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1. Obtain the Presidential Libraries Mandatory Review Request Form (NA Form 14020).
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NLF-NSC_ILCC-5-2-4-3



O40 file Oman

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN PM-04

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 AID-05
IGA-02 OMB-01 MC-02 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 /057 R

DRAFTED BY PM/SAS:DRKEENF:RF
APPROVED BY PM/SAS - SWINSHIP
PM/SAS - MR. JAMES
NEA/ARP - MR. MOLINEAUX
NEA/RA - COL. JOBBS
ODD/TSA - ~~CON~~ SICK

Jan 26

033349

051449Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
INFO SECDEF
USCINCEUR VATHINGEN GER
CMDRMC ALEX VA

[Handwritten signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 018926

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MU, US

SUBJECT: OMANI REQUEST FOR TOW LOA

REF: A) MUSCAT 1426; B) MUSCAT 040

1. NORMAL CHANNEL FOR NEW FMS REQUESTS IS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
2. AS EMBASSY AWARE, ORIGINAL TOW SALE TO OMAN WAS MADE AS AN EXCEPTION TO USG POLICY FOR FMS SALES TO THE LOWER GULF REGION. EXCEPTION WAS MADE IN RESPONSE TO A CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE THREAT. AS FAR AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, OMAN HAS NOT EXPENDED ANY OF THE TOWS PREVIOUSLY SUPPLIED. AS SITUATION IN DHOFAR PROVINCE NOW SEEMS WELL IN HAND, NEED FOR ADDITIONAL TOWS IS FAR FROM CLEAR.



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3. TO ASSIST DEPARTMENT IN ASSESSING THIS REQUEST, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY JUSTIFICATION FOR SALE OF ADDITIONAL TOWS, INCLUDING THE BASIS FOR THE ANTICIPATED EXPENDITURE RATE CITED IN REF B.

4. DEPARTMENT WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL IMPACT SHOULD THE REQUEST BE DENIED. KISSINGER

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PM

PAGE 01 MUSCAT 00040 130453Z

15
ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 AID-05
IGA-02 L-03 DODE-00 MC-02 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 /056 W
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R 130340Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO SECSTATE WAHDC 1755

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MUSCAT 040

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS MU US
SUBJECT: FMS: REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL TOW MISSILES

REF: (A) 75 MUSCAT 1426, (B) CDRAMC ALEX VA DTG 021358Z JAN 76

1. REFTEL (A) OUTLINED FUTURE SAF REQUIREMENTS FOR TOW MISSILES AND REQUESTED PREPARATION OF APPROPRIATE LOA. REFTEL (B) REQUESTED THAT REQUIREMENTS BE "SUBMITTED THROUGH NORMAL FMS CHANNELS..."

2. PLEASE ADVISE ON HOW EMBASSY SHOULD PROCEED. UNFORTUNATELY, ALMOST NOTHING ABOUT OUR MINIMAL FMS PROGRAM SEEMS TO BE "NORMAL", SO WE ARE UNAWARE OF WHAT CHANNELS TO USE.
WOILE

1/21 leave all draft reply.

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PAGE 01 021443Z

43
ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 INR-07 NEA-10 OMB-01 MC-02 AID-05 IGA-02 /032 W
089919

P 021358Z JAN 76
FM CDRAMC ALEX VA //AMCIL-P/MI//
TO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT OMAN
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER //ECJ7-FMS//
DA WASHDC //DALO-ILA/ILM//
SECDEF WASHDC //DSAA//
CDRMICOM REDSTONE ARS AL //AMSMI-SB/TO//

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SURJ: FMS CASE UAB: ADDITIONAL OMANI REQUIREMENTS FOR TOW MISSILES

- A. AMC MSG, AMCIL-P/MI, DTG 072228Z NOV 75 (C)
- B. AMEMBASSY MUSCAT MSG, DTG 210821Z DEC 75 (C)

1. (C) REF A ADVISED THAT THE FY75 CONTRACT OPTION FOR THE TOW MISSILE WOULD EXPIRE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND REQUESTED SURVEY OF INTERESTED COUNTRIES TO OBTAIN FIRM FUNDED ORDERS NLT 30 JAN 76. REF B ADVISED THAT OMAN WOULD REQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL 96 MISSILES DURING CY76. REF INQUIRES AS TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT LOA CAN BE PREPARED FOR THIS QUANTITY AND FURTHER REQUESTS INFO CONCERNING FUTURE SUPPLY SITUATION
2. (C) BASED ON CURRENT AVAILABLE PRODUCTION CAPACITY, DELIVERIES FROM

PAGE 2 RUERBEAR006 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE FY76 CONTRACT OPTION CURRENTLY BEING EXERCISED COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE IN APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIMEFRAME AS THE FY75 OPTION, JUNE 1978. HOWEVER, FIRM FUNDED ORDERS COULD BE SUBMITTED THROUGH OCT 1976. DELIVERIES FROM THE SUBSEQUENT FY77 PROCUREMENT PROGRAM WILL BECOME AVAILABLE DURING LATTER CY78 WITH SUBMISSION OF FUNDED ORDER NLT MAR 1977.

3. (U) YOUR RESPONSE TO SUBJECT SURVEY IS ACKNOWLEDGED. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOUR FIRM REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL MISSILES BE SUBMITTED THROUGH YOUR NORMAL FMS CHANNELS. IF REQUIREMENT IS

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PAGE 02 021443Z

APPROVED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY THIS COMMAND WILL EXPEDITE ACTION TO
PREPARE LOA.
GDS: 31 DEC 1982

FOT



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Handwritten: ~~WOLLE~~ 4/12 action taken?

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PAGE 01 MUSCAT 01426 210841Z

11
ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 IGA-02
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117945

R 210821Z DEC 75
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO CDRAMC ALEX VA//AMCIL-P/MI
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1712
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER//ECJ7-FMS
DA WASHDC//DALO-ILA/ILM
SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA
CDRMICOM REDSTONE ARSENAL AL//AMSMI-SB/TO

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MUSCAT 1426

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS MU US
SUBJECT: FMS: CASE UAB; ADDITIONAL OMANI REQUIREMENTS FOR TOW MISSILES

REF: (A) MUSCAT 1386 DTG 100505Z DEC 75; (B) CDRAMC ALEX VA//AMCIL-P/MI DTG 072228Z NOV 75

1. EMBASSY IN RECEIPT OF DEC. 18 LETTER FROM OMANI DEFENSE DEPARTMENT STATING THAT ANNUAL REQUIREMENT FOR TOW MISSILES DURING 1976 WILL BE FOR TOTAL OF 96 (EXPENDITURE RATE OF 8 PER MONTH). LETTER WENT ON TO INQUIRE AS TO POSSIBILITY THAT LOA CAN BE PREPARED FOR THIS NUMBER OF MISSILES AND REQUESTED INFORMATION CONCERNING FUTURE SUPPLY SITUATION. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE.

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By HR NARA, Date 4/5/13

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 9, 1976

Mr. Paul Molineaux
NEA/ARP - Dept. of State
Room 5248-A, New State

The attached cable on Omani Interests
in US Naval Training Assistance
is ok with us.


Robert B. Oakley
NSC Staff

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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC-3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By: HR NARA, Date: 4/5/13



LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

26

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S/S #

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SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 1099 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 2

FROM: P.D. Molineaux NEA/ARP 21139 5248-A
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION US Naval Training Assistance for Oman

FROM TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>DOD/ISA</u>	<u>Commander G. Sick</u>	<u>54871</u>	<u>4-D-842</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>A. Houghton</u>	<u>395-3308</u>	<u>EOB 386</u>

REMARKS: Sick for Clearance -- Houghton for Comment

S/S Officer: M. Houghton

Bob -

I do not think this violates the preferred option in NSM 217, or even the lower options, as long as we keep ourselves out of Oman + Masirah. Do you see any reason this should not go?



TELEGRAM

D R A F T
PDMOLINEAUX
2/6/76

20

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APPROVING: NEA - SSOBER

CLEARANCES: DOD/ISA - GSICK
PM/SAS - DKEENE
NSC - AHOUGHTON
NEA/RA - RHOBBS

ACTION: ROUTINE TO MUSCAT

INFORMATION: ROUTINE TO LONDON, USCINCEUR VAHINGIN GERMANY
EMBASSY JIDDA

EO: GDS

TAGS: MARR, MASS, MU, US

SUBJECT: OMANI INTERESTS IN US NAVAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE

REF: (A) 75 STATE 182970 (DTG 020107Z AUG 75), (B) LETTER
SICK-WOLLE, 24 NOVEMBER 75 (NOTE^A), (C) MUSCAT 88 (DTG 270500 Z
JANUARY 7576)

1. USG DESIRE TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, ON FULLY REIMBURSABLE BASIS,
TO OMAN IN PROVIDING MODEST NAVAL TRAINING (REFTEL A) REMAINS
UNCHANGED, AND REMAINS WELL WITHIN SCOPE OF USG POLICY OF
LIMITED INVOLVEMENT IN OMANI MILITARY AFFAIRS.

2. SUGGEST EMBASSY, IN DISCUSSIONS OF THIS QUESTION WITH OMANIS,
URGE OMANIS CONSULT WITH SAUDIS TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED
OMANI PARTICIPATION IN SAUDI NAVAL EXPANSION PROGRAM (SNEP),
ALONG LINES SUGGESTED IN REFERENCE B.

3. USG WELCOMES BNX EMBASSY SUGGESTION THAT OMANI DEFENSE
LIAISON OFFICER, MAJOR SALIM AL-GHAZALI, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE
OMANI OFFICIAL, VISIT US TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR TRAINING
OF OMANIS HERE. YOU AUTHORIZED PROCEED TO MAKE THIS SUGGESTION

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State Dept Circumstances

By HR NARA D 415113

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- 2 -

TO OMANI GOVERNMENT, ASSURING THAT CONTEXT OF VISITS IS TO
EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF LIMITED TRAINING OR FOR SUITABLE
OMANI OFFICERS AND SEAMEN, AND DOES NOT IMPLY USG COMMITMENT TO
BROADER PROGRAM. YY



Qman

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LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 10 22 04 '76

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S/S #

'76 FEB 10 PM 10:28

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

LDX MESSAGE NO. 1164 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 3

FROM: MACK S/S-0 _____
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Call to MUSCAT - Omani Interests in US Naval Training Assistance

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>WH</u>	<u>Jeanne Davis</u>		

REMARKS: For clearance by R. Oakley
S/S Officer: DLB

*OK to clear 2/11/76
Telephoned Davis' office -*



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NEA/ARP:PDMOLINEAUX:CEJ
2/10/76 X-21139
NEA:SSOBER

DOD/ISA:GSICK
NSC:ROAKLEY
S/S

PM/SAS:DKEENE
NEA/RA:RHOBBS

ROUTINE MUSCAT
ROUTINE LONDON, JIDDA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, MASS, MU, US

SUBJECT: OMANI INTERESTS IN US NAVAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE

REFS: {A} 75 STATE 182970 {DTG 020107Z AUG 75}, {B} LETTER
SICK-WOLLE, 24 NOV 75 {NOTAL}, {C} MUSCAT 88 {DTG 270500Z
JAN 76}

Handwritten notes:
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1. USG DESIRE TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, ON FULLY REIMBURSABLE BASIS, TO OMAN IN PROVIDING MODEST NAVAL TRAINING (REFTEL A) REMAINS UNCHANGED, AND REMAINS WELL WITHIN SCOPE OF USG POLICY OF LIMITED INVOLVEMENT IN OMANI MILITARY AFFAIRS.

2. SUGGEST EMBASSY, IN DISCUSSIONS OF THIS QUESTION WITH OMANIS, URGE OMANIS CONSULT WITH SAUDIS TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED OMANI PARTICIPATION IN SAUDI NAVAL EXPANSION PROGRAM {SNEP}, ALONG LINES SUGGESTED IN REF B.

3. USG WELCOMES EMBASSY SUGGESTION THAT OMANI DEFENSE LIAISON OFFICER, MAJOR SALIM AL-GHAZALI, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OMANI OFFICIAL, VISIT US TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR TRAINING OF OMANIS HERE. YOU AUTHORIZED PROCEED TO MAKE THIS SUGGESTION TO OMANI GOVERNMENT, ASSURING THAT CONTEXT OF VISIT IS TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF LIMITED TRAINING FOR SUITABLE OMANI OFFICERS AND SEAMEN, AND DOES



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State Dept Guidelines

By *HR* NARA Date *4/5/13*

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NOT IMPLY USG COMMITMENT TO BROADER PROGRAM.

4. WHEN RELAYING PROPOSAL TO OMANIS, YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT VALUE OF ANY VISIT WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON ABILITY OF VISITING OFFICIAL TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF POTENTIAL TRAINEES. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANY SUCCESSFUL TRAINING PROGRAM AND MUST BE ADDRESSED BY OMANIS AT SOME POINT. 44



ADDITIONAL INFO ADDRESSEE: USCINCEUR VAIHINGIN GERMANY





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PAGE 01 LONDON 02201 111734Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

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R 111729Z FEB 76
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8915
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

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SCI/ENV _____
ECON _____
OPNL/INT _____
SS/PR _____
CONGR

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MU, UK
SUBJECT: BRITISH PLANS FOR MASIRAH

REF: LONDON 17981 (NOV. 21, 1975)

1. REFTEL REPORTED LUCAS, HEAD OF FCO MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT, TOLD EMOFF FCO OPPOSED WITHDRAWAL FROM MASIRAH BECAUSE OF ADVERSE POLITICAL EFFECT ON FRIENDLY ARAB STATES IN AREA. DURING DISCUSSION OF GULF AFFAIRS ON FEBRUARY 11, LUCAS TOLD EMOFF THAT SINCE THEN SITUATION HAS BEEN CHANGED BY OMANI VICTORY IN DHOFAR CAMPAIGN. IN SULTAN'S PRESENT CONFIDENT SITUATION, BRITISH WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT HAVE AN ADVERSE POLITICAL IMPACT ON HIM. LUCAS STATED QUESTION STILL UNDER DISCUSSION WITHIN HMG AND HE IS NOT ABLE TO DISCUSS IT FURTHER AT PRESENT.

2. COMMENT: WE SUSPECT THAT ADVOCATES WITHIN THE MOD ARE HAVING MOPE SUCCESS PRESSING FOR PHASING DOWN OF MASIRAH ON COQT-EFFECTIVENESS GROUNDS AS PART OF CURRENT REDUCTION IN MOD BUDGET.

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State Review
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HR *4/5/13*



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ORIGIN NEA-10

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444FTED BY NEA/ARP:PDMOLINEAUX:CEJ
APPROVED BY NEA:SSOBER
DOD/ISA:GSICK
PM/SAS:DKEENE
NSC:ROAKLEY
NEA/RA:RHOBBS
S/S - MR. ORTIZ

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R 111634Z FEB 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USCINCEUR

at

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 033530

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, MASS, MU, US

SUBJECT: OMANI INTERESTS IN US NAVAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE

REFS: (A) 75 STATE 182970 (DTG 020107Z AUG 75), (B) LETTER
SICK-WOLLE, 24 NOV 75 (NOTAL), (C) MUSCAT 88 (DTG 270500Z
JAN 76)

1. USG DESIRE TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, ON FULLY REIMBURSABLE
BASIS, TO OMAN IN PROVIDING MODEST NAVAL TRAINING (REFTEL
A) REMAINS UNCHANGED, AND REMAINS WELL WITHIN SCOPE OF USG
POLICY OF LIMITED INVOLVEMENT IN OMANI MILITARY AFFAIRS.

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2. SUGGEST EMBASSY, IN DISCUSSIONS OF THIS QUESTION WITH OMANIS, URGE OMANIS CONSULT WITH SAUDIS TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED OMANI PARTICIPATION IN SAUDI NAVAL EXPANSION PROGRAM (SNEP), ALONG LINES SUGGESTED IN REF B.

3. USG WELCOMES EMBASSY SUGGESTION THAT OMANI DEFENSE LIAISON OFFICER, MAJOR SALIM AL-GHAZALI, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OMANI OFFICIAL, VISIT US TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR TRAINING OF OMANIS HERE. YOU AUTHORIZED PROCEED TO MAKE THIS SUGGESTION TO OMANI GOVERNMENT, ASSURING THAT CONTEXT OF VISIT IS TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF LIMITED TRAINING FOR SUITABLE OMANI OFFICERS AND SEAMEN, AND DOES

NOT IMPLY USG COMMITMENT TO BROADER PROGRAM.

4. WHEN RELAYING PROPOSAL TO OMANIS, YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT VALUE OF ANY VISIT WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON ABILITY OF VISITING OFFICIAL TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF POTENTIAL TRAINEES. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANY SUCCESSFUL TRAINING PROGRAM AND MUST BE ADDRESSED BY OMANIS AT SOME POINT. INGERSOLL

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PAGE 01 MUSCAT 00164 150853Z

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ACTION NEA-10

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USIA-06 OMB-01 ACDA-05 /075 W

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R 150815Z FER 76
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1838
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
COMIDEASTFOR
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USCINCEUR VAHINGENNOER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MUSCAT 0164

E.O. 11652GDS
TAGS: MARR UK MU
SUBJECT: PLANS FOR RAF WITHDRAWAL FROM SALALAH

1. IN FEBRUARY 15 CONVERSATION, UK AIR ATTACHE CONFIRMED THAT RAF WILL WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM SALALAH. RAF HAS RUN THAT AIR-FIELD FOR MANY YEARS, BUT IN TERMS OF HMG INTERESTS THERE IS LITTLE JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING TO DO SO. OMANGOV HAS AGREED TO PLAN, ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL SOME QUESTION ABOUT TIMING. RAF WOULD LIKE TO AIM FOR OCTOBER 1976 WITHDRAWAL; OMANIS ARE PRESSING FOR SOMEWHAT LATER DATE.

2. RAF UNITS WILL BE PULLED BACK TO UK, HENCE REDUCING OVERALL LEVEL OF DIRECT UK MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OMAN. HOWEVER, BASIC DECISION REVOLVES AROUND HMG DESIRE TO CUT EXPENSES RATHER THAN MORE STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS. (CONTRARITLY, OMANGOV WANTS TO PROLONG BRITISH FUNDING FOR RUNNING SALALAH

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E.O. 12958 (a) (1) SEC 3.3

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11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

R 030345Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1877

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EXDIS

DEPT PASS TO SECDEF, USCINCEUR AND CMDRMC ALEX VA IF DESIRED

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS MU US
SUBJECT: OMANI REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TOW MISSILES

REF: (A) STATE 18926, (B) 75 MUSCAT 1426

1. EMBASSY RESPECTFULLY TAKES EXCEPTION TO GENESIS OF OMANI ACQUISITION OF TOW AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 2 OF REFTEL (A). FURTHER, WE URGE THAT PROMPT AND FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO OMANI REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL MISSILES.

2. EMBASSY FILES, SUPPORTED BY OUR RECOLLECTION OF EVENTS, CLEARLY SHOW THAT, DURING 1974, MILITARY JUSTIFICATION FOR TOW WAS DEBATED AT LENGTH WITHIN USG CIRCLES AND DISCUSSED IN DEPTH WITH OMANIS. FOR THEIR PART, OMANIS NEVER ARGUED THAT TOW WAS REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONS WITHIN DHOFAR UNDER THEN-EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. RATHER, THEY REQUESTED THIS SYSTEM BASED ON THEIR BELIEF THAT PDRY ARMOR POSED VIABLE THREAT OF INVASION, THAT TOW OR COMPARABLE SYSTEM WAS REQUIRED TO MEET THAT CONTINGENCY. HENCE MOTIVE WAS TO OBTAIN DEFENSIVE SYSTEM, NOT ONE THAT WOULD BE ENGAGED PRIMARILY IN PURSUIT OF GUERRILLA WAR.

3. BASED TO VERY CONSIDERABLE DEGREE ON THEN-EXISTING TIGHT SUPPLY SITUATION WITHIN U.S. DEFENSE SYSTEM, BUT ALSO REFLECTING USG CONCLUSION THAT PDRY THREAT NOT IMMEDIATE, USG TURNED DOWN OMANI REQUEST FOR TOW. TO EMBASSY KNOWLEDGE, OMANGOV-

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- SEA _____
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QUIETLY ACCEPTED THIS DECISION, ALTHOUGH WITH REAL DISAPPOINTMENT.

4. IN CONTEXT OF SULTAN QABOOS' JANUARY 1975 VISIT TO WASHINGTON, OMANIS WERE INFORMED THAT TOW WOULD BE AVAIL-
ABLE AFTER ALL--ON AN FMS CASH SALES BASIS. USG WANTED TO GIVE
SOME SUBSTANCE TO SULTAN'S VISIT, BUT TOW OFFER ALSO SERVED
AS QUID PRO QUO FOR OUR DESIRE FOR POSSIBLE ACCESS TO MASIRAH
FACILITIES.

5. HAVING BEEN INITIATED ON THIS POLITICAL BASIS, IT IS IRONIC
THAT MAINTENANCE AND RESUPPLY PROBLEMS WHOULD BE JUSTIFIED
SOLELY ON GROUNDS OF AN IDENTIFIABLE MILITARY THREAT TO WHICH
TOW IS THE SUITABLE RESPONSE. CERTAINLY FROM OMANI POINT OF
VIEW, CURRENT QUESTIONS RE TOW ARE JUST AS POLITICAL AS WAS
INITIAL DECISION--I.E., THERE ARE THOSE, INCLUDING SOME BRITISH
MILITARY OFFICERS, WHO WOULD BE ONLY TOO HAPPY TO SEIZE UPON
EVIDENCE THAT USG NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN OMAN, ESPECIALLY
NOW THAT MILITARY SITUATION VASTLY IMPROVED IN DHOFAR. SUCH
ARGUMENTS COULD HAVE TELLING EFFECT AMONG OMANI LEADERS WHO
STILL PERCEIVE OF PDRY THREAT AGAINST WHICH TOW IS SUPPOSED
TO BE DEFENSIVE DETERRENT. IN EFFECT, WE WOULD BE TELLING
OMANIS THAT WE SOLD THEM SOMETHING OF A WHITE ELEPHANT.

6. INCIDENTALLY, SAF SOURCES STATE THAT SOME TOW MISSILES
WEERE FIRED DURING LATTER PART OF DHOFAR CAMPAIGN, PRIMARILY AG-
AINST CAVE POSITIONS. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED EXACT NUMBERS OR
DETAILS, BUT PRESUMABLY THIS USAGE SERVED AS BASIS FOR SAF
DETERMINATION OF EXPENDITURE RATES.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: THAT EARLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE IS GIVEN
TO OMANI REQUEST FOR TOW MISSILE RESUPPLY AND THAT APPRO-
PRIATE LOA BE FORWARDED TO EMBASSY.
WOLLE

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Queen

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~***** COPY

ROUTINE
CRZ247
DE RUEHCR #0228 0630550
R 030345Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1877

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MUSCAT 0228

EXDIS
DEPT PASS TO SECDEF, USCINCEUR AND CMDRAMC ALEX VA IF DESIRED
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS MU US
SUBJECT: OMANI REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TOW MISSILES
REF: (A) STATE 18926, (B) 75 MUSCAT 1426

1. EMBASSY RESPECTFULLY TAKES EXCEPTION TO GENESIS OF OMANI ACQUISITION OF TOW AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 2 OF REFTTEL (A). FURTHER, WE URGE THAT PROMPT AND FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO OMANI REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL MISSILES.

2. EMBASSY FILES, SUPPORTED BY OUR RECOLLECTION OF EVENTS, CLEARLY SHOW THAT, DURING 1974, MILITARY JUSTIFICATION FOR TOW WAS DEBATED AT LENGTH WITHIN USG CIRCLES AND DISCUSSED IN DEPTH WITH OMANIS. FOR THEIR PART, OMANIS NEVER ARGUED THAT TOW WAS REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONS WITHIN DHOFAR UNDER THEN-EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. RATHER, THEY REQUESTED THIS SYSTEM BASED ON THEIR BELIEF THAT PDRY ARMOR POSED VIABLE THREAT OF INVASION, THAT TOW OR COMPARABLE SYSTEM WAS REQUIRED TO MEET THAT CONTINGENCY. HENCE MOTIVE WAS TO OBTAIN DEFENSIVE SYSTEM, NOT ONE THAT WOULD BE ENGAGED PRIMARILY IN PURSUIT OF GUERRILLA WAR.

3. BASED TO VERY CONSIDERABLE DEGREE ON THEN-EXISTING TIGHT SUPPLY SITUATION WITHIN U.S. DEFENSE SYSTEM, BUT ALSO REFLECTING USG CONCLUSION THAT PDRY THREAT NOT IMMEDIATE, USG TURNED DOWN OMANI REQUEST FOR TOW. TO EMBASSY KNOWLEDGE, OMANGOV QUIETLY ACCEPTED THIS DECISION, ALTHOUGH WITH REAL DISAPPOINTMENT.

4. IN CONTEXT OF SULTAN QABOOS' JANUARY 1975 VISIT TO WASHINGTON, OMANIS WERE INFORMED THAT TOW WOULD BE AVAILABLE AFTER ALL--ON AN FMS CASH SALES BASIS. USG WANTED TO GIVE SOME SUBSTANCE TO SULTAN'S VISIT, BUT TOW OFFER ALSO SERVED AS QUID PRO QUO FOR OUR DESIRE FOR POSSIBLE ACCESS TO MASIRAH

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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 9/5/13



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PAGE 01

PSN:015527

TOR:063/13:24Z

DTG:030345Z MAR 76

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FACILITIES.

5. HAVING BEEN INITIATED ON THIS POLITICAL BASIS, IT IS IRONIC THAT MAINTENANCE AND RESUPPLY PROBLEMS WOULD BE JUSTIFIED SOLELY ON GROUNDS OF AN IDENTIFIABLE MILITARY THREAT TO WHICH TOW IS THE SUITABLE RESPONSE. CERTAINLY FROM OMANI POINT OF VIEW, CURRENT QUESTIONS RE TOW ARE JUST AS POLITICAL AS WAS INITIAL DECISION--I.E., THERE ARE THOSE, INCLUDING SOME BRITISH MILITARY OFFICERS, WHO WOULD BE ONLY TOO HAPPY TO SEIZE UPON EVIDENCE THAT USG NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN OMAN, ESPECIALLY NOW THAT MILITARY SITUATION VASTLY IMPROVED IN DHOFAR. SUCH ARGUMENTS COULD HAVE TELLING EFFECT AMONG OMANI LEADERS WHO STILL PERCEIVE OF PDRY THREAT AGAINST WHICH TOW IS SUPPOSED TO BE DEFENSIVE DETERRENT. IN EFFECT, WE WOULD BE TELLING OMANIS THAT WE SOLD THEM SOMETHING OF A WHITE ELEPHANT.

6. INCIDENTALLY, SAF SOURCES STATE THAT SOME TOW MISSILES WERE FIRED DURING LATTER PART OF DHOFAR CAMPAIGN, PRIMARILY AGAINST CAVE POSITIONS. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED EXACT NUMBERS OR DETAILS, BUT PRESUMABLY THIS USAGE SERVED AS BASIS FOR SAF DETERMINATION OF EXPENDITURE RATES.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: THAT EARLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE IS GIVEN TO OMANI REQUEST FOR TOW MISSILE RESUPPLY AND THAT APPROPRIATE LOA BE FORWARDED TO EMBASSY.

WOLLE
BT



PSN:015527 RECALLED PAGE 02 DF 02 TOR:063/13:24Z DTG:030345Z MAR 76

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LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 10 10 15 76

(Handwritten scribbles)

SITE

B

S/S #

'76 MAR 10 AM 10:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

LDX MESSAGE NO. 1950 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS No. Pages 1
FROM: P.D.MOLINEAUX NEA/ARP 21139 5248-A
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION TELEGRAM RE TOW MISSILES

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>DOD/ISAACNESAJ</u>	<u>CMDR GARY SICK</u>	<u>0X5-4871</u>	<u>40842</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>ARTHUR HOUGHTON</u>	<u>395-3308</u>	<u>366</u>

REMARKS: SICK FOR CLEARANCE, HOUGHTON FOR COMMENT

S/S Officer: L. M. MacFarlane

Telephoned Mr. Houghton's "OK" on this message to Mr. Molineaux's secretary 3/10/76 - 2:29pm.



D R A F T
PDMOLINEAUX
3/9/76

9-6

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

NEA/ARP:PDMOLINEAUX:LB
3/9/76 EXT 21139
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
NEA/SSOBER

CLEARANCES: PM/SAS/DKEENE ✓
DOD/ISA/GSICK
NSC/AHOUGHTON

ACTION: ROUTINE TO MUSCAT

INFO: ROUTINE TO LONDON

MILITARY INFO ADDRESSEE: USCINCEUR/VAHINGEN, GERMANY

CAPTION: EXDIS

EO: GDS

TAGS: MASS, MU, US

SUBJECT: OMANI REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TOW MISSILES

REFERENCES: (A) MUSCAT 228, (B) STATE 18926, (C) 75 MUSCAT 1426

1. USG CONTINUES PREPARED BE OF ASSISTANCE TO OMANI GOVERNMENT AS APPROPRIATE. USG FULLY SUPPORTS AND APPLAUDS OMANI GOVERNMENT STRATEGY IN DHOFAR.

2. IN LINE WITH ESTABLISHED AND UNCHANGED USG POLICY, USG PREPARED TO MAINTAIN OMANI TOW MISSILE STOCK AT LEVEL OF SOME 20 MISSILES PER LAUNCHER, OR A TOTAL OF SOME 200. WE UNDERSTAND (REFTEL A, REFTEL C) THAT OMANI FORCES HAVE SO FAR EXPENDED APPROXIMATELY EIGHT MISSILES. ORIGINAL JANUARY 1975 PURCHASE WAS 180 MISSILES. PLEASE VERIFY ACCURACY OF ACTUAL CONSUMPTION FIGURE AND INFORM SAF THAT USG WILL PREPARE APPROPRIATE LETTER OF OFFER TO COVER CONSUMPTION TO DATE PLUS 20. YY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines
By HR NARA, Date 4/5/13





Department of State

Oman

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3475

PAGE 01 STATE 060474

21
ORIGIN NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 FA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 ONI-01
AID-05 MC-02 ACDA-05 TRSE-00 IGA-02 EUR-12 /084 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:PDHOLINEAUX:BN
APPROVED BY NEA:SSOBER
PM/SAS:DKEENE
DOD/ISA:GSICK
NSC:AMOUGHTON
S/S-O: A, OTTO

~~PO~~
~~Ad~~
③

..... 102353

R 120239Z MAR 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY

- AFR/UN _____
- European _____
- FE _____
- LA _____
- Western _____
- PRC _____
- SEA _____
- NSC/PLS _____
- COMINT _____
- CONJINT _____
- ECON _____
- OPNL/INT _____
- SS/PR _____
- CONCERN _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 060474

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, MU, US

SUBJECT: OMANI REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TOW MISSILES

REF: (A) MUSCAT 228, (B) STATE 18926, (C) 75 MUSCAT 1426

IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST OF OMAN GOVERNMENT, USG PREPARED TO MAINTAIN OMANI TOW MISSILE STOCK AT LEVEL OF SOME 20 MISSILES PER LAUNCHER, OR A TOTAL OF SOME 200. WE UNDERSTAND (REFTEL A, REFTEL C) THAT OMANI FORCES HAVE SO FAR EXPENDED APPROXIMATELY EIGHT MISSILES. ORIGINAL JANUARY 1975 PURCHASE WAS 180 MISSILES. PLEASE VERIFY ACCURACY OF ACTUAL CONSUMPTION FIGURE AND INFORM SAF THAT USG WILL PREPARE APPROPRIATE LETTER OF OFFER TO COVER CONSUMPTION TO DATE PLUS 20.

KISSINGER



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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By HR NAW, Date 4/5/13

7

12 March, 1976.

11a



With the Compliments of
THE BRITISH EMBASSY

R. J. S. Lewis

WASHINGTON, D.C.



Oman

11b.
1.

~~to
PW~~
original of this was delivered
to West March 10 or 11.

Aide Mémoire

MASIRAH

1. The post monsoon campaign has resulted in the effective collapse of the rebellion in Dhofar. The rebels (PFLO- Popular Front of the Liberation of Oman) and their supporters from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) have been forced back over the PDRY border, and there remain only a few isolated pockets of resistance. The Sultan has declared the war as won, and has held a large victory parade in Muscat. PDRY and PFLO have not admitted defeat, however, and no doubt will attempt to keep up some sort of harassing activity, however sporadic, unless diplomatic activity by Saudi Arabia and Egypt wins over the PDRY Government and some sort of political settlement is reached. Nevertheless the main threat to Oman has been overcome and the "political connection" between our presence at Masirah and the Dhofar campaign is therefore severed. This enables us to review our military commitment to the Sultan in the light of the present total military supremacy of the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), which on present assessments is unlikely to be challenged seriously in the near future. We no longer have a military requirement for the facilities on Masirah. The political requirement in the Dhofar context has now also gone. We have concluded therefore that we can safely withdraw from

/Masirah

DECLASSIFIED *State Rev.* ~~SECRET~~

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 12/4/03

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA Date 4/5/13



2.

Masirah, having fulfilled our obligations to the Sultan and taken full account of the interests and concerns of our allies and our friends in the region. Withdrawal from Masirah will no longer be seen as an encouragement to the rebels or to PDRY. Our target date for withdrawal is 31 December 1976.

2. The decision to withdraw from Masirah was communicated to the US Government when Sir John Hunt and Field Marshall Carver visited Washington in January 1976th. The sudden and decisive military collapse of the Dhofar rebellion, together with the end of Masirah's usefulness as a staging post have now made it possible for HMG to set a firm date for departure.

SECRET



Omms
[Signature]

DIA REVIEWED 05-Dec-2003: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

***** ~~SECRET~~ ***** COPY

PRIORITY
DE RUEKJCS #3319 0730529
P 130450Z MAR 76 ZEX
FM DIA WASH DC

TO DIAINTBUL
AIG 7011

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN 1234

FROM DIH-16
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE MESSAGE (U)
DIADIN 72-8A
OMAN: INVOLVEMENT IN SAUDI-SOUTH YEMENI RAPPROCHEMENT (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ THE OMANI GOVERNMENT VIEWS THE 10 MARCH ANNOUNCEMENTS BY SAUDI ARABIA AND SOUTH YEMEN TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS AS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARDS STABILITY ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA.

2. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ OMAN HAD GIVEN RIYADH VIRTUAL CARTE BLANCHE TO NEGOTIATE ITS POSITION, THOUGH MUSCAT HAD OFTEN COMPLAINED ABOUT NOT BEING KEPT INFORMED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE SAUDI-SOUTH YEMENI TALKS. CONSEQUENTLY, AS A MERE FORMALITY, THE SAUDIS INVITED OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER AL-AWAWI TO RIYADH ON THE 9TH AND PROBABLY INFORMED HIM OF THE STATEMENT PRIOR TO PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 3319 ~~SECRET~~ ITS RELEASE.

3. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ ALSO ON 10 MARCH, SULTAN QABUS OF OMAN ISSUED A LIMITED AMNESTY DECREE FOR OMANI CITIZENS WHO HAD TAKEN PART IN THE DHOFAR REBELLION, WHICH ENDED LAST FALL. THE DECREE WILL RUN FOR 60 DAYS. THIS MOVE WAS PROBABLY DESIGNED AS A COMPROMISE TO MEET ADEN'S DEMAND FOR POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF OMAN PARTICIPATION IN OMAN'S GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH A LIBERAL POLICY TOWARD FORMER REBELS HAD ALWAYS BEEN PURSUED.

4. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ THE SAUDI-SOUTH YEMENI ANNOUNCEMENTS ENCOMPASS VAGUE TERMS THAT PERMIT OMAN TO INTERPRET ESPOUSAL OF ITS OWN POSITION. THE REFERENCE STRESSING NONINTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS CAN BE APPLIED TO OMAN'S OPPOSITION TO

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AUTHORITY DIA RAC Review 12/5/03
BY llh NLF, DATE 5/25/05



~~SECRET~~

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SOUTH YEMEN'S BACKING OF THE DHOFAR REBELLION. IN ADDITION, THE STATEMENT AGAINST FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT SUPPORTS MUSCAT'S OBJECTION TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN SOUTH YEMEN AS WELL AS ADEN'S CONCERNING IRANIAN AND BRITISH FORCES IN OMAN.

PAGE 3 RUFKJCS 3319 ~~SECRET~~

5. (S/NOFORN) A REDUCTION OF THE FOREIGN PRESENCE IN OMAN WILL ONLY TAKE PLACE IF QABUS IS CONVINCED OF ADEN'S SINCERITY OF NO FURTHER OVERT INTERFERENCE IN DHOFAR PROVINCE. THERE ARE CURRENTLY ABOUT 3,000 IRANIS IN THE COUNTRY AND THIS NUMBER COULD DECLINE WITHIN SIX MONTHS, THOUGH IT IS NOT EXPECTED TO FALL BELOW 1,000 IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ANY REDUCTION IN BRITISH PERSONNEL -- ABOUT 1,250 REGULAR OR SPCONDED -- WILL BE SLOWER BECAUSE OF THEIR SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE OMANI ARMED FORCES. HOWEVER, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE BRITISH MAY TURN OVER THE OPERATION OF SALALAH AIRFIELD TO THE OMANIS WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR. THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULAR BRITISH FORCES FROM SALALAH, WHICH SUPPORTED OPERATIONS DURING THE DHOFAR WAR, COULD BE INTERPRETED BY SOUTH YEMEN AS A MOVE TO REDUCE FOREIGN PRESENCE IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA.

6. (S/NOFORN) THE POSSIBLE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS ALONG THE OMAN-SOUTH YEMEN BORDER, WHICH MAY RESULT FROM THE NORMALIZATION ANNOUNCEMENT TOGETHER WITH THE DEMISE OF THE DHOFAR REBELLION AND THE RETURN OF SOME STABILITY TO

PAGE 4 RUEKJCS 3319 ~~SECRET~~
WESTERN OMAN, COULD PORTEND A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN THE LONG RUN.

PREPARED BY: 25x1 PIN-20

(XGDS-2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION OF ORIGINATOR)

BT



~~SECRET~~

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TRANSMITTED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

MAR 10 19 53 '76

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

'76 MAR 18 PM 7:57

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Oman

130

LDX MESSAGE NO. 2250, CLASSIFICATION Secret, NO. PAGES 1
DESCRIPTION OF MSG. Cable to Macaire UK Intent Depart
FROM: MACK, S/S-0, Maurit Island
Officer Office Symbol Extension Room Number

LDX TO: DELIVER TO: EXTENSION: ROOM NUMBER:
W.H., Jeanne Davis, _____, _____
_____, _____, _____, _____
_____, _____, _____, _____

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: _____

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: PLA
Executive Secretariat Officer

3/19/76

Cleared with Davis' office 9:30 am



~~SECRET~~

NEA/ARP:PDMOLINEAUX:LB
3/18/76 EXT 21139
NEA:SSOBER

PM/ISO:MPASZTALANIEC {SBST}
DOD/ISA:GSICK {INFO}

EUR/NE:SWORREL {SBST}
NSC:ROAKLEY

ROUTINE MUSCAT
ROUTINE JIDDA, LONDON

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MPOL, MU, UK, US

SUBJECT: UK INTENT DEPART MASIRAH ISLAND

1. UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON HAS DELIVERED AIDE MEMOIRE TO DEPARTMENT INDICATING DECISION BY HMG TO CLOSE DOWN ITS BASE ON MASIRAH ISLAND BY END OF 1976. BASIC RATIONALE GIVEN IS THAT, SINCE DHOFAR WAR NOW APPEARS TO BE SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED, POLITICAL NEED TO MAINTAIN MASIRAH BASE NO LONGER EXISTS. AIDE MEMOIRE OFFERS NO DETAILS, SUCH AS DISPOSITION OF COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES OR BBC TRANSMITTER ON MASIRAH. UK EMBASSY ASSUMES USG WILL REACT TO AIDE MEMOIRE WITH EXPRESSION OF INTEREST OR LACK OF INTEREST IN ACCESS TO BASE FACILITIES.

2. QUESTION OF US INTEREST IN MASIRAH UNDER STUDY AS PART OF BROADER CURRENT REVIEW OF US PERSIAN GULF POLICY. AFTER REVIEW COMPLETED, USG WILL PREPARE RESPONSE TO UK AIDE MEMOIRE.

3. UK EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED THAT HMG HAS NOT REPEAT NOT INFORMED OMANI GOVERNMENT OF ITS INTENTION, AND REQUESTS THAT USG HOLD MATTER CLOSELY. 44

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PM
MP
SW
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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 8.3

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA Date 4/5/13

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PRIORITY /ROUTINE
LDN574
DE RUDTC #4978 0911422
P R 311420Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

PO
PO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0331
INFO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0125
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 04978

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MPOL, MU, UK, US
SUBJECT: UK INTENT DEPART MASIRAH ISLAND
REF: STATE 67173

1. FCO HEAD OF MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT LUCAS TOLD EMBOFF MARCH 30 THAT BRITISH HAD GIVEN US ADVANCE NOTICE OF THEIR IMPENDING ABANDONMENT OF RAF BASE AT MASIRAH IN OMAN SO THAT USG COULD DISCUSS ANY "MODALITIES" BEFORE BRITISH INFORM SULTAN. BRITISH WOULD NOW LIKE TO INFORM SULTAN BY MID-APRIL, AND WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE ANY USG REACTION BEFORE THEN.
2. LUCAS SAID BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM MASIRAH MAY NOW BE LINKED TO BRITISH TURNOVER OF SALALAH AIR BASE CONTROL. BRITISH HAD ORIGINALLY INFORMED SULTAN THEY PROPOSED TO TURN OVER SALALAH IN OCTOBER 1976. HOWEVER, SULTAN HAS BEEN HAVING SOME SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THIS AND MAY ASK BRITISH TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE SALALAH THROUGH MARCH 1977. IF SULTAN SO PROPOSES, BRITISH MAY REPLY TO HIM THAT BRITISH MAY OBTAIN ADDITIONAL FUNDS NEEDED TO EXTEND SALALAH OPERATION BY TIMELY CLOSING OF MASIRAH.
ARMSTRONG
BT

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3 12/4/03
State Dept Guidelines
By *HR* NARA, Date *4/5/13*



PSN:045449 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:091/19:07Z DTG:311420Z MAR 76

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O'Malley

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NSSM 238
x Oman
1941
15

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

April 1, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

M. Staser Holcomb
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Military Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Defense

Mr. Richard Monsen
Assistant to the Director
U. S. Information Agency

Mr. Benjamin Evans
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Toward Masira Island

The British Government has recently officially informed the USG that it intends to depart Masira Island at the end of 1976. While the subject of U. S. policy toward Masira was initially considered in NSSM 217 and is currently being dealt with within the broader context of NSSM 238, it would be useful if the USG could enter exploratory discussions with the British regarding Masira prior to the completion of the NSSM 238 response and Presidential decisions in connection with that response.

Accordingly, a meeting is to be held on the subject of U. S. Policy Toward Masira on Tuesday, April 6, 1976, at 11:00 a. m. in the NSC Conference Room, Room 305, Old Executive Office Building.

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED
NCC
By HR 4/5/13



This meeting will be chaired by Robert B. Oakley, Senior Staff Member for Middle East and South Asian Affairs. Addressees are requested to send representatives authorized to discuss their Agency positions regarding Masira and to inform Mr. Oakley's office (395-3330) of the names of their representatives.



Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 039167

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇCable

DESCRIPTION re Oman/Saudi Arabia

CREATION DATE 04/01/1976

VOLUME 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034300225

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC MIDDLE
EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STAFF: FILES

BOX NUMBER 19

FOLDER TITLE Oman (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/11/2013

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 039168

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBriefing Paper

DESCRIPTION re State position for NSC Meeting

CREATION DATE 04/05/1976

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034300225

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC MIDDLE
EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STAFF: FILES

BOX NUMBER 19

FOLDER TITLE Oman (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/11/2013

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR



Department of State

Ames

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 8981

PAGE 01 MUSCAT 00397 060856Z

22
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-01 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 OMB-01 AID-05 MC-02 ACDA-07 TRSE-00 IGA-02

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FM AEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1995
INFO AEMBASSY LONDON
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MUSCAT 0397

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS MU US
SUBJECT: OMANI REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TOW MISSILES

REF: STATE 60474 DTG 120239Z MAR 76

1. EMBASSY HAS HAD FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH SAF CONCERNING TOW ARSENAL. OMANI SIDE FINDS SUGGESTION OF MAINTAINING LEVEL OF 200 ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE, SAF WILL PROVIDE SPECIFIC NUMBER OF MISSILES PRESENTLY REQUIRED TO BRING OMANI ARSENAL UP TO THIS LEVEL.

2. IN MEANTIME, WHAT IS TIME LAPSE BETWEEN PLACING ORDER AND RECEIPT OF MISSILES? DO USG SOURCES ANTICIPATE ANNUAL REPLENISHMENT, OR WOULD TIMING OF REORDER BE BASED STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXPENDITURE? WILL RESUPPLY BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER OPEN LOA, OR WILL NEW DOCUMENTATION BE REQUIRED EACH TIME?

3. FOR FUTURE LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS, SAF POINTS OUT THAT ONCE UNPACKED MISSILES HAVE SHELF LIFE OF ONLY 6-8 MONTHS. HENCE, "READY" BATTERY WILL BE MAINTAINED

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By HR NARA Date 4/5/13





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MUSCAT 00397 060856Z

THROUGH ABOUT HALF OF SHELF LIFE, THEN UTILIZED FOR TRAIN-
ING PURPOSES. HOPEFULLY, THIS WILL COMPRISE ENTIRETY
OF EXPENDITURE.
WOLLE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 039169

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Amembassy Tehran

RECEIVER'S NAME Secstate WashDC

DESCRIPTION re Dhofar

CREATION DATE 04/06/1976

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034300225

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC MIDDLE
EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STAFF: FILES

BOX NUMBER 19

FOLDER TITLE Oman (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/11/2013

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 039170

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Secstate WashDC

RECEIVER'S NAME Amembassy London

DESCRIPTION re Masirah Island

CREATION DATE 04/08/1976

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034300225

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC MIDDLE
EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STAFF: FILES

BOX NUMBER 19

FOLDER TITLE Oman (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/11/2013

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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DE RUOTC #5586 1001724
R 091722Z APR 76
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0664

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2347
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0127
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2500

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 05586

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MPOL. UK, UX
SUBJECT: US/UK DISCUSSIONS OF MASIRAH ISLAND
REF: STATE 84477

1. EMBOFF SAW FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY WEIR AFTER-NOON APRIL 9 TO MAKE SURE HE HAD FULL VERSION OF /US/UK DISCUSSION OF APRIL 7 ON MASIRAH. EMBOFF SOUGHT UNSUCCESSFULLY TO PRY OUT OF WEIR EXACTLY HOW MUCH LONGER BRITISH COULD GIVE USS BEFORE INFORMING SULTAN OF DECISION TO WITHDRAW RAF. /USS REQUEST TO DEFER DATE OF INFORMING SULTAN WOULD HAVE TO BE RUN THROUGH NEW FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND TO CABINET LEVEL.

2. WEIR STRESSED THAT DECISION TO WITHDRAW WAS DICTATED NOT MERELY BY FINANCIAL STRINGENCY. WITH THIS DIMINUTING OF ITS CHAIN OF BASES TO SINGAPORE, RAF DOES NOT WISH TO KEEP ITS PERSONNEL IN AN EXCESSIVE HARDSHIP POST SUCH AS MASIRAH FOR NO APPARENT USEFUL PURPOSE.

3. HMG ALSO HAS A LEGAL PROBLEM ON ITS HANDS SINCE IT HAS A 99-YEAR LEASE ON THE BASE AREA AND HAS NO ADEQUATE PROVISION IN THE LEASE FOR UNILATERAL ABROGATION. BRITISH AFRAID THAT WHEN THEY DO ABROGATE, THE SULTAN MAY DEMAND COMPENSATION. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BRITISH WISH TO GIVE THE SULTAN AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AS POSSIBLE. HENCE, HMG WOULD STILL LIKE TO ADHERE TO MID-APRIL TIMING OF NOTIFICATION.

4. IN ANY CASE, WEIR SAID, BRITISH ARE INCLINED TO BE-

DECLASSIFIED *State Website*
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3
BY *HR* NARA, Date *4/5/13*



~~SECRET~~

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LIEVE THAT, FOLLOWING THE PATTERN OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM BAHREIN BASE, US SHOULD NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH SULTAN OVER ANY FUTURE US USE OF MASIRAH.

5. WEIR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BBC FACILITIES AS DISTINCT FROM RAF FACILITIES WOULD REMAIN IN MASIRAH, AND THAT OMANI GOVERNMENT HAS SOME PLANS TO USE AIRFIELD AS A FLYING SCHOOL.

ARMSTRONG

BT



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Orran

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SITE
B
S/S #

16 APR 19 PM 12:06

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1976 APR 19 PM 12 09

LDX MESSAGE NO. 3425 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~NODIS No. Pages 6

FROM: P.D. Molineaux NEA/ARP 21139 5248-A
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Masirah Island Action Memorandum

<u>LDX TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Mr. R. Oakley</u>	<u>395-3330</u>	<u>386 EOB</u>

REMARKS: For clearance
S/S Officer: *J. Ortiz*

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 039171

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

RECEIVER'S NAME Secstate

DESCRIPTION text of action memorandum re Masirah
Island

CREATION DATE 04/19/1976

VOLUME 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034300225

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC MIDDLE
EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STAFF: FILES

BOX NUMBER 19

FOLDER TITLE Oman (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/11/2013

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR