

The original documents are located in Box 21, folder “October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic of China - HAKTO (2)” of Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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 FM BUD MC FARLANE//HAKTO 21//

TO BRENT SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: BUD MC FARLANE

(1) THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE AS PRESENTED TO THE CHINESE MONDAY MORNING. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IT IS EXPECTED TO CHANGE.

BEGIN TEXT

PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VISITED THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AT THE INVITATION OF PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI FROM TO 1975, ACCOMPANYING THE PRESIDENT WERE MRS. FORD, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER, AND OTHER AMERICAN OFFICIALS.

PRESIDENT FORD MET WITH CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG ON

THE TWO LEADERS HAD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. PRESIDENT FORD ALSO PAID A CALL ON PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI AND HELD A DISCUSSION WITH HIM.

DURING THE VISIT, PRESIDENT FORD AND VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING HELD A SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE REVIEW OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE IN FEBRUARY 1972. IN ADDITION, THEY DISCUSSED A BROAD RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS OF COMMON CONCERN, AND REVIEWED THE PROSPECTS FOR EVOLUTION OF A MORE JUST AND SECURE WORLD ORDER. THE LEADERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES AGREED THAT THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN STRENGTHENING THEIR RELATIONSHIP DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS BENEFITS NOT ONLY THEIR TWO COUNTRIES BUT THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AS WELL. THEY EMPHASIZED THAT THE CONSOLIDATION OF A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES REFLECTS THE COMMON DESIRES OF THE

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NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/3/10

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PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, WOULD NOT BE INIMICAL TO THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS, AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE EVOLUTION OF A MORE SECURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER. THE NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAS BECOME A DURABLE ELEMENT IN THE WORLD. THE TWO SIDES REAFFIRMED THE PRINCIPLES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR RELATIONS WHICH WERE FIRST EXPRESSED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. IN PARTICULAR, THEY REEMPHASIZED THAT ALL COUNTRIES, REGARDLESS OF THEIR SOCIAL SYSTEMS, SHOULD CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES, NON-AGGRESSION AGAINST OTHER STATES, NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES, EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT, AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, AND THAT INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES SHOULD BE SETTLED ON THIS BASIS, WITHOUT RESORTING TO THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY OF ALL STATES REGARDLESS OF SIZE OR SOCIAL SYSTEM. THEY REITERATED THEIR VIEW THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD SEEK HEGEMONY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION OR ANY OTHER PART OF THE WORLD. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT HEGEMONIC ACTIONS WHICH THREATEN THE INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF ANY NATION, WHATEVER THE SOURCE AND WHETHER IN THE EAST OR WEST, WOULD BE A CAUSE OF CONCERN AND SHOULD BE OPPOSED. THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT IN A WORLD OF CHANGE THERE MUST BE DIVERSE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, WHATEVER THEIR SOCIAL SYSTEMS, IN ORDER FOR THEIR PEOPLES TO MAINTAIN INDEPENDENCE AND MAKE PROGRESS. IN REVIEWING THE EAST ASIAN AREA, THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO REALIZE THEIR FUTURE PROGRESS AND SECURITY FREE FROM THE THREAT OF FORCE OR OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT POLITICAL PROCESSES TO BRING ABOUT THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES IN THE REGION. THE TWO SIDES REVIEWED THE SUBJECT OF NORMALIZING THEIR RELATIONS. THE CHINESE SIDE REITERATED THEIR VIEW IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, INCLUDING THE PROPOSITIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA, THAT TAIWAN IS A PROVINCE OF CHINA, AND THAT REUNIFICATION OF TAIWAN WITH CHINA IS CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIR. THE UNITED STATES SIDE, RECOGNIZING THAT ALL CHINESE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT MAINTAIN THAT THERE IS BUT ONE CHINA AND THAT TAIWAN IS PART OF CHINA, EXPRESSED ITS AGREEMENT WITH THAT VIEW. IN AFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE CHINA, THE UNITED STATES REITERATED ITS INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION BY THE CHINESE THEMSELVES. BOTH SIDES NOTED



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THE PROGRESS MADE TO DATE AND AGREED TO WORK TOWARD THE FULL NORMALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP. THE UNITED STATES SIDE REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ITS ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FROM TAIWAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS STATEMENT IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. IT NOTED THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD THIS GOAL IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS, AND EXPRESSED ITS INTENTION TO MAKE FURTHER WITHDRAWALS. THE TWO SIDES NOTED THE PERIODIC MEETINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD BETWEEN LEADERS OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN PEKING AND NEW YORK WHICH HAVE ENABLED THE TWO LEADERSHIPS TO CONDUCT CANDID AND WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGES ON ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST. THEY ALSO NOTED THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE LIAISON OFFICES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS, AND THE GREATER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED THROUGH THE GROWING PROGRAM OF CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES, AND TRADE CONTACTS. IN ORDER TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, THE TWO SIDES REACHED A NUMBER OF NEW AGREEMENTS: THE WORK OF THE TWO LIAISON OFFICES WILL BE FURTHER ENHANCED. IN ADDITION, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WAS REACHED TO ESTABLISH BRANCH LIAISON OFFICES IN SAN FRANCISCO AND CANTON. IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE TWO LEADERSHIPS TO MAINTAIN EVEN MORE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE CONTACT, IT WAS AGREED TO ESTABLISH MEANS OF DIRECT, INSTANTANEOUS COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. FINAL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUE OF PRIVATE CLAIMS AND BLOCKED ASSETS. IT WAS ALSO AGREED TO INITIATE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMERCIAL NAVIGATION TREATY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL AIR ROUTES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. IN ORDER TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND PUT TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON A MORE BALANCED BASIS, IT WAS ALSO AGREED TO FACILITATE THE HOLDING OF TRADE EXHIBITIONS, FIRST IN THE UNITED STATES AND LATER IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. THE TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED ON MEASURES WHICH WOULD FACILITATE THE REUNITING OF FAMILIES WHERE CITIZENS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE RELATIVES LIVING IN THE OTHER COUNTRY. IN ORDER TO DEEPEN THE FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS AND ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT, IT WAS AGREED TO EXPAND THE PROGRAM OF CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL, INDUSTRIAL, LEADERSHIP AND OTHER EXCHANGES. MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN IN THE COMING



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YEAR TO FACILITATE THE EXCHANGE OF STUDENTS FOR LANGUAGE STUDY IN THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES, AND TO ENCOURAGE THE PROMOTION OF GREATER SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION THROUGH JOINT RESEARCH ACTIVITY. IN ADDITION, A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WERE AGREED UPON FOR THE COMING YEAR.

BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED THAT DESPITE THE PROFOUND DIFFERENCES OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SYSTEM WHICH EXIST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, IT IS NONETHELESS POSSIBLE TO DEEPEN FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES, AND THAT MUTUAL EFFORTS WILL BE SUSTAINED TO COMPLETE THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE BASIS OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.

PRESIDENT FORD AND HIS PARTY EXPRESSED THEIR DEEP APPRECIATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR THE WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO THEM.

END TEXT

(2) VERY RESPECTFULLY.



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FM HENRY A. KISSINGER//HAKTO 22//

TO BRENT SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ NODIS VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING TO THE PRESIDENT.
BEGIN TEXT

(1) I MET WITH CHAIRMAN MAO FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS STARTING AT 1630 TUESDAY ON THE USUAL SHORT NOTICE. HE SENT HIS PERSONAL GREETINGS TO YOU AND LOOKS FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT. AS IN ALL PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS THE DOMINANT TOPIC WAS THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, PARTICULARLY THE SOVIET UNION.

(2) THE DISCUSSION WAS FRIENDLY AND WIDE-RANGING, AS THE CHINESE COMMUNIQUE SAYS, BUT FRANKLY IT WAS ALSO DISTURBING. I THINK IT BEST TO GIVE YOU A FIRST HAND RUN-DOWN AND APPRAISAL UPON MY RETURN, BUT IN ESSENCE THE CHAIRMAN STRESSED THE THEMES THAT VICE PREMIER TENG PRESENTED ON MONDAY AS I REPORTED THEM TO YOU, ONLY WITH MORE PROMINENT EMPHASIS. CLEARLY HE SEES OUR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AS EMASCULATING OUR STAYING POWER IN THE WORLD, THINKS WE ARE FLOUNDERING LARGELY AS A RESULT OF DOMESTIC WEAKNESSES, AND BELIEVES CHINA MUST RELY ON ITSELF. HE SEES EUROPE AS BEING PARTICULARLY SOFT AND JAPAN AS POTENTIALLY AGGRESSIVE. ONCE AGAIN HE WAS VERY RELAXED ABOUT TAIWAN, SPENDING ONLY A FEW SENTENCES ON AN ISSUE HE LABELLED AS CLEARLY SUBSIDIARY TO THE GLOBAL SITUATION. HE SAID THAT THE PRC COULD WAIT FOR SOME TIME TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM, WHILE SUGGESTING THAT FORCEFUL MEANS WOULD PROBABLY BE REQUIRED.

(3) I SPENT AN HOUR WITH TENG BEFORE THE MAO MEETING DURING WHICH HE INVITED MY VIEWS ON THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO. THIS IS OF CONCERN TO THEM, AND THEIR ANALYSIS AND PREFERENCES ARE VERY CLOSE TO OURS. WE HAD PASSED THE MORNING STROLLING AROUND THE FRAGRANT HILLS, WHICH ARE OUTSIDE OF PEKING, TINGED WITH AUTUMN RED AND DOTTED WITH

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NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By NR NAPA, Date 8/3/10



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TEMPLES. TENG HOSTED A CORDIAL AND SUMPTUOUS LUNCH.
(4) I MEET AGAIN WITH TENG WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON AT WHICH
TIME WE SHOULD GET THEIR REACTION TO OUR DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
FOR YOUR TRIP.
END TEXT
WARM REGARDS

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FM BUD MC FARLANE//HAKTO 23//

TO BRENT SCOWCROFT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: BUD MC FARLANE

(1) WITH REGARD TO LEVI PACKAGE GIVEN TO ME JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, ISSUES RAISED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL AS WELL AS OPPOSING VIEWS AND OPTIONS WERE PRESENTED IN LENGTHY MEMO TO SECRETARY.

(2) HAK APPROVED HYLAND PROPOSAL. THAT IS, DCI RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING TARGET RECOMMENDATIONS TO AG (AFTER COORDINATION WITH STATE AND DEFENSE). AUTHORITIES VALID FOR SIX MONTHS; AG RESPONSIBILITY LIMITED TO JUDGING LEGAL BUT NOT SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF RECOMMENDATION. CRITERIA TO REMAIN AS REFLECTED IN DECEMBER 19 MEMO I.E. INFORMATION NECESSARY TO THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS CONTINUES TO QUALIFY. HE DOES NOT ENDORSE ATTORNEY GENERAL GETTING INTO BUSINESS OF APPROVING. NSA ACTIVITIES -- DIRECT OR INDIRECT. FINALLY, SECRETARY WAS INDIFFERENT TO STUDY OF OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY A. G.

(3) IF IT WOULD BE OF ANY VALUE IN GETTING THESE VIEWS TO BUCHEN OR PRESIDENT, I WOULD BE PLEASED TO SEND TEXT OF MEMO HAK APPROVED.

(4) NEW SUBJECT: HAVE ANY IDEAS SURFACED ON C-130S FOR EGYPT?

(5) VERY RESPECTFULLY.

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NSC Guidelines
BY HR NLE DATE 3/4/09



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O 220130Z OCT 75
FM JERRY BREMER//HAKTO 24//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 22, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: MR. JERRY BREMER

1. THE SECRETARY DOES NOT SEE HOW WE CAN HANDLE THE RABIN VISIT DECEMBER 8-11, SINCE THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT BE RETURNING UNTIL THE SEVENTH, WHICH WOULD PUT THE ARRIVAL CEREMONY THE MORNING AFTER HIS RETURN. IN ADDITION, THE SECRETARY HAS TO LEAVE FOR BRUSSELS ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 10 AND GIVEN THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY, HE DOES NOT WANT RABIN TALKING AROUND TOWN WHEN HE IS NOT THERE.

2. THE SECRETARY AT FIRST SUGGESTED WE NOW JUST TELL THE ISRAELIS THEY WILL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL JANUARY. THIS HE THEN MODIFIED TO SAY YOU SHOULD OFFER THEM NOVEMBER 18-19.

3. HE ALSO ASKS YOU TO CHECK WITH DOBRYNIN ON WHETHER OR NOT NOVEMBER 14 IS ACCEPTABLE TO GROMYKO FOR THEIR MEETING. ALSO, WOULD IT BE IN GENEVA?

4. WARM REGARDS.

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By HR NARA, Date 8/3/10



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FM JERRY BREMER//HAKTO 25//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH~~

OCTOBER 22, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: JERRY BREMER

1. THE SECRETARY ASKED ME TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR HAKTO 12 ABOUT C-130'S FOR EGYPT. HE SAID WE SIMPLY HAVE TO FIND A WAY TO GIVE THEM, DESPITE THE OPPOSITION OF EVERYONE ELSE.
2. WARM REGARDS,

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SCOWCROFT, SEC FLE

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FM SECRETARY KISSINGER//HAKTO 26//

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/05, State Dept. Guidelines
By NR NARA, Date 8/3/10

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 22, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOCROFT
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

1. PLEASE SEND FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT VIA SPECIAL CHANNEL TO ENSURE DELIVERY TO HIM PERSONALLY.

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR HELMUT: I AM SENDING YOU THIS VERY PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PEKING BECAUSE I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE OF VALUE TO YOU IN MAKING YOUR FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR YOUR OWN VISIT HERE.

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF ANXIETY HERE ABOUT WHAT IS CONSIDERED A GROWING SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, ABOUT THEIR INTENTION IN ASIA AND DIRECTLY TOWARD CHINA. WHAT I FOUND ESPECIALLY DISTURBING IS A MISPERCEPTION OF WESTERN "DETENTE" POLICIES WHICH SEES THEM LARGELY AS POLICIES OF APPEASEMENT, BILATERAL CONCESSIONS AND WEAKENING DEFENSES, ALL SUPPOSEDLY WITH THE EFFECT OF GIVING THE SOVIETS AN IMPULSE TO AGGRESSION OR PRESSURE IN THE EAST. IT IS QUITE APPARENT THAT TO A LARGE EXTENT THIS ERRONEOUS CHINESE PERCEPTION OF OUR SOVIET POLICIES HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE CRITICS OF THESE POLICIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE PARLIAMENTS AND MEDIA AND BY THE VISITS HERE OF OPPOSITION POLITICIANS.

I HAVE TRIED, IN MY NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH MAO AND IN THE SEVERAL MORE HOURS WITH TENG, TO CORRECT THESE CHINESE VIEWS. I HAVE POINTED OUT THAT WE IN THE WEST ARE DETERMINED TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSION OR PRESSURE BUT THAT RECKLESS CONFRONTATION POLICIES ALONE CANNOT ACCOMPLISH THIS, IF ONLY BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO OUR PUBLIC. I HAVE EXPLAINED OUR STRATEGY AS ONE OF COMBINING STRENGTH AND INCENTIVES IN ORDER TO INDUCE RUSSIAN RESTRAINT. THIS REQUIRES



***** W H S R COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, SEC FLE

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THE USE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND VARIOUS FORMS OF BILATERAL INDUCEMENTS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME KEEPING OUR ALLIANCE STRONG AND REACTING VERY FIRMLY WHEN THE SOVIETS THREATEN TO INJURE OUR INTERESTS. I HAVE POINTED OUT THAT YOU ARE A LEADING PROTAGONIST OF A STRONG NATO AND A VIGOROUS EUROPEAN-ATLANTIC ASSOCIATION AND THAT YOU APPROACH EASTERN POLICY WITH NO ILLUSIONS BUT WITH REALISM. I HAVE ALSO TRIED TO CORRECT THE CHINESE VIEW THAT CSCE WAS A GREAT SOVIET VICTORY, NOTING THAT THE WEST GRANTED NOTHING THAT HAD NOT BEEN GRANTED EARLIER WHILE ACQUIRING SEVERAL MEANS OF PRESSURE VIS-A-VIS THE RUSSIANS.

I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO LAY OUT YOUR VIEWS ON EUROPEAN UNITY, NATO STRENGTH AND ATLANTIC COHESION AND TO STRESS THAT THE SO-CALLED DETENTE POLICIES ARE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ILLUSION TO SATISFY OUR POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS WHILE ENTANGLING THE RUSSIANS IN RELATIONSHIPS THAT WILL INHIBIT THEM IN THE EXPLOITATION OF THEIR POWER. IF YOU COULD ENDORSE PRESIDENT FORD'S AND MY APPROACH IN THIS CONTEXT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL. IT WOULD BE USEFUL ALSO IF YOU NOTED THAT MUCH OF WHAT THE CRITICS OF THE RIGHT SAY IS PURE RHETORIC WHICH, IF TRANSLATED INTO POLICY, WOULD QUICKLY PRODUCE PARALYSIS. THE CRITICS ON THE LEFT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD QUICKLY, IF THEY WERE IN POWER, UNDERMINE THE PRESENT AND FUTURE BALANCE OF POWER. I THINK THESE POINTS ARE IMPORTANT TO SHOW THE CHINESE THE DANGERS TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS IF THEY INJECTED THEMSELVES INTO OUR DOMESTIC ELECTION DEBATES NEXT YEAR WITH THEIR CURRENT "ANTI-DETENTE" LINE.

I WILL BE MOST INTERESTED IN YOUR OWN REACTIONS FROM YOUR VISIT AND LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN PARIS ON NOVEMBER 15.

3. WARM REGARDS.



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FM JERRY BREMER//HAKTO 27//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 22, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: JERRY BREMER

1. THE SECRETARY HAS REACTED TO A NUMBER OF YOUR MESSAGES.
2. ON TOHAK 34, ISRAEL COMSEC EQUIPMENT, HE WOULD LIKE YOU TO HOLD OFF DOING ANYTHING UNTIL HIS RETURN.
3. ON C-130'S FOR EGYPT (TOHAK 36), HE ASKS THAT YOU TEST THE WATERS WITH DEFENSE AS YOU SUGGEST IN PARAGRAPH FOUR.
4. ON TOHAK 37, THE VICE PRESIDENT SHOULD ATTEND THE FRANCO FUNERAL. HE HAS NO PROBLEM WITH ELLSWORTH FOR THE AIR FORCE JOB.
5. ON ISRAELI ARMS ISSUES, (TOHAK 39), HE WANTS TO BE SURE THAT WHEN YOU GET SOME OF THE ITEMS RELEASED, WE GET CREDIT FOR IT. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE CALL DINITZ WHEN YOU HAVE THEM RELEASED SO THAT HE KNOWS WHO DID IT.
6. WARM REGARDS.

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***** W H S R COMMENT *****

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TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

TITLE HAKTO 28

CREATION DATE 10/22/1975

VOLUME 14 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900310

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER 21

FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - HAKTO (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/07/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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FM PETER RODMAN//HAKTO 29//

TO KATHLEEN TROIA

UNCLAS VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 22, 1975

TO: KATHLEEN TROIA
FROM: PETER RODMAN
REFS: TOHAK 35, HAKTO 20

1. PLEASE ACCEPT HOUGHTON DINNER FOR ME. TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED.
2. I FOUND A BROOCH.
3. HOT REGARDS.



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SECFILE, TROIA

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DE NYE34 #0027 2952011
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FM PAUL BARBIAN//NAKTO 30//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 23, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: PAUL BARBIAN
REF: TONAK 43

SECRETARY ASKS THAT YOU DELAY ANY FURTHER ACTION ON THE RAKIN VISIT UNTIL SECRETARY RETURNS TO WASHINGTON. REGARDS.
#0027

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*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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FM SECRETARY KISSINGER

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

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By NR NARA, Date 8/3/10

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

HAKTO 31

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. BEGIN TEXT: ON WEDNESDAY, AFTER SIGHTSEEING IN THE MORNING, A DESULTORY HOUR AND A QUARTER MEETING WITH TENG HSIAO-PING IN THE AFTERNOON, AND OUR RETURN BANQUET WITH MUTUALLY BRIEF, BLAND TOASTS, WE FINALLY WERE GIVEN THE CHINESE REACTION TO OUR DRAFT COMMUNIQUE FOR YOUR VISIT, THEY SUBMITTED THEIR COUNTERDRAFT WHICH BEARS ABSOLUTELY NO RESEMBLANCE TO OUR VERSION AND IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE, THE FULL TEXT IS ATTACHED AT THE END OF THIS CABLE.

3. THE DRAFT WE GAVE THEM CONTAINED SEVERAL COMMON PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, A HALF STEP FORWARD ON NORMALIZATION CONFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE CHINA, AND CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN VARIOUS FIELDS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, SUCH AS TRADE, EXCHANGE, BRANCH LIAISON OFFICES, AND A HOT LINE. WE EXPECT THEM TO WHITTLE DOWN THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND INSERT SOME UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES. WHAT THEY HAVE GIVEN US, HOWEVER, CONSTITUTES NOT ONLY NO FORWARD MOVEMENT, BUT RETROGRESSION FROM THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. A DOCUMENT OF THIS SORT WOULD BE TORN APART BY OUR CRITICS AND CONFUSE OUR FRIENDS. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU TO COME HERE TO SIGN A DOCUMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THEIR DRAFT.

4. IN ADDITION TO THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THEIR DRAFT WAS THE FACT THAT THEY WAITED UNTIL THE VERY LAST MOMENT TO GIVE IT TO US. WE GAVE THEM OUR VERSION ON MONDAY AND THEY RESPONDED AT 11:30 P.M. ON THE EVE OF MY DEPARTURE ON



*****HHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SEC FLE

PSN:049913

PAGE 01

TOR:296/04:08Z

WEDNESDAY NIGHT. THIS GAVE US NO TIME FOR MEANINGFUL EXCHANGE ON THE DOCUMENTS EVEN THOUGH THEY KNEW THEIR DRAFT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US, AND WE HAD FOREWARNED THEM WEEKS IN ADVANCE THAT WE WISHED TO ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE THE DRAFTING OF THE COMMUNIQUE ON MY VISIT.

5. THEREFORE, I IMMEDIATELY CALLED A MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WEDNESDAY NIGHT TO TELL THEM THAT THEIR COMMUNIQUE, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY PRESENTED IT TO US, WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AND THAT WE EXPECTED THEM TO COME UP WITH A MORE REASONABLE BASIS FOR YOUR VISIT IF WE WERE TO PROCEED. I EMPHASIZED THAT THEIR APPROACH WAS HEAVILY OVER-WEIGHTED WITH CONTENTIOUS LANGUAGE AND DISAGREEMENTS, AND WAS VERY LIGHT ON PROGRESS AND COMMON VIEWS. SUCH A DOCUMENT WAS IN NEITHER SIDE'S INTEREST. IN ANY EVENT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD NEVER UNDERSTAND WHY A U.S. PRESIDENT HAD TRAVELED 8000 MILES FOR SUCH AN OUTCOME.

6. CHIAO AT FIRST TOOK A VERY FIRM LINE, SAYING THAT OUR DRAFT WAS EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM. IT COVERED UP OUR DIFFERENCES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; REPRESENTED ONLY INFINITESIMAL PROGRESS ON TAIWAN; AND WAS UNREALISTICALLY AMBITIOUS ON BILATERAL AGREEMENTS GIVEN THE NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. HE AT FIRST SAID THAT WE HAD TO ACCEPT THEIR DRAFT OR DO WITHOUT A COMMUNIQUE. IN ANY EVENT THEY DIDN'T THINK A COMMUNIQUE WAS IMPORTANT AND WOULD BE READY TO DISPENSE WITH ONE.

7. I MADE CLEAR THAT THERE HAD TO BE A COMMUNIQUE AND THAT IT COULD NOT LOOK ANYTHING LIKE THEIRS. AFTER FURTHER EXCHANGES, DURING WHICH I QUESTIONED THE PURPOSE OF YOUR COMING, CHIAO SWUNG AROUND TO THE POSITION THAT WHILE THEY ABSOLUTELY MUST MAINTAIN THEIR STRUCTURE, I.E. EACH SIDE STATING THEIR DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES FOLLOWED BY AREAS OF COMMONALITY, THE ACTUAL WORDING AND BALANCE OF THE DOCUMENT WAS OPEN TO CHANGE. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE GREAT IMBALANCE BETWEEN DIFFERENCES AND AGREEMENTS IN THEIR DRAFT HAD TO BE RIGHTED. WE AGREED THAT WE WOULD SUBMIT A COUNTER-DRAFT THROUGH AMBASSADOR BUSH EARLY NEXT WEEK AND MEANWHILE WOULD HOLD THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DATES OF YOUR VISIT IN ABEYANCE. I CLEARLY FORESHADOWED WHAT WE WILL DO TO THEIR DOCUMENT--BOIL DOWN THE QUANTITY AND AGGRESSIVENESS OF THEIR POSITIONS; ADD THE US VIEWPOINTS; AND BEEFUP THE AREAS OF CONSENSUS AND BILATERAL MOVEMENT.

8. I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT WE ARE IN FOR ANYTHING BUT A TOUGH PROCESS IN ORDER TO GET WHAT AT BEST WILL BE A MINIMUM COMMUNIQUE. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD USE OUR COUNTERDRAFT



NEXT WEEK TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE WILLING TO SETTLE FOR SOMETHING THAT WILL JUSTIFY YOUR TRIP. DESPITE INEVITABLE PUBLIC SPECULATION, I DON'T BELIEVE WE SHOULD ANNOUNCE THE DATES OF YOUR TRIP UNTIL WE ARE CLEAR ON THE BASIC OUTLINES OF THE COMMUNIQUE. AT BEST THERE WILL STILL BE SOME HARD BARGAINING HERE DURING YOUR VISIT. YOU MAY EVEN BE FORCED TO CONSIDER POSTPONING YOUR TRIP IF THE CHINESE DO NOT IMPROVE THE COMMUNIQUE. WE CAN DECIDE THIS AFTER SEEING THEIR RESPONSE TO OUR NEXT DRAFT.

9. WORKING IN FAVOR IS THE FACT THAT IT CANNOT BE IN THE CHINESE INTEREST TO HAVE OUR RELATIONSHIP GO PUBLICLY SOUR. THIS WOULD ONLY EXPOSE THEM FURTHER TO THE SOVIET UNION, ABOUT WHICH THEY ARE GENUINELY CONCERNED. THEY HAVE CONTINUALLY MADE IT CLEAR, AND REPEATED TONIGHT, THAT YOU ARE WELCOME WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A MEETING OF THE MINDS OR COMMUNIQUE. WORKING AGAINST US IS THEIR PERCEPTION THAT OUR DOMESTIC WEAKNESS HAVE US FLOUNDERING AND WE ARE THEREFORE LESS USEFUL AS A BALANCE IN THE WORLD; THEIR OWN DOMESTIC PRE-SUCCESSION IMMOBILITY; THE FACT THAT TENG DOESN'T HAVE THE SCOPE OR FLEXIBILITY OF CHOU; THEIR POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS WHEN WE ARE AT THIS STAGE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS; AND THEIR APPARENT FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE MUST SHOW SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR OUR CHINA POLICY.

10. WE WILL WORK ON OUR COUNTERDRAFT ON THE WAY HOME, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING OUR STRATEGY WITH YOU UPON MY RETURN. END TEXT.

11. BEGIN TEXT:

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VISITED THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AT THE INVITATION OF PREMIER CHOW EN-LAI OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM DECEMBER 1 THROUGH DECEMBER 6, 1975. ACCOMPANYING THE PRESIDENT WERE MRS. FORD, SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER, AND OTHER AMERICAN OFFICIALS.

.....
DURING THE VISIT, THE LEADERS OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HELD A SERIOUS REVIEW OF THE TURBULENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND EXPOUNDED THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AND VIEWS. THE TWO SIDES ALSO HAD A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON SINO-U.-S. RELATIONS AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF COMMON INTEREST. THE CHINESE SIDE STATED: THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS CHARACTERIZED BY GREAT DISORDER UNDER HEAVEN, AND THE SITUATION IS EXCELLENT. ALL THE BASIC CONTRADICTIONS



IN THE WORLD ARE SHARPENING. THE FACTORS FOR REVOLUTION AND WAR ARE BOTH INCREASING. COUNTRIES WANT INDEPENDENCE, NATIONS WANT LIBERATION AND THE PEOPLE WANT REVOLUTION-- THIS TORRENTIAL TIDE OF OUR TIME IS RISING EVER HIGHER. THE PEOPLES OF THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE WON A SERIES OF SIGNIFICANT VICTORIES IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST COLONIALISM, IMPERIALISM AND HEGEMONISM. THE CONTENTION BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS FOR WORLD HEGEMONY HAS BECOME EVER MORE INTENSE. THERE IS NO LASTING PEACE IN THE WORLD. THERE DEFINITELY DOES NOT EXIST AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS OF DETENTE; INSTEAD, THE DANGER OF A NEW WORLD WAR IS MOUNTING. THIS HAS BEEN BORNE OUT EVER MORE CLEARLY BY OBJECTIVE REALITY. THE DANGER OF WAR COMES MAINLY FROM SOCIAL-IMPERIALISM. PEOPLE OF ALL COUNTRIES MUST GET PREPARED AGAINST WAR. WITHOUT PREPARATION ONE WILL SUFFER. IT IS CHINA'S FUNDAMENTAL POLICY TO DIG TUNNELS DEEP, STORE GRAIN EVERYWHERE AND NEVER SEEK HEGEMONY, AND TO PERSIST IN INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-RELIANCE. AS ALWAYS, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WILL FIRMLY SUPPORT THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES OF THE PEOPLE OF ALL COUNTRIES.

THE U. S. SIDE STATED

BOTH THE CHINESE AND U.S. SIDES REAFFIRMED THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. THEY MAINTAINED THAT THEY SHOULD CONDUCT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION, NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT, AND PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. IN PARTICULAR, THEY STATED THAT NEITHER SHOULD SEEK HEGEMONY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION OR ANY OTHER PART OF THE WORLD AND THAT EACH IS OPPOSED TO EFFORTS BY ANY OTHER COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH SUCH HEGEMONY.

BOTH THE CHINESE AND U.S. SIDES POINTED OUT THAT SINCE THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, THERE HAS BEEN A GROWTH IN THE EXCHANGES AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IT CONFORMS TO THE COMMON DESIRE OF THE PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES TO REALIZE THE NORMALIZATION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE CHINESE SIDE REAFFIRMED: THE TAIWAN ISSUE IS THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OBSTRUCTING THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES; THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES.

THE CHINESE SIDE REAFFIRMED: THE TAIWAN ISSUE IS THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OBSTRUCTING THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES; THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA; TAIWAN IS A PROVINCE OF CHINA WHICH



HAS LONG BEEN RETURNED TO THE MOTHERLAND; THE CHINESE PEOPLE ARE DETERMINED TO LIBERATE TAIWAN, AND WHEN AND HOW THE CHINESE PEOPLE LIBERATE TAIWAN IS ENTIRELY CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIR IN WHICH NO COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FIRMLY OPPOSES ANY ACTIVITIES WHICH AIM AT THE CREATION OF "ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN", "ONE CHINA, TWO GOVERNMENTS", "TWO CHINA", AN "INDEPENDENT TAIWAN", OR ADVOCATE THAT "THE STATUS OF TAIWAN REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED". THE CHINESE SIDE EMPHASIZED THAT THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES CAN BE REALIZED ONLY WHEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SEVERS ITS SO-CALLED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE TAIWAN "REGIME", WITHDRAWS ALL U.S. ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FROM TAIWAN AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA, AND ABROGATES THE U.S.-CHIANG "JOINT DEFENSE TREATY".

THE UNITED STATES SIDE STATED:

THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN SUCH FIELDS AS SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, SPORTS AND JOURNALISM WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND FRIENDSHIP. BOTH SIDES WILL FACILITATE THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES.

BOTH SIDES MAINTAINED THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE TWO PEOPLES TO DEVELOP BILATERAL TRADE STEP BY STEP ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT. THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE TO FACILITATE SUCH TRADE.

PRESIDENT FORD AND HIS PARTY EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR THE HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO THEM.



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FM JERRY BREMER

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT HAKTO 32

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

HAKTO32

1. THE SECRETARY BELIEVES THE ISSUE OF COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON OCEAN SURVEILLANCE (TOHAK37, NSC#6101) SHOULD GO TO THE PRESIDENT WITH A RECOMMENDATION THAT WE TURN IT DOWN.

2. WARM REGARDS
GRNC

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines *12/9/03*

By HR NARA, Date 8/3/10



*****HHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SEC FLE

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OO WTE
DE WTES3 #0040 2960420
FM GEORGE BUSH

TO BRENT SCOWCROFT

HAKTO 33

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By NR NARA, Date 8/3/10

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

HAKTO 33

WHILE THE SECRETARY WAS HERE HE AND I HAD A GOOD TALK ABOUT THE ADVANCE PARTY AND THE NEED FOR SENSITIVITY BECAUSE OF OUR UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP. HE URGED ME TO TAKE PERSONAL OVERSIGHT INTEREST IN ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS. WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH ADVANCE THIS IS WHAT I INTEND TO DO. I TOTALLY AGREE WITH THE SECRETARY THAT THE ADVANCE PARTY BE AS THOUGHTFUL AS POSSIBLE AND THAT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING THEY HAVE REAL UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE OTHER PLACES THE PRESIDENT HAS VISITED.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE SECRETARY THIS TIME, WITH THE SECRETARY BEING FIRST OFF THE PLANE WAS, I AM SURE, FAVORABLY NOTED BY THE CHINESE HOSTS. IT WAS GOOD.

I WILL HAVE AN EARLY VISIT WITH WHOEVER HEADS UP THE ADVANCE PARTY WHENEVER HE ARRIVES IN PEKING; BUT IT WOULD BE OF GREAT ADVANTAGE IN ASSURING THE SUCCESS OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IF (A) THEY COULD BE FULLY BRIEFED BY DICK SOLOMON OR SOMEONE IN HOW CHINESE SECURITY AND PROTOCOL WORKS AND (B) IF THEY WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO SUGGESTIONS FROM USLO ALONG THESE LINES.

I DO NOT WANT TO INTERFERE IN THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY, BUT I DO WANT OUR PEOPLE TO BE PARTICULARLY AMENABLE TO SUGGESTIONS FROM THE CHINESE SIDE AND FORM USLO.

THE SIZE OF THE ADVANCE WAS DISCUSSED HERE. I STRONGLY URGE AS SMALL AN ADVANCE PARTY AS POSSIBLE.

LASTLY, IN PEKING IN NOV, 1974 I SUGGESTED TO RUMSFELD THAT WE COULD USE A WHITE HOUSE PERSON HERE TO HELP OUT BETWEEN THE KISSINGER AND FORD VISITS. THIS PERSON WOULD WORK FOR ME. HELP COORDINATE WHILE THE ADVANCE IS HERE, TAKE ON ADDITIONAL TYPING AND OTHER CHORE WORKLOAD. I SUGGESTED CAROL PATRICK THERE AT THE WHITE HOUSE, FORMER ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO TOM COLE WHO IS IN BETWEEN JOBS THERE ON THE WHITE HOUSE

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SEC FLE

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STAFF. SHE COULD STAY WITH HER FRIEND WHO IS MY STAFF AIDE
AT NO COST. THERE MAY BE MANY VALID REASONS FROM THAT END WHY THIS
GIRL IS UNAVAILABLE., BUT I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE HER
OUT HERE ON TDY IF POSSIBLE. NO PRESSURE ON THIS ONE BUT
WE WILL NEED SOME EXTRA HELP AND IT MAKES SENSE TO HAVE IT
COME, AT LEAST IN THIS INSTANCE, FROM THE WHITE HOUSE SIDE
PARTICULARLY IF ADVANCE PEOPLE KNOW HER AND FEEL SHE IS
COMPETENT. I WON'T BOTHER ANY OF YOU WITH THIS AGAIN.

THANKS AND WARM REGARDS.

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FM JERRY BREMER

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT IMMEDIATE HAKTO 34

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

1. THE SECRETARY APPROVES THE STATEMENT PROPOSED IN YOUR TOHAK 46.
2. HE FINDS YOUR ARGUMENT ABOUT THE INADEQUACY OF MAW'S MEMO (TOHAK48) CONVINCING AND WOULD LIKE YOU TO SEND THE MEMO BACK TO MAW AND HAVE IT REVISED ALONG THE LINES YOU SUGGEST TO MAKE IT GOOD ENOUGH.
3. HE CONCURS IN A CALL BY THE DANISH PRIME MINISTER ON THE PRESIDENT.
4. WARM REGARDS.
GRNC

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NASA, Date 8/3/10

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SEC FLE

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PM THE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By NR NARA, Date 8/3/10
State Review 12/9/03

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT IMMEDIATE HAKTO 35

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

1. AKINS TELEGRAM ON SAUDI ARMS (JEDDA 7078) IS OUTRAGEOUS AND COMPLETELY AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT I SAID, AS REPORTED IN ATHERTON'S VERBATIM MEMCON. IT IS GUARANTEED TO CAUSE US SEVERE PROBLEMS WITH THE SAUDIS. I WANT YOU TO CONSULT WITH SISCO AND DOD ON HOW TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE HE HAS CAUSED.

2. YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CALL WICKHAM, TELL HIM AKINS VERSION OF MY TALKS IS ERRONEOUS AND THE ATHERTON LETTER IS CORRECT. TELL HIM I AM AWARE OF AND GREATLY APPRECIATE THE EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS DOD, AND ESPECIALLY BILL CLEMENTS, MADE IN GETTING THE ACCELERATED DELIVERY SCHEDULES WHICH I GAVE TO THE SAUDIS AND WHICH ARE REFLECTED IN THE ATHERTON LETTER. ASK HIM TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE DOD OFFICIALS ARE AWARE OF THIS BUT THAT THOSE IN CONTACT WITH THE SAUDIS, PARTICULARLY THE CHIEFS OF THE MAAG IN JIDDA AND THE MILITARY TRAINING MISSION IN DHAHRAN, ARE INSTRUCTED NOT TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF DELIVERY SCHEDULES WITH THE SAUDIS OR WITH AKINS.

3. TELL SISCO I WANT HIM TO INSTRUCT AKINS NOT TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT FURTHER WITH THE SAUDIS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES OR IN ANY WAY. AKINS SHOULD BE TOLD THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING SENDING A HIGH LEVEL TEAM FROM WASHINGTON TO CLEAR UP ANY DELIVERY SCHEDULE PROBLEMS. HE WILL RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS TO DATES.

4. WHEN I GET BACK, I WILL WANT TO CONSULT WITH SISCO AND CLEMENTS ON HOW BEST TO CLEAN UP THE LATEST MESS AKINS HAS MADE. MY PRESENT INCLINATION IS TO SEND ATHERTON (WHO TOOK THE NOTES AT MY TALK ON ARMS IN TAIF)

***** WWSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, SEC FLE



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WITH ELLSWORTH OR SOME OTHER SUITABLE DOD REPRESENTATIVE TO SAUDI ARABIA AS SOON AS THE SADAT VISIT IS OVER. THEY COULD REVIEW THE RECORD OF OUR ARMS RELATIONSHIP, POINT OUT JUST WHAT EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE TO ESTABLISH THE DELIVERY SCHEDULES I PASSED TO THE SAUDIS AT TAIF, AND EXPLAIN WHY WE CANNOT POSSIBLY DO ANY BETTER WITHOUT DRAWING HEAVILY ON OUR OWN INVENTORIES (WHICH THE PRESIDENT WAS UNWILLING TO DO EVEN FOR THE ISRAELIS). OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO CLEAR AWAY ALL MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREE UPON A FIRM, WRITTEN DELIVERY SCHEDULE. ATHERTON COULD ALSO USE THE OCCASION TO BRIEF THE SAUDIS ON THE SADAT VISIT AND FUTURE STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. IF YOU THINK THIS MAKES SENSE, YOU CAN PASS IT TO SISCO AND ASK HIM TO TAKE PRELIMINARY SOUNDINGS WITH CLEMENTS.

5. WARM REGARDS.
GRNC

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FM THE SECRETARY//HAKTO 136//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 23, LOU

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: THE SECRETARY

1. I HAVE REFLECTED FURTHER ON THE RABIN DATES. I KNOW THAT NOV. 18 AND 19 ARE FAR FROM IDEAL, BUT THEY ARE CERTAINLY BETTER THAN DEC 8-9, ESPECIALLY SINCE I AM NOW THINKING THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE STOPS IN INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES AFTER CHINA.

2. PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS BEFORE APPROACHING THE ISRAELIS.

3. WARM REGARDS,

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By LR NARA, Date 8/3/10

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SEC FLE

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WITHDRAWAL ID 031235

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

TITLE HAKTO 37

CREATION DATE 10/23/1975

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . . 035900310

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER 21

FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - HAKTO (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/07/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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DE WTE34 #0030 2970317
O 240315Z 75
FM PAUL BARBIAN// HAKTO 38//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
BOB HORMATS

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 24, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND ROBERT HORMATS
FROM: PAUL BARBIAN
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO ZARB
REF: TONAK 52

(1) SECRETARY APPROVES MESSAGE TO ZARB CONTAINED IN REFTEL. GENERAL SCOWCROFT, PLEASE TRANSMIT MESSAGE TO ZARB. IN ADDITION, SECRETARY WANTS ENDERS TO CALL ZARB TO MAKE SAME POINTS, AND ASK ZARB TO DELAY ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD THREATEN MSP UNTIL SECRETARY RETURNS.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By LR NARA, Date 8/3/10

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

SCOWCROFT, SECFILE (NOT PASSED TO HORMATS)

PSN:051231 RECALLED OF 01 TOR:296/03:342 DTG:240315Z OCT 75
PAGE 01

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FM THE SECRETARY//HAKTO 30//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 24, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT.
2. BEGIN TEXT: I AM DISTURBED AT THE CONTINUING FLOOD OF PRESS REPORTS THAT THE CHINESE AND WE QUARRELLED VIGOROUSLY ABOUT DETENTE. THE IMPETUS FOR MOST OF THESE STORIES APPEARS TO BE A SINGLE FABRICATED VERSION OF MY MEETING WITH MAO TUESDAY NIGHT, ON TOP OF CHIAO'S TOAST THE FIRST NIGHT. OTHER PRESS AGENCIES HAVE PICKED UP AND MAGNIFIED THIS THEME.
3. AS YOU KNOW FROM MY SUMMARY REPORTS OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE CHINESE, WE DID NOT HAVE BITTER ARGUMENTS OVER DETENTE. OBVIOUSLY, THE CHINESE WOULD LIKE DETENTE TO FALL APART; OUR MOVING INTO CONFRONTATION WITH MOSCOW WOULD EASE MANY OF PEKING'S PROBLEMS. IN ANY EVENT THEY WANT TO WARN THE WEST ABOUT SOVIET AGGRESSIVE DESIGN AND PLAY UP THE LINE THAT WAR IS PROBABLE. BUT OUR TALKS WERE FRIENDLY AND WE DID NOT HAVE THE BRAWL THE PRESS SUGGESTS. AT THE SAME TIME THERE WERE DISTURBING ELEMENTS AND WE DO INDEED HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE CHINESE, AS I SAID IN MY EARLIER REPORTS, I THINK THEY DERIVE MAINLY FROM THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT THAT WE HAVE BEEN WEAKENED OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. THEIR MAJOR CONCERN IS THAT WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS OUR DOMESTIC WEAKNESS WILL BE TRANSLATED INTO IRRESOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. AND THEY FEAR THAT AMERICAN WEAKNESS ABROAD WILL ENCOURAGE SOVIET ADVENTURISM.
4. I WILL MAKE SOME MORE PRECISE PROPOSALS AS TO THE SCHEDULE OF YOUR ASIAN TRIP WHEN I GET BACK. HOWEVER, MY PRELIMINARY VIEW NOW IS THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO RESURRECT THE IDEA OF YOU VISITING THE PHILLIPINES AND INDONESIA AND

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, SECFILE

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By 1JR NARA, Date 8/3/10



IF NECESSARY CUT A DAY OFF YOUR CHINA TRIP. END TEXT

3. WARM REGARDS.



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FM THE SECRETARY//HAKTO 40//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 24, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: THE SECRETARY

1. THE JAPANESE HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY WILL WANT US TO STOP AT HANEDA FOR REFUELING AND NOT AT ANY MILITARY AIRPORT IN JAPAN. HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT WANT ANY DISCUSSION OF THIS YET SO I JUST PROVIDE THIS FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
2. FOR REASONS WHICH I WILL GO INTO IN MORE DETAIL AFTER MY RETURN, I THINK WE WILL PROBABLY CUT BACK THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA AND ADD ON THE END OF IT STOPS IN THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA WOULD YOU PLEASE GET URGENTLY, BY THE TIME I RETURN, FLYING TIMES AND TIME CHANGES BETWEEN PEKING AND MANILA, MANILA AND JAKARTA, JAKARTA AND THE UNITED STATES.
3. THIS MAY MEAN TAGGING AN EXTRA DAY ONTO THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP.
4. LENGTHENING THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP WILL IN TURN MAKE A RABIN VISIT DECEMBER 8 AND 9 IMPOSSIBLE. THEREFORE, I WANT YOU URGENTLY TO FIND OUT IF RABIN CAN COME ON NOVEMBER 18-19. PLEASE ASK FOR AN ANSWER IN TIME FOR MY RETURN TODAY.
5. WARM REGARDS,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 2.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By HR NARA, Date 8/3/10

***** W H S R COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, SECFILE

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FM HENRY A. KISSINGER

TO BRENT SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE HAKTO 041

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT.
BEGIN TEST

1. I HELD VERY PRODUCTIVE AND RELAXED DISCUSSIONS WITH TOP JAPANESE LEADERS DURING MY 24 HOUR VISIT AFTER CHINA. THE INCREASING EASE AND CORDIALITY OF OUR TALKS WITH THE JAPANESE REFLECT THE SOLID STATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. I SAW PRIME MINISTER MIKI AT A WORKING BREAKFAST FRIDAY AND FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA AT A WORKING DINNER THURSDAY EVENING. IN ADDITION I MET WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA AND FINANCE MINISTER OHIRA SINCE THEY ARE THE PRIME CANDIDATES JOCKEYING TO BE THE NEXT PRIME MINISTER; EITHER ONE WOULD BE WELL DISPOSED TOWARD THE U.S. ALL THE JAPANESE AGAIN STRESSED THEIR GREAT SATISFACTION AND APPRECIATION FOR THE SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO THE U.S. OF THEIR MAJESTIES. WE AGREED THAT THIS EVENT PLUS YOUR VISIT TO JAPAN HAD GREATLY STRENGTHENED BI-LATERAL RELATIONS. THE MAIN THEMES OF MY DISCUSSIONS WERE CHINA, KOREA, AND THE FORTH-COMING ECONOMIC SUMMIT.

2. BOTH MIYAZAWA AND MIKI EXPRESSED INTENSE INTEREST IN CHINA AND ASKED ME A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT MY TRIP AND YOUR TRIP, AS WELL AS CHINESE POLICIES AND DOMESTIC SITUATION. I KNOWCKED DOWN THE PRESS STORIES THAT THE CHINESE AND I HAD QUARRELED ABOUT DETENTE, A DISTORTION ABOUT WHICH I WROTE YOU IN A SEPERATE REPORT. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE DO NOT ASK PEKING FOR ITS APPROVAL OF OUR POLICIES TOWARD OTHERS, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, ANYMORE THAN WE ASK MOSCOW'S APPROVAL. I POINTED OUT THAT, OF COURSE, PEKING WOULD LIKE TO SEE US IN A CONFRONTATION IT UZHE RUSSIANS, AIJ THAT THE CHINESE WERE TRYING TO ALERT THE WEST GENERALLY TO SOVIET DESIGNS, BUT WE WOULD PURSUE THE POLICIES WE THOUGHT WERE IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. I SAID THAT AS USUAL MY DISCUSSIONS IN PEKING CENTERED ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION RATHER THAN BI-LATFRF ISSUES OR TAIWAN I INDICATED

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SDO, SECFL

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *HR* NARA, Date *8/3/10*



THAT WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY SPECTACULAR DEVELOPMENTS ON YOUR TRIP; THE JAPANESE ARE ALWAYS PLEASED TO HEAR THIS SINCE THEY DO NOT WISH TO SEE US OUTPACING THEM IN IN RELATION TO PEKING. I SAID THAT WE HAD NOT SPECIAL INTEREST IN MOVING RAPIDLY ON TAIWAN BUT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD NORMALIZATION. IN RESPONSE TO THEIR QUERIES, I GAVE MY IMPRESSIONS OF MAO AND VICE PREMIER TENG, AND SAID THAT WE KNEW VERY LITTLE ABOUT CHINESE POLICIES OR THEIR DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. THE JAPANESE SAID THAT THEY AND THE CHINESE ARE STUDYING THEIR POSITIONS ON THE HEGEMONY QUESTION WITH RESPECT TO A PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY, IN THE WAKE OF THE LENGTHY TALKS BETWEEN THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK.

3 THE JAPANESE ALSO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN KOREA. I TOLD THEM THAT THIS SUBJECT ONLY CAME UP BRIEFLY WITH THE CHINESE, AND THAT PEKING WAS NOT PRESSING US NOR DID IT SEEM EAGER TO GET INVOLVED IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH KOREA. MY PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WITH THE JAPANESE WAS TO COOL OFF THEIR EFFORTS, FOR THEIR OWN DOMESTIC REASONS,

TO PROMOTE DIRECT TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA, EITHER BY US OR BY THEMSELVES. I SAID THAT SOUTH KOREA MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY DISCUSSIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE PENINSULA, BUT OTHERWISE WE ARE FLEXIBLE ON THE NUMBERS AND MAKEUP OF ANY FORUM. THIS CAMPAIGN IN JAPAN HAS DISQUITED AND ANNOYED PRESIDENT PARK. I SENT ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB TO SEOUL THURSDAY EVENING TO BRIEF PARK ON OUR TALKS IN PEKING, AND TO CONSULT WITH HIM ON OUR POLICIES AFTER THE UNITED NATIONS DEBATE. PARK WAS ESPECIALLY GRATEFUL FOR OUR THOUGHTFULNESS IN KEEPING HIM INFORMED. HE KNOWS HE FACES A TOUGH FIGHT AT THE UN THIS NEXT WEEK AND APPRECIATES OUR ALL-OUT SUPPORT. HE IS LOOKING FOR A BETTER WAY TO DEAL WITH NORTH KOREA THAN ANNUAL DEBATES AT THE UN. HE RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO THE IDEA OF OUR WORKING MORE DIRECTLY TO GETTING THE NORTH TO AGREE TO MEETINGS INCLUDING THE SOUTH AFTER WE GET THROUGH THE CURRENT DEBATE.

4. THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN FRANCE WAS A PRINCIPAL SUBJECT WITH MIKI. HE LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING YOU THERE. WE AGREED TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON OUR APPROACH TO THE SUMMIT AND I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE ANY SURPRISES FOR THE JAPANESE. I EXPLAINED THAT OUR OWN PREPARATIONS WERE STILL IN A PRELIMINARY STAGE. I AGREED WITH HIM THAT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT MAJOR CONCRETE DECISIONS, BUT THAT WE SHOULD WORK HARD TO MAKE THIS NEW DEPARTURE A SUCCESS. WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD PROBABLY TRY TO WORK OUT A COMMUNIQUE, A PROCESS WHICH COULD CONSUME ALL OUR ENERGIES. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT INSTEAD LOOK TOWARD AGREED PRINCIPLES, AND I WAS NON-COMMITTAL SINCE EVEN THIS MIGHT PROVE DIFFICULT. WE BRIEFLY REVIEWED THE AGENDA FOR THE SUMMIT. MIKI EXPRESSED PERSONAL INTEREST IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS. BOTH HE AND OHIRA SUGGESTED THAT THE SUMMIT MIGHT FOCUS ON AN EARNINGS STABILIZATION

State Review
7/1/03



SCHEME FOR THE LDC'S FOLLOWING UP OUR IMF INITIATIVE AT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

5. THESE WERE THE PRIMARY TOPICS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO RECONFIRMED JAPANESE CONCERN ABOUT ANY UNILATERAL LEGISLATION ON THE 200 MILE FISHING ISSUE. I SAID THAT WE WERE OPPOSED TO SUCH LEGISLATION, BUT NOTED THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS. THE JAPANESE ALSO EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION OVER THE NEW FRIENDSHIP AGREEMENT WHICH YOU SIGNED THIS WEEK.

END TEXT
WARM REGARDS
GRNC
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TO LES JANKA DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS FRIDAY HAKT0042

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS FRIDAY

(1) REGARDING FRIEDERSDOR'S INQUIRY ABOUT THE STATE OF CONGRESSMAN BROWN'S CHINA TRIP, YOU CAN PASS THE FOLLOWING TO MAX TO BE COVERED TO BROWN:

(2) BUSH TOLD US WHILE WE WERE IN PEKING THAT HE HAD REPLIED TO BROWN'S REQUEST FOR A VISIT BY INDICATING THAT THE ONLY WAY HE (BUSH) COULD HELP BROWN WOULD BE TO INVITE HIM AS A PERSONAL GUEST. FOR VARIOUS REASONS, HOWEVER, BUSH IS NOT IN A POSITION TO INVITE HIM AT THIS TIME. YOU MAY WANT TO ADD THAT INDIVIDUALS WHO GO AS BUSH'S PERSONAL GUESTS HAV NO ASSURANCE OF HAVING ANY CONTACT WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS.

(3) THE ONLY OTHER RECOURSE YOU COULD SUGGEST TO BROWN IS THAT HE PERSONALLY APPLY DIRECTLY TO THE PRC LIAISON OFFICE IN WASHINGTON FOR A VISA ON THE BASIS OF HIS DESIRE FOR A PRIVATE VISIT. GIVEN CHINA'S PREOCCUPATION WITH THE SECRETARY'S JUST-CONCLUDED VISIT, HOWEVER, AND THE FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL TRIP, WE ASSUME THAT PEKING WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE BROWN'S REQUEST AT THIS TIME.

GRNC

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HRC NARA, Date 8/3/10

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, SECFILE... PASSED TO JANKA

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TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

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MODIS
E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
REF: HAKTO 41
T TOHAK 61
YOU ARE CORRECT. PARA 4, SENTENCE 6 SHOULD READ
"...NOT TRY TO WORK OUT..."
HARM REGARDS
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/00, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/3/10

***** WWSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, SDO SECFLC

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