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President Ford's Schedule of Possible
Ambassadorial Calls August 9, 1974

Ambassadors from the following countries will call upon you for approximately 5 minutes in your Oval Office:

3:10 p. m.	Japan
3:40 p. m.	Soviet Union
5:10 p. m.	PRC
6:25 p. m.	Israel
6:55 p. m.	Vietnam

You may wish to drop by the Roosevelt Room for meetings with the following groups of Ambassadors:

2:00 p. m.	<u>NATO Ambassadors</u>	
to		
2:30 p. m.	- Belgium	- Italy
<u>Your presence 2:25</u>	- Canada	- Luxembourg
	- Denmark	- Netherlands
	- France	- Norway
	- Germany	- Portugal
	- Greece	- Turkey
	- Iceland	- UK
4:00 p. m.	<u>Middle Eastern Ambassadors</u>	
to		
4:30 p. m.	- Algeria	- Oman
<u>Your presence 4:25</u>	- Egypt	- Qatar
	- Jordan	- Saudia Arabia
	- Kuwait	- Sudan
	- Lebanon	- Syria
	- Libya	- Tunisia
	- Morocco	- United Arab Emirates
		- Yemen



5:15 p. m.


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
5:45 p. m.

Your presence 5:40

Latin American Ambassadors

- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| - Argentina | - Haiti |
| - Chile | - Honduras |
| - Colombia | - Jamaica |
| - Barbados | - Mexico |
| - Bolivia | - Nicaragua |
| - Brazil | - Panama |
| - Costa Rica | - Peru |
| - Dominican Republic | - Trinidad & Tobago |
| - Ecuador | - Uruguay |
| - El Salvador | - Venezuela |
| - Guatemala | - Paraguay |
| - Guyana | - Bahamas |







Friday, August 9, 1974
2:00 p.m.
Roosevelt Room

NATO AMBASSADORS

Ambassadors or Charges of

UK, France, Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark,
Norway, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Iceland,
Canada. (Luxembourg absent.)

Background. NATO has recently had a boost through the signature at the Brussels summit last June, just before the Soviet summit, of the Atlantic Declaration. This was the outgrowth of the "Year of Europe" we proposed in my speech in April 1973 but which had run into months of legalistic bickering, mostly inspired by the last French government.


The new Declaration:

- strongly reaffirmed alliance commitments,
- endorsed the policy of negotiation with the East, based on Western unity and strength, and
- provided for close and regular consultations.

NATO's current principal business is to respond to an initiative of ours to get a coherent Western position in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which has been meeting in Geneva for months. The basic issue relates to how much we should demand from the Russians in the way of human and other contacts before we agree to conclude the conference, possibly with a summit-level ceremony, which the Russians very much desire.

NATO has also been active in coordinating the Western position in the currently deadlocked Vienna negotiations on mutual force cuts (MBFR).

In addition, NATO was active on Cyprus in the early stages of the crisis. The Alliance is naturally concerned about potential conflict between two of its members, Greece and Turkey; recently, the focus has shifted to the Geneva negotiations chaired by the UK and to our own efforts with the Greeks, Turks and Cypriots to bring about a solution.



TALKING POINTS

In your remarks to the group, you may wish to stress the following basic points of US policy:

-- the Alliance remains the centerpiece of our international security arrangements and we are fully committed to it;

-- you have always been a strong supporter of NATO and of maintaining its military strength as a guarantee of security and a basis of strength from which to negotiate. You will continue to fight against unilateral US troop cuts provided our Allies continue to do their share;

-- you favor full and frank consultations so that our policies remain in close harmony while negotiations with the East proceed;


-- you believe it important that the Atlantic countries maximize their cooperation on economic issues, including for example on energy. It is important to maintain sound economic relations and close political harmony as a basis for maintaining our joint military efforts;

-- above all, our Allies should know that our alliance policies will be conducted in full conformity with the principles established during the last five years.



12

Japan



Friday, August 9, 1974

3:10 P.M.

Oval Office

Takeshi YASUKAWA
Japanese Ambassador

Background. Our relationship with Japan, which is a keystone of our policy in the Pacific area, is fundamentally sound.

Reliance on the US security umbrella remains a fundamental tenet of Japanese policy, and there is no Japanese Government pressure for us to remove our military forces from our bases in Japan. Economic relations are no longer the serious irritant they once were, and Japan cooperates closely with us on most foreign policy matters. The relative absence of bi-lateral problems in the last year has allowed us to shift the focus of our discussions with Japan to an effort to coordinate our approaches to important issues of multilateral concern.

Japan is still groping to find its proper role in the area and the world, and its political activities and influence are, in part by Japan's own choice, far from commensurate with its economic power. Japan finds the new era of global multipolarity less comfortable, because less predictable, than the period when only its relationship with the US was important. Partly for this reason, Japanese leaders place an extremely high value on personal relationships with US leaders, and Prime Minister Tanaka will wish to meet with you personally as early as possible.

Domestically, there are growing economic problems, aggravated by the increased costs of oil imports, on which its economic life is heavily dependent. Although Prime Minister Tanaka's own position has been slipping, there is no threat to the continuance in power of the ruling and conservative Liberal Democratic Party.



TALKING POINTS

In your remarks to Ambassador Yasukawa, you may wish to stress the following points of US policy towards Japan:

-- over the years, and particularly during President Nixon's administration, our two countries have built a firm partnership relationship;

-- that relationship has been a keystone of our foreign policy, and you are firmly dedicated to maintaining and strengthening it;

-- our security relationship is not only in the interests of our own two countries, but is essential if we are to build a structure of permanent peace in the area;

-- you are fully aware of the extensive economic ties we enjoy and of our mutual interest in cooperating to find solutions to the global economic problems we confront;

-- you intend to continue the policy of close consultation with Japan on a wide variety of matters through numerous channels;

-- you look forward to establishing a personal relationship with Japanese leaders, and hope that you will have the opportunity to visit Japan as soon as possible.



Soviet Union



14
Friday, August 9, 1974
3:40 p.m.
Oval Office

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SOVIET CHARGE

Yuly VORONTSOV -- Minister Counselor

Background

Ambassador Dobrynin is on leave at home.

The Soviets have tended to see Watergate in the context of US-Soviet relations and to attribute domestic attacks on President Nixon to "forces" opposed to detente. Consequently, they have shown some uneasiness about the implications of the events in this country for the future of our relations.

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the last summit, the Soviets have been actively interested in arranging a series of follow-up negotiations on (a) various bilateral cooperative projects such as housing construction, and artificial heart, etc., (b) several of the arms control issues agreed on in principle at the summit, such as controls over environmental warfare techniques and over chemical warfare, an agreement on inspecting peaceful nuclear explosions to ensure they are not used militarily (this was an issue left over in the underground test limitation treaty signed in Moscow) and (c) SALT, where the summit resulted in an understanding that we would seek an agreement running through 1985 to follow the interim offensive agreement that lapses in October 1977.

The Soviets will want reassurance that we are prepared to proceed with these and other negotiating projects. They will also be looking for some assurance that we will succeed in getting a Trade Bill that permits EXIM credits to continue and MFN to be granted. They have officially resisted the link to their emigration policy stipulated in the Jackson amendment but have privately been prepared to provide some assurances that harassments and other impediments to emigration will be moderated if the economic agreements go forward.

Most fundamentally, Brezhnev has acquired considerable stake in his detente policies and in his relationship with President Nixon. He is bound to be in a sensitive position at a moment when many in Moscow may see these relationships in jeopardy.

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By dal, NARA, Date 12/18/03



There may also be some in Moscow who see this as a time to test our resolve on some issue, especially since the Soviets have not done well in the Middle East and Cyprus crises; any such notion will be most effectively countered by the demonstration that our policy of firmness when challenged but reasonableness in negotiations will be continued.

TALKING POINTS

In your comments, you may wish to make the following points:

-- You supported President Nixon's policies in the Congress and participated in the preparations for the last summit;

-- You are therefore committed to their continuation and will put the authority and prestige of your office behind it, including in the Congress;

-- You have written General Secretary Brezhnev on this score and wish to reiterate it orally and directly;

-- You are aware that there is much follow-up work to be done after the last summit: on arms control, on SALT, on bilateral cooperation; you are taking a personal interest in all of these and expect our delegations to be ready to meet with their Soviet counterparts over the next several weeks, as already agreed between Dobrynin and Secretary Kissinger;

-- You will also continue the efforts of President Nixon to achieve an early and satisfactory outcome of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation;

-- Generally, you think the most important point to bear in mind as we move onto the period ahead is that our relations must be based on restraint and on respect for each other's interest; that is the best way to continue avoiding crises and to maintain the recent positive trend in our relations;

-- You look forward to seeing Brezhnev here next spring and have reaffirmed the invitation in your letter to him.



Middle East



Friday, August 9, 1974
4:00 PM - 4:45 PM
Roosevelt Room

MIDDLE EAST AMBASSADORS

Ambassadors or Charges of

Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates,
Yemen

Background. The two principal issues in our relations with this group of countries are:

- The Arab-Israeli dispute with its potential for producing a U.S.-Soviet confrontation and a reversal in the improving trend in U.S.-Arab relations, including re-imposition of the oil boycott. Israel looks to the U.S. to offset Soviet backing for the radical Arabs, and the Arabs look to us to press Israel to return the Arab lands it captured in 1967. Thus, the U.S. position vis-a-vis the USSR in the Middle East depends on our making clear that we will maintain Israel's strength so that Soviet arms will not give the Arabs what they want while at the same time giving the Arabs hope that they can get what they want through U.S. diplomacy. The diplomatic process we have launched is designed to move steadily step-by-step but not to force the pace of decisions on issues too difficult to resolve now. The basic problem is to reach ultimately a point where (a) the Arab Governments can satisfy Israel that they are prepared to co-exist in peace with Israel and control extremist Palestinians and others who are not, and (b) Israel can satisfy the Arab sense of injustice over the displacement of the Arabs of much of Palestine in 1948 and 1967, and the Arab desire to recover territory occupied and, in many places, settled by Israel as a result of the 1967 war. The increase in Arab confidence, and consequent willingness to negotiate with Israel, and the initial Israeli withdrawals under the disengagement agreements, have given the Arabs an incentive to stay on the negotiating track with renewed confidence in the U.S. Many remain suspicious, however, that the



process will stop there and the U.S. will not persevere.

- The steady flow of oil at reasonable prices and the related orderly management of oil income so as not to disrupt the global economy. The best assurance that the Arabs will not again cut off oil shipments lies in their confidence that we are making an active effort to bring about a just peace -- which in their eyes is epitomized by Israeli withdrawal from the Arab land captured in 1967. The price problem stems from the ability of the producers' cartel (OPEC) to enforce a higher price than could be obtained in a market economy; virtually every producing country -- except perhaps Saudi Arabia -- favors a level of prices which threatens key consumers with economic disaster. Meanwhile, ways must be found to "recycle petro-dollars," i.e., to enable a large portion of the increased revenues of oil producers to find its way back into the financial system of the consuming countries.

The U.S. objectives in this area are to prevent another war, to move toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, and to erode the bloc of Soviet-supported radical Arab states. Our strategy has been to develop a framework for negotiation of an Arab-Israeli settlement. Now that we have proved that these negotiations can produce results that both sides want, some of the radical Arabs like Syria and Algeria have been drawn into tentative cooperation with us and the incentive for re-imposing the oil embargo is reduced. Since the Arabs on the front lines know they could not win a war with Israel now, the possibility of successful negotiations gives them an excuse not to renew the fighting. It also makes it acceptable in the eyes of most other Arabs for the wealthy oil-producing states to work in cooperation with us in dealing with the problems created by the high price of oil and the sharp increase of financial reserves in these countries. If we were to lose control of the negotiations, we would face a situation in which another war would be likely, pressures on Israel to withdraw completely would mount, and the oil embargo might be re-imposed. To increase Arab incentives to give the peace negotiations time and to maintain good relations with us, we have initiated a number of Joint Commissions and other cooperative arrangements with key Arab states, beginning with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.



This month we are conducting a series of consultations to determine how the Arab-Israeli negotiations should proceed. The foreign ministers of Israel and Egypt, the Prime Minister and King of Jordan, and a Syrian representative are scheduled for talks here. As you know, you will have an opportunity to see Foreign Minister Fahmy and King Hussein.

TALKING POINTS

In your remarks to the group, you may wish to stress the following basic points of U.S. policy:

-- It is my firm intention to carry out the main lines of the foreign policy which the United States has pursued over the past five years;

-- I believe it will be possible to pursue this policy on a bipartisan basis with strong Congressional and public support;

-- I want to say particularly to this group that I am determined to continue the diplomatic efforts of the past ten months directed at achieving a just and durable peace in the Middle East. Secretary Kissinger will continue to play an active role in this effort;

-- In pursuing this effort, the U.S. recognizes that no peace agreement can last if it does not respond to the legitimate interests of the parties concerned. The U.S. has no interest in a one-sided settlement;

-- All of us have a strong interest in maintaining a healthy world economy. We have begun to strengthen our economic cooperation with the countries in this area, and it is important that we work closely together to overcome the problems of inflation, food shortages, high cost of energy and others which are causing major economic hardship for nations around the world.



14

PRC



Friday, August 9, 1974
5:10 p.m.
Oval Office

People's Republic of China

Background: Ambassador Huang Chen (phonetic Hwahng) is the Chief of the Chinese Liaison Office, having assumed his post in May 1973. Liaison offices here and in Peking (Ambassador Bruce) were established in the wake of Secretary Kissinger's visit to China in February 1973. Ambassador Huang is a seasoned diplomat, 65 years old, who was with Chairman Mao on the Long March and is one of three ambassadors elected to the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee. He served as Ambassador to France from 1964-1973 where he was a secret contact point for many months. He is affable and expansive, with a good sense of humor. Although he is self-assured, he seldom seems to make significant substantive observations unless under instructions. I see him continuously as part of our practice to keep the Chinese meticulously informed of our major foreign policy moves, particularly those with regard to the Soviet Union.

Our opening to China has been carefully orchestrated since early 1969. After private messages through third parties and a series of unilateral public steps on trade and travel, we established a reliable channel through Pakistan to the Chinese leaders in 1970-71. My first secret trip in July 1971 led to the President's February 1972 visit and the Shanghai Communique. Since then I have travelled to China several times; we have opened up Liaison Offices; our trade has grown dramatically to over \$1 billion this past year (10-1 in our favor); and there have been a series of cultural/scientific exchanges and Congressional visits, including your own.

In our bilateral relations we have committed ourselves to full normalization of relations, and we have said that we will not support a two China policy, Taiwan independence, or third country (Moscow or Tokyo) interference in Taiwan.

Most importantly we have conducted an ongoing intensive exchange on all major international issues in which it is clear that our world views are parallel in many respects. The Chinese are preoccupied with the Soviet threat which has been their major incentive for improving relations with us. We are most important to them primarily as a global

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By dal, NARA, Date 12/18/03

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counterweight to Moscow. Thus they are most concerned that we play a strong international role; maintain a strong national defense; strengthen our ties with NATO and Japan; counter Soviet influence in the Middle East (they have encouraged our efforts there); and help other countries such as Pakistan and Iran who can offset not only the Soviet Union but India as well.

The PRC's internal political problems appear to be in a calmer phase, the poster campaign has been moderated, and Chou-En-lai seems to be recovering somewhat physically and politically. In any event, the PRC's foreign relations (including those with the U.S.) have not been materially affected by the current campaigns.

Against this backdrop, the Chinese will be looking for reassurance on the continuity of our foreign policy -- in particular a strong world role to balance the Soviet Union, and the normalization of our relations with Peking. You will have sent a personal message to Chairman Mao stressing these themes. You will want to reiterate them to the Ambassador.

Talking Points:

-- As one of my first acts as President, I wish to reaffirm the basic continuity of American foreign policy in general and our policy toward the People's Republic of China in particular. I have sent a personal message to Chairman Mao stressing these points.

-- Under My Administration, the United States will continue the basic approach to the world scene that President Nixon followed. We intend to maintain a strong international role. These are themes that I emphasized publicly last night.

-- Our relationship with China will remain a central element in our foreign policies. Our policy toward China has strong bipartisan backing in this nation, and my own views were strengthened during my visit to your country. We intend to continue on the course of normalization as reflected in the Shanghai Communique.


-- I will maintain the policy of keeping your government carefully informed on all major issues that could affect Chinese interests. I have asked Secretary Kissinger to continue the practice of consulting with you on a regular basis.



-- The recent difficulties in this country should not obscure the basic strength and resolve of the United States or the basic unity of the American people. I am confident this nation will emerge from this period even stronger.

-- U.S.-Chinese relations will be one of the highest priorities in my Administration, and I look forward to working with your leaders to make enduring the course on which we have embarked.

-- I am aware of the important personal role in our bilateral relations that you have played, Mr. Ambassador, not only here but in the early days in Paris as well.



122

Latin
America



121
Friday, August 9, 1974
5:15 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
Roosevelt Room

CONFIDENTIAL

LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ambassadors or Charges of

Argentina, Bahamas, Chile, Colombia, Barbados,
Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Paraguay

Background. The Latin American Ambassadors and Charges who attend this meeting will be wondering whether the change in the Presidency will foreshadow reduced U.S. interest in Latin America. They will welcome reassurances that you endorse and support Secretary Kissinger's new initiatives this past year to design a new U.S. policy and improve our relationships with Latin America and the Caribbean. Your meeting with them briefly will go a long way in dispelling any apprehension they may have about the vigor and health of the United States and the continuity in our Government.

After following a highly activist policy under the "Alliance for Progress" during the 1960s, we went through a phase from 1969-73 of lowering our profile and reducing our involvement in Latin American programs and activities. While at first welcoming this new more restrained approach by the United States, the Latin Americans later began to complain about what they saw as lessened United States interest in Latin America, if not indifference and neglect by Washington.

Since last fall we have been embarked upon a vigorous program to revitalize our relations with the countries of Latin America. Secretary Kissinger has met with the Latin American Foreign Ministers as a group four times in the last ten months -- in New York, Mexico City, Washington

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State Dept. Guidelines
By del, NARA, Date 12/18/03



and, most recently in Atlanta at the annual OAS General Assembly in April.

He has also met with them individually many times and has traveled to Panama to initiate a major new negotiation governing the Canal.

The group Foreign Minister meetings resulted from his invitation to a "New Dialogue" about our mutual interest and objectives and has been extremely well received. Simultaneously, during this transition phase to a comprehensive new policy for Latin America, we have made strong efforts to settle the major outstanding disputes, such as U.S. investment problems in Peru, the Colorado River salinity problem with Mexico, the territorial sea and tuna fishing disputes with the Andean countries, a new modern treaty covering the Panama Canal, military assistance, trade with Cuba, and many others.

We are also seeking through the establishment of multilateral Working Groups to set up processes and mechanisms to avoid some possible new disagreements on the horizon. We have, in addition, greatly increased our consultations at almost all levels of Government on a wide variety of trade and economic issues. We have also recommitted ourselves to cooperating with the Latin American countries in their development and in restructuring the Inter-American System.

All of these new initiatives on our part have been extremely well received and are putting our relations with the Latin American countries back on the right track. They will be hoping for your endorsement of them.

TALKING POINTS

-- Mrs. Ford and I have long had a deep personal interest in the countries of this hemisphere, and I have long recognized the special importance of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States.

-- This is not only because of our common heritage and history in developing the New World, but also because if we in this hemisphere cannot find together the solutions



to the basic problems confronting mankind today, then the prospects are bleak indeed of finding them anywhere on this globe.

-- I have been following with the greatest interest the development of our new policy toward Latin America and Secretary Kissinger's "New Dialogue." I fully endorse his initiatives and count myself fortunate indeed that he has agreed to stay on at my request to serve as Secretary of State.

-- There will be no lessening of our commitment to these new initiatives. Indeed the United States will not fail to honor each and every one of its commitments to the countries of this hemisphere and, for that matter, around the world.

-- This country is strong and I myself have drawn great strength from the bipartisan nature of the support that I have received not only from the Congress but across the length and breadth of this great land.

-- As you know I come from the Midwest -- from Michigan -- where one of the marks of a man's worth and success is his "neighborliness." I was raised by my parents to be a good, thoughtful and considerate neighbor. Therefore, to all of you, who represent our closest neighbors, I wish to ask for your understanding and cooperation as we move ahead together towards the great goals of peace and progress to which we are all dedicated. I assure you that you can count on my understanding and cooperation.

-- Please convey to your Presidents my warm personal greetings and assure them that they have a friend in the President of the United States.





Friday, August 9, 1974
6:25 p.m.
Oval Office

ISRAELI AMBASSADOR

Background

Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz is a Golda Meir appointee and confidant. He generally takes a hardline on Arab-Israeli relations and is an active promoter of Israeli interests with wide contacts in Congress and the press.

The principal issues in U.S.-Israeli relations fall into two categories:

-- Middle East peacemaking. Since last October's war, Israel has come to recognize the extent of its dependence on the U.S. and the need for territorial compromises in the search for peace. While it has been a tough negotiator, we have brought Israel along on the disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria without serious strains in our relations. The present government of Prime Minister Rabin, which took office in early June with a one-vote majority in the Knesset, is seeking domestic maneuvering room in preparation for the next stages in negotiations with the Arabs. In Secretary Kissinger's meetings with Deputy Prime Minister Allon last week, Allon initially took a hardline against early negotiations but came around to recognizing the need to keep the negotiating process going, beginning if possible with a first stage agreement with Jordan. There are no serious immediate issues, but Israel remains apprehensive that, as negotiations move to later stages, it will be under pressure to make unacceptable territorial concessions in the occupied territories, particularly with respect to the West Bank of Jordan and the Golan Heights.

-- Bilateral relations. Israel has presented a long list of its requirements in the military equipment field-- both items needed urgently by next spring and items needed for a multi-year long-term buildup and modernization of its armed forces. These are under discussion in Defense and no immediate decisions are needed. In the economic field, Israel seeks to move rapidly in organizing the joint Israel-U.S. Committee on Trade and Investment agreed to during Secretary Simon's recent visit there. It also seeks an increase in the level of grant aid we have requested from Congress (our present request is for \$50 million grant and \$300 million Foreign Military Sales Credit). Israel estimates



it will need \$1.5 billion annually, over and above its own resources, for the next few years at least to cover its defense imports.

U.S. Objectives. Our principal objectives with Israel are twofold:

-- We want to keep Israel engaged in the negotiating process and, by moving that process one step at a time and at as measured a pace as possible, to develop increasing Israeli flexibility.

-- We want to maintain sufficient Israeli confidence in its own strength, and in U.S. support for its security and economic well-being, to encourage Israel to continue down the negotiating path.

TALKING POINTS

-- I have always supported close U.S.-Israeli relations and the concept of a strong, secure Israel. I will continue the tradition of all preceding Administrations in this regard.

-- Progress toward peace in the Middle East will remain a primary American foreign policy objective. We will continue our active role in promoting an ongoing negotiating process.

-- I am encouraged by the progress made over the past months. The recent talks with Minister Allon give me hope that it will be possible over the next couple of months to move the negotiating process a step further through a first stage agreement with Jordan.

-- We recognize the difficult decisions Israel faces, as it moves toward peace, and the risks involved. We intend to stand by Israel as it moves down the path toward peace. Israel can be assured of our continuing support for its military supply and economic assistance requirements on a long-term basis.





12
Friday, August 9, 1974
6:55 p.m.
Oval Office

Tran Kim PHUONG
Vietnamese Ambassador

Background. Disturbing indications of increased levels of North Vietnamese initiated activity have become apparent in recent weeks. Intelligence sources suggest a distinct possibility of considerably larger-scale enemy action, perhaps within the next week. Additionally, Administration efforts to secure adequate levels of economic and military assistance from the Congress have suffered serious setbacks this week. The levels which could result from the current Congressional processes would be wholly inadequate to sustain the South Vietnamese armed forces' capability at existing levels, or to maintain the already precarious state of the Vietnamese economy. They would clearly not permit the South Vietnamese to move toward increased economic self-sufficiency. Significantly greater North Vietnamese military pressure would substantially aggravate the situation. Intensive action by you and Secretary Kissinger will be essential to prevent Congressional actions which would dangerously weaken the South Vietnamese economy and defense capability.

TALKING POINTS

In your remarks to Ambassador Phuong, you may wish to stress the following basic points of US policy:

-- The new Administration will continue the policy of the past Administration in attempting to provide all necessary support to your country in order that the people of South Viet-Nam remain free to exercise their right to self-determination.

-- We are disturbed at the indications of possible increased levels of North Vietnamese attacks, and want you to be assured we will take all appropriate steps to support your country should such attacks occur.

-- Despite difficulties in the Congress encountered by our efforts to obtain sufficient levels of assistance for Viet-Nam, we are confident that at the end of the legislative process we will secure adequate support for both the military and economic aid your country requires.

-- Please convey to President Thieu my profound admiration and respect for the gallant people of South Viet-Nam, and my heartfelt hope that they will soon be able to realize genuine peace in their country.

