

**The original documents are located in Box 3, folder “Oman - Sultan Qaboos” of the National Security Adviser’s Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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2004

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION  
2856

June 1, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

WILLIAM G. HYLAND

FROM:

Jeanne W. Davi *JWD*


*OK*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Correspondence

I have noted your comments (Tab A) regarding the State Department's delay in handling the letter from Sultan Qaboos to the President.

We too felt that the delay was inexcusable and that some sort of protest was in order. I therefore sent the attached memo to George Springsteen (Tab B) and followed it up with a telephone call to S/S. I believe they have received our message loud and clear and don't think any further action is necessary.



MEMORANDUM

Tab I fwd to T  
5.27 1040

16 WH  
AH  
3/14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2856

ACTION

SECRET (GDS) ATTACHMENT

May 21, 1976

Retyped pgs 2  
Tab I & A

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY  
SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to the Sultan of Oman

We received only this week from the Department of State a letter to the President from the Sultan of Oman along with a suggested reply (approved by the Secretary's staff--draft at Tab II). It took one month before State informed us they had this letter.


The memorandum at Tab I to the President transmits the letter, summarizes its contents and recommends a letter of reply--a shortened version of the State draft which has been reviewed and cleared by Messrs. Horan, Clift, Low and Boverie as well as Mr. Hartmann's office (Smith).

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President transmitting the Sultan's letter at Tab B and seeking the President's signature on the reply at Tab A.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ AS AMENDED \_\_\_\_\_

I think we should complain about letter to Pres. delivered to Dept & were held up.

If you want I will do a general memo saying that letter must be sent out within 3 days -



SECRET (GDS) ATTACHMENT

WH 3/8/04

*[Handwritten signature]*

May 22, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State


SUBJECT:


Letter to President Ford  
from Sultan Qaboos (S/S 7607970)

Your memorandum of May 14, 1976 stated that the Omani Ambassador delivered a letter to President Ford from Sultan Qaboos of Oman to the Department on April 9, 1976. This means there was a five week delay between delivery of the letter to the Department and its transmission to the White House.

It would be appreciated if you could remind the bureaus and your staff of the need for the prompt handling of correspondence to the President from Chiefs of State and Heads of Government. Such letters should be sent to the White House within 72 hours of receipt. Whenever possible the transmittal memo should include the Department's recommendation on whether or not a reply is necessary or indicate that this recommendation and proposed reply, if appropriate, will be forwarded later in separate memorandum.

  
Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary





The Palace,  
Muscat,  
Sultanate of Oman.

28th March, 1976.

Mr. President.

It has been just over one year since we enjoyed our first visit to the United States; a short but satisfying experience which gave us the opportunity of meeting you and your senior officials involved in foreign affairs. Since that time we have naturally followed American policy with a personal interest based upon our new appreciation of your great country.

In our own country many changes have occurred and it is now much stronger and more settled than it was at the time of our meeting. The most important change, as you are undoubtedly aware, is our successful conclusion of the foreign-supported rebellion in Dhofar after ten years of struggle, which diverted national resources from development projects into military projects. Thanks be to God, most of the rebels saw the error of their ways and most of them, some one thousand four hundred, defected voluntarily from the enemy before the final military victory.

We have chosen to mention our own modest successes because we believe that they have a bearing upon one of the problems which has been plaguing American policy-makers recently. That problem is the support of national Leftist

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines


By ADA

, NARA, Date 3/8/04

State Review 9/16/03



HO




- Page 2 -

guerrillas by a combination of material support from the Soviet Union, military support from Cuba, the use of safe-havens for these guerrillas offered by neighbouring Marxist-oriented States and the world-wide dissemination of Soviet-inspired propaganda. The latest case in point, and the one that has drawn world-wide attention, has been the intervention of other States in the internal affairs of Angola.

As you are aware from our discussion at the White House in January 1975, Angola is not the first case of this kind. For at least seven years of the ten-year struggle in Dhofar, the Soviet Union assisted the Dhofar rebels with arms and military training, either directly or through the assistance of the neighbouring State, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. In recent years the rebels were assisted with military training by Cuban personnel. Unlike the case of Angola, Cuban Advisers did not, as far as we know, actually take part in the fighting.

Oman, therefore, is quite familiar with the Soviet/Cuban combination, and this combination has created some unease; not just during the conflict itself. We have long regarded the growing presence in the area of the Soviet Union with concern, noting the position that it has acquired with respect to East and Southern Africa, the Naval presence in the Indian Ocean, its growing influence around the periphery of that Ocean, and the failure of Area States to take organised action to counter this growing influence.






- Page 3 -

We therefore are heartened by the firm position taken both by you, Mr. President, and some of your responsible Officers in statements made recently on the subject of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of other States. Although our own fighting is over, we continue to view with alarm the spread of similar situations. We appreciate the fact that so long as a favourable climate for interference exists, armed violence will continue to plague our area.

Oman is an old and proud country with its own traditions of civilisation, naval and military prowess; traditions which are once more emerging with the rebirth of its people. We are proud of our victory in Dhofar, primarily because it was achieved by the return of the rebels to the support of their own people and government rather than by massive slaughter in battle. The few rebels who remain are for the most part convinced Communist revolutionaries, harbouring wherever they can find shelter and having no popular support.

Oman, however, recognises that the threat from revolution, promoted by foreign States and inspired by Marxist ideologies and propaganda, still exists and will remain constant. We are particularly concerned that the peoples of Southern Africa, whatever their ethnic origins, should be allowed to develop their own form of government, without the influence of terror in support of the Soviet Union's expansionist policy. Supported by the great majority of the Omani people, we remain resistant to





- Page 4 -

these threats.

At the same time we applaud efforts made by more powerful and more influential States to combat the same tendencies in world affairs, particularly those in the Indian Ocean area, where our future must to some extent be involved. We hope that you, Mr. President, and the United States Government, will not forget Oman's role in combatting a common enemy in the days to come and that our two Nations will remain bound by the same ties of common interests in the right of self-determination without foreign interference. We hope that we can continue to maintain a dialogue on subjects of mutual concern in this area.

We wish you, your family and the people of the United States, every success and good fortune in this year and the years ahead.

*Qaboos bin Said*  
SULTAN OF OMAN





THE PRESIDENT,  
THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA.






for the Soviet Union and make more urgent the need for finding solutions to the problems of ~~racial injustice in~~ Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. My Government has recently affirmed our support for self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa and outlined a series of proposals to support this policy. It is grounded in the conviction that no outside power should seek to impose solutions or divide Africa into confronting blocs. Nor should ambitions of hegemony be encouraged. Rather, African unity and integrity should be supported.

Developments in Africa and the activities of the Soviet Union have also been a factor in my Government's position with regard to our role in the Indian Ocean and the areas bordering on it. It is our view that restraint in Soviet military deployments in the Indian Ocean and forbearance from adventurism generally are essential to improving the prospects for the stability of the region as a whole.

I can assure Your Majesty that the United States will continue its firm stand in opposition to Soviet pressure and expansionism and that we will continue to seek moderate Soviet behavior. In turn, we look to the states of the regions affected by such ambitions, including the Middle East, to promote their own security through regional cooperation and we are prepared to work with them to this end. I am aware of the particular effort which Oman, under your leadership, has made. The success which has thus far been achieved demonstrates the beneficial effort of regional cooperation. In this context, I very much agree with Your Majesty that we maintain a dialogue on ways to deal with problems of mutual concern in your area of the world.



The Sultan's letter provides an opportunity for you to strongly reaffirm support for friends such as Oman in a common effort to oppose outside intervention and the growth of Soviet influence generally. We have strong interests in a sound relationship with Oman, given its position straddling the entrance to the Persian Gulf, its commitment to the West and the US, its moderation and its desire to collaborate with other friends in the Gulf area in the interests of regional stability. We may wish to discuss with the Sultan the possibility of using Omani airfields, ports or other facilities to support our military activities in the Indian Ocean--Persian Gulf area, particularly given the abandonment by the UK of an airfield it has operated on Oman's Masirah Island and the probability that we shall have to pull COMIDEASTFOR out of Bahrain.

The proposed letter at Tab A <sup>should</sup> is <sup>responsive</sup> responsive to concerns raised by the Sultan. It <sup>will</sup> be well received by him and will also <sup>give us</sup> give us an opening should we wish to explore at some later date the possible use of Omani military facilities.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter to the Sultan of Oman at Tab A. [Text coordinated with Mr. Hartmann's office (Mr. Smith).]

WA 3/8/04



~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

- 2 -

The Sultan's letter provides an opportunity for you to strongly reaffirm support for friends such as Oman in a common effort to oppose outside intervention and the growth of Soviet influence generally. We have strong interests in a sound relationship with Oman, given its position straddling the entrance to the Persian Gulf, its commitment to the West and the US, its moderation and its desire to collaborate with other friends in the Gulf area in the interests of regional stability. We may wish to discuss with the Sultan the possibility of using Omani airfields, ports or other facilities to support our military activities in the Indian Ocean -- Persian Gulf area, particularly given the abandonment by the UK of an airfield it has operated on Oman's Masirah Island and the probability that we shall have to pull our Mid East force out of Bahrain.

The proposed letter at Tab A responds to the concerns raised by the Sultan. It should be well received by him and will also provide an opening should we wish to explore at some later date the possible use of Omani military facilities.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to the Sultan of Oman at Tab A. [Text coordinated with Mr. Hartmann's office (Mr. Smith).]

Gen S:wgh:26 May 76 (retyped)

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

Wda 3/8/04



for the Soviet Union and make more urgent the need for finding solutions to the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. My Government has recently affirmed our support for self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa and outlined a series of proposals to support this policy. It is grounded in the conviction that no outside power should seek to impose solutions or divide Africa into confronting blocs. Nor should ambitions of hegemony be encouraged. Rather, African unity and integrity should be supported.

Developments in Africa and the activities of the Soviet Union have also been a factor in my Government's position with regard to our role in the Indian Ocean and the areas bordering on it. It is our view that restraint in Soviet military deployments in the Indian Ocean and forbearance from adventurism generally are essential to improving the prospects for the stability of the region as a whole.

I can assure Your Majesty that the United States will continue its firm stand in opposition to Soviet pressure and expansionism and that we will continue to seek moderate Soviet behavior. In turn, we look to the states of the regions affected by such ambitions, including the Middle East, to promote their own security through regional cooperation and we are prepared to work with them to this end. I am aware of the particular effort which Oman, under your leadership, has made. The success which has thus far been achieved demonstrates the beneficial effort of regional cooperation. In this context, I very much agree with Your Majesty that we maintain a dialogue on ways to deal with problems of mutual concern in your area of the world.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
REFERRAL

Date: 5/29/76  
NSC log # 7602856

MEMORANDUM FOR:

George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

To: Sultan of Oman  
From: President Ford  
Date: 5/29/76  
Subject: US - Oman relations

ACTION REQUESTED:

<input type="checkbox"/> Draft reply for:	<input type="checkbox"/> President's Signature
	<input type="checkbox"/> White House Staff
	<input type="checkbox"/> Other _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Direct reply	<input type="checkbox"/> Furnish info copy
<input type="checkbox"/> <del>XXXXX</del> Dispatch	<input type="checkbox"/> Translation
<input type="checkbox"/> Recommendations/Comments	<input type="checkbox"/> Appropriate Handling
<input type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/> Information

DUE DATE:


COMMENTS:

*Handy Kerchner*  
for Jeanie W. Davis  
Staff Secretary

CLASSIFICATION: \_\_\_\_\_

books

to state  
for transmission

 MM



12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1976

Your Majesty:

Thank you for your letter regarding the situation in your area. Recalling with pleasure our meeting last year, I certainly appreciate this opportunity to exchange views with you on matters of concern to both our countries.

I am pleased that Your Majesty's policy of firmness towards the Communist-dominated rebels in Dhofar has had success. This is a tribute to the efficacy of your military strategy--firmness tempered with restraint at the appropriate time--as well as of your foreign policy. I wish Your Majesty further success in your efforts in support of the civil development of that region.

As Your Majesty points out, the challenges which your country has faced are a reflection of a broader problem which affects the region as a whole. My Government has made clear that we do not accept the adventuristic activities of outside powers to advance their presence and influence.

I appreciate Your Majesty's perspective on the situation in southern Africa. The remaining serious problems there offer similar temptations

RECEIVED

for the Soviet Union and make more urgent the need for finding solutions to the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. My Government has recently affirmed our support for self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa and outlined a series of proposals to support this policy. It is grounded in the conviction that no outside power should seek to impose solutions or divide Africa into confronting blocs. Nor should ambitions of hegemony be encouraged. Rather, African unity and integrity should be supported.

Developments in Africa and the activities of the Soviet Union have also been a factor in my Government's position with regard to our role in the Indian Ocean and the areas bordering on it. It is our view that restraint in Soviet military deployments in the Indian Ocean and forbearance from adventurism generally are essential to improving the prospects for the stability of the region as a whole.

I can assure Your Majesty that the United States will continue its firm stand in opposition to Soviet pressure and expansionism and that we will continue to seek moderate Soviet behavior. In turn, we look to the states of the regions affected by such ambitions, including the Middle East, to promote their own security through regional cooperation and we are prepared to work with them to this end. I am aware of the particular effort which Oman, under your leadership, has made. The success which has thus far been achieved demonstrates the beneficial effort of regional cooperation. In this context, I very much agree with Your Majesty that we maintain a dialogue on ways to deal with problems of mutual concern in your area of the world.



Be assured of my hope that relations between Oman and the United States shall be strengthened for the future. I wish Your Majesty and the people of Oman a future blessed with peace and security as well as good fortune.

Sincerely,

*Gerald R. Ford*

His Majesty  
Sayyid Qaboos bin Said al Bu Said  
Sultan of Oman  
Muscat



MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*5/28/76*

SECRET (GDS)

ACTION  
May 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Letter from the Sultan of Oman--  
Proposed Reply

The Department of State has transmitted a letter to you from the Sultan of Oman at Tab B. A proposed reply is at Tab A. His Majesty recalls with pleasure his meeting with you during his January 1975 visit to Washington.


The Sultan expresses admiration for your policies of opposing outside (Soviet, Cuban) intervention in Angola and elsewhere in Africa and the broader Middle East/Indian Ocean region and concern about the trend of Soviet activities in these areas. He does so because of Oman's experience with this problem--radical South Yemen's backing (with Soviet arms and support) of a rebellion in Oman's western (Dhofar) province. Through a combination of firmness on the Sultan's part, military assistance from an Iranian brigade, a small Jordanian contingent and British officers seconded to the Omani armed forces, and Saudi financial incentives to South Yemen for moderation, the rebellion has apparently been defeated.

The Sultan remains concerned over the activities ("expansionist policies") of the Soviet Union in the general Indian Ocean area, including Southern and East Africa and the Persian Gulf. The possibility of a resurgence of radicalism in South Yemen is also of concern, and the Sultan points out the military support which that country has received from the USSR (we estimate some 300 advisers) and the Cubans (we estimate 100-200 advisers), although he acknowledges that neither Cubans nor Soviets participated directly in the Dhofar rebellion. The Sultan asks that you not forget the common interests of the US and Oman in combatting Soviet expansion and radicalism, especially in the Indian Ocean area. He hopes to maintain a dialogue with you on subjects of mutual concern in this area.

SECRET (GDS)

*WA 3/8/04*

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652  
Automatically Downgraded at  
Two Year Intervals and Declassified  
on December 31, 1984.



The Sultan's letter provides an opportunity for you to strongly reaffirm support for friends such as Oman in a common effort to oppose outside intervention and the growth of Soviet influence generally. We have strong interests in a sound relationship with Oman, given its position straddling the entrance to the Persian Gulf, its commitment to the West and the US, its moderation and its desire to collaborate with other friends in the Gulf area in the interests of regional stability. We may wish to discuss with the Sultan the possibility of using Omani airfields, ports or other facilities to support our military activities in the Indian Ocean -- Persian Gulf area, particularly given the abandonment by the UK of an airfield it has operated on Oman's Masirah Island and the probability that we shall have to pull our Mid East force out of Bahrain.

The proposed letter at Tab A responds to the concerns raised by the Sultan. It should be well received by him and will also provide an opening should we wish to explore at some later date the possible use of Omani military facilities.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to the Sultan of Oman at Tab A. [Text coordinated with Mr. Hartmann's office (Mr. Smith).]





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7607970

May 14, 1976 *filed 5/17*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Response by President Ford to Letter  
From Sultan Qaboos

On April 9, the Omani Ambassador delivered the attached letter from Sultan Qaboos of Oman to President Ford. The letter raises no specific issues of bilateral US-Omani concern, but does address in a broad tour d'horizon fashion some larger issues.

A proposed reply is attached which responds to the concerns raised by Sultan Qaboos.

*C. Arthur Bagley*  
George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Suggested Letter
2. Letter from Sultan Qaboos to President Ford

~~SECRET~~  
GDS

*Wa 3/8/04*



Suggested Letter

Your Majesty:

I am most appreciative of your letter of March 28, 1976, and welcome the opportunity it provides to discuss matters of concern to both our countries.

We are pleased that your policy of firmness toward the Communist-dominated rebels in Dhofar has borne good fruit. Your victory is a tribute to the efficacy of your military strategy -- firmness tempered by restraint at the appropriate time -- as well as of your foreign policy. I understand now that the military phase of this protracted struggle appears to be successfully concluded, and you are placing increased emphasis on projects for civil development in Dhofar. We wish you all success in this endeavor.

As you point out, the challenges which your country has faced are a reflection of a wider problem which affects the region as a whole: the desire of <sup>an outside power</sup> ~~the Soviet Union~~ to advance its presence and influence, ~~through a variety of methods, including the use of Cuban forces. The Soviet Union has viewed the existence of social and political problems, as in Angola, as providing opportunities for it to advance its interests and influence.~~ <sup>The United States has</sup> ~~we have~~ made clear that we cannot accept this kind of behavior, <sup>adventuristic expansionism.</sup>

per ABC Soviet etc

His Majesty  
Sayyid Qaboos bin Sa'id Al Bu Sa'id,  
Sultan of Oman  
Muscat

Department of State



The remaining serious problems of southern Africa offer similar temptations for the Soviet Union, and make more urgent the need for finding solutions to the problems of racial injustice in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. My government has recently affirmed our support for self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa, and outlined a series of proposals to support this policy. Our policy is grounded in the conviction that no outside power should seek to impose solutions, to divide Africa into confronting blocs or to pursue hegemonial ambitions, but rather that African unity and integrity should be supported.

Developments in Africa and the activities of the Soviet Union have also been a factor in my government's position with regard to our role in the Indian Ocean and the areas bordering on it. ~~We have noted the development of naval and air support facilities in Somalia, and the general increase in deployments of naval vessels by the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area since 1969.~~ It is our view that restraint in Soviet military deployments in the Indian Ocean area and a more general forbearance from adventurism are essential to improving the prospects for stability in the region as a whole.

Let me assure Your Majesty that the United States will continue to take a firm stand in the face of Soviet pressure and expansionism, and to seek to moderate Soviet behavior. In turn





and are prepared to  
work with them to this end.

we look to the states of the regions affected by Soviet ambitions, such as the Middle East, to promote their security through regional cooperation. We are aware of the particular effort which Oman has made in this regard, <sup>we</sup> and look forward to a continuing dialogue with Your Majesty's Government, ~~on matters of mutual concern. My government would hope to have Oman's support~~ as we examine ways to deal with the challenges which face us all.

I wish you, ~~your family,~~ and the people of Oman a future blessed as much by peace and security as good fortune.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

and the success which has thus far been achieved demonstrates the efficacy of regional cooperation. It is important to remain vigilant, and, in this context,



For Purposes of Routing and recording only:

This copy of Page 1 of a letter to President Ford from the Sultan of Oman, is to be treated As a note from the Omani Emb, dated April 9, 1976, because the letter was delivered on that date to NEA/ARP by the Omani Ambassador .


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P760052-2416

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1976 APR 13 PM 12 13

FADRC  
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS



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**ACTION**  
is assigned to  
**NEA**

The Palace,  
Muscat,  
Sultanate of Oman.

28th March, 1976.

Mr. President.


It has been just over one year since we enjoyed our first visit to the United States; a short but satisfying experience which gave us the opportunity of meeting you and your senior officials involved in foreign affairs. Since that time we have naturally followed American policy with a personal interest based upon our new appreciation of your great country.

In our own country many changes have occurred and it is now much stronger and more settled than it was at the time of our meeting. The most important change, as you are undoubtedly aware, is our successful conclusion of the foreign-supported rebellion in Dhofar after ten years of struggle, which diverted national resources from development projects into military projects. Thanks be to God, most of the rebels saw the error of their ways and most of them, some one thousand four hundred, defected voluntarily from the enemy before the final military victory.

We have chosen to mention our own modest successes because we believe that they have a bearing upon one of the problems which has been plaguing American policy-makers recently. That problem is the support of national Leftist

end 4 page letter to Pres.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines, State Rev: ew 9/16/03  
NARA, Date 3/14/04



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
RO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
5	14	5	15	10	7602856

INITIAL ACTION 0  
*Callen*

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: SECSTATE \_\_\_\_\_ S/S 7607970 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT \_\_\_\_\_  
 SCOWCROFT F SECDEF \_\_\_\_\_ LOU NO FORM NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HYLAND \_\_\_\_\_ DCI \_\_\_\_\_ X. REF \_\_\_\_\_ C EYES ONLY EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ STATE EXSEC \_\_\_\_\_ S CODEWORD \_\_\_\_\_  
 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ TS SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Call ltr to his for Sultan Qabus of Oman re 205-Oman Relations & previous other subjects*

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO			
ADV CYS S'CROFT/WGH						MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. _____
STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR <u>PRES</u> _____ <i>F</i>
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR _____
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION _____
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS				<i>F</i>		MEMO _____ TO _____
FAR EAST/PRC						RECOMMENDATIONS _____
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO _____
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA	<i>F</i>				<i>F</i>	ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: <u>5-22</u>
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN				<i>F</i>		

*Mildred Howard*

*Henry K. ...*

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
5/28/76	Oarley	Scowcroft				
5/21		Scraft	X	Pres to sign ltr to Qabus (5/30)		
5-27		Pres		Agree ltr to Qabus		
5-28		NSC/S	C	Pres agree ltr to Qabus		
6/1				Reopened		
6/1		Hyland	CIX	Info	6/6	
6-3		NSC/S	C	Noted by Pres Hyland		Davis

SUBSEQUENT ROUTE


NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INDEXING: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS

M/F/D \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

JUN 9 1976

CRT ID: \_\_\_\_\_ NS DY \_\_\_\_\_

OPEN *MST/MK* \_\_\_\_\_ SA FP \_\_\_\_\_

CLOSE *MK* \_\_\_\_\_ PA \_\_\_\_\_