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NLF-NSC_ILCC-5-2-4-3

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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CONTAINS CODEWORD

July 3, 1975

Presidential Library Review of DOS & NSC
Equities is Required

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: The Situation Room


SUBJECT: Noon Notes

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
AUTHORITY OAD NLF-WH N-1-54-1-1
nsc Staff Guidelines
BY WA NARA DATE 7/22/10


Peking Criticizes Gandhi's Actions: Peking has sharply criticized Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's latest actions, leveling the hardest personal attack against her in some time. The Chinese paid special attention to Soviet support for Gandhi's moves; they charged that she is attempting to act as Moscow's "subregent," so that the USSR can maintain its control of India and its influence in South Asia. The Chinese had handled with discretion the prime minister's conviction on June 12.

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
DIA and NSA review(s) completed.

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MORI/CDF

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North Vietnam Receives MIGs From PRC: Hanoi has recently augmented its fighter strength with as many as 30 MIG-17 or MIG-19 aircraft delivered from China. This is the first delivery of fighters to the North Vietnamese air force since the communist takeover of South Vietnam and raises Hanoi's total MIG strength to about 300. The last delivery of MIG aircraft to North Vietnam occurred in February. The additional aircraft may be assigned to Kien An airfield, near Haiphong, which has not been used by North Vietnamese tactical aircraft since January.

Additional Press Items

Philip Shabecoff in the New York Times today quoted a White House official saying that the President avoided a visit with Solzhenitsyn on advice from the NSC. The President was advised that a meeting would be inconsistent with the policy of detente. Several aides reportedly felt that the President should meet with Solzhenitsyn but Ford was disposed against a meeting and allowed himself to be persuaded against seeing him.

George C. Wilson in the Washington Post quotes from a farewell address yesterday by Army Secretary Callaway. He called for a law directing that the service secretaries should have full access to military information. He pointed out the reaction which would occur if he went down and attempted to sit in on the triweekly afternoon meetings of the JCS. On the Panama Canal he said that the U.S. should keep a military presence in Panama indefinitely. He said his preference


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is for a bilateral agreement between the U.S. to protect the canal. He declined to specify where the Pentagon and State differ in their recommendations. He also said that tanks are our biggest problem because so many have been taken away from the army and given to others -- such as Israel during the 1973 war. The increased production should ease this shortage in the future.

A Washington Post editorial takes Mrs. Gandhi to task. She recently said that she had drawn inspiration from Jefferson and Lincoln. Noting the ouster of Lewis Simons and the restrictive measures Mrs. Gandhi has imposed, the Post offers to refresh her memory of what Jefferson stood for by sending a "gift of his (uncensored) works."



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No Objection To Declassification 2007/09/20 : NLF-WH_N-1-54-1-1

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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July 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: The Situation Room
SUBJECT: Information Items

ADVICE - WH-N-1-54-2-0
NSC / State guidelines 9/20/07
DATE 7/22/10

International Oil Developments: CIA reports that the exact size of the OPEC price increase in October remains highly uncertain. However, statements at the Gabon meeting last month by some of the more moderate OPEC members -- principally Saudi Arabia and Venezuela -- suggest an increase of 10 to 12 percent, or \$1.00 to \$1.25 per barrel, for Saudi benchmark crude. This moderate element in OPEC has wielded the greatest influence in previous pricing decisions. A more worrisome prospect was raised by the Shah, who stated earlier that OPEC would be justified in boosting prices by 35 percent -- the amount by which the value of oil receipts has eroded, according to OPEC calculations. Although the Shah gave no indication that he actually favors such a large increase, a few hard-line OPEC members that need more revenue -- notably Algeria -- do favor such a boost.

In the absence of solid new information on Saudi and Iranian intentions, CIA believes that OPEC is likely to raise prices in October by only about a dollar. The countries probably will then assess the political situation and the oil market over the remainder of the year and raise prices still further in January, if a rise seems warranted. With demand for OPEC oil expected to rise sharply this fall, the cartel will be in a good position to increase prices by substantially more than a dollar. Political factors will play a predominant role in this decision, and these are more likely to push up the increase than to moderate it. They can scarcely visualize circumstances in which the rise would be much less than a dollar, and a number of political developments could lead even the more moderate OPEC states to favor a higher figure.

Guided-Missile Launches in Indonesia: The head of Air Navigation Services in Jakarta revealed on June 28 that guided-missile launches -- probably SA-2s -- will be

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conducted by the Indonesian National Air Defense Command. The only missile unit in that country is an SA-2 battalion at Cilodong whose equipment has long been considered inoperable. In the early 1960s, the USSR delivered at least 150 SA-2 missiles and sufficient equipment for three battalions to Indonesia. If the June 29 launch occurred as scheduled, it would be the first Indonesian service-ability test since 1969. Restoration of even a limited surface-to-air missile capability would climax Jakarta's refurbishment of the air defense system that has been under way during the past four years. DIA believes that even the limited capabilities attained may be cited as a showpiece of Indonesia's "national resilience" strategy. More importantly, assuming that progress continues to operational status for all equipment, Jakarta will have substantially improved its capability to police the reaches of the archipelago.

The Washington Star News

Jeremiah O'Leary writes that retired Major General Edward G. Lansdale has named Robert F. Kennedy as the administration official who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project to work out all feasible plans for "getting rid of" Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Lansdale, in an interview with the Star said there could be no doubt that "the project for disposing of Castro envisioned the whole spectrum of plans from overthrowing the Cuban leader to assassinating him." Lansdale said he received his instruction from Kennedy and in turn relayed orders directly to CIA official William K. Harvey, bypassing the agency's chain of command. A former high-ranking CIA official, who insisted on anonymity, also said that President Kennedy's brother and most trusted adviser precipitated the 1962 CIA project for planning the destruction of Castro and his regime. Both Lansdale and the ex-CIA source said the request was relayed without the knowledge of either CIA Director John A. McCone or Secretary McNamara. But Lansdale said both became aware of the planning later, along with members of the "40 Committee."

Henry S. Bradsher reports that Ambassador Graham A. Martin has finally reached Washington, but the administration has not yet decided whether to expose him to the residual anger on Capitol Hill. Some members of Congress were displeased that Martin went off on vacation in Europe instead of coming home to report on what he had done in his last days in

Vietnam. There is no formal request now pending for him to appear for questioning. However, some congressional staffers expect requests to be made when Congress returns from its Fourth of July recess. In any showdown Congress could force Martin to appear. It will, therefore, be up to you to decide how to handle the situation, and ultimately may be up to President Ford because of the political ramifications. It was on the assumption that a cease-fire was coming that Martin rejected repeated efforts by other Americans to take steps before the final collapse made an orderly evacuation impossible. According to informed sources, he has been hoping for another ambassadorial assignment, although at the age of 62 and with 42 years of government service he could retire. Some sources think the outspokenly anticommunist ambassador wants another assignment as a form of vindication for the way he handled his last one. Congressional sources say, however, that any attempt to appoint Martin to a new job which would require Senate confirmation would be certain to stir up a storm. One senior Senate staff member suggested that the administration might find a post for Martin which does not require confirmation, such as making him an ambassador-in-residence at a university.

Henry S. Bradsher reports on the upcoming talks with Gromyko. Since the conclusion several weeks ago of the public phase of the American "reassessment" of Middle East peace prospects, the Ford administration has tried by quiet diplomacy to work out another Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai Peninsula in return for fresh Egyptian peace guarantees. These efforts are now reportedly near the stalling point. Israel is resisting American pressure for greater concessions to Egypt. You are expected to bring Gromyko up to date on the American efforts. At the Vienna meeting you tried to clear a major obstacle to writing a new strategic arms treaty by a compromise on counting missiles with multiple warheads. Other problems include U.S. efforts to count Soviet backfire supersonic jet bombers among strategic weapons to be limited and Soviet efforts to count the subsonic cruise missiles which the United States is developing. The multiple-warhead missile count remains undecided, either in Soviet-American talks or within the Ford administration.

A Star-News editorial notes that short of the President becoming his own press secretary, there probably isn't any complete cure for the enduring hostility between the White House press corps and the White House press office. Reporters assigned to the White House never will be completely satisfied with the answers or threatment they get from the

President's hired help. The closest these reporters have been to the horse's mouth in recent decades was Jim Hagerty. Hagerty was more than a press secretary; he was a presidential intimate deeply involved in policy making; he therefore knew whereof he spoke. What they've got -- at the moment at least -- is:

- a press secretary, Ron Nessen, who appears to be trying to do a decent job but who has a rather thin skin and who, while he has access to the President, is more of a functionary than an intimate;
- a press corps that for the most part is trying honestly to gather and interpret the news but which has a few members who enjoy the attention they get out of bearbaiting or think their mission in life is to reform the world.

The press should not expect the press secretary to know everything that goes on behind closed doors, or even to tell all of what he does know. Unless he can prove it, no reporter should publicly accuse the press secretary of being a "liar," as one did at a recent Nessen briefing; nor should Nessen accuse reporters of being mindless and irrational.

Crosby S. Noyes says this is hardly the time to rock the Korean boat. He believes that the disappearance of the UN command from South Korea may have a profoundly disturbing psychological effect in a situation where psychological factors count for a great deal. The decision to abolish the UN command was not the idea of the United States or of the South Korean regime. It is, rather, recognition of the fact that North Korea has won strong support in recent years among the newer "Third World" members of the UN and that the UN command in South Korea is rapidly becoming untenable. In short, the unavoidable boat-rocking has more serious implications than meet the eye -- including implications that bear on the legality and political practicality of the American military presence in Korea. It will be surprising if, in the months to come, it does not become a major political issue in this country.