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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

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Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of July 25

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at the White House on July 25.

Press release 387 dated July 25

Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford: This is all on the record, for immediate release and quotation. Maybe the best way to go at this would be to have 20 minutes or so of questions on the trip, which begins tomorrow, and 15 minutes or so, if there are other matters that interest you. The Secretary has a crowded schedule today, and we would like to try to hold this to somewhere between 30 and 35 minutes.

Secretary Kissinger: Barry [Barry Schweid, Associated Press], I understand you have the first question.

Q. I was going to ask a Middle East question. There is a statement here that the White House has put out on the trip.[1] *In it, the President says the Helsinki declaration will further the aspirations of the people of Eastern Europe, and he restates our commitment to the peaceful changes. In a specific way, can you tell us how somehow this will further the aspirations of the people now locked into the Soviet sphere?*

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, one has to analyze what the phrase "locked into the Soviet sphere" means.

Q. Lithuania, Latvia, and part of the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: In those countries, the existing situation in Europe reflects, among other things, a balance of forces and a state of affairs that has continued for a generation. It was not created by a document, and it will not, as such, be changed by a document.

Therefore, the question that has had to be answered in the entire postwar period and has been answered in different ways at different times is, what is more helpful for a humane evolution, a policy of confrontation or a policy of easing tensions; whether peoples can realize their aspirations better under conditions in which there is political, and a threat of military, conflict or under conditions in which the two sides are attempting to settle their disputes and ease tensions.

The judgment that has been made—and it is important to remember that it is not only that of the United States but of all West European countries—is that a policy in which an attempt is made to settle political conflicts will help the humane values that they espouse.

This was the basis for Chancellor [of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy] Brandt's Ostpolitik in 1969, in which he faced within his country the question of whether the objectives that he sought were best achieved by a policy of political confrontation or by a policy of easing tensions.

He gave the answer; he made the decisions as far as the Federal Republic and the German question was concerned, which in turn was at the heart of the European problem.

The agreement by the United States to attend the European Security Conference was in fact made conditional on progress on the German question and particularly on the solution of the Berlin issue.

So, therefore, it is, I believe, that the easing of tensions in the world and easing of tensions in Europe will help ease the lives of people and may contribute to an evolution in which the problems that produced the cold

[1] See p. 204.

war can be dealt with more effectively.

No document is going to change the existing balance of power on the Continent, and therefore there are limits to what any agreement can achieve, but this is the sense in which the President used that paragraph.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you foresee as being the consequences of yesterday's House vote on the Turkish arms embargo? Do you see any progress in—

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to answer that in the second part of the press conference.

Q. Question please.

Secretary Kissinger: The question was the consequences of the House vote on the Turkish aid embargo, and I would prefer to answer this—if we could keep the first 20 minutes on the trip and the implications of the trip and the second 20 minutes on general foreign policy questions—

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President will be meeting with Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] twice. Can you describe what will be discussed in those talks and how far apart and how difficult to narrow is the gap on the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, every time the President and the General Secretary meet, there is a general review of the world situation. But I would think that the three subjects that will receive most attention will be primarily SALT, then the further evolution of European negotiations such as MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions], and finally, undoubtedly there will be a discussion about the Middle East.

With respect to the SALT negotiations, Foreign Minister [of the U.S.S.R. Andrei A.] Gromyko gave us some replies to the American position on SALT while we met in Geneva. On several important categories, these represented distinct progress.

In other categories, there is still a gap. The issues on which a gap remains are substantially fewer in number than was the case a few weeks ago. So, what the President and the General Secretary will attempt to do is to see whether the issues on which progress has been made—how to turn them over to Geneva, and on the issues on which progress still remains to be made, whether they can narrow the differences.

It is our view that a SALT agreement is possible and that the issues on which the compromises have to be made are now quite clearly defined, and therefore it depends on political decisions in both countries.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, since the United States is going to go into the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] summit with absolutely no economic policy whatsoever except massive austerity and triage, which is backed up by the kind of international terrorisms that you are now personally implicated in, in the Colt arms deal and Black September and various other things, New Solidarity would like to know what you are going to tell us will be the American response to the Soviet alternative to all of this, which is increasing trade arrangements with the Third World and Western Europe based on a transfer of rubles which would undercut the existing dollar debt structure—

Q. Question?

Q. What was the question, Dr. Kissinger? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: The question was almost as complicated as my answers tend to be and probably a little more comprehensible. But if I understand the question it was, has the United States an economic policy—I am leaving out the various personal allusions—

Q. No, what would your response be to the Soviet policy which has now been made clear?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have to make clear that at the European Security Conference the Soviet Union is not likely to put forward an integrated economic policy to which we have to respond, because the European Security Conference really is primarily concerned with ratifying the agreements that have been reached in stage

two and to permit each of the leaders to make a policy statement.

However, at the side there will be many bilateral discussions. The United States—leaving aside the various comments about Soviet economic policy—the United States requires a foreign economic policy for an extremely rapidly changing world and one which it is quite possible the Soviet Union may attempt to enter over the next five to ten years, but I do not believe that that issue will come up at Helsinki.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you think the Russians seem so interested in having such a conference? What do they get out of it?

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to stress that our policy has to be made in terms of our purposes. We should not gear our policy to preventing something that the Soviets may have a motive for doing. We have to assess whether it also serves our own purposes.

Now, the European Security Conference has been a part of Soviet policy since 1953 and 1954. At that time, it had a totally different purpose. At that time, it was designed to keep the Federal Republic from entering NATO.

It has been resurrected at periodic intervals by the Soviet Union. It was rejected for a long time by all the European nations as well as the United States.

In the 1960's an increasing number of West European nations moved toward acceptance of the idea of a European Security Conference. And then, in the late 1960's, with the beginning of the change in German policy, it gained a momentum in which the United States decided that it was wiser to participate in that process rather than to attempt to block it.

However, the conditions have changed importantly since this process was initiated, and I would say that for the Soviet Union it was started at one time to prevent the Federal Republic from entering NATO.

In the 1960's it may have been conceived as a kind of a substitute peace treaty, but then as the 1960's developed, many of the issues which originally could have been discussed at the European Security Conference were settled in a series of bilateral agreements which the Soviet Union made with every West European country and the United States, so now the focus of the European Security Conference has drifted more to a general statement of principles rather than the character it had then.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has continued to attach great importance to it, perhaps in part because, like other governments, when something has been such a cardinal aim, once it is achieved, even if some of the original assumptions have somewhat altered, it still retains its importance as an achievement, as a long-held goal.

But as far as the United States is concerned, we see the significance of the Security Conference as a useful step in a general pattern of the improvement of relations between the East and West. We do not consider it an additional ratification of any existing arrangement. We consider these principles of conduct that repeat what has already been stated in many bilateral arrangements and add to it certain principles of peaceful change and improved human contact, which we consider useful progress but which we will confine to the words "useful progress."

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States initially came to the position of participating in the conference in the belief that also some parallel progress should be made in MBFR. Can you tell us now what progress is being made in MBFR?

Secretary Kissinger: No, that is not a correct description of what the U.S. position has been. The United States linked the opening of the European Security Conference to the opening of the MBFR discussion. During the course of it, it was never the position of the United States, and certainly never the position of our West European allies, that progress in both of these negotiations should be linked, and indeed on the one or two occasions that we explored the possibility of this link with our West European allies, they rejected the concept that the force reduction negotiations should be conducted in step with the European Security Conference.

So the fact that they are not linked together is primarily due to discussions within the West, and it has never been a condition that the United States made.

The question is, where do we stand on the force reduction negotiations? The United States attaches importance to the force reduction negotiations. Without question, the President will raise this in his discussion with the General Secretary.

These negotiations are now in recess. They have followed the procedures and the general atmosphere that occur in the general course of these negotiations, which is that they go through a long discussion of technical phases in which the positions of the two sides are not frequently compatible.

They are now at a point where some decisions have to be made on both sides. Some decisions have to be made on both sides modifying the positions that exist.

The positions that have been taken up to now, while they have been irreconcilable, have nevertheless enabled both sides to study the technical implications of a number of reduction proposals that have been put forward. We are now at a phase where this requires a decision—which has happened also in the SALT negotiations—to move things into a stage of more detailed negotiations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one criticism of this conference is that its purposes are so modest that it does not seem to warrant engaging the presence of the President of the United States and 34 other heads of government, to sign these papers. How do you respond to that?

Secretary Kissinger: The position that the United States took throughout the conference was that we would attend the conference at the highest level if this was the judgment of the other participants and if sufficient progress were made to justify it.

That "sufficient progress" was defined during the conference as progress in the so-called Basket 3 on human rights and progress on the military provisions of the advance notification of maneuvers and, finally, on the clause with respect to peaceful change in Basket 1 on the statement of principles. These objectives were substantially attained.

Nevertheless, the United States did not agree to the summit level until all the major West European countries had previously agreed to it, and it was our view that nuances that might separate one in one's assessment of this did not warrant breaking allied unity on the subject.

Secondly, the conference will give a very useful opportunity, of course, for the meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev and also with other leaders for the President to exchange views and to make progress on outstanding issues.

So on the whole we consider the content of the conference useful, and the visit will also make a significant contribution in a number of areas.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the meeting with Brezhnev, you had talked about SALT a little bit, but can you be more specific? Has there been progress on the verification issue, and has the Soviet Union accepted American proposals on the counting of MIRV's [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles] or have they come up with a viable substitute?

And two, are you seeking Soviet forbearance for an interim agreement or for American presence, as technicians, in the Middle East? What do you want to talk about on the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to SALT, I have no question that within the next weeks it will seep out of various elements in the government, uncharacteristically, but in summer our standards relax a little.

But I have promised Foreign Minister Gromyko that until the negotiations were somewhat further advanced not to go into a detailed description of the proposal.

I can only repeat what I have said before, that in some areas some significant progress has been made. In other areas, considerable differences remain. And, of course, the United States has attached importance to the verification issue, but I don't want to go

into where the differences remain and where the progress has been made.

With respect to the Middle East, to say the United States asked for Soviet forbearance is to imply a state of affairs that may not correspond to facts. We naturally, as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, periodically review the Middle East situation with the Soviet Union. We have also always held the view that no final settlement could be made in the Middle East that excluded Soviet participation.

So what we have to discuss with the Soviet Union is where down the road and in what manner the approaches to a final settlement will be made.

With respect to negotiations now in progress, it is not correct to say we are seeking Soviet forbearance, so, of course, the restraint of all of the parties as well as outside countries in that process, is of utility.

Mr. Nessen: Let's open it up now for more general questions, for 15 minutes.

Q. I would like to ask this question to bridge the two subjects. Mr. Secretary, the Administration is encountering extraordinary criticism here of the President's trip to Helsinki. Simultaneously, the Administration suffered a major setback in Congress yesterday on the Turkish vote and also in committee on the Jordanian Hawk missiles. Can it be the Administration is seriously misjudging the Congress and the public in terms of what their views are of what the traffic will bear on foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: One of the benefits of détente is that you can criticize détente; and if we did not have it, we would be criticized for missing opportunities for peace.

Is it true? Is the Administration misjudging what the temper of the country is? We believe that in the basic direction of East-West relations, the Administration is in no way misjudging the temper of the country.

In any event, the Administration has an obligation to put before the country and to put before the Congress its best judgment of what is required for peace or progress toward peace in certain areas, even if it should get defeated on the issues.

First, on the East-West relations, we do not believe we are misjudging the temper of the country, and we ought to keep in perspective the nature of the criticism, the depth of the criticism, and we ought to be aware of the fact that what makes the criticism possible at all is that we are not living under conditions of crisis.

So there is a temptation to have all the benefits of peace, as well as all the benefits of looking tough.

With respect to the Turkish aid vote, I believe this is a result of a special congressional situation that existed before last year and of considerable pressures that were mounted.

We offered a compromise between the total cutoff and the total restoration, which we favored. We believe that it is a very unfortunate decision. We had no choice except to request a change in a congressional decision which is unfortunate for Greece, unfortunate for Turkey, unfortunate for the possibilities of a settlement in Cyprus, and unfortunate for the security of the eastern Mediterranean.

I think it is a tragic evolution, and I hope that when this subject continues to be discussed, it will not be seen in terms of a conflict between the executive and the legislative and not trying to prove who was right to begin with, but trying to see it in terms of the fundamental interests of the United States and the basic requirements of peace.

It is in that spirit that we will try to live with the decision and we will try to do the best we can. We will have to come back to the Congress with our best judgment later on.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen says a CIA spokesman told him the Soviets are pumping about $10 million a month into Portugal to finance a Communist takeover of that country.

Senator Bentsen says the State Department tells him there are unconfirmed reports of $2 million a month. Can you tell us what you know about how the Soviets are inter-

vening in the internal affairs of Portugal? Is this intervention not a violation of the European security agreement, and if it is a violation, why are we signing the agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, with respect to the CIA estimates, we may have reached a point where the CIA estimates to nongovernmental personnel have a greater degree of precision than the CIA estimates which we received.

We have not been given that figure, but that is not the point. I have not seen any confirmed reports of any particular figure, $10 million, $2 million, or any other figure. What I have seen makes $10 million seem high, but that is not the issue which you are raising.

With respect to Portugal, it is important to remember a number of things.

First, the original change in Portugal had nothing to do with the Communist Party of Portugal or with the Soviet Union. That resulted from the colonial war and the inefficiency and lack of popular base of the previous authoritarian government.

Secondly, when the change occurred, the evolution it took also was largely due to internal Portuguese trends, including the fact that the dominant Armed Forces Movement had been serving in African colonial wars for a long time and had not perhaps been in the mainstream of Western European liberal democratic thought.

Thirdly, in assessing what outside powers did, it is important to assess not only what one side did do but what the Western countries, for a variety of reasons, did not do. In making a fair assessment of the evolution in Portugal, both of these factors have to be taken into account.

Fourthly, to the extent that the Soviet Union is active in Portugal, we consider it incompatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions, and we will bring it to the attention of the Soviet leaders when we meet with them, as we already have brought it to their attention.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that question, what do they say?

Q. What do they say when you bring it to their attention?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is, first of all, what is the degree of their intervention?

I will not go into the details of the diplomatic discussions. We have brought it to their attention. If there is any result from our approaches, the result is more likely to be reflected in actions—if there is any result—than in a long exchange, because governments are not in the habit of confirming this kind of activity.

I would like to stress, however, again, it is an easy way out for us to blame everything that goes against our interests on Soviet machinations. We have also to consider the failures of the West to do what it can do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say now or give any indication how close you believe Egypt and Israel are to reaching a new interim agreement and whether you believe another shuttle will be required?

Secretary Kissinger: Egypt and Israel, in my view, are now both making serious efforts. These efforts still have left considerable gaps between the two positions. Nevertheless, if the two sides can survive each other's public statements—which is not yet self-evident to me—I believe that they are beginning now to talk about the same range of issues in a negotiable manner.

Whether there will in fact be an agreement is premature to say. If we should get close to an agreement and if the success is probable, then I would think that a shuttle will be necessary to work out the language and the final details.

We are not yet at the point where we can make that decision; but basically there has been a serious effort by both sides which has led to a narrowing of the differences, which in several key areas, however, are still quite wide.

Q. Can I follow that up, Mr. Secretary?

Are you prepared at this point to offer any suggestion of your own in order to bridge the gap between the two sides?

Secretary Kissinger: In the mediating process in which we are engaged we obviously, when we receive ideas from either side, occasionally indicate what in our view the traffic will bear and occasionally make suggestions of the direction in which we believe progress can be made.

We have not thought, up to now, that the difference between the two sides was sufficiently narrow for us to put forward an integrated American plan, and we still do not think we have reached that point and, moreover, it is not necessary as long as there is not any total deadlock, and we don't believe there is a deadlock now.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that the CIA plotted to overthrow the Allende regime in Chile. In one instance, the plot included the kidnapping of a ranking military officer of that country. Is this indeed the case, and were you aware of it, and did you do anything about it?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that any purpose is served by discussing fragmentary reports that leak out of this or that office. All the documents on all the covert activities that have ever been planned or carried out in Chile have been submitted to the Church committee [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities].

The Church committee therefore will be able to make a report based on all the documents in everybody's file, and it will be able to distinguish between things that may have been talked about and things that were actually done in a way that the press does not always do in reporting about it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am just interested in your answer to Murrey Marder a while ago on this criticism, where you said one of the things we have to do is keep in perspective the nature and depth of the criticism. What does that mean? Does that mean the criticism is invalid in some ways?

Secretary Kissinger: No, it does not mean that even remotely. The criticism is put forward by serious people with serious concerns, but I believe also that it does not necessarily reflect the majority of the American people.

It is inevitable when you conduct a policy across as wide a range of issues as are involved in moving toward a less tense relation with the East European countries and the Soviet Union, that there are many aspects of it that will be objected to by this or that group.

Our point is that one has to look at the evolution; and secondly, one has to look at the alternative, and one has to ask oneself what the alternative policy is that is being proposed.

We respect the views of the critics. We take them seriously; but we have to assess that criticism on its merits, and we have to assess also its threats.

Q. Would you answer a question on CSCE vis-a-vis the matter of human rights, which there has been skepticism raised about? How far are the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries willing to go on the matter of respecting the human rights embodied in the CSCE document, and how optimistic are you that the Soviet Government and the Eastern European bloc will liberalize to that extent?

Secretary Kissinger: On the so-called Basket 3, which contains the human rights provisions, the outcome of the conference was substantially a Soviet acceptance of a joint Western proposal that was made as a final agreed position in early May. So if all of these provisions are carried out, we believe it would be a substantial step forward.

At the same time, of course, we cannot assert that this document is without legal force with respect to us, but is of legal force with respect to the other side. Therefore a great deal depends on the general atmosphere that exists in the world on whether these guidelines and principles will in fact be implemented.

What the so-called Basket 3 does is to enable the West and the United States to ap-

peal to agreed documents as a guide for conduct, and this is what we will do. And we will also hope to bring about a further improvement of East-West relations that would accelerate the process and improve the atmosphere. It is not absolutely binding, but it is a step forward, to have Communist agreement with these principles; and we will do our utmost to hold them to it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what reaction do you anticipate the Turkish Government will take in response to what Congress has done? Will they now cause us to have to give up, leave, or otherwise terminate some of our bases there?

Secretary Kissinger: I have learned one thing in recent months, which is that if what you predict happens, you are blamed for having caused the result which you foresee by your prediction; and therefore I am not going to make a prediction which we will then be accused of having encouraged the Turkish Government to take.

We believe that it was a very unfortunate and sad decision that was taken yesterday because it helped nobody, including those who passionately urged it. But we have made this case now.

We have been told by the Turkish Government on innumerable occasions that there would be some reaction. We are now engaged in talking to the Turkish Government—I had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Demirel this morning; the President sent him a message yesterday—in trying to urge restraint and moderation on the Turkish Government, because the basic values that are involved in our joint defense and that affect issues far beyond Turkish-American relations have not changed as a result of this vote.

So we are hoping that Turkey will not take any precipitous action and give everybody an opportunity to see whether progress can be made on the issues that have produced this in the first place, so I would not want to make a prediction. I do not know what the Turkish reaction to our appeals will be.

European Security Conference Discussed by President Ford

Statement by President Ford [1]

I am glad to have this opportunity, before taking off for Europe tomorrow, to discuss with you frankly how I feel about the forthcoming European Security Conference in Helsinki.

I know there are some honest doubts and disagreements among good Americans about this meeting with the leaders of Eastern and Western European countries and Canada —35 nations altogether.

There are those who fear the conference will put a seal of approval on the political division of Europe that has existed since the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic nations and set new boundaries elsewhere in Europe by military action in World War II. These critics contend that participation by the United States in the Helsinki understandings amounts to tacit recognition of a status quo which favors the Soviet Union and perpetuates its control over countries allied with it.

On the other extreme there are critics who say the meeting is a meaningless exercise because the Helsinki declarations are merely statements of principles and good intentions which are neither legally binding nor enforceable and cannot be depended upon. They express concern, however, that the result will be to make the free governments of Western Europe and North America less wary and lead to a letting down of NATO's political guard and military defenses.

If I seriously shared these reservations I would not be going, but I certainly understand the historical reasons for them and, especially, the anxiety of Americans whose ancestral homelands, families, and friends have been and still are profoundly affected

[1] Made on July 25 at a meeting at the White House with seven Members of Congress and representatives of Eastern European ethnic groups (text from White House press release).

by East-West political developments in Europe.

I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any participating state. The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West.

It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe—with whom we have close ties of culture and blood—by every proper and peaceful means. I believe the outcome of this European Security Conference will be a step—how long a step remains to be tested—in that direction. I hope my visits to Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia will again demonstrate our continuing friendship and interest in the welfare and progress of the fine people of Eastern Europe.

To keep the Helsinki Conference in perspective, we must remember that it is not simply another summit between the superpowers. On the contrary, it is primarily a political dialogue among the Europeans, East, West, and neutral, with primary emphasis on European relationships rather than global differences. The United States has taken part, along with Canada, to maintain the solidarity of the Atlantic alliance and because our absence would have caused a serious imbalance for the West.

We have acted in concert with our free and democratic partners to preserve our interests in Berlin and Germany and have obtained the public commitment of the Warsaw Pact governments to the possibility of peaceful adjustment of frontiers—a major concession which runs quite contrary to the allegation that present borders are being permanently frozen.

The Warsaw Pact nations met important Western preconditions—the Berlin Agreement of 1971, the force reduction talks now underway in Vienna—before our agreement to go to Helsinki.

Specifically addressing the understandable concern about the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic nations, I can assure you as one who has long been interested in this question that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and is not doing so now. Our official policy of nonrecognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.

There is included in the declaration of principles on territorial integrity the provision that no occupation or acquisition of territory in violation of international law will be recognized as legal. This is not to raise the hope that there will be any immediate change in the map of Europe, but the United States has not abandoned and will not compromise this longstanding principle.

The question has been asked: What have we given up in these negotiations and what have we obtained in return from the other side? I have studied the negotiations and declarations carefully and will discuss them even more intensely with other leaders in Helsinki. In my judgment, the United States and the open countries of the West already practice what the Helsinki accords preach and have no intention of doing what they prohibit—such as using force or restricting freedoms. We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights.

We are getting a public commitment by the leaders of the more closed and controlled countries to a greater measure of freedom and movement for individuals, information, and ideas than has existed there in the past and establishing a yardstick by which the world can measure how well they live up to these stated intentions. It is a step in the direction of a greater degree of European community, of expanding East-West con-

tacts, of more normal and healthier relations in an area where we have the closest historic ties. Surely this is the best interest of the United States and of peace in the world.

I think we are all agreed that our world cannot be changed for the better by war; that in the thermonuclear age our primary task is to reduce the danger of unprecedented destruction. This we are doing through continuing Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union and the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. This European Security Conference in Helsinki, while it contains some military understandings such as advance notice of maneuvers, should not be confused with either the SALT or MBFR negotiations. The Helsinki summit is linked with our overall policy of working to reduce East-West tensions and pursuing peace, but it is a much more general and modest undertaking.

Its success or failure depends not alone on the United States and the Soviet Union but primarily upon its 33 European signatories, East, West, and neutral. The fact that each of them, large and small, can have their voices heard is itself a good sign. The fact that these very different governments can agree, even on paper, to such principles as greater human contacts and exchanges, improved conditions for journalists, reunification of families and international marriages, a freer flow of information and publications, and increased tourism and travel seems to me a development well worthy of positive and public encouragement by the United States. If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot of the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better, and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far.

I saw an editorial the other day entitled "Jerry, Don't Go."

But I would rather read that than headlines all over Europe saying "United States Boycotts Peace Hopes."

So I am going, and I hope your support goes with me.

Department Stresses Importance of Economic Assistance Programs

Statement by Robert S. Ingersoll
Deputy Secretary [1]

It is with pleasure that I appear before this committee this morning. The Administration greatly welcomes the consideration your committee is and will be giving toward one of the most essential elements in our framework of international cooperation; namely, our economic assistance program.

Our country, about to enter the third century of its existence as a nation, faces problems of enormous complexity which go beyond the political and economic techniques devised in response to needs of an earlier, simpler time. Today, when change is constant and accelerating, when the fates of so many societies are closely interwoven, the essential conditions of our international cooperation need to be strong and well considered, and they must enjoy the support of the American Congress and people.

Since the beginning of this decade many new factors have transformed the international scene. Japan and Europe have emerged as major economic forces. There has been some muting of East-West tensions along with the concurrent growth in complexity and destructiveness of military power. In the postcolonial era, the number and diversity of developing nations have increased. These countries represent 70 percent of the world's population. Their underdevelopment, poverty, and scarce managerial skills are a detriment to themselves and to stable international conditions.

The people who comprise the southern part of the globe face problems of hunger and malnutrition, of inadequate health services, poor education, and unemployment. They

[1] Made before the House Committee on International Relations on July 14. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

need help from the United States and other industrialized countries in their efforts to improve the quality of their lives. One significant way to approach this goal is through an aid program designed to help meet the basic needs of the majority of these countries.

This committee, two years ago, took the initiative to give new emphasis to our assistance programs by addressing the problems of food and nutrition and of population and health. It also took the initiative to stress an AID [Agency for International Development] program design which, to the extent possible, directly aids the poor in less developed countries (LDC's). Seventy-two percent of the development assistance program for fiscal year 1976, which you are considering today, will go to countries with a per capita income of less than $275 per annum. The U.S. emphasis on this assistance to the poorest elements is echoed by the other international development institutions. Similarly, American innovations in the sectors of food production and education have served as models for such institutions—the World Bank, for instance.

Our record in the past has been a good one. Indeed, one of the more important achievements over the past decade has been the success of our efforts in helping the poor countries achieve a commendable level of economic growth, although all poor countries have not shared in this. We have also engaged other donor countries in increasing the flow of assistance to the less developed. For every dollar of U.S. economic aid we now provide, other donors are providing two dollars of assistance.

In effect, we have participated with others in creating an international system of assistance-giving that is unprecedented in the history of mankind. We must continue to contribute our fair share along with European nations and Japan while at the same time encouraging the oil-rich countries to increase their portion of the assistance burden. Despite their current economic difficulties, other countries are maintaining and many are increasing their contributions.

We do well to preserve and to maintain a role which represents an essential continuity in our foreign policy. We have been a generous donor in the past. The United States has been in the forefront of those countries who have shared their bounty with others less developed, although, expressed in real terms, the volume of official development assistance over the past decade has remained relatively the same. Yet our bilateral aid programs are the vital means whereby we remain active partners in the difficult long-term process of working with other nations to foster a less chaotic world through economic growth and an enhancing of the human condition.

To fail to deal with these problems can lead to economic-bloc confrontation and breakdown in the world economic system. To fail to respond effectively to the basic economic and social issues will have an effect on our own economic order and ultimately on our own security. To falter in our aid because of current domestic economic problems would be a form of beggar-thy-neighbor policy that would be taken as a signal of U.S. indifference to the problems of the world's poor.

The United States recognizes the responsibilities that accompany its political, economic, and military power. And we recognize our own self-interest in promoting cooperative approaches.

Our relations with the less developed countries embrace a network of important economic, political, and defense agreements. In the economic sphere alone we depend on some of them both to supply critical raw materials and to absorb many of our exports.

Last year, the LDC's purchased approximately one-third of our exports. Our balance-of-trade surplus with non-oil-producing LDC's was approximately $5.5 billion. This never would have occurred in the absence of current interlocking network of development assistance programs by all the industrialized nations. U.S. investment in LDC's has grown to over $28 billion as of last year. These statistics indicate that the U.S. relationship

with LDC's is not one-sided, with all the benefits flowing in one direction.

Growing worldwide economic interdependence and the increasing impact of events abroad on our domestic policies requires the United States to play an active economic role on the world stage. There is mutuality of interest in expanding trade and investment, in monetary stability, in equitable access to raw materials, and in the protection of the environment.

We are convinced that an international system whose paramount characteristic is rivalry between blocs will result in instability and confrontation. The outcome of such a situation would be disastrous, especially for the less developed countries. The international order will be stable only so long as its economic benefits are widely shared and its arrangements are perceived as just.

The United States cannot prosper as an island of plenty in a world of deprivation. A foreign aid program becomes an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy aimed at:

—Making it possible for cooperation rather than confrontation to become the way the North-South dialogue is conducted.

—Engaging the ingenuity, creativity, and technical competence of our nation to cope with the problems of hunger, disease, illiteracy, and poverty which characterize the lot of most of the rest of the world.

—Assisting in the expansion of the world's trade and more productive employment for all nations.

If our foreign policy fulfills what is best in America, the world will not remain always divided between the permanently poor and the permanently rich.

Responsibility for Indochina Refugee Task Force Transferred to HEW

Statement by President Ford [1]

I am today formally announcing the transfer of principal operational responsibility of the Interagency Task Force for the resettlement of refugees from Indochina from the Department of State to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Since I formed the task force in April, the resettlement of refugees has become primarily a domestic rather than foreign affairs concern. A great deal has been accomplished in evacuating, caring for, and resettling refugees from Indochina. However, much remains to be done. I ask all Americans to open their hearts to these refugees as we have to others throughout our history.

Mrs. Julia Taft, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who has been acting as Director of the Task Force since the departure of Ambassador Dean Brown, will continue as Director. All decisions and activities regarding the domestic and international resettlement of refugees from Indochina will be coordinated by her. She will act under my direction and in close coordination with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees. Mrs. Taft's responsibilities will continue to involve numerous governmental departments, and I am directing each of them to offer her their full cooperation and support in this important task.

[1] Issued on July 21 (text from White House press release).

Department Discusses Situation in Southern Rhodesia

Following are statements by Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 10.[1]

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIS

I welcome this opportunity to meet with the subcommittee again—this time for an exchange of views on the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Ambassador William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, is here with me today.

As you know, Rhodesia is technically a self-governing British colony in revolt against the British Government. Its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) of 1965 has not been formally recognized by any country. The regime of Ian Smith, representing less than 5 percent of the total Rhodesian population, has since 1965 taken steps to perpetuate white minority rule and to exclude the African majority from meaningful participation in the political and economic life of the country.

For the better part of 10 years the Rhodesian problem has evaded every solution despite repeated efforts of the British Government, supported by the United Nations, which imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 1966 and 1968.

Since the accession of Mozambique to independence, the situation in southern Africa, including Rhodesia, has changed. As you know, Mozambique, a nation with a 700-mile common border with Rhodesia, became independent just two weeks ago. The independence of Mozambique and the possibility of the closing of its borders to Rhodesian trade has placed additional pressure on the Smith regime. (It is estimated that some 80 percent of Rhodesian exports and imports go through Mozambique.)

There are some indications of an increased perception within the minority regime that its present course can only lead to further violence and tragedy and that it would be preferable to enter into serious negotiations with representatives of the African majority on the future of Rhodesia. Leaders of the neighboring states of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa are seeking to exert influence toward the promotion of peaceful solution in Rhodesia. Preliminary talks between the Smith regime and the Rhodesian nationalists, who formally united in December under the African National Council, are continuing, despite deadlocks, interruptions, and procedural difficulties. The formal unification of Rhodesian nationalists is a significant development, encouraged by Presidents Kaunda [of Zambia], Seretse Khama [of Botswana], Nyerere [of Tanzania], and Machel [of Mozambique]. The preliminary talks, which resulted from the December agreement in Lusaka, are designed to pave the way for a full-fledged constitutional conference.

Thus, there are some encouraging signs—

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

including the fact that the United Kingdom sent an emissary to Salisbury late in June to discuss with the Smith regime and with Rhodesian nationalist leaders the timing and modalities of a possible constitutional conference. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be a mistake to be overly optimistic. A Rhodesian settlement is still far from accomplishment at this point, and there is every likelihood that there will be a period of hard negotiations ahead.

The main lines of our policy toward Rhodesia have followed from the illegal Rhodesian UDI based on minority rule. In brief, we do not recognize the Rhodesian regime's claim to independence; we continue to regard the British Crown as the lawful sovereign in Rhodesia; we support the United Nations and the United Kingdom in their efforts to influence the Rhodesian regime to negotiate a peaceful settlement based on the principles of self-determination and eventual majority rule in Rhodesia. To this end we voted for and support the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia.

I might add, Mr. Chairman, that while our record of sanctions enforcement has been good, there is a major gap in this enforcement created by the Byrd amendment allowing the importation of chrome and certain other materials from Rhodesia. In addition to providing the regime in Salisbury with much-needed foreign exchange, the Byrd amendment has also provided moral and psychological support to that regime. I would like to stress again the Administration's support for legislation repealing the Byrd amendment (H.R. 1287) currently being considered by the Congress. We are very encouraged by the progress of the repeal bill, voted out of the House International Relations Committee yesterday. Early repeal not only would enable the United States to comply fully with its international obligations but, we hope, would add an important increment of influence on the Smith regime to move into serious negotiations regarding Rhodesia's future.

Mr. Chairman, we strongly support self-determination for the people of Rhodesia and hope that current efforts to arrive at a settlement acceptable to the population of Rhodesia as a whole will be successful.

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUFFUM

I should like to review briefly for this committee the nature of the U.N.'s concerns with Rhodesia and the U.S. position with regard to those concerns.

As you know, the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence from Great Britain on November 11, 1965. Great Britain, interested in granting independence to a multiracial state governed by majority rule, requested U.N. assistance in dealing with the Smith regime's persistent illegal claim to independence. The Security Council decided on November 12 and 20, 1965, to set in motion a program of voluntary economic sanctions directed at Southern Rhodesia at the request of the United Kingdom, calling on all states to refrain from assisting the illegal Smith regime and to do their utmost to break all economic relations with it, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products.

Early in April 1966 attempts were made to circumvent the voluntary oil embargo. On the grounds that such action, specifically the arrival of the oil tanker *Joanna V* at the port of Beira, Mozambique, could lead to a collapse of the entire sanctions program against Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom urgently requested a meeting of the Security Council on April 7, 1966. The British submitted a resolution before the Security Council describing the situation in Southern Rhodesia as "a threat to the peace," and it was adopted on April 9. The United States had participated in the voluntary sanctions, and if you wish I can supply this committee with a brief chronology of U.S. actions taken during 1965 and 1966.

The U.N. Security Council responded again to British requests for a meeting in December of 1966, and on December 16 again decided that the Rhodesian situation constituted a threat to the peace. The United

States concurred in these Security Council findings because we believed that a U.N. policy of passivity in the face of the Rhodesian rebellion would sharpen existing tensions in the southern half of Africa, encourage extremism on the part of both black and white communities in African states, and make possible exploitation of the situation by extremists of the left and right.

At the request of the United Kingdom, members of the U.N. Security Council concluded that selective mandatory sanctions should be applied against the Rhodesian regime. The prevailing hope was that the sanctions would induce the leaders in Rhodesia to agree to majority rule, a step which would clearly reduce the potential for violence in a very sensitive area of the African Continent. It was the first time that the Security Council had decided in favor of mandatory sanctions. While it was uncertain at the time what the actual effect of mandatory sanctions on the Smith regime might be, the U.S. support of this decision was based on the hope that the mandatory sanctions would assist the United Kingdom in its effort to create a more equitable political situation in the British territory.

The issue of sanctions is not without limits. In March of 1970, the United States first exercised its veto on a proposal to include further mandatory provisions to the effect that all states should sever all ties with the Smith regime, including means of transportation, postal service, and all forms of communication. The U.S. Representative, Ambassador Yost, pointed out that his government shared the desire to achieve an equitable solution to this problem, but that:

> The question . . . arises whether these more extreme measures which have been suggested would be sufficiently supported by the international community, especially those most directly concerned, to make them in fact effective . . . .

He further pointed out that the United States has consistently attached great significance to the maintenance of communications even where relations were strained, since we would view most seriously the prospect of leaving U.S. citizens anywhere in the world without the means to travel and communicate.

As to the U.S. actions pursuant to the Security Council decisions, on January 5, 1967, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11322, which implemented for the United States the Security Council's Resolution 232 of December 16, 1966.

The Security Council reconvened on the question of Southern Rhodesia, and on May 29, 1968, unanimously adopted Resolution 253, which reaffirmed the 1966 resolution, expanded the scope of the sanctions, and in addition, established a committee of the Security Council (commonly referred to as the Sanctions Committee) to monitor the implementation of the sanctions. The United States has been and is an active member of the Sanctions Committee, and we submit quarterly reports regarding trade (medical and educational materials are permitted) and investigations of possible violations. To date there are 237 cases of alleged sanctions violations by various states. Thirty-three of those cases involve U.S. importation of Rhodesian chrome.

The status of the Byrd amendment and its repeal are inextricably a part of U.S. participation in the Sanctions Committee. In November 1971, President Nixon signed into law the Military Procurement Authorization Act, of which section 503 was the Byrd amendment. The Byrd amendment permits the importation into the United States of certain strategic and critical materials, including those from Rhodesia. A key item included in this category is chrome.

This legislation had as a stated objective the lessening of U.S. dependence on the Soviet Union as a source of chromium imports. During the period before 1972, the United States had imported from the Soviet Union about one-half of its metallurgical-grade chromite. We imported virtually no chrome ore from Rhodesia from 1968 through 1971 inclusive, and no ferrochrome before 1972. Since 1972, our metallurgical-grade chromite imports from Rhodesia have remained steady at approximately 10 percent of total U.S. imports of this material.

However, imports of Rhodesian chromite seem to have replaced declining purchases from other countries rather than to have displaced imports from the Soviet Union. In general, importation of this material from areas other than Soviet Union has fallen, while the Soviet Union has maintained its relative percentage of total U.S. imports.

A few days after assuming the Presidency, President Ford stated his full commitment to the repeal of the Byrd amendment. Secretary Kissinger has declared [in a letter to Representative John Buchanan dated February 8, 1974] that he is personally convinced that the Byrd amendment is "not essential to our national security, brings us no real economic advantages, and is costly to the national interest of the United States in our conduct of foreign relations." His statement is particularly pertinent to the U.S. posture in the United Nations and the Security Council's Sanctions Committee. I hope that the Senate will see its way clear to repeal the Byrd amendment.

Department Discusses Situation in Angola

Statement by Nathaniel Davis
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs [1]

I welcome this opportunity to meet with the subcommittee for an exchange of views on the situation in Angola.

Angola, as you know, will be the last of Portugal's African colonies to attain its independence, which is scheduled for November 11 of this year. Unlike the situation in the other territories, where a single liberation movement existed when Portugal embarked on its policy of decolonization last year, three major liberation groups have existed in Angola for some years. In addition to agreement with Portugal, the three groups had to agree among themselves on the modalities for independence. This was done last January, and a transitional government composed of representatives of the three movements and of Portugal was installed on January 31.

The basic problem posed by the separate identities of the three groups and the strong competition between them for ultimate leadership of Angola was not resolved; and as you know, there have been recurring serious outbreaks of violence since January. The three movements, divided by ethnic, ideological, and personal differences, have made several efforts to reach political accommodation and to insure a peaceful transition to independence; but fighting among them has continued. A second "summit" meeting between leaders of the three groups took place in Nakuru, Kenya, June 16–21, under the sponsorship of President Kenyatta. We sincerely hope that the three leaders—Agostinho Neto of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Holden Roberto of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Jonas Savimbi of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—will continue to make serious efforts to resolve their differences through negotiations. The agreement reached on June 21 pledged each of them to sharing in the preparations for independence without additional bloodshed. Fighting between MPLA and FNLA broke out again late last week, however.

Our own position toward the future independent Angola was started by President Ford at the White House dinner for President Kaunda of Zambia on April 19, when he said:

> . . . we have been following developments in southern Africa with great, great interest. For many years the United States has supported self-determination for the peoples of that area, and we continue to do so today.
>
> We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola, and the island territories with great satisfaction, just as we viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau just last year.

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 14. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

. . . America stands ready to help the emerging countries . . . and to provide what assistance we can . . . .

I would add that we hope to enter into mutually beneficial relations with independent Angola at the appropriate time.

Although the problems now facing Angola and its leaders are profound, the country has a great potential which can only be realized if peace and order prevail. Angola's natural and human resources will, in the long term, make it a politically important and economically viable member of the family of nations. We look forward to welcoming Angola into the international community and wish the leaders success in reaching a peaceful resolution of their differences.

United States Extends Recognition to Republic of Cape Verde

Following is the text of a letter dated July 5 from President Ford to President Aristedes Pereira of the Republic of Cape Verde, which was released on July 14.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 21

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The American people join me in extending congratulations and best wishes to you and the people of the Republic of Cape Verde on the occasion of your independence. In this regard, I am pleased to inform you that the United States Government extends recognition to Cape Verde.

I am aware of the serious drought which has affected the islands for the past eight years. I know that this situation must be a matter of great concern as your government assumes the responsibilities for the well-being of your people. I am hopeful that the steps already taken by the United States to provide humanitarian aid and technical assistance to Cape Verde will help alleviate the current hardship and provide a base for economic development and future prosperity.

As the historic ties of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the United States and Cape Verde grow and strengthen, I look forward to the opportunity for our two nations to work together in the cause of peace, freedom and the welfare of mankind.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 5, 1975.*

Department Urges U.S. Participation in African Development Fund

Statement by Nathaniel Davis
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs [1]

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to testify on behalf of the proposed U.S. membership in the African Development Fund. The statement of my colleague Assistant Secretary Cooper [Charles A. Cooper, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs] has already provided you with a background analysis of the Fund and its financial operations. I would like to add to Assistant Secretary Cooper's statement and underline the importance of this legislation in our general relations with Africa.

The African Development Fund is the African Development Bank's affiliate institution for providing concessional assistance to Bank members. The Fund's membership includes the Bank, representing its member states, and non-African donors. We are proposing that the U.S. Government join and contribute to the Fund, the appropriate vehicle for American financial participation in the joint regional development activities of the two institutions. We do not consider the provisions of the Bank's charter which exclude non-African members to be detrimental to our interests nor an argument against our belonging to the Fund.

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance of the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing on July 15. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Our primary purpose in seeking to join the African Development Fund is to take our place with other donors in providing the financial resources required by an institution already proven effective in the African development effort. It is the clear sense of the Congress that our assistance should be directed to the needs of the poorest nations. Africa, despite progress made in recent years, remains one of the poorest regions of the world. Sixteen of the world's twenty-five least developed countries are in Africa. The resources of the African Development Fund have been largely directed to these 16 states. Thus, American membership in the Fund is entirely consistent with our own policies in encouraging African economic development.

Our growing economic stake in Africa also argues for U.S. participation in the African Development Fund. Assistant Secretary Cooper has noted the quintupling—from $1 billion to $5 billion—of American private investment in Africa over the last decade. U.S. trade with Africa doubled in value during 1974. The value of U.S. exports to Africa increased by 58 percent in 1974 although the doubling of trade largely reflects increased petroleum imports from Nigeria, now our first supplier of imported oil. The combined long-term trade and investment figures show a clear trend toward greatly increased interest by American business in African countries, both as suppliers and as purchasers of goods and services in our international trade.

This growth in our trade and investment relations with Africa has also involved a significant shift in geographic emphasis. Until the 1960's, when the majority of black African nations achieved independence, the American economic stake in the Republic of South Africa was almost as important as our economic involvement in the rest of Africa combined. However, when Angola becomes independent this year, 73 percent of direct American investment in Africa south of the Sahara and over three-fourths of our trade with that area will be with independent black African countries. Thus, our interest in those countries belonging to the African Development Bank has grown substantially.

Generally speaking, regional development finance institutions have two major advantages:

—Greater familiarity with and focus on regional development problems.

—Ability to provide a training ground in sound principles of development finance for regional nationals.

These merits are particularly valid in the case of the African Development Bank and Fund.

The application of local expertise by the Fund has been reflected in the institution's rightfully directing its major efforts toward rural infrastructure in the poorest African countries. Compared with other parts of the developing world, infrastructure deficiencies in Africa are relatively more important and intimately related to problems of rural development and self-sufficiency in food production.

Local confidence in the African Development Bank stems from the Bank's status as a unique example of self-help within the developing world. The African decision to restrict Bank membership to African states meant substantially reduced prospects for capital resources. Nevertheless, the Africans, on the basis of their colonial experience, were determined to establish an institution with full commitment to African interests. The African Development Fund was established as a separate affiliated institution to permit developed country participation in the African development effort without diluting the African character of the Bank. The African oil producers (Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, and Gabon) have recently increased their combined capital subscriptions to the Bank by $78 million. In addition, the Africans have asked Arab donors to use the Bank and Fund as vehicles for transferring Arab oil-producer resources into Africa. Finally, Algeria has turned over its $20 million contribution to the Arab-African solidarity fund to the Bank for administration.

Training in development finance for Africans within the Bank's operations is partic-

ularly effective not only because the Bank enjoys the confidence of African governments but also because the trainees are exposed to the expertise of the technical assistance staff provided separately by all major Fund donors. I would like strongly to endorse Assistant Secretary Cooper's support for continued AID-funded [Agency for International Development] American technical assistance to the Bank following our membership in the Fund. This formula of a Treasury-sponsored contribution to the Fund coupled with separate AID-funded technical assistance to the Bank is the most appropriate way for the United States to participate in the two institutions.

Assistant Secretary Cooper has described the growing financial importance of both the African Development Bank and Fund. These institutions are now recognized by the international financial community as vigorous and effective participants in the African development process. Participant donors have already begun the process of increasing their contributions to the Fund. Fund procurement is growing rapidly. Since procurement is limited to firms whose governments are members of the Bank and Fund, American companies will not have access to the business opportunities arising from that increased Fund procurement until we have made our contribution.

American membership in the African Development Fund is consistent with our contributions to the concessional loan facilities of other regional financial institutions in Asia and Latin America. Conversely, a refusal to participate might be construed as a discriminatory act and cast doubt on the U.S. commitment to African development. During my recent consultations with officials of the African Development Bank, it was made clear to me that our participation in the Fund has become a matter of considerable importance to them. African participants expressed similar views during the symposium on "Changing Vistas in U.S.-African Economic Relations" which Chairman Diggs [Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr.], sponsored here last March. The African keynote speaker, the representative of the Organization for African Unity, and the representative of the African Development Bank urged the United States to join the African Development Fund.

We seek a cooperative basis for our growing economic interdependence with the developing world. We seek to emphasize to African and other developing nations that we must have pragmatic dialogue on the specific problems of the developing world and joint efforts to develop solutions in which we can actively participate. Most important to African nations will be a demonstration on our part that we are committed to assisting them in their own objective of achieving a better life for their peoples. Membership in the African Development Fund is entirely consistent with this approach.

President Ford, in his September 1974 legislative goals message to the Congress, urged early authorization of American membership in the Fund. I can only reiterate to this committee his appeal for favorable action on the pending authorization request.

U.S. Provides Assistance to Cape Verde

AID press release 65 dated July 2

The new island Government of Cape Verde, a former Portuguese possession, will receive a $3 million agricultural-sector support loan and grants totaling $2 million from the Agency for International Development to assist it in its early days of independence.

Cape Verde, with a population estimated at 300,000, obtained its independence on July 5. A Constituent Assembly, which was elected June 30, is empowered to draft a constitution and select a President. The Cape Verde Archipelago has been governed since December 1974 by the Transitional Government of Cape Verde.

Cape Verde obtains its independence at a time when the 10 islands are suffering from an eight-year drought related to the Sahelian drought in continental Africa. The drought has reduced agricultural output, particularly

maize and livestock, to about one-fourth of its normal level and has made the economy heavily dependent on imported food for subsistence. Portugal, which has been providing assistance up to $30 million annually, announced it would no longer continue large-scale assistance after independence.

The transitional government appealed to the U.N. agencies and to bilateral donors for assistance both in meeting its immediate need for food and in development programs to foster the newly independent country's economic development.

Assistance is being given Cape Verde at a time when there is estimated to be only one month's supply of basic foods in the islands. A $1 million grant which was signed on June 30 will be used for the procurement of food from the United States for distribution to the needy and to assist food-for-work projects. An amendment adding an additional $1 million is planned in July. The transitional government has estimated food requirements for 1975 at about 70,000 tons, including 40,000 tons of maize, 8,000 tons of beans, 8,000 tons of maize and cassava flour, and 4,500 tons of milk powder.

The $3 million agricultural loan, also signed June 30, will provide financing for foreign exchange and local costs to support labor-intensive rural works projects, including land clearing, construction of access roads, conservation works, and small-scale irrigation facilities. Project activities will be organized by the Ministry of Economic Coordination and Labor. The soil and water conservation works would be located primarily on Santo Antão island, which has the greatest agricultural potential, as well as on São Vicente, Fogo, Brava, and Santiago. These would include building dikes in valley areas to catch alluvial soils washed from the mountainsides, erection of retaining walls to prevent further erosion of soils into valley areas used for crop production, and construction of stone and concrete aqueducts to permit irrigation of valley areas through the diking system.

The overall project goal is to increase production of agricultural products and increase small-farmer income as well as reducing Cape Verde's dependence on imported food commodities. The loan will be repaid in dollars within 40 years from the first disbursement, including a grace period not to exceed 10 years.

U.S.-U.K. Creative Arts Fellowships Established To Mark Bicentennial

Press release 354 dated July 2

As part of the celebration of the American Revolution Bicentennial the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom announced on July 1 a program of fellowships in the creative and performing arts. The exchange of notes establishing the program, which will be jointly funded, took place in London between the U.S. Ambassador, Elliot Richardson, and the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan.

Under the new program, up to five fellowships will be awarded each year for a period of five years in such fields as drama, opera, ballet, music, cinema, television, graphics, design, painting, sculpture, and architecture, or any other field of activity considered by the selection committees to be in the spirit of the fellowships. The fellowships will be open to men and women already established in their fields who show a clear potential to become prominent members of their professions.

Fellowships for American participants, which will be funded by the Department of State and by the National Endowment for the Arts, will be administered by the Endowment. In the United Kingdom the program will be administered by the British Council.

Thomas L. Hughes, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former American Minister at London, has agreed to serve as chairman of the American selection committee. Others on the committee will be Nancy Hanks, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts; John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs; and George Sanderson, Educational Attaché of the British Embassy in Washington.

Department Discusses Status of International Energy Program

Statement by Thomas O. Enders
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs [1]

The energy crisis is not only a crisis in our economy; it is a fundamental challenge to our security as a nation and to our role in the world. At present, the element in our economy most critical to employment and prosperity is subject to manipulation both as to price and as to supply by countries that do not necessarily have an interest in our well-being and success.

Just as we are vulnerable, so are the other main industrial countries. Most of them are far more dependent on oil imports than we are; most have fewer energy resources to develop.

And the industrial countries have a strong interest in cooperation with each other to overcome their vulnerability. Alone, no single country can, through conservation and the creation of alternative sources, create a new balance in the world market for oil and thus bring the price down. In the next few years no country can successfully defend alone against a new embargo or massive shifts in petrodollars. Finally, no single country can alone carry out all the research and development (R. & D.) or provide all the capital required for replacing fossil fuels when they are exhausted.

But it is equally true that the industrial countries would all suffer if they failed to restore competitive conditions to the oil market. A degree of national freedom would permanently be lost. It would be far more difficult to restore sustained growth. The industrial world would begin to split as each country offered political and economic concessions in an effort to make a separate peace with the oil producers. The future balance of power in the Middle East might be irreparably compromised.

It was this sense of shared interest that led to the U.S. initiative to convene the Washington Energy Conference in February 1974. As a consequence, the International Energy Agency was founded in November 1974. Eighteen countries now belong to it. The IEA's objectives are:

—To provide security against a new oil embargo by a coordinated program to build oil stocks and to share available oil in an emergency;

—To share equitably among industrial countries the burden of conservation; and

—To coordinate our measures to stimulate the development of alternative sources.

Current Situation

That is what we are aiming at. What has so far been accomplished?

First, emergency planning. On the basis of the detailed agreement signed in November, the IEA now has the necessary planning and machinery in a good state of readiness, should we be confronted with a new embargo situation. In order to back them up, each country must have authority to implement quick-acting conservation measures on a coordinated basis, and we need decisions to

[1] Made before the Senate Committee on Finance on July 14. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

raise emergency oil stocks in all countries from the present minimum of 60 days of imports to the agreed level of 90 days.

In contrast to some other IEA members, the United States has lagged in developing the needed emergency authorities. On the other hand, congressional action to create a 90-day petroleum reserve will put us ahead of our partners in this critical area. However, both emergency powers and more storage are necessary for an effective response to a new embargo. It is clear that instability in the Middle East creates a very real potential for a new interruption in oil supplies.

Second, conservation. However necessary, it is painful and costly to restrain demand for oil. And as a matter of simple politics, few other industrialized countries will be willing to sustain a strong conservation program over time unless others join them, and there is thus the possibility of changing market conditions and eventually bringing oil prices down. For this reason we proposed and the IEA adopted the goal of saving 2 million barrels per day (MMBD) of oil by the end of 1975 and distributed the target among countries according to their oil consumption. Since we have half the oil consumption of the group, our target was 1 MMBD by the end of the year.

Nearly all the other members of the IEA have taken action to decrease oil demand, by passing through increased crude costs to the end user, by new taxation, by such specific conservation measures as fuel switching and lighting and heating regulations.

In contrast, the United States has lagged. So far the only major conservation measure with immediate effect that this country has taken is the oil import fees. Decontrol of old oil over the phased schedule the President will recommend will add very substantially to our conservation effort, bringing us up to the level where other countries are already.

The lagging performance of the United States can be seen in comparisons with other countries' results. Between the first quarter of 1973 and the first quarter of this year Germany's oil consumption fell by 14 percent, Italy's by 8 percent, Japan's by 8 percent, Britain's by 18 percent, ours by 6 percent. And yet of all these countries the recession, which of course has reduced demand for oil, was far more severe here than elsewhere. We have the world's highest per capita consumption of energy—twice Germany's—but we have not been doing our part.

H.R. 6860 [A Bill To Provide a Comprehensive Energy Conservation and Conversion Program] would save us an estimated 314,000 barrels per day in 1977—not much more than the program Britain has already undertaken with an economy one-tenth the size of ours.

Third, alternative sources. The basic actions to stimulate the development of new energy must of course be national: the provision of subsidies to high-cost or untested energy developments; tax incentives; adequate domestic pricing policies; the removal of unnecessary or undesirable legal obstructions. But there are important contributions to be made internationally:

—By finding a way to cooperate in R. & D. without jeopardizing proprietary rights. No country has a monopoly on scientific imagination and innovation. Even the United States, with its major public and private industry commitment to energy R. & D., has much to gain through avoiding duplication and sharing costs and through scientific cross-fertilization.

—By encouraging the flow of foreign capital into areas of energy development where it is needed and wanted. All of us have capital-short economies; with perhaps a trillion dollars of new capital needed in the energy sector in IEA countries over the next 10 years, we have an interest in finding ways to encourage foreign investment without jeopardizing the achievement of the national energy policy goal of independence.

—By assuring that countries that contribute to the welfare of the whole group by developing higher cost energy sources are protected against possible predatory pricing by OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and are not penalized

if for other reasons prices fall on the international oil market. This is the purpose of the minimum safeguard price concept, in which each country in the IEA, by means of its own choosing, applies a comparable level of border protection to energy investment. Contrary to what is often suggested, this mechanism would not assure a minimum price to OPEC; it is a guarantee only to our own investors that they will not face competition from imported oil below a minimum preestablished level well below current world prices.

IEA countries agreed in principle on these three points in March. They are now being elaborated within the Agency with the objective of having a complete package ready for adoption by year's end.

Future Action

Domestically and internationally, we have just begun on conservation and alternative sources. The question we must ask is how far we must go, how fast.

The answer must come, in part, from analysis of the staying power of the oil cartel. In May OPEC produced 26 MMBD as against 32.8 MMBD in September 1973, just before the crisis. Despite the soft market, the OPEC price structure has come through largely intact, although quality differentials have been reduced or eliminated and credit terms lengthened. Now demand will firm, as we go into the winter and out of the recession. In the absence of additional conservation measures, the OPEC market may rise to preembargo levels by the end of 1977. In the late 1970's it may begin to fall again as North Sea, Alaskan, Mexican, and Chinese oil comes on the market in large quantities.

Even if there are no new conservation measures, and if OPEC succeeds in raising prices to offset any increased costs of its imports, some oil-exporting countries will already have gone into balance-of-payments deficit during the period 1975–77. Algeria is in deficit now; so is Libya; Venezuela and Iran may follow. These pressures will intensify in the late 1970's as the OPEC market shrinks, when most producers other than Saudi Arabia and Kuwait may go into deficit.

A serious program of conservation—the 2 MMBD the President proposed for the United States by the end of 1977, matched by other IEA members to make 4 MMBD—would greatly intensify the pressures on the cartel.

Given the cohesion the cartel has shown this year during the recession, it is not certain that such a conservation program would suffice. To be sure that the cartel loses its exclusive capacity to set oil prices and does not regain it, we probably would have to compress the OPEC market to somewhat over 20 MMBD. In the next decade, this can only be done by a large-scale program of developing fossil fuels. For the United States this would imply an import level of 3 to 5 MMBD in the mid-1980's, as proposed by the President.

To see the meaning of this, consider the possible price increase OPEC now threatens us with. Each additional dollar on the price of oil might reduce demand by one-half to 1 MMBD, out of a market of a little more than 25 MMBD. OPEC can now absorb cuts like that without excessive difficulty. But if we had the President's program in place, the scope for such price increases would be greatly reduced or eliminated in the next three years. Not only would they be unjustified, as now; they would be infeasible.

Consumer-Producer Dialogue

In parallel with our effort to develop effective programs of consumer cooperation, we are also seeking to establish a basis for productive dialogue between consuming and producing nations. The first formal attempt to launch a multilateral energy dialogue in Paris this past April did not succeed.

In May Secretary Kissinger proposed a new approach to the launching of a dialogue, broadening it to include the whole range of relations between industrial and developing countries. This would involve the establishment of three separate commissions: one to cover energy, one for raw materials, and one

to consider problems of economic development. The reaction to Secretary Kissinger's proposals has been generally positive, and we are optimistic that sufficient consensus can be reached along those lines over the next several weeks to permit agreement to reconvene the Paris meeting in early fall to prepare for the creation of the commissions.

The purpose of this dialogue is broader than energy; it is to find a realistic and equitable basis on which decisions affecting the main elements of the world economy can be shared between industrial and developing countries. The oil producers must understand that unilateral exercise of their power to raise prices at this time would not be consistent with this purpose.

For two years we have all been trying, in the United States and among industrial countries, to build agreement around the tougher energy policies we must all adopt. We have so far achieved far less than we require. But it would be wrong to judge what now can be done by what has been done. It has always been true that the great democracies are extraordinarily difficult to get moving. But when they do, they go very far. I think both our friends and our adversaries should keep that in mind, Mr. Chairman. So should we, for it is high time that we get on with it.

U.S. Rejects Fisheries Regulations Proposed by ICNAF

Press release 382 dated July 18

The United States on July 18 rejected a proposal from the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) which would regulate the overall fishing off the U.S. coast from Maine to North Carolina in 1976.

Under the proposal, the total catch would be reduced to 650,000 metric tons in 1976 from the allowable catch of 850,000 metric tons in 1975, but squid would be excluded from the quota—which was not the case in previous years. Quotas on squid will allow a catch of 74,000 tons of that species in 1976, up from 71,000 tons in 1974. The United States and Canada voted against the proposal at the ICNAF annual meeting which was held in Edinburgh, Scotland, from June 10 to 20, 1975.

At the catch level of 650,000 tons plus the squid, scientists estimate that a full decade would be required for stock recovery. In addition, there is an associated probability of approximately 30 percent that recovery will not begin in 1976 at this catch level, and hence a longer period of recovery may be required.

The United States had proposed a quota of 550,000 tons, including squid, which would have meant a five-year recovery period with a 90 percent probability of recovery, starting in 1976. That proposal, along with others ranging up to 800,000 tons (13-year recovery, 59 percent chance of success), was rejected by the Commission before the 650,000 level was agreed upon unanimously. A later proposal to exclude squid from the total was carried by a majority vote over U.S. objections.

In announcing the official objection, which will exclude the United States from applicability of the proposal if it becomes effective for others, Ambassador Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, called the situation "intolerable."

"The United States has been watching massive overfishing off its coasts for some years now," the Ambassador said. "This kind of situation cannot be allowed to continue. Nor can we any longer afford the luxury of a leisurely approach to fisheries problems. The resources have been too badly depleted, and the American fishermen have suffered too much, to avoid the hard decisions which are required now by all fishing nations."

The chief U.S. representative to ICNAF, David H. Wallace, Associate Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce, said that the ICNAF decision to increase the

U.S. quota from 211,600 tons in 1975 to 230,000 tons in 1976 had not persuaded the U.S. delegation to vote for the proposal or the U.S. Government to accept it after it was adopted by majority vote.

"We attach as much importance to the conservation and protection of the valuable natural resources as we do to the protection of the American fishermen," Wallace declared. "Starting to give the fishermen a real opportunity to produce an adequate supply of fish for the American market, as they were once able to do, is not enough. We must also restore the productivity of the stocks. Virtually every species off our Atlantic coast has been overfished, some very severely. The only way to correct the situation is by a drastic cutback in catch and fishing effort, and this is what the United States is insisting upon."

The question of the overall allowable catch and the exclusion of squid from it will be taken up again at a special meeting of ICNAF in Montreal. A decision had already been made to schedule the meeting to discuss various matters, mostly related to the Canadian coast, which had not been resolved at the annual meeting. The United States has put the quota and squid issue on the agenda for the special meeting, which will be held September 22–27.

Each individual species or stock is the subject of a separate quota and national allocation. These were adopted by ICNAF in June and do not appear to be in question. The overall quota is less than the sum of the individual quotas and is designed to focus fishing effort as precisely as possible on target species.

One reason the stocks are so depleted off the U.S. coast is that there is an unusually high species mix, with the result that many fish are taken as a bycatch, or incidental to the target species. Such fish are often simply discarded at sea or made into fishmeal.

The basis for this "two-tier" quota system was laid at a special ICNAF meeting in Ottawa in October 1973 after the 1973 annual meeting had ended in complete failure. At that time the United States was seriously considering withdrawing from the Commission but acceded to the pleas of other members to enter into the special negotiations. They produced an agreement that the catch would be reduced to 923,900 tons in 1974 and 850,000 tons in 1975 from the over 1.1 million tons it had reached in 1972 and 1973.

The agreement also specified that the catch would be further reduced in 1976 to the "amount which will allow the biomass to recover to a level which will produce the maximum sustainable yield." However, the agreement did not specify how long the recovery period was to be. That led to the present difficulty.

Three other U.S. proposals will be taken up at the Montreal meeting:

1. To close a large area on Georges Bank, off New England, to fishing with bottom gear all year round in order to protect the seriously depleted groundfish stocks in the area, such as haddock.
2. To license fishing vessels from all ICNAF members in the Northwest Atlantic. At the present time some members do not know where their vessels are or what they are fishing for.
3. To simplify and clarify the allowable exemptions in the ICNAF trawl regulations, which allow for a bycatch which is too high.

The second and third proposals were added to the agenda of the Montreal meeting at the request of the United States. These subjects had been discussed at the June and earlier meetings, but agreement was not reached on them in ICNAF. The Georges Bank closure proposal had already been referred to the special meeting. Progress had been made on it in Edinburgh, but time did not permit conclusion of the discussions on some major details.

Members of ICNAF are Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, German Democratic Republic, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, Cuba has indicated it might join ICNAF after discussions at the Montreal meeting.

Vessels from most of these countries fish off the U.S. coast, but a few nations normally fish only in the ICNAF areas off Canada or Greenland.

Report on World Weather Program Transmitted to Congress

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

People everywhere recognize that weather influences day-to-day activities. People are also mindful that weather, sometimes violent, breeds storms that take lives and destroy property. Coupled with these traditional concerns, there is now a new awareness of the cumulative effects of weather. The impact of climate and climatic fluctuations upon global energy, food and water resources poses a potential threat to the quality of life everywhere.

The World Weather Program helps man cope with his atmosphere. We must continue to rely upon and to strengthen this vital international program as these atmospheric challenges—both old and new—confront us in the future.

I am pleased to report significant progress in furthering the goals of the World Weather Program. This past year has recorded these accomplishments:

—The United States began near-continuous viewing of weather and storms over most of North and South America and adjacent waters through the use of two geostationary satellites.

—The U.S.S.R., Japan, and the European Space Research Organization have taken steps to join with the United States in extending this weather watch to include five geostationary satellites around the globe.

—Computer power devoted to operational weather services and to atmospheric research has been increased appreciably. This leads to immediate gains in weather prediction and to long-term gains in extending the time, range and scope of weather predictions and in assessing the consequences of climatic fluctuations upon man and of man's activities upon climate.

—During the summer of 1974, an unprecedented event in international science occurred with the successful conduct of an experiment in the tropical Atlantic. More than one-third of the earth's tropical belt was placed under intensive observation by 69 nations using a network of hundreds of land stations, 39 research ships, 13 specially instrumented aircraft and 7 meteorological satellites. The results of this experiment are expected to permit a sound understanding of the role of the tropics as the heat source for the global atmosphere and to provide new insight into the origin of tropical storms and hurricanes.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 67 of the 90th Congress declared the intention of the United States to participate fully in the World Weather Program. It is in accordance with this Resolution that I transmit this annual report describing current and planned Federal activities that contribute, in part, to this international program from which all nations benefit.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *June 10, 1975.*

[1] Transmitted on June 10 (text from White House press release).

U.S.-Japan Committee on Cultural and Educational Cooperation

Following is the text of a communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting of the Joint Committee on U.S.-Japan Cultural and Educational Cooperation June 21–23.

Press release 351 dated June 30

The Joint Committee on United States-Japan Cultural and Educational Cooperation met in Hawaii, June 21–23, 1975.

The Committee took special note of the growing importance of the cultural and educational factors

in achieving mutual understanding between Japan and the United States. It recognized the increased importance of improved communication between the two countries in a world drawn together by interdependence. Both countries were seen to share numerous societal problems brought on by rapid technological innovation, especially the information explosion.

In this atmosphere, the Committee reviewed progress made in carrying forward the recommendations of CULCON VII [Seventh United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange] which met in Tokyo in June 1974. These included cooperative projects and activities in the fields of American studies, education, Japanese studies, journalist exchange, museum, and television.

The Committee was gratified to note that there has been a marked increase in private participation on both sides, thus highlighting the unique feature of CULCON, which is the cooperation between government and private representatives to further mutual understanding. Greater activity by the subcommittees of CULCON suggests the possibility of increased cooperation among them.

The organization of the Joint Committee was discussed, and it was agreed to ask the panel chairmen to consider what modifications might be recommended to CULCON VIII.

The Committee welcomed the June 18th announcement by Secretary of State Kissinger that the U.S. Administration would seek to integrate and obtain approval this year of proposals before the U.S. Congress to establish a Japan-U.S. Friendship Fund for the expansion of cultural and educational activities between both nations.

In reviewing activities related to CULCON, the Committee particularly noted:

1. The Conference of Asian and Pacific American Studies Specialists to be held in September 1975 in Japan and the Bicentennial World Conference on American Studies to be held in Washington, D.C. in September 1976,

2. The work in the field of education for international understanding to develop educational materials on each other's country for elementary and secondary schools,

3. The increased efforts by Japanese government and private organizations to publish books and articles on Japan translated into English,

4. The increased importance of exchanging journalists as a means of narrowing the communication gap,

5. Plans for exchanging museum exhibitions and other related programs in the coming years,

6. The prospect of new cooperation in cultural and educational television in both countries,

7. The need for a library subcommittee and separate subcommittees for television and print media and recommended their establishment to CULCON VIII.

A. American Studies

The Committee received with satisfaction the Japanese Association of American Studies' report, "Current Status of the Study of America in Japanese Universities," an extensive accumulation of data sponsored by the Fulbright Commission in Japan, and noted the progress of American Studies in Japan.

The Hawaii meeting influenced the subcommittee by directing attention outside the field of higher education and research toward public and adult education, professional internships, the teaching of English, and public information. The opportunity to contribute to the discussion of the concerns of other subcommittees, including the proposed subcommittee on libraries, is viewed with anticipation.

It was reported that the Asia and Pacific Regional Conference of American Studies Specialists will be held on 4–7 September at the Institute of International Studies and Training Center in Fujinomiya City with the participation of fourteen nations. Approximately fifty people will attend the conference from abroad and roughly the same number from Japan. The subjects to be discussed are: (1) American Revolution, (2) Influence of American civilization on other countries, and (3) Problems relating to American Studies in the participating countries.

Recommendations:

1. Taking advantage of the Regional Conference, at which most of the subcommittee members will be in attendance, there should be a joint subcommittee meeting in Tokyo on September 8, 1975.

2. The Committee recommends the following agenda for the joint meeting: (a) Report on Hawaii meeting; (b) Role and scope of American Studies Subcommittee; (c) Evaluation of Asian Bicentennial Conference; (d) Report on Washington Bicentennial Conference for 1976; (e) Response to "Current Status of the Study of America in Japanese Universities"; (f) Future of Kyoto American Studies Seminar; (g) CULCON VIII; (h) Progress reports on translations, book orders, teacher orientation, student exchange, counseling and accreditation, financing: public and private, joint and cooperative research and bibliographies, faculty and scholarly exchange, and cooperation with the United Nations University.

B. Education

The meeting concerned with education for international understanding discussed the final arrangements for the opening of the joint seminar which is

scheduled to begin three weeks hence at the East-West Center.

The new Office of Education publication, *Film Resources on Japan*, was presented at the meeting. It inventories more than 550 films and filmstrips about Japan available in the United States, which can be used for multiple educational purposes.

Finally, the Committee noted with approval the U.S. Office of Education decision to assist four new East Asian Studies centers in American colleges and universities located in regions not currently well served by the existing USOE centers. One center is in North Carolina and an important part of that Center's program is collaboration with the North Carolina State Department of Education and the CULCON project on education for mutual understanding in elementary and secondary education.

Recommendations:

A variety of possible activities for future consideration by the joint subcommittee was considered. Some of these might be initiated during the coming year and some could be undertaken following the completion of the present project. Among the possibilities for building bridges for understanding between educators and educational systems in the two countries are:

1. Expanding and improving links between elementary and secondary schools and teacher education institutions in both countries.

2. Establishing and/or strengthening facilities and service in both countries to assist visiting teachers from the other country with their study interests, including the development of curriculum materials.

3. Increasing access to reliable, up-to-date information about the educational system, issues, and developments in the other country. To help expand the dialogue between Japanese and American educators across language barriers, various possibilities for publishing articles in English by Japanese educators about education in Japan were considered. For example, occasional issues of specialized existing journals might be devoted to U.S.-Japan educational subjects. The reverse need was also considered—helping the Japanese side to select particularly significant articles from the wide collection of writing on education in American professional journals for translation into Japanese.

C. Japanese Studies

The Committee expressed its appreciation for the efforts of the Japan Foundation and the Expo '70 Foundation to strengthen Japanese language training and improve library resources in the U.S. to disseminate the results of Japanese scholarship to an international audience. It noted, as well, progress in integrating the study of Japan into teaching and research by social scientists outside of Japan and in expanding Japanese studies at the undergraduate level in the United States. The Japan Foundation's *Introductory Bibliography for Japanese Studies and Books on Japan* were well received. The work of the newly established Japanese Language Division of the Natural Research Institute on the Japanese Language also was noted with appreciation.

Recommendations:

1. Precise, up-to-date data about institutions, scholars and activities in Japanese studies should be compiled through the efforts of both sides for presentation to CULCON VIII.

2. More specialists from Japan should teach in American universities.

3. Joint research projects in Japanese studies need more solid American financing.

4. The quality and quantity of English abstracts and translations of Japanese scholarly works need improving (and the Committee will give special priority to this problem).

5. A Japanese mission to survey Japanese studies in the U.S. should be sent to the U.S., possibly in the spring of 1976, and an American mission to survey facilities for Americans to study in Japan should be considered.

D. Journalist Exchange

Substantial time was devoted to a discussion of the exchange of journalists between the U.S. and Japan. Recognition was given to another of the International Press Institute's bilateral seminars for newspapermen which will be held in Racine, Wisconsin this coming November. The changing roles of the two nations in Asia will be explored during the seminar discussions.

It was reemphasized that one of the important and effective ways to fill the communication gap between Japan and the U.S.A. and to deepen the understanding of the general public in both countries is the exchange of mass-media people, including publishers, editorial writers, columnists, journalists, and magazine writers.

Recommendation:

1. Details of the respective exchange or grant-type programs should be widely disseminated among the individual professional organizations concerned with management, editorial or reporting responsibilities. As an example, attention should be given to making the Fulbright program for working newsmen more widely known throughout the profession.

E. Library

Recommendations:

1. It was recommended to establish a Library Subcommittee with the following suggested objective and activities:

a. The primary objective of the subcommittee would be to improve access of Japanese to American material and American access to Japanese materials.

b. A number of possible activities that the subcommittee may wish to explore would include the interchange and training of personnel, interchange of publications, inter-library cooperation, the establishment of documentation centers especially in the social sciences, and the need for specialized bibliographies.

2. The committee expressed the view that the proposed Library Subcommittee, when officially established, should maintain close liaison with other subcommittees of CULCON, especially the Japanese Studies, American Studies and Education Subcommittees as it formulates and implements its programs.

3. Establishment of this subcommittee should be at an early date and that a preparatory meeting be held in Tokyo or Kyoto before or after the Third Japan-U.S. Conference on Libraries and Information Science in Higher Education to be held in Kyoto in October 1975 to work out a plan of activities for the future.

F. Museum Exchange

In the field of museum exchange, details were discussed concerning the exhibition "Collected Masterworks from Art Museums of the United States" which will be held in Tokyo and Kyoto during 1976 to celebrate the U.S. Bicentennial. Other exhibitions including the Shinto Exhibition, Chinese Ceramics from Japanese collections and Kamakura Sculpture were also discussed.

Recommendations:

1. With regard to future exchanges, it was agreed that the following should be discussed further:

a. The appropriate interval between major Japanese exhibitions to be sent to the United States.

b. Use of the museum subcommittee as an information center among American museums for the planning of art exhibitions to and from Japan.

c. Better balance in the exchange of exhibitions between the United States and Japan.

d. Financial guidelines for the sharing of expenses between the sender and recipient of exhibitions.

G. Television

The Committee considered the next T.V. Program Festival with a view to promoting the program exchange more effectively. It noted the important role of PBS [Public Broadcasting Service] in this area. Further, providing United States cultural and educational television programs to Japan and showing Japanese produced magazine television programs over PBS stations in the United States was discussed.

The establishment of an American Subcommittee was noted with appreciation in view of the need for continuity on the U.S. side.

The Committee discussed Sister Station affiliations and expressed satisfaction regarding progress in this area.

Recommendations:

1. Considering that the most promising opportunity for Japanese educational and cultural programs to be viewed by the most American people would be on PBS stations, it is recommended that consideration be given to holding the 3rd Television Program Festival at the National Association of Educational Broadcasting (NAEB) Meeting in mid-November 1975 or in 1976. In the case of the 1975 NAEB Meeting, the Japanese program entries would come mainly from the group of programs in custody of the Japan Society in New York. Final decision on this issue will be made after consultation with the Broadcast Programming center of Japan (BPJC).

2. Information should continue to be exchanged on type and subject of programs to be exchanged considering other country's program needs.

3. To further the exchange of information regarding Sister Station activities a newsletter could be developed by the BPJC and the Japan Society.

H. CULCON VIII

The Committee recommended that CULCON VIII be held in Washington, D.C. in May 1976. In view of the celebration of the American Bicentennial in 1976, it was also recommended that private organizations be invited to sponsor and organize, in consultation with CULCON, a special symposium on a major theme of common interest to both countries to be held in conjunction with CULCON VIII.

U.S. Discusses Approach to the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly

Statement by Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr.
U.S. Representative in the U.N. Economic and Social Council [1]

Just a few days ago we marked the 30th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. It is therefore appropriate that this, the 59th session of the Economic and Social Council, should be the first major U.N. session following our recent celebration. This fortuitous appropriateness symbolizes the fundamental importance of global economic and social health to the well-being of mankind.

The founders of the United Nations recognized this when they assigned to the organization as one of its purposes: "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character . . . ." But for many reasons, in the intervening years political and security problems have been the central focus of U.N. deliberations. These remain serious problems. Problems of security and political coexistence, however, do not exist as isolated phenomena. They are not detachable coupons from the main bond of the human condition. As our Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, said in a recent speech: [2]

> The paramount necessity of our time is the preservation of peace. But history has shown that international political stability requires international economic stability. Order cannot survive if economic arrangements are constantly buffeted by crisis or if they fail to meet the aspirations of nations and peoples for progress.

The 59th ECOSOC is also an important link in a series of past and future conferences dedicated to the resolution of urgent economic problems, particularly those of developing countries. We convene here at a particularly critical time. A scintilla of evidence suggests that the world's economy could be at a stage of turning from slowdown and contraction to new growth and expansion.

But for many national economies, time is relative. Some are yet to experience the throes others have survived. We meet at a time when many countries, having experienced the most severe economic strains, are reviewing long-held economic policies and seeking new openings for economic and social cooperation. And our convocation occurs at a time when we perceive more clearly the shortfalls of the global economy and sense more keenly the need to render economic justice rather than to adjudge guilt for real or imagined past deeds.

It has been a bit more than one year since the General Assembly devoted itself, in its sixth special session, to the overwhelming issue of the nature and shape of global economic interdependence. While in that session many issues divided us, and some of those issues still retain their divisive potential, nonetheless that session marked the beginning of our preoccupation with the global economic crisis.

[1] Made before the 59th session of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at Geneva on July 4 (text from USUN press release 75 dated July 7).

[2] For Secretary Kissinger's address at Kansas City, Mo., on May 13, see BULLETIN of June 2, 1975, p. 713.

The word "crisis" has become such common currency in our commentaries and exchanges as to risk a devaluation of the meaning through overuse. Nonetheless a survey of global economic problems, imbalances, and injustices fully warrants the denomination "crisis" as descriptive of the current state of the global economy.

But crisis also connotes opportunity. Rarely in the more than a quarter century since the end of World War II have so many opportunities been presented to address the fundamentals of the global economic system. Indeed, it may very well be that this is the first opportunity to work out the implications of global interdependence in the full realization that it is indeed interdependence, consciously perceived, that is the organizing principle of our labors.

A central concern over the last year has been the nomenclature of that which we seek to achieve. There has indeed been divisiveness on this issue. Whether in our labors we have been about the design of a new international economic order or whether we have been about the task of fundamental reform of the existing order has needlessly consumed all too much time and effort.

Our Secretary of State has called for an end to this theoretical confrontation. Indeed, we hope that this essentially theological debate will come to an end. My government has sought and now seeks to make clear that this problem of nomenclature should be set aside in the interest of resolving some of those crucial issues which need the urgent attention of not only this body but the entire U.N. system. These problems exist by virtue of their own imperatives. And their solutions will commend themselves to the global community not on the basis of labels but, rather, because of their intrinsic justice.

For our part, the United States recognizes the declaration and program of action as articulated policy goals of a substantial number of states within the United Nations.[3] Many of these articulated goals are radical in the truest sense of the word. On the other hand, we should hope that the mutuality of respect for differing opinions would extend to those views espoused by my government, derived from our principled beliefs as shaped by our national experience.

The theoretical—and at times even theological—differences need not require that we resolve questions of philosophy before addressing what we all recognize as problems which simply must be urgently addressed lest the human condition sustain irremediable injury in a generation of economic warfare.

It is, then, in the spirit of addressing those issues which appear to be ripe for resolution that my government has sought cooperation rather than confrontation in this body and elsewhere.

The first implication of global economic interdependence is that all on this globe are involved in, and affected by, that condition. It would seem to follow that all those involved and affected have the right—even the duty—to participate in the process of identifying and resolving those problems which so urgently require solution. It is too late in the day to accept that any single state or any bloc of states can arrogate unto itself all wisdom and all power in the ordering of our economic system. It is indeed much too late in the day to forget that judgments and opinions can be wrong as well as being right. My government is most happy to join with all those other governments who hold to the belief that true consensus regarding solutions is the only viable outcome of our deliberations. We are prepared to join the quest for *consensus veritas*.

The General Assembly and Economic Reform

Mr. Chairman, of overriding concern is the impending seventh special session and, more immediately, preparations for that Assembly in this session of ECOSOC. The seventh special session is included on our formal agenda. Perhaps of more importance is the fact that that session of the General Assembly will be a subject for informal consultations in accordance with the recommendation

[3] For texts of the Declaration and Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order adopted by the sixth special session of the U.N. General Assembly on May 1, 1974, see BULLETIN of May 27, 1974, p. 569.

of the second preparatory conference recently concluded in New York.

Although most important decisions regarding the seventh special session remain to be taken, our efforts thus far have not been in vain. A general consensus seems to be emerging—that we will focus on a limited number of items of high priority and that we will seek meaningful positive action.

It remains to build on this emerging consensus in agreeing to an agenda and perhaps a general outline of the form of action to be taken by the seventh special General Assembly.

I believe it will be helpful to review the relative roles which various forums in the international system—the General Assembly, the specialized agencies, and other bodies—can best play in making progress toward concrete achievement. The U.N. General Assembly has not been much experienced in the world of global economics. Expounding the reasons for this lack need not detain us now.

It does seem necessary, however, to state explicitly what to us seems to be the obvious. The General Assembly as it is constituted—and given its history over the last 29 years—does not seem to be the institution best designed to actually fashion the necessary remedies, to negotiate the required commitments, and to administer those processes that might be brought into being.

Of necessity, these tasks must be performed elsewhere and with a different type of representative from those of us who people the General Assembly. On the other hand, in this dawning era of global economic interdependence, only the General Assembly comes near to that ideal of a representative body of the entire globe. The General Assembly does have the capability for the true expression of that perfect consensus, or nearly perfect consensus, of all mankind.

It is the view of my government that the true role and function of the General Assembly is to give expression to the broad consensuses as to priorities, to give general guidance, and to keep itself apprised of developments in the global economy. We, for ourselves, are certain that no one contemplates that it will be the General Assembly which itself negotiates commodity arrangements reflecting a general consensus, or that the General Assembly itself will undertake to negotiate trade reform or monetary reform, or that the General Assembly will itself undertake to fashion arrangements to assure the feeding of the world.

Its basic responsibilities are clear—to observe and keep under review the state of international cooperation and to draw attention of member states to conditions requiring international cooperation in the solution of problems. In this, it is neither a passive observer nor a technical negotiating body. We might therefore envisage the seventh special session of the General Assembly as identifying areas of priority interest, as establishing guidelines for international cooperation in those areas and continuing its normal process for monitoring the activities of the various bodies charged with actual negotiations.

U.S. Proposals for Seventh Special Session

The general approach of my government to the seventh special session has been enunciated in the recent speeches of Secretary Kissinger. This positive approach is buttressed by a serious and thorough review of our policies at the highest levels of the U.S. Government.

As our varied positions emerge, we will be prepared to engage in the dialogue and negotiations we all contemplate. I hope, however, that it is clear now that our effort is to identify: first, policies which are responsive in particular to the needs of developing countries; second, policies which are susceptible to meaningful cooperative action; and third, policies to which the United States can make a real contribution. These are the parameters of our own review.

Speaking of the seventh special session, Secretary Kissinger stated on June 23:

> Working closely with Congress, we are now preparing concrete, detailed, and—we hope—creative proposals for that session. We intend, while fully protecting our nation's interests, to deal with con-

troversial issues with realism, imagination, and understanding. We hope that others will meet us in the same spirit.

Without going into details, I would like to note that my government has circulated its proposals regarding the agenda for the seventh special session. While differing in some respects, we believe that in general they are in keeping with the proposals advanced by the Group of 77. We have suggested two additional topics—"International Food Needs" and "The Problems of the Poorer Developing Countries." We believe that they fit into the criteria of being of priority interest and of a potential for effective international action.

In any event, we look forward to consultations during this session to refine our collective thinking. I would emphasize, however, that we approach the issue of the agenda not in terms of substantive agreement but in terms of identifying areas appropriate for intensive consideration by the seventh special session.

Meeting International Food Needs

Among the suggestions for the agenda of the seventh special session proposed by my government is the addition of an item on "International Food Needs." Formation of a sound global agricultural economy requires effective action in a number of critical areas. First, world food production must be increased significantly, with primary emphasis on raising average yields in developing countries. Until this increase is attained, food needs of developing countries must be met, at least in part, by dependable food-aid programs. In addition, we support an international system of nationally held grain reserves as the best means to achieve world food security through enhancing the assurance of availability of adequate supplies.

The long-range needs for food require further action on preliminary agreements reached at the World Food Conference. My government believes that meeting international food needs is of prime concern to the U.N. system. The U.N. General Assembly should take note of the World Food Conference resolutions and progress on their implementation, taking into account the report of the World Food Council, and should request the World Food Council to periodically inform the General Assembly of its proceedings and recommendations.

Global Economic and Social Issues

If I have dealt at length with preparations for the seventh special session, it was not to denigrate other agenda items before us. Appropriate to the purpose of the Economic and Social Council, they cover a wide range of genuine economic and social concerns and could by themselves fully occupy us over the next four weeeks. My delegation will, as appropriate, be commenting in detail on these items as they arise, but a few general comments may be in order.

Both national economies and the global economy have been through a trying period. We are particularly aware of the strains placed on most developing countries facing the multiple problems of international inflation and recession.

Looking at the United States, most economists both within and without the government believe that we are bottoming out and can now anticipate a period of general economic recovery with, hopefully, further declension in the rate of inflation. Perhaps we should draw two major conclusions from our recent national experience. First, of course, is the fact of the interdependence of our national economies, and second is the realization of the importance and effectiveness of cooperative action among nations in dealing with global economic problems.

President Ford spelled this out in transmitting his report on the international economy to the U.S. Congress when he said:

> The United States firmly believes that our own problems, and those of the rest of the world, can be dealt with most effectively through international cooperation . . . . our motivating principles, our standards of conduct and the guidelines we set for the conduct of international economic development are ever more crucial to our national well-being, and that of the world.

Mr. Chairman, the World Conference of the International Women's Year recently concluded its session in Mexico City, and we look forward to reviewing the results. As in other instances, my government's delegation to that conference had reservations concerning some of the resolutions discussed. We fully support, however, the underlying purpose of the conference—to seek to insure that a person who happens to be a woman will not be consigned to a life of deprivation or, in some instances, a life of misery solely because of the accident of sex.

Issues of relief and assistance, of national resources and environment, of industrial development, of freedom from colonialism—in fact all of the items on the agenda deserve our serious attention. And we will be commenting on them later.

Mr. Chairman, I opened by referring to the 30th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. I would like to refer to another anniversary, today: the 199th anniversary of our Declaration of Independence from a colonial yoke. And, Mr. Chairman, I beg your indulgence for a personal note. As I am preparing to take leave of you and my colleagues on the Economic and Social Council, I eagerly seize this occasion to say to you all that I consider myself to have been privileged to have labored with you in our joint endeavor to better the human condition.

U.S. Contributes $17 Million to U.N. Forces in Middle East

USUN press release 72 dated July 3

The United States on July 3 transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations a check in the amount of $17,278,413. This payment covers the U.S. contribution toward the apportioned costs of the U.N. Emergency Force (including the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force) through the period ending April 24, 1975. It represents a total of $34,614,613 contributed toward the total UNEF costs of $119.8 million for the period October 24, 1973–April 24, 1975.

U.S. Completes Contribution to UNFICYP for Fiscal 1975

USUN press release 74 dated July 3

The United States on July 3 presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations a check in the amount of $4.8 million. This payment, which completes the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for fiscal year 1975, brings the cumulative total of U.S. support for UNFICYP to $76.1 million.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on North Pacific Fisheries

Press release 381 dated July 18

The Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded on July 18 at Washington an agreement relating to the fisheries of the North Pacific area, extending from California north to Alaska. This is the fifth such agreement concluded between the two governments on Pacific coast fisheries. The new agreement covers the period August 1, 1975, through December 31, 1976. A 30-day-notice reopening clause is provided, should the situation in the fisheries change greatly during that period.

Under the new agreement, the Soviet Union is required to place additional and extensive restrictions on its Pacific fishery off the U.S. coast. These restrictions include the closing-off of large areas to the Soviet fleets, either on a year-round basis or during periods when Soviet fishing could be harmful to stocks of fish such as halibut, rockfish, and crabs that are of particular interest to U.S. fishermen.

Limitations on Soviet catches are provided for such species as pollock, hake, and rockfish. These catch quotas, in combination

with the extensive area-time closures, are expected to provide considerable protection for species of special interest to U.S. fishermen.

As has been the case in all such agreements recently concluded by the United States with foreign countries fishing off its shores, the new agreement contains measures to prevent fishing-gear conflicts, protect the species which inhabit the U.S. continental shelf, and provide for observation and enforcement of the agreement's provisions. Cooperative research and exchange of information on species of joint interest are also provided for.

The U.S. delegation, which included representatives from the Departments of State and Commerce, state agencies, and the fishing industry, was headed by Ambassador Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs. The Soviet delegation was led by Deputy Minister of Fisheries Vladimir M. Kamentsev.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. TIAS 6768.
Accession deposited: Tunisia, February 25, 1975.
Notification of succession: Bahamas, effective July 10, 1973.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Done at London October 17, 1974.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Canada, July 16, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.
Accession deposited: Singapore, July 9, 1975.
Entered into force: August 8, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.[1]
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, July 14, 1975.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification of articles 1 through 12 deposited: Japan, June 27, 1975 (effective from October 1, 1975).
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession to articles 1 through 12 deposited: Australia, June 27, 1975.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284.
Acceptance deposited: Ecuador, June 30, 1975.
International regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.
Acceptance deposited: Ecuador, June 30, 1975.
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 1974.[1]
Signatures: People's Republic of China, June 20, 1975;[2] Norway, June 24, 1975.[2]

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.[1]
Signature: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, July 11, 1975.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.[3]
Notification of approval: Pakistan, May 15, 1975.
Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.[3]
Notification of approval: Pakistan, May 15, 1975.
International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.[3]
Ratification deposited: Israel, May 28, 1975.
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974.[1]
Notifications of approval: Australia, May 30, 1975; Singapore, May 10, 1975.

[1] Not in force.
[2] Subject to ratification.
[3] Not in force for the United States.

World Meteorological Organization

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (with reservation), July 8, 1975.

BILATERAL

Costa Rica

Agreement relating to the provision of assistance by the United States to support Costa Rican efforts to curb the production and traffic in illegal narcotics. Effected by exchange of notes at San José May 29 and June 2, 1975. Entered into force June 2, 1975.

Luxembourg

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2014). Effected by exchange of notes at Luxembourg June 27 and July 4, 1975.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement regarding fisheries in the northeastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States, with related letters. Signed at Washington July 18, 1975. Entered into force August 1, 1975.

Agreement relating to fishing for king and tanner crab, with related letter and statement. Signed at Washington July 18, 1975. Entered into force August 1, 1975.

PUBLICATIONS

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on the United Nations Released

Press release 350 dated June 27

The Department of State on June 27 released volume I, part 1, in the series "Foreign Relations of the United States" for the year 1948. This volume is entitled "General; The United Nations."

Part 1 includes documentation on U.S. policies with regard to the United Nations as an institution, including matters related to implementation of the Headquarters Agreement of 1947; elections to certain organs, commissions, and committees of the United Nations; elections of new members to the United Nations; voting procedures; and budget. Part 1 also includes material on non-self-governing territories outside the U.N. trusteeship system; the human rights question; the U.N. conference at Geneva on freedom of information; U.S. policy at the United Nations with respect to regulation of armaments and collective security; international control of atomic energy; and efforts toward agreements placing armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council.

Part 2, to be published subsequently, will contain documentation on national security policy, atomic energy, foreign economic policy, and Antarctica.

This volume was prepared by the Historical Office Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume I, part 1 (Department of State publication 8805; GPO cat no. S1.1:948/v. I, 1) may be obtained for $8.10 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

United States Foreign Policy. This pamphlet in the General Foreign Policy series is an overview of current U.S. foreign policy. Pub. 8814. 40 pp. 75¢ (Cat. No. S1.71:8814).

Assistance for Children and Mothers. Agreement with the United Nations Children's Fund. TIAS 7970. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7970).

Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Panama. TIAS 7977. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7977).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel. TIAS 7978. 15 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7978).

Protection of Birds and Their Environment. Convention with Japan. TIAS 7990. 54 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7990).

Peace Corps. Agreement with the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. TIAS 7991. 4 pp. 25¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:7991).

Peace Corps. Agreement with Rwanda. TIAS 7992. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7992).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Chile. TIAS 7993. 36 pp. 50¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7993).

Launching of French-German Symphonie Communications Satellites. Agreement with France and the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 7994. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7994).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jordan. TIAS 7995. 25 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7995).

Name Index

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 21–27

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*383	7/21	Shipping Coordinating Committee working group on subdivision and stability, Aug. 14.
*384	7/21	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Aug. 7.
†385	7/23	U.S.-Spain joint communique.
*386	7/23	Robert V. Keeley appointed Deputy Director of Inter-Agency Task Force for Indochinese Refugees (biographic data).
387	7/25	Kissinger: news conference, July 25.
*388	7/25	Theberge sworn in as Ambassador to Nicaragua (biographic data).

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.