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U. S. - U. S. S. R.

PRESIDENTIAL EXCHANGES

August 9, 1974 -

1. Exchange of Letters between the President and Brezhnev on President Ford's Assumption of Office, August 9 - 11, 1974
2. President's Meeting with Dobrynin, August 14, 1974
3. Exchange of Notes between Brezhnev and the President on Cyprus, August 15 - 17, 1974
4. Notes to President on Simas Kudirka, August 31 - September 4, 1974
5. President's Meeting with Gromyko, September 20, 1974
6. President's Meeting with Gromyko, September 21, 1974
7. Exchange of Letters between the President and Brezhnev on Secretary Kissinger's Talks in Moscow, October 24 - November 5, 1974

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By dat, NARA, Date 12/18/03



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labeled "The President"

10/31/74 WHM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

August 13, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Brezhnev's First Message to You

Brezhnev's response to the message you sent him immediately after you were sworn in is friendly and positive in tone. He picks up the theme of continuity contained in your message.

As was to have been expected in this first exchange, Brezhnev's letter is couched in generalities. His most specific points relate to the continuation of personal contact; thus, he accepts again the previously extended invitation to him to visit the U.S. next year which you had confirmed, and he reaffirms his own interest in the idea of a working meeting on "neutral ground" before the end of this year. He also in effect invites you to the Soviet Union in 1976. In addition, he also endorses continued use of confidential communication channels. All these points reflect Brezhnev's continued personal stake in the relationship with us.

While strongly affirming Soviet interest in continued improvements in our relations, Brezhnev on the whole avoids the millennial rhetoric he sometimes uses in this regard. There is, in fact, a note of realism in his letter: he notes that the road of detente is not simple and requires persistent effort.


There is no overtly contentious note -- in recent communications to President Nixon, Brezhnev was quite polemical concerning Cyprus, and the Soviets displayed impatience over the delay in resuming the Geneva conference on the Middle East and in our extending them MFN. The closest he comes is to insist that our relations must be based on "full equality and mutual benefit." These are standard terms but are sometimes used as euphemisms for Soviet complaints against us.

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In referring to the idea of a working summit meeting, Brezhnev is evidently prepared to await developments. While he no doubt would welcome an early get-acquainted session, he probably does not want to crowd you so early in your term by making a specific proposal. He probably also anticipates that some of the issues now under negotiation, or in preparation for negotiation, will take some time to become ripe for summit-level consideration. Gromyko's visit here for the UN General Assembly and my own projected visit to Moscow later in the fall would be part of this process. (I referred to both of these in a message I sent Gromyko immediately after you assumed office.)

In sum, the initial written contact between you and Brezhnev, reinforced by the talks with Vorontsov and Dobrynin, leave US-Soviet relations essentially on course. Brezhnev seems reassured that the change here portends no change in policy and he himself is intent on reassuring you of continuity in Soviet policies. These themes are also evident in public Soviet comment. This in itself does not solve the knotty problems we confront on such issues as SALT and MBFR or even Cyprus, should that crisis erupt actively again. But it gives us a base for maintaining the momentum in dealing with these issues.

Attached at Tab A is Brezhnev's message to you; at Tab B is a copy of your message to Brezhnev; and at Tab C is a copy of my letter to Gromyko.

In your talk with Dobrynin, you should express gratification at the positive tone and content of Brezhnev's message, note what Brezhnev says about the "road of detente" not being a "simple task" and stress your determination to pursue negotiations vigorously in the coming weeks while dealing with critical issues, like Cyprus, in a spirit of restraint and respect for each other's interests.



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A



August 11, 1974

Dear Mr. President,

First of all I would like to congratulate you on the occasion of your assuming office of the President of the United States.

I received your message of August 9. Saying it straight, I and my colleagues were gratified to see your determination to continue the policy of maintaining and developing further all the good progress which was achieved in relations between our countries during the administration of your predecessor, President Nixon.

Such an approach concurs with our course in Soviet-American relations. I wish with all firmness to underline to you, Mr. President, personally that we are full of determination to build further our relations with the United States on the basis of long-range and stable perspective. To maintain with the United States the relations of peace and cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit is the line of principle for the Soviet Union and this line remains invariable.

Thus we are convinced that the better and more stable are the relations between the USSR and the US as the most powerful countries, the more lasting will be peace on the earth, the more realistic will be the possibility of eliminating completely the threat of nuclear catastrophe, and consequently the better it will be for all the peoples of the world.

It is well known that it took energetic and pointed efforts of both sides to make possible the turn which has been achieved in the relations between the USSR and the US during last years. It is also clear that further advance along the road of detente and improvement of relations between our countries is not a simple task. But we make

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from this only one conclusion: it is necessary not to relax but to persistently multiply efforts directed at securing what has been achieved, at further developing and deepening the reconstruction of Soviet-American relations.

Judging by your message, by your confidential words which were reported to me, and also by public statements made by you already in your capacity as the President of the United States, we have between us a common understanding exactly in the main thing - where to lead to in Soviet-American relations. And this is very important. Let us, Mr. President, act jointly in this big and important cause.

And we do have established channels for frank exchange of opinion on all questions which may arise. On our part we consider these channels quite effective and, like you, intend to further use them.

I thank you, Mr. President, for reaffirming the invitation to come to the United States next year with official visit. I intend to take advantage of this invitation. Concrete time of my visit to the United States can be agreed upon later. Of course, we proceed from the assumption that after this you also will make an official visit to the Soviet Union.

At the same time I also believe, like you, that a working meeting between us before the end of the year and somewhere on, so to say, neutral ground would be in the best interests of the cause. Experience shows how useful and valuable are personal contacts. There will be no difficulties, I think, to agree upon details of arranging such a meeting with due account of the development of events.

In conclusion I would like to tell you, Mr. President, that I and my colleagues understand full well the enormous responsibility which the leader of a great country has to shoulder, and we wish you successful and fruitful activity in your high office.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev



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B



B 18

August 9, 1974

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Upon assuming office as President of the United States, I wanted to be in immediate contact with you to share my views on the importance of continuing along the course of Soviet-American relations that you and President Nixon have charted in your summit meetings, in the agreements that our two governments have reached, and in the general spirit of cooperation we have established. I have naturally participated as Vice President in the discussions prior to the most recent meetings with you in Moscow and discussed the results with both President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger. As you are no doubt aware, I have consistently supported in our Congress the foreign policy of President Nixon throughout his administration. Thus, I can confirm without qualification that American policy toward the Soviet Union will continue unchanged in my administration.

I share the worthy goals that were set forth in the communique of the summit meetings in Moscow and in this country, and the approach to our relations that you and President Nixon have elaborated in your private discussions. I firmly believe that in the nuclear age a policy of mutual restraint and of respecting the interests of all is the only course open to responsible statesmen. I am committed to that course. I will also give closest attention to the many negotiations already in progress between our governments or projected for the coming weeks. My administration will continue to approach these negotiations with the utmost seriousness and with determination to achieve concrete and lasting results in the common interest of our two countries as well as the world at large.

I value the intimate and open exchanges that have been carried on in the interim between the summit conferences. I would like to assure you that the channels of communication that have been established remain open at any time.



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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 91-34 #1 State Dept. 2/11/92
By KBH NARA, Date 3/7/92

I have asked Secretary of State Kissinger to continue in office to us to ensure continuity in the conduct of our foreign policies. He has my full confidence and support.



Finally, Mr. General Secretary, I want to reaffirm the invitation to you to visit this country next year. Please convey my regards to your colleagues, President Podgorny, Premier Kosygin, and Minister Gromyko.

Sincerely,

Leonid I. Brezhnev
General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow



1h



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1974

Dear Mr. Minister:

I am taking advantage of the close personal relationship we have enjoyed to send you a private message to explain certain points with utmost frankness. You are free, of course, to share them with the General Secretary who will receive a communication from our new President.

Regardless of what you may hear or read in the next few weeks, I can assure you personally that President Ford intends to continue and develop further the policies that have guided our relations with the USSR under President Nixon. He has asked me to remain in office, and to devote special attention to Soviet affairs. He will be a strong President, and you will see that he will take command immediately and assert his authority and responsibility over foreign affairs. You may rely on his assurances, and the approach to the issues we discussed in Moscow and since my return will be carried through.

You will realize from your long acquaintance with this country, that the coming period will be one in which the President will be engaged in a review of our position in many areas and on many issues -- but this will not affect Soviet-American relations.

Thus, I will probably return to Moscow this fall as we discussed if the President's schedule permits me to be away. In any case, we expect to meet you should you come to the UN General Assembly this year.

Let me make one further point, and I do so in the spirit of candor that had characterized our many discussions.

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By dot, NARA, Date 12/18/03




*orig. Handed to Min Vorontsov
8/9/74 - 3:15 pm by HAK*

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The change in the Presidency will not end the criticism that our policy toward the Soviet Union has been subjected to over this past year. I will soon make a major speech on this subject, which will commit the new Administration to the process of improving Soviet-American relations. But I hope that in Moscow the most serious thought will be given to the substantive issues facing us -- in CSCE, MBFR and SALT -- so that there will be no loss of momentum when these negotiations resume.

It will be of more importance now, in the new circumstances, to demonstrate that what we have achieved is in fact a solid foundation for the future.

Warm regards,



Henry A. Kissinger

His Excellency
Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLYMEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

Wednesday, August 14, 1974

11:00 a.m. (30 minutes)

The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*I. PURPOSE

The Soviets are eager to establish prompt direct contact with you to assure themselves, after a period of uncertainty, that our relations will continue on an even keel. Your purpose will be to reassure them on this score -- as you have already begun to do in your message to Brezhnev and talk with Mr. Vorontsov -- while leaving them in no doubt that this is no time for them to take liberties with our interests.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS PLAN

- A. Background: Soviet Views. The past months have been a period of uncertainty for the Soviets in their relations with us. They tended to see our domestic difficulties largely in terms of attacks on the President by "forces" hostile to detente. They saw President Nixon as hampered in negotiations by his declining influence on Congress. They were uncertain about your own attitudes. At the same time, they have seen our influence rise and theirs fall in an area of great interest to them and where they have traditional ambitions: the Middle East. They have been largely impotent in the Cyprus crisis. They were irritated by the successful NATO summit in Brussels.


Brezhnev's reply to your first message seems to reflect a sense of reassurance that you will pursue the basic policy lines of the past two years.

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By dal, NARA, Date 12/18/03

Our View. Our own interest remains in keeping the Soviets on a constructive course through an admixture of incentives (such as benefits from trade) and potential penalties for aggressive behavior.

You should therefore again underline your basic commitment to the policies and agreements resulting from the three summits since 1972. You should stress not only continuity in general but note your strong interest in ongoing and projected negotiations, such as SALT, MBFR, peaceful nuclear explosions. Without being overly explicit, you should stress that it is basic to constructive US-Soviet relations for both of us to operate internationally with restraint and conscious of each other's interests. Although our respective influence may fluctuate in one or another part of the world, neither of us should set out deliberately to damage the interests of the other.

While stressing the central role of US-Soviet relations, you should avoid any implication of interest in condominium. You should also avoid any suggestion that we are prepared to collaborate with the Soviets against China.

Brezhnev has a personal stake in good relations with us. Thus, you should assure Dobrynin that you want to maintain personal contact and continue to use existing confidential channels of communication. Brezhnev has already accepted your invitation to him to go through with the previously projected visit to this country next year. He is also interested in an interim working summit and you should confirm your own interest in such a meeting when there is concrete business to transact.

- B. Participants: Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary Kissinger.
- C. Press Plan: The meeting will be announced and photographs will be taken.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I am pleased to take this early opportunity to confirm that American policy toward the Soviet Union will continue in this



Administration along the positive and promising lines already established. I said this in my written message to Mr. Brezhnev and address to Congress, and I welcome Mr. Brezhnev's positive response.

2. I have vigorously supported this policy both in the Congress and as Vice President.
3. I endorse the goals that have been set forth in the joint communique of the Moscow and Washington summits, and the approach to our relations as elaborated in the discussions between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev.
4. I have asked Secretary Kissinger to continue both as Secretary of State and as my Assistant for National Security Affairs. One of his foremost tasks will be to ensure that on the US side we maintain the desired momentum in our relations. The NSC is actively preparing for negotiations with the USSR.
5. The US approach, as discussed in Moscow, on issues such as the European Security Conference, on SALT and other arms control questions and on our economic relations remains positive. I expect that negotiations will proceed as scheduled.
6. As you know, on Monday night I called on the Congress to take quick action on a Trade Bill acceptable to the Administration. We are actively working on a compromise on the emigration issue.
7. At the same time that I reaffirm our policy, I will be frank in pointing out that within the United States there will be many people watching for signs of any action that might be cited as taking advantage of this transition period.
8. For this reason, it is all the more important that the US and USSR continue to work toward improved, mutually beneficial relations. Restraint and respect for each other's interests are the key.




9. I value the exchanges that have been conducted at the highest level between summit conferences, and you should assure General Secretary Brezhnev that the channels of communication remain open. The exchanges we have already had show this.

10. As I said in my message of August 9 to the General Secretary, I am looking forward to his visit to the United States in 1975. I am glad he has confirmed his intention to come here. I am prepared to consider a working summit before year-end. We can plan for it when we see how negotiations are progressing and after talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko when he comes here for the UN. I will also look forward to visiting the USSR in 1976.

* * * * *



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Delivered 5:30 p.m. 8/15/74
to General Scowcroft

It is believed in Moscow that there is an urgent necessity to exchange opinions with the President on the question of Cyprus which has gained particular acuteness in view of the recent events. Addressing the President on this question it is assumed in Moscow that the Soviet Union and the U. S. , being guided by high goals of strengthening peace and international security, have agreed on the importance of the prevention and the removal of situations which can bring about complications dangerous to peace.

As is known, hostilities have been resumed on Cyprus, with the conflict endangering to spread beyond the limits of the island. Such development of events runs contrary to the trend for relaxation, which is being established in international relations, and can create a new dangerous hotbed of international tension. The Security Council decisions aimed at stopping the foreign military intervention in Cyprus, at ensuring the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and legitimate interests of the Cypriot people, are not being implemented.

On the other hand, the approach, which was used at the Geneva talks, to solve the question of Cyprus in the narrow circle of some powers, in camera, have gone bankrupt.

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By del, NARA, Date 12/18/03



It is becoming still more and more evident that the situation on Cyprus and in connection with the developments there, is demanding active and purposeful actions directed at the liquidation of the conflict.

It seems to us, that an important step, which under the present circumstances could produce the greatest effect, would be a joint effort of our two countries for the purpose of implementing the Security Council Resolution 353 of July 20. We have in mind a solution of main problems of the settlement as that Resolution demands.

In this connection we have the following considerations to which we would like to draw the attention of the President. The joint effort of the USSR and the US could provide appropriate guarantees of our both countries aimed at securing the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Cypriot state, as well as creating necessary conditions for the Cypriots to settle themselves their internal affairs without any outside intervention. We would be also prepared to consider a possibility of providing such guarantees on the part of the Security Council.

Along the same lines, in our view, a special group should be established, composed of nonpermanent members of the Security Council, representing all main geographic areas. The functions of such group, small in its composition (representatives of 5-6 states),



could include observing, on behalf of the Security Council, the situation on Cyprus, the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council on the question of Cyprus, as well as the promotion of a just, peaceful and democratic settlement of the problem of Cyprus, including a direct participation in negotiations.

Undertaking this initiative, we express our readiness to cooperate closely with the US in implementing measures both those mentioned above and possible others, aimed at preserving Cyprus as a sovereign and independent state.

It is hoped in Moscow that the US Government will regard our considerations with full attention. On our part we are ready, of course, to consider the views that the American side may have.



*Delivered to Soviet
Embassy at 11:30 on 8/17/74*

The President appreciates receiving the detailed Soviet views on the Cyprus situation. In the spirit of our agreement to consult closely on situations capable of raising international tensions, the President wishes to respond promptly to the considerations set forth in the Soviet communication of August 15.

We agree of course that everything should be done to achieve an end to the conflict and a just settlement. It now appears that a ceasefire, as called for by the UN Security Council resolutions which we both support, can be established today. When this occurs, the next objective must be to bring the parties together as soon as possible to undertake immediate efforts toward a settlement. The President has carefully considered the advisability of the joint initiative proposed and elaborated in the Soviet communication of August 15. In the present delicate situation, the President feels that it may be wiser for our two countries to continue to use their diplomatic influence, with the parties as well as in the UN Security Council, to ensure that the ceasefire will remain effective and that the parties make a maximum and prompt effort to bring about a settlement acceptable to all concerned.

We should of course remain in close contact as the next phase develops to determine how we can most effectively contribute to achievement of this common goal. As our ideas develop, we shall communicate them to the Soviet side.





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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August 31, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*


Ambassador Dobrynin has just given me the following message relating to Simas Kudirka.

"Kudirka has been released from detention as a result of a Pardon. He is given the possibility now to return to his home in the Lithuanian Republic and to get employment. The question of further possible steps concerning Kudirka in connection with President Ford's request is under continuous consideration. For the personal knowledge of the President, Mr. Brezhnev would like him to know that he is keeping this question within the scope of his personal attention."

*Thanks / keep me posted / I am most interested.
JR*

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER



Ambassador Dobrynin has given us the following message with respect to Simas Kudirka:

"Your President has already been informed that because of the interest of the President, Kudirka was given pardon and he is now at his home in the Lithuanian Republic. The situation at present is as follows: As a result of disagreement which occurred in his family, Kudirka up until now has not applied to the local authorities about his wish to immigrate permanently to the United States. When he does so it will take several days to consider his application and to process the proper documents. After that has been done, Kudirka and those members of his family who so desire will be able to leave the Soviet Union and go if they like to the United States."

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By dal, NARA, Date 12/18/03



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 20, 1974
TIME: 11:10 a.m.
PLACE: Oval Room, White House

SUBJECT: Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's Call
on President Ford

PARTICIPANTS:

Soviet Side

Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

U.S. Side

The President
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Stoessel


The President: It is very nice to have you here, Mr. Foreign Minister, so that we can get better acquainted and can talk about serious things.

Gromyko: First, let's agree that half of the conversation will be through the interpreter. I don't need an interpreter when you speak, but I will speak through an interpreter. Let's also agree -- since we have a number of questions to exchange views on -- to take them up one after the other. Of course, we can comment as we wish on each question.

The President: That sounds fine.

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


Gromyko: First, I would like to begin by transmitting to you, Mr. President, the greetings and best wishes of Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The President: Thank you. I was very grateful for his message and I look forward to meeting him.

Gromyko: Yes, I agree that the message was good and that it sheds light on the general situation with regard to relations between our two countries. I hope you noticed the evidence in that message of the permanency of our line of policy toward the US.

In connection with the changes which took place in the US leadership, we asked ourselves within our leadership -- and this was true personally of Mr. Brezhnev -- whether the US would hold to its line of policy toward the Soviet Union which it had adopted in recent years or whether there would be some changes. I should add that we noted your message, Mr. President, to Leonid Brezhnev, and your public statements, and we came to the conclusion that your line aimed at detente and improving relations with the Soviet Union probably will not change. I would appreciate it if you could confirm this.



Regarding our own policy, it remains as it has been with regard to US-Soviet relations. This has been expressed in the joint documents approved by our two countries and is aimed at achieving detente in our relations.

The Secretary: Mr. President, you may have noted that the Foreign Minister said our line "probably will not change." He is not a man given to rash statements. (The Secretary recalled an incident which took place last year at the UN Secretary General's dinner for the Security Council.) Sometime, I would like to hear one unqualified statement from Mr. Gromyko. He has a diabolical ability to phrase double negatives. I'm too obvious about this, but he is not.

The President: As Ambassador Dobrynin and his predecessor knew, I was a hardliner in Congress in 1949. But I want to emphasize that, as our new relations developed under the label of detente, and as I became acquainted with the benefits of this policy to our two countries and to the whole world, I changed my views. I want to assure you, Mr. Foreign Minister, that I will continue the policy of President Nixon. You noted correctly that in my speech to the Congress I emphasized my support of this policy and I wish to reiterate that. I thought it would never be possible to develop it, but I support it. It has



been very effectively developed by Secretary Kissinger and we will continue this.

I don't have to tell you that we are most fortunate to have Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. He has convinced me about our policy toward the Soviet Union and of the importance of building on the new relationship. I feel we have a good basis on which to build and good prospects for the future. You should know that my relations with Secretary Kissinger are close and I back him fully.

Gromyko: I have listened to your statement with satisfaction, Mr. President. It is quite natural that what interests us first and foremost is the political line of US policy toward the Soviet Union. We consider this most important; it is the soul of the relations between our two countries. We've seen ups and downs over many years -- over 50 years -- and we have experienced periods of lessening of tensions and of increasing tensions. However, in the last several years, we have noted that our relations have evened out and have shown more stability. It is not that we are on a smooth, paved road; maybe there will be problems in the future in connection with our assessments of the phenomena of political life, but it is true to say that what has



happened in our relations is historic and has never happened before. Of course, we worked together in World War II, but this was a special period. The level of our relations which we have achieved is of paramount importance, especially considering the role we two great powers are destined to play in the world. Therefore, we can only hear your statement with pleasure. If this line indeed will be observed, then we can look with confidence toward the future.

The President: Our line will continue from our point of view, and I gather the same is true from your point of view. We won't be able to solve all problems. As you know, we have some difficulties domestically in the United States about our policy, but, over-all, our people feel that our policy toward the Soviet Union and our relationship with you have been beneficial. I feel the American people will support me in this policy.

Gromyko: Now I would like to go to some concrete problems. As you know, the Soviet Union and the United States on several occasions have emphasized the significance of restraint in regard to the arms race. This is a big problem involving the military and security interests of both sides. In recent years, this problem has been a central issue between the US and the Soviet Union. It



has attracted the attention not just of our peoples in general but also the leadership on both sides. It is regarded as the most topical and the most important of the problems between us.

Much has been done in regard to this question already. You of course are familiar with the accords which have been reached between us. They are important for our two countries and also for the world. I want to say that our interest in finding ways to solve this problem has not lessened.

You probably have heard of our statements made at various levels, and especially at the highest level, on this subject, particularly in connection with the high-level US-Soviet meetings. We believe that serious efforts are required to achieve agreement where this has not yet been achieved. This means that all possible preparations should be made for further agreements, in particular to replace the Interim Agreement in the period after 1977.

We know you are working on this question. Talks took place between Secretary Kissinger and General Secretary Brezhnev and also on the highest level at the last summit meeting. We are ready and fully determined to move forward to find common grounds for an agreement on this major problem.



This is a complex question and I am sure you also are aware of the complexity. It affects the fundamental interests and security of both the US and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the work which must be done must be detailed and subtle; it will take patience and a broad outlook to find a solution acceptable to both countries.

In discussing this, I don't plan to set forth any detailed scheme or numbers. I don't know if you have such details either; if you did, we would gladly hear them. But I wish to emphasize the need for both sides to prepare thoroughly. Any agreement must take into account on an equal basis the interests of both sides so that there will be no harm to the security of either side. This is the cornerstone of any agreement in this field. If this is observed, then there will be a good chance of finding agreement.

I want to express our determination to continue and to redouble our efforts to find a solution on those aspects of the problems where there has not yet been a solution. We will do everything possible to find such a solution. We hope the US will act in the same way.

We know that you have various shades of opinion in the US on this subject. This is obvious to anyone who reads the press. It is you, Mr. President, who must bring all of this down to a common denominator. It is




for you to decide. We know that we are dealing with the President of the United States. We assume the US will be guided by the principle of equal security for both sides. This must be the basis for any agreement, that neither side will be harmed by an agreement.

I don't want to go into more detail at this time on this subject. There are many factors to be taken into account. One of them is geography. Also, so far there are only two of us dealing with this subject. You and we can talk and try to find an agreement, but other states are sitting and watching us. There are some who criticize one or the other of us, and some don't even like either side. This complicates the situation.

We could be pessimistic or fatalistic about the outcome, but we are not. We believe there is the possibility of an agreement which would be acceptable to both sides.

The President: There is no diminution on our side of the desire to make progress. We want to double and re-double our efforts. We feel we can handle the problem of the Interim Agreement and achieve a longer term agreement.

I'm in the process of working with the Secretary and others to determine a position which will be safe for both countries yet will be aimed at reducing the



problem of destabilization which would occur if both of us went down the path of developing more arms.


As you know, Secretary Kissinger will be going to Moscow.

The Secretary: They don't seem to want me -- they can't agree on a date. Sometime around the end of October or early November seems probable.

Gromyko: We do want him!

The President: I hope he can lay the foundation for a longer term agreement which can be worked out in the course of the next 12 months.

I am faced with a domestic problem. I feel the US people want real progress on the arms question. If I didn't feel that we could make progress, my actions regarding the military budget which I must submit in December would be different. But I am reassured by what you say, Mr. Foreign Minister, and my recommendations to Congress will be different. If I were disappointed in your position, I would have to take a stronger line. But on the basis of your assurances and the prospects of progress, it will be easier for me to convince the US Congress and the people that we can get results.



The Secretary: And, of course, much will depend on what we can accomplish in Moscow in October.

The President: Yes, as well as in the arms negotiations. I have to think of dollar appropriations and details. If Henry comes back from Moscow with concrete results, it will be most important and helpful.

Gromyko: On both sides, let us give earnest thought to this. We should endeavor to get a longer term agreement, at least to 1985. This could ease the situation and would help in considering variants of a solution; this is why we agreed to this approach at the last summit.

At some point, all of this must be reduced to concrete figures. This is a crucial and topical issue. It is of paramount importance that the principle of no harm to the security of either side will be observed closely.

We'll be prepared to discuss all of this in detail with Secretary Kissinger in Moscow.

The Secretary: Mr. President, I've told Ambassador Dobrynin on your behalf of our general approach. We will discuss a rough order of magnitude. It is conceivable that you and the General Secretary could then announce this in Vladivostok when you meet toward the end of November. Then, when Mr. Brezhnev comes



here next June an agreement could be concluded. This could also fit into your Congressional schedule. Before you go to Vladivostok there would be concrete progress going beyond general statements. This would anchor the policy in the public mind before rational debate becomes difficult in the period preceding the 1976 elections.

The President: That is correct. It would be better to achieve an agreement in a non-election year. If we could achieve it in May or June, based on Dr. Kissinger's trip and my own meeting, then it would be out of the political arena.

The Secretary: Practically speaking, we won't have an agreement in June unless there is agreement in principle in November.

On two occasions, we've attempted to achieve rapid agreement on SALT. This is too difficult a procedure. If we can't get an agreement in principle, then we can't get agreement in 1975.

The President: And we can't get it in 1976.

The Secretary: Those are the realities.

Gromyko: It follows from what the President and the Secretary have said that we must seriously try to find a solution. We are prepared to do this and we trust the



US is also. If, before my departure from the US, you have any more details to offer -- some kind of preliminary material for discussion -- we would hear them with interest. This would facilitate consideration of the matter before the Secretary comes to Moscow.

The Secretary: Maybe we could discuss this next Tuesday night at dinner in a very preliminary way. This would be just a concept.

Gromyko: What we need is something material, which can be touched.

The Secretary: You see, Mr. President, he's on his good behavior!

I have told the President, Mr. Foreign Minister, that you are a man of great ability, a tough negotiator, but also completely reliable.

The President: And also that you are the best professional in the business.

Gromyko: Now I would like to touch on European affairs, including European security. Much has been done by the US and the Soviet Union acting together with regard to policy concerning Europe.

The President: I agree. I also feel there are areas




where we could make more progress, but please proceed.

Gromyko: There was a time in the history of our relations when we were partners in a joint struggle against the aggressor and we shed blood for a common cause. This is imbedded in human memory and always will be. Now, we have reached a level which shows the advantage of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the US in connection with European security in our own interest and in the general interest of other countries. This should not be weakened in any way and nothing should be allowed to disturb this. We feel that together we can do much more which would entirely meet the interests of strengthening European security and improving our own relations.

First, about the conference on European security and the successful completion of its work with positive results. As you know, the second stage is now in progress in Geneva. I would like to say, for the Soviet leadership and for Leonid Brezhnev personally, that we attach great importance to finishing the work of the conference with positive results.

However, we see some artificial and unjustified delays in the conference. We feel that the completion of the conference, and especially holding the third phase at the highest level, would give a new impulse to security in Europe as well as to US-Soviet relations.



We know that some say that the US and the Soviets are acting together in unison. Even if people do say this, we don't feel we should give up our cooperation or sacrifice the advantages which could accrue from such cooperation.

Secretary Kissinger can confirm that when we have reached an agreement and find a common language, then things move forward as a rule. But when we don't have agreement, then there is no progress, and we go in circles.

Lately, there have been some hitches in our cooperation in Geneva. We ask ourselves whether this means a change in US policy about what has been agreed or whether this is a chance occurrence. We would like to work for a successful completion of the conference with good results. We would like to urge you to cooperate with the Soviet Union to bring the conference to a successful conclusion. We have many other things to do after the conference and we want to get to them.

The Secretary: I think Ambassador Dobrynin has a microphone in our office!;

The President: When I said that we could do more, I had in mind the security conference and also the force reduction talks. I feel we can work together even better than we did in the war. I am not familiar with the



difficulties you mentioned at Geneva, although I know there are some problems about Basket III.

The Secretary: I will talk at lunch with the Foreign Minister about this. The trouble, Mr. President, is with our European allies. Speaking very frankly, every country wants to extract something from the Soviet Union. I've told all of them that the Soviet Union won't be overthrown without noticing it, and certainly not because of things like increased circulation of newspapers and so on. I don't know how many projects have been submitted in Basket III, but there is a big pile. We've tried to reduce that and to explain to our allies that the Soviet Union has difficulty in making concessions on one issue when it doesn't know what else it may be asked to concede on.

We've had enormous difficulties with our friends to get one document; now they are going through all of the projects and reading them. There is no deliberate policy on our part to slow down the conference. We remain on the course as we discussed it at the summit.

This whole thing is one of the wierdest negotiations I have ever seen. I talked with one foreign minister in Europe and said we needed one position. I didn't care what it was, but we needed one position. He objected that the Russians would find out about it. But, of



course, that's the point -- we want them to!

We do need more flexibility from the Soviet side, but I also see the Foreign Minister's problem. He has to know what he is dealing with.

Gromyko: Two or three issues at Geneva have become barriers which have not yet been surmounted.

First is the inviolability of frontiers. We have been in agreement with the US on this going back to the time of Kennedy. Of course, Roosevelt's position on this was known. At the conference in Geneva, everyone agreed on one formula. But lately, we have heard that some don't like this formula and we have heard that the US wanted to change it.

The Secretary: That's not true!

Gromyko: We should talk further about this matter.

Second is the question of military movements. Some countries want us to build a great accounting house and to devote all of our efforts to this so that when one division moves from one place to another we can report on it, as if we had nothing else to do. What does this have to do with security in the present day -- what does this contribute to confidence? Initially, we knew Secretary Kissinger's position on this, but at Geneva, unfortunately, the voice of the



US has not been heard. I repeat, that the movement of one or two divisions from one point to another does not affect the real security of a country.

I think the US is under pressure from Luxembourg on this.

The Secretary: We see you are being pressed by Bulgaria!

Gromyko: A country like West Germany, for obvious reasons, is cautious on this and other similar questions. However, they say that we might solve this question with a voluntary exchange of observers on the basis of reciprocity. The Germans mentioned this to me in Bonn in passing.

To conclude on this point, we hope we can work more closely together and achieve greater mutual understanding at the conference.

The Secretary: On the security conference, I would say, first, that you have to be a Talmudic student to understand it. On the question of the inviolability of frontiers, this is a German issue and not a problem for the US. Following the change of government in Germany -- in which Eastern Europe was not totally uninvolved -- they asked for a change. We gave two versions to you but didn't get an answer.

On troop movements, the issue is the size of the



unit and the area. It is no secret that our means of information are better than those of our allies.

Gromyko: We proceed from that assumption.

The Secretary: This is primarily a European problem. We don't know what the Germans said to you. If they come to us there will be no problem. I have had instructions from the President to work on the basis of our previous understanding.

The President: That is right. There is no change in our policy. The lack of progress on Basket III seems to be holding things up.

The Secretary: If we could get something on these other points, it might help on Basket III.

Gromyko: On Basket III, I have always favored shaking some things out of the basket, but I believe the issues essentially have been resolved.

The Secretary: Some of our allies have to show that they have extorted from you what you already have agreed to.

Gromyko: Now about the reduction of forces and the Vienna talks. This is a very important issue. You agree that it is complicated and we feel it is, too. Its solution obviously requires time and I feel our efforts



should continue. But we believe the Western participants must give up the idea of some kind of a common ceiling for forces on both sides. Some say they don't like Soviet tanks in Europe. They say there are too many of them and that we should withdraw a full tank division. We should take 1700 out.

The Secretary: I'm for it!

Gromyko: The Western participants say we should reduce our forces twice as much as reductions on the Western side. But they refuse to reduce their air force, nuclear arms and bases in Western Europe. We could demand that these be removed, but we don't take that approach.

We should scrupulously observe the principle of no harm to the security of either side and we should preserve the co-relation of forces in Western Europe today.

We favor a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. We should go in this direction. We should make the best effort we can.

The Western participants say that only the US and Soviets should reduce and the others should be left as they are. Reductions for them would come in the indefinite future in a second phase. There is nothing precise about this and no figures are given. Everything will be subject to negotiations.

We should think more about all of this. Perhaps in



the next meeting with Secretary Kissinger we could try to find a new approach to the whole problem which would serve our common interests.

The President: As I recall, we offered to take out 29,000; you should take out 68,000. I also recall that the Soviet Union talked in terms of a 5% reduction.

The Secretary: The Soviet Union has gone through an evolution on this point. In the Brezhnev-Nixon meeting in 1973, Brezhnev proposed a rapid 5% reduction to get things started. Since then, the Soviet position has evolved in a more complicated way.

Gromyko: Brezhnev's suggestion did not constitute a broad program of action. It covered only a partial aspect. It was an illustration of the possible dimension of a first step involving US and Soviet forces.

If the US and Soviet sides reduce, it won't help if the others increase their forces.

The Secretary: But the Foreign Minister knows that if we reduce, there must be a ceiling on the forces of the others. Whatever either of us reduces cannot be replaced by increases by the others.

Gromyko: It is not enough to talk about US-Soviet



reductions and a concurrent freeze of the others. We should agree on a definite stage for the reduction of the forces of the other countries.

Also, a first step reduction of US-Soviet forces with concurrent conditions poses very complicated problems. In subsequent meetings we should discuss this.


The Secretary: The President met with Stanley Resor on Saturday and you can also read what I said in my testimony yesterday. It is hard to attest to the success of detente if armed forces are always going up.

All of this really doesn't make much difference in practical terms. However, we are looking at new approaches.

Gromyko: Your argument works both ways.

The President: I am glad you brought this question up. We are interested in new approaches and this is something we should discuss later.

Gromyko: About the Middle East. Our concern about events there has been rising lately. We are apprehensive that the present period might be a prelude to a flare up of fighting. It would be useful if we could coordinate our efforts. We know that the US doesn't always take a positive view in practice of our suggestions for cooperation. But we are realists. We want a firm peace in the Middle East and neither of us should fear coordination of our efforts.



Concretely we would be grateful if you could give us answers to two questions.

First, how does the United States Government now assess the situation in the Middle East? Should the Arab countries continue to be occupied or should Israel withdraw?

Secondly, about Palestine. Does the US recognize the just Palestinian aspirations for their own national statehood? I don't want to discuss where this might be.

We've both acknowledged the need for our two countries to cooperate. The Middle East constitutes a big problem which affects our relations. Your comments would be of significance for the meeting in Vladivostok and for Secretary Kissinger's talks in Moscow.

The President: It is obvious that we both have an interest in resolving the issues which have arisen in the Middle East. Both of us have tried to prevent or solve the problems there in the past. What we have to do in order to work together is to receive concrete views from you about how to solve specific problems. For example, between Israel and Jordan, between Israel and Syria, or the Palestinian question.

If we are to work together, we need your concrete suggestions so that we can then decide how to approach a solution of these problems.



In this kind of exchange today I don't want to go into details about frontier lines or about Palestine. Dr. Kissinger can get into these matters. On Palestine, of course, there is the problem of the Palestinian view versus the Jordanian view.

Our assessment of the situation is that it could be very serious. It could erupt. We will use our maximum influence to prevent this. We will welcome working more closely with you to this end. To solve the territorial problems and to recognize the rights of others, we need something more concrete from you.

Gromyko: Thank you for your comments. The problem is really a very serious one and I hope we will be able to discuss it later with Dr. Kissinger. I favor continued cooperation with the US in this matter. We don't quite understand why the US is reticent about cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East. We feel it would be in the interest of both our countries. Also, we can't retreat from our position of principle about the complete withdrawal of Israel from occupied lands.

As far as Israel itself is concerned, we have said many times we favor the continued existence of Israel as a sovereign state with all possible guarantees. We are prepared to participate in such guarantees together with the US, or under the Security Council.



Now I would like to say something about two questions which are quite different and about which we would like to hear your views.

First, on the question of trade and MFN. We value your efforts and those of Secretary Kissinger very highly in this regard. This is the view of our entire leadership and of Leonid Brezhnev personally. We would like to know how you assess the situation and the prospects.

Secondly, we have noted your statements and the statements of others that the US favors detente and that things are moving in this direction. However, you also have said that the US must be second to none and must be first in armed strength. Frankly, this puzzles us. We could take the same position and say we want to be first. It is obvious that if we claim to be first there will be no end to the race. We believe the logic of things should persuade us not to give impetus to the arms race. We feel that the interests of the US and the Soviet Union are best served by restraint, restraint and more restraint until the time when we can turn back the arms race altogether. We feel that a continuation of the arms race is against your line and by and large against Secretary Kissinger's statement.



The Secretary: That is the highest praise!

Gromyko: We feel that we should try gradually and steadily to eliminate the arms race.

The President: What you have said emphasizes the need for negotiations on arms. This will be discussed by Secretary Kissinger when he goes to Moscow, in Vladivostok and also here in 1975.

The statements I have made about the US position should be understood in terms of the US domestic situation. But we have a complete and total dedication to the objective of limiting the arms race.

On the Trade Bill, I've worked with Senator Jackson and Secretary Kissinger has done so also. The Trade Bill is ready for agreement if we find a parliamentary method by which we can be sure that Congress cannot delay or easily destroy what we want -- MFN. The struggle is between the Congress and the President. The Congress wants more control.

I was rather disappointed with our talk this morning with Senator Jackson. We made some progress, but not enough. We made a proposition which is reasonable. He also made a proposal, but we cannot accept it. He said he would consider the matter and we hope we will have something by Monday. We will keep on trying.



We need the most firm assurances on emigration, such as have been given through Ambassador Dobrynin. I am convinced by the words of Mr. Brezhnev. Our problem is to convince the members of Congress who have less faith than I do.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Some figures on emigration have been mentioned in the press. This never was mentioned in our discussions.

The Secretary: I want to discuss this further at lunch. I've never given any figures to the Senators.

Briefly, Mr. President, to recapitulate our understanding: it is understood that, on the Soviet side, there will be no restrictions on applications for emigration; there will be no harrassment, and there will be no restrictions on exit visas except for reasons of national security. If all these conditions are met, then everything will depend on the number of applications. The Soviet Union has no responsibility to produce applicants. If 100,000 apply, then 99,000 will get out. If 9,000 apply, then 8,000 will get out. We have made all of this clear to the Senators.

You told me this, Mr. Foreign Minister, in Moscow and in Geneva. There have been no new concessions on your part. The Senators can think anything they want about numbers, but this has not been discussed with them.



Gromyko: Are you hopeful?

The Secretary: Yes, I think we'll work this out sooner or later.

The President: I didn't give an inch to Jackson this morning.

Gromyko: Mr. President, I appreciate very much the time you have given to me this morning. Also, I should tell you that I appreciated your statement at the UN, particularly your words about detente and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The President: I meant every word.

* * *

The meeting ended at 1:30 p.m.

WJStoessel/d



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

USSR: Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U. S.

U. S.: President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, September 21, 1974
12:15 - 12:39 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The conversation began with greetings and initial pleasantries.]

Gromyko: Kissinger follows me very closely. I cannot afford to make a mistake.

The President: I enjoyed our talk, and Secretary Kissinger has filled me in on his talks with you.

Kissinger: Just before this meeting, Gromyko gave me a response to the suggestion that we agree on nuclear reactor safeguards. That is very important.

The President: Would this have to be an agreement?

Kissinger: Yes, because the problem now is that each country sells reactors competitively.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines - st dept.
By dsl, NARA, Date 12/18/03 review
12/03



Gromyko: On this, non-proliferation is a problem that is as important as it was ten years ago.

The President: Maybe so.

Gromyko: Two-thirds of the states have ratified it, but the remainder haven't. It would be good if we two did our best to get more states to ratify.

The President: I hope we could work effectively on this. I'm interested, Congress is, and if we could stabilize this...

Kissinger: These are two points. One is the spread of reactor technology. Maybe we can do something on this. The other is, the Foreign Minister wouldn't want some of his allies to get the impression of condominium.

Gromyko: If you mean our real allies [smile], it is no problem. No one can predict how someone might act irresponsibly.

Kissinger: Speaking frankly, France has sold four reactors to Iran and we don't know what safeguards there were. If we two can agree on safeguards, then we could go to the Europeans.


Dobrynin: Do you have sufficient safeguards?

Kissinger: In the Egyptian case, we have, we think, foolproof safeguards. If we two can agree and if we get the Europeans to agree, we can control the situation. We will tell you our safeguards -- maybe you have better ones.

Gromyko: Sometimes Japan and Brazil are mentioned. What do you think?

The President: Japan has its own problems...

Kissinger: The line between weapons and peaceful uses is vague. The Indian explosion obviously has military implication. The Japanese have a big nuclear program but have not done any explosion yet. If they moved this way, they would go like India and could be a big power very quickly.



The President: The Japanese are having trouble with their ship.

Dobrynin: Leakage on their nuclear vessel.

Gromyko: Fukuda told me Japan would not do it.

Kissinger: We have no idea they are moving.

Dobrynin: In the PRC they have a new Commander-in-Chief.


The President: One of the points we discussed yesterday. I agree with you and I think it was a constructive speech. I was looking over the report on our defense appropriations -- that was my expertise in Congress. And Congress has given us a good list with what we need to move ahead. I want you to know that despite the strength they gave me to move ahead, we want to cooperate with you -- but if we have to compete, we will. The American people will accept a planned equality, but if we are going to compete, the American people will want me to -- and I will -- keep the country in a strong position.

Gromyko: There are two ways to go: if we move ahead while negotiating. We could say to our peoples we will work on some areas. The first way is to say: stay strong while negotiating; the other is to say: the main task is to find areas for cooperation. When you go the first direction, we ask how we should report to our people. Now we prefer the second approach.

The President: We believe in restraint. But we must assure the American people that while we go through this process, our strength is adequate. I must assure that the American people are not in jeopardy.

Gromyko: It is difficult to find a way to cut the knot. Partial solutions are the more practical way to approach the problem. We just discussed non-proliferation.

The President: Competition which drains you and us is not useful. But until we can see the progress which can be made, I must preserve our security. The American people want us to move forward, but want to be secure also. Don't feel what I'm saying is to upset what I am talking about, but it is to assure the American people that as we move ahead our people are adequately protected.



Gromyko: I can assure you we will carry out our policy. We don't like some things we see on the U.S. scene -- like Jackson -- but it will not dissuade us. The summit conferences and any other talks will continue. The U.S., Soviet Union, Europeans -- and even the PRC -- do not want tension. But we won't give up what belongs to us. But we want to help be good neighbors. It is nothing directed against the United States. We want good relations with Europe -- and with China, but we will not give up territory which belongs to us. We proceed from that assumption. We are not against your good relations with Eastern Europe, if it is based on mutual respect and security.



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November 8, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*SUBJECT: Letter from Brezhnev *MR 3*

General Secretary Brezhnev has sent you the November 5 message at Tab A responding to your message of October 24 (copy at Tab B). Your message was sent at the time of Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moscow, and the General Secretary expresses his satisfaction with those talks -- describing them as useful, fruitful and an important preparatory stage for his meeting with you later this month.


In his message, the General Secretary reaffirms the determination of the Soviet Union to work with the United States in "that really historic endeavor" of improving US-USSR relations. He expresses appreciation for the fact that you have so definitely stated that this is your intention. The General Secretary notes that the principal focus of his talks with Secretary Kissinger was on SALT -- specifically, the further limitation of strategic offensive arms. He says that during these talks the Soviet side proposed a concept for a long-range agreement together with the components for such an agreement. He expresses the hope that you will give due consideration to these proposals, and he adds that he is willing to continue exploration of the SALT negotiations in this channel in the hope that it will be possible to reach an understanding on the major provisions of a new agreement at Vladivostok.

The General Secretary also tells you that he took the occasion of his talks with Secretary Kissinger to discuss current negative aspects of US-USSR relations, with the hope of removing difficulties and misunderstandings. In closing, the General Secretary says that he and his colleagues attach great significance to his meeting with you in the belief that it will provide a new driving force to Soviet-American relations.

No reply is required to the General Secretary's message as it is in response to your earlier message.


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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By dal, NARA, Date 12/18/03



IX

A



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Dear Mr. President:

It is with great attention that I have studied your letter of October 24 and I consider it constructive. I have in mind, first of all, the central idea of your letter which is entirely consonant with our thoughts and aspirations regarding the necessity that the process of positive development of the relations between our countries becomes permanent and irreversible. We appreciate the fact that you so definitely state your intention to continue the improvement of Soviet-American relations.

I would like to tell you once again, Mr. President, that on this road you will meet from our side complete reciprocity and firm determination for cooperation and most close interaction. Our agreement with you concerning the further course of the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States inspires confidence in the success of that really historic endeavor which was jointly started by the leadership of our countries in the interests of the Soviet and American peoples, in the interests of peace and well-being of all peoples of the world.

I received your letter during my talks with Secretary of State H. Kissinger who came to Moscow. Naturally, we took notice of what was said in the letter - that Mr. Kissinger enjoyed your full confidence and was authorized to speak on your behalf

His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford
President of the United States
of America

The White House
Washington, D.C.

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


Mr. Kissinger undoubtedly has already informed you about the contents and the results of the talks. On my part I would like to express to you the following considerations in this regard.

I believe that those talks were fruitful and useful from the point of view both of searching for a solution of the concrete questions in essence and of the importance of continuity of the active political dialogue which has been established between us. We consider the talks as an important preparatory stage for our forthcoming working meeting.

We regard as important the agreement by both sides, confirmed in the talks, that on the whole the relations between our countries continue to shape up in accordance with the course taken with the aim of their improvement. At the same time we believed it necessary to draw attention to a number of aspects of a negative nature as well, which, by the way, are also mentioned in your letter. In that case we proceeded from the assumption that a timely exposure and removal of all kinds of difficulties and misunderstandings are equally in the interests of both countries and prevent unwanted complications in our relations. I hope that you too adhere to the similar opinion.

You, Mr. President, know that the questions related to further limitation of the strategic offensive arms were central in our talks with Mr. Kissinger. We have thoroughly gone over those questions with due regard to those considerations which were recently forwarded by the American side. In the course of the talks we have expounded both a general concept of a long-range agreement and its possible concrete substance by basic components. In our proposals we proceed from the assumption that in



this matter there cannot be a simplified approach, that the agreement should be based upon a realistic evaluation of the security interests of the sides both at present and in the perspective for the years to come.


I hope that you will duly appreciate the position set forth by us in the talks with the Secretary of State on the questions of limiting strategic arms. We are ready to continue to discuss these questions through the confidential channel so that later to reach final understanding on major provisions of a new agreement at our meeting at the end of November.

I must say that in general we attach a great significance to this meeting having in mind that it should provide a new impulse to the development of Soviet-American relations.

Sincerely yours,

L. Brezhnev

November 5, 1974



B



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TEXT OF MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As you proceed with your conversations with Secretary Kissinger, may I share with you some of my views on the future course of Soviet-American relations.

First of all, I wish to make clear that Secretary Kissinger is speaking for me with the same authority as on all previous visits and I hope with the same good results. He has, as you know, my full confidence.

I recognize that in recent weeks we have encountered certain difficulties, but these are not fundamental in nature. What is fundamental is our mutual agreement that the improvement of Soviet-American relations is in the mutual interest of our two countries and must and will be continued under my Presidency. This is the main point in my instruction to Secretary Kissinger.

The talks you are beginning will, of course, be frank and candid and may even reveal areas of difficulty, but whatever temporary obstacles may arise, I am confident that, with patience and devotion to our joint objectives, we can make substantial progress; I recently asked Secretary Kissinger to set forth in considerable detail the view of my Administration on Soviet-American relations. Whatever else may be said or written about Soviet-American relations, my posture is clear: We believe that a positive, constructive relationship can be made permanent, and thus irreversible. I have instructed Secretary Kissinger to conduct his negotiation in this spirit.

I will not go into the details of your agenda, but permit me to underscore one basic point. As you may know, I have had several meetings with my National Security Council on matters of strategic arms control. On this I have emphasized to my advisors is the necessity to bring competition under control through agreements that are equitable and realistic; for we cannot hope for, or expect that our relations will flourish in an atmosphere of unrestrained military tensions. Thus, I have authorized Secretary Kissinger to discuss with you the cardinal elements of a new agreement which we might address in our forthcoming meeting. No other action would demonstrate the transitory nature of our differences and the permanent character of our mutual interest.


Indeed, I am looking forward to our meeting in Vladivostok. It is a testimony to the new course of Soviet-American relations that this meeting is regarded on both sides as a natural development.

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NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines

By dal, NARA, Date 12/18/03



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I have been travelling recently and unfortunately did not have the occasion to convey these thoughts to Ambassador Dobrynin before he left, but I wanted you to have my views personally.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

October 24, 1974

