will remain confidential. The events of those years not only injured individuals but also did significant damage to the process by which foreign policy is made. Who can be certain how many recommendations during the years that followed were colored by memories of those experiences?

As Deputy Under Secretary for Management, the principal official responsible for the personnel of the Department and the Foreign Service, I have an obligation to see that the Department of State never again



faces such a circumstance. I know that I have, and will continue to have, the full support of Secretary Kissinger as I carry out that obligation.

The second point of principle is that of "executive responsibility" for policy. It is the Secretary of State and his immediate principal advisers who are responsible for determining the basic questions of policy. And it is the Secretary and his principal advisers who are, and must be, accountable for the decisions they make and the actions they authorize. Thus, just as we must preserve the confidentiality of the decisionmaking process, so must we preserve the accountability of the decisionmaker. It is therefore those who bear responsibility for policy—rather than junior and middle-grade Foreign Service officers—who should be held accountable for it.

If senior officials are responsible—as we believe they must be—they alone should be the ones to describe, explain, and defend their decisions. Thus, once the issue of classified information is resolved, we will be prepared to permit policy-level officials to appear before this committee to discuss the main considerations that were taken into account in formulating the policies finally decided upon as well as intelligence information relating to the specific questions before this committee. The Department will also be willing to make available to the committee, as we have in the past, State Department intelligence officers to discuss the *facts* concerning the intelligence situation surrounding the events under examination by the committee. But we would not want any official who does appear to respond to questions designed to associate any particular individual with any particular course of action or recommendation. The sanctity of the privacy of internal debate, discussion, personal views, and recommendations must, we believe, be preserved.

Finally, we also have insisted on a third limitation for the protection of our employees: a State Department representative must be present during the interview of any subordinate officials of the State Department to provide advice to the interviewee

on the application of the existing guidelines and, in the case of informal interviews, where no formal record is kept, to help note and remember the points covered.

Mr. Chairman, if the differences over classified information can be resolved, the Department is prepared to be cooperative in meeting the needs of this committee for information. We have an obligation and a duty to do so. But I also have another obligation and duty to the members of the Department of State and the Foreign Service: to assure them the freedom and protection they need and must have if they are to give the Department—and the country—their best.

## Policy on Private Humanitarian Aid to Viet-Nam Discussed

*Following is a joint State-Treasury-Commerce statement made before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations on September 9 by Robert H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.<sup>1</sup>*

I am Robert H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. I am appearing today jointly with my colleagues Mr. James B. Clawson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs, and Mr. Rauer H. Meyer, Director of the Office of Export Administration of the Department of Commerce. This statement reflects the joint views of all three Departments. We are pleased to appear today to review the Administration's position on private humanitarian assistance to Viet-Nam supplied within the context of the export and foreign assets controls presently in force against both North and South Viet-Nam.

Let me first review a bit of background. In 1958 an embargo was imposed over U.S.

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<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



exports to "Communist-controlled areas of Viet-Nam." When South Viet-Nam fell under Communist control in April 1975, export control regulations in force against the Communist-controlled part of the country in effect were automatically extended to all of Viet-Nam.

The Foreign Assets Control Regulations were first applied to North Viet-Nam on May 5, 1964, in the light of the continued North Vietnamese military attacks against the former Republic of Viet-Nam. At the same time, the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong, and the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam Red Cross were listed as "specifically designated nationals" under the regulations, on a determination that they acted for or on behalf of the authorities exercising control over North Viet-Nam.

The licensing policy in general, under both the Treasury and Commerce regulations in the period prior to the fall of Saigon, was to deny licenses for shipments to North Viet-Nam or to areas controlled by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam; i.e., the Viet Cong. An exception to this denial policy was granted toward the end of 1966 for a limited amount of funds from private sources to be used to purchase foreign-origin medical supplies for civilian relief work in North Viet-Nam and Viet Cong-controlled areas. It was hoped that there would be impartial observation when the goods arrived to assure that supplies would be used solely for civilian relief and that the relief program might develop channels through which assistance could be forwarded to American prisoners of war. However, the program was discontinued in February 1967 when it became clear that North Viet-Nam refused to admit impartial observers.

With regard to export controls, during the time the embargo policy has been in effect, either for North Viet-Nam alone or for the rest of the area, there were few applications for licenses to make humanitarian shipments prior to 1971. However, in 1969 authorization was sought for the supply of some general-purpose antibiotics and syringes for the

Viet Cong. This was denied because there was no way to insure that the goods in question would not be used to support the war effort of the Communist forces. At that time, any application or inquiry that was made would have been reviewed carefully to determine the likelihood that the goods would be used for other than civilian medical or charitable purposes.

Since 1971, several applications for North Viet-Nam have been approved because the commodities were specialized enough and contacts by the donors with the consignees were such that the likelihood of diversion from civilian purposes was considered minimal. Examples of goods approved were equipment and supplies for cardiac surgery, neurosurgery, and related postoperative care; equipment for an enzymology laboratory; intrauterine devices for a clinic; gift parcel of clothing, teabags, and raisins; ear, nose, and throat equipment.

Applications were denied for instruments or equipment intended for unidentified scientific research in North Viet-Nam because the transactions could not be related to medical or charitable purposes. A request for advice as to possible licensing action was received in 1974 regarding a transaction whereby a U.S. firm would sell several million dollars' worth of building materials to a foreign firm for a UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] school-building project in North Viet-Nam. It was decided this proposal did not qualify as an exemption to the embargo because the transaction was commercial in nature rather than private nonprofit assistance and the magnitude of the transaction so far exceeded the level of U.S. humanitarian assistance theretofore given.

When Phnom Penh and Saigon fell in April 1975, our economic controls were extended to Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. As I have testified earlier before this committee, the purpose of these controls is to deny to the present regimes the use of Cambodian and South Vietnamese assets held in the United States; to prevent them from extracting under duress from private Cambodian and Vietnamese nationals their assets in the United States; to keep Cambodian and Viet-

name assets in the United States frozen for possible use in the satisfaction of private claims of American citizens for losses of property in those areas, pending further determinations to be made with respect to future U.S. relationships with those countries; and to deny these countries the benefits of trading with the United States.

During the first half of this year, we received several license applications from private agencies to authorize shipments of assistance to Viet-Nam. The fighting in South Viet-Nam was reaching a climax in that period, and action on the applications was therefore temporarily delayed. In July, several applications to send strictly humanitarian items were approved. At the same time, a number of other applications involving equipment more of an economic assistance nature were not approved.

These latest decisions have been made within the context of the Administration's stated policy that the responsibility for providing reconstruction aid to the present regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh has passed to those countries which assisted those regimes to come to power by force of arms but that we are prepared to consider requests for humanitarian assistance on a case-by-case basis. Humanitarian aid is construed as being limited to items traditionally considered to be of humanitarian character, such as medical supplies, drugs, food, school equipment, and school supplies.<sup>2</sup> It is anticipated that in each case in which a license is issued, the humanitarian agencies providing the supplies will carry out end-use checks through their resident or visiting personnel.

We have thus recently licensed the shipment of medical supplies, foodstuffs, school supplies, and pediatric drugs to North and South Viet-Nam. Simultaneously, we denied a license to ship drilling machines, lathes, electric furnaces, and similar industrial items to Viet-Nam. While this machinery was said to be intended to be used to produce surgical prosthetic appliances, it was quite clear

<sup>2</sup> cf. articles 23, 55, et al, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.N.T.S. 3516. [Footnote in original.]

that the machinery was of an industrial character and could be used to produce all sorts of commodities.

We also denied an application to ship machinery to produce wood screws, metal button blanks, and berets. This machinery was said to be intended for use in cooperative workshops. A significant amount of North Viet-Nam's industrial output comes from cooperative workshops, and it is evident that this shipment was for economic assistance purposes rather than strictly humanitarian purposes. To the extent these workshops may employ some handicapped workers, there is a charitable aspect, but it is basically true that the manufacture of screws, clothing, and buttons is an industrial undertaking and does not qualify as traditional humanitarian assistance.

In addition, we have disapproved shipments of agricultural implements and fishing equipment because these, too, were felt to be economic in nature. The exception for such equipment that was authorized in 1973 was made in the relatively hopeful atmosphere that existed in the months following the signing of the Paris agreements.

As to the future, we will continue to look at all requests for private humanitarian assistance on a case-by-case basis in light of the circumstances of the time, the scope and nature of the proposed assistance, and the attitudes and actions of both North and South Viet-Nam.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 1st Session

Special Appropriations for Assistance to Refugees From Cambodia and Vietnam. Report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations to accompany H.R. 6894. S. Rept. 94-138. May 15, 1975. 4 pp.

Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975. Report of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to accompany H.R. 5522; H. Rept. 94-295; June 14, 1975; 22 pp. Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce to accompany H.R. 5522; S. Rept. 94-269; July 9, 1975; 16 pp.



## U.S. Repeats Veto of U.N. Admission of North and South Viet-Nam

Following are statements by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly on September 19 and in the Security Council on September 26 and 30.

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER 19

USUN press release 98 dated September 19

The recent admission of three new member states has moved the United Nations still closer to the goal of universality. The United States has warmly welcomed the People's Republic of Mozambique, the Republic of Cape Verde, and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe to the United Nations. May their membership contribute to their prosperity, happiness, and independence and to the wisdom and effectiveness of our Assembly.

Let me also emphasize, Mr. President, that the United States is ready for the admission of all qualified states not now members of the United Nations. As the goal of universality comes nearer and nearer, our hopes for universality intensify.

Unhappily, though, there are those fully qualified whose admission is being denied for political motives. The United States is not opposed to the admission of the two Vietnamese states, but we are not prepared to agree to their admission as part of a practice of selective admissions by which the Republic of Korea is excluded. For this reason, the United States has abstained on the proposal that the Security Council should again consider the applications of the two Viet-Nams.<sup>1</sup>

We have had no objection to the usual practice of discussing the admission of new

members, that item, in the General Assembly. However, we do think that the Assembly has not acted wisely, perhaps, in departing from the longstanding tradition that only representatives of member states are entitled to speak in plenary as against appropriate committees.

Now, Mr. President, a final remark. The distinguished Representative of Albania has just extended his comments on the subject of admission of the Viet-Nams to indicate his strong disapproval of the admission of the Republic of Korea. And he called attention in his remarks to what he judges to have been the previous practice of the United States in blocking, through the veto, the admission of new members. I should like, with great respect to the distinguished delegate, to suggest that he has got his superpowers mixed up. It is the superpower that styles itself Socialist that has done the blocking in the past. We, the superpower that styles itself non-Socialist, have, alas, never exercised that power until just most recently and with great regret. I would caution the distinguished delegate not to let opportunities of that kind pass him by. They don't come every day.

I would like in great seriousness, however, to make one remark; it comes almost as a *cri de coeur*. As we discuss this issue, we are dealing with the nature of a representative institution. For ill or good, the U.N. Charter is primarily the work, the drafting, of constitutional lawyers versed in the representative tradition of Western democracy.

Now we recognize that this is not a universal tradition. We recognize that it is per-

<sup>1</sup> The Assembly on Sept. 19 adopted by a vote of 123 to 0, with 9 abstentions (U.S.), a resolution (A/RES/3366 (XXX)) requesting the Security Council "to reconsider immediately and favourably" the applications of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the Republic of South Viet-Nam for admission to membership in the United Nations.



haps subscribed to by fewer nations today than it may have been even at that time. We recognize that for many nations who come to this forum the idea of a representative institution in which minority views are accorded rights, in which minority views are expressed, is in a sense an unfamiliar idea, even an alien idea, possibly an intolerable idea. That may be the condition domestically of many nations. But it cannot be the condition of a United Nations that truly carries out its charter responsibilities. We are here representative of nations committed to the charter.

The charter calls for the membership of states which are otherwise equal to the admission standards. The Republic of Korea is surely one such state. Four times in the history of this institution, four times, the Security Council by majority vote has recommended its admission. However, this last occasion, if you recall, the majority did something which is abhorrent to the tradition of representative institutions. It refused even to consider the application of a new member.

Ladies and gentlemen, how we conduct our respective internal affairs is the concern of each individual nation and not for any other to dictate. Yet I say to you the United Nations will die if it does not remain representative. We have here a system that will only succeed if its fundamental spirit of representativeness is allowed its true and full play. We have here a system which does not reflect on any other system, but only on this one. If we wish the United Nations to work, we must follow the charter which establishes the working principles of the United Nations.

## **STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

### **Statement of September 26**

USUN press release 103 dated September 26

I could not hope in my remarks to equal the intellectual vigor or the authority with which the distinguished Foreign Minister of

Costa Rica has just spoken. I would only hope it be understood that I wholly endorse what he says, which derives from an understanding of the nature of democratic societies which I think is shared by some members of this Council and about which we do not have to consult with one another in advance in order to know that we agree on fundamental principles. We have heard them from a man of conviction; if little else was to be hoped for from this meeting of the Security Council, that at least has been gained.

Nor need I recapitulate the statement I made to the Council on August 11. I only wish to assure the members that there has been no change in my government's basic position on the applications before us.

In 1948 the United States sought a ruling from the International Court of Justice on the propriety of "linkage" of applications for membership in the United Nations. The reply of the Court made it clear that "package deals," as they were termed, are not in order. Each application should be considered on its merits on the basis of established criteria. In our view, the Republic of Korea fully meets these criteria. Justice and procedure—procedure perhaps being the more important of those matters—requires that this fully qualified state be admitted to the United Nations forthwith and that its desire to do so be not linked to the case of North Korea.

We are of course prepared to see North Korea enter the United Nations along with the Republic of Korea. Equally, it is North Korea's privilege to stay outside the U.N. community if it does not wish to assume the obligations of membership at this time. However, the one-third of the Korean people living in North Korea have no right to stand in the way of the desire of the two-thirds of the Korean people who live in the Republic of Korea to assume the privileges, and the duties and responsibilities, of U.N. membership.

Neither, in our view, is the Security Council entitled, authorized, or wise in linking those two matters, in the face of the judgment of the Court and indeed our recent well-established practice.

The principle of universality is not divisible. My delegation is not prepared to see it flouted in the case of the Republic of Korea only to be hailed in the case of the Viet-Nams. It is not my government's desire in any way to stand in the way of admission of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the Republic of South Viet-Nam, but my government will continue to support in every feasible way the Republic of Korea's desire to participate as a member in the United Nations.

The General Assembly has on four separate occasions found the Republic of Korea qualified for U.N. membership. At the request of the Assembly, the Security Council has repeatedly reconsidered the application of the Republic of Korea, but its admission has been prevented by repeated vetoes. Now, with the Security Council about to reconsider, after a parallel finding and request from the Assembly, the applications of the two Vietnamese Republics, my government must insist that all three applicants be treated equally. If this necessitates a second veto of the applications of the two Viet-Nams, my government, though with regret, can act accordingly.

Allow me, Mr. President, to emphasize a further point. We believe that the goal of unification can best be sought through the framework of the United Nations. We find it hard to follow the argument that to assume the responsibility of membership in the United Nations would somehow diminish the prospect for peaceful reunification. On the contrary, it should enhance that prospect.

Finally, let me simply refer to the thoughts which I left with the General Assembly in my comments on the occasion on which the resolution before us was adopted. It may have come to pass, Mr. President, that the United Nations is made up principally of one-party states, but it cannot come to pass that we shall have a one-party United Nations. I accept, Mr. President, that there may be members of this Council who do not believe that the behavior of liberal democracies derives from firmly held principles. But they are wrong in this,

and I fear before this issue is resolved they shall have learned just how wrong they are.

### Statement of September 30

USUN press release 105 dated September 30

The Security Council has again declined to consider the application of the Republic of Korea, a state fully qualified for membership in the United Nations. The United States has accordingly vetoed the membership applications of the Republic of South Viet-Nam and of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.<sup>2</sup>

In this era of dialogue, which was underlined so distinctly during the seventh special session of the General Assembly, the United States cannot accept that the admission of a fully qualified applicant should be dependent on the wishes of a nonmember state. The Republic of Korea, with a population of over 35 million persons, has been duly constituted as a state since August 15, 1948. It has been a U.N. observer since 1949. It enjoys diplomatic relations with over 90 states which are members of the United Nations. The Republic of Korea has repeated its assurances that its admission to the United Nations would in no way dilute its hopes for peaceful reunification on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, membership in the United Nations, with its dedication to peace and harmony, should promote unification, not set it back.

The United States favors admission of all qualified states desiring membership, including, I repeat, the Viet-Nams. The United States hopes that the parties directly concerned in this impasse will discuss this question urgently so that it may be resolved.

<sup>2</sup> The Council on Sept. 26 approved by a vote of 14 to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.), the inclusion on the agenda of the letter from the Secretary-General transmitting General Assembly Resolution 3366 (XXX); the inclusion of the application of the Republic of Korea on the agenda did not obtain the nine votes required, the vote being 7 (U.S.) in favor, 7 against, with 1 abstention. On Sept. 30 the Council voted on the draft resolutions to admit South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam; the votes were 14 in favor and 1 (U.S.) against.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.

*Accession deposited:* United Kingdom, September 24, 1975.

##### Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

*Acceptance deposited:* Lesotho, October 2, 1975.

##### Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974. Entered into force October 1, 1975.

*Notification to apply protocol provisionally:* United States, September 30, 1975.

##### Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975.

*Ratification deposited:* Brazil, August 6, 1975.

##### Energy

Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperative information exchange relating to the development of solar heating and cooling systems in buildings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 1-4, 1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975.

*Signature:* Le Secrétaire général des Services de Programmation de la Politique scientifique, Belgium, September 4, 1975.

##### Finance

Onchocerciasis Fund Agreement, with annexes. Done at Washington May 7, 1975. Entered into force May 7, 1975.

*Signatures:* African Development Bank, September 2, 1975; Japan, Netherlands,<sup>1</sup> June 27, 1975.

##### Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Guinea, Singapore, September 22, 1975; Maldives, September 16, 1975.

##### Meteorology

Amendments to the convention of the World Meteorological Organization of October 11, 1947, as amended. Adopted by the Seventh Congress of the World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, April 28-May 25, 1975. Entered into force May 20, 1975.

##### Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

*Ratification deposited:* Venezuela, September 26, 1975.

##### Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Syria, September 10, 1975.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Saudi Arabia, September 5, 1975; Syria, September 10, 1975.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Saudi Arabia, September 5, 1975; Syria, September 10, 1975.

##### Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited:* Congo (Brazzaville), September 5, 1975.

##### Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 30, 1966.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Syria, September 10, 1975.

<sup>1</sup> With reservation as to acceptance.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.



Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London October 25, 1967.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Syria, September 10, 1975.

## Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force January 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.

*De facto application:* Papua New Guinea, September 16, 1975.

## BILATERAL

### Italy

Agreement extending the agreement of June 19, 1967, as extended, for a cooperative program in science. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome August 25 and September 10, 1975. Entered into force September 10, 1975.

### Portugal

Loan agreement relating to housing for low-income families, with annex. Signed at Lisbon June 30, 1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975.

## PUBLICATIONS

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Telecommunication—Pre-sunrise Operation of Certain Standard (AM) Radio Broadcasting Stations.** Agreement with Canada modifying the agreement of March 31 and June 12, 1967, as amended. TIAS 8015. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8015).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Bangladesh amending the agreement of October 14, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8016. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8016).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with the Republic of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of October 8, 1974. TIAS 8017. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8017).

**Trade in Cotton Textiles.** Agreement with Jamaica amending and extending the agreement of September 29, 1967, as amended and extended. TIAS 8018. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8018).

**Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses.** Agreement with Israel extending the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended and extended. TIAS 8019. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8019).

**Fisheries.** Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics extending the agreements of February 21, 1973, as extended. TIAS 8020. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8020).

**Fisheries—Certain Fisheries Problems on the High Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean.** Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 8021. 29 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8021).

**Fisheries—Consideration of Claims Resulting from Damage to Fishing Vessels or Gear and Measures To Prevent Fishing Conflicts.** Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics amending the agreement of February 21, 1973, as amended. TIAS 8022. 10 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8022).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreements with the Republic of Korea amending the agreement of April 12, 1973, as amended. TIAS 8023. 8 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8023).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Pakistan amending the agreement of November 23, 1974. TIAS 8024. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8024).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with the Republic of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of October 8, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8025. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8025).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with India. TIAS 8026. 20 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8026).

**Trade in Textiles With Macao.** Agreement with Portugal. TIAS 8027. 23 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8027).

**Technical Consultations and Training.** Agreement with Portugal. TIAS 8028. 17 pp. 40¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:8028).

**Military Mission to Iran.** Agreement with Iran extending the agreement of October 6, 1947, as amended and extended. TIAS 8029. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8029).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Chile amending the agreement of October 25, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8030. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8030).

**Finance—Consulting Services.** Agreement with Portugal. TIAS 8038. 23 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8038).

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

Colombia. President Lopez of Colombia Makes State Visit to the United States (Ford, Lopez, joint communique) . . . . . 588

Congress  
 Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy . . . . . 603  
 Department Reviews Recent Developments in U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (Rogers) . . . . . 596  
 Guidelines Explained for Testimony to House Intelligence Committee (Eagleburger) . . . . . 599  
 Policy on Private Humanitarian Aid to Viet-Nam Discussed (joint State-Treasury-Commerce statement before House subcommittee) . . . . . 601

Cuba. Department Reviews Recent Developments in U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (Rogers) . . . . . 596

Cyprus. President Welcomes Passage of Bill Modifying Turkish Arms Embargo (statement by President Ford) . . . . . 595

Department and Foreign Service. Guidelines Explained for Testimony to House Intelligence Committee (Eagleburger) . . . . . 599

Export Controls. Policy on Private Humanitarian Aid to Viet-Nam Discussed (joint State-Treasury-Commerce statement before House subcommittee) . . . . . 601

Greece. President Welcomes Passage of Bill Modifying Turkish Arms Embargo (statement by President Ford) . . . . . 595

Korea. U.S. Repeats Veto of U.N. Admission of North and South Viet-Nam (Moynihan) . . . . . 604

Latin America. The Western Hemisphere: Our Common Future (Kissinger) . . . . . 584

Middle East. Furthering Peace in the Middle East (Kissinger) . . . . . 581

Organization of American States. Department Reviews Recent Developments in U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (Rogers) . . . . . 596

Presidential Documents  
 President Lopez of Colombia Makes State Visit to the United States . . . . . 588  
 President Welcomes Passage of Bill Modifying Turkish Arms Embargo . . . . . 595

Publications. GPO Sales Publications . . . . . 608

Spain. U.S. and Spain Set New Framework of Cooperative Relationships (joint statement) . . . . . 587

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . . . 607

Turkey. President Welcomes Passage of Bill Modifying Turkish Arms Embargo (statement by President Ford) . . . . . 595

United Nations  
 U.S. Repeats Veto of U.N. Admission of North and South Viet-Nam (Moynihan) . . . . . 604

Viet-Nam  
 Policy on Private Humanitarian Aid to Viet-Nam Discussed (joint State-Treasury-Commerce statement before House subcommittee) . . . . . 601  
 U.S. Repeats Veto of U.N. Admission of North and South Viet-Nam (Moynihan) . . . . . 604

*Name Index*

Eagleburger, Lawrence S . . . . . 599  
 Ford, President . . . . . 588, 595  
 Kissinger, Secretary . . . . . 581, 584  
 Lopez Michelsen, Alfonso . . . . . 588  
 Miller, Robert H . . . . . 601  
 Moynihan, Daniel P . . . . . 604  
 Rogers, William D . . . . . 596

**Check List of Department of State  
 Press Releases: Sept. 29–Oct. 5**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
506	9/29	Kissinger: toast at dinner for Arab League members' U.N. Representatives, New York.
507	9/30	Kissinger: toast at luncheon for Latin American Foreign Ministers and U.N. Representatives, New York.
*508	10/1	Shipping Coordinating Committee, U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, working group on oil content meters, Nov. 6.
*509	10/1	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 21–22.
†510	10/1	International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries seventh special meeting.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.