# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
# BULLETIN

Volume LXXII • No. 1872 • May 12, 1975

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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*The Department of State BULLETIN a weekly publication issued by th Office of Media Services, Bureau o Public Affairs, provides the public an interested agencies of the governmen with information on developments i the field of U.S. foreign relations an on the work of the Department an the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selecte press releases on foreign policy, issue by the White House and the Depar ment, and statements, addresse and news conferences of the Presider and the Secretary of State and othe officers of the Department, as well a special articles on various phases o international affairs and the functior of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and inter national agreements to which th United States is or may become party and on treaties of general inter national interest.*

*Publications of the Department o State, United Nations documents, an legislative material in the field o international relations are also listed*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

# An Agenda for America's Third Century

*Address by President Ford* [1]

Today, America can regain the sense of pride that existed before Viet-Nam, but it cannot be achieved by refighting a war that is finished as far as America is concerned.

As I see it, the time has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unify, to bind up the nation's wounds, and to restore its health and its optimistic self-confidence.

In New Orleans, a great battle was fought after a war was over. In New Orleans tonight, we can begin a great national reconciliation. The first engagement must be with the problems of today, but just as importantly, the problems of the future.

That is why I think it is so appropriate that I find myself tonight at a university which addresses itself to preparing young people for the challenge of tomorrow.

I ask that we stop refighting the battles and the recriminations of the past. I ask that we look now at what is right with America—at our possibilities and our potentialities for change and growth, achievement and sharing. I ask that we accept the responsibility of leadership as a good neighbor to all peoples and an enemy of none.

I ask that we strive to become, in the finest American tradition, something more tomorrow than we are today.

Instead of my addressing the image of America, I prefer to consider the reality of America. It is true that we have launched our Bicentennial celebration without having achieved human perfection, but we have attained a very remarkable self-governed society that possesses the flexibility and the dynamism to grow and undertake an entirely new agenda, an agenda for America's third century.

So I ask you to join me in helping to write that agenda. I am as determined as a President can be to seek national rediscovery of the belief in ourselves that characterized the most creative periods in our nation's history. The greatest challenge of creativity, as I see it, lies ahead.

We, of course, are saddened indeed by the events in Indochina; but these events, tragic as they are, portend neither the end of the world nor of America's leadership in the world.

Let me put it this way, if I might. Some tend to feel that if we do not succeed in everything everywhere, then we have succeeded in nothing anywhere.

I reject categorically such polarized thinking. We can and we should help others to help themselves; but the fate of responsible men and women everywhere, in the final decision, rests in their own hands, not in ours.

America's future depends upon Americans, especially your generation, which is now equipping itself to assume the challenges of the future, to help write the agenda for America.

Earlier today in this great community, I spoke about the need to maintain our defenses. Tonight I would like to talk about another kind of strength, the true source of American power that transcends all of the

[1] Made at Tulane University, New Orleans, La., on Apr. 23 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 28; introductory paragraphs omitted).

deterrent powers for peace of our Armed Forces. I am speaking here of our belief in ourselves and our belief in our nation.

Abraham Lincoln asked, in his own words, "What constitutes the bulwark of our own liberty and independence?" He answered:

> It is not our frowning battlements, our bristling sea coasts, our army and our navy . . . . Our defense is in the spirit which prized liberty as the heritage of all men, in all lands everywhere.

It is in this spirit that we must now move beyond the discords of the past decade. It is in this spirit that I ask you to join me in writing an agenda for the future.

I welcome your invitation, particularly, tonight because I know it is at Tulane and other centers of thought throughout our great country that much consideration is being given to the kind of future that Americans want and, just as importantly, will work for.

Each of you are preparing yourselves for the future, and I am deeply interested in your preparations and your opinions and your goals. However, tonight, with your indulgence, let me share with you my own views.

I envision a creative program that goes as far as our courage and our capacities can take us, both at home and abroad. My goal is for a cooperative world at peace, using its resources to build, not to destroy.

As President, I am determined to offer leadership to overcome our current economic problems. My goal is for jobs for all who want to work and economic opportunity for all who want to achieve.

I am determined to seek self-sufficiency in energy as an urgent national priority. My goal is to make America independent of foreign energy sources by 1985. Of course, I will pursue interdependence with other nations and a reformed international economic system.

My goal is for a world in which consuming and producing nations achieve a working balance. I will address the humanitarian issues of hunger and famine, of health and of healing. My goal is to achieve or to assure basic needs and an effective system to achieve this result.

I recognize the need for technology that enriches life while preserving our natural environment. My goal is to stimulate productivity but use technology to redeem, not to destroy, our environment.

I will strive for new cooperation rather than conflict in the peaceful exploration of our oceans and our space. My goal is to use resources for peaceful progress rather than war and destruction.

Let America symbolize humanity's struggle to conquer nature and master technology. The time has now come for our government to facilitate the individual's control over his or her future and of the future of America.

But the future requires more than Americans congratulating themselves on how much we know and how many products that we can produce. It requires new knowledge to meet new problems. We must not only be motivated to build a better America; we must know how to do it.

If we really want a humane America that will, for instance, contribute to the alleviation of the world's hunger, we must realize that good intentions do not feed people. Some problems, as anyone who served in the Congress knows, are complex. There are no easy answers. Willpower alone does not grow food.

We thought in a well-intentioned past that we could export our technology lock, stock, and barrel to developing nations. We did it with the best of intentions. But we are now learning that a strain of rice that grows in one place will not grow in another, that factories that produce at 100 percent in one nation produce less than half as much in a society where temperaments and work habits are somewhat different.

Yet the world economy has become interdependent. Not only food technology, but money management, natural resources and energy, research and development—all kinds of this group require an organized world society that makes the maximum effective use of the world's resources.

I want to tell the world: Let's grow food together, but let's also learn more about nutrition, about weather forecasting, about irrigation, about the many other specialties involved in helping people to help themselves.

We must learn more about people, about the development of communities, architecture, engineering, education, motivation, productivity, public health and medicine, arts and sciences, political, legal, and social organization. All of these specialties, and many, many more, are required if young people like you are to help this nation develop an agenda for our future, your future, our country's future.

I challenge, for example, the medical students in this audience to put on their agenda the achievement of a cure for cancer. I challenge the engineers in this audience to devise new techniques for developing cheap, clean, and plentiful energy and, as a by-product, to control floods. I challenge the law students in this audience to find ways to speed the administration of equal justice and make good citizens out of convicted criminals. I challenge education, those of you as education majors, to do real teaching for real life. I challenge the arts majors in this audience to compose the great American symphony, to write the great American novel, and to enrich and inspire our daily lives.

America's leadership is essential. America's resources are vast. America's opportunities are unprecedented.

As we strive together to perfect a new agenda, I put high on the list of important points the maintenance of alliances and partnerships with other people and other nations. These do provide a basis of shared values, even as we stand up with determination for what we believe.

This, of course, requires a continuing commitment to peace and a determination to use our good offices wherever possible to promote better relations between nations of this world.

The new agenda, that which is developed by you and by us, must place a high priority on the need to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to work for the mutual reduction in strategic arms and control of other weapons.

I must say parenthetically the successful negotiations at Vladivostok, in my opinion, are just a beginning.

Your generation of Americans is uniquely endowed by history to give new meaning to the pride and spirit of America. The magnetism of an American society confident of its own strength will attract the good will and the esteem of all people wherever they might be in this globe in which we live.

It will enhance our own perception of ourselves and our pride in being an American. We can—we can, and I say it with emphasis—write a new agenda for our future.

I am glad that Tulane University and other great American educational institutions are reaching out to others in programs to work with developing nations, and I look forward with confidence to your participation in every aspect of America's future. And I urge Americans of all ages to unite in this Bicentennial year to take responsibilities for themselves, as our ancestors did.

Let us resolve tonight to rediscover the old virtues of confidence and self-reliance and capability that characterized our forefathers two centuries ago.

I pledge, as I know you do, each one of us, to do our part. Let the beacon lights of the past shine forth from historic New Orleans, and from Tulane University, and from every other corner of this land to illuminate a boundless future for all Americans and a peace for all mankind.

Thank you very much.

## "A Conversation With President Ford"—An Interview for CBS Television and Radio

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of an interview with President Ford by Walter Cronkite, Eric Sevareid, and Bob Schieffer broadcast live on CBS television and radio on April 21.*[1]

. . . . . .

*Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, just this moment as we came on the air, I was surprised over this little machine here that the Associated Press and the United Press International are reporting from Honolulu that a large number of battle-equipped marines, 800 or so, have left Hawaii by air, on chartered aircraft. Can you tell us what their destination is and what is up?*

*President Ford:* That is part of a movement to strengthen, or to bring up to strength, the Marine detachment in that area of the Pacific. It is not an unusual military movement. On the other hand, we felt under the circumstances that it was wise to bring that Marine group in that area of the world—the South Pacific—up to strength.

*Mr. Cronkite: Can you tell us where they are going, sir?*

*President Ford:* I don't think I should be any more definitive than that.

*Mr. Cronkite: They are not going directly to Saigon?*

*President Ford:* No, they are not.

*Mr. Cronkite: Now that President Thieu [Nguyen Van Thieu, of South Viet-Nam] has resigned, which was the big news this morning, of course, are we involved in, are we acting as an intermediary in any negotiations for a peaceful settlement out there?*

*President Ford:* We are exploring with a number of governments negotiating opportunities, but in this very rapid change, with President Thieu stepping down, there really hasn't been an opportunity for us to make contact with a new government. And the net result is we are planning to explore with them and with other governments in that area or connected with that area so that we don't miss any opportunity to try and get a cease-fire.

*Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, what is your own estimate of the situation now? Do you think that the Hanoi people want to negotiate the turnover of the city, a peaceful turnover, or just drive ahead?*

*President Ford:* Eric, I wish I knew. I don't think anybody can be absolutely certain, except the North Vietnamese themselves.

You get the impression that in the last few days they were anxious to move in very quickly for a quick takeover. On the other hand, within the last 12, 24 hours, there seems to be a slowdown. It is not certain from what we see just what their tactic will be. We naturally hope that there is a period when the fighting will cease or the military activity will become less intense so that negotiations might be undertaken or even a cease-fire achieved.

But it is so fluid right now I don't think anybody can be certain what the North Vietnamese are going to do.

*Mr. Sevareid: Are they communicating with our government through third parties or otherwise?*

*President Ford:* We have communications

[1] For the complete transcript, see White House press release dated Apr. 21.

with other governments. I can't tell you whether the North Vietnamese are communicating with them or not. I don't know.

*Mr. Sevareid: President Thieu, when he stepped down, said one of the reasons was American pressure. What was our role in his resignation?*

*President Ford:* Our government made no direct request that President Thieu step down. There was no pressure by me or anyone in Washington in that regard.

There may have been some on the scene in Saigon who may have talked to President Thieu, but there was no pressure from here to force President Thieu to step down and he made, I am sure, the final decision all on his own.

*Mr. Sevareid: Surely our representatives there would not speak without your authority on this matter?*

*President Ford:* It is a question of how you phrase it. We never asked anybody to ask him to step down. There were discussions as to whether or not he should or shouldn't, but there was no direct request from me for him to relinquish his role as the head of state.

After all, he was an elected President. He was the head of that government, properly chosen, so his decision, as far as we know, was made totally on his own.

#### Evacuation From Viet-Nam

*Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, on the evacuation, you have expressed hope that something could be arranged so tens of thousands of loyal South Vietnamese could be brought out of the country.*

*Do you think it is possible to have something like that if the North Vietnamese oppose it or if the Viet Cong are not willing to go along with it? Are any kinds of negotiations underway right now to try to set up some sort of an arrangement like that?*

*President Ford:* I would agree with you that if the North Vietnamese make a military effort, it would be virtually impossible to do so unless we moved in substantial U.S. military personnel to protect the evacuation. On the other hand, if the South Vietnamese should make it difficult in their disappointment that our support hadn't been as much as they thought it should be, their involvement would make it virtually impossible, again without a sizable U.S. military commitment. That is one reason why we want a cease-fire. That is why we want the military operation stopped—so that we can certainly get all the Americans out without any trouble and, hopefully, those South Vietnamese that we feel a special obligation to.

But at the moment, it does not appear that that is possible. We intend to keep working on it because we feel it is the humane and proper thing to do.

*Mr. Schieffer: What if it is not possible? Then what do you do? Do you ask the Congress to let you send those troops in there, American troops to protect the withdrawal? Do you send them in without congressional approval? What do you do next?*

*President Ford:* As you know, I have asked the Congress to clarify my authority as President to send American troops in to bring about the evacuation of friendly South Vietnamese or South Vietnamese that we have an obligation to, or at least I think we do. There is no problem in sending U.S. military personnel into South Viet-Nam to evacuate Americans. That is permitted under the War Powers Act, providing we give adequate prenotification to the Congress.

That is what we did in the case of Phnom Penh, in our personnel there. But if we are going to have a sizable evacuation of South Vietnamese, I would think the Congress ought to clarify the law and give me specific authority. Whether they will or not, I can't tell you at this point.

*Mr. Schieffer: If you do send them in and if Congress gives you the authority, they will have to have airpower. It will have to be a sizable commitment. They will almost have to have an open-ended authority in order to protect themselves. That is what you are asking for, isn't it?*

*President Ford:* Unless the North Viet-

namese and the South Vietnamese have a cease-fire, and then the evacuation of those South Vietnamese could be done very easily.

Now, if there is a military conflict still going on, or if either one side or the other shows displeasure about this, and if we decided to do it—there are a number of "ifs" in that—yes, there would have to be some fairly sizable U.S.—on a short term—very precise, military involvement, not on a broad scale, of course.

#### Factors Contributing to Vietnamese Pullback

*Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, when did you last talk to President Thieu?*

*President Ford:* I have not personally talked to President Thieu since I became President. I have had a number of exchanges of correspondence with him, but the last time I talked to him was when he was in the United States and I was minority leader. That was roughly two years ago, as I recollect.

*Mr. Cronkite: Gracious, we have this hotline with the potential great-power adversary, the Soviet Union, and yet, with an ally who is in dire straits at this moment there is no communication between the Presidents. It seems strange.*

*President Ford:* Well, there is very good communication between myself, our Secretary of State, and our Ambassador there. So, there is no lack of communication in and through proper channels. I don't think it is essential in this situation that there be a direct communication between myself and former President Thieu.

*Mr. Cronkite: Might it help to solve some of the misunderstandings if you had talked directly to him?*

*President Ford:* I don't think so. We have had communications back and forth, both by message and as well as by correspondence. I think we understand one another. I think some of his comments were more directed at our government as a whole than directed at me personally.

*Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, one of his comments was that the United States had led the South Vietnamese people to their deaths. Do you have any specific reply to that one?*

*President Ford:* There were some public and corresponding private commitments made in 1972–1973 where I think that the President of South Viet-Nam could have come to the conclusion, as he did, that the U.S. Government would do two things: One, replace military hardware on a one-for-one basis, keep his military strength sufficiently high so that he could meet any of the challenges of the North, and in addition there was a commitment that we, as a nation, would try to enforce the agreements that were signed in Paris in January of 1973.

Now, unfortunately, the Congress in August of 1973 removed the latter, took away from the President the power to move in a military way to enforce the agreements that were signed in Paris.

So, we were left then only with the other commitment, and unfortunately the replacement of military hardware was not lived up to. I therefore can understand President Thieu's disappointment in the rather traumatic times that he went through in the last week. I can understand his observations.

*Mr. Sevareid: What is the relative weight that you assign to, first, this question of how much aid we sent or didn't send, and his use of it, especially in this pullback? Where is the greater mistake? Because historically this is terribly important.*

*President Ford:* It is my judgment—and history will be probably more precise—but it is my judgment at the moment that the failure of the Congress to appropriate the military aid requested—the previous Administration asked for $1.4 billion for this fiscal year; Congress authorized $1 billion; Congress appropriated $700 million—and the failure to make the commitment for this fiscal year of something close to what was asked for certainly raised doubts in the mind of President Thieu and his military that we would be supplying sufficient mili-

tary hardware for them to adequately defend their various positions in South Viet-Nam.

Now, the lack of support certainly had an impact on the decision that President Thieu made to withdraw precipitously. I don't think he would have withdrawn if the support had been there. It wasn't there, so he decided to withdraw.

Unfortunately, the withdrawal was hastily done, inadequately prepared, and consequently was a chaotic withdrawal of the forces from military regions 1, 2, and 3.

How you place the blame, what percentages, our failure to supply the arms, what percentage related to the hastily and inadequately prepared withdrawal—the experts, after they study the records, probably can give you a better assessment; but the initial kickoff came for the withdrawal from the failure of our government to adequately support the military request for help.

*Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, what I don't understand is, if they are saying we have got to leave because the United States is not going to give us some more equipment, why did they leave all the equipment up there that they had? Why did they abandon so much of that equipment?*

*President Ford:* As I was saying, the withdrawal was very poorly planned and hastily determined. I am not an Army man. I was in the Navy. But I have talked to a good many Army and Marine Corps experts, and they tell me that a withdrawal, military withdrawal, is the most difficult maneuver to execute, and this decision by President Thieu was hastily done without adequate preparation, and it in effect became a rout.

When you are in a panic state of mind, inevitably you are going to leave a lot of military hardware. It is tragic. There is no excuse for that kind of a military operation, but even though that happened, if they had been given military aid that General Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army] recommended during the last month, I am convinced that with that additional military hardware on time, there could have been a stabilization of the situation which, in my judgment, would have led more quickly to a cease-fire.

*Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, you have said you were not advised of this withdrawal of President Thieu's. Are you certain, however, that none of the American military or diplomatic advisers out in Saigon did not agree with him that a limited withdrawal might be effective in bringing pressure on Congress to vote these funds and that therefore there was an American participation in that decision?*

*President Ford:* As far as I know, Walter, there was no prenotification to any, certainly high-ranking, U.S. military or civilian official of the withdrawal decision.

*Mr. Sevareid: This whole affair is going to be argued over. There will be vast books on it for years and years. Wouldn't it be wisest to publish the correspondence between former President Nixon and President Thieu, which is disputed now, the 1973 correspondence after the Paris accords?*

*President Ford:* In the first place, I have personally read the correspondence. The personal correspondence between President Nixon and President Thieu corresponds with the public record. I have personally verified that. I don't think in this atmosphere it would be wise to establish the precedent of publishing the personal correspondence between heads of state.

Maybe historically, after a period of time, it might be possible in this instance, but if we establish a precedent for the publication of correspondence between heads of state, I don't think that that correspondence or that kind of correspondence will be effective because heads of state—I have learned firsthand—have to be very frank in their exchanges with one another, and to establish a precedent that such correspondence would be public, I think will downgrade what heads of state try to do in order to solve problems.

*Mr. Sevareid: Of course, there is no way to keep President Thieu from publishing it?*

*President Ford:* No.

*Mr. Sevareid: Things like this have been judiciously leaked when it served the purpose of the President or the Secretary of State. You have no such plans for that?*

*President Ford:* No, I have no such plans, and to be very frank about it, it seems to me that the American people today are yearning for a new start. As I said in my state of the world address to the Congress, let's start afresh.

Now, unless I am pressed, I don't say the Congress did this or did that. I have to be frank if I am asked the categorical question.

I think we ought to turn back the past and take a long look at how we can solve these problems affirmatively in the future. Viet-Nam has been a trauma for this country for 15 years or more. A lot of blame can be shared by a good many people—Democrats as well as Republicans, Congress as well as Presidents.

We have some big jobs to do in other parts of the world. We have treaty commitments to keep. We have relations with adversaries or potential adversaries that we should be concerned about. It is my judgment, under these circumstances, we should look ahead and not concentrate on the problems of the past where a good bit of blame can be shared by many.

*Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, Vice President Rockefeller suggested he thinks this would be an issue in the 1976 campaign. Will you make it an issue in 1976 or will you try to keep it out of the campaign?*

*President Ford:* I will not make it a campaign issue in 1976.

*Mr. Schieffer: Will Mr. Rockefeller? I didn't quite understand what he was driving at in that recent interview when he said, you know, if 2,000 or 3,000 Americans die in this evacuation, that raises some issues.*

*President Ford:* Well, of course, the record—whatever a man in public office says—can be in and of itself a campaign issue. But I can speak only for myself, and I do not intend to go out and point the finger or make a speech concerning those who have differed with me who I might privately think contributed to the problem.

By 1976, I would hope we could look forward, with some progress in the field of foreign policy. I think we have got some potential successes that will be very much possible as we look ahead.

So, rather than to replay the past with all the division and divisive feelings between good people in this country, I just hope we can admit we made some mistakes, not try to assess the blame, but decide how we can solve the problems that are on our doorstep.

And we have a few, but they are solvable if we stick together, if we have a high degree of American unity.

*Mr. Cronkite: There is not much trouble—leaving the Viet-Nam issue as the nation has had, in leaving Viet-Nam here tonight, but I would like to ask just one more. Have you talked to former President Nixon about any aspects of this Viet-Nam thing in the last few weeks?*

*President Ford:* After my state of the world speech April 10, he called me, congratulated me on it. We discussed what I had said. It was a rather short but a very friendly chat on the telephone.

*Mr. Cronkite: Any talk about secret agreements?*

*President Ford:* As I recall the conversation, he reiterated what I have said, that the public record corresponds with the private correspondence in reference to the commitments, moral or legal or otherwise.

*Mr. Cronkite: Speaking of your state of the world address, there was speculation around just before that address that you were going to use it to put your own stamp on foreign policy. I think the phrase was "to get out from under the shadow" of Secretary Henry Kissinger. Do you feel you did that with that speech, or was that ever your intention?*

*President Ford:* It wasn't done to show any particular purpose, other than the problems we had. Viet-Nam, of course, was number one on the agenda. We did want to

indicate that—and I must say "we," it means the Administration—that we were strengthening NATO. We had to solve the problem of the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.

It was sort of a world look, and I don't think it was necessary for me to put my own imprint. I think it is more important to deal with reality rather than to try and go off on my own.

The problems have to be solved, and I don't care who has the label for it.

**Foreign Policy Decisionmaking**

*Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, we all get the impression, and have since you have been in office, that you get your foreign policy advice exclusively from Henry Kissinger. If that isn't so, who else do you listen to?*

*President Ford:* That is a good question, and I would like to answer it quite frankly. The National Security Council meets on the major decisions that I have to make—SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions], et cetera.

I get the recommendations from the National Security Council. It includes Secretary Kissinger, Secretary Schlesinger [Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger], the head of the CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The major decisions come to me in option papers from the National Security Council.

I meet daily with Secretary Kissinger for about an hour, because I think it is important for me to be brought up day by day on what the circumstances are in the various areas where we have potential decisionmaking on the agenda. But, the actual information that is involved in a major decision comes through the National Security Council.

*Mr. Sevareid: Suppose there is a position paper or policy recommendation from somebody in the National Security Council to which the Secretary is opposed? Could it get to you? Could it get past him to you?*

*President Ford:* Oh, yes. Surely. No question about that. As a matter of fact, in our discussions in the National Security Council, particularly when we were preparing for SALT Two negotiations, there were some options proposed by one individual or others.

There wasn't unanimity at the outset, but by having, as I recall, three or four NSC meetings, we resolved those differences. At the outset there were differences, but when we got there, there was unanimity on what we decided.

*Mr. Sevareid: One more short question on this. It was the complaint of many people that worked with President Johnson on the Viet-Nam war that he never had time to read any of the books about Indochina, the French experience, the Viet Minh movement, and so on. Have you ever had time to read any of the books about that part of the world?*

*President Ford:* I, over the years, have read four to five books, but I have had the experience of sitting on a Committee on Appropriations that had involvement going back as early as 1953, with economic-military aid to South Viet-Nam, and those hearings on appropriations for economic and military aid would go into the problems of South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, South Viet-Nam, in great depth.

So, this outside reading, plus the testimony, plus the opportunity to visit South Viet-Nam I think has given me a fairly good background on the history as well as the current circumstances.

. . . . .

*Mr. Cronkite: John Hersey, in that excellent New York Times Magazine piece yesterday, said that you are quite impatient with palace feuds—*

*President Ford:* That is an understatement.

*Mr. Cronkite: —yet, reports have gone around quite continually here in Washington that there are members of your most intimate White House staff who would like to see Dr. Kissinger go. Are you aware of that?*

*President Ford:* If they believe it, they have never said it to me. I happen to think Henry Kissinger is an outstanding Secretary of State. I have thought it since I have known him and he has been in the job.

Fortunately, my personal acquaintanceship with Secretary Kissinger goes back 10 or 15 years, so I have known him over a period of time, and it is my strong feeling that he has made a tremendous contribution to world peace.

He has been the most effective Secretary of State, certainly in my period of service in the Congress, or in the Vice Presidency, or the White House. I have never heard anybody on my staff ever make a recommendation to me that Secretary Kissinger should leave.

*Mr. Cronkite: What about suggestions—*

*President Ford:* I would strongly disagree with them and let them know it quite forthrightly.

*Mr. Cronkite: What about suggestions that perhaps someone else should be the national security adviser, that he should give up one of those hats? How do you feel about that?*

*President Ford:* If you were to draw a chart, I think you might make a good argument that that job ought to be divided.

On the other hand, sometimes in government you get unique individuals who can very successfully handle a combination of jobs like Secretary Kissinger is doing today as head of the National Security Council and Secretary of State.

If you get that kind of a person, you ought to take advantage of that capability. And therefore, under the current circumstances, I would not recommend, nor would I want, a division of those two responsibilities.

*Mr. Cronkite: Is there any talk of his resigning?*

*President Ford:* I have talked to Secretary of State Kissinger. I have asked him to stay and he is committed to stay through the end of this Administration, January 20, 1977.

**CIA's Role and Congressional Oversight**

*Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, you said last fall—changing the subject—regarding the CIA, that you were ordering a study on how better to keep Congress informed of CIA activities. Can you tell us how that study is coming, and can we expect any report on that in the near future?*

*President Ford:* I appointed the Rockefeller Commission, an excellent group, and they are now in the process of taking testimony from people within the government and people outside of the government. It is a very thorough investigation. They have an outstanding staff.

I would expect within the next 60 to 90 days I would have from that commission its recommendations for any structural changes or any other changes that might be made, but I haven't gotten that report yet.

*Mr. Cronkite: That is the only study. There is not a study on just congressional liaison with the CIA?*

*President Ford:* No. That, to some extent, is a separate issue. The Congress, in recent years, has broadened the number of people who are filled in by the CIA.

When I was on the Committee on Appropriations, I don't think there were more than 10 or 12 people in the Congress, House and Senate, who were kept abreast of the budget of the CIA, the activities of the CIA, but today I would guess that it is close to 50 to 75.

Now, when the number of people being told reaches that magnitude, inevitably there can and will be leaks about some of the jobs or activities being undertaken by the CIA.

Of course, the CIA under those circumstances can't possibly operate effectively, either covertly or overtly, so I think we have got to find a better way of adequately keeping the Congress informed, but not enlarging the number who have to be informed.

*Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, wouldn't the whole thing be safer and clearer and cleaner if it was simply the law that the CIA gather intelligence only and engage in no covert political operations abroad?*

*President Ford:* If we lived in a different world—

*Mr. Sevareid: It might help to make the world different.*

*President Ford:* Well, I can't imagine the United States saying we would not undertake any covert activities, and knowing at the same time that friends, as well as foes, are undertaking covert activity, not only in the United States but elsewhere.

That would be like tying a President's hand behind his back in the planning and execution of foreign policy. I believe that we have to have an outstanding intelligence-gathering group, such as the CIA or in the other intelligence-collection organizations in our government. But I also think we have to have some operational activity.

Now, we cannot compete in this very real world if you are just going to tie the United States with one hand behind its back and everybody else has got two good hands to carry out their operations.

*Mr. Cronkite: Do you people mean by covert activities—I want to get clear on this —does this mean the use of the "dirty tricks" department to support friendly governments and try to bring down unfriendly ones?*

*President Ford:* It covers a wide range of activities, Walter. I wouldn't want to get in and try to pinpoint or define them, but it covers a wide range of activities. I just happen to believe, as President, but I believed it when I was in the Congress, that our government must carry out certain covert activities.

*Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, what do we get for that, for these covert activities? We hear about this business of "destabilizing" the government in Chile—we didn't seem to help ourselves very much in that—the Phoenix program in Viet-Nam, the "secret war" in Laos. Is it that we just never hear of the successful ones?*

*President Ford:* A good intelligence covert activity, you don't go around talking about.

*Mr. Schieffer: Have there ever been any good ones?*

*President Ford:* There have been some most successful ones, and I don't think it is wise for us today to talk about the good ones or even the bad ones in the past.

It is a very risky business, but it is a very important part of our national security, and I don't think we should discuss—certainly I shouldn't discuss—specifics. I shouldn't indicate we have done this or done that.

But I can assure you that, if we are to compete with foes on the one hand, or even be equal in the execution of foreign policy with our friends, we have to have covert activities carried out.

*Mr. Cronkite: How in a democracy can the people have an input into what governments overseas they are going to knock off or what ones they are going to support? It seems to be antithetical to the whole principle of democracy.*

*President Ford:* Every four years, Walter, the American people elect a President, and they elect a Congress every two years, or most of the Congress every two years.

The American people, I think, have to make a judgment that the people they elect are going to carry out, of course, domestic policy, but equally important, foreign policy.

And the implementation of foreign policy inevitably means that you are going to have intelligence gathering as well as operational activities by your intelligence organization.

#### Options for Middle East Negotiations

*Mr. Cronkite: Can we move on to the Middle East now? Are you reconciled to a Geneva meeting now or would you still like to see some more direct diplomacy in the step-by-step Kissinger pattern?*

*President Ford:* I think, following the very serious disappointment of the last negotiations between Israel and Egypt, we are committed, at least in principle, to going to Geneva.

Now in the meantime, we are going through this process of reassessment of our whole Middle Eastern policy which, prior to the suspension of the negotiations between

Egypt and Israel, had been a very successful one.

Now, there really are three options. You could resume the suspended negotiations without making a commitment to go to Geneva. You could go to Geneva and try to get an overall settlement, which is a very complicated matter. Many people advocate it, however. But while you were going through this negotiation for an overall settlement, as a third option you might have an interim negotiated settlement between two of the parties, such as Israel and Egypt.

Now, those are basically the three options. We have not made any decision yet. We have had our Ambassadors from the Middle East come back and report to me. We have undertaken a study under the leadership of Joe Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs] to bring together the best thinking and all of the options.

We have brought in, or Secretary Kissinger has brought in, some outside experts in the Middle East. Last week, I had a meeting with a former State Department official, Gene Rostow, who is an expert in this area. But right at the moment, we have made no firm decision as to what our next particular step will be in the Middle East.

*Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, can you foresee any possible circumstances in which you would feel it right to send American armed forces into the Middle East on land or in the air? In other words, military intervention?*

*President Ford:* I can't foresee any, Eric, but—and I see no reason to do so. So, I think the answer is pretty categorically no.

*Mr. Sevareid: What about a wholly different level, if there were agreement for a Russian-American peace patrol and the alternative to that was another Mideast war, would you go that far?*

*President Ford:* You put it on about the most extreme alternatives. We want peace in the Middle East, and I think the Soviet Union does, too.

I would hope that there wouldn't be a need for either the United States or the Soviet Union having any peacekeeping responsibilities with their own forces in the Middle East.

*Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, does the reassessment now going on of the Middle East policy also include a reassessment of the U.S. position toward the Palestinians?*

*President Ford:* If you take the path of an overall settlement and going to Geneva, I think you have to have an analysis of what is going to happen there because the Palestinians are going to demand recognition.

But I don't mean to infer that we have made any decision. But the Palestinians have to be examined as a part of the overall Middle East situation. I am not making any commitment one way or another, but it has to be part of the problem that we are analyzing.

*Mr. Schieffer: Let me ask you this just as a followup. Could the Palestinians be included if they refuse to deal with the Israelis?*

*President Ford:* I don't see how, because the Israelis, in the first place, don't recognize the Palestinians as a proper party, and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] doesn't recognize the existence of Israel. So, I think that is an impasse right there, and it will be one of the most difficult things that will have to be worked out if it is worked out at Geneva.

*Mr. Schieffer: Do you have any feel for when there will be a date for the Geneva Conference reconvening?*

*President Ford:* I have seen a lot of speculation early this summer, but no set time has been determined.

*Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, the Israeli Foreign Minister, [Yigal] Allon, is in Washington now, and there are reports out of Jerusalem today that he is going to suggest a summit meeting between you and President [Prime Minister] Rabin. Do you expect to have such a meeting?*

*President Ford:* I wouldn't expect that I would make any commitment on that until we are further along in our reassessment. It may be desirable at some point. It may be desirable to meet other parties, or other

heads of state, in the Middle East, but I don't want to make any commitment tonight as to any one or as to more than one.

*Mr. Cronkite: Doesn't that sort of imply that we are still being a little bit hardnosed in our disappointment over the Kissinger mission?*

*President Ford:* No, I think it is wise for us to take a look ourselves at the new options or different options. I certainly wouldn't rule out a meeting with Mr. Rabin, but I don't want to make any commitment to one until we have moved a bit further down in the process of a reassessment.

I reiterate that if we meet with one, we certainly ought to give others an opportunity, other heads of state, to have the same input.

*Mr. Cronkite: So, there won't be any favored-nation treatment of Israel in the future?*

*President Ford:* I think we have to, in this very difficult situation, where the possibility of war is certainly a serious one, if you have a war, you are inevitably going to have an oil embargo—I think we have to be very cautious in our process of reassessment.

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## Republic of Korea Ratifies Nonproliferation Treaty

*Remarks by J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.*[1]

Today the Republic of Korea deposited the instrument of ratification by which it becomes a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United States welcomes this important act by the Republic of Korea to join the 85 countries which have given concrete expression to their determination to combat the danger of nuclear proliferation by becoming parties to the NPT.

Korea is one of several countries which have completed ratification of the NPT in recent months. These developments enhance the effectiveness of the treaty, which, as Secretary Kissinger said in his address to the U.N. General Assembly last autumn, deserves full and continuing international support. We hope the Korean example will encourage still other countries to become NPT parties, for we believe that the security of the international community and each of its members can be furthered by wider support for the treaty.

## Secretary Regrets Postponement of Trip to South America

*Statement by Secretary Kissinger*[2]

Events in Indochina are unfolding with such unexpected speed that the President has asked me to stay in Washington in the days just ahead. It is with great reluctance and even greater personal regret that I must therefore postpone my trip to South America scheduled for later this week.

I have communicated with the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela to inform them of this decision and of my determination to visit South America at a later date.

The forging of strengthened ties with our neighbors in this hemisphere is a cardinal objective of our foreign policy. The aspirations of Latin America and the United States are indissolubly linked and are of significance for the rest of the world.

For these reasons, I particularly regret the postponement of my South American trip under these circumstances. And I look forward to working with my colleagues at the OAS General Assembly here in Washington next month, where we will have another opportunity to discuss our common goals.

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[1] Made at a ceremony in the Treaty Room of the Department of State on Apr. 23 (text from press release 213). Mr. Zurhellen is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

[2] Issued on Apr. 21.

## Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for L'Express of France

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by Pierre Salinger of L'Express of France conducted at the Department of State on April 12.*

Press release 208 dated April 19

*Q. You have said on a number of occasions that you are more a historian than a statesman. I wonder whether you might step back a minute in your role of a statesman and take on your role as a historian and give me an assessment of American foreign policy from 1969 to 1975.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When I came into office with the Nixon administration, we were really at the end of a period of American foreign policy in which a redesign would have been necessary to do no matter who took over. I think myself, for example, in retrospect that the Kennedy period will be seen as the last flowering of the previous era rather than as the beginning of a new era. I don't say this as a criticism, but simply to define the problem.

What was the situation we faced? In most of the postwar period we could operate with a simplicity of the cold war until 1969—of absolute good against absolute evil or preventing military aggression against allies. Insofar as we were engaged in economic development, we did so really as a projection of this abroad on the theory that economic development would produce political stability. And we were operating with enormous self-confidence and self-assurance; that is, as the only major Western country that had come out of the war undamaged and indeed had been generally successful in everything that it attempted.

When we came into office in 1969, we faced a dramatically changed environment. First, Western Europe and Japan had regained economic vitality and some political constancy. Secondly, the simplicities of the cold war began to evaporate.

The domestic pressures in all countries for putting an end to tension became greater and greater, and within the Communist world it was self-evident that we were no longer confronting a monolith. America had gone through two assassinations and a war in Viet-Nam which was a profound shock to us because we entered it rather lightheartedly and with great self-confidence, and when we came into office we found 550,000 men engaged in a war against which public opinion was increasingly turning, including the very people who had gotten us into the war.

With respect to newly developing countries it became clear that we faced a problem that was much more philosophical than economic in terms of their perception of the world.

So our problem was how to orient America in this world and how to do it in such a way that we could avoid these oscillations between excessive moralism and excessive pragmatism, with excessive concern with power and total rejection of power, which have been fairly characteristic of American policy. This was the basic goal we set ourselves.

I think we did establish a new relationship with Europe, with some strain, but I would say all our relations now are more mature and calmer than at any period since the fifties. The same is true of Japan.

I think we have taken, I hope, creative account of the polarity of the Communist world. We have tried to respond to the need to ease tensions, and we disengaged our military forces from Viet-Nam.

I think we have made progress in the Middle East, too, but I think we had better dis-

cuss that more as a tactical than as a philosophical problem.

What have been our difficulties? Our difficulties have been almost entirely domestic on a variety of levels.

In order to be able to unify the country when the war in Viet-Nam was finished, we believed that those who were opposed to the war in Viet-Nam would be satisfied with our withdrawal and those who favored an honorable ending would be satisfied if the United States would not destroy an ally.

We will never know whether there would have been a domestic tranquillity, but within three months of the end of that war we were projected into the middle of the Watergate crisis that no one could foresee and that had an enormously debilitating impact on our executive authority. The conduct of foreign policy without executive authority becomes extremely difficult.

This in turn triggered a series of actions by the Congress which in a number of cases such as Turkey and Indochina have accelerated our difficulties and encouraged pressure groups of all kinds to influence foreign policy. I think this has been an unexpected event or at least unpredicted by us.

So, we face now a problem that while the design of our foreign policy is intact, the authority to implement it may be impaired, and it is a primary responsibility to attempt to restore that through partnership with the Congress and through perhaps getting more of a public consensus.

Finally, all of this has happened at a time when the establishment that carried our foreign policy has been both disintegrated and demoralized.

At the time of the Kennedy period, you still had a group of people who had carried American foreign policy, who helped shape public opinion and on whom a President could count to perform missions. These people are now 15 years older and really have had no adequate replacements.

So that the administration—and I would say this would be true as well of a Democrat as well as a Republican administration—is more naked to day-to-day pressures of public opinion than has been the case throughout the entire postwar period.

This is how I would assess the pluses and minuses of American foreign policy, and I am absolutely confident that we can restore the situation now that certain of our traumas are seen in that perspective.

### Foreign Policy and Domestic Problems

*Q. About three months ago in an interview with an American magazine, you said, and I quote, The political problem is that the whole Western world with the exception perhaps of the United States is suffering from a political malaise, inner uncertainty and from lack of direction. Those very words have been used in Europe to describe what is going on in the United States.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I would say that they can probably be applied in some respects to the United States right now. I know there is a school of thought that says if you admit difficulties you are causing these difficulties. These are the people probably who would have recommended that Churchill in 1940 say that a group of British yachtsmen decided to cross the channel and happened to congregate off the coast of Dunkirk.

We have had assassinations and two Presidents driven from office, a war which as generally seen is not successful, so we have this problem. But we also have great strengths, great resources, and a basically correct design of foreign policy, and therefore I believe that we can overcome our domestic problems, and I believe that we can start a period of new creativity.

I would therefore reject the term "political malaise." We are having major difficulties. We are determined to overcome them. And I am confident we shall.

*Q. Do you think realistically that in the short term the problems of American foreign policy, as they relate to internal politics in America, can be righted until you have an election and have a President who has been elected running the country?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think they can be, yes, and in fact they must be. History won't wait two years until we can have an election. Moreover, our election could easily be conducted in terms that would not of itself give a clear-cut answer, especially if the President doesn't exercise active leadership.

So the President has to act in terms of the problems he now faces, which he is determined to do.

We have some anomalies in our situation domestically in the sense that if there was ever an election fought on issues it was the last one. Sixty-two percent of the public voted for a strong foreign policy and moderate conservatism and, in a way, were disenfranchised because of the series of events over which they had absolutely no control, which were totally unforeseeable, and which produced the collapse of the Nixon Presidency. That is an anomalous situation.

There is no reason to suppose that a new election fought on those issues would produce a different result.

*Q. Yet today public polls would indicate that less than 40 percent of the American people would be willing to intervene in Europe if there was a military overrun of Europe by the Soviet Union, less than 30 percent in Israel if Israel was to fall to the Arabs, and it seems that there is a real trend of isolationism in this country.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that there is a certain trend, but this I think is partly due to this disassociation from the political process that has resulted from Watergate.

Every public opinion poll shows that about 70 percent of the people support our foreign policy, which is certainly not isolationist, so a great deal depends on whether the public finds leadership with which it can identify.

*Q. You have said that credibility of the United States in one part of the world is very important in how people in other parts of the world view that credibility. There are those who say that by saying that you are planting in people's minds the feeling that the American credibility is no longer to be counted on.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that when a major country engages in a decade in a major effort which then does not obviously succeed, it raises questions about wisdom, judgment, and effectiveness, and questions about the impact of that setback on the psyche of the country.

Now, I say this is a problem the United States has to face. I cite it also as a problem we can overcome and will overcome. But we will surely not overcome it if we pretend that it does not exist and we are going to continue business as usual.

So I repeat: I think it has produced a problem that affects our general stance in the world. I want Americans to face this. When they face it, they can also overcome it. I don't believe that my saying it creates the problem. It is my duty as Secretary of State to describe the world as it is.

*Q. And you have said that if American leadership is not there, there is no other leadership in the Western world. But as to that leadership present today, are you getting the impression from your reports from abroad that people still have confidence in American leadership?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think right now people around the world, from what I can learn, are worried at a minimum about how America will assess its present situation. I believe we have to face the fact that the past decade has raised certain doubts about American leadership. I say this in order to reestablish American leadership and not to abdicate it.

I think the President is absolutely determined to conduct a strong foreign policy, and in the weeks ahead you will see that he will speak increasingly on foreign policy.

I believe that the design of our foreign policy can be maintained, and I believe also that our friends will be more reassured if we admit that we have a problem which we are trying to solve than if we pretend that we don't have a problem that they recognize.

*Q. Let me go away from the past for a minute and ask you to look into the future a little bit. If you were to portray the best*

*and the worst scenario for American policy in the world over the next five years, how would you see those two possibilities?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the best scenario would be one in which our cohesion with Europe is strengthened and the relationship across the Atlantic is fostered, in which we can develop a new set of relationships with Japan, Western Europe, and the United States that are adjusted to issues that transcend events, in which détente becomes not a tactical policy but the method of operation of the great powers, in which relations with China would continue toward normalization, and in which in our relationships with the underdeveloped world we overcome the present dilemma of simultaneous confrontation and cooperation in a spirit in which at least the general conceptions of a desirable world structure begin to emerge.

The worst scenario is one which will show a gradual disintegration of the domestic stability of all of our friendly countries, accompanied by a growing sense of impotence and less self-confidence by the United States, which will sooner or later trigger a series of more aggressive actions by hostile powers and increasing confrontations with the less developed world.

I would put into the best scenario also a creative solution to problems of energy, food, and raw materials, and in the worst scenario that these issues become increasingly issues of confrontation.

Both scenarios are possible. I believe we can achieve the best scenario. I think the building blocks are there, and I think the will is there. We are going through one of those difficult periods now which perhaps because of their very difficulty can be used to start new creations and so, in a funny way, I am more optimistic now than I was six months ago.

Six months ago I saw the dangers, but very few others agreed with me. Now I think most people can see the dangers and therefore they can also seize the opportunities. Six months ago people were satisfied that things were getting juggled into reasonable shape, and now they know they have got to work for it. So I think the possibilities now are better, strangely enough, than say last October when I would give occasionally gloomy interviews and everyone was saying, "What in God's name is he talking about?"

Now that some of these events have happened, I think we are in a much better position to transcend our problems.

#### U.S.-Soviet Relations

*Q. How would you assess the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and détente?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think we have had a setback in the trade agreement. I think there is a tendency on the negative side to use détente as a sort of a palliative while the bureaucracies on both sides, and especially on the Soviet side, continue on traditional courses. I think in America too many people have taken détente for granted and have forgotten what it was like to live in the cold war, and so they think they can hack away at it and think that then there is no price for it.

I think we have a possibility and indeed a duty to attempt to transform the cold war into a more cooperative relationship. I think when two countries possess the capability to destroy civilized life, they cannot conduct foreign policy by traditional maxims. My disagreement with some of our domestic opponents is that they think that if they would only apply some of the old pure-power political terms to Soviet-American relations they might get some unspecified concessions, but they also might get a series of confrontations out of proportion to anything that we began. To be sure, we have to defend our vital interests, but Soviet-American relations are not designed for tests of manhood.

I think the relationship has had a setback. It has had a period of stagnation. I have the impression that the Soviet Union is now fairly anxious to pick it up again. I think that the possibilities to move in a positive direction still exist.

*Q. Do you agree with those who say that the ability or the possibility of the super-*

*powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—to influence events in the world is becoming less and less?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Not when they are dealing with each other, but dealing with third powers. It depends on how determined they are to influence events. If they really are determined to influence them, I think that they can do it.

*Q. If that is true, don't you think that the current perception of the American situation, whether that is true or not, may not influence the Soviet Union to start moving into areas where it has not traditionally moved?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is one of the dangers of the situation; but I think that the Soviet Union will find over the next few months that this perception is not the real perception, because I think that the President and his associates are absolutely determined to strengthen American foreign policy.

*Q. Are you in touch with the Soviet Union in any way to indicate to them this American determination?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, but they also know our determination to pursue détente. They know both.

### Middle East Negotiations

*Q. Do you think there is any possibility of having a new round of talks in which the United States played a role before a new Geneva Conference was assembled?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is entirely up to the parties. The United States cannot be in a position where it seems more interested in an interim settlement than the parties themselves.

It is not enough to have a desire to resume them. Something has to be put into the negotiations that is different from what preceded it, and until we see that from one or both of the parties, there is no point in our engaging ourselves.

*Q. It is generally believed that the relations between the United States and Israel are less good today than they were before those negotiations because of the feeling that perhaps Israel could have gone further in those negotiations.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I wouldn't say our relations are less good, I would say our relations are now different in the sense that when we were the sole mediator there could be a degree of coordination that is more difficult to achieve than when we are dealing with a wider forum.

In any event, it forces us to assess how we are to conduct this diplomacy. This is the essence of our reassessment. Our reassessment isn't primarily concerned with questions of economic and military aid.

*Q. There is a feeling in Israel that there is an erosion of support for Israel in the United States.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, my friend Abba Eban once said to me that Israel considered objectivity 100 percent agreement with their point of view. So if you slip to 98 percent, you can already be accused of erosion and deterioration.

I think there are two separate problems—the relation between the Israeli Government and the U.S. Government, and the perception of the American public of the American role in the world. I think in general the readiness to give foreign aid and to run the risk of war has deteriorated in America, but I think that Israel has suffered less from that deterioration than almost any other country.

*Q. What would be your prognosis if you went to Geneva without any further conversations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would send someone who has a lot of time.

### Viet-Nam and Cambodia

*Q. The Cambodian Ambassador was quoted as saying yesterday that after using Cambodia for five years and carrying out American policy in Southeast Asia, the*

*Americans have now abandoned a naive people to their fate.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* What happened in Cambodia is heartbreaking. In our domestic debate, Cambodia is often described as if we went into it because we didn't have enough of a war going on so we had to add another neutral country.

In fact, we entered Cambodia because there were 60,000 North Vietnamese in sanctuaries along the border, and we picked up between 15,000 and 20,000 tons of war materiel. After we entered Cambodia, our casualties dropped from over 100 a week to less than 50 a week and finally to 10 a week because, in effect, our operation in Cambodia deprived the North Vietnamese of the ability to conduct military operations in military regions 3 and 4, Saigon and the delta. So from the point of view of achieving our withdrawal, the operation in Cambodia was a success.

However, from the beginning, from 1970 on, we were prevented from conducting our operations in Cambodia for any purpose other than promoting the withdrawal of Americans. We were forced to put a limit of 30 miles on the extent of our penetration and from really conducting operations in a way that would have supported the Government of Cambodia.

I must say I have great admiration for the bravery of the government that stayed when we withdrew, and I am very saddened by the fact that in its final days we were not even able to give them ammunition. I am not proud of it.

*Q. Isn't it entirely possible that the situation in Viet-Nam may be identical, the Americans may be evacuating, the last Americans from Viet-Nam?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't think it is settled, but it would be idle to deny that South Viet-Nam is in very grave danger. But there the situation is different. We cannot be accused of not having made an all-out fight. We can be accused in the last two years of having reduced our aid too precipitously and maybe having triggered panic by the nature of our domestic debate this year and triggered panic and encouraged moves, but we have made a monumental effort in South Viet-Nam. Cambodia is always different.

*Q. Those who are your harshest critics say if you had made an effort after the 1973 accord of Paris to bring about a political settlement in Cambodia and Viet-Nam instead of concentrating on military help, that this might not have happened.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, my experience in these negotiations is that you cannot have political settlement without military stabilization. I think we can demonstrate that in the summer of 1973 we were closer to a political settlement in Cambodia than at any other period and that this possibility evaporated when the right to conduct bombing in Cambodia was removed so that we lost the ability to trade the end of the bombing for some political concessions.

As for the rest, I believe that the North Vietnamese would have negotiated only under conditions in which any possibility of a military takeover was foreclosed to them, and as these conditions deteriorated, the possibility of a political settlement deteriorated, too.

*Q. What is your reaction to the statement of President d'Estaing [Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, of France] this week about the need for political settlement in Viet-Nam?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I agree with him. The question is what kind of a political settlement and how it is going to be achieved, but I substantially agree with him.

*Q. His statement pretty much let it be understood that a political settlement can only be achieved with the departure of President Thieu, the President of South Viet-Nam.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the United States has been in Viet-Nam and Indochina now for 15 years. I would hate to think that everybody that ever worked with us wound up being discarded by the United States.

Now, basically the political evolution in Saigon depends on the people of South Viet-Nam, and the United States will accept any political settlement that the people of South Viet-Nam negotiate among themselves. But I don't think we will participate in any political preconditions of this kind.

*Q. I remember the period from 1969 to 1972 when you were carrying out the policy of bringing Americans back home from Viet-Nam that you replied repeatedly to critics of your policy at that time and stated to them this was the way you had to do it in order to prevent a debate in this country that could tear the country apart in terms of trying to pin blame for the disaster in Viet-Nam.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I thought it was essential that America withdraw from Viet-Nam in a manner that Americans could feel carried out the obligations inherent in having 550,000 troops there, and very often, popular policies become much less popular when people recognize the consequences of what they have done. Chamberlain was extremely popular in Britain in 1938, and that didn't protect him from those very same people 18 months later.

*Q. Are you concerned that the current effort of the Administration attempting to pin the blame for the problems in South Viet-Nam and Cambodia on the Congress will produce exactly the same kind of debate that you were trying to avoid?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I believe that the debate that was started this year on the supplemental request was quite unnecessary and it wasn't started by us. But it is my intention, and I know it is the intention of the President, that we will not engage in a period of recrimination and we will not look for scapegoats.

#### Developments in Europe

*Q. Let me turn, if I can, for a minute to Europe. NATO, which had its 25th anniversary last year, seems to be in more trouble right now than it has been in its entire history, with the Greeks and Turks questioning NATO commitments, and you have the danger of Portugal leaving NATO.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, in the so-called southern tier we are having massive problems, and they haven't been made easier by our domestic events with respect to Turkey and Greece.

As I told you, the Western alliance now faces a period not so much of strain between Europe and the United States as adjustment of the domestic structures of various European countries. The Cyprus problem should be settled by negotiation, and I think can be settled by negotiation, if the parties are ever left alone long enough to develop some rhythm in their negotiations. We will try to be helpful.

The problem in Portugal, too, is very serious, because it could be taken as a test case for possible evolutions in other countries, and not only if the Communists take over. It could also be the case if the Communists become the sinews of non-Communist government, and perhaps especially so.

I would think in the Western alliance now the major problem is not the debate that seemed so important two years ago between Europe and the United States. I think that has been almost substantially or almost completely overcome by the domestic evolution in many European countries, and I would say, irrespective of Europe, also the domestic evolution in America.

*Q. Would you see any responsibility on the part of European countries to try to do something about the evolution of matters in Portugal?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is not an appropriate subject for me to discuss, but certainly it is a subject in which I am in close contact with my colleagues.

*Q. How do you judge the current state of U.S.-French relations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that the relations between France and the United States began to improve very rapidly after the beginning of the Presidency of Giscard d'Estaing and also under the foreign ministry of Sauvagnargues.

I think the meeting between the two Presidents in Martinique was one of the most successful meetings that I have attended, not only in the sense of formal agreements, although some substantial ones were made, but in the sense that I think both sides are now dealing with each other without complexes.

We recognize that France is performing or playing a somewhat special role in Europe. I think France understands that the last problem with respect to America now is an unquenchable thirst for domination—quite the contrary. So we are now dealing with each other in a much more matter-of-fact way, much less theological. We began to have many disagreements on the energy conference last November, and it was very rapidly settled, and since then I think it is correct to say that we have worked together most cooperatively.

It has become a matter of course for the two Presidents and for the two Foreign Ministers to exchange ideas as to events of major international importance, so much a matter of course that it isn't even reported any more when letters are exchanged.

I would say on the whole that the state of the relations between France and the United States is better than it has been since I have been involved in government, which is since 1961. This doesn't mean that there aren't some problems.

*Q. What is your view on the termination of the preparatory energy conference this week?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let me be clear: Of course we recognize the interconnection between energy and other resource issues, but experience has shown that a "global" negotiation on all issues leads to stalemate. Consequently, we were prepared to respond positively to the French initiative for a multilateral conference focused on energy while other problems were dealt with in other forums, whether existing ones or, where required, new ones. We remain ready to proceed in this manner.

*Q. How do you see your own future? What is the future of Henry Kissinger?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* For the morale of some of our Ambassadors, I would like to keep open the possibility of a potential vacancy, and also, quite frankly, I was not overly eager to be involved or to have foreign policy involved in the political campaign.

But if my analysis of the situation is correct, as I believe it is, and if we have an obligation to rally other countries and our own people to the real tasks and opportunities before us, then this is not a time in which I can leave, unless the President asked me to leave, which he has not done.

So I would think that I would stay for a foreseeable future. What happens after that, I have absolutely no idea, and I have never thought about it. There aren't too many jobs for which being Secretary of State prepares you.

*Mr. Salinger: Mr. Secretary, thank you.*

## Mr. Dent To Be Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

The Senate on March 19 confirmed the nomination of Frederick B. Dent to be Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

## President Kaunda of Zambia Visits Washington

*Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia, visited Washington April 18–21. He met with President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and other U.S. Government officials. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and President Kaunda at a dinner at the White House on April 19.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 28

**PRESIDENT FORD**

Mr. President, Mrs. Kaunda, Kaweche Kaunda, distinguished guests: Let me say that Mrs. Ford and I are extremely delighted to have you, Mr. President, your family, and your distinguished guests with us here this evening. It has been a great pleasure for me to talk to your lovely wife and to know of your delightful family, and on behalf of Mrs. Ford and myself, we extend and wish to you our very, very best.

Your visit to Washington is a mark of friendship that has existed between our two nations since Zambia gained her independence in 1964.

America knows and respects you, Mr. President, but also I should say we know that in the modern history of Zambia and the history of Kenneth Kaunda, they are inseparable. Your moral and intellectual leadership guided your country to independence, and for that we praise you.

Your leadership has made your young nation an example of respect and admiration throughout the world. The American people join me in saluting you for your accomplishments, your dedication, and your wisdom in a controversial and difficult world.

We ask that you convey to your people in Zambia our admiration for them and for you and our greetings.

Mr. President, we have been following developments in southern Africa with great, great interest. For many years the United States has supported self-determination for the peoples of that area, and we continue to do so today.

We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola, and the island territories with great satisfaction, just as we viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau just last year.

May I say, Mr. President, America stands ready to help the emerging countries, the emerging nations, and to provide what assistance we can, and we know, Mr. President, that these new states will continue to look to you for wise, wise counsel as they build to nationhood in the future.

Much still remains to be done in southern Africa. In this connection, Mr. President, we welcome your commitment to change through peaceful negotiations and understanding between the parties concerned, rather than through recourse to violence.

We deeply believe that patient diplomacy will bear great fruit, and we promise our continued efforts and our support as you seek, with others, to resolve these problems at the conference table.

Mr. President, in my April 10 speech to the Congress and to the American people, I noted that America is developing a closer relationship with nations of Africa, and I said that Africans must know that America is a true and concerned friend, reliable both in word as well as in deed.

Your visit, Mr. President, coming so soon after that occasion, is most timely for all of us. I hope that you will take back to your countrymen and to all Africans our renewed pledge of friendship.

Our wide-ranging discussions, Mr. President, this afternoon after my return from

some of our historic celebrations of our 200th, or Bicentennial, anniversary covered matters of common interest and concern, and it confirmed the relationship between your country and my country.

There is, however, one area, Mr. President, of mutual interest which we tacitly did not discuss. I have since found, tonight, from your lovely wife, that we have a close and intimate interest in a special area. I understand that you do enjoy playing golf. [Laughter.] I feel sure, Mr. President, that our common problems, nationally, internationally, bilaterally, on some occasions in the future can best be resolved by a little competition on the links. [Laughter.] I intend to make an honest effort to see if our friendship cannot be broadened by such an experience.

So, I say to you, Mr. President, to your lovely wife and your son and your colleagues here this evening, let me propose a toast to you, to the Republic of Zambia, and to the continuing excellent relations between our two countries: To you, Mr. President, and to your Republic and to your wonderful people.

**PRESIDENT KAUNDA**

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, brothers and sisters: I first want to express my deep appreciation and gratitude for inviting me to visit Washington, D.C. I also thank you, the government, and the people of the United States for their warm welcome and the kind hospitality given to my wife and the entire Zambian delegation.

Mr. President, we are happy to be in Washington, D.C. It is a very brief visit, but since we come for specific objectives, it is not the duration that matters, but the results.

So far, we have done a lot. We find we have a lot in common on vital issues affecting mankind. Our discussions have been characterized by a spirit of frankness and cordiality.

This spirit, coupled by the definition of areas of urgent action, should move the United States and Africa closer toward the attainment of our common objectives.

We come, Mr. President, to America with a clear purpose. We simply want to be understood. We seek American understanding of Africa's objectives and America's fullest support in the attainment of these objectives.

The relations between Zambia and the United States cause me no concern, because they are cordial, although there is room for improvement through more sound cooperation.

What gives Zambia and Africa great cause for concern is, Mr. President, America's policy toward Africa—or is it the lack of it, which, of course, can mean the same thing.

I have not worked at the U.N., but I have been told that at the U.N. sometimes there are tricks in which an abstention in a vote can be a vote for or against. A no-policy position may not be a neutral position indicative of a passive posture, but a deliberate act of policy to support the status quo or to influence events in one direction or the other at a particular time.

We have, in recent years, been most anxious, Mr. President, about the nature and degree of the United States' participation in building conditions for genuine peace based on human equality, human dignity, freedom, and justice for all—for all—particularly in southern Africa.

You will forgive us, Mr. President, for our candor if we reaffirmed on this occasion our dismay at the fact that America has not fulfilled our expectations. Our dismay arises from a number of factors. We are agreed that peace is central, that peace is central to all human endeavors.

Our struggle for independence was designed to build peace, and thank God, our people have enjoyed internal peace.

We are agreed, Mr. President, that we must help strengthen peace wherever it is threatened. There has been no peace in southern Africa for a very long time, a very long time indeed, even if there was no war as such.

The absence of war does not necessarily mean peace. Peace, as you know, Mr. President, dear brothers and sisters, is something much deeper, much deeper than that.

The threat of escalation of violence is now real. It is our duty to avoid such an escalation. We want to build peace in the place of violence, racial harmony in place of disharmony, prosperity in place of economic stagnation, security in place of insecurity now dogging every family every day.

Mr. President, to build genuine peace in southern Africa, we must recognize with honesty the root causes of the existing conflict.

First, colonialism in Rhodesia and Namibia. The existence of a rebel regime in Rhodesia has since compounded that problem. Second, apartheid and racial domination in South Africa. Over the last few years, a number of catalytic factors have given strength to these forces of evil.

External economic and strategic interests have flourished in colonial and apartheid regimes. Realism and moral conscience dictate that those who believe in peace must join hands in promoting conditions for peace. We cannot declare our commitment to peace and yet strengthen forces which stand in the way of the attainment of that peace.

The era of colonialism has ended. Apartheid cannot endure the test of time. Our obligation is that these evil systems end peacefully, peacefully. To achieve our aim, we need America's total commitment, total commitment to action consistent with that aim.

So far, American policy, let alone action, has been low keyed. This has given psychological comfort to the forces of evil.

We become, Mr. President, even more dismayed when the current posture of America toward Africa is set against the background of historical performance in the late fifties and early sixties.

We cannot but recall that America did not wait for and march in step with the colonial powers but, rather, boldly, boldly marched ahead with the colonial peoples in their struggles to fulfill their aspirations—an America undaunted by the strong forces of reaction against the wind of change, whose nationals helped teach the colonial settlers about the evils of racial discrimination; an America whose Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, "Soapy" Williams [G. Mennen Williams], could be slapped in the face by a white reactionary on our soil and yet, undaunted, still smile, still stand by American principles of freedom, justice, and national independence based on majority rule. Yes, the reactionaries hated Americans for "spoiling the natives," as they would say, for helping dismantle colonialism.

We ask and wonder what has happened throughout America. Have the principles changed? The aspirations of the oppressed have not changed at all. In desperation, their anger has exploded their patience. Their resolve to fight, if peaceful negotiations are impossible, is borne out by history.

So, their struggle has now received the baptism of fire. Victories in Mozambique and Angola have given them added inspiration. Africa has no reason, no reason at all, not to support the liberation movements.

Can America still end only with declarations of support for the principles of freedom and racial justice? This, I submit, Mr. President, would not be enough. Southern Africa is poised for a dangerous armed conflict. Peace is at stake.

The conflict with disastrous consequences can be averted, but I submit again, Mr. President, there is not much time. Urgent action is required.

At this time, America cannot realistically wait and see what administering powers will do or to pledge to support their efforts when none are in plan. America must heed the call of the oppressed.

America, once an apostle in decolonization, must not be a mere disciple of those which promise but never perform and thus give strength to evils of colonialism and apartheid.

If we want peace, we must end the era of inertia in Rhodesia and Namibia and vigorously work for ending apartheid. America must now be in the vanguard of democratic revolution in southern Africa.

This is not the first time we make this appeal. It is Africa's constant plea.

Now, Africa has taken an unequivocal stand on decolonization. We do not want to fight a war to win freedom and full national

independence in southern Africa. Africa wants to achieve these objectives by peaceful means; that is, through negotiations.

Our declaration to give high priority to peaceful methods to resolve the current crisis is a conscious decision, a conscious decision. We feel it to be our moral duty to avoid bloodshed where we can.

We are determined to fulfill this obligation—but, Mr. President, not at any price, not at any price, not at the price of freedom and justice. There we say no. No.

Africa has made it clear that if the road to peaceful change is closed by the stone walls of racial bigotry and force of arms by minority regimes, then we are equally duty-bound to take the inescapable alternative.

The oppressed people have a right to answer force with force, and Africa and all her friends in the world will support them.

Liberation movements fought fascist Portugal. We supported them. They won. Now we must turn to Rhodesia and Namibia.

Can America stand and be counted in implementing the Dar es Salaam strategy adopted by Africa? In Dar es Salaam early this month, Mr. President, Africa reaffirmed its commitment, its commitment to a peaceful solution to the crisis in southern Africa as a first priority.

Our strategy opens even new doors, now new doors to peaceful change, if those caught up in the crisis seek an honorable exit. Here is a chance in a century to achieve peace based on human equality and human dignity without further violence.

We call upon America to support our efforts in achieving majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia immediately and the ending of apartheid in South Africa. If we are committed to peace, then let us join hands in building peace by removing factors underlying the current crisis.

If the oppressed peoples fail to achieve these noble ends by peaceful means, we call upon America not to give any support to the oppressors. Even now we call upon America to desist from direct and indirect support to minority regimes, for this puts America in direct conflict with the interests of Africa; that is, peace deeply rooted, deeply rooted in human dignity and equality and freedom without discrimination.

We have recently demonstrated, Mr. President, our readiness to make peaceful change possible in Mozambique and Angola. We are equally committed to assist the oppressed if they should convince us that the road to peaceful change is closed and armed struggle is the only alternative.

The rebels in Rhodesia, assisted by South African troops, have committed some of the worst atrocities on the continent. Africa cannot allow them to continue, and we urge America not to allow them to continue.

Victory for the majority is a matter of time, a matter of time. Let us, therefore, make it as painless as possible to those who have dominated their fellow men for years.

Mr. President, we wish America, we wish America to understand our aims and objectives. We are not fighting whites; we are fighting an evil and brutal system. On this there must be no compromise, none at all.

America should also understand our strategy. We want to achieve our objectives by peaceful methods first and foremost. Africa is ready to try this approach with patience and exhaust all possible tactics—for peace is too precious, is too precious for all of us —but our patience and the patience of the oppressed has its limits.

Mr. President, we are here only for a short time. We have no other mission except to take the opportunity of the visit to put Africa's stand clearly. We want to avoid confrontation, but let us not be pushed.

Once again, Mr. President, on behalf of my wife and my compatriots, and indeed on my own behalf, I thank you, Mrs. Ford, and our colleagues, brothers and sisters, for this warm welcome and hospitality.

This is indeed a memorable visit, memorable because it has been fruitful, and it coincides with the launching only yesterday of your Bicentennial celebrations. We congratulate the people of the United States for their tremendous achievements since independence, which have justified the anti-colonialist struggle of their Founding Fathers.

Finally, I take the opportunity of inviting

you, Mr. President, and Mrs. Ford, to pay a visit to Zambia. We will be happy to receive you in our country at any time convenient to you.

And may I say, sir, at that time I might answer the challenge of playing golf. [Laughter.]

I now invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to join me and my wife and my colleagues in this toast to the President and Mrs. Ford: Mr. President, Mrs. Ford. Bilateral relations.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 1st Session

Temporary Suspension of Presidential Authority To Impose Fees on, or Otherwise Adjust, Petroleum Imports. Report from the Senate Committee on Finance, together with minority and supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 1767. S. Rept. 94–11. February 17, 1975. 23 pp.

Proposed Legislation To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization of appropriations, and for other purposes. February 19, 1975. H. Doc. 94–54. 3 pp.

Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO and the Middle East. Study prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. February 28, 1975. 63 pp.

Standby Energy Authorities Act. Report of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, together with minority and additional views, to accompany S. 622. S. Rept. 94–26. March 5, 1975. 90 pp.

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1975. Report of the House Committee on Appropriations, together with separate and dissenting views, to accompany H.R. 4592. H. Rept. 94–53. March 10, 1975. 71 pp.

Legislative History of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, January 3, 1973–December 20, 1974. S. Rept. 94–37. March 17, 1975. 196 pp.

## Pan American Day and Pan American Week

### A PROCLAMATION[1]

Each year, we and other members of the Organization of American States celebrate our shared origins and the close ties that continue to flourish among us. To do this, we commemorate a significant event in the diplomatic history of the Western Hemisphere—the founding, late in the last century, of the International Union of the American Republics. This year marks the 85th anniversary of the establishment of that first inter-governmental regional organization and forerunner of the Organization of American States.

From its earliest days, the organization has taken for its two major objectives the maintenance of peace and the promotion of economic, social and cultural development in the Americas. The strength and longevity of inter-American cooperation in furtherance of these goals derives from its tested ability to evolve and reconstitute itself to meet new realities and new challenges over the years.

In the Americas, we have come to recognize the fresh challenge presented by a new interdependence, which is global as well as hemispheric, linking developed with less developed countries both in and beyond the hemisphere. We sense the opportunity for effective inter-American cooperation to advance our traditional goals of peace and progress for our hemisphere while strengthening the global cooperation decreed by our world.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Monday, April 14, 1975, as Pan American Day, and the week beginning April 13, 1975, as Pan American Week, and I call upon the Governors of the fifty states, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and appropriate officials of all other areas under the flag of the United States to issue similar Proclamations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this eleventh day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.

Gerald R. Ford

[1] 40 *Fed. Reg.* 16643.

## Preparatory Meeting for Proposed Conference of Oil Producers and Consumers Held at Paris

*A preparatory meeting for the international conference on energy and related economic problems was held at Paris April 7–15.*[1] *Following is a statement made in the meeting on April 7 by Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, who headed the U.S. delegation, together with a statement by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, issued to the press on April 15 at the conclusion of the meeting.*

### STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON

The United States is pleased to participate in this preparatory meeting for the international conference on energy and related economic problems, which initiates an important—in fact an essential—dialogue between oil producer and consumer countries. We congratulate the Government of France for its initiative and express our appreciation for its efforts in convening this meeting today. We also extend thanks for the generous hospitality which is being extended to those of us fortunate enough to be invited to Paris in April.

There have been various analyses and interpretations of the oil crisis that began in the autumn of 1973. There are clearly differences of view among us, which will be discussed in the conference that we will be organizing at this preparatory meeting, but there are also many areas of common interest to which we will need to devote our primary efforts.

I believe that we can agree on at least two things.

First, the quintupling of oil prices over the past two years, although posing problems for the world economy, has heightened awareness of the interdependence of nations.

Second, the problems emanating from the current oil situation cannot be resolved through confrontation or by unilateral action, but only through cooperative efforts among all major parties.

We all share a common concern that the social and economic well-being of our peoples be enhanced rather than retarded, that developing nations be able to look forward to their rapid development rather than have their prospects undermined, and that the international financial and trading system be responsible enough and strong enough to cope with new stresses and meet our common needs.

In calling the Washington Energy Conference a little more than a year ago, we made clear from the outset that the initial discussion among the major industrialized importers of oil was only a first step toward the necessary dialogue between both consumers and producers of oil.

At the conclusion of the Washington Conference, ministers of the major industrialized countries stated their recognition of the "need to develop a cooperative multilateral relationship with producing countries, and other consuming countries that takes into account the long-term interests of all."

Returning to this theme in February, one year later, Secretary Kissinger stated that:

> In an interdependent world, our hopes for prosperity and stability rest ultimately on a cooperative long-term relationship between consumers and producers.

. . . . . .

[1] Attending the meeting were the United States, the European Common Market, and Japan for the industrialized consumer countries; Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria for the producing countries; and Brazil, India, and Zaire for the developing consumer countries.

The producers seek a better life for their peoples and a future free from dependence on a single depleting resource; the industrialized nations seek to preserve the hard-earned economic and social progress of centuries; the poorer nations seek desperately to resume their advance toward a more hopeful existence.

A year has passed since the Washington Conference. In that time, energy problems and the inflation and recession to which they have contributed have adversely affected large numbers of people throughout the world. We and other like-minded consumer nations have agreed on a series of collective measures to enable our economies and the world economy to meet the problems associated with the increased price of oil. We sought the consumer cooperation that we considered necessary to insure a substantive and constructive dialogue. The International Energy Agency, present today as an observer, was established last November in recognition that a degree of consumer solidarity had been achieved and to serve as the institutional vehicle for the further elaboration of necessary cooperative measures.

Our purpose at this preparatory meeting is to organize the procedures for the conference that will build on the dialogue initiated at this meeting. Toward this end, we need to strike a balance between the immense scale and complexity of the world energy problem on the one hand and the constraint of realistic expectations for concrete results on the other. It is certainly true that today we are living in a highly interdependent world economy. The countries of the world have an interest in many economic issues in addition to the international oil situation. But if we are to have a conference with a reasonable expectation of tangible results, we must set bounds as to what such a meeting is designed to achieve. We must therefore consider carefully the scope of both the agenda and participation of the conference.

With regard to the agenda, we are here, in the words of the invitation received from the President of the French Republic, to organize a conference "to examine the energy problems to which many aspects of international economic relations are linked." The social, economic, and political dimensions of this problem are enormous, and the characteristics of the relations between producers and consumers of oil are in many respects unique. Our discussions are bound to overlap at times with other aspects of the world economy, and due account must be taken of such linkages. But I feel strongly that the work program to be developed here should be concentrated on the specifics of energy and related matters and not become diluted with parallel discussions of other issues, however important they may be.

I say this recognizing that oil is only one of the major commodities traded on world markets and that, indeed, all commodities are interrelated within the world trade and financial system. We recognize the need for imaginative new initiatives in this area and are indeed prepared to discuss these other issues elsewhere in appropriate fora, and I take particular note of the upcoming special session of the U.N. General Assembly in September. The point I wish to make here is simply that we have more than enough to handle with the energy-related problems in the effort we are initiating today. To broaden the scope of our discussions would substantially decrease the likelihood of a productive outcome.

As for the number of participants in the main conference, we would foresee a reasonable limitation in participation, but with balanced representation of industrialized consumer countries, developing consumer countries, and the oil-exporting countries. The total number should be sufficiently restricted to permit constructive discussions but large enough that all interests are adequately represented.

It will obviously be impossible for us in this preparatory meeting to designate in a specific manner the participants in the eventual main conference. However, we can concentrate on developing procedures under which participants can be designated in the period between the end of this meeting and the convening of the full conference.

In conclusion, we are initiating a process

of vital and far-reaching concern to the international economy. The people of our nations and of other nations expect and deserve constructive results from this process. We must respond with determination and imagination and take the initial steps at this meeting toward more harmonious relationships in energy and related economic fields.

I pledge the best efforts of the U.S. Government to that end.

### STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS

I wish to express appreciation to the Government of France for acting as host at this preparatory meeting, on behalf of Under Secretary Robinson, the U.S. delegation, and myself. It has provided a useful opportunity for an exchange of views among industrialized countries, oil-exporting nations, and developing countries on a range of subjects of mutual interest. The meetings have proceeded constructively, and there has been a genuine desire to understand and appreciate respective points of view.

We are disappointed that we have not been able to complete the arrangements necessary for the convening of a formal conference. We have agreed to return to our capitals to consider various points of view which have been discussed in considerable detail over the past nine days. We will remain in contact through appropriate channels to resume together preparations for a conference as quickly as possible.

As you are aware, the major subject of discussion during the last several days has been the proposed draft agenda for a full conference. I do not believe it useful to comment in detail on the various issues involved in these discussions. There has been a basic difference of view with regard to the scope and objectives of the proposed conference.

We were, of course, invited here by the President of the French Republic to prepare for a conference on energy and energy-related issues. We came here ready to discuss these issues, which are of central concern to all countries. Others have insisted on a much broader conference, extending to all aspects of the relationship between the industrialized countries and the developing world.

We have been and will continue to be willing to discuss seriously raw materials and other development issues in forums more directly concerned with them and to attempt therein to seek mutually beneficial solutions. However, we believe that the proposed conference could achieve constructive results only if it were focused on a relatively limited number of points related to the central subject of energy.

I would like to stress that the discussions of the past nine days have taken place in an atmosphere of cordiality, and genuine attempts have been made to understand respective points of view. In this sense we must all consider this meeting has not been a failed effort. The United States attaches great importance to its exchanges with each of the countries represented at this meeting. Our intention is to continue our efforts to promote cooperation with them through all channels.

## U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector Extended for Three Months

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on April 17, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 31 dated April 17

I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President [Louis de Guiringaud of France], for your leadership in the consultations which have led today to the agreement of the Council to renew the mandate of UNEF. The United States is pleased to join in this consensus and to support extension of the United Nations Emergency Force and its mandate.

Once again I wish to offer my government's appreciation to those countries which have supplied and maintained contingents for UNEF, to the civilian staff, the UNTSO [U.N. Truce Supervision Organization] observers in the field, and particularly to the U.N. troops who contribute so directly to the continuous search for peace in the area.

The Commander of UNEF, Lt. Gen. Ensio Siilasvuo, deserves a special tribute from us all for his exemplary and steadfast leadership of UNEF since its inception. His example provides an enviable model for any future U.N. peacekeeping endeavors.

The Secretary General and his headquarters staff also deserve our highest commendation for continuing to perform such a difficult task so well. The operational efficiency of the UNEF force is borne out by the latest report of the Secretary General. The most conclusive evidence of UNEF's effectiveness is that the situation has remained quiet and that both sides have generally complied with the agreement of disengagement and cooperated with UNEF. In consequence there have been no significant incidents since the preceding report of the Secretary General.

These U.N. peacekeeping troops are essential not only in maintaining the lines of separation between Egypt and Israel and providing a deterrent to renewed hostilities but also in creating a climate of trust and confidence upon which the success of further negotiations depends. The U.N. Emergency Force and the disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel are both means to an end, not settlements themselves. They are part of the process toward an overall peaceful solution through negotiations as envisaged in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

As a matter of principle, we would have preferred an extension for a longer period of time. But whether the mandate is extended for three or six months or even longer, we believe there is an urgent need to move ahead in achieving a negotiated settlement.

The last time this Council met to renew a U.N. peacekeeping force in the Middle East, I said that no one could doubt that the road toward peace would be long and difficult, that it would try the patience and test the good will of all concerned. This has been proven all too true. But the essential point is that we are still on that road—the road toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The United States is determined to continue that search. As President Ford said in his address to the joint session of Congress:

> The United States will move ahead on whatever course looks most promising, either toward an overall settlement or interim agreements should the parties themselves desire them. We will not accept stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks to peace and prosperity and to our relations in and outside of the region.

Renewal of UNEF today is an important contribution toward continued movement in this process. We are happy to join with the Council in this action, and we pledge our best efforts in the continued search for peace in the Middle East.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION [1]

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973), 346 (1974) and 362 (1974),

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11670 and Corr. 1),

*Having noted* the developments in the situation in the Middle East,

*Expressing concern* over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

*Decides:*

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of three months, that is, until 24 July 1975;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

[1] U.N. doc. S/RES/368 (1975); adopted by the Council on Apr. 17 by a vote of 13 to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not participating in the vote.

TREATY INFORMATION

# Current Actions

## MULTILATERAL

### Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.[1]
*Signature and acceptance deposited:* Uganda, March 11, 1975.

### Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.
*Ratification deposited:* Portugal (with reservations and declarations), March 12, 1975.

### Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
*Acceptance deposited:* Austria, April 2, 1975.
Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.[1]
*Acceptances deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany (applicable to Berlin (West)), December 30, 1974; Tunisia, February 19, 1975; United States, April 2, 1975.

### Narcotics

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.
*Ratification deposited:* Italy, April 14, 1975.
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.[1]
*Ratification deposited:* Denmark, April 18, 1975.
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.[1]
*Ratifications deposited:* Denmark, April 18, 1975; Italy, April 14, 1975.

### Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
*Ratification deposited:* Republic of Korea, April 23, 1975.

### Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975.
*Accession deposited:* New Zealand, March 26, 1975.
International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Enters into force June 19, 1975.
*Ratification deposited:* Dominican Republic, April 2, 1975.
*Accession deposited:* Denmark, April 2, 1975.
Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.[1]
*Acceptance deposited:* France, March 24, 1975.
International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971.[1]
*Accession deposited:* Denmark, April 2, 1975.

### Safety at Sea

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic ice patrol. Done at Washington January 4, 1956. Entered into force July 5, 1956. TIAS 3597.
*Acceptance deposited:* Poland, April 22, 1975.
Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.[1]
*Accession deposited:* Romania (with statements), March 27, 1975.

### Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.[1]
*Signature:* Switzerland, April 14, 1975.

### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.[2]
*Accession deposited:* Colombia, February 21, 1975.

## BILATERAL

### Australia

Agreement transferring the facility for research on aerospace disturbances at Amberley to the Australian National University. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra January 31 and February 26, 1975. Entered into force February 26, 1975.
Agreement concerning a program of research on aero-space disturbances. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra January 3, 1964. Entered into force January 3, 1964. TIAS 5510.
*Terminated:* February 26, 1975.

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[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.

Agreement for the establishment and operation of additional facilities in connection with a program of research on aero-space disturbances. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra April 12, 1965. TIAS 5801.
*Terminated:* February 26, 1975.

### Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS 7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca April 11, 1975. Entered into force April 11, 1975.

### International Committee of the Red Cross

Grant agreement concerning emergency relief and assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic. Signed at Washington and Geneva February 20 and March 16 and 17, 1975. Entered into force March 17, 1975.

### Jamaica

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of September 29, 1967, as amended and extended, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 2, 1975. Entered into force April 2, 1975.

### Romania

Agreement on trade relations. Signed at Bucharest April 2, 1975. Enters into force on the date of exchange of written notice of acceptance by the two governments.

### Syria

Loan agreement to assist Syria to increase its agricultural production. Signed at Damascus February 27, 1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975.

Grant agreement for general participant training. Signed at Damascus February 27, 1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975.

Grant agreement to promote the economic development of Syria. Signed at Damascus February 27, 1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975.

### United Nations Children's Fund

Grant agreement concerning assistance for children and mothers in South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. Signed at Washington and New York December 26 and 30, 1974. Entered into force December 30, 1974.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of December 26 and 30, 1974, concerning assistance for children and mothers in South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. Signed at New York February 10 and 14, 1975. Entered into force February 14, 1975.

### Viet-Nam

Agreement supplementing the agreement of November 5, 1957, as supplemented and modified (TIAS 3932, 5419, 6869), relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon January 13 and March 7, 1975. Entered into force March 7, 1975.

## PUBLICATIONS

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Privileges and Immunities for American Technicians Assisting in Modernization Program of Iranian Armed Forces.** Agreement with Iran. TIAS 7963. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7963).

**Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aeronautical Products and Components.** Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 7965. 12 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7965).

**Defense—Continuation of Agreement of May 5, 1951.** Agreement with Iceland. TIAS 7969. 8 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7969).

**Narcotic Drugs—Provision of Helicopters and Related Assistance.** Agreement with Jamaica. TIAS 7966. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7966).

**Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, Technology, Industry and Defense.** Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 7974. 10 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7974).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with the Republic of Korea amending the agreement of April 12, 1973, as amended. TIAS 7976. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7976).

**Launching of NASA Satellites From San Marco Range.** Agreement with Italy extending the agreement of April 30 and June 12, 1969. TIAS 7972. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7972).

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**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 21–27**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to April 21 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 208 of April 19.

| No. | Date | Subject |
|---|---|---|
| *209 | 4/21 | Foreign agricultural and nutritional specialists visit U.S. |
| *210 | 4/22 | Reinhardt sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (biographic data). |
| *211 | 4/22 | Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Pittsburgh, Pa., Apr. 29. |
| *212 | 4/22 | Study Group I of the U.S. National Committee for the CCITT, May 15. |
| 213 | 4/23 | Republic of Korea ratifies Nonproliferation Treaty. |
| *214 | 4/23 | Shipping Coordinating Committee, May 22. |
| *215 | 4/23 | Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Birmingham, Ala. May 7. |
| †216 | 4/24 | U.S. and Canada extend Fisheries Agreement. |
| *217 | 4/25 | Maj. Gen. David S. Parker, former Canal Zone Governor, receives Department of State award. |

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.