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MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

Evidence of a serious breakdown in China's alliance with the Soviet Union began to accumulate in the early 1960s; and in 1969 a series of armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet border brought the two major powers of the "socialist camp" to the verge of open warfare. China's current openness to the United States, coming as it does in the context of this military confrontation with the Russians--and in the wake of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia--implies that fear of a Russian invasion is a major element motivating the present "thaw" in Sino-American relations. There is thus an important contemporary point of convergence in Chinese and American views of the world in the concern (long held in the United States) with the Soviet Union as an "imperialist" power. Indeed, since 1969 Chinese polemics have described the Soviet Union as a "social imperialist" state--that is, a socialist country that has taken the road of imperialist aggression.

This memorandum summarizes the long history of tension between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties, and presents the recent historical evidence--derived from Cultural Revolution documents--that Mao Tse-tung himself was responsible for the worsening of relations between China and the Soviet Union beginning in the late 1950s.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded with the guidance of the Comintern (Communist International, based in Moscow) in Shanghai in 1921. Two years later the Comintern advised the small CCP to establish a "united front" with the more powerful Nationalist Party of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin wanted a strongly

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nationalistic government in China which would exclude foreign influence--primarily British and Japanese--and thus protect the young Soviet Union against its "capitalist" enemies. The CCP entered into this united front reluctantly and at Russian insistence. The Chinese Communists feared that their party would be swallowed by the larger Nationalist movement. By 1927, however, the Communists had become sufficiently powerful that Chiang Kai-shek, fearing that his CCP "allies" would take over the Nationalist Party from within, launched an armed suppression of the Communists. Mao Tse-tung and other leaders of the CCP fled to safety in the mountains of south China; but tens of thousands of Communists were killed by Chiang's armies in coastal and inland cities.

By 1930 the remnant leadership of the CCP had built an army in the rural areas of south China beyond Chiang Kai-shek's control. Stalin continued to attempt to direct the CCP by sending a group of young Chinese students trained in Moscow back to China to take over Party leadership. Mao Tse-tung found his growing authority within the CCP undercut by these "returned students." Guided by Comintern agents, these Moscow-trained Chinese reversed Mao's relatively cautious political and military policies in an effort to speed up the pace of their revolution. This radical leadership provoked renewed Nationalist military actions against the CCP in the early 1930s, and by 1934 Chiang Kai-shek's armies were almost able to destroy the Communist base of operations, and the Party's military forces, in south China. Mao Tse-tung and other leaders once again fled Chiang's armies in what they term the "Long March" to safety in China's northwest provinces bordering on the Soviet Union.

In 1937 the Japanese attack on China prevented Chiang Kai-shek from destroying the remnant CCP leadership; and Stalin again urged the Communists



to enter into a "united front" of national resistance with Chiang Kai-shek in order to prevent Japan from gaining control of China at Soviet expense. Mao and other CCP leaders superficially followed Stalin's advice; but there was no real cooperation between the CCP and the Nationalists in the fight to defeat the Japanese. During this period Stalin repeatedly gave semi-public evidence of his displeasure with Mao and the Chinese Communists. For example, in a talk with Averell Harriman the Soviet ruler characterized the CCP leaders as "margarine Communists," that is, not genuine revolutionaries, only peasant rebels.

With the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, Stalin advised Mao that the CCP should not use its army to wage a civil war against the Nationalists. As Mao recalled to Party leaders in a speech of 1962: "Stalin tried to prevent the Chinese revolution by saying there should not be any civil war and that we must collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek." As in earlier periods, Stalin feared that civil war in China would draw in outside powers hostile to the Soviet Union--in this case the United States, which continued to support Chiang Kai-shek. Mao rejected Stalin's advice, however; and with the failure of General Marshall's efforts to mediate a cease-fire between the Nationalists and the CCP in 1946, the Communist armies attacked and defeated the Nationalist forces in three years of civil war.

When the People's Republic of China was founded in October of 1949, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed that his country would "lean to one side," that China would become a member of the Soviet-led "socialist camp." Why did Mao turn to Stalin, given the clear record of the previous three decades of bad Soviet advice to the CCP, and Stalin's distrust of Mao as its leader? Three reasons seem to account for this paradoxical situation: First Mao's attempts in



1944-1945 to initiate contacts with President Roosevelt in an effort to gain U.S. support for the Communists in the war against Japan had led to nothing. Mao interpreted the exclusive American support for Chiang Kai-shek as hostility to the CCP; and in 1949 Mao very likely feared that the U.S. would continue to be hostile to the newly founded People's Republic of China. His turn to the Soviet Union thus was in part an effort to protect the People's Republic from anticipated U.S. opposition. Second, Mao and the other leaders of the Chinese Communist movement deeply believed that the Soviet approach and experience in national development represented the most appropriate way to modernize China. Hence, the alliance with the USSR represented commitment to the path of "socialist transformation" in their efforts to make peasant China an industrial state. Third, in 1949 Stalin had great prestige within the Chinese Communist Party, as in the International Communist Movement at large. The Russian leader had the power to influence any struggle for leadership within the CCP. Given Stalin's demonstrated reserve in supporting Mao in past years, Mao very likely feared that without public acceptance of Stalin's role as leader of the International Communist Movement, Stalin might repudiate his leadership of the CCP. At least the Soviet leader might seek to influence internal CCP leadership struggles against him, as he had done in the past. Thus, Mao's continued support for Stalin had the quality of an effort to gain Stalin's approval for his leadership of the CCP.

Stalin's backing, however, was at best grudgingly given. Mao went to Moscow in December 1949 to negotiate a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance with the Russian leaders. But as Mao recalled, this effort to establish the Sino-Soviet alliance involved "a struggle:" (Stalin) did not want to sign the treaty, but finally agreed to do so after two months of negotiations." Mao asserted

that he finally gained Stalin's confidence when Chinese troops were committed to the Korean War. "He (Stalin) finally believed that we were not going to be another Yugoslavia, and that I would not be another Tito (for breaking away from Soviet leadership)." When Stalin died in 1953, Mao had thus succeeded in gaining Soviet protection against "imperialist" attack, was publicly committed to Stalin's policies of national development, and had gained the Soviet leader's approval of his leadership of the CCP.

Stalin's death left Mao a senior figure in the International Communist Movement, as well as the leader of the world's largest Communist Party and country. In 1954 Mao made his prestige felt when he gave backing to Nikita Khrushchev, then struggling to win out in the succession crisis precipitated by Stalin's death. Mao was soon to regret his support of Khrushchev.

In 1956 Khrushchev, in an effort to undercut Stalin's political heirs and consolidate his leadership of the Soviet Communist Party, launched a secret attack on the dead dictator and his "cult of personality." This criticism of Stalin came at a time when Mao Tse-tung had been pressing a reluctant Chinese Communist Party to adopt radical agricultural policies in order to stimulate a lagging economic development program. Given Mao's close public identification with the now-discredited Stalin, Chinese leaders opposed to Mao's policies were able to restrict his leadership amid fears of a Maoist "cult of personality" and in a context of "collective leadership." Khrushchev's attack on Stalin thus constituted a great personal embarrassment for Mao, for it undercut his authority within the CCP. Mao has dated the onset of the Sino-Soviet dispute from the time of Khrushchev's attack on Stalin.

The Hungarian uprising of 1956 gave Mao an issue to throw back at his critics within the CCP, and at Khrushchev. In the wake of this uprising Mao claimed that corruption of a Communist Party by bureaucratism, not a leader's "cult of personality," was responsible for the Hungarian events, and for less serious disturbances in Poland. Mao thus gained political leverage over Party bureaucrats who had opposed his agricultural policies. This was to be used by Mao in shaping the 1957-1958 public criticism of "bureaucratism" and "rightist conservatism" within the CCP known as the Hundred Flowers Campaign. Internationally, Mao sent Chou En-lai to Eastern Europe in early 1957 to mediate between the Soviets and the now more independent-minded satellite Communist Parties. Khrushchev was angered by this Chinese diplomatic initiative, fearing that it represented Chinese efforts to undercut Soviet leadership of the Bloc.

Late 1957 was the onset of the most critical period of testing in the increasingly tense Sino-Soviet relationship. Khrushchev attempted to gain Mao's support for his leading role in the International Communist Movement by offering the Chinese leader a nuclear sharing agreement, an offer which carried the added weight of the recent Soviet "Sputnik" breakthrough in an ICBM delivery capability. Mao at this time was willing to affirm Khrushchev's leadership of the Bloc, but only on the terms that the Russian Party, in fact, exercise active leadership in support of the national goals of its allies. For Mao this was to involve efforts to have the Soviets back his initiative of the fall of 1958 to confront the Nationalist and U.S. over the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

While we do not know all of the politicking which went on between Mao and Khrushchev in 1958, the evidence is clear that in the spring of that year Mao urged the Chinese military establishment



to free itself of Soviet controls and develop an independent nuclear capability--even at the price of alienating Soviet support. Mao was highly distrustful of the impulsive Khrushchev, and wanted to show his colleagues within the CCP that the Soviets were unreliable allies in matters of China's national defense. As planning for the Taiwan Strait confrontation progressed in the summer of 1958 Khrushchev secretly journeyed to China to dissuade Mao from provoking a confrontation which risked a Soviet-American clash. Mao appears to have told Khrushchev that he could confront the Nationalists without direct Soviet assistance, and without the danger of drawing in the U.S. Mao pressed ahead with the military adventure, apparently confident that he could undermine U.S. support for the Nationalists, and show Khrushchev that the United States was a "paper tiger." The failure of Mao's gamble, however, only infuriated Khrushchev and increased the Chairman's political vulnerability within the CCP.

In the summer of 1959 Mao's military and economic policies were attacked by the Chinese Defense Minister, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, at a leadership conference in south China. Khrushchev may have encouraged the Chinese Defense Minister in his criticism of Mao's policies, for P'eng had met with the Soviet leader in Eastern Europe shortly before his attack on Mao. Subsequent criticism of P'eng asserted that he had "colluded with a foreign power" in his attack on the Party Chairman. While Mao was able to defeat the Defense Minister's challenge to his policies--and have him removed from office, to be replaced by Lin Piao--relations between Mao and Khrushchev were at the breaking point.

The final breakdown in personal relations between the two leaders occurred in September-October

1959. Khrushchev came to China to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China right after his meeting with President Eisenhower at Camp David. At the official anniversary banquet Khrushchev indirectly criticized Mao's military adventure of the previous year in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese later recalled that Khrushchev had tried to "read them a lesson" about the dangers of testing by force the stability of the capitalist world. Foreign accounts of the anniversary banquet recall that when Khrushchev voiced his veiled criticism of Mao's policies, Mao turned his back on the Soviet leader.

While Mao's difference with Khrushchev had their personal dimension, the basis of the dispute lay in conflicting national policies, and in the manner in which Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and his advocacy of a "peaceful coexistence" line in international relations were undercutting Mao's position within the CCP. These political differences broke into view in early 1960 with indirect public criticism in the Chinese press of Soviet "re-visionism." Mao had made a basic decision to protect his leadership of the CCP and undermine the possible appeal of Soviet-style "peace" policies within China by launching a vigorous campaign against Khrushchev's policies. Khrushchev responded to Mao's challenge first by breaking the nuclear sharing agreement of 1957, and then, in the summer of 1960, by withdrawing all Soviet aid advisers from China. The Sino-Soviet split was now a fact.

Into the early 1960s public recriminations between the Chinese and Soviets gave increasing evidence of the depth of bitterness now dividing the two Communist powers. The Russians attempted to convene a meeting of the International Communist Movement to criticize and expel the Chinese, but were unable to gain substantial backing from other Communist Parties who feared that a permanent split in the

International Movement would undermine their own struggles for power. In 1964 Khrushchev's fall from power further strengthened Mao's position in the dispute between the two countries; yet within the CCP other leaders were increasingly distraught at the costs to China not only of the dispute with the Soviets, but also the damage wrought to the country's political and economic life by Mao's Great Leap Forward policies. Mao was finding himself resisted by other Party leaders. To reverse this trend Mao turned increasingly to the army for political backing.

The escalation of the Vietnam War in late 1964 brought these international and domestic political tensions to a head. Liu Shao-ch'i and other Chinese leaders opposed to Mao's policies appear to have called for "united action" by Bloc countries against the increasing U.S. military presence. These leaders knew that Mao was relying on the People's Liberation Army as his base of power, and they had inklings that he was thinking of a purge of his opponents within the CCP. Thus their call for "united action" with the Soviets represented an effort to pull the army into a more active national defense posture--and out of Mao's hands as an instrument of domestic political conflict.

Mao, however, resisted these pressures, and in the late summer of 1965--apparently confident that the United States would limit its involvement in Vietnam short of directly threatening China's security--the Party Chairman initiated his "Cultural Revolution" attack on the Party. The fact that in this purge Mao characterized Liu Shao-ch'i as "China's Khrushchev" gives some idea of how much Mao had come to fear repudiation of his leadership by Chinese leaders, just as Khrushchev had repudiated Stalin. The Sino-Soviet dispute and Mao's effort to preserve his leadership within the CCP had become fully intertwined.



The transformation of the Sino-Soviet conflict from a political to a military confrontation occurred gradually during the 1960s. The Soviets watched with increasing dismay as Mao's 1958 national defense policy of independence from the Soviet Union acquired greater reality, in 1964, through the successful test of a nuclear device. Tensions along the Sino-Soviet border increased in the early 1960s with armed clashes resulting from the movement of minority nationalities across the heretofore unguarded frontier. And as the Cultural Revolution increased in intensity, the Soviets began a military buildup on the Chinese border, in part as a cautionary move against the militant and unpredictable Mao, and in part as an effort to strengthen the hand of those Chinese leaders less hostile to the Soviet Union by making fully apparent to the CCP the costs of Mao's "anti-Soviet" policies. The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia only increased Chinese distrust of Russian intentions; and in early 1969 the Chinese apparently provoked a limited military clash along the disputed Ussuri River border in order to show their determination to resist Soviet pressures. Mao may also have intended this clash to call the world's attention to the Soviet military buildup, and to undermine Soviet support in the Eastern European countries still fearful of Russian intentions in the wake of the Czech invasion. Subsequent to this initial border clash, the Soviets escalated the military confrontation, bringing the two countries to the verge of war in the summer of 1969.

At present the Sino-Soviet dispute remains suspended in an uncertain state of neither peace nor war. Talks between the two governments to resolve the border dispute continue without resolution of outstanding issues. The Soviet military buildup on China's northern border continues at a deliberate pace, with a present strength of nearly 40 divisions. Trade between the two countries is at a low level,



but continues. Relations between the two Communist Parties are virtually non-existent. As long as Mao lives, it is most unlikely that the present situation will take a dramatic turn for the better, inasmuch as for more than a decade the Chinese leader has sought to prevent "revisionism" within China by confronting Soviet "revisionism." There is indirect, but persuasive, evidence that in the CCP leadership crisis of August-September 1971 military leaders may have pressed for an easing of China's hostility toward the Soviet Union. Mao apparently remained unyielding in his opposition to Russian "revisionism"--and in his effort to balance the Sino-Soviet confrontation with an easing of Sino-American tensions. While efforts to moderate the dispute short of war seem in China's interest--and perhaps may be intensified by Mao's successors, who will be less committed to an anti-Soviet position--the dispute between the two Communist powers has passed well beyond a leadership conflict to one of a rivalry of nations.

This rivalry will continue to be based in the political and military confrontation dividing the two parties; yet given China's slowly growing nuclear potential, and the costs to the Soviets of a land invasion of China (brought home to them, no doubt, by the U.S. experience in Vietnam), the Sino-Soviet dispute seems likely to be played out in the coming decade indirectly, in peripheral political and geographical regions. Three arenas of conflict seem most likely to contain this evolving dispute: rivalry within the International Communist Movement; competition for influence in third-country areas between the two major powers, primarily in Asia, the Middle East/Africa, and Eastern Europe; and an evolving balance in the "super-power triangle" of the U.S./China/USSR.

Developments in the International Communist Movement in the past few years indicate continued jockeying between the Russians and Chinese for influence



and support for their positions. The Chinese retain dominant influence in most of the illegal and militant Communist Parties of Southeast but they remain wary that Moscow will attempt to wean these parties away from their alliance to Peking; the Soviets are dominant in the orthodox parties of Europe and most of the Third World, and while the Chinese in the early 1970s gave up their attempt to build up a rival "Marxist-Leninist" movement subservient to themselves they continue to look for opportunities to nudge the orthodox parties toward a more neutralist position between the two great Communist powers. The Chinese have made significant gains some Balkan countries, particularly Romania and Yugoslavia, and they can be expected to actively continue their efforts to erode Soviet support in Eastern Europe--probably with little additional success. The Chinese recently have gained influence at Soviet expense with the North Koreans, but at the same time the North Vietnamese have moved markedly closer to Moscow. This vying for influence among both ruling and nonruling Communist Parties is likely to continue, with marginal effect on the political positions of both powers.

A more substantial area of rivalry continues to be in third countries where Russian and Chinese defense, economic and political interests clash. The India-Pakistan rivalry, for example, holds some danger of dragging the Soviets and Chinese into a direct confrontation over a peripheral military rivalry. Competition is at least as intense in Western Europe, where the Soviets hope to exploit perceived advantages deriving from the successful conclusion of the CSCE negotiations, from momentum stemming from detente, and from weaknesses apparent at present on Europe's southern flank, while the Chinese are very actively engaged in a diplomatic campaign designed to warn the Western European states of the dangers growing out of Soviet political and presumed military ambitions.

Sino-Soviet rivalry also continues unabated in the Middle East and Africa. The Russians undoubtedly view access to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal as an important objective in their effort to out-flank China from the south. Their efforts seem intended to increase the Russian sea-borne military presence and influence in India and Southeast Asia. The Chinese, with limited economic resources, are increasing their efforts to rival the Soviets in Africa and are quietly encouraging further movement in the step-by-step Arab-Israeli negotiations as a means of eroding Soviet influence in the Middle East.

In the Far East the rivalry is equally active. A major area of contention is Japan, where the Chinese have been attempting to induce Tokyo to include a clause inimical to Moscow in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship currently under negotiation, while the Soviets have been urging the Japanese to resist through heavy-handed pressure tactics; both are also suggesting to Tokyo that major economic opportunities for investment and exploitation of natural resources exist in their respective countries. In the aftermath of the Indochina war the Soviets are attempting to exploit deep-seated wariness of Chinese intentions in Southeast Asia to draw the countries of that region closer to Moscow while the Chinese are attempting to play on local antipathies to Moscow and fear of Hanoi to draw those countries closer to Peking. The Chinese also seem to fear that Taiwan itself could be drawn into this dimension of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and while their concerns are probably exaggerated, the Soviets from time to time have made unofficial and low-key overtures to a generally unresponsive Taipei.

The third major factor influencing the future Sino-Soviet relationship is the U.S. itself. Our position as a "balancer" in the evolving triangular



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relationship among the superpowers, and our influence in third-country areas such as Japan, Taiwan, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East/Africa, will have a major role to play in shaping the future rivalry between the two giants of the Communist world.

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MEMORANDUM

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February 21, 1972

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Chairman Mao Tsetung
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol
of the Foreign Ministry
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

President Nixon
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, National Security Council Staff
(Notetaker)

DATE AND TIME: Monday, February 21, 1972 - 2:50-3:55 p.m.

PLACE: Chairman Mao's Residence, Peking

(There were opening greetings during which the Chairman welcomed President Nixon, and the President expressed his great pleasure at meeting the Chairman.)

President Nixon: You read a great deal. The Prime Minister said that you read more than he does.

Chairman Mao: Yesterday in the airplane you put forward a very difficult problem for us. You said that what it is required to talk about are philosophic problems.

President Nixon: I said that because I have read the Chairman's poems and speeches, and I knew he was a professional philosopher. (Chinese laugh.)

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Chairman Mao: (looking at Dr. Kissinger) He is a doctor of philosophy?

President Nixon: He is a doctor of brains.

Chairman Mao: What about asking him to be the main speaker today?

President Nixon: He is an expert in philosophy.

Dr. Kissinger: I used to assign the Chairman's collective writings to my classes at Harvard.

Chairman Mao: Those writings of mine aren't anything. There is nothing instructive in what I wrote.

(Looking toward photographers) Now they are trying to interrupt our meeting, our order here.

President Nixon: The Chairman's writings moved a nation and have changed the world.

Chairman Mao: I haven't been able to change it. I've only been able to change a few places in the vicinity of Peking.

Our common old friend, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, doesn't approve of this. He calls us communist bandits. He recently issued a speech. Have you seen it?

President Nixon: Chiang Kai-shek calls the Chairman a bandit. What does the Chairman call Chiang Kai-shek?

Prime Minister Chou: Generally speaking we call them Chiang Kai-shek's clique. In the newspapers sometimes we call him a bandit; we are also called bandits in turn. Anyway, we abuse each other.

Chairman Mao: Actually, the history of our friendship with him is much longer than the history of your friendship with him.

President Nixon: Yes, I know.

Chairman Mao: We two must not monopolize the whole show. It won't do if we don't let Dr. Kissinger have a say. You have been famous about your trips to China.

Dr. Kissinger: It was the President who set the direction and worked out the plan.

President Nixon: He is a very wise assistant to say it that way. (Mao and Chou laugh.)

Chairman Mao: He is praising you, saying you are clever in doing so.

President Nixon: He doesn't look like a secret agent. He is the only man in captivity who could go to Paris 12 times and Peking once and no one knew it, except possibly a couple of pretty girls. (Chou laughs.)

Dr. Kissinger: They didn't know it; I used it as a cover.

Chairman Mao: In Paris?

President Nixon: Anyone who uses pretty girls as a cover must be the greatest diplomat of all time.

Chairman Mao: So your girls are very often made use of?

President Nixon: His girls, not mine. It would get me into great trouble if I used girls as a cover.

Prime Minister Chou: (laughs) Especially during elections. (Kissinger laughs.) Dr. Kissinger doesn't run for President because he wasn't born a citizen of the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: Miss Tang is eligible to be President of the United States.

President Nixon: She would be the first woman President. There's our candidate.

Chairman Mao: It would be very dangerous if you have such a candidate. But let us speak the truth. As for the Democratic Party, if they come into office again, we cannot avoid contacting them.

President Nixon: We understand. We will hope that we don't give you that problem.

Chairman Mao: Those questions are not questions to be discussed in my place. They should be discussed with the Premier. I discuss the philosophical questions. That is to say, I voted for you during your election. There is an American here called Mr. Frank Coe, and he wrote an article precisely at the time when your country was in havoc, during your last electoral campaign. He said you were going to be elected President. I appreciated that article very much. But now he is against the visit.

President Nixon: When the Chairman says he voted for me, he voted for the lesser of two evils.

Chairman Mao: I like rightists. People say you are rightists, that the Republican Party is to the right, that Prime Minister Heath is also to the right.

President Nixon: And General DeGaulle.

Chairman Mao: DeGaulle is a different question. They also say the Christian Democratic Party of West Germany is also to the right. I am comparatively happy when these people on the right come into power.

President Nixon: I think the important thing to note is that in America, at least at this time, those on the right can do what those on the left talk about.

Dr. Kissinger: There is another point, Mr. President. Those on the left are pro-Soviet and would not encourage a move toward the People's Republic, and in fact criticize you on those grounds.

Chairman Mao: Exactly that. Some are opposing you. In our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad.

Prime Minister Chou: Maybe you know this.

Chairman Mao: Throughout the whole world, the U.S. intelligence reports are comparatively accurate. The next was Japan. As for the Soviet Union, they finally went to dig out the corpses, but they didn't say anything about it.

Prime Minister Chou: In Outer Mongolia.

President Nixon: We had similar problems recently in the crisis on India-Pakistan. The American left criticized me very heavily for failing to side with India. This was for two reasons: they were pro-Indian and they were pro-Soviet.

I thought it was important to look at the bigger issue. We could not let a country, no matter how big, gobble up its neighbor. It cost me -- I don't say this with sorrow because it was right -- it cost me politically, but I think history will record that it was the right thing to do.

Chairman Mao: As a suggestion, may I suggest that you do a little less briefing? (The President points at Dr. Kissinger and Chou laughs.) Do you think it is good if you brief others on what we talk about, our philosophic discussions here?

President Nixon: The Chairman can be sure that whatever we discuss, or whatever I and the Prime Minister discuss, nothing goes beyond the room. That is the only way to have conversations at the highest level.

Chairman Mao: That's good.

President Nixon: For example, I hope to talk with the Prime Minister and later with the Chairman about issues like Taiwan, Vietnam and Korea.

I also want to talk about -- and this is very sensitive -- the future of Japan, the future of the subcontinent, and what India's role will be; and on the broader world scene, the future of US-Soviet relations. Because only if we see the whole picture of the world and the great forces that move the world will we be able to make the right decisions about the immediate and urgent problems that always completely dominate our vision.

Chairman Mao: All those troublesome problems I don't want to get into very much. I think your topic is better -- philosophic questions.

President Nixon: For example, Mr. Chairman, it is interesting to note that most nations would approve of this meeting, but the Soviets disapprove, the Japanese have doubts which they express, and the Indians disapprove. So we must examine why, and determine how our policies should develop to deal with the whole world, as well as the immediate problems such as Korea, Vietnam, and of course, Taiwan.

Chairman Mao: Yes, I agree.

President Nixon: We, for example, must ask ourselves -- again in the confines of this room -- why the Soviets have more forces on the border facing you than on the border facing Western Europe. We must ask ourselves, what is the future of Japan? Is it better -- here I know we have disagreements -- is it better for Japan to be neutral, totally defenseless, or it is better for a time for Japan to have some relations with the United States? The point being -- I am talking now in the realm of philosophy -- in international relations there are no good choices. One thing is sure -- we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled. The Prime Minister, for example, has pointed out that the United States reaches out its hands and that the Soviet Union reaches out its hands. The question is which danger the People's Republic faces, whether it is the danger of American aggression or Soviet aggression. These are hard questions, but we have to discuss them.

Chairman Mao: At the present time, the question of aggression from the United States or aggression from China is relatively small; that is, it could be said that this is not a major issue, because the present situation is one in which a state of war does not exist between our

two countries. You want to withdraw some of your troops back on your soil; ours do not go abroad.

Therefore, the situation between our two countries is strange because during the past 22 years our ideas have never met in talks. Now the time is less than 10 months since we began playing table tennis; if one counts the time since you put forward your suggestion at Warsaw it is less than two years. Our side also is bureaucratic in dealing with matters. For example, you wanted some exchange of persons on a personal level, things like that; also trade. But rather than deciding that we stuck with our stand that without settling major issues there is nothing to do with smaller issues. I myself persisted in that position. Later on I saw you were right, and we played table tennis. The Prime Minister said this was also after President Nixon came to office.

The former President of Pakistan introduced President Nixon to us. At that time, our Ambassador in Pakistan refused to agree on our having a contact with you. He said it should be compared whether President Johnson or President Nixon would be better. But President Yahya said the two men cannot be compared, that these two men are incomparable. He said that one was like a gangster -- he meant President Johnson. I don't know how he got that impression. We on our side were not very happy with that President either. We were not very happy with your former Presidents, beginning from Truman through Johnson. We were not very happy with these Presidents, Truman and Johnson.

In between there were eight years of a Republican President. During that period probably you hadn't thought things out either.

Prime Minister Chou: The main thing was John Foster Dulles' policy.

Chairman Mao: He (Chou) also discussed this with Dr. Kissinger before.



President Nixon: But they (gesturing towards Prime Minister Chou and Dr. Kissinger) shook hands. (Chou laughs.)

Chairman Mao: Do you have anything to say, Doctor?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, the world situation has also changed dramatically during that period. We've had to learn a great deal. We thought all socialist/communist states were the same phenomenon. We didn't understand until the President came into office the different nature of revolution in China and the way revolution had developed in other socialist states.

President Nixon: Mr. Chairman, I am aware of the fact that over a period of years my position with regard to the People's Republic was one that the Chairman and Prime Minister totally disagreed with. What brings us together is a recognition of a new situation in the world and a recognition on our part that what is important is not a nation's internal political philosophy. What is important is its policy toward the rest of the world and toward us. That is why -- this point I think can be said to be honest -- we have differences. The Prime Minister and Dr. Kissinger discussed these differences.

It also should be said -- looking at the two great powers, the United States and China -- we know China doesn't threaten the territory of the United States; I think you know the United States has no territorial designs on China. We know China doesn't want to dominate the United States. We believe you too realize the United States doesn't want to dominate the world. Also -- maybe you don't believe this, but I do -- neither China nor the United States, both great nations, want to dominate the world. Because our attitudes are the same on these two issues, we don't threaten each others' territories.

Therefore, we can find common ground, despite our differences, to build a world structure in which both can be safe to develop in our own ways on our own roads. That cannot be said about some other nations in the world.

Chairman Mao: Neither do we threaten Japan or South Korea.

President Nixon: Nor any country. Nor do we.

Chairman Mao: (Checking the time with Chou) Do you think we have covered enough today?

President Nixon: Yes. I would like to say as we finish, Mr. Chairman, we know you and the Prime Minister have taken great risks in inviting us here. For us also it was a difficult decision. But having read some of the Chairman's statements, I know he is one who sees when an opportunity comes, that you must seize the hour and seize the day.

I would also like to say in a personal sense -- and this to you Mr. Prime Minister -- you do not know me. Since you do not know me, you shouldn't trust me. You will find I never say something I cannot do. And I always will do more than I can say. On this basis I want to have frank talks with the Chairman and, of course, with the Prime Minister.

Chairman Mao: (Pointing to Dr. Kissinger) "Seize the hour and seize the day." I think that, generally speaking, people like me sound a lot of big cannons. (Chou laughs) That is, things like "the whole world should unite and defeat imperialism, revisionism, and all reactionaries, and establish socialism."

President Nixon: Like me. And bandits.

Chairman Mao: But perhaps you as an individual may not be among those to be overthrown. They say that he (Dr. Kissinger) is also among those not to be overthrown personally. And if all of you are overthrown we wouldn't have any more friends left.

President Nixon: Mr. Chairman, the Chairman's life is well-known to all of us. He came from a very poor family to the top of the most populous nation in the world, a great nation.

My background is not so well known. I also came from a very poor family, and to the top of a very great nation. History has brought us

together. The question is whether we, with different philosophies, but both with feet on the ground, and having come from the people, can make a breakthrough that will serve not just China and America, but the whole world in the years ahead. And that is why we are here.

Chairman Mao: Your book, "The Six Crises," is not a bad book.

President Nixon: He (Mao) reads too much.

Chairman Mao: Too little. I don't know much about the United States. I must ask you to send some teachers here, mainly teachers of history and geography.

President Nixon: That's good, the best.

Chairman Mao: That's what I said to Mr. Edgar Snow, the correspondent who passed away a few days ago.

President Nixon: That was very sad.

Chairman Mao: Yes, indeed.

It is alright to talk well and also alright if there are no agreements, because what use is there if we stand in deadlock? Why is it that we must be able to reach results? People will say. . . if we fail the first time, then people will talk why are we not able to succeed the first time? The only reason would be that we have taken the wrong road. What will they say if we succeed the second time?

(There were then some closing pleasantries. The Chairman said he was not well. President Nixon responded that he looked good. The Chairman said that appearances were deceiving. After handshakes and more pictures, Prime Minister Chou then escorted the President out of the residence.)



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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mao Tsetung, Chairman, Politburo,
Chinese Communist Party
Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, February 17, 1973, 11:30 p.m. -
Sunday, February 18, 1973, 1:20 a.m.

PLACE: 'Chungnahai, Chairman Mao's Residence
Peking
People's Republic of China

(At 11:00 p.m. February 17, 1973 at a meeting in a villa near the Guest House where Dr. Kissinger and his party were staying, Prime Minister Chou En-lai informed Dr. Kissinger that he and Winston Lord were invited to meet with Chairman Mao Tsetung at 11:30 p.m. that evening. He told Dr. Kissinger that he would come to the Guest House shortly to escort him to the Chairman's residence.

Dr. Kissinger and his delegation members at the meeting went back to the Guest House. Prime Minister Chou En-lai came to the Guest House at 11:20 p.m. and rode with Dr. Kissinger to Chungnahai. Mr. Chu, Deputy Director of Protocol, accompanied Mr. Lord. Prime Minister

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By NR NARA, Date 6/24/10



~~TOP SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Chou En-lai escorted Dr. Kissinger into the outer room of the Guest House and then through another room to Chairman Mao's sitting room.

The Chairman was helped up from his chair by his young female attendant and came forward to greet Dr. Kissinger. Photographers took pictures. He welcomed Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Kissinger pointed out that it was almost exactly a year ago that he had first met the Chairman. The Chairman then greeted Mr. Lord and commented that he was so young, younger than the interpreters. Mr. Lord replied that he was in any event older than the interpreters. The Chairman then motioned to the large easy chairs and the parties sat down. The photographers continued to take pictures.)

Chairman Mao (As he headed toward his chair): I don't look bad, but God has sent me an invitation.

(To Mr. Lord) You are a young man.

Mr. Lord: I am getting older.

Chairman Mao: I am the oldest among those seated here.

Prime Minister Chou: I am the second oldest.

Chairman Mao: There was someone in the British Army who was opposed to the independence of your country. Field Marshal Montgomery was one of those to oppose your policy.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chairman Mao: He opposed the Dulles policy. He probably doesn't oppose you anymore. At that time, you also opposed us. We also opposed you. So we are two enemies (Laughter).

Dr. Kissinger: Two former enemies.

Chairman Mao: Now we call the relationship between ourselves a friendship.

Dr. Kissinger: That's our sentiment.

Chairman Mao: That's what I am saying.

Dr. Kissinger: I have told the Prime Minister that we speak to no other country as frankly and as openly as we do to you.

Chairman Mao (To the photographers): That's all for you.

[The photographers leave.]

But let us not speak false words or engage in trickery. We don't steal your documents. You can deliberately leave them somewhere and try us out. Nor do we engage in eavesdropping and bugging. There is no use in those small tricks. And some of the big maneuvering, there is no use to them too. I said that to your correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow. I said that your CIA is no good for major events.

Dr. Kissinger: That's absolutely true. That's been our experience.

Chairman Mao: Because when you issue an order, for example, when your President issues an order, and you want information on a certain question, then the intelligence reports come as so many snowflakes. We also have our intelligence service and it is the same with them. They do not work well (Prime Minister Chou laughs). For instance, they didn't know about Lin Piao. (Prime Minister Chou laughs). Then again they didn't know you wanted to come.

I read two articles in 1969. One of your Directors of your China desk in the State Department wrote an article later published in a Japanese newspaper.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think I read that.

Prime Minister Chou: I hadn't mentioned it to you before.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

Chairman Mao: Your business was done well. You've been flying everywhere. Are you a swallow or a pigeon? (Laughter) And the Vietnamese issue can be counted as basically settled.

Dr. Kissinger: That is our feeling. We must now have a transitional period toward tranquility.

Chairman Mao: Yes, that's right.

Dr. Kissinger: The basic issues are settled.

Chairman Mao: We also say in the same situation (gesturing with his hand) that's what your President said when he was sitting here, that each side has its own means and acted out of its own necessity. That resulted in the two countries acting hand-in-hand.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we both face the same danger. We may have to use different methods sometimes but for the same objectives.

Chairman Mao: That would be good. So long as the objectives are the same, we would not harm you nor would you harm us. And we can work together to commonly deal with a bastard. (Laughter]

Actually it would be that sometime we want to criticize you for a while and you want to criticize us for a while. That, your President said, is the ideological influence. You say, away with you Communists. We say, away with you imperialists. Sometimes we say things like that. It would not do not to do that.

Dr. Kissinger: I think both of us must be true to our principles. And in fact it would confuse the situation if we spoke the same language. I have told the Prime Minister that in Europe you, because of your principles, can speak more firmly than we can, strangely enough.

Chairman Mao: As for you, in Europe and Japan, we hope that you will cooperate with each other. As for some things it is alright to quarrel and bicker about, but fundamental cooperation is needed.

Dr. Kissinger: As between you and us, even if we sometimes criticize each other, we will coordinate our actions with you, and we would never participate in a policy to isolate you. As for Japan and Europe, we agree that we should cooperate on all essential matters with them. Europe has very weak leadership right now.

Chairman Mao: They don't unite with each other.

Dr. Kissinger: They don't unite, and they don't take farsighted views. When they are confronted with a danger they hope it will go away without effort.

Prime Minister Chou: I told Dr. Kissinger you [the U.S.] should still help Pompidou.

Chairman Mao: Yes indeed.

Dr. Kissinger: We are doing our utmost, and we will do more.

Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hands) Now Mr. Pompidou is being threatened. It is the Socialist Party and the Communist Party putting their strength against him.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and they have united.

Chairman Mao: (Pointing at Dr. Kissinger) They are uniting and the Soviet Union wants the Communist Party to get into office. I don't like their Communist party, just like I don't like your Communist party. I like you, but not your Communist party. (Laughter)

In the West you always historically had a policy, for example, in both World Wars you always began by pushing Germany to fight against Russia.

Dr. Kissinger: But it is not our policy to push Russia to fight against China, because the danger to us of a war in China is as great as a war in Europe.

Chairman Mao: (Before Dr. Kissinger's remarks are translated, he makes remarks in Chinese and counts on his fingers. Miss Tang then translates Dr. Kissinger's remarks and after that Chairman Mao's remarks.)

What I wanted to say is whether or not you are now pushing West Germany to make peace with Russia and then push Russia eastward. I suspect the whole of the West has such an idea, that is to push Russia eastward, mainly against us and also Japan. Also probably towards you, in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

Dr. Kissinger: We did not favor this policy. We preferred the German opposition party which did not pursue this policy. (Chairman Mao, smoking a cigar, offers cigars to Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord who decline.)

Chairman Mao: Yes, that's our feeling. We are also in favor of the opposition party in Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: They conducted themselves very stupidly.

Chairman Mao: Yes, they were defeated. The whole of Europe is thinking only of peace.

Prime Minister Chou: The illusions of peace created by their leaders.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we will do our best to strengthen European defenses and keep our armies in Europe.

Chairman Mao: That would be very good.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no plan for any large reduction of our forces in Europe for the next four years (Chairman Mao turns to Prime Minister Chou).

Prime Minister Chou: In talking about reducing your troops, you mean only at the most 10 to 15 percent.

Dr. Kissinger: That is exactly correct.

Chairman Mao: What is the number of American troops in Europe? They are probably mostly rocket units.

Prime Minister Chou: There are between 300-350,000 including the Mediterranean.

Chairman Mao: That probably does not include the Navy.

Dr. Kissinger: It does not include the Navy. There are about 275,000 in Central Europe. That does not include the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Chairman Mao: And your troop deployment to Asia and the Pacific Ocean is too scattered. You have them in Korea. I heard the number is about 300,000,

Dr. Kissinger: About 40,000.

Chairman Mao: And from 8 to 9,000 with Chiang Kai-shek.

Prime Minister Chou: In Taiwan.

Chairman Mao: Then it is said that there are two groups in Japan, 40,000 in Okinawa and 20 to 30,000 in Japan proper. I don't know how many there are in the Philippines. Now you have remaining in Vietnam a bit over 10,000.

Dr. Kissinger: But they will all be withdrawn.

Chairman Mao: Yes, and I heard that you have 40,000 in Thailand.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. But all the units the Chairman mentioned are mostly air force units and therefore they probably cannot be measured by the number of personnel.

Chairman Mao: You also have ground forces, for instance, in South Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: In South Korea we have ground forces.

Chairman Mao: That was all begun by Truman and Acheson. So this time you held a memorial service for Truman and we didn't go. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: When you have a liaison office in Washington it will be more possible in the future.

Prime Minister Chou: You've held all these memorial services, both for Truman and Johnson (Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou laugh).

It seems to me that your voice is hoarse today. You should have a day's rest tomorrow. Why do you want to continue to talk so much?

Dr. Kissinger: Because it is very important that you and we understand what we are going to do and to coordinate our actions, and therefore we always tell the Prime Minister what our plans are in various areas of the world so that you can understand the individual moves when they are made.

Chairman Mao: Yes. When you pass through Japan, you should perhaps talk a bit more with them. You only talked with them for one day and that isn't very good for their face.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, we wanted this trip's emphasis to be on the talks in Peking, and I will take a separate trip to Tokyo.

Chairman Mao: Good. And also make clear to them.

You know the Japanese feelings towards the Soviet Union are not so very good.

Dr. Kissinger: They are very ambivalent.

Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hand) In a word, during the Second World War, Prime Minister Tanaka told our Premier, what the Soviet

Union did was that upon seeing a person about to hang himself, they immediately took the chair from under his feet.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Chairman Mao: It could be said that they didn't fire a single shot and yet they were able to grab so many places (Prime Minister Chou chuckles). They grabbed the People's Republic of Mongolia. They grabbed half of Sinkiang. It was called a sphere of influence. And Manchuko, on the northeast, was also called their sphere of influence.

Dr. Kissinger: And they took all the industry out of it.

Chairman Mao: Yes. And they grabbed also the islands of Sakhalin and the Kuriles Island. (Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou discuss among themselves.) Sakhalin is the southern part of the Kuriles Island. I will look it up in the dictionary to see what its Chinese translation is.

Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese are tempted by the economic possibilities in Russia.

Chairman Mao:(Nodding yes) They want to grab something there.

Dr. Kissinger: But we will encourage closer ties between Japan and ourselves, and also we welcome their relationship with the People's Republic.

Chairman Mao: We also believe that rather than Japan having closer relations with the Soviet Union, we would rather that they would better their relations with you. That would be better.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be very dangerous if Japan and the Soviet Union formed closer political relations.

Chairman Mao: That doesn't seem likely.

Prime Minister Chou: The prospects are not too good.

Chairman Mao: We can also do some work there.

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union has made overtures but the Japanese have not responded. They have invited Ohira to go to Moscow.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, this year, the second half.

Dr. Kissinger: This year.

Prime Minister Chou: And it seems on this question that Ohira has a clearer idea of the Soviet Union than others. But there are some not so clear in their understanding as their Foreign Minister.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct.

Prime Minister Chou: That is also the bureaucracy as you term it.

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to exchange information with you on these matters.

Prime Minister Chou: (To Chairman Mao) We have decided besides establishing a liaison office in each capital to maintain the contact between Huang Hua and the White House.

Chairman Mao: (To Prime Minister Chou) Where is the stress?

Prime Minister Chou: The liaison office will handle the general public exchanges. For confidential and urgent matters not covered by the liaison office we will use the channel of Ambassador Huang Hua.

Chairman Mao: Huang Hua has met an ill fate (Prime Minister Chou laughs). He was doing very well in your place and immediately upon his return to Shanghai, he twisted his back.

Dr. Kissinger: We will find a doctor for him when he returns.

Chairman Mao: Yes. (Prime Minister Chou laughs). He seemed more safe in your place. Immediately upon his return to Shanghai he collapsed.

From the atmosphere with which your President received our acrobatic troupe, I thought that the Vietnamese issue was going to be settled.

There were some rumors that said that you were about to collapse (laughter). And the women folk seated here were all dissatisfied with that (laughter, especially pronounced among the women). They said if the Doctor is going to collapse, we would be out of work.

Dr. Kissinger: Not only in China.

Chairman Mao: Yes, and the whole line would collapse like dominos.

Dr. Kissinger: Those were just journalists' speculation.

Chairman Mao: Only speculation?

Dr. Kissinger: Only speculation.

Chairman Mao: No ground whatsoever?

Dr. Kissinger: No ground whatsoever. In fact the opposite was true. We have now been able to place our men into all key positions.

Chairman Mao:(Nodding yes) Your President is now saying that you are proposing something as if you were moving the Great Wall from China to the United States, that is, trade barriers.

Dr. Kissinger: What we want to do is lower barriers.

Chairman Mao: To lower them? Then you were doing that just to frighten people. You are saying that you are going to raise tariffs and non-tariff barriers and maybe you do that to intimidate Europe and Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: Partly. We are proposing a trade bill which gives both the power to raise and lower barriers, in order to get it passed through Congress. We must create the impression that we might increase barriers. We want executive authority to do it without Congressional approval, but if we ask Congress to reduce barriers they would refuse. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) And this is why we are asking for executive authority to move in either direction.

Chairman Mao: What if they don't give it to you?

Dr. Kissinger: We think they will give it to us. It will be a difficult battle, but we are quite certain we will win. We are proposing it also in such general language that we can remove discrimination that still exists towards the People's Republic.

Chairman Mao: The trade between our two countries at present is very pitiful. It is gradually increasing. You know China is a very poor country. We don't have much. What we have in excess is women. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: There are no quotas for those or tariffs.

Chairman Mao: So if you want them we can give a few of those to you, some tens of thousands. (Laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, on a voluntary basis.

Chairman Mao: Let them go to your place. They will create disasters. That way you can lessen our burdens. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: Our interest in trade with China is not commercial. It is to establish a relationship that is necessary for the political relations we both have.

Chairman Mao: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the spirit with which we are conducting our discussions.

Chairman Mao: I once had a discussion with a foreign friend. (The interpreters hold a discussion with Chairman Mao.) I said that we should draw a horizontal line - the U. S. - Japan - Pakistan - Iran (Chairman Mao coughs badly.) - Turkey and Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: We have a very similar conception. You may have read in a newspaper that Mr. Helms has been moved to Iran, and there was a great deal of speculation how this affected my position. In fact

we sent Helms to Iran to take care of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, because of his experience in his previous position and we needed a reliable man in that spot who understands the more complex matters that are needed to be done. (Chairman Mao lights his cigar again.) We will give him authority to deal with all of these countries, although this will not be publicly announced.

Chairman Mao: As for such matters we do not understand very much your affairs in the United States. There are a lot of things we don't know very well. For example, your domestic affairs, we don't understand them. There are also many things about foreign policy that we don't understand either. Perhaps in your future four years we might be able to learn a bit.

Dr. Kissinger: I told the Prime Minister that you have a more direct, maybe a more heroic mode of action than we do. We have to use sometimes more complicated methods because of our domestic situation. (Chairman Mao queries about the translation and Miss Tang repeats "mode of action.") But on our fundamental objectives we will act very decisively and without regard to public opinion. So if a real danger develops or hegemonial intentions become active, we will certainly resist them wherever they appear. And as the President said to the Chairman, in our own interests, not as a kindness to anyone else.

Chairman Mao: (Laughing) Those are honest words.

Dr. Kissinger: This is our position.

Chairman Mao: Do you want our Chinese women? We can give you ten million. (Laughter, particularly among the women.)

Dr. Kissinger: The Chairman is improving his offer.

Chairman Mao: By doing so we can let them flood your country with disaster and therefore impair your interests. In our country we have too many women, and they have a way of doing things. They give birth to children and our children are too many. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: It is such a novel proposition, we will have to study it.

Chairman Mao: You can set up a committee to study the issue. That is how your visit to China is settling the population question. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: We will study utilization and allocation.

Chairman Mao: If we ask them to go I think they would be willing.

Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily.

Chairman Mao: That's because of their feudal ideas, big nation chauvinism.

Dr. Kissinger: We are certainly willing to receive them.

Chairman Mao: The Chinese are very alien-excluding.

For instance, in your country you can let in so many nationalities, yet in China how many foreigners do you see?

Prime Minister Chou: Very few.

Dr. Kissinger: Very few.

Chairman Mao: You have about 600,000 Chinese in the United States. We probably don't even have 60 Americans here. I would like to study the problem. I don't know the reason.

Miss Tang: Mr. Lord's wife is Chinese.

Chairman Mao: Oh?

Mr. Lord: Yes.

Chairman Mao: I studied the problem. I don't know why the Chinese never like foreigners. There are no Indians perhaps. As for the

Japanese, they are not very numerous either; compared to others there are quite a few and some are married and settled down.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, your experience with foreigners has not been all that fortunate.

Chairman Mao: Yes, perhaps that is some reason for that.

Yes, in the past hundred years, mainly the eight powers, and later it was Japan during the Boxer Revolution. For thirteen years Japan occupied China, they occupied the major part of China; and in the past the allied forces, the invading foreigners, not only occupied Chinese territory, they also asked China for indemnity.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and extraterritorial rights.

Chairman Mao: Now in our relations with Japan, we haven't asked them for indemnity and that would add to the burden of the people. It would be difficult to calculate all the indemnity. No accountant would be able to do it.

And only in this way can we move from hostility to relaxation in relations between peoples. And it will be more difficult to settle relations of hostility between the Japanese and Chinese peoples than between us and you.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. There is no feeling of hostility of American people at all toward the Chinese people. On the contrary. Between us right now there is only essentially a juridical problem. (Chairman Mao nods agreement.) Which we will solve in the next years. But there is a strong community of interest which is operating immediately.

Chairman Mao: Is that so?

Dr. Kissinger: Between China and the U. S.

Chairman Mao: What do you mean by community of interest? On Taiwan?

Dr. Kissinger: In relation to other countries that may have intentions.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the Soviet Union?

Dr. Kissinger: I mean the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: Miss Shen understood you.

Chairman Mao: (Looking toward Miss Shen.) The Chinese have a good command of English. (To Prime Minister Chou.) Who is she?

Prime Minister Chou: Miss Shen Jo-yun.

Chairman Mao: Girls. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) Today I have been uttering some nonsense for which I will have to beg the pardon of the women of China.

Dr. Kissinger: It sounded very attractive to the Americans present. (Chairman Mao and the girls laugh.)

Chairman Mao: If we are going to establish a liaison office in your country do you want Miss Shen or Miss Tang?

Dr. Kissinger: We will deal with that through the channel of Huang Hua. (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: Our interpreters are truly too few.

Dr. Kissinger: But they have done a remarkable job, the interpreters we have met.

Chairman Mao: The interpreters you have met and our present interpreters who are doing most of the work are now in their twenties and thirties. If they grow too old they don't do interpretation so well.

Prime Minister Chou: We should send some abroad.

Chairman Mao: We will send children at such a height (indicating with his hands), not too old.

Dr. Kissinger: We will be prepared to establish exchange programs where you can send students to America.

Chairman Mao: And if among a hundred persons there are ten who are successful learning the language well, then that would be a remarkable success. And if among them a few dozens don't want to come back, for example, some girls who want to stay in the United States, no matter. Because you do not exclude foreigners like Chinese. In the past the Chinese went abroad and they didn't want to learn the local language. (Looking toward Miss Tang) Her grandparents refused to learn English. They are so obstinate. You know Chinese are very obstinate and conservative. Many of the older generation overseas Chinese don't speak the local language. But they are getting better, the younger generation.

Dr. Kissinger: In America, all, or the vast majority, speak English.

Prime Minister Chou: That is the younger people. The first generation ones don't learn the local language. There was an old overseas Chinese who came back to China after living abroad. She was old and died in Peking in the 1950s when she was in her nineties. She was a member of our People's Government. She didn't speak a word of English. She was Cantonese, extremely conservative.

Dr. Kissinger: Chinese culture is so particular that it is difficult to assimilate other cultures.

Chairman Mao: Chinese language is not bad, but the Chinese characters are not good.

Prime Minister Chou: They are very difficult to learn.

Chairman Mao: And there are many contradictions between the oral and written language because the oral language is monosyllabic while the written language develops from symbols. We do not use the alphabet.

Dr. Kissinger: There are some attempts to use an alphabet I am told.

Prime Minister Chou: First we must standardize the oral language.

Chairman Mao: (Gestures with his hand and points to his books.) But if the Soviet Union would throw its bombs and kill all those over 30 who are Chinese, that would solve the problem for us. Because the old people like me can't learn Chinese. We read Chinese. The majority of my books are Chinese. There are very few dictionaries over there. All the other books are in Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the Chairman learning English now?

Chairman Mao: I have heard that I am studying it. Those are rumors on the outside. I don't heed them. They are false. I know a few English letters. I don't know the grammar.

Miss Tang: The Chairman invented an English word.

Chairman Mao: Yes, I invented the English term "paper tiger."

Dr. Kissinger: "Paper tiger." Yes, that was all about us. (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: But you are a German from Germany. But your Germany now has met with an ill fate, because in two wars it has been defeated.

Dr. Kissinger: It attempted too much, beyond its abilities and resources.

Chairman Mao: Yes, and it also scattered its forces in war. For example, in its attack against the Soviet Union. If it is going to attack, it should attack in one place, but they separated their troops into three routes. It began in June but then by the winter they couldn't stand it because it was too cold. What is the reason for the Europeans fear of the cold?

Dr. Kissinger: The Germans were not prepared for a long war. Actually they did not mobilize their whole forces until 1943. I agree with the Chairman that if they had concentrated on one front they would almost certainly have won. They were only ten kilometers from Moscow even by dispersing their forces. (Chairman Mao relights his cigar.)

Chairman Mao: They shouldn't have attacked Moscow or Kiev. They should have taken Leningrad as a first step. Another error in policy was they didn't cross the sea after Dunkirk.

Dr. Kissinger: After Dunkirk.

Chairman Mao: They were entirely unprepared.

Dr. Kissinger: And Hitler was a romantic. He had a strange liking for England.

Chairman Mao: Oh? Then why didn't they go there? Because the British at that time were completely without troops.

Dr. Kissinger: If they were able to cross the channel into Britain . . . I think they had only one division in all of England.

Prime Minister Chou: Is that so?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Also Sir Anthony Eden told us in Germany at that time that a Minister in the Army of Churchill's Government said at that time if Hitler had crossed the channel they would have had no forces. They had withdrawn all their forces back. When they were preparing for the German crossing, Churchill had no arms. He could only organize police to defend the coast. If they crossed they would not be able to defend.

Dr. Kissinger: It also shows what a courageous man can do because Churchill created by his personality much more strength than they possessed.

Chairman Mao: Actually by that time they couldn't hold.

Prime Minister Chou: So Hitler carried some romantic feelings about Britain?

Dr. Kissinger: I think he was a maniac, but he did have some feelings about Britain.

Chairman Mao: I believe Hitler was from the Rhine area?

Dr. Kissinger: Austria.

Prime Minister Chou: He was a soldier in the First World War.

Dr. Kissinger: He was in the Germany Army, but he was a native of Austria.

Prime Minister Chou: From the Danube.

Dr. Kissinger: He conducted strategy artistically rather than strategically. He did it by intuition. He had no overall plan.

Chairman Mao: Then why did the German troops heed him so much?

Dr. Kissinger: Probably because the Germans are somewhat romantic people and because he must have had a very strong personality.

Chairman Mao: Mainly because during the First World War the German nation was humiliated.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that was a very important factor.

Chairman Mao: If there are Russians going to attack China, I can tell you today that our way of conducting a war will be guerrilla war and protracted war. We will let them go wherever they want. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) They want to come to the Yellow River tributaries. That would be good, very good. (Laughter.) And if they go further to the Yangtse River tributaries, that would not be bad either.

Dr. Kissinger: But if they use bombs and do not send armies? (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: What should we do? Perhaps you can organize a committee to study the problem. We'll let them beat us up and they will

lose any resources. They say they are socialists. We are also socialists and that will be socialists attacking socialists.

Dr. Kissinger: If they attack China, we would certainly oppose them for our own reasons.

Chairman Mao: But your people are not awakened, and Europe and you would think that it would be a fine thing if it were that the ill water would flow toward China.

Dr. Kissinger: What Europe thinks I am not able to judge. They cannot do anything anyway. They are basically irrelevant. (In the midst of this Chairman Mao toasts Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord with tea.) What we think is that if the Soviet Union overruns China, this would dislocate the security of all other countries and will lead to our own isolation.

Chairman Mao: (Laughing) How will that happen? How would that be?

Because since in being bogged down in Vietnam you met so many difficulties, do you think they would feel good if they were bogged down in China?

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union?

Miss Tang: The Soviet Union.

Chairman Mao: And then you can let them get bogged down in China, for half a year, or one, or two, or three, or four years. And then you can poke your finger at the Soviet back. And your slogan then will be for peace, that is you must bring down Socialist imperialism for the sake of peace. And perhaps you can begin to help them in doing business, saying whatever you need we will help against China.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, it is really very important that we understand each other's motives. We will never knowingly cooperate in an attack on China.

Chairman Mao: (Interrupting) No, that's not so. Your aim in doing that would be to bring the Soviet Union down.

Dr. Kissinger: That's a very dangerous thing. (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: (Using both hands for gestures) The goal of the Soviet Union is to occupy both Europe and Asia, the two continents.

Dr. Kissinger: We want to discourage a Soviet attack, not defeat it. We want to prevent it. (Prime Minister Chou looks at his watch.)

Chairman Mao: As for things, matters, in the world, it is hard to say. We would rather think about things this way. We think this way the world would be better.

Dr. Kissinger: Which way?

Chairman Mao: That is that they would attack China and be defeated. We must think of the worst eventuality.

Dr. Kissinger: That is your necessity. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Chairman Mao: We have so many women in our country that don't know how to fight.

Miss Tang: Not necessarily. There are women's detachments.

Chairman Mao: They are only on stage. In reality if there is a fight you would flee very quickly and run into underground shelters.

Miss Wong: If the minutes of this talk were made public, it would incur the public wrath on behalf of half the population.

Chairman Mao: That is half of the population of China.

Prime Minister Chou: First of all, it wouldn't pass the Foreign Ministry.

Chairman Mao: We can call this a secret meeting. (Chinese laughter) Should our meeting today be public, or kept secret?

Dr. Kissinger: It's up to you. I am prepared to make it public if you wish.

Chairman Mao: What is your idea? Is it better to have it public or secret?

Dr. Kissinger: I think it is probably better to make it public.

Chairman Mao: Then the words we say about women today shall be made nonexistent. (Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: We will remove them from the record. (Laughter) We will start studying this proposal when I get back.

Chairman Mao: You know, the Chinese have a scheme to harm the United States, that is, to send ten million women to the United States and impair its interests by increasing its population.

Dr. Kissinger: The Chairman has fixed the idea so much in my mind that I'll certainly use it at my next press conference. (Laughter)

Chairman Mao: That would be all right with me. I'm not afraid of anything. Anyway, God has sent me an invitation.

Dr. Kissinger: I really find the Chairman in better health this year than last year.

Chairman Mao: Yes, I am better than last year.

[The photographers entered the room.]

They are attacking us. (The Chairman then gets up without assistance to say goodbye to the Americans.)

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Please give my warm regards to President Nixon. Also to Mrs. Nixon. I was not able to meet her and Secretary Rogers. I must apologize.

Dr. Kissinger: I will certainly do that.

Prime Minister Chou: We will send you a press release in one hour.

(Chairman Mao escorts Dr. Kissinger into the outer room where he says goodbye to Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord. Prime Minister Chou then escorts Dr. Kissinger to his waiting car.)

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