

1866



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXII • No. 1866 • March 31, 1975

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXII, No. 1866

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic \$42.50, foreign \$53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

President Ford's News Conference of March 6

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the Old Executive Office Building on March 6.¹

President Ford: Before we start the questions tonight, I would like to make a statement on the subject of assistance to Cambodia and to Viet-Nam.

There are three issues—the first, the future of the people who live there. It is a concern that is humanitarian—food for those who hunger and medical supplies for the men and women and children who are suffering the ravages of war. We seek to stop the bloodshed and end the horror and the tragedy that we see on television as rockets are fired wantonly into Phnom Penh.

I would like to be able to say that the killing would cease if we were to stop our aid, but that is not the case. The record shows, in both Viet-Nam and Cambodia, that Communist takeover of an area does not bring an end to violence but, on the contrary, subjects the innocent to new horrors.

We cannot meet humanitarian needs unless we provide some military assistance. Only through a combination of humanitarian endeavors and military aid do we have a chance to stop the fighting in that country in such a way as to end the bloodshed.

The second issue is whether the problems of Indochina will be settled by conquest or by negotiation. Both the Governments of Cambodia and the United States have made vigorous and continued efforts over the last few years to bring about a cease-fire and a political settlement.

The Cambodian Government declared a

unilateral cease-fire and called for negotiations immediately after the peace accords of January 1973. It has since repeatedly expressed its willingness to be flexible in seeking a negotiated end to the conflict. Its leaders have made clear that they are willing to do whatever they can do to bring peace to the country.

The United States has backed these peace efforts. Yesterday we made public an outline of our unceasing efforts over the years, including six separate initiatives since I became President.²

Let me assure you: We will support any negotiations and accept any outcome that the parties themselves will agree to. As far as the United States is concerned, the personalities involved will not, themselves, constitute obstacles of any kind to a settlement.

Yet all of our efforts have been rebuffed. Peace in Cambodia has not been prevented by our failure to offer reasonable solutions. The aggressor believes it can win its objectives on the battlefield. This belief will be encouraged if we cut off assistance to our friends.

We want an end to the killing and a negotiated settlement. But there is no hope of success unless the Congress acts quickly to provide the necessary means for Cambodia to survive.

If we abandon our allies, we will be saying to all the world that war pays. Aggression will not stop; rather, it will increase. In Cambodia the aggressors will have shown that if negotiations are resisted the United States will weary, abandon its friends, and force will prevail.

The third issue is the reliability of the United States. If we cease to help our friends

¹ For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 10.

² See p. 401.

in Indochina, we will have violated their trust that we would help them with arms, with food, and with supplies so long as they remain determined to fight for their own freedom. We will have been false to ourselves, to our word, and to our friends. No one should think for a moment that we can walk away from that without a deep sense of shame.

This is not a question of involvement or reinvolvement in Indochina. We have ended our involvement. All American forces have come home. They will not go back.

Time is short. There are two things the United States can do to affect the outcome. For my part, I will continue to seek a negotiated settlement. I ask the Congress to do its part by providing the assistance required to make such a settlement possible.

Time is running out.

Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. President, you wound up saying, "Time is running out" in Cambodia. Can you give us any assurance that even if the aid is voted it will get there in time? Is it stock-piled and ready to roll, or what is the situation?

President Ford: If we don't give the aid, there is no hope. If we do get the necessary legislation from the Congress and it comes quickly—I would say within the next 10 days or 2 weeks—it will be possible to get the necessary aid to Cambodia, both economic assistance—humanitarian assistance—and military assistance. I believe there is a hope that we can help our friends to continue long enough to get into the wet season; then there will be an opportunity for the kind of negotiation which I think offers the best hope for a peace in Cambodia.

Q. Mr. President, you say that there would be a deep sense of shame in the country if Cambodia should fall. If that would be the case, sir, can you explain why there seems to be such a broad feeling of apathy in the country, and also in the Congress, toward

providing any more aid for either Cambodia or South Viet-Nam?

President Ford: I believe there is a growing concern which has been accentuated since we have seen the horror stories on television in recent weeks—the wanton use of rockets in the city of Phnom Penh, the children lying stricken on the streets, and people under great stress and strain, bloody scenes of the worst kind.

I think this kind of depicting of a tragedy there has aroused American concern, and I think it is a growing concern as the prospect of tragedy of this kind becomes even more evident.

So, I have noticed in the last week in the U.S. Congress, in a bipartisan way, a great deal more interest in trying to find an answer. And yesterday I spent an hour-plus with Members of Congress who came back from a trip to Cambodia and South Viet-Nam; and they saw firsthand the kind of killing, the kind of bloodshed; and it had a severe impact on these Members of Congress, some of whom have been very, very strongly opposed to our involvement in the past in Viet-Nam. And I think their impact will be significant in the Congress as well as in the country.

Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

Q. Mr. President, the question is raised by many critics of our policy in Southeast Asia as to why we can conduct a policy of détente with the two Communist superpowers in the world and could not follow a policy of détente should Cambodia and South Viet-Nam go Communist. Could you explain that to us?

President Ford: I think you have to understand the differences that we have with China, the People's Republic of China, and with the Soviet Union. We do not accept their ideology. We do not accept their philosophy. On the other hand, we have to recognize that both countries have great power bases in the world, not only in population but in the regions in which they exist.

We do not expect to recognize or to believe in their philosophies. But it is important for us, the United States, to try and remove any of the obstacles that keep us from working together to solve some of the problems that exist throughout the world, including Indochina.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have supplied and are supplying military assistance to South Viet-Nam and Cambodia. We have to work with them to try and get an answer in that part of the world; but at the same time, I think that effort can be increased and the prospects improved if we continue the détente between ourselves and both of those powers.

Tom [Tom Brokaw, NBC News].

Q. Mr. President, putting it bluntly, wouldn't we just be continuing a bloodbath that already exists in Cambodia if we voted the \$222 million in assistance?

President Ford: I don't think so, because the prospects are that with the kind of military assistance and economic and humanitarian aid we are proposing, the government forces, hopefully, can hold out. Now, if we do not, the prospects are almost certain that Phnom Penh will be overrun. And we know from previous experiences that the overrunning of a community or an area results in the murder and the bloodshed that comes when they pick up and sort out the people who were schoolteachers, the leaders, the government officials.

This was told very dramatically to me yesterday by several Members of the Congress who were there and talked to some of the people who were in some of these communities or villages that were overrun.

It is an unbelievable horror story. And if we can hold out—and I think the prospects are encouraging—then I think we will avoid that kind of massacre and innocent murdering of people who really do not deserve that kind of treatment.

Q. Mr. President, if I may follow up, as I understand it, the Administration's point is that if we vote the aid that we will have the

possibility of a negotiated settlement, not just the avoidance of a bloodbath. Is that correct?

President Ford: That is correct, sir.

Q. And yet, just yesterday, as you indicated in your statement, the State Department listed at least six unsuccessful efforts to negotiate an end to the war in Cambodia, dating to the summer of 1973, when American bombing stopped there. The Cambodian Government was certainly stronger then than it would be with just conceivably another \$220 million.

President Ford: Well, I think if you look at that long list of bona-fide, legitimate negotiated efforts, the best prospects came when the enemy felt that it would be better off to negotiate than to fight.

Now, if we can strengthen the government forces now and get into the wet season, then I believe the opportunity to negotiate will be infinitely better, certainly better than if the government forces are routed and the rebels—the Khmer Rouge—take over and do what they have done in other communities where they have had this kind of opportunity.

Q. Mr. President, you said, sir, that if the funds are provided that, hopefully, they can hold out. How long are you talking about? How long can they hold out? In other words, how long do you feel this aid will be necessary to continue?

President Ford: Well, this aid that we have requested on an emergency basis from the Congress is anticipated to provide the necessary humanitarian effort and the necessary military effort to get them through the dry season, which ends roughly the latter part of June or the first of July.

Q. What effect do you think last night's massacre in Tel Aviv will have on the current Kissinger negotiations, and what advice would you give to Israel to counteract such terrorist attacks?

President Ford: Let me answer the last

first. I don't think it is appropriate for me to give any advice to Israel or any other nation as to what they should do in circumstances like that. I hope that the very ill-advised action—the terrorist action—in Israel, or in Tel Aviv, last night was absolutely unwarranted under any circumstances. I condemn it because I think it is not only inhumane but it is the wrong way to try and resolve the difficult problems in the Middle East.

I would hope that that terrorist activity would not under any circumstances destroy the prospects or the possibilities for further peace accomplishments in the Middle East.

Q. Mr. President, to follow up on that, have you considered asking Israel to become part of NATO?

President Ford: I have not.

Q. Mr. President, you sounded encouraged about the prospect for Cambodian aid. Can you give us an estimate of what you think the chances are now of it being passed?

President Ford: They are certainly better than they were. I had a meeting this morning with Senator [John J.] Sparkman and Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator Clifford Case. They want to help. They say the prospects are 50-50. But if they are that, I think we ought to try and make the effort because I think the stakes are very, very high when you involve the innocent people who are being killed in Cambodia.

Q. May I follow up? If the Congress does not provide the aid and the Lon Nol government should fall, would the country be in for any recrimination from this Administration? Would we have another "who lost China" debate, for example?

President Ford: I first would hope we get the aid and the government is able to negotiate a settlement. I do not think—at least from my point of view—that I would go around the country pointing my finger at anybody. I think the facts would speak for themselves.

Q. Mr. President, from some of the re-

marks the Senators who met with you today made, they did not indicate that they were quite in as much agreement as you have indicated; but Senator Humphrey, for one, asked, as part of a negotiated settlement that you spoke of, if you would be willing to seek the orderly resignation of President Lon Nol.

President Ford: I do not believe it is the proper role of this government to ask the head of another state to resign. I said in my opening statement that we believe that the settlement ought to be undertaken, and it is not one that revolves around any one individual. And I would hope that some formula—some individuals on both sides could sit down and negotiate a settlement to stop the bloodshed.

Q. Could I follow up? On that, are you saying that the United States will support any government, no matter how weak or corrupt, in a situation like this?

President Ford: I am not saying we would support any government. I am saying that we would support any government that we can see coming out of the present situation or the negotiated settlement.

Q. Mr. President, out of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] summit meeting in Algiers today came a declaration that oil prices should be pegged to inflation and the prices they have to pay for the products they buy. Do you think this kind of inflation-indexing system is fair?

President Ford: We are trying to organize the consuming nations, and we have been quite successful. I believe that once that organization has been put together—and it is well along—that we should sit down and negotiate any matters with the producing nations.

I personally have many reservations about the suggestion that has been made by the OPEC organization. I think the best way for us to answer that problem is to be organized and to negotiate rather than to speculate in advance.

Summary of Negotiating Efforts on Cambodia

*Department Statement, March 5*¹

We have made continual and numerous private attempts, in addition to our numerous public declarations, to demonstrate in concrete and specific ways our readiness to see an early compromise settlement in Cambodia.

—Throughout the negotiations that led to the Paris agreement on Viet-Nam in January 1973, the United States repeatedly indicated—both in these negotiations and through other channels—its desire to see a cease-fire and political settlement in Cambodia as well as in Viet-Nam and Laos. In later discussions concerning the implementation of the Paris agreement, the United States conveyed its ideas and its desire to promote a negotiated settlement between the Cambodian parties.

—A number of major efforts toward negotiation were made in 1973. By the summer of that year, these efforts were extremely promising. Just as they appeared to be approaching a serious stage they were thwarted by the forced bombing halt in August that was legislated by the Congress.

—In October 1974, we broached the idea of an international conference on Cambodia with two countries having relations with the side headed by Prince Sihanouk (GRUNK) [Royal Khmer Government of National Union]. We also discussed the elements of a peaceful settlement. We received no substantive response to these overtures.

—In November 1974, we again indicated with specificity our readiness to see a compromise settlement in Cambodia in which all elements could play a role to a govern-

ment with relations with the GRUNK. Our interlocutors showed no interest in pursuing the subject.

—In December 1974, we tried to facilitate a channel to representatives of the Khmer Communists through a neutralist country with relations with the GRUNK. Nothing came of this initiative.

—In December 1974 and early January 1975, we concurred in an initiative to open a dialogue with Sihanouk in Peking. Sihanouk at first agreed to receive an emissary but later refused.

—In February 1975, we tried to establish a direct contact with Sihanouk ourselves. We received no response.

—Also in February 1975, we apprised certain friendly governments with clear interests and concerns in the region, and with access to governments supporting the GRUNK, of our efforts to move the conflict toward a negotiated solution and of the degree of flexibility in our approach. They could offer no help.

Unfortunately, none of these attempts have had any result. The reactions we have gotten so far suggest that negotiating prospects will be dim as long as the Cambodian Government's military position remains precarious.

We are continuing to pursue our long-stated objective of an early compromise settlement in Cambodia. In this process we are, and have been, guided by the following principles:

1. The United States will support any negotiations that the parties themselves are prepared to support.
2. The United States will accept any outcome from the negotiations that the parties themselves will accept.
3. As far as the United States is concerned, the personalities involved will not, themselves, constitute obstacles of any kind to a settlement.

¹ Initially distributed to news correspondents on Mar. 5; also issued as press release 138 dated Mar. 12.

U.S.-Iran Joint Commission Meets at Washington

The U.S.-Iran Joint Commission met at Washington March 3-4. Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger and Hushang Ansary, Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance of Iran, at a news conference held on March 4 at the conclusion of the meeting, together with the texts of the joint communique of the Joint Commission and the U.S.-Iran agreement on technical cooperation signed that day by Secretary Kissinger and Minister Ansary.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND MINISTER ANSARY¹

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Minister, on behalf of the President and the U.S. Government I would like to express our very great gratification at the agreed minutes and the technical cooperation agreement that we have just signed.

The economic cooperation agreement between Iran and the United States that is foreseen is the largest agreement of this kind that has been signed between any two countries. It represents an attempt to underline the interdependence to which both of our countries have been committed, in which the resources of the producers are combined with the technological experience of some of the consuming countries to enhance the development and the progress of both sides.

It reflects also the very deep political bonds that exist between Iran and the United States.

The economic cooperation agreement foresees projects on the order of \$12 billion which

will be completed or the negotiation for which is in the process of being completed or will be completed in the very near future.

Out of this economic cooperation we expect that there will develop a trade between the two countries, excluding oil, over the next five years in the amount of \$15 billion. These projects will represent a major step forward in the very vast scheme of development that Iran has undertaken, and the United States is happy that it can play its part in this enterprise. It also reflects the conviction of both sides that an expanding world economy is in the interests of progress and peace.

I would like to express our appreciation to my colleague the cochairman of the Commission for the manner in which the negotiations have been conducted. It was in an atmosphere of friendship and understanding and cooperation which we are certain will be extended in the years to come.

I also would like to express on behalf of the President how much he's looking forward to the visit of His Imperial Majesty the Shah in May.

Minister Ansary: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. May I join you in expressing the gratification and appreciation of the Iranian team in the talks that we have had in the course of the past two days in the second session of our joint ministerial commission for economic cooperation. We are extremely pleased on our side that the outcome of these negotiations is entirely satisfactory to both sides. We have managed to reach agreement on the use of the comparative advantages of the two countries for the benefit not only of our respective nations but also of the world at large.

To your remarks, Mr. Secretary, I may add that Iran is the first major oil-producing

¹ Text from press release 115 dated Mar. 4, which also includes a transcript of the questions and answers which followed.

country to go nuclear in a major way, and one important aspect of the agreement that we have reached on the areas of cooperation between the two countries is of course the readiness that has been expressed in principle on the part of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to place orders for a large number of nuclear power plants in the United States.

Of the other agreements that we reached, I think the most important in terms not only of the development for our relations but also of the problems facing the world today is where this cooperation entails the production of additional amounts of food and agricultural products not only for the use of domestic needs of Iran but also for the region at large.

This includes also the development of a center for agricultural technology that would be used regionally by all the countries concerned.

In addition to this, of course, it is highly satisfactory to us that, the end result of economic cooperation being increasing trade, the amount envisaged in the agreement for the exchange of commodities between the two countries in the next five years is a rather impressive figure of \$15 billion that the Secretary has just mentioned.

May I take the opportunity also, Mr. Secretary, to express my appreciation and sincere thanks for the opportunity that I had to call on the President this morning and for his support and encouragement in the efforts that are being made by the two sides for the development for our relations.

May I also thank you sincerely for all your kindness, for your hospitality and for your warmth, and for the constructive attitude that at all times was clearly visible on your personal side, for the attention that you rendered personally to the development of our negotiations, and for the tremendous contributions of every distinguished member of your party.

Secretary Kissinger: Thank you. I would like also to point out that all the nuclear

plants are under the safeguards that are appropriate to signatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which of course includes Iran. And I also would like to underline the point that my colleague has already made about the importance we attach to the agricultural development not only for Iran but on a regional basis, and how much the United States appreciates the efforts of Iran to use some of its resources in the field of agricultural development for increasing production—food production—in the entire region.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Press release 115A dated March 4

The U.S.-Iran Joint Commission completed its second session in Washington on March 3-4, 1975. The Iranian Delegation was headed by His Excellency Hushang Ansary, Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, and the U.S. Delegation by the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who are the co-chairmen of the Commission. Other high officials of both governments participated in the meeting.

The Joint Commission was established in November 1974 in order to broaden and intensify economic cooperation and consultation on economic policy matters.

During his visit Minister Ansary called on President Ford and conveyed to him the personal greetings of His Imperial Majesty, the Shahanshah Aryamehr of Iran. In his talks with President Ford and other American leaders, Minister Ansary discussed the current world situation and reviewed bilateral matters in the spirit of mutual respect and understanding long characteristic of the relations between Iran and the United States. He met with members of the Senate and House of Representatives, journalists, and leaders of the American business community.

The Commission reviewed the work done by its five joint committees, which had met during January and February, and approved a large number of technical cooperation projects and development programs which had been recommended by the committees. The Commission concluded that the scope for cooperation between the two countries for their mutual benefit was almost unlimited.

In the light of the strong desire on the part of the two sides to extend areas of mutual cooperation, the Commission set a target of \$15 billion in total non-oil trade between the two countries during the next five years.

Major Iranian development projects selected for cooperation between the two countries include a series of large nuclear power plants, totaling 8,000 electrical megawatts, with associated water desalination plants; 20 prefabricated housing factories; 100,000 apartments and other housing units; five hospitals with a total of 3,000 beds; establishment of an integrated electronics industry; a major port for handling agricultural commodities and other port facilities; joint ventures to produce fertilizer, pesticides, farm machinery, and processed foods; super highways; and vocational training centers. The total cost of these projects is estimated to reach \$12 billion.

The Commission also recognized the special importance of cooperation between the two countries in the field of petrochemicals, and took note of major projects under study for joint ventures between Iran and major companies in the United States to produce petrochemical intermediates and finished products for general use in Iran and for export.

The Commission agreed that a joint business council could play a very useful role in broadening contact between the business sectors in both countries and in facilitating exchange of information on business opportunities and agreed that such a council should be established forthwith.

The Commission agreed that long-term investment from each country in the economy of the other should be on terms and conditions assuring mutual benefit, subject to prevailing rules and regulations in each country. The Commission also agreed on the importance of public awareness of the nature and objectives of the investment policies of the two countries.

The two sides agreed to cooperate actively in the development of the Iranian capital market and in the establishment of Iran as a financial center for the region. It was agreed that a financial conference should be held in Tehran before the end of the current year, to which would be invited high officials of the two governments as well as leaders of banking, insurance and other financial institutions.

Substantial progress was made toward conclusion of an Agreement on Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. This Agreement will provide for a broad exchange of information on the application of atomic energy to peaceful purposes, and for related transfer of equipment and materials, including enriched uranium fuel for Iran's power reactors.

In order to facilitate exchange of technical specialists, the two co-chairmen signed a reciprocal agreement for technical cooperation. Technical cooperation projects were agreed upon in agriculture,

manpower, science and higher education, and health services.

The Commission agreed to emphasize scientific programs in the fields of oceanography, seismic studies, geological and mineral surveys, remote sensing applications, and radio astronomy. In the field of higher education and advanced study, the Commission also agreed that the two governments should increase exchanges and develop a network of inter-institutional relationships.

The Commission noted that, concurrent with the meeting of the Commission, agreement in principle was reached between Iranian and U.S. private interests on projects for production of graphite electrodes, sanitary wares and trailers, and for establishment of a hotel chain in Iran.

It was agreed to hold the next meeting of the Joint Commission in Tehran before the end of 1975.

Leader of the Iranian
Delegation

Leader of the United
States Delegation

HUSHANG ANSARY

HENRY A. KISSINGER

*Minister of Economic
Affairs and Finance*

The Secretary of State

TEXT OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT

Press release 115B dated March 4

AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN

The Government of the United States of America,
and the Imperial Government of Iran,

Desiring to expand and strengthen their friendly
relations,

Confirming their mutual interest in the expansion
of economic cooperation between the two countries,

Recognizing the importance of technical coopera-
tion for the expansion of economic relations, and

Wishing to create the most appropriate condi-
tions for the development of technical cooperation,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Contracting Parties undertake to develop
technical cooperation, on the basis of mutual respect
for sovereignty and noninterference in each other's
domestic affairs.

ARTICLE 2

Technical cooperation as mentioned in Article 1
shall cover a wide variety of economic activities

including industry, agriculture, social affairs, and the development of infrastructure, and may take the form of furnishing technical and training services, advisory personnel and the supply of related commodities and facilities, for the implementation of joint projects, as may be mutually agreed between the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 3

The Contracting Parties shall adopt mutually agreeable administrative, organizational and staff arrangements to facilitate implementation of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

The Contracting Parties or their agencies or Ministries may enter into specific agreements to implement technical cooperation described in Article 2.

ARTICLE 5

The implementation agreements described in Article 4 will contain, *inter alia*, standard provisions on:

A. Advance payment, as mutually agreed upon for costs incurred in the technical cooperation described in Article 2 including costs of project development, program implementation, administrative and staff support and project termination;

B. Privileges and immunities, when applicable, of personnel assigned to engage in such technical cooperation in the territory of the other Contracting Party; and

C. Claims arising from such technical cooperation.

ARTICLE 6

When requested by either Contracting Party, representatives of both Contracting Parties shall meet to review progress toward achieving the purposes of this Agreement, and to negotiate solutions to any outstanding problems.

ARTICLE 7

This Agreement shall be inapplicable to agreements and transactions relating to the sale of defense articles and services by the Government of the United States to the Imperial Government of Iran.

ARTICLE 8

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of an exchange of notes confirming this fact between the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 9

This Agreement shall remain in effect for five

years from the date it enters into force, subject to revision or extension, as mutually agreed, and may be terminated at any time by either Contracting Party by one hundred and eighty days' advance notice in writing.

Done in Washington in duplicate on March 4, 1975, both originals being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

For the Imperial Government of Iran:

HUSHANG ANSARY.

U.S. and Spain Hold Fourth Session of Talks on Cooperation

*Text of Joint Communiqué*¹

The fourth round of negotiations between the delegations of Spain and the United States concerning the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation took place in Washington from March 10 to 13, 1975. The Spanish delegation was chaired by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Juan Jose Rovira, and the American delegation was headed by Ambassador-at-Large Robert J. McCloskey.

The conversations in this Round included further analysis of the first two points of the agenda agreed upon in November; namely, the nature of the defense relationship between Spain and the United States and how this bilateral relationship could be coordinated more closely with the Western defense system. Central to the thinking of both delegations was the concern that whatever agreement results from these bilateral negotiations will complement existing security arrangements in the Atlantic framework and by so doing will strengthen Western defense and promote the appropriate relationship with that system, bearing in mind that all partners should receive equal treatment.

¹ Issued on Mar. 13 (text from press release 140).

The delegations then addressed Item 3 on the agenda which concerns the status of the various facilities granted to U.S. forces in Spain. The Spanish delegation began with an exposition which assessed the changes in global defensive strategy which have affected U.S. forces in Spain since the beginning of our bilateral defense relationship in 1953. The Spanish delegation presented its views on Point 4 regarding the manner in which Spain's defense needs could be attained. The discussion of these items will continue during the Fifth Round which will begin on April 2 in Madrid.

As during past negotiating sessions, the two delegations were able to agree in principle on the value of the relationship which has tied both countries together for the past 22 years. The benefits of improving this relationship were recognized by both delegations.

The Spanish Ambassador offered a reception for Ambassador McCloskey and the U.S. delegation on Sunday, March 9th, and in return, Ambassador McCloskey offered a lunch on March 10th at the State Department in honor of Under Secretary Rovira and the Spanish delegation.

U.S. Approves Grant of Rice for Cambodia

Following is a statement read to news correspondents on March 4 by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations.

The U.S. Government has today approved a [Public Law 480] title II rice program of up to 20,000 metric tons for Cambodia. U.S. and international voluntary agencies such as CARE [Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere], Catholic Relief Services, World Vision Relief Organization, and the International Committee for the Red Cross will distribute this rice to refugees and other needy persons. In order to speed the rice shipments to the refugees, the United States

will transfer title I loan rice currently stored in Viet-Nam to the title II grant program. This rice will be airlifted to the Khmer Republic as is the title I rice presently in Viet-Nam.

This action, which has been under consideration by the U.S. Government, is being taken now because the Communist dry season offensive has aggravated the food supply situation in the Khmer Republic and has increased the number of affected refugees.

U.S. Deplores Terrorist Incident in Tel Aviv

Following is a statement by President Ford issued on March 6, together with a statement by Secretary Kissinger issued at London that day.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated March 6

The act of terrorism which occurred last night at Tel Aviv resulting in the tragic loss of innocent lives should be strongly deplored by everyone. Outrages of this nature can only damage the cause in whose name they are perpetrated.

I extend my deepest sympathy, and that of the American people, to the families of those persons who have been killed as a result of this senseless act.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 118 dated March 7

The Secretary deeply regrets the loss of innocent life in this incident and extends profound sympathy to all those affected.

We deplore all recourse to violence, which is entirely contrary to all civilized norms and to the search for a peace which will be just and lasting for all the peoples of the area.

Department Discusses Goal of Military Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia

Statement by Philip C. Habib

*Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs*¹

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has been a thoughtful and constructive participant in the evolution of U.S. policy toward East Asia, and it is appropriate that early consideration of the new and difficult situations in Viet-Nam and Cambodia should take place here. In the interim since this hearing was originally scheduled, I visited Indochina briefly, accompanying a congressional delegation. I found the experience illuminating, as I believe did your colleagues, and I will draw on my observations there in my testimony today. My opening remarks will be relatively brief so that most of our time can be devoted to your questions.

Two years ago in Paris we concluded an agreement which we hoped would end the war in Viet-Nam and pave the way for settlements of the conflicts in Laos and Cambodia. We felt the Paris agreement was fair to both sides. From the standpoint of the United States, the agreement in large measure met what had been our purpose throughout the long period of our involvement in Viet-Nam. It established a formula through which the people of South Viet-Nam could

determine their political future, without outside interference. U.S. forces were withdrawn and our prisoners released. The Government of South Viet-Nam was left intact, and the agreement permitted the provision of necessary military and economic assistance to that government.

The war has not ended in Indochina; peace has not been restored. Only in Laos have the contending parties moved from military confrontation toward a political solution. In Cambodia, the conflict is unabated. In Viet-Nam, after a brief period of relative quiescence, warfare is again intensive and the structure established by the Paris agreement for working toward a political settlement is not functioning. This is deeply disappointing, but it is not surprising. The Paris agreement contained no automatic self-enforcing mechanisms. Although instruments were established which could have been effective in restricting subsequent military action, the viability of those instruments—and of the agreement itself—depended ultimately on the voluntary adherence of the signatories. Such adherence has been conspicuously lacking in Hanoi's approach.

The Communist record in the last two years, in sharp contrast to that of the GVN [Government of Viet-Nam] and the United States, is one of massive and systematic violations of the agreement's most fundamental provisions. Hanoi has sent nearly 200,000

¹Made before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 6. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

additional troops into South Viet-Nam although the introduction of any new forces was expressly prohibited by the agreement. Amply supplied by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, Hanoi has tripled the strength of its armor in the South, sending in more than 400 new armored vehicles, and has greatly increased its artillery and antiaircraft weaponry. The agreement, of course, permitted only a one-for-one replacement of weapons and material. Hanoi has improved and expanded its logistic system in the South and, drawing on Soviet and Chinese support, has built up its armament stockpiles—within the borders of South Viet-Nam—to levels exceeding even those which existed just prior to the Easter offensive of 1972.

Hanoi has employed a rich variety of tactics to undermine the mechanisms established by the agreement for the purpose of monitoring the cease-fire. It has, for example, refused to deploy the jointly manned military teams which were to oversee the cease-fire. It has also refused to pay its share of the support costs for the International Commission of Control and Supervision, has not allowed the ICCS to station teams in areas its forces control, and has prevented, by delay and obfuscation, any effective investigation of cease-fire violations.

Hanoi has been similarly obstructive on the political front, breaking off all political (and military) negotiations with the GVN, which were a cornerstone of the agreement. The South Vietnamese Government has repeatedly called for negotiations to be resumed. Hanoi's response—reminiscent of its position prior to the fall of 1972—has been to demand the overthrow of President Thieu as a precondition to any talks. As you all know, Hanoi has also failed to cooperate with us and the GVN in helping to resolve the status of American and other personnel who are missing in action.

Finally, Hanoi has applied gradually increasing military pressure, seizing territory clearly held by the GVN when the agreement was signed. More recently, beginning last December 5, Hanoi embarked on a major

new offensive. Since that date it has overrun six district towns and one provincial capital and now threatens additional administrative and population centers.

Through its massive infiltration of men and equipment since the cease-fire was signed, Hanoi obviously has the ability to conduct even more widespread and intensive actions. Through its systematic sabotage of the mechanisms set up by the agreement to monitor violations of the cease-fire and from the evidence of the past two months, it is also clear that Hanoi intends to step up its attacks. The aim of this new offensive clearly is to force additional political concessions from the GVN and to dictate a political solution on Hanoi's terms or, if South Viet-Nam proves unable to resist, to achieve outright military victory. In either case the Paris agreement, and the progress toward peace which it represented, is gravely threatened.

The South Vietnamese have fought well, indeed valiantly, against difficult odds. The GVN still controls most of the territory it held in January 1973, which of course includes the vast majority of the South Vietnamese people, and it has done this without direct U.S. military involvement and despite sharply declining levels of U.S. assistance. But the current North Vietnamese offensive poses new dangers. Present levels of U.S. military aid to South Viet-Nam are clearly inadequate to meet them. We are unable to replace, on the one-for-one basis permitted by the agreement, the consumables essential for South Viet-Nam's defense effort—ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and medical supplies. We are unable to provide any replacement of major equipment losses—tanks, trucks, planes, or artillery pieces. Thus, South Viet-Nam's stockpiles are being drawn down at a dangerous rate; and its ability to successfully withstand further large-scale North Vietnamese attacks is being eroded. South Viet-Nam is even now faced with a harsh choice: to husband its diminishing resources and face additional battlefield losses or to use supplies at a rate sufficient to stem the tide—and risk running out at an early date.

It is for these reasons that the President has requested urgent congressional approval of a \$300 million supplemental appropriation for military assistance for Viet-Nam. This additional amount is the absolute minimum required, and it is needed now.

The Paris agreement also contained provisions relating to Laos and Cambodia. The signatories were enjoined to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those countries and to refrain from using their territory for military purposes. South Viet-Nam and the United States have abided by these strictures. Hanoi has not. North Viet-Nam continues to use the territory of Laos to send forces and war material to South Viet-Nam and continues to station troops in remote areas of that country. Nevertheless the contending Laotian parties were able to establish a cease-fire—which is only infrequently broken—and to form a Provisional Government of National Union.

As a result of these encouraging developments, our military presence in Laos has been withdrawn (except of course for the normal Defense attache office as part of our diplomatic establishment) and we have been able to reduce our military assistance to an enormous degree. For example, during the last fiscal year of widespread combat, fiscal year 1973, U.S. military aid amounted to \$360 million. For fiscal year 1975, the figure is \$30 million.

Unfortunately, a similar evolution has not occurred in Cambodia. North Viet-Nam continues to use the territory of Cambodia to support its military operations in South Viet-Nam and in addition gives material assistance and advice in the military operations of Cambodian Communist forces. We do not contend that Hanoi is the sole motive force for the Cambodian insurgency. However, in its support and encouragement of that conflict as well as in its own flagrant abuse of Cambodian territory, Hanoi bears a large measure of responsibility for the continuation of the fighting there. That fighting has recently intensified. Since January 1, Communist forces have stepped up their attacks in the area near Phnom Penh. At the same time they have increased their

pressure along the Mekong River between Phnom Penh and the South Vietnamese border, the capital's main supply route. Cambodian forces have fought well, but they are stretched thin in attempting to combat this two-pronged offensive. And despite stringent economies their supplies of ammunition and fuel are dangerously low.

The intensified Communist attacks have taken a heavy human toll, evident in even a short visit to that country. Casualties are running at more than 1,000 a day for both sides—killed, wounded, and missing—and the stricken economic life of Cambodia is further weakened. At least 60,000 new refugees have been created, posing additional strain on the resources and the administrative capacity of the government.

The Cambodian Government does not seek an end to the conflict through conclusive military victory. Nor, however, does it wish it to end in military victory by Communist forces. The only logical and fair solution is one involving negotiations and a compromise settlement. To this end we welcomed the resolution, sponsored by Cambodia's neighbors and adopted by the last U.N. General Assembly, calling for early negotiations. The Cambodian Government has repeatedly expressed its readiness to negotiate, without preconditions and with any interlocutor the other side may choose. We fully support that position and have pledged to do our utmost to facilitate such talks.

As you are aware, we have recently documented the efforts the United States has already made to promote a negotiated settlement in Cambodia—in 1973-74 and as recently as February of this year.² Those efforts, which included attempts to establish direct contact with the Communists and Sihanouk, have thus far been futile. The Cambodian Communists have been adamantly opposed to a negotiated settlement, and we believe their attitude is unlikely to change unless and until they conclude that military victory is not possible. The first imperative, therefore, and the aim of our military assist-

² See p. 401.

ance program in Cambodia is to maintain a military balance and thereby to promote negotiations.

Restrictions on our military and economic aid contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 make it impossible to accomplish that goal. Both the \$200 million ceiling on military assistance and the \$75 million draw-down authorized from Department of Defense stocks have been largely exhausted as a result of significantly intensified Communist offensive actions. In addition, Cambodia also faces a serious impending food shortage. Therefore, to meet the minimum requirements for the survival of the Khmer Republic, the President has asked the Congress to provide on an urgent basis an additional \$222 million in military aid for Cambodia and to eliminate the \$200 million ceiling. He has also asked that the \$377 million ceiling on overall assistance be removed, or at least that Public Law 480 food be exempted from the ceiling.

In Viet-Nam we seek to restore the rough military balance, now threatened by North Vietnamese action, which permitted the progress toward peace represented by the Paris agreement and without which further progress toward a lasting political solution is unlikely to be found. Despite Hanoi's flagrant violation of the Paris agreement, we believe it remains a potentially workable framework for an overall settlement and it must be preserved. By redressing the deteriorating military situation in South Viet-Nam our hope is that the momentum can once again be shifted from warfare toward negotiations among the Vietnamese parties. In Cambodia also, only by maintaining the defensive capability of government forces can conditions be established which will permit negotiations to take place.

For neither Viet-Nam nor Cambodia is the provision of additional aid the harbinger of a new and open-ended commitment for the United States. Our record in Indochina supports rather than contradicts that assertion. We worked successfully with the South Vietnamese in reducing and eventually eliminating our own direct military role, and

subsequently with both the South Vietnamese and Cambodian Governments in achieving maximum economies and maximum impact from our aid. Those efforts will continue.

In previous testimony before this and other committees of the Congress in behalf of assistance for Indochina, I and other Administration witnesses have attempted to relate our policies and our programs there to the broader purposes of the United States in the world. For despite the agony of this nation's experience in Indochina and the substantial reappraisal which has taken place concerning our proper role there, Indochina remains relevant to those broader foreign policy concerns. We no longer see the security of the United States as directly, immediately at issue. Nonetheless it remains true that failure to sustain our purposes in Indochina would have a corrosive effect on our ability to conduct effective diplomacy worldwide. Our readiness to see through to an orderly conclusion the obligations we undertook in Indochina cannot fail to influence other nations' estimates of our stamina and our determination. Thus we cannot isolate the situation in Indochina from our other and broader interests in this increasingly interdependent world. To now weaken in our resolve would have consequences inimical to those interests.

Finally, we cannot ignore another aspect of our policy toward Indochina. In entering into the Paris agreement, we in effect told South Viet-Nam that we would no longer defend that country with U.S. forces but that we would give it the means to defend itself. The South Vietnamese have carried on impressively, as have our friends in Cambodia, in the face of extreme difficulty. I do not believe that we can walk away. Measured against the sacrifices which we, and the people of Indochina, have already offered, the amounts which are now being requested are not large. Nor, even in this time of economic constraint, are they beyond our ability to provide. They are, however, vital to the restoration of conditions which can lead to lasting peace in Indochina.

Department Discusses Situation in Portugal

Following is a statement by Bruce Laingen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 14.¹

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you and to discuss with you and your colleagues the current situation in Portugal and our interests there. Events of recent days have dramatized again the complex period of transition now facing Portugal, a process that all Americans view with both sympathy and concern.

Portugal is an old and valued friend with whose people Americans have close and friendly ties and whose people throughout our history have made their own unique contribution to our society. It is a country with whom we share many fundamental cultural values. It is an important NATO ally faced today with a staggering array of economic and political difficulties.

Portugal's history, culture, and economy are bound up inextricably with Western Europe and the Atlantic community. We have a strong interest in Portugal remaining true to this heritage at the same time as it quite naturally seeks to reaffirm and strengthen with many other parts of the world the historic associations which a dynamic Portuguese people have developed over their long history.

The United States has an obvious interest in NATO and therefore an interest in keeping Portugal's traditional ties to the Atlantic community strong. We wish to encourage Portugal, as a founding member of NATO, to continue its role in Western defense.

Since the armed forces overthrew the authoritarian Caetano government on April 25 last year, Portugal has seen events of far-

reaching consequence in many fields. By calling for constituent assembly elections, inviting a wide range of parties to participate, and promising the establishment of democracy, the provisional government has sought to try to bridge the philosophical gap which divided its predecessors from the majority view of its NATO partners. In Africa, five centuries of colonial role are being brought to an end. By the end of this year, all of the Portuguese territories in Africa will be fully independent: Mozambique on June 25; the Cape Verde Islands on July 5; São Tomé and Príncipe on July 12; and Angola on November 11. Guinea-Bissau became independent last September. This policy of swift and peaceful transition of power in Africa has been pursued vigorously despite serious economic costs to the homeland. In the aftermath of President Spínola's forced resignation on September 28, 1974, military participation in the Cabinet was increased, although the triparty (Communists, Socialists, Popular Democrats) coalition in the provisional government remained intact.

Portugal's announced intention to build democratic institutions will continue to have our support. We prescribe no models for Portugal. Our interest is no more and no less than the preservation of an atmosphere in which the free will of the Portuguese people can be expressed.

For that reason we have welcomed the steps taken by the provisional government to develop a schedule of elections. This process is to begin on April 12, when the people of Portugal choose delegates for a constituent assembly to draft a future constitution, and is expected to culminate later this year in elections for a legislature and a President. The April election will be the first formal test of the relative appeal of the different political parties now on the scene. The largest appear to be the Socialists, the Communist-front Portuguese Democratic Movement, the Communists, the Popular Democrats, and the Christian Democrats/Center Social Democrats.

The strongest political element in Portugal today is the Armed Forces Movement itself,

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

which overthrew the Caetano government last April and which has guided the development of the country's economy and political process since that time. The Movement is on record as favoring broad participation in free institutions of government, while emphasizing its intention to continue to guide the course of political events through a process of "institutionalization." That process, meaning the role that the military will continue to play in Portuguese politics, has until the recent abortive coup been under active discussion between the Movement and the principal political groups now on the scene. One effect of this coup attempt in all likelihood will be to involve the Armed Forces Movement for a much longer time and more decisively in the political process than might otherwise have been the case.

To reemphasize, we support Portugal's own stated policy of transition to democratic processes of government. We have made that position consistently and firmly clear in all our contacts with the present Portuguese leadership, and we will continue to do so.

The economic assistance which the Congress has appropriated is a further demonstration of U.S. support and has been warmly welcomed by the Portuguese leadership. We will maintain close contact with the Congress on the question of future economic assistance. We regard the assistance not as a permanent feature of our foreign policy toward Portugal but, rather, as a way of demonstrating our desire to help a close friend and ally struggling with problems of economic and social transition.

For the current fiscal year, the Congress has authorized a \$25 million program of economic assistance to Portugal and to its present and former African territories. Of that amount, \$10 million was appropriated under the continuing resolution which expired February 28. On the basis of that appropriation, we have signed with the Portuguese Government two agreements totaling \$1.75 million: a \$1 million loan for feasibility studies and \$.75 million for grant techni-

cal assistance to provide needed consultants and training to the Portuguese. We also are prepared to authorize, subject to renewal of the continuing resolution, a \$7 million low-cost-housing loan and \$1.25 million for assistance to the African territories. Our expectation is that most of this will go to the Cape Verde Islands. We have also announced a \$20 million low-cost-housing investment guarantee.

In the expectation that the full \$25 million will be appropriated, we have been discussing in general terms with the Portuguese assistance in such additional areas as the construction of prefabricated schools, grain storage facilities, support for the water and sewage systems of Lisbon, and construction assistance at the new University of Lisbon. The Portuguese have also indicated their interest in technical assistance in the areas of education, health, agriculture, and transportation. We believe that assistance in these areas reflects both the desires of the Portuguese themselves and the expressed interest of the American Congress and people in tangible support for the efforts of the Portuguese themselves to strengthen their economy. With the cooperation of the Congress, we hope to move ahead with this program of economic assistance.

Let me finally touch briefly on the abortive coup d'etat that took place this week in Lisbon. The facts on this development are not entirely in, but it is generally assumed to have been inspired by concern over excessive leftist influence in the Armed Forces Movement. In the process the ex-President, General Spínola, sought refuge in Spain, giving rise to a general assumption in Portugal that he was involved, although that remains unclear. In any event, the coup attempt was small in scale and easily put down and all of the principal political parties have since issued statements condemning it as antidemocratic and a serious threat to the electoral process. The Armed Forces Movement itself has announced a reorganization, including the immediate establish-

ment of a Council of the Revolution with broad executive and legislative powers.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure you have seen reference to totally irresponsible statements to the effect that the United States was somehow involved in this attempted coup and the even more regrettable statement that because of Ambassador [Frank C.] Carlucci's alleged role, his safety in Portugal could not be assured.

For the record, I want our position to be unmistakably clear. As the Department's press spokesman said on March 12, the United States—and that obviously includes Ambassador Carlucci—had absolutely no involvement in this affair. Any suggestions to the contrary are malicious and contrary to the facts. As to the safety of Ambassador Carlucci, we have made clear to both the Portuguese Ambassador here and the government in Lisbon that we expect that government to take every step necessary to insure that nothing adversely affects the safety of our Ambassador and his entire Mission. I am glad to say that we have received the assurance we have requested.

We have also reaffirmed, in the aftermath of this aborted coup, that we continue to welcome the prospects of free elections in Portugal and would naturally regret any development, from whatever quarter, that would in any way interrupt this trend. In this connection, we have noted the Portuguese Government's reiteration of its intention to hold to the schedule of an election campaign beginning March 20, leading to constituent assembly elections on April 12.

Mr. Chairman, as I said at the outset of my statement, these events of recent days have quite naturally raised questions anew as to the direction Portugal is going. Frankly, we do not have all of the answers. After nearly 50 years of authoritarian rule and a decade and a half of political, economic, and military tension over issues of decolonization, it is not surprising that this transition period is a difficult one. Quite clearly, this is a time for both sympathy and sensitivity on the

part of all outside observers. I think I express, however, both the hope and the confidence of the American Government and people that this transition period will be securely navigated and that the end result will be a strengthening of the ties that have for so long bound our two countries together.

President Ford Vetoes Bill Concerning Oil Import Fees

*Message to the House of Representatives:*¹

To the House of Representatives:

I am returning H.R. 1767 without my approval. The purposes of this Act were to suspend for a ninety-day period the authority of the President under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 or any other provision of law to increase tariffs, or to take any other import adjustment action, with respect to petroleum or products derived therefrom; to negate any such action which may be taken by the President after January 15, 1975, and before the beginning of such ninety-day period.

I was deeply disappointed that the first action by the Congress on my comprehensive energy and economic programs did nothing positive to meet America's serious problems. Nor did it deal with the hard questions that must be resolved if we are to carry out our responsibilities to the American people.

If this Act became law, it would indicate to the American people that their Congress, when faced with hard decisions, acted negatively rather than positively.

That course is unacceptable. Recent history has demonstrated the threat to America's security and economy caused by our significant and growing reliance on imported petroleum.

¹ Transmitted on Mar. 4 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 10).

Some understandable questions have been raised since my program was announced in January. I am now convinced that it is possible to achieve my import goals while reducing the problems of adjustment to higher energy prices. Accordingly:

—I have directed the Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration to use existing legal authorities to adjust the price increases for petroleum products so that the added costs of the import fees will be equitably distributed between gasoline prices and the prices for other petroleum products, such as heating oil. These adjustments for gasoline will not be permanent, and will be phased out.

—To assist farmers, I am proposing a further tax measure that will rebate all of the increased fuel costs from the new import fees for off-road farm use. This particular rebate program will also be phased out. This proposal, which would be retroactive to the date of the new import fee schedule, will substantially lessen the adverse economic impact on agricultural production, and will reduce price increases in agricultural products.

These actions will ease the adjustment to my conservation program in critical sectors of the Nation while still achieving the necessary savings in petroleum imports.

Some have criticized the impact of my program and called for delay. But the higher costs of the added import fees would be more than offset for most families and businesses if Congress acted on the tax cuts and rebates I proposed as part of my comprehensive energy program.

The costs of failure to act can be profound. Delaying enactment of my comprehensive program will result in spending nearly \$2.5 billion more on petroleum imports this year alone.

If we do nothing, in two or three years we may have doubled our vulnerability to a future oil embargo. The effects of a future oil embargo by foreign suppliers would be infinitely more drastic than the one we experienced last winter. And rising imports

will continue to export jobs that are sorely needed at home, will drain our dollars into foreign hands and will lead to much worse economic troubles than we have now.

Our present economic difficulty demands action. But it is no excuse for delaying an energy program. Our economic troubles came about partly because we have had no energy program to lessen our dependence on expensive foreign oil.

The Nation deserves better than this. I will do all within my power to work with the Congress so the people may have a solution and not merely a delay.

In my State of the Union Message, I informed the Congress that this country required an immediate Federal income tax cut to revive the economy and reduce unemployment.

I requested a comprehensive program of legislative action against recession, inflation and energy dependence. I asked the Congress to act in 90 days.

In that context, I also used the stand-by authority the Congress had provided to apply an additional dollar-a-barrel import fee on most foreign oil coming into the United States, starting February 1 and increasing in March and April.

I wanted an immediate first step toward energy conservation—the only step so far to reduce oil imports and the loss of American dollars. I also wanted to prompt action by Congress on the broad program I requested.

The Congress initially responded by adopting H.R. 1767 to take away Presidential authority to impose import fees on foreign oil for 90 days.

Although I am vetoing H.R. 1767 for the reasons stated, I meant what I said about cooperation and compromise. The Congress now pledges action. I offer the Congress reasonable time for such action. I want to avoid a futile confrontation which helps neither unemployed nor employed Americans.

The most important business before us after 50 days of debate remains the simple but substantial tax refund I requested for

Individuals and job-creating credits to farmers and businessmen. This economic stimulant is essential.

Last Friday, the majority leaders of the Senate and House asked me to delay scheduled increases in the import fees on foreign oil for 60 days while they work out the specifics of an energy policy they have jointly produced. Their policy blueprint differs considerably from my energy program as well as from the energy legislation now being considered by the House Committee on Ways and Means.

I welcome such initiative in the Congress and agree to a deferral until May 1, 1975. The important thing is that the Congress is finally moving on our urgent national energy problem. I am, therefore, amending my proclamation to postpone the effect of the scheduled increases for two months while holding firm to the principles I have stated. It is also my intention not to submit a plan for decontrol of old domestic oil before May 1.

I hope the House and Senate will have agreed to a workable and comprehensive national energy legislation.

But we must use every day of those two months to develop and adopt an energy program. Also, I seek a legislative climate for immediate action on the tax reductions I have requested. It is my fervent wish that we can now move from points of conflict to areas of agreement.

I will do nothing to delay the speedy enactment by the Congress of straightforward income tax cuts and credits by the end of this month.

Under present conditions, any delay in rebating dollars to consumers and letting businessmen and farmers expand, modernize and create more jobs is intolerable.

I do not believe the Congress will endanger the future of all Americans. I am confident that the legislative branch will work with me in the Nation's highest interests.

What we need now is a simple tax cut and then a comprehensive energy plan to end our dependence on foreign oil.

What we *don't* need is a time-wasting *test* of strength between the Congress and the President. What we *do* need is a *show* of strength that the United States government can act decisively and with dispatch.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 4, 1975.*

U.S. Alternate Governor of IBRD and International Banks Confirmed

The Senate on February 19 confirmed the nomination of Charles W. Robinson to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of five years, U.S. Alternate Governor of the Inter-American Development Bank for a term of five years and until his successor has been appointed, and U.S. Alternate Governor of the Asian Development Bank.

U.N. Calls for Resumption of Cyprus Negotiations

Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on February 27 and March 12, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on March 12.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI, FEB. 27

USUN press release 15 dated February 27

The Council meets today to consider how to revive and encourage movement toward peace on Cyprus. To date, progress toward this goal has not met the hopes and expectations of this Council when it endorsed the talks between the two communities on the island two months ago.

The efforts on Cyprus to achieve a mutually acceptable settlement are essentially the responsibility of the parties themselves. Nevertheless the Security Council has had an important interest in encouraging them. Thus, in July of last year, following the outbreak of fighting on the island, this Council achieved a cease-fire, created a framework for negotiations at Geneva, and established principles to guide these talks. In August, following the breakdown of these negotiations, the Council endorsed contacts between representatives of the two communities under the auspices of the Secretary General and his representative. We urged that those negotiations deal not only with immediate humanitarian issues but with political problems as well.

In November, the General Assembly in Resolution 3212 commended the discussions between the representatives of the two communities and called for their continuation with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement. The Assembly

emphasized that the future constitutional system of Cyprus is the concern of the two communities. The Security Council endorsed this General Assembly resolution in December. Finally, throughout the period in which these talks have been conducted, the Secretary General, through his able representative in Nicosia, Ambassador [Luis] Weckmann-Munoz, has provided every encouragement for their success.

These actions provide the basis for our consideration of the present situation in Cyprus. Having seen established a framework in which a negotiated settlement is possible, we regret any unilateral action such as the announcement of a federal Turkish state on Cyprus, which complicates the search for a resolution.

Thus, my government stated on February 13 that:

The United States regrets the action that has been announced today. We support the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and have sought to discourage unilateral actions by either side that would complicate efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. We believe that any eventual solution to the Cyprus problem must be found through a process of negotiation, a process which has been underway.¹

¹ The statement issued by the Department of State on Feb. 13 continued as follows:

We have fully supported this process and were instrumental in reestablishing the [Glafcos] Clerides-[Rauf] Denktash talks, which we continue to support. We had also hoped that we could give additional impetus to the negotiations by meetings between Secretary Kissinger and interested parties during his present Middle Eastern trip. Regrettably, however, events in recent weeks have made it impossible for these meetings to go forward as previously planned and have clearly reduced our ability to influence the outcome. Nevertheless the United States will continue to do its utmost to further the process of negotiation.

Secretary Kissinger added on the same day that the "United States continues to recognize the Government of Cyprus as the legitimate Government of Cyprus" and that "the United States will make every effort to encourage a peaceful solution."²

We believe the Secretary General and his representative on Cyprus have played and continue to play a significant role in facilitating the efforts of those directly concerned to achieve a peaceful settlement. We are especially encouraged to note from the Secretary General's statement of February 21 to the Council that he is prepared to facilitate the continuation of the talks under new conditions and procedures. This provides legitimate hope for further progress. We urge the Governments of Greece and Turkey—two allies whom we value—and the Republic of Cyprus—with which we have had a long and friendly relationship—to respond positively to the timely initiative of the Secretary General.

In our deliberations thus far, we have been impressed with the serious character of the debate which reflects a sober understanding of the complexity and delicacy of the problems which confront the parties and the Council.

The discussion in this chamber has gone forward in an atmosphere which demonstrates recognition of the vital fact that there is no substitute for a realistic dialogue when the Security Council deals with the critical problem of international peace and security.

²The following statement by Secretary Kissinger was issued at Jerusalem on Feb. 13:

The Department of State has today issued a statement regretting the establishment of a Turkish Cypriot federated state by unilateral action. I would like to add to this statement that the United States continues to recognize the Government of Cyprus as the legitimate Government of Cyprus and remains committed to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The United States has tried to encourage a peaceful negotiated settlement and was instrumental in bringing about the Clerides-Denktaş talks. We regret some temporary interruption in these talks.

We would like to stress that it is in the interest of all parties—two allies whom we value—to return to the path of negotiation. The United States will make every effort to encourage a peaceful solution and to enable all parties to find a solution based on justice and dignity and self-respect.

Informal consultations are being actively pursued in the search for a resolution which will encourage and further the settlement process. The members of this Council can be assured that the United States is prepared to cooperate constructively in the efforts to negotiate and formulate a resolution acceptable both to members of the Council and to the parties concerned.

I wish to reaffirm emphatically that the interest of the United States is in a peaceful negotiated solution guided by the principles enunciated in this Council and in the General Assembly and based on justice, dignity, and self-respect. We believe that such a solution can only be achieved by free negotiations between the parties, not by dictation from the outside. We call on all concerned to reaffirm their commitment to this approach and to rededicate themselves to such a solution.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI, MARCH 12

USUN press release 21 dated March 12

My delegation joined in approving Resolution 367 because from the outset we firmly believed that the primary goal of the Security Council should be to encourage the resumption of talks between the two communities in Cyprus. Along with members of this Council, other governments, and the Secretary General, Secretary of State Kissinger devoted his personal efforts to contribute to this objective.

Nearly a month ago, when our deliberations began, a broad chasm separated the parties. In the course of these strenuous consultations, this chasm has narrowed but has not been bridged completely. However, when this was clear, eight delegations representing a broad spectrum of the Council membership, acting in cooperation with the Secretary General, worked out a constructive compromise. We all owe a deep debt of gratitude to these eight delegations for their imaginative, constructive, and courageous drafting of yesterday which produced the positive result before us.

All of us at this table can take satisfaction

in the seriousness and the sense of responsibility which have generally characterized the Council's efforts in the weeks just past. The outcome, I believe, is a victory of patience and reason and compromise over confrontation.

As is frequently the case when an attempt is made to bridge the gap between strongly held views of contending parties, none of the parties may be entirely satisfied with our result. This is natural. At the same time, no one has suffered a defeat.

We urge the parties to respond positively and cooperatively to the initiatives the Secretary General must take in pursuance of today's resolution.

It now becomes the duty of each of us and of the governments we represent to do our utmost to help realize the progress which is represented in the resolution we have passed. We shall fulfill this duty by doing whatever we can to promote the resumption of talks between the communities—talks looking to a peaceful resolution of the conflicts that have afflicted the people of Cyprus during this generation.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION³

The Security Council,

Having considered the situation in Cyprus in response to the complaint submitted by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,

Having heard the report of the Secretary-General and the statements made by the parties concerned,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the crisis in Cyprus,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974,

Noting the absence of progress towards implementation of its resolutions,

1. *Calls once more* on all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and urgently requests them, as well as the parties concerned, to refrain from any action which might

prejudice that sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment, as well as from any attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country;

2. *Regrets* the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975 declaring that a part of the Republic of Cyprus would become "a Federated Turkish State" as *inter alia*, tending to compromise the continuation of negotiations between the representatives of the two communities on an equal footing, the objective of which must continue to be to reach freely a solution providing for a political settlement and the establishment of a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement, and expresses its concern over all unilateral actions by the parties which have compromised or may compromise the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions;

3. *Affirms* that the decision referred to in paragraph 2 above does not prejudice the final political settlement of the problem of Cyprus and takes note of the declaration that this was not its intention

4. *Calls* for the urgent and effective implementation of all parts and provisions of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974);

5. *Considers* that new efforts should be undertaken to assist the resumption of the negotiation referred to in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) between the representatives of the two communities;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General accordingly to undertake a new mission of good offices and to that end to convene the parties under new agreed procedures and place himself personally at their disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the progress of comprehensive negotiations carried out in a reciprocal spirit of understanding, and of moderation under his personal auspices and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated;

7. *Calls on* the representatives of the two communities to co-operate closely with the Secretary-General in the discharge of this new mission of good offices and asks them to accord personally a high priority to their negotiations;

8. *Calls on* all the parties concerned to refrain from any action which might jeopardize the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities and to take steps which will facilitate the creation of the climate necessary for the success of those negotiations;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made towards the implementation of resolution 365 (1974) and of this resolution and to report to it whenever he considers it appropriate and, in any case, before 15 June 1975;

10. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

³ U.N. doc. S/RES/367 (1975); adopted by the Council on Mar. 12 without a vote.

United States Presents Guidelines for Remote Sensing of the Natural Environment From Outer Space

The Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met at U.N. Headquarters February 10–March 7. Following is a statement made in the subcommittee on February 19 by U.S. Representative Ronald F. Stowe, who is Department of State Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, together with the text of a U.S. working paper.

STATEMENT BY MR. STOWE

USUN press release 10 dated February 19

I appreciate this opportunity to share with the Legal Subcommittee the views of my government on the legal aspects of remote sensing of the natural environment of the Earth from outer space. Diverse positions on this subject have been expressed during the past year by a number of states in this subcommittee, in the General Assembly debates, in the full Outer Space Committee, and in the Working Group on Remote Sensing. In addition, we have before us now two draft texts, one introduced by Brazil and Argentina and the other introduced by France and the Soviet Union.

The United States has a number of views rather different from those reflected in either of those drafts, particularly with regard to the present state of international law relating to remote sensing, to the types of problems which may remain to be resolved, and above all, to the approach which the international community should take toward sensing of the natural environment in the future. I would like to summarize the views of the United States, to comment on a num-

ber of the issues which have been raised by others, and to propose an alternative conclusion which this subcommittee might reach in its report to the Outer Space Committee. I would also recall the statement given to the Working Group on Remote Sensing by Leonard Jaffe, the U.S. Representative to the third session of that working group, last February 25.¹ Copies of that statement are available for any interested delegations.

A preliminary question which can and should be resolved with relative ease is, in short: What are we talking about when we use the term "remote sensing" in these discussions? The United States, having launched the remote sensing experiments from which practical experience and data are currently available to the international community, initially spoke of remote sensing in terms of Earth resources technology. However, both the sensing capabilities of the experiments undertaken and the experience we have gained in the last two years have convinced us that reference only to natural resources is inadequate.

A more appropriate and meaningful definition of "remote sensing" would also include environmental factors, and hence we should speak of remote sensing of the natural environment of the Earth. This term seems more useful for several reasons. First, the experiments which we have undertaken through what were called ERTS-1 [Earth Resources Technology Satellite] and ERTS-B, now renamed Landsat 1 and 2, reveal that

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1974, p. 376.

equally as important as potential resource identification from outer space are the possibilities for land use analysis, mapping, water quality studies, disaster relief, air and water pollution detection and analysis, protection and preservation of the environment, and many others. To address only one of these potential uses is misleading. All states, including especially developing countries, have broad and sometimes urgent interests in all of these uses.

To refer only to data about resources is also technically unrealistic, because the same data base which gives information about resources gives information about all of these other uses I have mentioned and more. To inhibit access to data about one potential use is to inhibit access to data about all other such uses. The data interpretation which takes place here on the ground after the data are received from the satellite determines the types of information which will be elicited. There are no data from these satellites which are peculiar to or which can be restricted to Earth resources.

The concerns which some states feel about their natural resources are evident and should be addressed in our discussions. However, if we are to attempt to analyze the legal aspects of such remote sensing, our focus and our attention must be broader than just one particular element of that sensing. It is our belief that reference to the concept of remote sensing of the natural environment of the Earth may be a helpful step in that direction.

Question of International Law

Agreement on definitions, however important, would still leave a variety of fundamental and difficult substantive questions which one or more members have posed to this subcommittee. Among those questions, even if not expressly asked, is: What is the present state of international law relating to remote sensing of the natural environment? I address this issue not because in our view that law is uncertain or unsettled, but rather because during the last year cer-

tain questions have been raised to what we believe are the well-established provisions of international law in this area. We do not believe that these challenges are well founded or that the change in law which they implicitly propose would be desirable.

I refer in particular to the assertion that Earth-oriented sensing activities from outer space are not sanctioned by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which provides in part that:

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law

As my delegation pointed out at the last session of the Legal Subcommittee, in our view such remote sensing activities are clearly within the scope of that treaty.

The negotiating history of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty indicates that primary interest was evinced in the possibilities of using space technology to improve certain capabilities here on Earth. Certainly, one cannot then reasonably infer that Earth-oriented activities were not covered. Practice, too, confounds such an assertion; for one need not look far to realize that before, during, and after the negotiation of the 1967 treaty, which we all recognize as the basic authority in this area, Earth-oriented space activities were plentiful and well known.

Telecommunications and meteorological satellites were much more common than and equally as accepted as deep space probes. For example, over 70 countries utilize the U.S. meteorological satellite system on a daily basis. That system is focused on the Earth and sends back daily images of the Earth's surface as well as its cloud cover. The manned Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs all contained widely publicized and intensively studied experiments focusing on the Earth, including its resources and environment. I should mention here that this acceptance continues to the present day and that it applies specifically to remote sensing. Fifty-two countries, including 17 members of this subcommittee, plus a number of international organizations have be-

some party to international agreements covering the open use of such remote sensing data for their own interests. They have chosen to do so for important reasons which we must neither ignore nor discard in our own analysis.

Benefits of Dissemination of Data

It has been suggested that remote sensing of the natural environment is distinguishable from earlier activities because it allegedly affects the Earth in a way that earlier sensing did not. However, this argument does not withstand serious scrutiny. Sensing of the natural environment for resources, mapping contours, air and water pollution, land use, or any other purpose does not of itself affect the Earth any more than a meteorological satellite changes or affects the cloud formations it senses. If we are to be serious about our work, we must discard these facile arguments and come to grips with the essence of the facts, including the genuine concerns which are before us.

Attempts to inhibit or even prohibit the gathering and exchange and analysis of information about the Earth are misdirected in that they will not solve what seem to be the underlying concerns which generate them. They are counterproductive, in that they could, if pressed, undermine or eliminate the potential for developing extraordinary new benefits which can be meaningfully shared by all peoples in all countries of the world.

An essential tenet of both the Brazilian-Argentine and the French-Soviet drafts, as we read them, appears to be the belief that if each state would have a right to prohibit the dissemination to third parties of data about its territory, then each state would be more secure and better off. We believe that the majority of states, including especially the large number of developing countries, will see the situation differently. Their prime need is to identify what resources they have. They will want equal access to all information about their resources. They will not want it available only to those few countries which operate spacecraft,

which in our view would be the result of a restrictive data-dissemination system. The surest and perhaps the only reliable way to protect states from being comparatively disadvantaged or discriminated against is to insure that all states and all peoples have as much opportunity to obtain that data as does anyone else.

The total body of information and understanding about the world can grow at a much greater rate with the cooperative efforts of investigators throughout the world, and that growth will benefit in particular those states which do not have the financial resources to carry on sophisticated sensing programs themselves even within their own territories.

The United States does not make this point to defend our own interests. We expect to have access to and to use data about the natural environment of this Earth in any case. We believe that it is strongly in the interests of other states that we and other collectors of this data share it rather than being in effect asked not to.

Technical and Organizational Realities

Quite apart from the scientific or political merits or disadvantages of a restrictive dissemination system, such a system does not appear either technically or economically feasible; and hence if such restrictions were universally agreed the result could be the complete negation of virtually any public system for remote sensing of the natural environment of the Earth. We have no capability to separate satellite images along the lines of invisible political boundaries. If in the future some technical means for doing so were discovered, it is still highly improbable that the cost of applying it could be brought down to the level at which it would be economically feasible. As a practical matter—and in the end we must deal with the practical realm—it makes little sense to adopt a restrictive dissemination system unless we are prepared to negate the possibility of any internationally available source of remote sensing data. The

United States would oppose such a decision and would consider it most unfortunate and a great mistake if agreed to by others.

Finally, on this point I would note the fact that limiting the data availability to conform to national boundaries, even if it were feasible, would destroy many of the most useful functions of satellite remote sensing systems, functions including the study of ecological systems, water systems, pollution, soil moisture conditions, rift systems, and vegetation and soil patterns, as well as most other objectives of sensing systems such as those undertaken by the Landsat experiments. The most pressing need for such satellite observations involves the acquisition and analysis of large area and global data in order to make it possible to deal with problems which are inherently regional or global in character.

I emphasize this fact in particular to illustrate the essential point that we cannot constructively deal with the legal aspects of remote sensing without remaining sensitive at each step to the technical and organizational realities of this developing technology. This interaction was recognized by the working group, by the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, and by the full Outer Space Committee; and if we are to develop useful and meaningful recommendations in this forum, we must also integrate these considerations into our analysis. This makes our task more difficult, but this is an area of great complexity and of great potential significance to all of us. We are certainly equal to the challenge.

Improvement of International Guidelines

The U.S. Government has undertaken a thorough review of our position on the legal aspects of remote sensing of the natural environment and of our views regarding the appropriate work of this subcommittee. At the same time that we have no doubt that such remote sensing and open availability of data are sanctioned and encouraged by the present provisions of applicable international law, we are also quite willing to

participate actively in efforts to examine whether international arrangements and guidelines can be improved.

With this in mind, we have prepared a working paper containing a number of provisions reflecting the substance of international guidelines for remote sensing which we would support in addition to those contained in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Such guidelines might be endorsed by the General Assembly and recommended to all states engaged in remote sensing of the natural environment.

We believe that after careful study others will also agree that the approach we are advocating will in the long run insure greater benefits to all countries, regardless of the level of their economic development, will better protect those who fear that the inevitable expansion of knowledge will somehow threaten them, and may well give us all a valuable new tool to use in our shared efforts to deal with international problems relating to the natural environment.

The working paper, which the United States submits as a Legal Subcommittee document, recognizes in particular the value of international cooperation, whether bilateral, regional, or universal in scope. It is based on the premise that all states are free without discrimination of any kind to carry out remote sensing of the natural environment and encourages the development of cooperation particularly on the regional level, to help insure that all states can share in benefits which may be derived from the use of this developing technology.

In addition, we believe that states which are engaged in remote sensing programs such as our Landsat experiments, or whatever operational systems may grow out of such experiments by the United States and others should within their capabilities endeavor to assist others on an equitable basis to develop an understanding of the techniques, potential benefits, and costs of remote sensing, including the conditions under which they could be afforded. Such assistance might include enhanced opportunities to learn what data are available, how to handle and interpret

those data, and how to apply the knowledge gained to meet national, regional, and global needs. Our reference to states engaged in such programs includes all those states which have developed and are utilizing capabilities for data handling and analysis in addition to those states which are operating the space segment of such programs.

To enhance the ability of all states to benefit from such remote sensing programs, states which receive data directly from remote sensing satellites should publish catalogues or other appropriate listings of publicly available data so that others can learn what data they might obtain for their own use.

States which receive data directly from satellites designed for remote sensing of the natural environment should insure that data of a sensed area within the territory of any other state are available to the sensed state as soon as practicable and in any event as soon as they are available to any state other than the sensing state. Data acquired from such satellites should be available to all interested states, international organizations, individuals, scientific communities, and others on an equitable, timely, and nondiscriminatory basis. As a part of this commitment, the question of the allocation of the costs of establishing and operating such a system will at some point have to be addressed.

It is our view that, contrary to the fears of some, an open and widely utilized system of data dissemination will enhance rather than undermine the ability of states to manage and control the natural resources within their respective territories.

We believe that a careful analysis of the nature and potential of systems for remote sensing of the natural environment will reveal that the interests of the international community as a whole and individual states in all areas of the world, regardless of their degrees of development, will be best served by extensive cooperation in a system or systems based on open data dissemination, an approach to the use of this new technology which we continue to follow and which is

surely in keeping with our common commitment to the use of outer space in the interests and for the benefit of all mankind.

TEXT OF U.S. WORKING PAPER ²

Remote sensing of the natural environment of the earth from outer space

United States working paper on the development of additional guidelines

Possible preambular provisions

Recalling the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Reaffirming that the common interest of mankind is served by the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Considering that international co-operation in the continuing development of technology enabling mankind to undertake remote sensing of the natural environment of the earth from outer space may provide unique opportunities for all peoples to gain useful understanding of the earth and its environment,

Recognizing that the most valuable potential advantages to mankind from these technological developments, including among others preservation of the environment and effective management and control by States of their natural resources, will depend on the sharing of data and its use on a regional and global basis.

Possible operative provisions

I. Remote sensing of the natural environment of the Earth from outer space shall be conducted in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and other generally accepted principles of international law relating to man's activities in outer space.

II. Satellites designed for remote sensing of the natural environment of the Earth shall be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. States shall as appropriate inform the Secretary-General of the progress of such remote sensing space programmes they have undertaken.

III. Remote sensing of the natural environment of the Earth from outer space should promote

² U.N. doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L. 103.

inter alia (a) international co-operation in the solution of international problems relating to natural resources and the environment, (b) the development of friendly relations among States, (c) co-operation in scientific investigation, and (d) the use of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all mankind.

IV. States undertaking programmes designed for remote sensing of the natural environment from satellites shall encourage the broadest feasible international participation in appropriate phases of those programmes.

V. States receiving data directly from satellites designed for remote sensing of the natural environment of the earth shall make those data available to interested States, international organizations, individuals, scientific communities and others on an equitable, timely and non-discriminatory basis. To enhance the ability of all States, organizations and individuals to share in the knowledge gained from remote sensing of the natural environment from outer space, States should publish catalogues or other appropriate listings of publicly available data which they have received directly from such remote sensing satellites.

VI. States receiving data directly from such remote sensing satellites shall ensure in particular that data of a sensed area within the territory of any other State are available to the sensed State as soon as practicable, and in any event as soon as they are available to any State other than the sensing States. States owning such remote sensing satellites shall facilitate the direct reception of data from those satellites by other interested States when technically possible and on equitable terms.

VII. States engaged in such remote sensing programmes shall within their capabilities endeavour to assist on an equitable basis other interested States, organizations and individuals to develop an understanding of the techniques, potential benefits and costs of remote sensing. Such assistance could include the provision of opportunities to learn what data are available, how to handle and interpret the data, and, where appropriate, how to apply the knowledge gained to meet national, regional and global needs.

VIII. States should cooperate with other States in the same geographical region in the use of data from such remote sensing programmes, whether regional or global in nature, to promote the common development of knowledge about that region.

IX. States which undertake such remote sensing programmes should encourage relevant international organizations to which they belong to assist other member States in acquiring and using data from those programmes so that the maximum number of States can share in potential benefits which may result from the development of this technology.

United States Discusses Response to the World Food Crisis

Statement by John Scali

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

Last November the nations of the world joined together in Rome to pledge that within one decade no child would go hungry, no family would fear for its next day's bread, and no human being's future would be stunted by malnutrition.

In a recent statement the new Executive Director of the World Food Council, Dr. John Hannah, has described the awesome obstacles we face in achieving our goal and made a compelling case for urgent action. Today more than 10 percent of all of the people on this earth, Dr. Hannah pointed out, face chronic hunger. Although mass starvation has been avoided, tens of thousands of persons die annually from hunger or hunger-related diseases. Many millions are never far from famine.

Over the past year on many occasions I have spoken to American audiences of the critical food situation now facing the poorer nations of the earth. I frankly noted the political and economic difficulties our country would face in providing food aid at a time when our traditional food surpluses had disappeared, our own food prices were rising, and our economy was in recession. Under these new conditions, I said, our national decision whether to provide substantial food assistance would test the convictions of our people and the vision of our leaders as it never had in the past. Despite these problems, I remained confident that the United States would meet this challenge and remain true to its long heritage of generosity for those in need.

Since I made these remarks, events have justified my confidence. I am thus particularly pleased to be able to report officially to you that the U.S. Government has decided

¹ Made in informal consultation on the World Food Council at U.N. Headquarters on Feb. 24 (text from USUN press release 13).

on a food aid program for the current fiscal year that represents the highest dollar level in the last 10 years and which includes approximately 2 million tons more food than was programed last year.

The P.L. 480 budget this year provides \$1.47 billion to purchase agricultural commodities. With the addition of freight costs the total value is \$1.6 billion. We estimate that this budget will purchase approximately 5.5 million tons of grain. At least 4 million tons of this will be provided as outright grants for humanitarian relief or made available under concessionary terms to those nations most in need. In all, we will make available between 850 and 900 million dollars' worth of food assistance to those countries most seriously affected by the current economic crisis. Thus, 31 of these most seriously affected nations will receive U.S. food assistance totaling over \$850 million in the current fiscal year.

The scale of this year's American food aid program is in keeping with the pledges made by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger to the 29th General Assembly, when they promised that the value of American food shipments to those in need would be increased. The President was encouraged in this difficult decision by members of the American Congress and by concerned citizens throughout our country. He has ordered a food aid program which represents about a 70 percent increase over last year's food aid, raising the funding from \$843 million to \$1.47 billion and, more important, raising the amount of food provided by approximately 2 million tons. The task of shipping such an enormous quantity of food before the end of the fiscal year will be a large one. We intend, however, to make a maximum effort to solve any transportation problems.

The United States also intends to increase its assistance for agricultural development in the Third World. The Administration has asked the U.S. Congress to provide \$650 million for aid in this area, thus raising our total agricultural assistance program this year to over \$2.2 billion.

I hope our response to the food crisis will

draw new attention to the plight of those nations in need and encourage others to join in cooperative action to feed those still facing hunger in the developing nations. Words and paper promises will not feed the hungry. Utopian programs will not fuel the faltering economies of the world's poorest nations. Only generous and concrete assistance from all those in a position to give will serve to meet the present crisis and to provide hope for a better future.

In the months to come, the United States will seek to work with all others who wish to contribute in a concrete way to the realization of the goals set by the World Food Conference. It is the intention of the United States to continue to contribute its fair share toward the global target of 10 million tons of cereal food aid annually.

President Ford told the General Assembly last fall that the United States would join in a worldwide effort to negotiate, establish, and maintain an international system of food reserves. The United States is already actively working to achieve that goal, both in its cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization on the International Undertaking on World Food Security and more recently in convening a meeting of major grain importers and exporters to discuss the possible elements of effective reserves arrangements among these countries. Domestically, we are continuing to encourage our farmers to produce at full production levels, so that even in the current absence of international arrangements on reserves we can this year contribute our full share to the availability of food worldwide. Finally, the United States will continue to provide a high level of assistance to agricultural development in the Third World, and we will work with other potential donors to increase the flow of aid to agriculture through both multilateral and bilateral channels.

As we move with other nations to implement the decisions of the World Food Conference, we will give serious attention to the important role which can be played by the World Food Council itself. We look with

eager anticipation to the initial session of the Council in Rome and are pleased that the Secretary General has called this meeting today to facilitate the June discussions. Mr. President, I assure you the United States stands ready to play a constructive role in the important work of this Council.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Fisheries Issues

Press release 104 dated February 26

Discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on Middle Atlantic and North Pacific fisheries issues which commenced February 3 were terminated on February 26. Agreement was reached between the two countries on Middle Atlantic problems, and a new agreement extending previous arrangements was signed February 26 with some modifications. The new agreement provides for stricter enforcement of U.S. regulations relating to the taking of U.S. continental shelf fishery resources and strengthens measures aimed at minimizing gear conflicts between Soviet mobile (trawl) gear and U.S. fixed gear (lobster pots).

However, the United States and the Soviet Union failed to reach agreement on issues relating to the conservation of North Pacific fishery resources and on ways of most effectively reducing conflicts between U.S. and Soviet fishermen with minimal impact on the fisheries of both countries. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., who headed the U.S. delegation, expressed concern over the continuing decline of fishery resources off the U.S. Pacific coast and the urgent need to implement measures to control overfishing. He further expressed his keen disappointment over the failure to reach an agreement

that would protect and conserve resources of special interest to U.S. fishermen.

Both countries agreed to extend to July 1, 1975, the former three agreements relating to crab fishing in the eastern Bering Sea and arrangements to prevent gear conflicts in the vicinity of Kodiak Island and the fisheries of the northeastern Pacific extending from Alaska south to California and also agreed to meet again later this year.

The U.S. delegation included representatives from the Departments of State and Commerce, the Coast Guard, and from state governments and industry. The Soviet delegation was led by Vladimir M. Kamentsev, Deputy Minister of Fisheries.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Ecuador, March 12, 1975

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement of 1968, as amended and extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974. Open for signature November 1, 1974, through March 31, 1975.¹

Signatures: Brazil, January 6, 1975;² Guatemala February 7, 1975;² Mexico,² Rwanda,² January 22, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Accession deposited: Colombia, March 3, 1975.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.²
Accession deposited: Colombia, March 3, 1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties,

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to approval, ratification, or acceptance.

with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Enters into force May 6, 1975.

Ratification deposited: Monaco, February 24, 1975.

Accession deposited: Syria, February 6, 1975.

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.¹

Accession deposited: Syria, February 6, 1975.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 1974.¹

Signature: Federal Republic of Germany (subject to ratification), February 18, 1975.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957; for the United States December 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.

Accession deposited: Zaire, February 28, 1975.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.¹

Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, March 10, 1975.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.¹

Acceptance deposited: Israel, February 13, 1975.

Trade

Arrangement regarding international trade in textiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which entered into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, November 27, 1974.

BILATERAL

Honduras

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities. Signed at Tegucigalpa March 5, 1975. Entered into force March 5, 1975.

Italy

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Rome January 18, 1973.

Ratifications exchanged: March 11, 1975.

Entered into force: March 11, 1975.

Extradition convention. Signed at Washington March 23, 1868. Entered into force September 17, 1868. 15 Stat. 629.

Additional article to extradition convention of March 23, 1868. Signed at Washington January 21, 1869. Entered into force May 7, 1869. 16 Stat. 767.

¹ Not in force.

Supplementary convention to extradition convention of March 23, 1868. Signed at Washington June 11, 1884. Entered into force April 24, 1885. 24 Stat. 1001.

Agreement for the reciprocal application of article 1 of the extradition convention of March 23, 1868. Effected by exchange of notes signed at Rome April 16 and 17, 1946. Entered into force April 17, 1946; operative May 1, 1946. 61 Stat. 3687.
Terminated: March 11, 1975.

Japan

Arrangement providing for Japan's financial contribution for U.S. administrative and related expenses for the Japanese fiscal year 1974 pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo May 10, 1974. Entered into force May 10, 1974.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul February 26, 1975. Entered into force February 26, 1975.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of December 11, 1974, relating to cooperative arrangements to support Mexican efforts to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at México February 24, 1975. Entered into force February 24, 1975.

Panama

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of March 31, 1949, as amended (TIAS 1932, 2551, 6270), with memorandum of consultations. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama December 23, 1974, and March 6, 1975. Entered into force March 6, 1975.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on March 11 confirmed the following nominations:

William B. Bowdler to be Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa.

Nathaniel Davis to be an Assistant Secretary of State [for African Affairs].

Harry W. Shlaudeman to be Ambassador to Venezuela.

PUBLICATIONS

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Correction

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following error which appears in the February 3 issue:

p. 134, col. 2: The second-to-last paragraph should read “. . . I will request legislation to authorize and require tariffs, import quotas, or price floors . . .”

Check List of Department of State

Press Releases: March 10–16

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 104 of February 26, 115, 115A, and 115B of March 4, and 118 of March 7.

No.	Date	Subject
*120	3/10	Schaufele appointed Inspector General of the Foreign Service (biographic data).
†121	3/10	Kissinger, Bitsios: remarks, Brussels, Mar. 7.
†122	3/10	Kissinger: arrival, Aswan, Mar. 8.
†123	3/10	Kissinger, Sadat: remarks, Aswan, Mar. 8.
†124	3/10	Kissinger: departure, Aswan, Mar. 9.
†125	3/10	Kissinger: arrival, Damascus, Mar. 9.
†126	3/10	Kissinger, Khaddam: toasts, Damascus, Mar. 9.
†127	3/10	Kissinger: departure, Damascus, Mar. 9.
†128	3/10	Kissinger, Allon: arrival, Tel Aviv, Mar. 9.
†129	3/10	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.
†130	3/11	Kissinger: arrival, Ankara, Mar. 10.
*131	3/11	SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) working group on fire protection, Apr. 4.
*132	3/11	SOLAS working group on design and equipment, Apr. 3.
†133	3/11	Kissinger: remarks, Ankara, Mar. 10.
*134	3/11	U.S.-Japan Scientific and Technical Cooperation Review Panel established.
†135	3/11	Kissinger: departure, Ankara.
†136	3/12	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.
†137	3/12	Kissinger: arrival, Aswan.
138	3/12	Summary of negotiating efforts on Cambodia, Mar. 5.
*139	3/13	Handyside sworn in as Ambassador to Mauritania (biographic data).
140	3/13	U.S.-Spain joint communique.
†141	3/14	Kissinger, Sadat: remarks, Aswan, Mar. 13.
†142	3/14	Kissinger: departure, Aswan.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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