

The original documents are located in Box 4, folder “Press Guidance, February 1-9, 1976” of the National Security Adviser. NSC Press and Congressional Liaison Staff Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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file

1A

February 2, 1976

-3-

MERCENARIES FOR ANGOLA

Q. Are we, either directly or indirectly providing funds for the recruitment training or hiring of mercenaries in Great Britain - for instance?

A. We have stated before and I will state again that no agency of the US government is being used for the recruitment hiring or training of American mercenaries. We have stated further that we have provided limited assistance to countries which share our goals in Angola. But cannot account abviously for every penny of these funds when they are transmitted to the recipient government. I would refer you to Secretary Kissinger's testimony of January 29 when he discussed the question of mercenaries with the State Foreign Relations Committee.

Q. Well are we providing the British with Funds for use in mercenary recruitment?

A. We are not giving the British funds for recruitment of mercenaries in Angola.



February 2, 1976

18

NIXON PLEDGE OF 3 BILLION
TO NORTH VIETNAM

Q. The New York Times has an article today that asserts that President Nixon pledged over 3 billion in aid to the North Vietnamese after the signing of the Paris agreement. What is our aid policy toward Vietnam and was there in fact a Nixon memorandum?

A. The article correctly points out that Secretary Kissinger in a January 1973 press conference stated that no specific sums in post war reconstruction aid had been promised to North Vietnam. Discussions were begun in early 1973, with a Joint Economic Commission, the purpose of which was to implement the Paris agreement. The Commission did not come to any conclusions, nor were any decisions reached on specific figures largely because Hanoi's behavior was so clearly in violation of the Paris agreement.


Q. What about the Vietnamese that information on our statement missing in an action brings on our "responsibility" to provide aid to Vietnam?

A. Our previously stated policy still holds: we believe that Vietnam has a unilateral obligation to provide information on our missing in action. This obligation is in keeping with the Paris agreement and is untied to any other provisions or conditions.

Q. What is our general policy with regard to Vietnam?

A. Our general policy is as stated in the President's East-West Center address in Hawaii, December 7:

"In Indochina, the healing effects of time are required. Our policies toward the new regimes of the Peninsula will be determined by their conduct toward us. We are prepared to reciprocate



by their conduct toward us. We are prepared to reciprocate gestures of good will -- particularly the return of remains of Americans killed or missing in action or information about them.

If they exhibit restraint toward their neighbors and constructive approaches to international problems, we will look to the future rather than to the past!!

Q. Did Nixon Actually send a memorandum to the Vietnamese?

A. We never discuss correspondence between heads of State.



10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 2, 1976

FOR MARGIE VANDERHYE


Margie,


Totals for following years per the attached chart:

- 1973 -- ~~roughly~~ ^{close to a} half billion (472 million)
- 1974 -- \$2.6 billion (special situation in ^{following} ~~attempt~~ ^{October war})
- 1975 -- close to three-quarters of a billion (\$734 million)
- 1976 -- \$2.3 billion (now before the Congress) (special situation following ^{Sinai II} ~~agreement~~)
- 1977 -- figures not announced except for \$1 billion in FMS. Figures for full Israeli aid will become known when overall assistance package for FY-77 goes to the Congress. [However, on FYI basis only you will see from attached chart figure will be \$1.8 billion.] How-package will be "substantial" in line with our continuing commitment to Israel's security."

Rosemary Niehuss

Margie - note 70-72 figures which we just got.





U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL (IN \$MILLION)

1977 figures
NOT announced
except for
\$1 billion in
1977² Fms

	FISCAL YEAR				
	1973	1974	1975	1976	
<u>Grants</u>					
Supporting Assistance	50	50	324.5	510	523.3
Immigration Assistance	49	36.5	40	20	-
American Schools Abroad	4.4	3.3	2.4		
Subtotal	93.4	89.8	366.9	530	523.3
<u>Loans</u>					
Supporting Assistance	0	6	0	245	261.7
PL 480	47.9	0	9	15	9
EXIMBANK	21.3	35	39.9	50 (est)	50
AID Housing Investment Guarantee	0 (was 50 in FY 72)	25	25	25	25
Subtotal	69.2	60	68.9	335	345.7
<u>Military Assistance</u>					
FMS Credits	300	982.7	200	750	500
Grant Assistance	0	1,500	100	750	500
Subtotal	300	2,482.7	300	1500	1000
TOTAL	472.6	2,632.5	734.8	2365	1869
--Grants	103.7	1,589.8	466.9	1280	1023.3
--Loans	368.9	1,042.7	268.9	1085	845.7

¹ Congressional approval of Administration's FY 76 request is still pending

² Planning figures which will be affected by a variety of factors. Immigration Assistance figure will be provided by Congress; PL-480, EXIMBANK and AID Housing Guarantee figures are estimates.

1970 - Total of \$93.9 mil (includ \$30 mil Fms)

1971 - total of \$634 mil (includ \$545-Fms)

1972 - total of \$483 mil (includ \$300 Fms)

FYI
etc.

January 27, 1976

Margie Vandenberg

HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT VISIT SCHEDULE

Announced

Prime Minister Rabin
of Israel

Official Visit
January 27

Yes

10:30 AM Arrival ceremony,
90-minute Office meeting
8 PM Black tie dinner

January 28

11 AM 60-minute Office meeting

January 29

7 PM Attend Israeli Reception

Prime Minister Cosgrave
of Ireland

Official Visit
March 17

NO

10:30 AM Arrival ceremony,
60-minute Office meeting
8 PM Black tie dinner

*Feb. 5
announcement*

King Hussein of Jordan

Private Visit
March 30

NO

11 AM 60-minute Office Meeting
7:30 PM Black Tie Working Dinner

King Carl XVI Gustaf
of Sweden

Private Visit
April 5

NO

11 AM 30-minute Office meeting

President Giscard d'Estaing
of France

State Visit
May 17-20

Yes

Queen Elizabeth II
of Great Britain

State Visit
July 7-11


Yes

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines

By dal, NARA, Date 9/9/04



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 018924

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Cable

CREATOR'S TITLE AM Embassy Beirut

RECEIVER'S NAME Kissinger

RECEIVER'S TITLE Secretary of State

TITLE Lebanon Report

CREATION DATE 02/02/1976

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034500060

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC PRESS
AND CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE Press Guidance, February 1-9, 1976

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/10/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST DAL


February 3, 1976

IF

FORD PUSHING FOR ISRAELI-JORDANIAN TALKS?

Q. The New York Times carries a story today that President Ford has agreed to pursue a suggestion made by Prime Minister Rabin to see if it would be possible to arrange negotiations between Israel and Jordan for an accord on the West Bank. Can you verify the story, and will the U.S. use its good offices to see whether Jordan has an interest in negotiating with Israel?

A. We are not going to get into the details of discussions with the Israelis, but I can assure you that the President reaffirmed his intentions and the intention of his Administration to continue to work with the parties in the Middle East to see how progress can be made toward peace in the region.



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
FYI:

Amb. Moynihan was:

NOMINATED: May 21, 1975

CONFIRMED: June 9, 1975

SWORN-IN: June 30, 1975



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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1206
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 6253
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2523

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 1076

DELIVER TO NEA/ARN/DRAPER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PINT, LE
SUBJECT: 0900 LEBANON REPORT

1. CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY DID NOT REPEAT NOT DECIDE FRANGIE SHOULD VISIT DAMASCUS TODAY. MORE TIME WAS REPORTEDLY ALLOWED FOR VIEWPOINTS OF MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO BE EXPRESSED ON THE AGREEMENT SO THAT, ACCORDING TO KARAME AT LEAST, AGREEMENT WOULD MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT WISHES OF ALL CONCERNED. IT WAS ANNOUNCED KARAME WILL ACCOMPANY FRANGIE WHEN HE GOES TO SEE ASAD AND THAT DATE HAS BEEN PUT AS PROBABLY THURSDAY OR FRIDAY. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CHAMOUNIST PRESSURES ARE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE. KHADDAM WENT BACK TO DAMASCUS YESTERDAY AND IS SAID TO BE RETURNING HERE TODAY AFTER A LIGHTENING VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA IN BETWEEN. THIS HAS GIVEN RISE TO SPELATION THAT MEETING BETWEEN FRANGIE AND ASAD MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY SUMMIY MEETING IN SAUDI ARABIA OF THESE TWO WITH KING KHALED AND YASSER ARAFAT.

2. TO FURTHER COMPLICATE POLITICAL SCENARIO, RUMOR APPEARS IN PRESS THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE WOULD GO TO PARIS AND THE VATICAN IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS, PURPOSE UNSTATED.


3. CABINET PASSED A NUMBER OF MEARURES IN THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENT, INCLUDING THE NEW CONSCRIPTION LAW AND THE 1976 BUDGET. CABINET CALLED FOR UNAUTHORIZED RADIO STATIONS TO CEASE OPERATING IN THE LEBANON.

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, LL

PSN:041682 PAGE 01 TOR:034/11:58Z DTG:031027Z FEB 76

dat 9/9/04




4. KAREAME HAS MADE SOOTHING NOISES ABOUT FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN WAKE OF SATURDAY'S HEAVY BOMBARDMENT OF TWO IRAQI BACKED NEWSPAPERS. CHAMOUN HAS REPLIED TO CHARGES BY JUMBLATT BY SAYING THAT NO ONE IS THINKING OF A NEW ROUND (JUMBLATT HAVING ACCUSED RIGHT WING OF PLANNING ONE FOR SPRING). WE UNDERSTAND THAT A "LEBANESE SOLUTION" HAS BEEN PUT TOGETHER IN THE CASE OF DISSIDENT OFFICER LT. AHMED KHATIB AND HIS FOLLOWERS. DETAILS FOLLOW.

5. PRESS REPORTS ARRIVAL HERE FOR STAY OF ABOUT A WEEK OF FATHER HENRI DE RIEDMATTEN, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POPE LEADING A MISSION TO STUDY THE WELFARE PROBLEM AND WELFARE PROGRAMS OF LOCAL ECCLESTICAL INSTITUTIONS. A REPRESENTATIVE OF CARITAS INTERNATIONAL IS IN THE MISSION. THE WHOLE QUESTION OF ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES AND OTHERS DESTITUTE IS GETTING MORE AND MORE ATTENTION HERE. OUR VIEWS ARE COMING BY SEPTEL.

LAMBRAKIS

BT



February 4, 1976

11

KISSINGER'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

The purpose of the Secretary's address was to reinforce the Administration's policy of detente, refuting those who characterize it as a "sell-out" to the Soviets and secondly, to explain the rationale for a new SALT agreement in the hopes of building support for it.

In the speech delivered to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, Kissinger spelled out the consequences of failure to reach a new SALT agreement: an accelerated strategic arms build-up over the next five years could cost as much as an additional \$20 billion dollars, and be "a tragically missed opportunity."


He said the President's policy would be:

-- We will never stand for the violation of a solemn treaty or agreement and we will remain alert.

-- We never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us; by violations of agreements, by unsatisfactory agreements or by neglect of our own programs; we will spend what is necessary to maintain strategic sufficiency.

-- The President is determined to pursue the effort to negotiate a saner strategic balance on equitable terms -- because it is in our interest, and because we have an obligation to our own people and to world peace.

On Angola, Kissinger outlined the history and philosophy behind our involvement there, adding that Angola represents the first time that the Soviets have moved militarily, at long distance, to impose a regime of their choice; it is the first time the U. S. has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside the Soviet orbit, and it is the first time that Congress has halted national action in the middle of a crisis. He concluded by saying that our Government has a duty to make clear in the Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola sets no precedent, that this type of action will not be tolerated again.



Q. Secretary Kissinger has stated that Angola sets no precedent and that this type of action "will not be tolerated" again. But what does the Administration intend to do in that eventuality -- what can it do, given the mood in Congress today.

A. As we have said before, the continuation of Soviet and Cuban policies and action in an area where they have no legitimate interests cannot help but affect our bilateral relationship with the Soviets in the long run. While I wouldn't want to expand on the Secretary's remarks or hypothesize on what the President may or may not do in a given circumstance, I think our policy is quite clear on this and needs no further elaboration at this time. We will not, and cannot, be indifferent to such Soviet actions, ~~and the President hopes that Congress will come to share his views on the implications and importance of our American policy on these~~ questions.



February 4, 1976

15

SADAT ON U. S. PLEDGES TO RECOGNIZE PLO

Q. Yesterday you were asked for a reaction to a statement supposedly made by President Sadat to the effect that he obtained a U. S. commitment "far beyond" a promise to recognize the PLO. Can you give us anything on that today?

A] All I can tell you is that our position on the Palestinians remain the same: remain the same: we believe that any final settlement must take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. This position was elaborated most recently in the State Department's statement on the U. S. veto of the recent UN resolution on the Middle East, and I commend it to you.



February 4, 1976

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INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

1. Algeria/Morocco
2. Lebanon



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 018925

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION re Algeria, Morocco, Angola
CREATION DATE 02/04/1976
VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034500060
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC PRESS
AND CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER 4
FOLDER TITLE Press Guidance, February 1-9, 1976

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/10/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST DAL

Sanitized 9/8/04

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National Intelligence Bulletin



February 4, 1976

ANGOLA

[redacted] reports that the southern-based National Union, increasingly unable to compete with the Soviet-armed Cuban troops doing most of the fighting for the Popular Movement, is organizing many of its troops into guerrilla units. The National Union plans to continue using conventional forces, however, to defend fixed positions and strongholds.

In eastern Angola, the National Union is reportedly grouping some 3,000 troops into guerrilla units, which are already active around the town of Lumege. The National Union plans to use these units to screen conventional forces that will attempt to advance toward Teixeira de Sousa from positions held by the Union between Luso and Lumege. Other guerrilla units being formed are to operate northward from Andulo.

The Popular Movement has apparently not made any major gains in recent days. Its forces in the central sector, however, are pressing hard in the vicinity of Teixeira da Silva, where there is an important road junction. Two separate Cuban columns, estimated at 1,000 men each and backed by armored cars, are reportedly moving on that town. Their ultimate target is probably Huambo (Nova Lisboa), the National Union's former political headquarters.



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AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-24-27-1-5

BY MLC NARA, DATE 6/14/2011 9/8/2004



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February 4, 1976

ALGERIA-MOROCCO

Neither Algiers nor Rabat appears disposed to make major concessions on Spanish Sahara, despite the continuing Arab mediation attempts and the dispatch of a UN envoy to the area.

Algeria's party newspaper yesterday welcomed the decision by UN Secretary General Waldheim—under pressure from Algiers—to send a personal representative to the area. Waldheim's envoy, Sweden's ambassador to the UN, will leave for Madrid today and will visit the Saharan territory later in the week. The newspaper held out little hope of success for the Arab diplomatic effort.

Algeria's preference for a UN role in mediating the dispute with Morocco over Sahara reflects its disappointment with the lack of support from other Arabs. Libya and South Yemen are the only Arab states publicly backing Algiers.

The Algerians presumably will push their case for a referendum on self-determination with the UN envoy. The envoy, however, is expected to limit his role to a fact-finding mission and not make any specific commitments on self-determination.

The most persistent of several Arab mediators, Egyptian Vice President Mubarak, yesterday continued his diplomatic shuttle between Algiers and Rabat. Press reports from Rabat indicate the Moroccans are insisting on recognition of their sovereignty over the territory. Rabat maintains it has already consulted the Saharan people through the territorial assembly.

Algeria, which has rejected the tripartite agreement signed last November transferring administrative authority from Madrid to Rabat and Nouakchott, characterizes Morocco's presence in Sahara as totally illegitimate.

According to the press reports from Rabat, Morocco is also insisting on a withdrawal of "Algerian forces" from several points in Sahara and northern Mauritania as a condition for accepting mediation of the dispute. Rabat almost certainly is including the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas among the Algerian forces and demanding their withdrawal, a condition unacceptable to Algiers.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2529

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 1112

DELIVER TO NEA/ARN/DRAPER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PINT, LE
SUBJECT: 0900 LEBANON REPORT

1. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IN TOWN AND COUNTRYSIDE YESTERDAY OF MINOR NATURE; INDIVIDUALS SHOT IN THE STREET, ARMED ROBBERY AND MURDER, CHRISTIANS KILLING EACH OTHER I JOUNIEH, MOST OF WHICH HAD FLAVOR OF SETTLEING OLD SCORES AND GENERALLY LOW LEVEL OF LAW AND ORDER. ZOHER MOHSEN RETURNED FROM TRIP TO DAMASCUS TO ANNOUNCE FRANGIE TRIP IMMINENT EITHER TOMORROW OR BY SATURDAY AT LATEST.

2. FAIR AMOUNT OF SQUABBLING CONTINUES AMONG MOSLEMS OVER A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS, MOST PARTICULARLY RATION OF DIVIDING SEATS IN NEW PARLIAMENT. SUNNIS ARE SAID TO BE OPPOSING SHIITE DEMANDS FOR EQUAL REPRESENTATION, WHILE DRUZE HAVE FOR SOME TIME FELT THEY WERE GETTING THE LEAST OUT OF ALL THIS. JUMBLATT HAS TOLD PRESS HE IS NO LONGER PUSHING AT PRESENT FOR PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT BUT WILL SETTLE FOR DECONFESSIONALIZATION OF THE THREE PRESIDENCIES (I.E. OF THE REPUBLIC, OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND OF THE PARLIAMENT). IDEA HE HAS RETURNED TO LAST COUPLE OF DAYS WOULD BE THAT CHRISTIAN PRESIDENT NEED NOT BE A MARONITE BUT COULD BE SOMEONE SUCH AS GREEK ORTHODOX AND BY SAME TOKEN OTHER TWO PRESIDENTS COULD BE MOSLEMS BUT NOT NECESSARILY ONE SUNNI AND ONE SHIA. JUMBLATT MAKES NO BONES ABOUT HIS OWN AMBITIONS TO FILL ONE OF THOSE POSITIONS, MOST

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCONCROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, LL

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PAGE 01

dal 9/9/04



~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~ COPY

LIKELY THAT OF PRIME MINISTER (PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS), WHICH EVERYBODY EXPECTS WILL HAVE CONSIDERABLY GREATER POWERS IN FUTURE THAN IN THE PAST.

3. PHALANGE LEADER GEMAYEL HAS COME OUT WITH ANOTHER STATEMENT INSISTING REESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY AND "RETURN OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY" MUST PRECEDE ANY POLITICAL SOLUTION. THIS EMPHASIZES RECENT TENDENCY ON CHRISTIAN AS ON MOSLEM SIDE OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERS TO VIE FOR POPULAR SUPPORT. THIS IS A NATURAL TENDENCY IN THE LEBANON AND ONE WHICH BODES TROUBLE FOR FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY AGREEMENT, BUT AT THE MOMENT APPEARS RELATIVELY MUTED AND PROBABLY CAN BE CONTAINED.

4. JOYFUL NOTE: IT HAS JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT VOLUNTEERS WILL HELP SORT ESTIMATED FIFTEEN MILLION PIECES OF MAIL PILED UP AT CENTRAL POST OFFICE.

LAMBRAKIS
BT



PSN:042674 RECALLED PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:035/09:50Z DTG:040910Z FEB 76

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~ COPY

[2/4/76?] ^{IM}

If the Decision is Fully Affirmative

Q. Do you think Secretary Coleman was right in overruling the strongly expressed concerns regarding the environmental impact of the Concorde and approving Concorde flights into JFK and Dulles?

A. Secretary Coleman carried out an exhaustive study of the issues connected with allowing Concorde entry to the U.S. He personally held public hearings on the questions involved -- particularly relating to Concorde's possible environmental impact. He has explained his decision in great detail in the paper released today. Regarding the environmental questions, his analysis shows only the slightest impact in noise exposure near the airport and no measurable effect on the environment otherwise. The President has complete faith in the Secretary's judgments and his decisions.

Q. How much pressure was put on us by the British and French for Concorde approval?

A. The British and French have made a heavy investment in the Concorde, not only in terms of money, but also in industrial and human effort. They have stated their concern for the future of the project were the U.S. to deny the aircraft entry. We made no commitment to the British and French to give special consideration to the Concorde -- only that we would be fair and non-discriminatory. The considerations that shaped Secretary Coleman's decision are clearly and fully put forth in his paper -- backstage pressure did not dictate or influence that decision.



Q. EPA has proposed that all Concorde s-- with the exception of the two operating before December 31,1974 -- should be banned from the U.S. How is Secretary Coleman's decision consistent with that recommendation?

A. These are separate questions with different procedures and different time tables. EPA made one recommendation to the FAA last year regarding a so-called SST noise rule which would apply to aircraft certification. EPA has recently changed that recommendation. I understand that the new EPA input may have to go through a public hearing process again, and then be weighed by the FAA within the statutory guidelines for aircraft rule making. The final outcome cannot be predicted now and will probably take some time to complete.

Q. But might not an eventual SST noise rule have the effect of overturning Secretary Coleman's decision today?


A. There obviously are several possible outcomes of this particular rule making: the one you suggest is a possibility.

Q. Do you expect Congress to try to overturn Secretary Coleman's decision?

A: I am not in a position to speak for the Congress. However, Secretary Coleman has done such a thorough analysis of the issue that I would hope the Congress would accept his judgment.

Q: Do you expect the courts to intervene?

A. Secretary Coleman has done such a superb job of preparation that one would not expect a basis for judicial intervention. But that is obviously a question for the courts to decide if they are petitioned.




Q. Might the Port of New York and New Jersey Authority refuse Concorde entry to JFK?

A. The PONYNJA has its rules regarding airport use. If the Concorde meets those rules, there would not seem to be a basis for denying Concorde use of JFK.

Q. Won't Coleman's decision set a precedent whereby more SST flights will be allowed, and environmental deterioration will eventually occur?

A. Secretary Coleman made reasonable projections of future SST activity and concluded that the environmental impact would be small. Also, the decision today is not a commitment to more and more flights. Other applications would be evaluated as they are received. If there are such applications, we will have the experience of the Concorde flights upon which to make further judgments.




If the Decision is to Allow Entry to Dulles but not JFK

Q. Do you think Secretary Coleman was right in overruling the strongly expressed concerns regarding the environmental impact of the Concorde and approving Concorde flights into Dulles?

A. Secretary Coleman carried out a most careful analysis of the issues connected with allowing Concorde entry to the U.S., and he personally held public hearings on the questions involved -- particularly relating to Concorde's possible environmental impact. He has explained his decision in great detail in the paper released today. Regarding the environmental questions, his analysis shows no impact in noise exposure near the airport and no measurable effect on the environment otherwise. The President has complete faith in the Secretary's judgments and his decision.

Q. Is it fair to expose those around Dulles to noise that was not acceptable for JFK?

A. I understand that Secretary Coleman's analysis indicated no increase in noise exposure at Dulles, while a slight increase at JFK was predicted. Based on this, the Secretary decided it would be preferable to approve entry only to Dulles. Presumably, after some experience has been gained at Dulles regarding the actual noise impact -- as opposed to the calculation we are now dealing with -- the question of New York entry may be reconsidered.



Q. How much pressure was put on us by the British and French for Concorde approval?

A. The British and French have made a significant commitment in terms of money, effort and prestige in developing this plane. They have stated their concern for the future of the project were the U.S. to deny the aircraft entry. However, we made no commitment to the British and French to give special consideration to the Concorde -- only that we would be fair and nondiscriminatory. The considerations that shaped Secretary Coleman's decision are clearly and fully put forth in his paper -- backstage pressure did not dictate or influence that decision.

Q. EPA has proposed that all Concordes, with the possible exception of two operating before December 31, 1974, be banned from the U.S. How is Secretary Coleman's decision consistent with that recommendation?

A. These are separate questions with different procedures and different time tables. EPA made one recommendation to the FAA last year regarding a so-called SST noise rule which would apply to aircraft certification. EPA has recently changed that recommendation. I understand that the new EPA input may have to go through a public hearing process again, and then be weighed by the FAA within the statutory guidelines for aircraft rule making. The final outcome cannot be predicted now and will probably take some time to complete.



Q. But might not an eventual SST noise rule have the effect of overturning Secretary Coleman's decision today?

A. There are obviously several possible outcomes. The one you suggest is a possibility.

Q. Do you expect Congress to try to overturn Secretary Coleman's decision?


A. I am not in a position to speak for the Congress. However, Secretary Coleman has done such a thorough analysis of the issue that I would hope the Congress would accept his judgment.

Q. Do you expect the courts to intervene?

A. Secretary Coleman has done such a superb job of preparation that we would not expect a basis for judicial intervention. But that is obviously a question for the courts to decide if they are petitioned.

Q. Won't Secretary Coleman's decision open the door to more and more SST flights?

A. Secretary Coleman has made it quite clear by today's decision that SSR flights would be considered on a case-by-case basis -- and no future approval can be implied.



If the Decision is to Allow Entry on an Experimental Basis (For example, six months commercial trials into Dulles)

Q. Isn't this six month approval just the nose-under-the-tent approach to ultimate approval?

A. No. It has become clear from months of studies and hearings that the noise impact of the Concorde is uncertain. Calculations have been made but they are based on models which may or may not be fully valid. The Secretary has decided that we need experience on which to make a final decision regarding Concorde, and the Dulles trial will provide that experience.

Q. Do you expect British or French retaliation to this situation of incomplete approval?

A. We think the British and French experts understand the uncertainties we need to resolve. We hope the public will also understand -- particularly that these difficult decisions carry with them no anti-foreign bias, or are excuses for covering up a commercial concern. The Concorde is a significant achievement and we look forward to the upcoming experimental period to answer various questions including those relating to environmental factors.

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
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Q. Do you expect Congress to try to overturn Secretary Coleman's decision?

A. We hope Congress will be as interested as we in obtaining information from the trial period so that a better based decision can be reached.

Q. Do you expect the courts to intervene?

A. Secretary Coleman has done such a superb job of preparation that we would not expect a basis for judicial intervention. But that is obviously a question for the courts to decide if they are petitioned.



If the Decision is Negative

Q. Does the President agree with Secretary Coleman's decision?

A. Although disappointed that this new mode of air travel will not be available to the U.S., the President understands and accepts the decision.

Q. Would the plane have made that much difference environmentally?


A. No, but The Secretary obviously feels that approving the Concorde would be a reversal of the direction we have been moving toward ~~id not~~ improving our environment. He also was concerned that approval of a few flights would inevitably lead to more flights in the future -- a trend he did not want to see initiated.

Q. Won't the British and French take retaliatory action?

A. The decision was taken in the most open possible way, and it is clear that no anti-foreign or commercial bias was involved. Our relationship with these friends and allies is much broader than that embodied in any single issue, and we do not expect retaliatory action. It would be unwarranted.

Q. Might the British and French take legal action against us?

A. Secretary Coleman has considered very carefully the legal aspects of his decision, and is convinced that he is acting within our legal and treaty obligations.



Simon - Trade bill

revisions
for Lou

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February 5, 1976

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EARTHQUAKE IN GUATEMALA


A major earthquake struck Guatemala yesterday, the effects of which were felt in neighboring Honduras, El Salvador, and parts of Mexico. Casualty reports in the papers appear to be exaggerated according to official accounts from the area which indicate the death toll may be between 500 and 1500 with the injuries into the thousands.

Q. What are we doing to assist the Guatemalans, and what can you tell us about the safety of Americans there?

A. We have sent a disaster survey team from Panama to inspect the situation and to discuss with the Guatemalans how our assistance resources can best be utilized for their immediate needs. The Embassy in Guatemala (Amb. Francis Malloy) has authorized \$25,000 in cash for immediate relief needs. \$525,000 has been obligated from the Disaster Relief funds and supplies are already enroute to the area. We understand that the International Red Cross and the Catholic Relief Organization are gearing up to help and neighboring countries are providing assistance as well.

As for Americans, all official Americans are accounted for and we have no reports of injured U.S. citizens, although at this point, our information is not complete.

At this point casualty figures are sketchy. There is substantial property damage, injury and loss of life, but we cannot pin down any statistics as yet.



February 5, 1975

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT OF COSGRAVE VISIT

President Ford has invited Prime Minister Liam Cosgrave of Ireland to pay an official visit to the United States in connection with the United States Bicentennial. Prime Minister Cosgrave has accepted the President's invitation with pleasure and will meet with President for discussions on March 17, 1976 during the course of his visit. The two leaders look forward to marking the close ties of friendship between the American and Irish people and to reviewing a number of matters of current common interest.

* * * *

Q: Have Prime Minister Cosgrave and the President met?


A: No, they have not. This visit will provide them an opportunity to become acquainted.

Q: How long has Cosgrave been Prime Minister?

A: Since March, 1973.

Q: What is the purpose of this meeting?

A: The President attaches great importance to maintaining close and continuing consultations with all our friends in Western Europe. The Prime Minister's visit will be a part of that process. Also, as the announcement text indicates, the visit is in connection with our Bicentennial and will mark the contributions of Irish immigrants to the cultural heritage and growth of this country.



Q: Why is the Prime Minister visiting the United States at this time?

A: As the text of the announcement said, the visit is in connection with our Bicentennial year. March 17 -- St. Patrick's Day -- seemed an appropriate time and was convenient for both leaders.

Q: When was the last visit to the U.S. by an Irish Prime Minister?

A: In March 1971 when Prime Minister Lynch was here.

Q: Will the President and the Prime Minister be discussing specific problems?

A: I am sure that during their talks the Prime Minister and the President will discuss a broad range of issues of mutual interest.

Q: But there is no single issue which brings the two together?

A: No.

Q: Will they discuss Northern Ireland?

A: I really do not have an agenda for the meeting at this time.

Q: What is US policy on Northern Ireland?

A: Long-standing US Government policy is one of specifically avoiding direct involvement since we do not believe this would serve any useful or productive purpose. In our judgment, a solution to this centuries-old dispute can come about only through the efforts of the parties directly concerned.

Q: So, in other words, we are standing aside?

A: We are obviously very concerned about the tragic situation in Northern Ireland. As a people we have close ties of friendship and kinship with




all those involved -- Irish, British and the people of Ulster alike.

We therefore have offered and will continue to offer moral support and encouragement to all those of good will who are working to break the circle of violence and to build a peaceful, just society in that area.

Q: We hear about Americans contributing funds and guns to terrorists in Northern Ireland. What about that?

A: I don't think this is the time or forum to go into Northern Ireland, with all its complexities. Wherever there is evidence of illegal involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland by persons in the United States, the US Government has enforced, and will continue to enforce, the laws against such involvement to the best of its ability.



February 5, 1976

KRAFT STORY ON ARMS CONTROL POLICY

Q. What can you tell us about the Kraft story today to the effect that Secretary Kissinger's negotiating position in Moscow was at variance with the Administration's agreed upon SALT strategy and that by an NSC meeting it was determined that Kissinger should be called home?

A. The article is quite misleading. The President had planned before the Secretary's departure to hold an NSC meeting on January 21 to review the situation at the time.

It is absolutely false that Kissinger operated at variance with NSC decisions. There were agreed upon positions prior to his departure. The positions he took in Moscow were directed by the President, and agreed upon by NSC members. The January 21 NSC meeting was planned in advance in order to review the bidding at that point.

Furthermore, the Secretary's schedule was dictated by his appointments in Brussels and Madrid, as well as the Rabin visit to Washington.



February 5, 1976


SAFIRE COLUMN ON U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE KURDS

Q. Will you comment on the Safire story in the New York Times today which accuses the United States and President Ford of "betrayal of the Kurdish people? "

A. The story you mention is based on leaks from the Pike Committee and illustrates two problems we have always had with that Committee -- the first being the use of and leaking of classified information, the second being the gross distortions of documented testimony and evidence they have received. It is extremely difficult to comment on a sensitive subject like this and obviously we cannot and will not comment on the details or substance of the issue, but let me just say that the general thrust of the story is contrary to the record.

To all other questions:

"I am not able to go beyond my remarks today.



for Kaizer - 3
file

February 9, 1976

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT

Q. In the context of moving to solidify our relations with Egypt, is it true that you plan to provide military assistance to Egypt, beginning with C-130 aircraft?

A: Egyptian interest in military equipment from the US is not a new issue. The subject came up in a general way during the visit of President Sadat and he has also discussed his desires in this regard with visiting members of the Congress.

We have made it very clear that we would consult with Congress before selling military equipment to Egypt and whatever is done in this regard would be done in consultation with Congress.

This is understood by the Egyptians.

As the State Department spokesman indicated last week, a specific request from Egypt for C-130 aircraft has been received and is being considered. Congress will be consulted before the sale of these aircraft is approved. These consultations can be expected to begin fairly soon.

We will also consult Congress on the development of this relationship, the shape and size of which would be worked out gradually in consultation with the Congress.



Q: Has Rabin been told, during his visit?

A: The situation is as I have described it and I am not going to get into a discussion of diplomatic exchanges with other Governments. I emphasize that any decision on military equipment for Egypt is dependent on consultations with Congress.

Q: Are you concerned about fueling an arms race by providing military assistance to Egypt or will you place restraints on what they can purchase? What is the rationale for providing arms to Egypt?

Should there be any future military supply relationship, it would have to be seen within the context of our efforts to assist our friends in the area who are trying to reach a negotiated peace and who have certain legitimate security needs. In the case of Egypt, our emphasis is primarily on assisting in the economic and development areas. We have also told them we are prepared to discuss purchases of some kinds of equipment but that prior consultations with Congress would be required for any actual sale to take place.



PAGE 3

Q. What else besides the C-130s are we planning to give to Egypt -- F-5s, TOWs?

A. I have made clear that the shape and size of any future military sales to Egypt has not been decided and would only be decided in consultations with the Congress. I

am not going to get




NEW CHINESE PREMIER

Q. Can you give any additional information on the new acting Premier Hua kuo-feng? Did President Ford meet him when he was in China in December?

A. We are checking the records but as far as we can determine, no, he did not meet Hua during his trip.

Q. Do we have any indication that the Nixon visit is connected with the timing of the announcement on the new acting Premier?


A. If there is a connection, we don't know of it.



CORPORATE BRIBES TO FOREIGN
LEADERS

Q. According to reports the Dutch government has concluded that Prince Bernhard was the "high Dutch official" who allegedly received over a million dollars from Lockheed Aircraft. This is another in what seems to be a continuing series of reports on corporate bribes to foreign officials. Is the President concerned with these developments? What is our policy on such activities.

A. The President's views on such activities are well known and are reflected in a policy statement issued by the Department of State May 15. (attached).



Department Press Statement of May 15


Bribery of Foreign Officials by U.S. Companies

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The Department believes it would be advisable at this time to amplify recent policy statements regarding illegal activities by U.S. enterprises abroad.

As indicated in those statements, the U.S. Government does not condone illegal activities by American business and industrial firms abroad. The U.S. condemns such actions by U.S. corporations in the strongest terms. Moreover, any American firm or individual making unlawful payments to officials of foreign governments cannot look to the Department of State for protection from legitimate law enforcement actions by the responsible authorities of either the foreign country in question or the United States.

At the same time, the United States Government believes it would be helpful if host governments would clarify the rules for foreign firms in their countries regarding political contributions and other payments. We assume that the investigation and prosecution of offenses by foreign authorities will be nondiscriminatory; that the penalties will be proportionate to the offense; and that persons or firms found guilty of improper conduct will be treated fairly and in accordance with international law.



US NUCLEAR FUEL POLICY:
HAK TESTIMONY


Q. According to a New York Times story, Secretary Kissinger in testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy backed away from the previous Administration demand that private industry take the major role in developing new enrichment facilities. Can you clarify the Administration policy on this point?

A. I do not know how the conclusion you mention was reached, but I do have excerpts of the Secretary's opening statement Friday and one section is particularly appropriate:

"Like other landmark U.S. legislation in the nuclear field, the nuclear Fuel Assurance Act involves a policy decision which is essential to the future growth and development of the nuclear industry. That decision is that uranium enrichment, like every other activity of the civil nuclear industry - with the exception of radioactive waste management - and in keeping with the fundamental nature of our economy, should henceforth be undertaken in the United States by private industry."

There are additional excerpts I can give you, but I suggest you read through the entire opening statement on this.


(Excerpts attached)



forcing customers to turn away from the United States.

I have concentrated so far on the need to expand our enrichment capacity at a rate which will ensure that future capacity keeps up with domestic and foreign demand. This is the fundamental objective of the proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act, and is of overriding importance both to our domestic and international goals. I should like to turn now to several additional features of the proposed program which are of direct international significance.


The proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act is far more than a plan for the next increments of uranium enrichment capacity in the United States, important as that aspect is. Like other landmark U.S. legislation in the nuclear field, the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act involves a policy decision which is essential to the future growth and development of the nuclear industry. That decision is that uranium enrichment, like every other activity of the civil nuclear industry -- with exception of radioactive waste management -- and in keeping with the fundamental nature of our economy, should henceforth be undertaken in the United States by private industry. While this decision may appear to involve fundamentally domestic considerations, it has important implications for our international nuclear cooperation as well.



Under our private enterprise system, capacity expansion in response to increased demands normally is provided with few transitional problems given adequate economic incentives. This capability to respond to growing needs without resort to our complex Governmental procedures can serve our foreign policy -- including non-proliferation objectives -- as well as our domestic interests.


Knowledgeable private and governmental authorities responsible for nuclear power developments abroad are well aware that in the United States the continuity needed to assure that the requirements of an expanding market are met is best provided by industry, rather than by Government. I am convinced, therefore, that the earliest possible establishment of a private enrichment industry will greatly enhance the credibility of the U.S. as a reliable source of enrichment. Based on the current state of our technical and economic knowledge and the schedule on which new enrichment demands must be filled, this will require commercialization of both the gaseous diffusion and centrifuge processes. The Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act will serve this purpose.

Another key feature of the proposed legislation are the governmental guarantees and assurances to ensure the early and successful launching of a viable private enrichment industry. This factor should rapidly rebuild



confidence on the part of both foreign and domestic users of enrichment services in the reliability of the United States as a nuclear fuel supplier. From this standpoint, the most important aspects of the proposed legislation are those enabling the Government to supply and warrant its technology and to assume the assets and liabilities of the private venture should it be threatened with failure. These features, coupled with the President's pledge that orders placed with a private entity will be filled as the services are needed, are necessary to instill that confidence.


A third important feature is that foreign investment is not precluded for either the gaseous diffusion or centrifuge enrichment facilities whose construction the Act will bring about. Aside from the importance of such investment in facilitating the successful execution of any of the uranium enrichment projects under consideration, we consider it important to encourage foreign investment in private U.S. uranium enrichment facilities within the limits, of course, defined by the Atomic Energy Act. We plan to reasonably limit foreign investment and access to enrichment services both on an individual nation and overall participation basis. To discourage or exclude foreign participation would be inconsistent with our traditional support for freedom



take place without any Governmental commitment whatsoever for the transfer of enrichment technology. Access to U.S. enrichment technology by our partners abroad may, under certain carefully controlled circumstances, serve U.S. foreign policy interests, but any proposals toward this end would be dealt with as a separate issue which would be subject to Congressional review.

Similarly, the establishment of a private enrichment industry in the United States will have no adverse effect on existing U.S. policies and programs designed to avoid proliferation. Appropriate Agreements for Cooperation would continue to be required for transfers of the uranium enriching services abroad and all of the normal guarantees and safeguards controls would be applied to such transfers. Given the benefit to U.S. non-proliferation objectives discussed previously, our national security will be enhanced, rather than endangered, by the earliest possible passage and implementation of the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act.


In proposing this legislation, President Ford described the nation as at a crossroads. The Congress and this Committee have shown strong leadership in the past in support of the development of a strong, competitive private nuclear industry capable of asserting America's nuclear leadership throughout the world. The challenge



THE B-1 BOMBER
IS IT NECESSARY ?

Attached for your background are an excerpt from the FY 77 defense report explaining our plans and the budget for the B1 as well as an excerpt from the FY 76 report explaining why the B1 is needed.

IF ASKED the President's views on the feasibility of the B-1, you can say that the President has confidence in the way we are proceeding on the B-1. You may also want to refer to the Pentagon for technical details on the B-1. The Air Force public affairs officers are preparing material this morning for use in response to query.



FY 77 REPORT (RUMSFELD)

unlikely under current circumstances, this crew ratio is the minimum which will ensure generation of the full bomber force in a short period of time.

Third, the structural modifications on 80 B-52D aircraft to extend their safe service life into the 1980s will be completed in FY 1977.


Last, the Department is continuing with the development and testing of a new short-range attack missile (SRAM) motor to replace those originally designed for a five-year service life. Although it is not clear how long the original solid fuel motors will retain their effectiveness, we may have to begin replacing some of them as early as FY 1977. The budget requests \$16 million in FY 1977 to continue this development and \$21 million to procure new SRAMs for the B-1. The B-1 SRAM program has been phased to correspond to programmed B-1 deployments; however, use of this funding would be contingent upon a B-1 production decision.

B-1 Bomber

* As noted last year, the Department wishes to be certain that the B-1 will perform as expected before it is committed to production. To that end, the Air Force has undertaken an extensive flight testing program prior to a production decision which is now scheduled for November 1976. The flight test results on aircraft #1 have been especially reassuring. Since its successful maiden flight on 23 December 1974, the B-1 has completed 25 flights and has logged nearly 120 hours.

By November 1976, barring unforeseen problems, there should be more than 200 flying hours on aircraft #1, which has met every milestone to date and in most cases exceeded performance expectations. Aircraft #2, the structural test aircraft, has completed its ground proof load testing, and will commence flight testing in mid-1976. Aircraft #3, the offensive avionics test aircraft, has had the initial avionics equipment installed and has begun its preflight checkout in preparation for its scheduled first flight in early 1976. By the scheduled November 1976 production decision date, the Air Force expects to have demonstrated the B-1's ability to accomplish successfully its primary mission requirements including cruise characteristics, air refueling, high altitude supersonic capability, and low altitude high speed penetration capability. In addition, the program will have completed engine production verification testing of over 9,000 hours, fatigue testing of approximately two lifetimes, and a demonstration of offensive avionics capability. *

Production of RDT&E aircraft #4 was started in September 1975 with delivery scheduled for early 1979. This aircraft will provide a test bed for defensive avionics and help maintain continuity between RDT&E




and production should it be decided to produce and deploy the B-1. Aircraft #4 is intended to become an operational aircraft after testing is completed.

As a result of the successful flight test program to date and the demonstrated B-1 performance capability, the Air Force wants to be in a position to initiate production in late CY 1976, if such a decision continues to be appropriate. Therefore, Congress is being asked to appropriate \$483 million for continued research and development and \$1,049 million for procurement of the first three production aircraft in FY 1977. The FY 1978 authorization request contains funding for procurement of the next eight aircraft. The plan is to build up over the FY 1977-82 period to a production rate of four B-1s per month. While none of the procurement funds will be committed prior to the production decision, it is essential to have the funds available if B-1 production is approved. Without these funds, the resulting delay in a production program would increase the cost substantially owing to the necessity of reconstituting the work force and the cost escalation that occurs from the resulting delay.

Cruise Missiles

The Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and the Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) will be kept in advanced development until the cruise missile concept has been satisfactorily demonstrated. Both programs are continuing, stressing maximum commonality in high cost areas such as the engine, navigation guidance package and warhead. The full-scale engineering development decision will not be made until early CY 1977, by which time a single development contractor will have been selected for the SLCM program and both the ALCM and SLCM will have demonstrated fully-guided powered flights.

During this past year the Congress has expressed concern about maintaining two separate cruise missile programs. Both the ALCM and the SLCM may still need to be developed, however, owing to the differences in sea-based and aircraft platforms and operational environments which are significant enough to warrant different airframe designs. The ALCM has been optimized for air launch from strategic bombers and stresses maximum compatibility with the existing SRAM avionics and ground handling equipment. The SLCM, on the other hand, has been optimized for launch at sea. Because of design differences, the ALCM cannot physically be launched from a submarine. The SLCM could be launched from a bomber; however, to do so would require modifications to the missile and the carrier aircraft resulting in a decreased cruise missile load per aircraft, and added costs for aircraft modifications and support equipment.



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have been established to provide the step-by-step testing of these subsystems.

The development contract for the TRIDENT I missile also has been awarded and the first flight test is expected in 1976. Four supplemental flight tests of the TRIDENT I MK 4 RV using ATLAS/MINUTEMAN boosters have already been successfully completed. Flight test on a TRIDENT I missile of the MK 500 MaRV Evader will be carried through advanced development only.

In view of our experience with the POSEIDON operational tests, we plan to conduct a larger proportion of such operational tests early in the TRIDENT program. For these tests to be valid, however, missiles which actually have been operationally deployed must be used. Thus the OT flight tests cannot be conducted prior to operational deployment. Assuming that the desired submarine delivery dates are met, we would have the first TRIDENT I missiles deployed by the end of FY 1979.

TRIDENT II Missile

To provide an option to deploy a higher throw-weight, more accurate SLBM in the late 1980s, if such a system should be needed at that time, we propose to continue our studies of the TRIDENT II. The new missile would be designed to utilize more fully the available volume of the TRIDENT submarine launch tubes.


We plan to proceed with the TRIDENT II effort at a very moderate pace. Only about \$3 million is included in the FY 1976 Budget for this purpose, plus \$1 million more in the Transition Budget. An authorization of about \$10 million is requested for FY 1977.

SSBN Subsystem Technology

As indicated earlier, we must continue our search for technology that will provide less expensive alternatives for use in future SLBM systems. Accordingly, we have established a new program element, "SSBN Subsystem Technology", to focus attention on this essential effort. About \$2 million is included in the FY 1976 Budget and \$1 million in the Transition Budget for this purpose. In addition, we are requesting an authorization of about \$4 million in FY 1977.

c. Bombers

As I indicated at the beginning of this discussion of strategic offensive forces and programs, we believe the retention of bombers in our forces for the foreseeable future is essential to a well



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balanced U.S. strategic posture. The current bomber force, particularly the B-52Gs and Hs, should be able to fulfill this need into the 1980s. But if we are to maintain an effective bomber force beyond that time, a new aircraft will have to be procured. While we can continue to modify and improve the B-52Gs and Hs for some time to come, and even equip them with stand-off cruise missiles, these aircraft may well become less effective during the next decade.

The principal potential threat to the pre-launch survivability of our current bomber force is the rapidly growing fleet of Soviet SSBNs which, if equipped with depressed trajectory missiles and operated close to our shores, could catch many of our alert B-52s before they could escape from the vicinity of their bases. While we still have no evidence of a Soviet depressed trajectory SLBM development program, such a system is clearly within their technical competence. We have already taken some steps to hedge against that potential threat, e.g., the satellite basing and the quick engine start modification programs. But beyond these measures we need a bomber which has both increased hardening to nuclear effects, and a significantly faster airfield escape time than the B-52.

With regard to penetration at very low altitude, the currently preferred U.S. mode, the principal potential threat to our current bomber force is the deployment of a Soviet AWACS/fighter air defense system with a good look-down, shoot-down capability. We have no evidence as yet that the Soviet Union has such a system under development but as we ourselves have already demonstrated, such a system is technologically feasible. Effective penetration at low altitude against an AWACS/fighter air defense system would require a faster bomber with a smaller radar cross section which is much more difficult to "see" against the ground clutter, and which is more difficult to intercept in a tail chase.

A B-52 force armed with Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) could attack targets within the Soviet Union without the B-52 penetrating the air defenses. But a bomber force limited to stand-off operations would have far less capability and flexibility than a force which includes penetrating aircraft. A pure stand-off bomber force could not provide reconnaissance or attack targets of opportunity as could a penetrating bomber force.

For these reasons, a bomber force which includes penetrating aircraft is much to be preferred over a pure stand-off bomber force, providing that the cost of the former is reasonably commensurate with the benefits to be gained. The difference in costs, we feel, would be modest in comparison to the difference in gain. Accordingly, we believe the B-1 development and test program should be continued to provide us the option to modernize our bomber force with that aircraft in the 1980s.

