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EUROPE



PREVIOUS TALKS



~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~EUROPEOCTOBER 1975 TALKSChinese Position in October 1975 (Mao + Teng):

- (Mao:) Europe is too soft now. They are afraid of the Soviet Union. Europe is too scattered, too loose and too spread out, and it is difficult for Europe to achieve unity. We would prefer Europe to be unified and stronger.
- (Mao:) France is afraid of Germany. They fear the reunification of West and East Germany, which would result in a fist. That France prefers to keep Germany divided is not good. China is in favor of reunification. West Germany has 50 million people; East Germany 18 million. The reunification of Germany now would not be dangerous.
- (Mao:) There is a considerable portion of Americans who do not believe the U.S. will use nuclear weapons in Europe. They do not believe Americans will be willing to die for Europe.
- In China's talks with the Europeans, they have constantly asked: "If there is trouble in Europe, what will be the attitude of the United States?" The U.S. asks what will be the attitude of the Europeans; this perhaps has something to do with U.S. relations with the Europeans.
- There is a difference between the U.S. and China in the assessment of Soviet strategy. China believes the focus of Soviet strategy is in the West, in Europe, and in the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf -- all places linked to Europe.
- China calls CSCE the European Insecurity Conference, and the West calls it the European Security Conference. The Munich agreement pulled the wool over the eyes of Chamberlain, Daladier and some Europeans. One can say that CSCE pulled the wool over the eyes of the West and demoralized the Western people and let them slacken their pace. There is a Chinese saying: A donkey is made to push the millstone because when you make the donkey to push around the millstone you have to blindfold it.

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E.O. 12958 (b) (1) - (2) - (3) - (4) - (5) - (6) - (7) - (8) - (9) - (10) - (11) - (12)

NSC/Memo, CIA/Int, State Dept, CIA/Polines ; State v. cws 9/17/03

By ll NARA, Date 6/22/10~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

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## (Chinese Position October 1975 continued)

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- The European Security Conference, or any attempt to appease the Russians, will fail; they will be counter productive.
- Those who have been most enthusiastic in proclaiming the so-called victories of the European Security Conference are firstly the Soviet Union and secondly the U.S.
- China understands that the Americans, Europeans and Japanese do not want a war because they have gone through two World Wars. And they fear a war, day and night. They hope to obtain peace for a certain period of time at any price. Exactly because of that, we should not blindfold them by the evolution of detente. We should remind them of the possibility of attack from the polar bear. So everytime Chairman Mao meets foreign guests, he advises them to get prepared.
- France has been engaging in negotiations with the USSR for long-term agreements involving about 2.5 million francs.

U.S. Position in October 1975;

- (To Mao) Europe is indeed too soft. They are afraid of the Soviet Union and of their domestic situation. We too prefer Europe to be unified and strong.
- (To Mao) Europe does not have too many strong leaders. Schmidt is the strongest of the leaders of Europe today.
- France prefers to keep Germany divided. If East and West Germany united, it might be on a nationalistic basis. The U.S. favors the reunification of Germany, but right now it would be prevented militarily by the Soviet Union. We are not afraid of a unified Germany; but Soviet power in Europe must be weakened before it can happen.
- (To Mao) The weakness in Europe is not U.S. troops but European troops. With nuclear weapons the U.S. can resist any attack. If there is a substantial attack in Western Europe we will certainly use nuclear weapons. And the Soviet Union must never believe otherwise -- it's too dangerous. We have 7000 weapons in Europe, and they're not there to be captured. In the U.S. we have many more weapons. We will never withdraw from Europe without a nuclear war.

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( U.S. Position October 1975 continued)

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- With respect to Western Europe, we think there are contradictory trends. On the one hand, our relations with the principal West European countries have greatly improved. We have very many leadership meetings now at the highest levels, including that of Presidents and Foreign Ministers, where we have intimate exchanges.
- On the other hand, in many European countries there is a tendency to base foreign policy on illusions. For many of them there is the temptation to substitute goodwill for strength. And in some of them, Communist parties controlled by Moscow are strong enough to influence foreign policy, as in Italy and to some extent France. We have the problems of perhaps especially optimistic assessments of foreign policy and of the leftist trend -- anti-defense rather than ideological -- which invites a weak defense posture.
- We greatly welcome the many visits of European leaders to the People's Republic of China and appreciate your giving them the Chinese perception of the international environment. Schmidt's visit [in Nov. 1975] can be of great significance. Within the Social Democratic Party Schmidt is by far the most realistic. Schmidt is much less of a vague and sentimental mind than Willy Brandt, and would greatly benefit from Chinese perceptions. It would strengthen him domestically and benefit the whole European situation, since Schmidt also has great influence with Giscard.
- While we have talked more than we have done in giving credits to the USSR the Europeans have done more than they have said. The People's Republic of China and France have given about \$7.5 billion in credits. The U.S. has given the Soviets about \$500 million over the years.
- We have had difficulties on the southern flank, in the Mediterranean, some of them caused by our own domestic situation. No country can afford a weakening, extending over years, of its central authority without paying some price for it over the next years. But we are in the process of rectifying this, and if you separate the debate from the votes, you will see we have lately been winning the votes in the Congress, which is a reflection of public opinion.

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(U.S. Position in October 1975, continued)

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We have improved the situation in Portugal. We hope that within the next four to six months we can solve or make major progress on the Turkish/Greek/Cyprus problem.

- There is no European of any standing that has any question about what the U.S. will do in case of Soviet attack. In any threat, the U.S. will be there. The U.S. concern is therefore whether the Europeans will be there. The U.S. organizes the defense of the North Atlantic and brings about the only cohesion that exists. It was not the U.S. that advocated the European Security Conference.
- If we had done what some Americans have recommended, namely to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, then the effect on our relative power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union would lead to the Finlandization of Western Europe.
- The U.S. did not advocate the European Security Conference but rather reluctantly agreed to do it in 1971 to ease some of the pressures on the European Governments. Our role in the CSCE was essentially passive. We do not rely on the European Security Conference and we do not rely on detente.
- It is a problem that greatly concerns us, whether the policy that is being pursued may lead to confusion. This is a serious concern. But China should also consider that the policy we are pursuing is the best means we have to rally resistance. If we pursued some other approach, the left wing parties in Europe might split the U.S. from Europe with the argument that the U.S. is a threat to the peace of the world. The present investigations going on in America indicate that it was the present Administration, including Dr. Kissinger, that has used methods to prevent the Soviet Union from stretching out its hands.
- We do not agree that the CSCE was a significant event. In America it had no impact whatever, and insofar as it is known in America it is as a device to ask the USSR to ease its control over Eastern Europe and its own people. In Europe, if one looks at specific countries, CSCE might have had some minor negative impact in a minority of countries. In France, Britain, and Germany it has had no impact.

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(U.S. Position in October 1975, continued)

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- In Eastern Europe it is the countries like Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland, which want most to be independent of the Soviet Union, which have been the most active supporters of the CSCE.
- One should not proclaim Soviet victories that do not exist. Those proclaiming the victories of CSCE are firstly the Soviet Union and secondly over domestic opponents in the U.S. The U.S. has not claimed any great achievements for CSCE. The Soviets must claim success since they pursued this policy for 15 years.
- Regardless of what the Soviets say publicly, they may feel that they miscalculated with respect to CSCE. All they got from the West were general statements about matters that had already been settled, which we obtained means of very specific pressures on matters of practical issues. There were no unsettled frontiers in Europe: The Balkan frontiers were settled in 1946-47 in the peace conferences in Paris; the Eastern frontier of Poland was settled at Yalta, and the western frontier of Poland was recognized by both German states. Not all of our politicians know this but this is legally a fact.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By MM NARA, Date 6/22/10

*State guidelines*  
*9/17/03*

EUROPE: SOUTHERN FLANK

I. OCTOBER 1975 TALKS

Chinese Position in October 1975

- China is not in a position to do anything in that part of the world. But it has done one thing; Portugal has approached China many times for the establishment of diplomatic relations, which China has not agreed to. China does not want to do anything that would be helpful to any Soviet forces gaining the upperhand.
- China thinks Portugal will see many reversals and many trials of strength.
- There are contradictions between the Spanish Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Among the revisionist Communist Parties in Europe, it can be said that the contradictions between the Spanish and Dutch Parties and the Soviet Union are comparatively deeper.
- China thinks that the influence of the Spanish revisionist party is not so deep as that of the Portuguese in the armed forces.
- Yugoslav Prime Minister Bijedic, visiting China, said that the Yugoslavs are also quite worried about what will happen after Tito's death. They are a very militant nation, although there are some contradictions among the various nationalities. One of their strong points is that they are comparatively clear-minded about the situation they face.
- It is very good that the U.S. will sell military equipment to Yugoslavia.
- It is quite good that Italy and Yugoslavia have recently reached an agreement to solve the Trieste problem.
- If the Soviet Union could control Yugoslavia, then the chessboard of Soviet strategy in Europe will become alive. The next will be Romania and Albania. If the Soviet Union moves on Yugoslavia, it will involve not only military strategy but also have a very serious political influence. Its impact will spread at least to the whole of the southern flank, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

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## (Chinese Position in October 1975)

- One can hardly see the trend in the development of the situation in Italy. To China, it is all blank; China doesn't know how to look at the situation. In its view the so-called "historic compromise" cannot succeed. But China does not attach so much significance to whether the Communist Party of Italy gets power. Communists were in government in France after the war and just "performed on the stage;" they carried out de Gaulle's policy.

U.S. Position in October 1975

- In Portugal, we find a situation where as a result of forty years of authoritarian rule, the democratic forces are not well organized, and where the political structure is very weak. The military have adopted some of the philosophy of African liberation movements, which they fought for 25 years. And the Communist Party of Cunhal is very much under the influence of the Soviet Union. In this vacuum the Communist Party achieved disproportionate influence, and for a while seemed on the verge of dominating the situation.
- We think this trend has been arrested. The U.S. is working with its West European friends to strengthen the forces opposed to Cunhal. Unfortunately some of these forces are better at rhetoric than at organization. But we think the situation has improved, and we will continue to improve it. But there will be many trials of strength. And the difficulty of our West European friends is they relax after a temporary success.
- If Goncalves, who is on the side of the Soviet Union, stages a coup, we will certainly oppose it. The U.S. supports Antunes and Soares. Antunes was in Washington a few weeks ago and we are cooperating with him. We are determined to resist a Soviet takeover there, even if it leads to armed conflict. If they are planning a coup it will not be easy for them.
- China's policy is very wise -- to avoid doing anything that would be helpful to the Soviets in Portugal.

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## (U.S. Position in October 1975)

- In Spain, the situation is more complicated. On one hand it is a regime on its last legs, because Franco is very old; but on the other hand we do not want to repeat the situation of Portugal in Spain. The U.S. has been approached on a number of occasions by the Spanish Communist Party, but we consider it controlled by Moscow.
- The U.S. has been negotiating a continuation of its base rights agreement with Spain. We are doing this because we do not believe a shrinkage of American security interests in the Mediterranean is in the security interest of the world.
- Along with this, the U.S. is planning to set up a number of committees in the cultural and economic fields so that in the case of a new situation we have organic contacts with many levels of Spanish life. We are setting up committees now in connection with the base agreement so that when Franco leaves we will not have to start, as we did in Portugal, looking around for contacts. We will have this infrastructure.
- One reason the U.S. needs the base agreement is to stay in contact with the Spanish military. Our assessment is that at the higher levels there is very little impact on what you call this revisionist party. At the lower levels -- the Captains-- we have had some reports that they are doing some recruiting. But at the commanding levels their influence can't be compared with the Portuguese situation.
- Juan Carlos is a nice but naive man. He doesn't understand revolution or what he will face. He thinks he can do it with goodwill. His intentions are good, but we don't think he is strong enough to manage events by himself.
- The U.S. is concerned about Yugoslavia, about a number of things that could happen after Tito's death. There could be a separatist movement from some of the provinces, or there could be a split within the Yugoslav Communist Party. Both of these could be supported by the Soviet Union. And there could be Soviet military intervention. In Montenegro, they discovered Soviet activities.

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## (U.S. Position in October 1975)

- The U.S. is very interested in the independence and independent policy of Yugoslavia. In the last year the President and I have paid separate visits to Yugoslavia, and we are going to start selling them conventional military equipment, such as anti-tank weapons, in the next few weeks.
- If the Soviet Union invades Yugoslavia it will be a difficult question politically and strategically. The U.S. is now doing some military planning for this contingency, we have asked General Haig, in his capacity as American Commander, to do some planning. This is ~~known~~ only to the top leaders of three European governments. It is a very complicated problem logistically because our best means of entering is through Italy and that is logistically very difficult. And any conflict that involves the U.S. and the Soviet Union is bound to involve nuclear threats. But if the Soviet Union can get away with a military move on Yugoslavia, we will face a very grave situation which will require serious countermeasures. It will not be like Czechoslovakia.
- If the Soviet Union invades Yugoslavia it will affect developments in Italy, Germany and France.
- China could be helpful in Italy, at least with some of the Socialists. The Christian Democratic Party has very weak leadership and it is not very disciplined. Even though they change Prime Ministers often, it is always the same group.
- The U.S. totally opposes what the Italians call the "historic compromise." It can succeed, but it will lead to disaster for the non-Communist parties. And the U.S. does not give visas to Italian Communists to come to the U.S.
- It is very important if the Communist Party gets into power in Italy, because it will have an effect on France and even the FRG. And it is of significance to the support that the U.S. can give to NATO, if there is a country there with a large Communist Party in the government.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/00, State Dept. Guidelines; State review  
By                      NARA, Date 6/22/10 7/1/03EUROPEI. NOVEMBER 1974 TALKSChinese Position in November 1974 (TENG)

- CSCE represents the same Soviet tactic as the Asian Collective Security scheme, to divide and control the countries of the area.
- The strategic emphasis of the Soviet Union is a feint toward the East to attack in the West -- to attack in Europe.
- It is true that an attack in any quarter is of significance to other areas too. But one's strategic assessment has its practical side. If Western Europe does not have a strategy and make preparations, it will suffer.
- It is the same with Europe as with Japan: It is the Chinese wish that the U.S. keep its good relations with Europe and Japan. Because if the Soviet Union wishes to launch a world war and doesn't get Europe first, they won't succeed in achieving hegemony in other parts of the world. Because Europe is so important politically, economically and militarily. And now that Europe is facing the threat from the polar bear, if they don't unite and strengthen themselves, then only one or two European countries will not be able to deal with this threat in isolation. When the U.S. deals with the polar bear, the U.S. needs strong allies in Europe and Japan. U.S. relations with its allies should be on the basis of equality, which is the only basis for real partnership.
- If Europe wishes to deal with the U.S. on the basis of equality, they should unite and strengthen themselves. This is in the U.S. interest.
- It is not possible that Western Europe will separate itself from the U.S.
- If the Left comes to power in Europe and appears on stage and performs, they will be teachers by negative example. For example, the Algerians had experience with a Communist Minister in France who, as Air Force Minister, sent planes to bomb the Algerian guerrillas. So if the Left comes to power, it is not so formidable.

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CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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(Chinese position in November 1974, continued)

- European leaders who have spoken with the PRC have seemed much more worried than Secretary Kissinger, not just about Soviet naval forces, but on the whole question of conventional forces.
- If there is a change in Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union incites pro-Soviet elements to bring in Soviet forces, what would the U.S. do? (Ch'iao's question) In China's opinion, not only the Middle East is explosive, but also the Balkan peninsula. And this is an old strategy of the Tsar. (Teng)
- China has no reason to be in disagreement with the U.S.'s support for the independent stance of Yugoslavia and Romania.

U.S. Position in November 1974

- U.S. relations with Western Europe have substantially improved since 1973. Relations with France are much better, and our discussions of 1974 have resulted in greater cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance along the lines the U.S. has pointed out in prior discussions.
- Neither Europe nor Japan is in the forefront of the energy problem, even though they are the primary victims. The same with defense. It is a historical reality that neither of these societies are in a position to take a leading role for their own survival without strong American support. If they were to separate from the U.S., they would very soon become impotent and Finlandized. Therefore, they are not capable of being a second world by themselves under the present circumstances. It would be much more convenient for us if they could be. But the U.S. believes in equal partnership.
- On the energy problem, neither Europe or Japan can play the strategic role on which the U.S. and China agree, if at the same time they are demoralized by economic pressures which are beyond their capacity to solve. That is why the U.S. is in the forefront on these issues. We are organizing the consumer nations for the consumer-producer dialogue because it is

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(U.S. Position in November 1974, continued)

important that Europe and Japan not be left in the position that they feel their future is in the hands of forces totally outside their control.

- The U.S. has taken the lead in organizing with Europe on the oil problem because if Europe continues to suffer a massive balance of payments drain, they will lose so much confidence that they will be unable to resist Soviet pressures. If they take money from Libya or Algeria, this will continue their political demoralization. The U.S. could easily have proceeded on its own, on economic grounds, to deal bilaterally with Saudi Arabia.
- CSCE is ridiculous. It can no longer achieve anything significant. History cannot be changed by sentences in a treaty. There will be no substantive agreement of any kind.
- CSCE should therefore be concluded. If it goes on, it will create an impression of success which is not warranted. It will be finished in early 1975.
- The U.S. delegation at CSCE is instructed to stay out of the technical discussions. One has to have a German or Soviet mind to understand these issues.
- The U.S. will do its best to increase its preparedness in Western Europe. Unfortunately some of Europe's leaders are not the most heroic right now. The Chinese have met them, and can form their own opinions.
- The U.S. fully agrees on the need to keep close ties with its NATO allies. The U.S. agrees that European unity is in the U.S. interest -- unless they try to unite on the basis of hostility towards the U.S., because this defeats the strategy.
- The Communist parties in France and Italy are substantially controlled from Moscow. They are now acting very moderate and responsible. One of the successes of our policy is that they have had to show their responsibility by supporting NATO -- at least the Italians. This is absolutely unreliable. Nevertheless, one aim of the U.S. strategy has been to paralyze not only our Left but the European Left as well.

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(U.S. Position in November 1974, continued)

- The U.S. opposes and will resist the inclusion of the Left in European governments. We oppose it in Portugal because we don't want it to be a model for other countries. We oppose it in Italy and France. If the Communists came into power in France or Italy it would have serious consequences, first in Germany. It would strengthen the Left Wing of the SPD, which is very much influenced by East Germany. It would have a serious effect on NATO.
  
- We agree that if the Left, in power, serves as a negative example for others, we should not be discouraged and it is not a final setback. But we must resist it.
  
- In MBFR, we face the irony that the best way for the U.S. to keep substantial troops in Europe is to agree to a very small reduction with the Soviet Union, because this reduces pressures from the internal left. There is no possibility of rapid progress in MBFR and no possibility of very substantial reductions. There is a slim chance that before Brezhnev's visit in 1975 they might agree to some small cut -- say 20-25,000-- but through 1976 there will be no substantial change in the military dispositions.
  
- In the Vladivostok agreement the U.S. paid no price of any kind, in any area. European fears that we will weaken our conventional forces as a result of Vladivostok are ridiculous. As nuclear war becomes more complex, we have to increase conventional forces, not weaken them.
  
- Secretary Kissinger visited Yugoslavia and talked with Tito and his colleagues about the precise problem Ch'iao raised -- of pro-Soviet elements inviting in Soviet forces. The U.S. will begin selling military equipment to Yugoslavia in 1975. We are now studying what to do in such a case. We will not let it happen unchallenged. It will not be like Hungary or Czechoslovakia. We have not yet decided on precise measures.
  
- If President Ford attends a CSCE Summit in 1975 -- which we never wanted -- he plans to stop in Bucharest and Belgrade to help make clear the American interest in the independence of those two countries.
  
- It was no accident that Secretary Kissinger, on his recent trip, visited Yugoslavia and Romania and Afghanistan and made statements in each about an independent foreign policy.



~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

EUROPE

I. NOVEMBER 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in November 1973

(MAO + CHOU)

- The attitude of major European countries [on the Soviet question] is not bad. The main trouble is the Benelux and the Scandinavian countries. Germany is still a part of the West and will not follow the Soviet Union, while Norway is quite fearful of the Soviet Union. Sweden is a bit wavering. Finland is slightly tended to be close to the Soviet Union. But they were very courageous during that war. (Mao)
- It will be greatly difficult for the Soviet Union to seize Europe and put it on its side. They have such ambition but great difficulty. (Mao)
- US troop withdrawal from Europe would be a great assistance to the Soviet Union. (Mao)
- There is a danger that Brandt, if he persists in his present policy, will give the Soviet Union a veto over German policy.
- For opponents of the Soviet Union, things will be complicated. For instance, it will not be so easy for the West Europeans to share a common view.

US Position in November 1973

- It is important that Western Europe, China, and the US pursue a coordinated course in this period. Then nobody will be attacked [by the Soviet Union]. (to Mao)
- The weaker links in Europe are indeed the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, and there is some ambiguity in the evolution of the German position. (to Mao)
- The US and our allies have almost completed drafting an "Atlantic Charter" in the military and political sphere. The economic one requires more work, but the "contradictions" have to be overcome, because of the great need. We think we can work them out. (to Mao)

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; State v. as 9/18/03  
By 111 NARA, Date 6/22/10

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(US Position in November 1973)

- It is very difficult for the Soviet Union to seize Europe militarily. And if they attempt it, they will certainly have to fight us. (to Mao)
- Our European allies are distressed when we engage in activities such as the alert as we did, and dissatisfied when we conduct a half policy. It seems to be our destiny that they are doomed to be dissatisfied. The secret dream of our Western allies in the Middle East is to restore their position of 1940 without any risk or effort on their part; therefore, to the extent we are more active, there is a vague feeling of jealousy and uneasiness.
- Each Western European leader faces the problem that for domestic reasons he has to say one thing while deep down he understands that what we are doing is essentially correct. Therefore, very often, particularly after the event is over, they take a public position which is at variance with their understanding of the real situation.
- Brezhnev's letter demanded an immediate reply. Therefore we had no time to consult.
- Frankly, there is no point in consulting if there is only one thing you can do. If the allies had not agreed with us, we still would have had to go on alert. Where we believe the overall equilibrium will be disturbed, we will continue to behave in this manner if there is no time.
- The occasional criticism of our Soviet policy by our European allies has to be weighed against the equally strong criticism in the previous period. It is healthier for them to be worried about how far we might go and to have them make greater efforts in their own defense than to have them pursue their earlier policies, when they were constantly pushing us to be less intransigent to the Soviet Union and were constantly approaching us with ideas on how to bring about detente. If there is to be detente, we had rather manage it than have the Europeans do so.
- Despite the surface phenomena, our relations with Western Europe are going along in a good direction.
- It is dangerous to underestimate West German shortsightedness. It is not just the Brandt government; it is an historical phenomenon.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-3-

(US Position in November 1973)

- Adenauer is the only German leader of stature. He never let himself be deflected. He understood the danger for Germany if it maneuvered too much.
- Brandt, if he persists in his policy, will give the Soviet Union a veto over German policy.
- If the US, PRC, and Western Europe understand each other and if we behave intelligently in other parts of the world, we can contain Soviet expansionism. Of the three, the West Europeans are the weakest link, in terms of their understanding. But on the other hand, they are also the most difficult area for the Soviet Union to attack. So the Soviets are trying to undermine them by such measures as the European Security Conference and other negotiations. If in these efforts we keep slightly to the left of the West Europeans, this is a means to prevent them from going further, because then they will be afraid we will make a separate arrangement with the Soviet Union. That will worry them sufficiently so that they start thinking about their own defense.
- True, there is the great danger that the people may not be able to comprehend this point.
- Some of our allies helped us draft the Nuclear War Agreement. So some were being critical of their own draft.
- Heath is the best of the European leaders, but he does not understand the importance of NATO as well as China does.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EUROPE

I. FEBRUARY TALKS 1973

Chinese Position in February (MAO + CHOU)

- The U.S. should cooperate with Europe and Japan on fundamental matters. (Mao)
- The Soviets are backing the French Communists against Pompidou. (Mao)
- China also favors the German CDU. (Mao)
- The whole of Europe is thinking only of peace (Mao) -- the illusions of peace created by their leaders. (Chou)
- HAK's pledge to strengthen European defenses and keep U.S. armies in Europe is "very good." (Mao)
- Maybe the U.S. plans to raise tariffs and non-tariff barriers in order to intimidate Europe and Japan. (Mao)
- Mao told Schumann that if a big war broke out in Europe, France would have to rely on the U.S. This may have shaken him a bit. Alec Douglas-Home seemed to have more understanding.
- The question in Europe is not entirely one of ideological confusion but that those now in power have created peaceful illusions, the people may be taken in, and the Soviets have made great use of this. Chou told each West European foreign minister that peaceful illusions shouldn't be maintained.
- Western Europe may want to push the ill waters of the USSR eastward. This is based on an illusion.
- Western Europe seems not to be fully prepared for a Soviet attack on them. The Soviets will use their military position to overcome the West European countries politically one by one.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; State v. v. 9/18/03

By MA NARA, Date 6/22/10

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

(Chinese position, continued)

- The British have not been helpful in South Asia.
- The Europeans are very nearsighted about the Soviet military danger.
- The European Security Conference is not really a security conference but really an insecurity conference. This was said by Ch'iao, but is the words of Chairman Mao.
- The Nordic countries, though they say some things about the U.S., are still vigilant against the Soviet Union. Even Sweden and Finland.
- It still seems possible to gradually rid the Europeans of their illusions about peace, but it will take some time. So it is all right to hold some security conferences and troop reduction meetings in Europe, because it will serve to educate them. Some truth will be told to them.

U.S. Position in February

- The PRC, because of its principles, can speak more firmly to Europe than the U.S. can. (to Mao)
- European leadership is weak now. They don't unite, they don't take farsighted views, and they hope dangers will go away without effort. (to Mao)
- The U.S. has no plan for any large reduction of U.S. forces in Europe for the next four years. At most, a ten - fifteen percent reduction. (to Mao)
- Western Europe's intellectual confusion, disunity, and failure to be an effective counterweight to the USSR are one of the long-term countervailing factors against an era of peace.
- The Germans will face a dilemma between Ostpolitik and maintaining their Western orientation. They will find that Ostpolitik didn't advance their national aspirations, and it will lead to domestic confusion.
- The danger is not their intention but the process they can start. They may divert the Soviets eastward, though they don't intend to. They

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(U.S. Position continued)

don't think in such long-range terms and don't believe the Soviets have aggressive intentions anyway.

- It is too dangerous for the Soviets to attack Western Europe. They will first create an atmosphere of peace to free themselves to move east or south.
- U.S. relations with Britain are very close. We are working on ways to keep them in the nuclear field because we don't want them to leave it. We will give them advanced technology to prevent their force from becoming obsolete in the face of new Soviet programs.
- Britain can be a positive influence in Europe.
- The European leaders have dealt with CSCE and MBFR entirely from the point of view of their domestic politics.
- The U.S. has gone along with CSCE in order to bring it to a head and get it out of the way quickly. We have sought to make it as meaningless as possible because it is in the Soviets' interest to treat it as a great historic event. It was imposed on us by our allies.
- In September 1972 HAK agreed to CSCE in exchange for MBFR. Whatever marginal benefit they gain from CSCE we make up for by the kind of serious security study produced by MBFR.
- The real problem in these negotiations now is not the Soviets but the Europeans.
- Any foreseeable MBFR reductions will not exceed ten - fifteen percent and will not occur before 1975. We will keep the PRC informed.
- We would like to support Pompidou. We did not react publicly when he attacked us. To help Pompidou we assented to have the International Conference on Vietnam in Paris.

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(U.S. position - continued)

- We wanted to give more freedom of maneuver to those in Europe who favor strong defenses. Paradoxically, this meant we had to dissociate ourselves somewhat from Europe. Because as long as we were dominant, there was no incentive for the Europeans to do anything. Now that we are discussing reductions, the Europeans are telling us that the danger is too great for us to leave!
- Therefore our policy on MBFR strengthens the West. It has a pedagogical purpose in Europe, forcing them to study the real military situation, and it allows us to resist unilateral cuts in Congress.
- In 1973, the President will pay very personal attention to Europe. We will attempt in the next six months a common economic and military policy and then have a summit meeting to develop a kind of Charter for our relationship. We will ask Japan to participate in some aspects of this, and make some maneuvers with the USSR, but in the direction of what I have described.

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EUROPE

II. JUNE TALKS 1972

PM Chou's Position

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By MA NARA, Date 6/22/10 ; state rev. cw  
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-- Collectively Europe represented great potential power, but how to lead that power is a question. A number of countries all wish to be the leadership of that power.

-- The US should not withdraw its forces in Europe. MBFR should not go too far. The Democrats would not be able to withdraw forces from Europe if they came to power.

-- It is impossible for a country as vigorous as Germany to become a Finland.

-- Soviet policy on Germany was not pressure on the FRG but pressure on the GDR to make concessions to the FRG.

HAK's Position

-- The US under Nixon will never abandon Europe. We will not substantially withdraw forces from Europe over the next five years. Even MBFR reductions would not exceed 10-15% in the near term.

-- Germany would either become part of the European Community fully, or turn nationalistic, or it could become

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"Finlandized," i. e. , beholden to Moscow on international and even internal policies. There were no strong German leaders on the horizon.

-- Germany, like Japan, is at a crossroads. Economic recovery can be a substitute for national purpose for 20 years but at some point it is no longer adequate.

-- The Scheel visit to the PRC is a positive step because the risk of Finlandization is reduced to the extent German leaders feel they have freedom of maneuver.

-- The Germans deserve the PRC's attention because they will be one of the key factors. They are indeed the most dynamic people in Europe.

-- The US could not deliberately maintain tensions in Europe even though we understood that the Soviet motive for detente in Europe was to force its hand for a greater role in Asia.

-- The PRC should forcefully express its views on South Asia and the Soviet Union to the various West European leaders who visit Peking, e. g. , Home, Schumann, Scheel, Schroeder.

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ISSUES PAPER



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## BRIEFING PAPER

EUROPEThe Problem

The Chinese view of Western Europe is largely a function of their overriding concern about the Soviet Union and the West's policy of detente. Peking favors a close US relationship with Western Europe. At the same time, the Chinese believe that European softness and disarray, as well as our policies, are weakening the area's will to resist the Soviets. Reasoning probably will not persuade the Chinese since their assessment has become dogma. Nevertheless, explanation of our European policy is important in order to underline the strategic importance we attach to the region and the steps we are in fact taking to shore up allied cohesion.

Background

In recent years, the Chinese view of Western Europe has evolved in a more pragmatic direction as they reassessed their position in the light of their changing perception of the Soviet Union. Until about the time of President Nixon's visit to China, the Chinese line was that there could be no unity or security in Western Europe unless the area freed itself from the influence of the two superpowers, the US and the USSR. They criticized NATO, and seemed to favor the De Gaulle concept of each country standing on its own feet. Then the line began to change, with more references in their press--usually by replaying foreign press reports--to the idea of Western European unity and the role the US plays in European security. In the Party Congress of August 1973, Chou En-lai first voiced the proposition, which has now become a constant refrain, that the Soviets are feinting to the East but will strike in the West. Since then, they have more openly advocated Western European unity, increased military preparedness, and close ties between Western Europe and the US.

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

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The Chinese now maintain that Western Europe is the focal point of the Soviet threat, but that the countries of the area neither understand, nor take adequate steps to combat, the Soviet menace. The Chinese desire to encourage East-West confrontation in Europe, in order to keep the Soviets from giving undivided attention to their adversary in Peking, is a major element in their foreign policy outlook. On the other hand, their inability to exert any significant influence on developments in Europe probably leads to a sense of frustration. Peking has diplomatic relations with most of the countries, and the European Community--to which it recently accredited an Ambassador --is China's second largest trading partner. However, this provides the Chinese with little leverage. Moreover, they consider the Communist parties in Western Europe to be tools of Moscow, and therefore have no effective party channels into the area.

Given this lack of meaningful influence, the Chinese resort to lecturing Western Europeans--and the US--about the fallacy of detente. This was a major theme during FRG Chancellor Schmidt's visit to the PRC October 29 - November 2, when the Chinese strongly criticized detente in general and US policy towards the Soviets in particular. A similar, if perhaps less strident, line was used with former British Prime Minister Heath and FRG opposition leader Strauss when they visited the PRC earlier this year. (The Chinese gave both the treatment usually accorded chiefs of state, including a meeting with Mao, as if to demonstrate Chinese liking for their conservative viewpoints.) The Chinese look for opportunities to press their views on West Europeans: Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing visited Paris earlier this year; the French Foreign Minister is in China this November and the British Foreign Minister has been invited to visit China sometime soon.

In his UNGA speech September 26, Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua reiterated the basic Chinese position on Europe: that the Soviets are feinting East while attacking West, that detente is a facade

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which will not stave off the inevitable world war, and that CSCE was really a "European Insecurity Conference." In private conversations with Western Europeans, the Chinese support Western European unity and strength, including NATO, and a close relationship with the US. (Inconsistently, they also sometimes revert in their public statements to the line that Western Europe should be more independent of the US. In their ideological view of the world, Western Europe is the "second world," over which the two superpowers are contending for domination.)

Peking's generalized concern about Western Europe's will and ability to resist the Soviets has been heightened by some recent developments: the situation in Portugal, the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus problem, the increased influence of the Italian Communist Party, the Helsinki CSCE conference which they view as a Soviet victory, and possibly the succession era in Spain.

Many of the PRC's views support US interests: the importance of Western European unity and strength and of continued close ties with the US, including NATO. However, the vehemence with which the Chinese challenge Western Europe's policy towards the Soviets, while disclaiming concern over potential Soviet pressures on the PRC, tends to reduce what effectiveness their admonitions might have on Western Europeans.

#### Chinese Position

In your talks in Peking, the Chinese will probably discuss Western Europe in the same terms as during Secretary Kissinger's visit. Both Chairman Mao and Vice Premier Teng laid great emphasis on Europe during the Secretary's talks. After the Soviet Union (and because of it), Europe is currently the major Chinese preoccupation. The main points were:

- Europe is too soft and disunited. It is being deluded into a false sense of complacency about the Soviets. It should be stronger, more unified, more alert to Soviet designs.

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- The U.S., by its policy towards the Soviets, is helping to pull the wool over the eyes of Europe. Moscow is feinting in the East while preparing to attack the West.
- The Western Europeans fear war, and hope to obtain a period of peace by following the appeasement policies of the 1930's that led to Munich and then to World War II. The British and French (Chamberlain and Daladier) hoped that those policies would redirect the menace of Hitler towards the Soviet Union, but Hitler first attacked the West. (In using this historical analogy, the Chinese are clearly saying that the West is trying to direct the Soviet threat towards China.)
- The Helsinki Conference was a European Insecurity Conference, since it was an attempt to appease the Soviets and since it creates further illusions about the Soviets in Western Europe.
- Many Europeans, in talking with the Chinese, have been very apprehensive as to whether the US would come to their assistance if the Soviets attacked. (We know of no responsible Western European leaders who have said this to the Chinese. Indeed, per our suggestion, Schmidt reaffirmed to the Chinese European confidence in us.) And many Americans doubt we would use nuclear weapons or allow Americans to die to defend Europe.
- The situation in Portugal will go through many changes and will involve many trials of strength. The Chinese have rejected Portugese requests to establish diplomatic relations, and they want to avoid any actions which would strengthen the pro-Soviet forces in Portugal.

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- There are "contradictions" between the Spanish Communist Party and Moscow, and in post-Franco Spain, the Communist Party will have less influence in the military than in Portugal.
- With respect to Italy, the Chinese do not think that a "historic compromise" (Communist participation in the government) can succeed. Yet they assert they do not worry whether the Communist Party comes to power (presumably because they believe it could not remain in power).
- The Chinese favor the reunification of Germany. West Germany should dominate because of its greater size.
- The Chinese are concerned about Soviet intentions towards Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period and hopeful the US and Western Europe will help the Yugoslavs resist any Soviet pressures.

#### U.S. Position

Your overall aim in discussing Europe should be to move the Chinese towards accepting that U.S. policy in Europe is realistic and effective, that we have no illusions about the Soviets, and that we are working closely with our allies to keep up NATO's political and military defenses. The Chinese concern about Europe provides you an opportunity to underline that US policy towards Western Europe serves Chinese interests as well as our own.

Our ties with Europe (and Japan) remain the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Our relations with Western Europe are stronger than they have been for some years. The NATO summit last May underscored the mutual commitment of the Allies to one another's security. The recent economic summit has strengthened the prospects for economic and political cooperation. You and Secretary Kissinger have spent a great deal of time with European leaders.

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We recognize that there are certain weaknesses in Western Europe: a tendency by some leaders to place too much credence in Soviet goodwill, a reluctance to bear the burden of proper military defense and other pandering to domestic pressures, the problems of NATO's southern flank. But we do not share the PRC's bleak assessment that Western Europe, following the lead of the US, has adopted a policy of appeasement that not only provides the Soviet Union with opportunities to expand its influence but also increases the likelihood of a Soviet attack.

Most key Western European leaders share with the US a realistic view of relations with Moscow. It is important to make a genuine effort to reduce tensions and lessen the possibility of conflict. At the same time, the essential precondition for detente is a strong defense, and NATO continues to provide this precondition. Moreover, the policy of detente is necessary to maintain public support for defense and for a hard-headed appraisal of the Soviet Union.

In any event, the US will certainly defend Europe if it is attacked, and we will use nuclear weapons if necessary. This is in the strong US national interest.

While some Western European countries have cut defense budgets, the NATO defense effort has resulted in an improved conventional defense capability, linked to theater and strategic nuclear deterrent forces. Any progress in MBFR will be limited in terms of numbers. It would not mean that the relative fighting capability of conventional forces remaining would be reduced. On the contrary, the Allies are determined to improve that combat capability. In any event, the US will maintain substantial forces in Europe.

The Helsinki Conference was not a Soviet victory. The West gave away nothing of substance; the borders had already been fixed by post-war conferences and Germany's Ostpolitik. CSCE has not resulted in the public euphoria some had feared. In fact, the Soviets, who long pressed for CSCE, may be wondering if they miscalculated, since they are now on the defensive with regard to implementing the CSCE provisions.

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Regarding the situation in certain countries:

- The situation in Portugal is still in flux. However, compared to some months ago, the pro-Soviet elements have lost ground. We are continuing to work with our European friends to strengthen the moderate forces.
- Franco's death will result in a new situation in Spain, but we hope it will not lead to a drastic upheaval such as occurred in Portugal. We are negotiating a base agreement, and are establishing economic and cultural committees so that we will have channels of contact in various fields in the post-Franco period.
- Congress has authorized the resumption of military aid to Turkey, and we are continuing our efforts to find a solution to the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus problem.
- We are doing everything we can to strengthen the Christian Democrats in Italy and keep the Communist Party out of the government.
- We do not oppose German reunification, but this is not feasible in the near term.
- We have been working particularly with independent-minded East European countries like Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia. You purposely visited this area during your CSCE trip. We are concerned about what will happen in Yugoslavia when Tito dies. We are beginning to sell Yugoslavia some military equipment, and are making contingency plans in case of Soviet intervention.

We welcome closer Chinese-Europe ties and Chinese support for European unity and a continuing US role in Europe. We would also welcome reasonable

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Chinese warnings to Western European leaders about the need to have a realistic view of the Soviet Union. However, we believe that the current Chinese line is so obviously self-serving that it loses most of its impact, and that their voicing to Western Europeans of strong criticism of the U.S., if it has any effect, tends to undermine Western European confidence in the US as a reliable partner in the effort to oppose Soviet expansionism.

Department of State  
November 1975

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MIDDLE EAST



PREVIOUS TALKS

1974

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~MIDDLE EASTI. OCTOBER 1975 TALKSChinese Position in October 1975 (Mao + Teng):

- Chairman Mao in 1973 advised the United States to use two hands in the Middle East -- not only one hand to help Israel, but also the other hand to help the Arab countries, especially Egypt. Mao emphasized that China supported the Arabs, and that our positions are different. But there is also a common ground -- that we can both fix the polar bear.
- China believes the focus of Soviet strategy is in the West, in Europe, and in the Middle East, Mediterranean and Persian Gulf -- all places linked to Europe.

United States Position in October 1975

- We believe that the Soviet Union has suffered a major setback in the Middle East.
- Sadat is coming to Washington to continue the development of a common strategy.
- Here again, it is important for China to understand the relationship between U. S. strategy and tactics in the Middle East. The U.S. recognizes that the best way to prevent hegemonistic desires in the Middle East is to bring about a permanent settlement. But one cannot bring about a permanent settlement by rhetoric or by putting forward plans. A permanent settlement has a local component, an international component and an American domestic component, and our problem is to synchronize these. We cannot master the local component unless we demonstrate that the Soviet Union cannot bring about a conclusion. Whenever the Soviet Union interferes, we have to go through a period of demonstrating its impotence. We also have to teach the Soviet clients in the Mideast that the only road to a settlement leads through Washington.

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E.O. 12958 (para. 1) SEC 3.3  
 NSC Memo, 3/30/77, State Dept. Guidelines; state review 9/18/03  
 By     NARA, Date 6/22/10

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(U.S. Position in October 1975, continued)

- Secondly, we have to get our domestic opinion used to a more even-handed policy between the Arabs and Israelis -- as Mao suggested to Dr. Kissinger two years ago. Every previous comprehensive American effort has failed because of the inability to mobilize our domestic support.
- Objective conditions now exist for a comprehensive settlement for the first time under American leadership, and we intend to move in that direction immediately after the U.S. elections.
- In the meantime we will take interim steps to alleviate the situation. No one else has any realistic alternatives. It is our fixed policy to move toward a comprehensive settlement.
- The major danger now is Arab disunity exploited by the Soviet Union. And whatever influence other countries may have, especially on Syria, would be of great importance.

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SECRET/NODIS/XGDSE.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; *State review*  
By W NARA, Date 6/22/10 7/18/03MIDDLE EASTI. NOVEMBER 1974 TALKSChinese Position in November 1974 (TENG)

- The Middle East is the most sensitive area in the world now.
- The US should use both of its hands. Of course it is not possible for the US to stop aiding Israel, but once the US aids Israel it should use both of its hands [and aid the Arabs].
- Chairman Mao's policy is twofold: One, China supports the Arabs and the Palestinians in their just struggle. Second, a heavy blow should be dealt to the polar bear in this area.
- China wonders if the Soviet Union hasn't gotten the upper hand over the US in the Middle East. The Soviets seem to be returning to Egypt.
- With the Russians, their habit is wherever there is a little hole, a little room, they will get in.
- The weakest point of the US in the Middle East is that it supports Israel against the Arab world, which has a population of 120 million, and on this point the Soviet Union is in a better position than the US.
- The basic contradiction in the area is between Israel and the whole Arab world and Palestine. Because the US gives Israel so much economic and military aid, the Arabs, in order to resist, will look for aid. If the US doesn't give it, the Soviet Union will. By giving them aid the USSR gains politically; by selling them arms the USSR gains economically. And the US will get itself bogged down in the Middle East.
- No matter how you look at the issue in the Middle East, for the US to foster Israeli expansionism in essence against 120 million Arabs -- from the political point of view, you are bound to be in a weaker position. No matter out of what [domestic] reason, as long as the Arab countries are not able to regain their lost territory, the principal issue remains unsolved. There is already some similarity between this and the Indochina issue and the Korean issue too. HAK should not take this Chinese view to be ill-intentioned.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~SECRET~~ XGDS (3)  
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SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

-2-

- The Arab question is not a question that can be solved in a few months. It will have to go on for a long period.
- It is not right to underestimate the strength of the Arab people. They may not be able to win the war in a few months but they are able to fight. Whether soldiers can fight or not depends on the principle for which they are fighting, whether they are fighting for the people.
- If the U.S. adopts an antagonistic attitude toward the Rabat Conference, it will not be conducive to U.S. relations with the Arabs.

US Position in November 1974

- For us the problem of Israel has profound domestic consequences. If we do not proceed carefully we can produce a situation in the U.S. in which a very serious domestic problem over the Middle East affects our overall foreign policy. And this China should keep in mind as well.
- U.S. policy is to produce progress that gradually returns Arab land to Arab control, but so as not to produce a paralysis of U.S. foreign policy because of the domestic reaction. We therefore have to divide the problem into parts, each of which can be managed domestically. Unless there is a fundamental solution, a tactical solution will not be permanent. HAK has explained what the U.S. strategy will be, and this strategy will lead inexorably to a radical solution. The Vice Premier's experience in military and political warfare teaches that if one accumulates enough minor changes, sooner or later fundamental change becomes permanent.
- The U.S. agrees that it should use both of its hands and aid both Israel and the Arab countries. We proposed \$250 million in economic aid to Egypt, plus \$150 in other kinds of assistance. And we arranged another \$250 million from the World Bank. We arranged 500,000 tons of grain and may give more. We have given Syria 100,000 tons of agricultural products.
- We are using both of our hands, but in a way to minimize our domestic problem. Because of the Presidential transition we lost two-to-three months.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

-3-

- The Arabs cannot win a war in the next five years. Historically they may be stronger but in the short term they are certainly not the stronger. Therefore any political progress has to come through the U.S. There is no other way. The only interest we have is that it appear that our decisions are made by our own free will. If the U.S. is pressed by the Arabs we will resist long enough to demonstrate that pressure cannot possibly succeed. If the U.S. is pressed by the Soviets, we will simply do nothing and tell the Soviet Union to produce progress.
- It is extremely dangerous for the Russians to start a war in the Middle East. They will rapidly face the same dilemma they faced in October 1973.
- U.S. military intervention over oil prices is out of the question. In the case of a total embargo, that would be another matter.
- The U.S. is studying the question of giving arms to selected Arab countries. We have a massive domestic problem about giving military aid to Arab countries. What we will do is have a substantial assistance program to Saudi Arabia beyond the needs of Saudi Arabia. After the next Egyptian-Israeli agreement, we plan to permit the acquisition of military equipment by Egypt, and Saudi Arabia has already set aside \$500 million for that purpose. Israel will run out of credits in March, and we will link new credits for Israel to the right to sell arms to Egypt. In the meantime we are encouraging the FRG to sell arms to Egypt; France needs no encouragement as long as cash is involved. We are also encouraging Britain to develop helicopter production in Egypt.
- In the negotiation, we will conduct the Egyptian-Israeli negotiation quietly and then surface it suddenly. We are proceeding by less spectacular methods than the last year. We are discussing with Israel a withdrawal of about 75 kilometers eastward and 150 kilometers to the south, to return the oil fields to Egypt and withdraw Israeli forces beyond the passes in the Sinai. We would plan to have it substantially achieved before Brezhnev's visit to Cairo, but the Egyptians would know that if they move too far to the Soviet Union they will jeopardize it. After that we will turn to Syria.
- Eventually, there will be a return to the Geneva Conference, but that will produce a certain stalemate. As long as the Arabs think they are making progress outside Geneva, they will be in no hurry to get there. No one wants it except the Soviet Union.

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- 4 -

- The US is not antagonistic to the Rabat decision. It is a question of timing. Because the Middle East will be a long-standing problem, it is important to pick the right time.
- The Palestinians are an issue on which the last word has not yet been spoken. The US would have preferred negotiations between Israel and Hussein to restore the West Bank to Arab control, and then subsequently between Hussein and the Palestinians to settle the ultimate disposition. After Rabat we need a period of moderation and cooling off to allow both sides to adjust to the new circumstances. It is a tragedy, because we had achieved agreement for a substantial part of the West Bank, with 2/3 of the population, to go back to Jordan under UN supervision. In a year there could have been discussions in the UN as to the ultimate disposition. From this point of view the Rabat decision was premature.
- It is not true that the Soviets have gotten the upper hand over the US in the Middle East. Egypt has to show, for domestic and inter-Arab reasons, that it also has relations with the Soviets. But the USSR stopped military aid and reduced economic aid to Egypt.
- By February 1975 it will be apparent that further progress is being made as a result of American initiatives, and we will see a repetition of the 1974 situation.
- The Soviet Union faces the contradiction that they can give the Arabs military aid but not political progress. And in country after country, once they give arms, they get into difficulty.
- Syria would be prepared to move away from the Soviet Union if Israel were prepared to make any concessions at all in the negotiation.
- President Asad gets arms from the USSR but he is a realist. He has understood that under conditions of pressure, the US diplomacy will not operate. He has just agreed to renew UNDOF.
- In Iraq, there is pressure from Iran, and certain strains between the Soviet Union and Iraq.
- Israel is both our weakest point in the Mideast and our strongest point. When all is said and done, no one else can make them move. The Arabs can't force them and the Soviets can't do it. Anyone who wants progress will have to come to us. And this even includes the Palestinians.

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- 5 -

- The Soviet approach has been to attempt to produce a comprehensive solution rapidly. Gromyko produces 10 principles, 20 subpoints, 20 subparagraphs. There is only one thing wrong -- the US has to do all the work, and the Soviet Union will get all the advantages. That we are not prepared to do.
  
- The US will never yield to pressure in the Middle East, especially Soviet pressure. No diplomatic progress can be made without the US; therefore, everyone who wants progress will sooner or later have to come to the US, no matter what they say in the interval. Thirdly, the US is determined to bring about diplomatic progress, and it will succeed.
  
- There will be ups and downs, especially when 15 Arabs get together in one room, because they cannot always distinguish epic poetry and foreign policy.
  
- The US must move one step at a time. If we propose grandiose schemes, we will be enmeshed in an endless domestic debate. As long as we move a step at a time, a solution is inevitable. We must move fast enough so that the Soviet Union doesn't reenter. We believe we can solve this problem.
  
- We do not underestimate the strength of the Arab people. Their ability to fight is a change in the situation. Therefore we believe it is essential for Israel to make peace.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines ; State review 9/18/03

By WA NARA, Date 6/22/10

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MIDDLE EASTI. NOVEMBER 1973 TALKSChinese Position in November 1973 (MAO + CHOU)

- Those were not bad, those measures [the US alert in October]. (Mao)
- The Egyptians said Dr. Kissinger was partial to Israel. The PRC said not necessarily. Those of Jewish descent are not a monolithic bloc. The communists cooperated with Engels, for example. (Mao) And Marx was Jewish. Perhaps this had some effect on the Egyptians. (Chou)
- The Soviet Union cannot possible dominate the Middle East, because although their ambition is great, their capacities are meager. (Mao)
- Dr. Kissinger's trip to the Middle East was a good one. (Mao)
- We are now facing a contradiction. On the one hand; China has supported various Arab countries against Israeli Zionism. On the other hand, China has to welcome the US putting the Soviet Union on the spot and making it so that the Soviet Union cannot control the Middle East. When Huang Chen mentioned this support of the Arab world, he didn't understand the importance of US resistance to the Soviet Union. (Mao)
- The question of Iraq is a crucial issue. China wonders if it is possible for the US to do some work in the area. China's possibilities are not so very great. (Mao) It is possible to have contacts with them, but it takes a period of time for them to change their orientation. It is possible they would change their orientation after they have suffered from them. (Chou)
- Recently US naval ships have gone in the Persian Gulf. That was good. (Mao)
- The President of South Yemen approached China and asked if he should sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. China was not taken in by him, and told him he should be prudent. Now they are trying themselves very closely to the Soviet Union. (Mao)

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(Chinese Position in November 1973)

- Qaddafi is a man I do not understand. (Mao)
- Some in China commented that the US lost an opportunity to take action when Egypt chased out Soviet military personnel. But at that time both the US's feet were in the whole of Southeast Asia and the US had not yet climbed out. (Mao)
- Mao, in meeting the Vice President of Egypt, was trying to persuade him to get closer to the US. Mao noticed Dr. Kissinger's luncheon meeting with the Arab Foreign Ministers at the UN. (Mao)
- The Arab countries, which spread from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, account for more than 100 million people in 19 countries. The difficulties are great because they are both united and engaged in internal struggles. It is not so easy to deal with. (Mao)
- Perhaps Dr. Kissinger being Secretary of State is in a better position than others to remedy the Arab-Israeli dispute and the problem of American domestic opinion.
- Bringing about a just Arab-Israeli settlement will be considerably more difficult than bringing about the new Sino-American relationship.
- Does Mrs. Meir understand that if she continues in such an absurd manner, that will increase the possibilities of Soviet troops entering into the Middle East?
- Now the Soviet focus of attention is in the Middle East. The contention will last for a period of time. Chou hopes the US will not spend such a long time as 4-1/2 years as in settling the Vietnam question.
- If Arab space [sic] should ever be occupied by the Soviet Union, the whole strategic situation will be greatly changed. The Europeans should understand this.
- Even the Shah of Iran couldn't help dealing with the Soviet Union. He agreed to consider the Soviet proposal of a collective security system. The PRC knew it was only a tactic to put them off, but he could not help saying that.

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(Chinese Position in November 1973)

- Egypt had to pay the Soviet Union in hard currency for the ammunition she received. Because the Soviet Union told Egypt: "Since you have so many friends who are rich in oil resources, you should pay us in money and not in goods."
- The Soviet Union wanted to be paid. Boumedienne spent 16 hours in discussions in the Soviet Union for that purpose. They gave him some things, but there were other things they did not give him. One cannot fight well if one relies on such.
- Among the Arab states they have also quite a few extremist positions. Libya, for example. Libya is also a friend of Chiang Kai-shek.
- Of course China understands that if the US had not asked for the \$2.2 billion, public opinion in the US would not have been able to understand.
- King Faisal is an old friend of Chou, who came to know him very well at the Bandung Conference.
- It will not be so quick that all Arab parties will recognize the existence of Israel. The number of the ones the US is dealing with is not so big.
- While the October fighting was going on, there was an ill wind of African countries breaking diplomatic relations with Israel. This was part of a just voice on the part of the Africans, and the US cannot say they are not correct. Because the US cannot expect everyone to be like the Chinese, who have combined principles with realities.
- China objected to the establishment of Israel to start with. Now that its population has reached 2-1/2 or 3 million, can you drive them into the sea? No. So when US press people ask about it, Chou answers them, "Of course not." That is why one is bound to find some way to settle this question.
- Would that be a reason to have the Palestinians driven out? This question should also be settled. It would not be fair if this question would not be settled at the same time. Only when these two questions are settled can there be any coexistence, and a peace to be spoken of. This is why China agrees to the US having direct dealings with the Arab states.

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(Chinese Position in November 1973)

- Although the first step has been taken, the journey will be even longer than the journey when Dr. Kissinger first came to China to prepare for the visit of President Nixon. Because it took only half a year for President Nixon to come. It is not so easy to settle the question because it is very complex.
- It seems that the problem of Jerusalem is even harder than the question of Taiwan. Would it not be better if this city would be shared by both sides? This is a kind of superstition.
- The US has also to meet with its domestic difficulties.

US Position in November 1973

- The problem in the Middle East is to prevent it now from being dominated by the Soviet Union. (to Mao)
- We understand that publicly China has to take certain positions, and it is not against our common position that China does so. But the reality is that we will move matters toward a settlement in the Middle East, but we also want to demonstrate that it was not done by Soviet pressures. So whenever the Soviets press, we must resist, apart from the merits of the dispute. When we have defeated them, we may even move in the same direction. We are not against Arab aspirations; we are against their being achieved with Soviet pressure. (to Mao)
- China can do good work in Iran, and Iran is active in Iraq. We have encouraged the Shah to have good relations with China. (to Mao)
- Iraq now is the most difficult place in that area. Our strategy with Iraq is first to try to win Syria away from it, and then to reduce its influence in the sheikdoms along the Persian Gulf. And when it sees it can achieve nothing by leaning toward the Soviet Union, then we will move toward them. But first they have to learn that they gain nothing from their present course. (to Mao)
- In 1972 the US was unable to act when Egypt chased out Soviet military personnel because (1) we had our elections, and (2) we were still in Vietnam and couldn't tackle both at once. (to Mao)

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(US Position in November 1973)

- We are making a major effort to improve our relations with the Arab countries and we take this very seriously. (to Mao)
- The night the October war started, we told the PRC what our basic strategy would be. For this period we were less interested in the merits of the dispute between Arabs and Israelis than in preventing Soviet predominance in the Middle East. We believed that a Soviet victory, like 1971 in the Indian subcontinent, would have disastrous consequences not only there but elsewhere and would encourage adventurism on a global scale.
- Our basic strategy is to convince the Arabs that while they can get weapons from the Soviet Union, they can get a political settlement only from the United States. Therefore we will always resist proposals that come to us from the Arabs through the Soviet Union.
- We are not asking for Chinese support on the specifics of the negotiation, because the Chinese position is well known. But we do think this basic strategy is in the interests of both our countries.
- We have no interest in a predominant position in the Middle East. That is not achievable. Nor is it desirable. We are interested in keeping any other country from having a predominant position.
- The US has a complex domestic situation with respect to the Arab-Israeli dispute. It cannot be an accident that the US is so heavily committed to a nation of 2-1/2 million people 6,000 miles away which has no strategic or economic importance. These factors cannot be changed from one day to the next, any more than some of the factors in the Sino-American relationship can be changed from one day to the next.
- We are as determined to bring about a just settlement in the Middle East as we were two years ago to improve our relations with the PRC. But it would be a great mistake to fight the battle prematurely, before we are organized, and on minor issues.
- The most significant aspect of the November Six-Point agreement was not the terms, which were important, but that it was negotiated between Egypt and the US without the Soviet Union.

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(US Position in November 1973)

- It will be very helpful to our common approach if China continues to speak well to the Arabs of US good faith, to the extent China can. Because there will be difficult periods in which we will not be able to move as fast as they want, but they can be sure we will move in the direction that we have discussed here and that we have told them.
- When the Geneva Conference starts, there is no possibility of excluding the Soviets from the formal discussion. But the real negotiation will take place separately between the Egyptians, the Israelis, and Dr. Kissinger.
- The Soviet Union is trying to dominate Iraq and have one front in the Mediterranean and another in the Persian Gulf.
- Our policy is to keep as much pressure on Iraq as we can, through Iran and other possible sources, so that it is absorbed as much as possible in its domestic difficulties rather than with others. Until Iraq becomes disinvolved from the Soviet Union, we have to keep them isolated and from gaining successes through their actions with the USSR.
- We will now make an attempt to have the same relationship with Syria that we have established with Egypt and to negotiate with Syria a settlement the same as the Egyptian settlement.
- The Shah is one of the outstanding leaders, though he misunderstood the significance of the Soviet proposal for a collective security system. He will not make mistakes in practice. His was the only country bordering the USSR that did not permit overflight of Soviet planes in the Middle East crisis. It took great courage.
- We have also established a preliminary contact with the Palestinians. In the second phase of the Geneva Conference, when the frontiers issue arises, the Palestinians should participate. They have agreed, and so has the King of Jordan. None of this has been discussed with the Soviets. We will continue to talk with the Palestinians. It is important that this phase of talks, in which we are involved separately, be kept secret as long as possible, because not every country has an interest in having it succeed.
- King Faisal is very vulnerable to the radical states and, on the other hand, emotionally a good friend of the US. Our impression is he is attempting to find a way to escape from the oil policy he adopted during the October War.

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
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(US Position in November 1973)

- We have started a major program to reduce and eventually eliminate our dependence on foreign oil. We believe we can successfully conclude this within this decade.
- The Middle East question will take more than half a year to solve, but not half a year to show progress. We can show progress in more than half a year.
- We think there should be an initial withdrawal of Israeli forces in order to give the Arabs some hope and courage.
- The problem of Jerusalem is harder than the problem of Taiwan, because the nature of the solution of Taiwan is obvious -- it is only a question of timing -- but the solution of Jerusalem is non-obvious, because both sides consider it a holy city.

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MIDDLE EAST

I. FEBRUARY TALKS 1973

Chinese Position in February (C Hou)

- If the Soviet Union feels a certain kind of settlement would be in their interest, they would be willing to accept it step by step.
- The Soviets have maintained their position in the Mideast and used it to make advances in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf.
- US actions in the Mideast and South Asia have been taken too slowly and prudently. The Soviets have not ceased their activities. Chased out of Egypt, they settled on Iraq. They supported Iraq in breaking ties with Iran over Iran's seizure of the Tunbs. The Soviets have sent arms to support internal disruption in northwest Pakistan.
- The Soviets want to link up the issues of the Middle East with those of the Subcontinent.
- Oil interests cannot be ignored, but because the US has slackened, the Soviets have taken the initiative.
- How can Israel be destroyed? It is impossible. But it must be said that its establishment is a very curious and peculiar phenomenon since World War I and II -- which the Soviet Union supported. Even Soviet movies show the Arabs in a bad light.
- The Soviets have allowed Russian Jews to flow to Israel, including military technicians and some who assisted Egypt with the Aswan Dam. We would like to make this public. The Soviets established the Israeli state and then pushed the Jews out of the USSR.
- China is not opposed to Israel. The existence of Israel is now a fact. But before they give up the territory they took by aggression, China cannot establish diplomatic relations with them. That is a principle.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/09, State Dept. Guidelines; State review 9/18/03  
By MM NARA, Date 6/22/10

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(Chinese position, cont'd)

- The present situation is no war, no peace. It is a situation in turmoil which is more favorable to the USSR. The Arabs claim to be socialist, but Qaddafi has relations with Chiang Kai-shek and not with Peking. He is an expansionist. The Soviets are reaching into his pockets and raising the price of their arms.
- China's principle is to settle the Mideast issue in the interests of all the Arab people including the Palestinian people. It is all right if the US informs China of future developments, but China does not have the capability of doing anything there. China can only express its opinions.
- China has told its Arab friends that since the USSR is dominating the area, Chinese activity there would only increase the trouble in the area and add to their burdens.

U.S. Position in February

- No conceivable solution will leave the Israelis in as strong a position as they are in now, so they are not now willing for a solution. Any solution they are likely to accept would be unacceptable to the Arabs.
- The Soviet Union may not really want a Mideast settlement. They always get enough ahead of the Arabs to prevent a step-by-step settlement but don't give them enough military equipment for a military solution.
- The Soviet Union has attempted mischief but has not been willing to run any risks. So it has tried to maximize its influence but without any constructive outcome.
- The US and PRC have a difference in the Mideast, because we stand for the preservation of Israel -- because we want a settlement.
- The future of the Palestinian people will have to be part of a general settlement. The practical solution is to establish the principle that they can return, but to have an understanding that only some will return, and to have Israel contribute to their resettlement in other parts, including the Arab part of Palestine.

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(U. S. position, cont'd)

- We cannot join China in any policy of dismemberment of Israel, but we can join China in any policy that would reduce Soviet influence and help a stable peace.
- The Soviet purpose may be to create a situation of turmoil so they can create bases as in Iraq and Syria.
- Many mistakes have been made; the diplomacy has been too public. We will attempt secret talks with Ismail.
- We have told Ismail that we will speak to Egypt as long as it speaks for itself and not for any other country. The Egyptians have replied that "if Egypt thinks there is a good solution that meets at least the minimum requirements of its people and the people of the area, it will go ahead with it and not allow it to be vetoed by anybody."
- We are also talking to Jordan. But we think Egypt should settle first. If Jordan settles first, it will create more turmoil.
- The US will keep China informed, but does not expect Chinese action. If China agrees with what we are doing, China might perhaps use its own influence.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

ISSUES PAPER



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

MIDDLE EAST

The Problem

The basic Chinese position on the Arab-Israeli conflict is to support the Arabs. Although our positions differ, there is common ground in that the overriding objective of Chinese policy in the Middle East is to see the reduction of the Soviet position there. The Chinese view is that the United States ought to "use two hands" in the Middle East--not only one hand to help Israel but also the other hand to help the Arabs, especially Egypt whose strong stance against the USSR appeals to China. They have strongly encouraged our efforts in the region (both mediation and new links with the Arabs), though they think we are still too partial to Israel. The main purpose of your conversations on this subject, therefore, will be to tell the Chinese that we are committed to continuing the negotiating process and that our relationship with Israel--as well as with the Arabs--is an essential ingredient in our making progress on the Arab-Israeli problem and thus reducing Soviet influence.

Background

The PRC has tended to regard the Near East primarily as an area of struggle between two imperialist superpowers, the Soviet Union and the US. Peking is aware of its relative lack of economic and military assets with which to compete and, therefore, it largely restricts its political activities to encouraging the Arabs to keep up the struggle against Israel while avoiding subservience to either the US or the USSR. Since Peking regards Moscow as the more immediate threat to its security, it has favored developments that weaken Moscow's position in various parts of Asia, including the Middle East. Hence, the resurgence of US influence

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EO. 12958 (amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept. Guidelines

By

NARA, Date

State review 9/18/03  
6/22/10

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in the Arab world following the 1973 war--at the expense of the Soviet Union--pleased the PRC. Indeed they have encouraged us from the very outset of our efforts.

Peking's line with the Arabs since the 1973 war has stressed Arab unity, especially in the face of perceived Soviet efforts designed to "split" Arab ranks over the question of cooperation with US peace efforts. In April, after the suspension of the Sinai talks, the PRC's Foreign Ministry instructed its missions abroad that the USSR's campaign to sabotage unilateral US peace efforts was a major cause of the breakdown of negotiations. Teng Hsiao-p'ing told former British Prime Minister Heath in September that the US had the upper hand in the Middle East at the moment, but he warned that the Soviets were planning a counter-attack.

Recently, the Chinese have been working hard to improve relations with Iraq and the Palestinians so as to dilute Soviet influence. Peking has apparently not wished to risk undercutting its efforts to court Arab militants by giving too visible signs of support for US peace initiatives.

The Chinese representative at the UN attacked the Sinai Agreement and blamed the "no war, no peace" situation in the area on the US and the USSR. He criticized us both, though the Soviets were treated as the worse villain: "In fact, while the United States has no intention of bringing about a thorough settlement of the Middle East question, the Soviet Union is still less inclined to do so". Within the Chinese government, however, the Agreement is seen as a US achievement which has weakened and angered the Soviets and put the issue of peace or war in the region firmly in US hands.

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### Chinese Position

During the Secretary's last visit in Peking, the Chinese did not pursue this subject at any length. If it comes up during your visit, they will presumably repeat the line that they have taken before--that we should pursue a "two-handed" policy. They will welcome our better ties with various Arab states but may question the level of our support for Israel. They would be interested in your future intentions in the area. They will probably content themselves with a general discussion of this issue.

### US Position

Our interest is to get across the following points:

The best way to prevent Soviet predominance in the Middle East is to achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement. One of the main purposes of the strategy we have followed over the last two years has been to maintain control over the diplomacy in the Middle East and thereby to help the moderate Arabs consolidate the reorientation of their policy away from exclusive dependence on the USSR. We are committed to continuing that strategy.

An important shift is taking place in American opinion. As a result of the strategy we have pursued, support is growing for an effort to achieve an overall settlement. But we must move gradually because domestic support is essential to success. We intend to move as soon as our elections are over, but the next months will be actively used in preparing the way for negotiations.

For us to pursue our strategy requires us to maintain a close relationship with Israel, as well as with the Arabs. We are committed to Israel's survival. But we also must retain a close relationship in order to have a basis for urging Israel to cooperate with us in the peace-making effort. Sadat and Asad seem to accept this.

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We also recognize that the issues of concern to the Palestinians must be drawn into the negotiating process if there is to be a durable peace. However, it is impossible to start a negotiation between two parties who do not recognize each other's right to exist and who do not accept the objective of negotiating peace with each other. Evolution of thinking both in Israel and among the Palestinians on this issue is essential. On the Palestinian side, our interest lies in seeing those who are willing to negotiate increase in strength.

Department of State  
November 1975

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