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TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
ATTN: MR SMYSER

INFO JCS

UNCLAS SECTION I OF VI

SUBJ: 346TH MAC MEETING

FOLLOWING IS A TRANSCRIPT OF THE 346TH MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION MEETING BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF THE UN COMMAND MAC AND THE KPA/CPV, ON 1 DECEMBER 1973. THIS TRANSCRIPT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED OFFICIAL UNTIL APPROVED BY THE LANGUAGE OFFICIALS OF EACH SIDE, HOWEVER IT WAS MADE FROM TAPES OF THE MEETING AND IS CONSIDERED ACCURATE, AND LITTLE OR NO CHANGES ARE EXPECTED. YOU WILL BE ADVISED IF THERE ARE SUBSTANTIV CHANGES TO THESE STATEMENTS AS A RESULT OF THE LANGUAGE OFFICIALS MEETING, HOWEVER FINAL KPA APPROVAL IS NOT EXPECTED FOR 7 TO 10 DAYS.

STATEMENT 1

I HAVE A STATEMENT TO MAKE ON GRAV VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT COMMITTED BY THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY AT THE INSTIGATION OF YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS. AS YOU KNOW, PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT SHALL BE APPLIED TO ALL OPPOSING NAVAL FORCES WHICH NAVAL FORCES SHALL RESPECT THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND THE LAND AREAS OF KOREA UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE OPPOSING SIDES, AND SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN BLOCKADE OF ANY KIND OFF KOREA.

HOWEVER, YOUR SIDE HAS KEPT ON VIOLATING EACH PROVISION SINCE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, AND OF LATE, INFILTRATING LARGE NUMBERS OF NAVAL VESSELS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS TO COMMIT VICIOUS ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS. IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYBODY THAT IF YOUR SIDE CONTINUES TO COMMIT SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS, IT WILL BRING GRAV IRRETREIVABLE CONSEQUENCES. THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO PREV NT AGGRAVATION OF TENSION IN OUR COUNTRY, AND TO KEEP GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FROM BEING BROUGHT ABOUT, OUR SIDE HAS PATIENTLY DEMANDED YOUR SIDE TO CEASE SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS WHENEV R YOUR SIDE INFILTRATED NAVAL V SSELS INTO OUR SIDE TO COMMIT ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS.

AT THE 344TH MAC MEETING, HELD ON OCTOBER 12, OUR SIDE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT YOUR SIDE HAD COMMITTED ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS BY MORE FREQUENTLY INFILTRATING VARIOUS NAVAL VESSELS, ARMED SPY-SHIPS AND OTHER V SSELS INTO THE SEA OFF HAEJU, DUNGSANGOT AND ONGJIN PENINSULAS

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IN OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA OF LATE, AND STRONGLY DEMANDED YOUR SIDE TO CEASE AT ONE SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS. THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, YOUR SIDE HAS KEPT ON VICIOUSLY COMMITTING SIMILAR CRIMINAL ACTS INSTEAD OF CARRYING OUT OUR JUST DEMANDS. AMONG THE CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITTED RECENTLY BY YOUR SIDE IN OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA, I WILL NOW POINT OUT ONLY THE INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 27, 28 AND THIS MORNING. HAVE A CLOSE LOOK AT THAT CHART. AROUND 0330 HOURS ON NOVEMBER 27, OUR SIDE WATCHED CLOSELY THE DESTROYER 96 OF YOUR SIDE AFTER FINDING HER APPROACHING OUR COASTAL WATERS FROM THE SOUTHERN SEA TO THE WESTERN SEA. THIS DESTROYER CONTINUED TO MOVE NORTHWARD. AROUND 0415 HOURS IT INTRUDED INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 30MIN NORTH, 125DGS 13 MIN EAST AND VEERED TO THE EAST. THIS VESSEL MOVED INTO THE DIRECTION OF YONPYONG-DO ISLAND, PASSING THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 31MIN NORTH, 125DGS 22MIN EAST AROUND 0530 HOURS AND THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 33MIN NORTH, 125DGS 32MIN EAST AROUND 0600 HOURS. AFTER THAT, THE VESSEL MOVED ABOUT THE SEA BETWEEN DAEPYONG-DO AND SOYONPYONG-DO ISLANDS FOR ABOUT HOURS FROM AROUND 0645 HOURS; AND, IT VEERED TO THE WEST AND PASSED THE SEA IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 35MIN NORTH, 125DGS 25MIN EAST AROUND 0920 HOURS; AND, THE SEA IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 27MIN NORTH, 125DGS 13MIN EAST AROUND 0955 HOURS. THE DESTROYER MET YOUR SIDE'S DESTROYER 91 ON THE SEA IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 27MIN NORTH, 125 05 EAST AROUND 1045 HOURS. AT AROUND 1200 HOURS, IT ARRIVED ON THE SEA IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 29MIN NORTH, 125DGS 23MIN EAST, VIA THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 30MIN NORTH, 125DGS 06MIN EAST, AND IT VEERED TO THE WEST, MOVING TO THE NORTHWEST VIA THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 31MIN NORTH, 124DGS 58MIN EAST AT ABOUT 1730 HOURS. THAT DAY THE DESTROYER 91 OF YOUR SIDE APPEARED FROM THE SOUTHERN SEA AROUND 0540 HOURS AND MOVED TO THE NORTH. AROUND 0615 HOURS AT INTRUDED INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS AT COORDINATES 37DGS 29MIN NORTH, 125DGS 06MIN EAST. THE DESTROYER MET THE AFORESAID DESTROYER 96 OF YOUR SIDE ON THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 27MIN NORTH, 125DGS 05MIN EAST AT ABOUT 1045 HOURS AFTER PASSING THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 29MIN NORTH, 125DGS 02MIN EAST. AROUND 1130 HOURS IT PASSED THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 31MIN NORTH, 124 DGS 57MIN EAST AND ARRIVED ON THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 32MIN NOR H, 125DGS 04MIN EAST AROUND 1700 BEFORE FLEEING SOUTHWARDS.

SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS OF YOUR SIDE WERE REPEATEDLY COMMITTED ON NOVEMBER 28, TOO. THAT IS, THE DESTROYER 96 OF YOUR SIDE WHICH HAD BEEN MOVING TO THE NORTHWEST IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 31MIN NORTH, 124DGS 58MIN EAST AROUND 1720 HOURS ON NOV 27, AFTER INTRUDING INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS, DID NOT WITHDRAW FROM OUR COASTAL WATERS ON NOVEMBER 28, BUT MOVED AROUND THE SEA WEST OF BAEKRYONG-DO, DAECHONG-DO AND SOCHONG-DO ISLANDS. AROUND 1245 HOURS, IT WENT TO THE SOUTH AFTER PASSING THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 41MIN NORTH, 124DGS 50MIN EAST AT ABOUT 1220 HOURS, AND ON THE DAY APB, HIGH-SPEED TRANSPORT SHIP, WHICH APPEARED FROM THE SOUTHERN SEA TO THE WEST SEA, INTRUDES INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS. THIS SHIP INTRUDED INTO THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 38MIN NORTH, 124DGS 47MIN EAST AROUND 0430 HOURS AND THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 43MIN NORTH, 124DGS 47MIN EAST AT ABOUT 0530 HOURS AND THEN MOVED

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ABOUT ON THE SEA WEST OF BAEKRYONG DO, DAECHONG-DO AND SOCHONG-DO ISLANDS BEFORE FLEEING TO THE SOUTH. LSMR 311 OF YOUR SIDE, WHICH WAS MOVING ABOUT ON THE SEA IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 26MIN NORTH, 125DGS 27MIN EAST ON THE DAY INTRUDED INTO THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 31 MIN NORTH, 125DGS 19MIN EAST AROUND 1030 HOURS VIA VICINITY OF 37DGS 27MIN NORTH, 125DGS 18MIN EAST AT ABOUT 1015 HOURS BEFORE MOVING TO THE SOUTH.

OUR PERSONNEL WHO WERE PERFORMING THEIR PATROL DUTY IN OUR COASTAL WATERS ON THE WEST SEA, TOOK IT SERIOUS THAT THE NAVAL CRAFT OF YOUR SIDE INTRUDED INTO THE COASTAL OF OUR SIDE AND REPEATEDLY DEMANDED THEM TO WITHDRAW FROM OUR COASTAL WATERS. HOWEVER, YOUR SIDE'S NAVAL VESSELS THAT HAD INTRUDED INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE DID NOT COMPLY WITH OUR DEMAND, BUT CONTINUOUSLY MOVED HERE AND THERE TO COMMIT ESPIONAGE ACTS AGAINST OUR SIDE AND COMMIT PROVOCATIVE HOSTILITIES OF HINDERING OUR NAVAL VESSELS FROM PERFORMING THEIR ROUTINE PATROL DUTY. IT IS BY NO MEANS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE WHAT GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WOULD HAVE HAPPENED ON THAT DAY BUT FOR THE PATIENCE OF OUR PERSONNEL. DURING THE PERIOD WHEN YOUR DESTROYERS 96 AND 91 AND APB HIGH-SPEED TRANSPORT SHIP AND LSMR 311 WERE COMMITTING ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS AFTER INTRUDING INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS, LANDING SHIP MEDIUM AND PATROL BOAT AND OTHER SHIPS OF YOUR SIDE WERE READY FOR ACTION MOVING IN THE AREAS MARKED ON THAT CHART. THE FACTS UNDOUBTEDLY PROVE THAT THE CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITTED BY YOUR SIDE IN OUR COASTAL WATERS ON THE WEST SEA ON NOVEMBER 27 AND 28 LAST WERE INTENTIONAL AND PREPLANNED ONES. AROUND 0745 HOURS THIS MORNING, DESTROYER 96 OF THE SOUTH KOREAN NAVY, NAVIGATED BY YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS, INTRUDED INTO THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 30MIN NORTH, 125DGS 12MIN EAST OFF DUNGSANGOT IN THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE AND VEERED TO THE EAST AND AROUND 0940 HOURS IT COMMITTED AN ESPIONAGE ACT OF TAKING PICTURES AFTER INTRUDING AS FAR INTO THE SEA AS COORDINATES 37DGS 32MIN NORTH, 125DGS 24MIN EAST.

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UNCLAS SECTION II OF VI

AS MENTIONED ABOVE, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS ORGANIZED THE SOUTH KOREAN NAVAL CRAFTS TO INTRUDE INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS TO COMMIT ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS AND TO ENFORCE THE SEA BLOCKADE AND WHAT IS WORSE, COMMIT WITHOUT HESITATION SUCH OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AS HINDER SEA NAVIGATION OF FOREIGN MERCHANT THIPS ENTERING THE PORT IN THE WEST SEA OF OUR COUNTRY.

HOW CAN SUCH CONDUCT BE REGARED AS AN EXPRESSION OF RESPECT OF THE SEA OF OUR SIDE? IT IS NOT ONLY A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BUT ALSO A VICIOUS CHALLENGE TO PEACE IN KOREA AS WELL AS IN THE FAR EAST THAT SOUTH KOREAN NAVAL V SSELS INTRUDED INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS TO PERPETRATE VICIOUS ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST OUR SIDE AT THE INSTIGATION OF YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORSM WHILE COMMITTING ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS BY INTRUDING SOUTH KOREAN NAVAL VESSELS INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE AS MENTIONED ABOVE, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS PERPETRATED THE SHAMELESS ACTS OF SLANDERING AND DEFAMING OUR SIDE AT RANDOM BY FABRICATING NON-EXISTENT INCIDENTS WORDING THAT OUR VESSLES INTRUDED INTO WATERS CONTIGOUS TO YOUR SIDE, COMMITTED ALLEGED PROVOCATIONS AND THE LIKE IN A DIRTY ATTEMPT TO COVER UP YOUR CRIMINAL ACTS AND TO MISLEAD THE WORLD PUBLIC.

ARE YOU TALKING SUCH STUPID NONSENSE IN A CLEAR MIND? ON THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 28, OUR NAVAL VESSELS HAS NEVER BEEN TO THE LOCATION TO WHICH YOU ARE REFERRING. EVEN IF THEY WERE THERE, IT CAN BY NO MEANS BE A VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, NOR ANY INTRUSION, NOR PROVOCATION. REFERE TO PAR 13B OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH EXPRESSLY PRESCRIBES THAT QUOTE ALL THE ISLANDS LYING TO THE NORTH AND WEST OF THE PROVINCEAT BOUNDARY LINE WHICH IN WHANGHAE-DO AND KYONGGI-DO SHALL BE UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, EXCEPT THE ISLAND GROUP OF BAEKRYONG-DO, 37DGS 58MIN NORTH, 124DGS 40MIN EAST, DAECHONG-DO, 37DGS 50MIN NORTH, 124DGS 42MIN EAST, SOCHONG-DO, 37DGS 46MIN NORTH, 124DGS 46MIN EAST, YONGPYONG-DO, 37DGS 38MIN NORTH, 125DGS 40MIN EAST, AND UDO, 37DGS 36MIN NORTH, 125DGS 58MIN EAST, WHICH SHALL REMAIN UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE COMMANDER IN

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CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. UNQUOTE.

AS IS CLEARLY WRITTEN IN THE PARAGRAPH, THESE FIVE ISLAND GROUPS ARE IN OUR COASTAL WATERS. NO PROVISION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR ANY BOUNDARY OR THE SO-CALLED ARMISTICE STRAIT ON THE WESTERN SEA. THE SEA AREA INVOLVING THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE FIV ISLANDS IN THE WEST SEA BELONG TO OUR COASTAL WATERS. IT ACCORDS WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND IS ROUTINE THAT OUR NAVAL CRAFTS HAVE THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN OUR COASTAL WATERS AND THEREFORE, NO PROBLEM WILL ARISE THEREFROM. WE HAV THE RIGHT OF FREE ACTIVITY IN OUR COASTAL WATERS. NO ONE CAN INFRINGE UPON THIS RIGHT AFD NO ACTION DESIGNED TO VIOLATE THIS RIGHT OF OURS CAN BE TOLERATED.

OUR SIDE STRONGLY PROTESTS AND DENOUNCE YOUR SIDE FOR ITS HAVING RECENTLY COMMITTED ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS BY INTRUDING VARIOUS NAVAL VESSELS INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE PREAMBLE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND PARAGRAPHS 15 AND 17 THEREOF, AND FOR ITS NASTY CONDUCT OF DEFAMING AND SLANDERING OUR SIDE AT RANDOM BY FABRICATING NON-EXISTENT INCIDENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR SIDE STRONGLY DEMANDS YOUR SIDE TO MAKE ASSURANCE AT THIS TABLE THAT IT WILL NOT REITERATE SIMILAR CRIMINAL ACTS IN THE FUTURE.

UNC 1

AT THE 344TH MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION MEETING, 12 OCTOBER 1973, AND AGAIN TODAY, YOUR SIDE CHARGED OUR SIDE WITH NAVAL VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IN THE SEA OFF HAEJU, TEUNGSANGOT, AND ONGJIN PENINSULA. ALTHOUGH YOUR PREVIOUS CHARGES WERE GENERAL IN NATURE, OUR SIDE, IN A SINCERE EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, MADE A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF YOUR CHARGES BUT COULD FIND NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER TO SUBSTANTIATE YOUR ALLEGATIONS. CONVINCED THAT YOUR SIDE AHD SOME NOTIVE FOR MAKING THE CHARGES, OUR SIDE HAS MAINTAINED CLOSE SURV ILLANCE OF THIS ENTIRE SEA AREA AND HAS INSURE THAT OUR VESSELS IN NO WAY VIOLATE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THAT IS WHY I CAN ASSURE YOU TODAY, WITHOUT ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION, THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHATSOEVER BY NAVAL VESSELS OF OUR SIDE, IN SPITE OF YOUR ALLEGATIONS. IN SHORT, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR YOUR CHARGES AND WE CATEGORICALLY DENY THEM AS COMPLETE FABRICATIONS. HOWEVER, OUR SURVEILLANCE HAS REVEALED THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITY BY NAVAL VESSELS OF YOUR SIDE.

ON THE MORNINGOF 28 NOVEMBER 1973, TWO OF YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS VIOLATED WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO SOCHONG DO IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF PARA 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. APPROACHING FROM THE NORTHEAST, TH SE BOATS WERE WITHIN 1300 YARDS OF SOCHONG DO AT COORDINATES 37DGS47MIN06DGS N, 124DGS45MIN48" E AT 0815 HOURS. IN FURTHER VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, THESE BOATS THEN MADE AN EXTREMELY PROVOCATIVE MANEUVER IN THE DIRECT PATH OF AND IN PROXIMITY TO A NAVAL VESSEL OF OUR SIDE BEFORE DEPARTING THE AREA IN A NORTHEASTERLY DIRECTION.

ON THE SAME DAY, ONE OF YOUR SIDE'S PATROL GUN BOATS AGAIN VIOLATED OUR WATERS, THIS TIME WATERS CON IGUOUS TO PAENGYONG DO. AT 1315 HOURS THIS BOAT WAS ATCOORDINATES 37DGS53MIN42" N, 124DGS43MIN00" E, A POSITION WHICH IS WITHIN 3000 YARDS OF PAENGYONG DO. IN ADDITION,

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DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF 19 NOVEMBER 1973, ONE OF YOUR VESSELS, IN VIOLATION OF PARA 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, MOVED INTO CONTIGUOUS WATERS OF PAENGYONG DO AND, AT 0450 HOURS, WAS WITHIN 1800 YARDS OF THE ISLAND. SINCE THE VESSEL WAS NOT CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AT THAT TIME BECAUSE OF THE DARKNESS, OUR SIDE DID NOT CHARGE YOUR SIDE WITH THIS VIOLATION AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER SINCE OUR SIDE'S VESSELS WERE ALL ACCOUNTED FOR, SINCE YOUR SIDE'S VESSELS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA, AND SINCE YOUR SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS HAVE MADE YOUR INTENT CLEAR, OUR SIDE NOW CONCLUDES THAT THIS VESSEL ALSO BELONGED TO YOUR NAVAL FORCES. THUS WE CHARGE YOU WITH THIS VIOLATION ALSO

OUR SIDE CHARGED YOUR SIDE WITH VIOLATION OF THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO SOCHONG DO BY MESSAGE WHICH YOUR SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT YOU HAD RECEIVED AT 1758 HOURS ON 28 NOVEMBER 1973. THEREFORE, IT IS WITH EVEN GREATER CONCERN TO OUR SIDE THAT, SUBSEQUENT TO THE RECEIPT OF OUR CHARGE, YOUR SIDE HAS CONTINUED TO VIOLATE THE CONTIGUOUS WATERS OF OUR SIDE'S ISLANDS.

THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT THE PRESENCE OF YOUR GUN BOATS 1300 YARDS OFFSHORE SOCHONG-DO IN THE CASE OF THE TWO PATROL GUN BOATS OF YOUR SIDE ON 28 NOVEMBER, 3000 YARDS OFFSHORE PAENGYONG-DO IN THE CASE OF ANOTHER VIOLATION BY ONE OF YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS LATER THAT DAY,

AND 4400 YARDS OFFSHORE TAEHONG-DO BY YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS ON 30 NOVEMBER, AND 5000 YARDS OFFSHORE SOCHONG-DO BY YOUR PATROL GUN BOAT LATER THAT SAME DAY, AND 4600 YARDS OFFSHORE TAEYONGPYONG-DO THIS VERY MORNING CONSTITUTE ENCROACHMENT OF OUR SIDE'S CONTIGUOUS WATERS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

ALL YOUR DENIALS CAN NOT CHANGE THE TRUTH AND I AGAIN REMIND YOU THAT YOUR SIDE'S NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THIS AREA ARE OF GREAT CONCERN.

OUR SIDE MUST REITERATE - LET THERE BE NO DOUBT - THESE ISLANDS ARE TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF OUR SIDE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 13B OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND YOUR SIDE VIOLATED PARAGRAPH 15 WHEN YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS ENTERED THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THESE ISLANDS.  
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STATEMENT #3

BEING DENOUNCED BY OUR SIDE, YOU ARE NOW UNREASONABLY COMPLAINING THAT IT IS WRONG TO ADDRESS AN INDIVIDUAL MEMBER NATION OF THE UNC. YOUR ALLEGATION IS NO MORE THAN A PRETEXT TO HIDE THE TRUE NATURE OF THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR ARMY WITH THE SIGNBOARD OF THE UN FORCES.

THAT IS ALREADY WELL KNOWN TO THE WORLD THAT SO-CALLED U.N. FORCES IS IN ITS NATURE THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR ARMY OCCUPYING SOUTH KOREA. YOUR SUCH SELESS CHARGES ONLY SERV TO REVEAL MORE CLEARLY THE SHAMELESSNESS OF THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS. DON'T REITERATE ANY LONGUEYDUE SILLY REMARKS.

SUB70-6-84-0# 13D OF THE ARMISTICE BAPFVEP POINTS OUT THAT BAEKRYONGDO DAECHONG-DO, SOCHONG-DO, YONPYONG-DO AND U-DO ISLANDS LOCATED LI OUR COASTAL WATERS AND THAT YOUR SIDE EXERCISES CONTROL OF THEM. PAGE QU R KAA07M UNCLAS

YOU SHOULD EASE THE AGGRESSIVE AND BURGLARIOUS CONDUCT OF ARBITRARILY DETERMINING THE COASTAL WATERS BY ALTERING THE FACTS.

YOUR WORDS ARE NO MORE THAN AN OPEN ADMISSION OF THE INTRUSION OF YOUR NAVAL VESSELS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS. ACCORDINGLY, WHAT YOU HAVE TO DO AT THIS TABLE IS NOT TO ENGAGE IN USELESS CHARGES BUT TO ASSURE FOR TAKING STEPS TO CEASE YOUR CRIMINAL ACTS.

WHAT ACTION WILL YOUR SIDE TAKE TO PRECLUDE CRIMINAL ACTS? MAKE A CLEAR CUT ANSWER TO THIS.

YOU HAVE JUST DECLARED THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STATED THAT THE PAENGYONG-DO, TAECHONG-DO, SOCHONG-DO, YONPYONG-DO AND U-DO ARE WITHIN YOUR COASTAL WATERS. PARA 13B DOES NOT MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT.

AGAIN OUR SIDE STATES CATEGORICALLY THAT OUR VESSELS HAVE OPERATED ONLY IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR IN WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S ISLANDS.

KPA STATEMENT #4

YOU SEEM TO HAVE NO CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONTENTS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. LISTEN CAREFULLY TO MY STATEMENT. PARA 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS: THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT SHALL APPLY TO ALL OPPOSING NAVAL FORCES, WHICH NAVAL FORCES SHALL RESPECT THE



WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND TO THE LAND AREA OF KOREA UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE OPPOSING SIDE, AND SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN BLOCKADA OF ANY KIND OF KOREA, AND PARA 13B OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STIPULATES AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE ALL THE ISLANDS LYING TO THE NORTH AND WEST OF PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN WHANGHAE-DO AND KYONGGI-DO SHALL BE UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS EXCEPT THE ISLAND GROUPS, BAEKRYONG-DO, 37DGS 58MIN NORTH 124DGS 40MIN EAST, DAECHONG-DO 37DGS 50MIN NORTH, 124DGS 42MIN EAST, SOCHONG-DO 37DGS 46MIN NORTH, 124DGS 46MIN EAST, YONGPYONG-DO, 37DGS 38MIN NORTH, 125DGS 40MIN EAST, AND U-DO, 37DGS 36MIN NORTH, 125DGS 58 MIN EAST, WHICH SHALL REMAIN UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE COMMANDER IN CHEIF OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAFD UNQUOTE. AS YOU SEE, NO PARA OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT ANY PART OF WATERS OF THE WEST SEA IS THE WATERS OF YOUR SIDE. THEREFORE, Q AGAIN CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT ALL THE WATERS INVOLVING THE WATERS OFF THE FIVE ISLANDS IN THE WEST SEA ARE THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE.

NOW, IS THIS CLEAR TO YOU? DON'T BE IN A HURRY, BEING IGNORANT OF YOUR RIGHT HAND FROM THE LEFT AND THE CONTENTS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. WHEN WILL YOUR SIDE CEASE IT PROVOCATIVE ACTS? ANSWER.

YOUR INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 13B BEGINS TO SOUND LIKE YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THE HISTORY OF THE WAR IN 1950 AS YOU HAVE EXPLAINED THAT IN PAST MEETINGS.

I UNDERSTAND THE TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT V RY WELL, AND IT DOES NOT STATE THAT THE ISLANDS IN QUESTION LIE WITHIN YOUR TERRITORIAL WATERS AS YOU STATED. PERHAPS YOU SHOULD READ IT AGAIN.

IN REFERENCE TO PARA 15, MUST I EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE FOR YOU BETWEEN LAND AND SEA? ISLANDS ARE LAND - THE SEA IS COMPOSED OF WATER. STATEMENT #5.

YOU HAVE JUST GIVEN US A DISTORTED INTERPRETATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND WHAT IS WORSE YOU HAV GONE SO FAR AS TO REITERATE YOUR ABSURD ALLEGATIONS THAT OUR COASTAL WATERS BELONG TO YOUR SIDE.

AS IS CLEAR IN SUB PARA 13B OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, FIV ISLANDS IN THE WEST SEA LIE TO THE NORTH AND WEST OF THE BOUNDARY LINE OF WHAENHAE-DO PROVINCE AND KYONGGI-DO PROVINCE, THEREFORE THE WATERS NORTH OF THE BOUNDARY LINE OF WHAENHAE-DO PROVINCE AND KYONGGI DO PROVINCE BELONG TO OUR COASTAL WATERS. NOW, IF THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE THE LAND OF AFRICA? CEASE MAKING SUCH RECKL SS REMARKS WHICH EXPOSE UNWITTINGLY THE BIGANDISH NATURE OF YOU AGGRESSORS.

WILL YOUR SIDE STOP COMMITTING ESPIONAG AND HOSTILE ACTS BY INTRUDING ITS NAVAL VESSELS INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE? ANSWER.

#5

AGAIN I SAY OUR SIDE'S VESSELS HAV NOT COMMITTED ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THEY HAVE ONLY OPERATED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR IN WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S TERRITORY. KPA STATEMENT #6

INSTEAD OF FRANKLY ADMIT YOUR CRIMINAL ACTS OF HAVING INTRUDED NAVAL VESSELS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS, APOLOGIZING FOR THEM TO OUR SIDE AND



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GIVING RESPONSIBLE ASSURANCE FOR CEASING SIMILAR CRIMINAL ACTS IN THE FUTURE, YOU ARE MAKING A VAIN ATTEMPT TO COVER UP YOUR CRIMINAL ACTS, TALKING ABOUT HIGH SEAS OR THE LIKE.

HOW CAN OUR COASTAL WATERS BE THE HIGH SEA? WHAT IS THIS BUT TUGLARIAN LOGIC OF A MAN WHO JUMPED INTO THE ROOM OF OTHERS INSISTING THAT HE IS OUTSIDE THE HOUSE? WITH SUCH A SHAMELESS REMARK AS HIGH SEA OR THE LIKE, YOU CANNOT COVER UP THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF HAVING DISPATCHED NAVAL VESSELS TO OUR COASTAL WATERS.

ON 30 NOVEMBER 1973, AT 0715 HOURS, TWO OF YOUR PATROL BOATS APPROACHED TO A POINT WITHIN 4400 YARDS OF TAECHONG DO, AT COORDINATES 37 48' 00'' N, 124 47' 55'' E. AT 0830 HOURS ON 30 NOVEMBER ANOTHER PATROL BOAT OF YOUR SIDE APPROACHED TO A POINT WITHIN 500 YARDS OF SOCHONG DO AT COORDINATES 37 47' 48'' N, 124 49' 36'' E. AND FINALLY THIS VERY MORNING AT 0715 HOURS STILL ANOTHER PATROL BOAT OF YOUR SIDE APPROACHED WITHIN 4600 YARDS OF TAEYONGPYONG-DO AT COORDINATES 37 39' 02'' N, 125 37' 04'' E. THUS BETWEEN 19 NOVEMBER AND 1 DECEMBER YOUR SIDE HAS VIOLATED THE CONTIGUOUS WATERS OF OUR SIDE ON 6 DIFFERENT OCCASIONS. FIVE OF THESE HAVE OCCURRED IN THE LAST THREE AND A HALF (3 1/2) DAYS. THESE VIOLATIONS HAVE OBVIOUSLY BEEN DELIBERATELY PLANNED AND EXECUTED. YOUR SIDE'S ACTIONS ARE HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE AND ARE OF GRAVE CONCERN TO OUR SIDE. THE ONLY INTERPRETATIONS THAT CAN BE PLACED ON YOUR ACTIONS IS A TOTAL DISREGARD FOR THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. BUT THERE BE NO DOUBT- THESE ISLANDS ARE TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF OUR SIDE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 13B OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND YOUR SIDE VIOLATED PARAGRAPH 15 WHEN YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS ENTERED THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THESE ISLANDS.

KPA NR2

YOU HAVE MADE SILLY ATTEMPT TO DENY THE CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITTED BY SOUTH KOREAN ARMY WHICH DELIBERATELY DISPATCHED ITS NAVAL VESSELS, ARMED SPYSHIPS AND BOATS TO OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA AT BT



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DE RUAGAAA #0770 3400350  
FM CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA//AA UNC//

TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
ATTN: MR SMYSER

INFO JCS

UNCLAS SECTION IV OF VI

THE INSTIGATION OF YOU U. S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS. AS WAS DISCLOSED AT THE PAST MEETINGS AND THIS MEETING, IT IS AN IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY COMMITTED SUCH HOSTILE ACTS OF DISPATCHING NAVAL VESSELS, ARMED SPY SHIPS AND BOATS TO OUR COASTAL WATERS OFF HAEJU, DUNGSANGOT AND JANGSANGOT IN THE WEST COAST. YOUR SIDE, HOWEVER, ATTEMPTED TO DENY IT. THIS A MERE INDICATION OF YOUR SIDE'S INTENTION NOT TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS TO STOP ITS CRIMINAL ACTS BUT TO CONTINUE SIMILAR CRIMINAL ACTS IN THE FUTURE, TOO. YOU ARE BRAZEN-FACED ENOUGH TO MAKE SUCH PREPOSTEROUS REMARKS THAT OUR NAVAL CRAFTS COMMITTED VIOLATIONS AND PROVOCATIONS AND WHAT NOT. HOW COULD YOU MAKE TH NONSENSICAL REMARKS ON VIOLATING WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO SOCHONG-DO ISLAND? IN YOUR TELEPHONE MESSAGE SENT TO ME AT 1755 HOURS ON NOV MBER 28 AND TODAY, YOU STATED THAT OUR TWO NAVAL BOATS VIOLATED WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO SOCHONG-DO ISLANDAT COORDINATES 37 47' 06'' NORTH, 124 45' 48'' EAST. ACCORDING TO THE SOUTH KOREAN RADIO CHUNGANG AT 1300 HOURS ON NOVEMBER 28, THE SPOKESMAN OF THE SOUTH KOREAN MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANNOUNCED THAT OUR NAVAL V SSELS INTRUDED FOR A WHILE INTO THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37 50' NORTH, 125 50' EAST. THE LOCATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE YOU EXPLAINED. STILL IN ILLCONCERTED ACTIONS, HOWEVR, YOU VOCIFEROUSLY TALKED AS IF OUR NAVAL VESSELS INFILTRATED INTO THE DIFFERENT SPOT FOURM MILES AWAY. THIS CLEARLY PROV S THAT YOU WERE IN A GREAT HURRY TO FABRICATE THE INCIDENTS. YOU HAVE SHAMELESSLY TALKED ABOUT THE SO-CALLED "INTRUSION" INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS. HOW COULD YOU POSSIBLY ALLEGE OTHERS COASTAL WATERS TO BE YOUR TERRITORIAL WATERS IF YOU ARE NOT MAD IN THE AGGRESSION AND BURGLARIOUS PLUNDER? DO YOU REGARD OUR WATERS IN THE WEST SEA AS THE WATERS IN THE SOUTH SEA OF KOREA? HOW CAN YOU POSSIBLY ALLEGE OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA INDICATED ON THE CHART SHOWING THE INTRUSION OF YOUR NAVAL VESSELS TO BE YOUR TERRITORIAL WATERS? CAN'T YOU DISTINGUISH NORTH, EAST, SOUTH AND WEST? YOU, WHO ARE MATCHLESSLY SHAMELESS, HAVE PILED UP SUCH NONSENSICAL REMARKS THAT OUR NAVAL BOATS COMMITTED PROVOCATIONS IN THE PATH OF YOUR NAVAL V SSELS.



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WHICH PATH OF YOUR NAVAL VESSELS. WHAT NONSENSE! YOUR SIDE HAS COMMITTED PROVOCATIONS BY DISPATCHING NAVAL BOATS WHICH WERE ON THEIR ROUTINE PATROL DUTY, BUT ALLEGED THAT OUR BOATS BLOCKED THE PATH OF ITS VESSELS, REVERSING BLACK AND WHITE. THIS ALLEGATION VIVIDLY SHOWS THAT THE BURGLARIOUS NATURE AND SHAMELESSNESS OF YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS. STOP MAKING THE BURGLARIOUS REMARKS OF THE AGGRESSORS. TODAY AT THIS TABLE, YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO REVERSE RIGHT AND WRONG BY DISTORTING THE STERN FACTS AT RANDOM. THIS IS A SELF-EXPOSURE THAT NONE OTHER THAN YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS ARE THE RING-LEADERS OF YOUR SIDE'S CRIMINAL ACTS BEING COMMITTED RECENTLY IN OUR COASTAL WATERS ON THE WEST SEA. AS I HAVE ALREADY STATED, IN DISREGARD OF OUR PATIENT WARNING, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS ARE INSTIGATING SOUTH KOREAN ARMY BELLICOSE ELEMENTS TO CONTINUOUSLY DISPATCH NUMEROUS NAVAL VESSELS TO OUR COASTAL WATERS AND COMMIT ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS. DURING THE PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY TO NOVEMBER 20 THIS YEAR ALONE, YOUR SIDE INFILTRATED INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS DESTROYERS ON 11 OCCASIONS AND LSMR'S ON 9 OCCASIONS, LST'S ON 10 OCCASIONS, LSM'S ON 46 OCCASIONS, PCE'S ON 10 OCCASIONS, APB HIGH-SPEED TRANSPORT SHIPS ON 4 OCCASIONS AND VARIOUS ARMED BOATS AND SHIPS ON 12 OCCASIONS, THAT IS, NAVAL VESSELS, ARMED APY SHIPS AND ARMED BOATS ON A TOTAL OF 100-ODD OCCASIONS TO COMMIT ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS. THE AFORESAID FACT CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THE ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS RECENTLY COMMITTED BY YOUR SIDE IN OUR COAST WATERS ON THE WEST SEA ARE NOT ANY ACCIDENTAL ONE BY ANY INDIVIDUAL UNIT OF SOUTH KOREAN ARMY BUT ARE DELIBERATE AND SYSTEMATIC HOSTILE ACTS FULLY CONSPIRED BY YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS AND SOUTH KOREAN BELLICOSE ELEMENTS. IT ALSO PROVES TO BE THE EXTREMELY GRAVE PROVOCATIONS ON THE PART OF YOUR SIDE WHICH IS INTENTIONALLY STRAINING THE MILITARY SITUATION BY CAUSING THE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN BOTH SIDES ON THE WEST SEA. IF YOUR SIDE CONTINUOUSLY INFILTRATE YOUR NAVAL VESSELS INTO YOUR COASTAL WATERS TO ARROGANTLY SAIL ABOUT HERE AND THERE AND COMMIT PROVOCATIONS OF HINDERING OUR NAVAL CRAFTS FROM PERFORMING THEIR ROUTINE PATROL DUTY, WHAT SITUATION WILL BE CREATED? SUCH RECKLESS PROVOCATIONS ON YOUR PART IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS PLAY WITH FIRE THAT WILL MAKE THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE NAVAL VESSELS OF BOTH SIDES ACUTE AND FURTHER CAUSE UNCONTROLLABLE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN BOTH SIDES. NOT WITHSTANDING THIS, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS, LIKE A THIEF CRYING FOR A THIEF, INSTIGATED THE SOUTH KOREAN BELLICOSE ELEMENTS TO SPELL OUT THE NONSENSE THAT RESOLUTE MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN IF OUR NAVAL CRAFTS INTRUDE INTO SOME TERRITORIAL WATERS. TO WHOM ARE YOU MOUTHING SUCH NONSENSE AS TAKING RESOLUTE MEASURES? IT IS LIKE A PUPPYDOG WHICH DOES NOT FEAR THE TIGER. THERE IS A LIMIT IN OUR PATIENCE, AS WE HAVE ALREADY TOLD YOU MANY TIMES, OUR SIDE WILL ANSWER YOUR PROVOCATIONS WITH PUNISHMENT. IN THAT CASE THE PROCESS OF HITTING AND BEING HIT WILL BE REPEATED. YOUR OUTCRY SUCH AS MEASURES OR THE LIKE ONLY SERVES TO VIVIDLY SHOW THE BLACK-HEARTED INTENTION OF YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS TO MAKE KOREANS FIGHT AGAINST EACH OTHER. BECAUSE OF YOUR RECKLESS



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COMMOTIONS TODAY IN THE WEST SEA THE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN BOTH SIDES MAY OCCUR AND GRAVE IRRETRIEVABLE SITUATION MAY BE CREATED. IS THE CREATED SITUATION GRAVE OR NOT? YOU SHOULD CORRECTLY VIEW THE CREATED SITUATION AND BEHAVE IN A DISCREET MANNER. TODAY, THE ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE ARE ACTIVELY STRIVING TO REALIZE THE INDEPENDENT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY WITHOUT RELYING UPON OUTSIDE FORCES. THE PEACE-LOVING PEOPLES THE WORLD OVER ARE RENDERING POSITIVE SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO IT. YOU UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS YEAR DISSOLVED THE UNCURK, AN AGGRESSION TOOL OF U.S. IMPERIALISM AND SUPPORTED NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE BASED ON THE

THE PRINCIPLES OF INDEPENDENT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION AND GREAT NATIONAL UNITY. AT THIS VERY JUNCTURE, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS HAVE INFILTRATING MANY NAVAL ARMED FORCES INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA TO MORE FREQUENTLY COMMIT ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST OUR SIDE, GOING AGAINST THE TREND OF THE TIMES AND WITH THESE AS A MOMENTUM ARE PLAYING WITH FIRE OF DRIVING SOUTH KOREAN BELLICOSE ELEMENTS TO THE BATTLEFIELD. SUCH CRIMINAL MACHINATION OF YOUR SIDE IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND AN INTOLERABLE VICIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE AND PEACE-LOVING PEOPLES OF THE WHOLE WORLD WISHING FOR PEACE AND INDEPENDENT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA. ALL THE FACTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS ARE THE MAIN CULPRITS WHO ARE RUNNING WILD TO INCREASE THE DANGER OF WAR IN KOREA BY FOSTERING ANTAGONISM AND DISTRUST BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH AND AGGRAVATING THE SITUATION. I ONCE AGAIN STRONGLY DEMAND YOUR SIDE TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE ITS OWN CRIMINAL ACTS AND GIVE ASSURANCE AT THIS TABLE THAT YOUR SIDE WILL NOT INFILTRATE NAVAL VESSELS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS ON THE WEST SEA IN THE FUTURE.

UNC NR2

ONCE AGAIN OUR SIDE IS FORCED TO REMIND YOU AT THIS TABLE , YOU ARE  
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DE RUAGAAA #0771 3400350  
FM CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA//AA UNC//

TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
ATTN: MR SMYSER

INFO JCS

UNCLAS SECTION V OF VI

IN FACT ADDRESSING THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND NOT ANY INDIVIDUAL MEMBER NATION OF THAT ORGANIZATION. OUR SIDE CATEGORICALLY STATES THAT OUR V SSELS DURING THE TIME IN QUESTION HAV OPERATED ONLY IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR IN WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S TERRITORY. FIVE OF THESE SIX VIOLATIONS BY YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS INTO WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S ISLANDS OCCURRED DURING DAY-LIGHT HOURS UNDER CONDITIONS OF CLEAR VISIBILITY. YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS WERE VISUALLY TRACKED FROM LAND AND SEA AND WERE ELECTRONICALLY TRACKED BY OUR SIDE'S RADAR. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT AS TO THE VALIDITY OF OUR SIDE'S CHARGES AND YOU SHOULD GIV US AN ASSURANCE FOR PROMPTLY CARRYING OUT OUR SIDE'S DEMAND INSTEAD OF MAKING USELESS CHARGES.

NO. 6

UNC NO. 6

AGAIN I SAY OUR VESSELS HAVE ONLY OPERATED INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR IN WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S TERRITORY. ON THE OTHER HAND, YOUR SIDE HAS CLEARLY VIOLATED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ON 6 OCCASSIONS BY INTRUDING INTO WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S ISLANDS BY SAILING AS CLOSE TO 1300 YARDS TO THESE ISLANDS. THESE ACTS OF YOURS ARE THE ONLY VIOLATIONS THAT HAV BEEN COMMITTED. YOUR ACTS ARE THE ONLY PROVOCATIV ACTS THAT HAVE BEEN COMMITTED.

I SUGGEST YOU RESPECT UNITED NATIONS COMMAND CONTIGUOUS WATERS AS UNITED NATIONS COMMAND RESPECTS YOUR CONTIGUOUS WATERS AND HONOR PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE ARMISTIC AGREEMENT.

AS IT IS NEARLY 1400 HOURS I PROPOSE THAT THIS MEETING BE RECESSED FOR 20 MINUTES FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF TRANSLATION.

KPA STATEMENT NO. 7

KPA NO. 7

I HAVE NOTED YOUR LAST STATEMENT THAT YOU WILL RESPECT THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE IN THE WEST SEA. IN ORDER TO RELAX TENSION CREATED IN THE WEST SEA AND TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY IN THAT AREA, YOUR SIDE SHOULD CEASE AT ONCE COMMITTING CRIMINAL ACTS OF ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILITIES BY INTRUDING ITS NAVAL CRAFTS INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE. OUR SIDE WILL WATCH YOUR SIDE'S FUTURE MOVE. OUR SIDE HAS NO OTHER SUBJECTS TO BRING UP AT TODAY'S MEETING.



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NO. 7 UNC NO. 7

DO NOT PUT WORDS IN MY MOUTH. OUR SIDE STATED THAT YOU SHOULD RESPECT OUR SIDE'S CONTIGUOUS WATERS JUST AS OUR SIDE RESPECTS YOUR CONTIGUOUS WATERS.

I WISH TO MAKE ONE POINT CLEAR. YOUR FABRICATIONS OF CHARGES AGAINST OUR SIDE HAVE CONSUMED MUCH OF OUR TIME TODAY. DO NOT LOST THIS POINT. THE CHARGES OUR SIDE HAS LEVIED AGAINST YOU TODAY CONCERNING YOUR 6 VIOLATIONS

OF THE WATER CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S TERRITORY WE CONSIDER VERY SERIOUS AND WE VIEW THEM WITH GRAVE CONCERN. YOUR ACTIONS ARE AGGRESSIVE AND PROVOCATIVE AND AGAIN OUR SIDE STRONGLY PROTESTS YOUR ACTIONS.

OUR SIDE HAS NOTHING FURTHER.

KPA NO. 8

YOU HAVE NOT GIVEN ANY RESPONSIBLE ASSURANCE AT THIS TABLE THAT YOU WILL CEASE PROVOCATIVE ACTS OF INFILTRATING NAVAL VESSELS AND ARMED SPY SHIPS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA. BUT INSTEAD, YOU ARE NOW CALLING OUT INVECTIVES AGAINST US SUCH AS "PROVOCATIVE ACTS" "AGGRESSIVE ACTS" OR THE LIKE. THIS IS LIKE A THIEF TURNING ON THE MASTER WITH A CLUB. AS WAS EXPOSED AT TODAY'S MEETING, OF LATE TOO, YOU U.S.

IMPERIALISTS AND SOUTH KOREAN ARMY, BEING INSTIGATED BY YOU, HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY INFILTRATING VARIOUS NAVAL VESSELS AND ARMED SPY SHIPS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA TO COMMIT CRIMINAL ACTS OF ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILITIES IS SUCCESSION AGAINST OUR SIDE. SUCH HOSTILE ACTS OF YOUR SIDE CONSTITUTE A FLAGRANT DESTRUCTION AND VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND CRIMINAL ACTS OF AGGRAVATING MILITARY

CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH AND CREATING TENSION. THAT'S WHY OUR SIDE PROTESTED AND DENOUNCED AT TODAY'S MEETING THE RECKLESS PROVOCATIVE ACTS OF YOUR SIDE, STRONGLY DEMANDING IT TO CEASE AT ONCE SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS. HOWEVER, YOUR SIDE, INSTEAD OF GIVING AN

ASSURANCE FOR CARRYING OUT OUR SIDE'S DEMANDS HAS BEEN MAKING CLUMSY ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY ITS OWN SEA INTRUSIONS UNDER THE PREPOSTEROUS PRETEXT OF SO-CALLED HIGH SEAS OR THE LIKE, WHILE BEHAVING IN A

SHAMELESS MANNER TO SLANDER AND DEFAME THE OTHER SIDE AT RANDOM WITH NON-EXISTENT INCIDENTS. WHO ON EARTH IS THE CRIMINAL WHO COMMITTED PROVOCATIVE ACTS AND AGAINST WHOM DO YOU MAKE PREPOSTEROUS CHARGES?

AS THE STERN FACTS VIVIDLY SHOW, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS AND SOUTH KOREAN WARLIKE ELEMENTS WHO ARE AT YOUR INSTIGATION, ARE THE VERY CRIMINALS THAT HAVE BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY INFILTRATING NAVAL VESSELS AND ARMED SPY SHIPS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA AND THE MAIN CULPRITS THAT HAVE BEEN CREATING TENSION BY SYSTEMATICALLY COMMITTING PROVOCATIVE ACTS.

YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS ALWAYS PROVOKED FIRST AND CHARGED THE OTHER SIDE OF IT, WITH SUCH HABITUAL FALSE PROPAGANDA DESIGNED TO SLANDER THE OTHER SIDE. YOU CAN NEITHER CONCEAL YOUR TRUE NATURE AS CRIMINALS NOR DECEIVE THE WORLD.

AT TODAY'S MEETING, YOUR SIDE HAS STATED THAT IT WILL RESPECT OUR COASTAL WATERS. IF YOUR SIDES WORDS ARE NOT EMPTY TALKS, YOU SHOULD SHOW IT BY ACTUAL DEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH WILL INSURE A COMPLETE CESSATION OF



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HOSTILITIES AND OF ALL ACTS OF ARMED FORCE IN KOREA, AND SHALL RESPECT THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE LAND AREA OF KOREA UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE OPPOSING SIDE, AND SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN BLOCKADE OF ANY KIND OF KOREA. YOUR SIDE SHOULD STOP FORCIBLY THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF DISPATCHING VARIOUS NAVAL VESSELS AND ARMED SPY SHIPS TO OUR COASTAL WATERS. IF YOUR SIDE WANTS TO SAIL TO THE WATERS OFF PAENGYONG-DO ISLAND, DAECHONG DO ISLAND, SO CHONG DO ISLAND YONGPYONGDO ISLAND AND UDO ISLAND IN OUR COASTAL WATERS OF THE WEST SEA, IT SHOULD MEASURE A REQUEST TO OUR SIDE AND GET OUR APPROVAL IN ADVANCE. SUCH A MEASURE FULLY ACCORDS WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND SERVS THE SECURITY ON THE WATERS IN OUR COASTAL IN THE WEST SEA AND YOUR SIDE WILL NOT HAVE ANY OBSTACLE IS SAILING TO THE ISLANDS IN OUR COASTAL WATERS UNDER THE CONTROL OF YOUR SIDE.

OUR SIDE WILL MAKE ALL EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN OUR COASTAL WATERS AND TO IMPLEMENT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IF YOUR SIDE DOES NOT RESPOND TO OUR JUST DEMANDS, OUR SIDE WILL TAKE PROPER STEPS FOR IT. IF YOUR SIDE MISJUDGES OUR SIDE'S PATIENCE AS WEAKNESS, RECKLESSLY INFILTRATING NAVAL VESSELS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA AND OBSTRUCT FREE NAVIGATION OF OUR NAVAL VESSELS, OR COMMIT PROVOCATIONS AGAINST THEM, OUR SIDE WILL NOT TOLERATE THEM, BUT DEAL OUT SEVERE PUNISHMENT TO THEM. IN THIS CASE, YOUR SIDE WILL HAVE TO BEAR THE FULL REPONSIBILITY FOR ALL THE CONSEQUENCES ARISING THEREFROM.

OUR SIDE WILL CLOSELY WATCH YOUR FUTURE MOVE.  
OUR SIDE PROPOSES TO RECESS THIS MEETING.

UNC NO. 8

YOUR SIDE'S INTERPRETATION TODAY OF PRAGRAPHS 13B AND 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY TO INDICATE THAT THE 5 ISLANDS DISCUSSED TODAY LIE WITHIN YOUR SIDE'S TERRITORIAL WATERS, IS A SERIOUS MISTAKE ON YOUR SIDE'S PART AND IS IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

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FM CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA//AA UNC//

TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
ATTN: MR SMYSER

INFO JCS

UNCLAS FINAL SECTION OF VI

YOUR SIDE'S SUGGESTION THAT OUR SIDE MUST REQUEST PERMISSION TO SAIL TO THE ISLANDS OF PAENGYONG-DO, TAECHONG-DO, SOCHONG-DO, YONPYONG-DO AND U-DO IS UTTERLY RIDICULOUS. OUR SIDE HAS FREELY SAILED TO AND FROM THESE ISLANDS FOR OVER 20 YEARS SINCE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED.

I SUGGEST YOU PURSUE THIS PREPOSTEROUS COURSE OF ACTION WHICH IS IN WANTON VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT NO FURTHER.

ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS WITHIN THIS FORUM YOUR SIDE HAS DEMANDED THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. YOU HAVE BASED YOUR DEMANDS ON YOUR CLAIM THAT YOU DESIRE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA AND THAT OUR SIDE HAS NO NEED WHATSOEVER TO FEAR AN ATTACK TO THE SOUTH BY YOUR SIDE. YOUR ACTIVITIES IN THE VICINITY OF PAENGYONG-DO THESE LAST FEW DAYS MAKE A MOCKERY OF YOUR SO-CALLED PEACEFUL INTENTIONS. YOUR ACTIONS IN REPEATEDLY VIOLATING OUR SIDE'S CONTIGUOUS WATERS AND THE THREATS CONTAINED IN YOUR SUMMARY STATEMENT ARE AGGRESSIVE, WAR-LIKE AND COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. SUCH ACTIONS ONLY TEND TO PROVE THE CONTINUED NEED FOR THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN KOREA TO ASSIST IN PRESERVING THE PEACE.

OUR SIDE AGREES TO YOUR SIDE'S PROPOSAL TO RECESS THIS MEETING.  
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: W. R. SMYSER *WRB/ JM*

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT: Proposed WSAG Meeting on Korean Situation

I strongly believe that we need a WSAG no later than tomorrow to decide what position we should take on the North Korean demand that UNC naval and merchant ships obtain prior permission to navigate the waters contiguous to the five UNC-controlled islands off the west coast of Korea (see attached map). North Korea, which made the demand at the MAC meeting December 1, threatened unspecified actions if the UNC did not comply. The UNC representative on the MAC, U. S. Army Major General Greer, rejected the demand.

The urgency of the issue is posed by the fact that the ROK plans to proceed with its regularly scheduled weekly resupply convoy to two of the islands before the end of the week, either Thursday or Friday. (The ROK has about 1,000 forces stationed on two of the islands.) The ROK, in coordination with CINUNC, who has operational control of all ROK forces in the event of hostilities, intends to reinforce the convoy. In the meantime, it also intends to continue the normal ROK naval patrols in the area, keeping them 10-12 miles from North Korean territory but reinforcing them. Since these questions and possible actions involve a number of agencies and interests, a WSAG offers an essential forum for hearing all views and for getting everybody on the same track.

The immediate U. S. policy issues are:

-- Whether the regular ROK resupply convoy should proceed as planned and, if so, how (including whether we should reinforce the convoy itself or make a reinforcing show of force in the area). To proceed risks a military clash, while postponing it unduly implies UNC-ROK acquiescence in the North Korean demand.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

XGDS 5b(2)  
 BYAUTH Sec Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
 NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
 By *MM* NARA, Date *2/1/11*



-- Whether to call for a MAC meeting before December 6 to discuss the North Korean demand, and thus to try to reduce the risk of a military confrontation.

-- Whether and how to approach the PRC and/or the Soviets on this issue.


-- How to relate this problem to the basic issue of the UNC's future status. (A principal North Korean objective in the situation may be to force early U.N. Security Council consideration of the UNC.)

Recommendation:

That a WSAG meeting be scheduled for tomorrow to consider this issue.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_





MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT: The Korean Situation and the China Element

North Korea's provocative action over the islands, coming as it does within a week of conclusion of General Assembly consideration of the compromise resolution on the Korean issue, has the quality of an effort by Pyongyang to assert its case for further action against the U. N. and U. S. presence in Korea. The compromise GA resolution, worked out at Chinese initiative, was highly favorable to the ROK in that it referred neither to the future of the U. N. Command or to the U. S. troop presence in the ROK. We were totally surprised by Peking's willingness and ability to bring the North along on such a favorable compromise, and Pyongyang may now be attempting to act somewhat independently of Peking in calling attention to the remaining issues where it seeks U. N. and U. S. action, or to force Chinese and Soviet hands in support of their position in the Security Council. (The Soviets at one point late in the GA debate made noises about raising the UNC issue in the Security Council. They were probably miffed at the indications of U. S. - PRC cooperation on the compromise.)

We must assume that the Chinese were able to gain the cooperation of the North Koreans for the GA compromise precisely because they could tell Pyongyang that we had privately indicated a willingness to reconsider the future of the UNC after this session of the GA. The North, not fully trusting Peking, and wanting to keep us off balance in a situation where we clearly have the initiative (only two weeks ago you flew from Peking to Seoul), appears to want to force our hand and impart public momentum to its drive against the UNC and U. S. forces in Korea.

In these circumstances, one of our major objectives should be to keep the Chinese as fully engaged in the evolution of the Korean situation as possible. By all indications Peking has much greater influence in Pyongyang than Moscow. The Chinese undoubtedly see it in their interest to maintain

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~


XGDS 5b(3)  
BYAUTH Sec Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC 1.1.6, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By *WA* NARA, Date *2/11/11*



40

stability on the Korean Peninsula even as our posture there evolves. We should take advantage of Pyongyang's provocative action regarding the islands to try to invoke Peking's constraint over the North's game-playing. To the degree that Pyongyang feels that the Chinese are able to move us on the UNC issue, they have reason to continue to follow Peking's lead.

I believe that two messages to the Chinese are now in order. The first, which is intended to engage Peking with Pyongyang regarding its provocation, reiterates our intention to reconsider the future of the UNC now that the GA compromise has been concluded, but raises the prospect that such action will be impeded by any incidents which raise tensions on the Peninsula (see Tab 1). This message should be conveyed to the PRCLO as soon as possible.

A second message should be sent to the Chinese just prior to any unusual resupply move that we may make to reassert our right to access to the west coast islands. Its intent would be to inform the PRC of exactly what we were doing, in effect communicating the limits of our action (yet our determination to act) and implicitly inviting their imposition of restraint on Pyongyang. The exact text of such a message would be based on the specifics of our resupply move, and is thus difficult to draft this far in advance of any action.


Recommendation:

That you approve the message to the PRCLO at Tab 1.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
and

That you approve in principle a second message to the PRCLO, to be delivered a few hours before our resupply effort begins, indicating the extent and objective of our resupply effort.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



(Draft message for delivery to the PRC Liaison Office)

The U. S. side wishes to advise the Chinese side of its serious concern about recent provocative actions by North Korean authorities off the west coast of Korea, including unusual naval patrol activity, a heightened state of military alert, and a demand presented on December 1 which would interfere with access to five islands. As a signatory to the Korean Armistice, the Chinese side will understand that this demand is unacceptable, being in contravention of both international agreement and past practice.

These actions are all the more disturbing coming as they do less than two weeks after adoption by the U. N. General Assembly of a compromise resolution on Korea abolishing the UNCVRK organization. This compromise, which avoided an unnecessary confrontation between the representatives of North and South Korea and their supporters, was worked out in a spirit of accommodation by both sides. This development seemed to establish conditions for further progress in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

The U. S. side has advised the Chinese side on several occasions, most recently during Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking in November, that it would be prepared to reconsider the future of the U. N. Command before the 29th session of the U. N. General Assembly. We must state, however, that provocations by the North Korean authorities which risk military confrontation and heighten tension will seriously complicate

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo. 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
By WJ NARA, Date 2/1/10



efforts by the U. S. side to consider and put into effect new arrangements affecting the security of the Korean Peninsula.

It is our understanding that normal communication and supply activities will be maintained to the five islands on their usual basis. The U. S. side hopes that no incident will be created which would alter the improved atmosphere which has been created as a result of U. N. General Assembly action on the Korean question.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 033398

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . W.R. Smyser

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

TITLE . . . . . North Korean Attempt to Restrict Our  
Access to West Coast Islands

CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/04/1973

VOLUME . . . . . 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700539

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 36

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/21/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . TMH

TRANSMITTED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

*Dev*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 4 PM 7 02

*Urgent*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

RECEIVED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

'73 DEC 4 PM 7:05

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

LDX MESSAGE NO. 546, CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~, NO. PAGES 3

DESCRIPTION OF MSG / *Flash* TELEGRAM TO SEOUL RE KOREAN NORTHWEST COASTAL SITUATION

FROM: MR. MILLER, S/S, 23126, \_\_\_\_\_  
Officer Office Symbol Extension Room Number

LDX TO: \_\_\_\_\_ DELIVER TO: \_\_\_\_\_ EXTENSION: \_\_\_\_\_ ROOM NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

NSC, MR. SMYSER, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: *OWN*

Executive Secretariat Officer



5c

FORM DS 322(OCR)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3; DoD Directive 5200.30  
State Dept Guidelines; *State Dept 12/14/03*

By                      NARA, Date 2/4/11

EA/K:DLRANARD:LM  
12/4/73 EXT 20780  
EA: RLSNEIDER

DOD/ISA -  
L/EA - EGVERVILLE  
S/S -

JCS-J/5 -  
NSC -

FLASH

SEOUL

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: -GDS  
TAGS: MOPS, PINT, KN, KS

RLS  
DLR *AK*

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: KOREAN NORTHWEST COASTAL SITUATION

EGV

REF: A. SEOUL 8106  
B. CINCUNC 021532Z DEC 73

WE ARE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION IN RESPONSE TO POSITION TAKEN BY NORTH KOREA IN DECEMBER 1 MAC MEETING.

A. DIPLOMATIC-POLITICAL MEASURES.

1. YOU ARE TO INFORM ROKG THAT WE AGREE TO CALL MAC MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR REAFFIRMATION OF OUR POSITION AND REJECTION OF NORTH KOREAN CLAIMS CONCERNING ACCESS TO FIVE ISLANDS UNDER UNC CONTROL. ACCORDINGLY, YOU ARE TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO REQUEST THE MEETING IMMEDIATELY. GUIDANCE FOR POSITION WE INTEND TO TAKE NOW BEING DRAFTED AND WILL BE FURNISHED ASAP.

2. SIMULTANEOUSLY, YOU ARE TO URGE THAT THE ROK UTILIZE THE HOT LINE FOR DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES AND, ASSUMING MAC MEETING DOES NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE DECEMBER 5 PRELIMINARY MEETING OF SNCC, YOU ARE TO RECOMMEND THAT

U.S. FORM 1  
MILITARY ADDRESSEES ATTACHED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

12

ROK ALSO RAISE SUBJECT IN THAT FORUM. WHILE WE UNDERSTAND NATURE OF ROK OBJECTIONS TO UTILIZING HOT LINE, YOU SHOULD REMIND THEM THAT, CONSISTENT WITH PLEDGES IN JULY 4, 1972 COMMUNIQUE, THIS CHANNEL WAS ESTABLISHED TO DEAL WITH HOSTILE INCIDENTS AND TO OUR KNOWLEDGE IT HAS BEEN USED FOR RELATED OCCURRENCES SUCH AS DMZ CROSSINGS AS WELL AS FIRINGS. IN HOT LINE DISCUSSION WITH THE NORTH, WE SUGGEST ROKG POINT OUT THEIR INTENTION IS (A) NOT TO DEBATE THE ISSUE WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED IN MAC MEETING, BUT RATHER (B) TO MAKE CLEAR THE ROKG INTENDS NO PROVOCATIVE INITIATIVES AND EXPECTS NORTH TO BE SIMILARLY RESPONSIBLE, AND (C) WILL CONTINUE COMMUNICATION AND SUPPLY TO THESE ISLANDS AS HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE IN THE PAST. NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE IN HOT LINE CONVERSATION MAY SHED LIGHT ON THEIR MOTIVATIONS AND PROVIDE VALUABLE INFORMATION TO US CONCERNING THEIR INTENTIONS AND TIMING. INITIATIVES BY SOUTH TO USE THIS CHANNEL MAY ALSO PROVE USEFUL SUBSEQUENTLY IN DEVELOPING THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR ROKG IN HER EFFORTS TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE SITUATION ON PENINSULA.

3. YOU MAY ALSO INFORM PRESIDENT PARK IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT WE INTEND TO APPROACH THE PRC AND SOVIETS, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, TO INFORM THEM WE HAVE NOTED THE INCREASED NORTH KOREAN PATROLS NEAR THESE ISLANDS AND THE UNPRECEDENTED CLAIM MADE AT THE RECENT MAC MEETING. WE CAN NOT ACCEPT THIS NORTH KOREAN INTERPRETATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND INTEND TO PROTECT UNC LONG-STANDING RIGHTS under the agreement to these ISLANDS. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE INTEND STRESS COMMON INTEREST IN AVOIDING PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AND POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION. GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS CHANNEL, WE EXPECT ROKG TO HOLD ESPECIALLY CLOSE OUR INTENTIONS TO MAKE THESE APPROACHES.

4. WE INTEND TO BRIEF THE JAPANESE CONCERNING ACTIONS WE PROPOSE TO TAKE WITH EXCEPTION OF APPROACH TO USSR AND PRC AND MAY DO SO SIMILARLY WITH OTHER POWERS WHO HAVE CLOSE INVOLVEMENT WITH KOREAN QUESTION.

B. MILITARY ACTION. WE CONCUR IN BASIC POSTURE AND GENERAL GUIDANCE SET FORTH IN REFTEL B. FOLLOWING IS MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE:

1. IT IS OUR GENERAL POSTURE THAT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WISH TO SEE OR PROVOKE MILITARY INCIDENTS OVER THESE ISSUES, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE DO NOT INTEND TO ACCEPT INTERFERENCE WITH ESTABLISHED RIGHTS under the agreement to THESE ISLANDS.

~~SECRET~~

5d

2. We concur in plans of UNC naval command to resupply the islands on a "business as usual" basis, as well as to continue normal ferry service without interruption. Exact timing of next convoy to three outer islands should be left open, however, subject to our guidance.

3. Should the NK Interfere with single unescorted ferry service such as that scheduled 5 and 6 December, which Embassy/CINCUNC apparently considered unlikely, we believe that ferry should proceed in the most prudent manner under the circumstances so as not to endanger lives of personnel. ROKG should avoid military activities and response except as necessary for protection of life or property. We will provide recommendations on ROK response to possible interdiction of other types of ferry service and supply convoys.

4. It is emphasized that ROK Forces should not repeat not fire except in self-defense. Under no circumstances should ROKG fire the first shot.

5. Since this message was prepared, we have been informed that a convoy to Paengnyong-do has been planned, departing Dec 6 at 0600. (We understand this convoy is to consist of three commercial vessels, one or more ROK naval vessels as close-in escort, and one or more ROK destroyers positioned nearby.) Departure of this convoy should be postponed for 24 hours, during which time we will forward guidance covering action to be taken in event of North Korean attempt to interdict this convoy.

6. Our understanding is that no US units are involved in escort or protective services for supply missions. Please confirm.

7. No US military personnel should be involved without approval from Washington.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3; DoD Directive 5200.30  
State Dept Guidelines; State Review 12/11/03  
By      NARA, Date 2/1/11



(Draft message for delivery to the PRC Liaison Office)

The U. S. side wishes to advise the Chinese side of its concern about the situation created by North Korean authorities. North Korea has recently instituted unusual naval patrol activity off the west coast of Korea, has placed its forces in a heightened state of military alert, and made demands on December 1 that would interfere with access to five islands. As a signatory to the Korean Armistice, the Chinese side will understand that these demands are in contravention of both international agreement and long-established practice, and are therefore unacceptable.

These actions are all the more disturbing coming as they do less than two weeks after adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of a compromise resolution on Korea abolishing the UNCURK organization. This agreement, which avoided an unnecessary confrontation between the representatives of North and South Korea and their supporters, was worked out in a spirit of accommodation by both sides. This development seemed to establish conditions for further progress in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The demands and actions of the North Korean authorities are completely contrary to the spirit of the agreement.

The U. S. side has advised the Chinese side on several occasions, most recently during Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking in November, that it would be prepared to reconsider the future of the U. N. Command before the 29th session of the U. N. General Assembly. We must state,

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Message, 090900Z, Sent Dept. Guidelines  
By ll NARA, Date 2/4/11

however, that provocations by the North Korean authorities which risk military confrontation and heighten tension will seriously complicate efforts by the U. S. side to consider and put into effect new arrangements affecting the security of the Korean Peninsula.

It is our understanding that normal communication and supply activities will be maintained to the five islands on their usual basis, and that North Korea will be informed of this policy. The U. S. side hopes that no incident will be created which would alter the improved atmosphere which has been created as a result of U. N. General Assembly action on the Korean question.



sf

(Draft message for delivery to the Soviet Ambassador)

The U. S. side wishes to advise the Soviet side of its concern about the situation created by North Korean authorities. North Korea has recently instituted unusual naval patrol activity off the west coast of Korea, has placed its forces in a heightened state of military alert, and made demands on December 1 that would interfere with access to five islands.

These actions are all the more disturbing coming as they do less than two weeks after adoption by the U. N. General Assembly of a compromise resolution on Korea abolishing the UNCURK organization. This development seemed to establish conditions for further progress in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The demands and actions of the North Korean authorities are completely contrary to the spirit of the agreement.

It is our understanding that normal communication and supply activities will be maintained to the five islands on their usual basis, and that North Korea will be informed of this policy. The U. S. side hopes that no incident will be created which would alter the improved atmosphere which has been created as a result of U. N. General Assembly action on the Korean question.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/66, State Dept. Guidelines  
By WJ NARA, Date 2/11/11



SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Suggested Talking Points for Congressional Consultations

-- The current situation has resulted from North Korea's demand, made in the Military Armistice Commission on December 1, that the U.N. Command (UNC) side obtain North Korea's prior permission in order to send at least naval vessels -- but also possibly commercial vessels as well -- to any of the five UNC - controlled islands off the west coast of Korea. The UNC's military control of these islands is explicitly provided for in the Armistice Agreement. The UNC's right of access to the contiguous waters, which we define as extending 12 miles outward from the islands, has long been recognized. Under Article 15 North Korea is bound to respect the waters contiguous to these islands, which obligates them not to interfere with the right of access.

-- We are proceeding on a business as usual basis as regards continued weekly ferry service and resupply convoys to these islands in accord with our claimed right of access to the islands and the practical logistic needs of those on the islands. (The ROK has approximately 1,500 military personnel on these islands, and they are inhabited by much larger civilian populations. We have no U.S. military personnel on them, but there are four U.S. citizens on one -- two missionaries and two nurses.) CINCUNC, who has operational control of all ROK forces, and the ROK have decided to provide an adequately reinforced -- but non-provocative -- ROK naval and air cover for these ferries and resupply convoys. No U.S. forces will be involved without express Washington approval.

-- We intend to go back in the next day or two to the North Koreans in the MAC to discuss the substantive issues involved, and will ask the ROK to ask North Korea in the South-North talks framework to refrain from provocative actions, in accord with the July 1972 Joint Communique issued by Seoul and Pyongyang.

-- (If asked.) We intend to approach the PRC and the Soviet Union to seek their involvement in avoiding any military incident over the North Korean demand.


-- We are consulting with Japan on our view of the situation and intended actions.

-- For the present we do not plan to take up in the U.N. Security Council either the present North Korean demand or the more basic issue of the UNC's future status.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY


DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (1995) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/20/73, State Dept Guidelines  
By MA NARA Date 2/11/11





Demilitarized Zone is two kilometers wide on each side of demarcation line.

**KOREA  
DEMILITARIZED ZONE AREA**



57023 9-67

58

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 033399

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . W.R. Smyser

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

TITLE . . . . . WSAG Meeting on Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/04/1973

VOLUME . . . . . 9 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700539

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 36

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/21/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . TMH

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

December 5, 1973

## MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*

SUBJECT: Minutes of the WSAG Working Group Meeting  
of December 4, 1973

Attached is a summary of the conclusions of the WSAG Working Group Meeting held on December 4, 1973 to discuss North Korea's demand that UN Command naval and merchant ships obtain prior permission to navigate the waters contiguous to five UNC-controlled islands off the west coast of Korea.

cc: Mr. Smyser  
Mr. Froebe ✓  
Mr. Solomon  
Mr. Hyland  
Col. Stukel

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526 (or successor) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/00, State Dept. Guidelines

By *WA* NARA, Date *2/4/11*~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

XGDS

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 033400

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMinute

TITLE . . . . . Washington Special Actions Group  
Working Group Meeting

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re North Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/04/1973

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700539

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 36

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/21/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . TMH

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 033644

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . W.R. Smyser

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re North & South Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/06/1973

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700539

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 36

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . TMH

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 033401

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇCable

TITLE . . . . . Korean Northwest Coastal Situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/06/1973

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700539

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 36

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/21/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . TMH



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 033645

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re North Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/08/1973

VOLUME . . . . . 10 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700539

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 36

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . TMH

W/FAK

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6747

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

December 22, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT: Korean West Coast Island Situation

At Tabs A and B are draft joint State-Defense cables to Embassy Seoul giving guidance for the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting tentatively scheduled for December 24 and comments on the ROK's proposed memorandum to be circulated to all diplomatic missions in Seoul explaining the South Korean position on the west coast island situation.

at Tab A


-- The proposed guidance for the MAC meeting/-- which will be the first full MAC meeting since that on December 1, in which the North Koreans attempted to restrict access to the UNC-controlled islands on the basis of claimed territorial waters -- would have our UNC representative avoid the conflicting territorial waters claim of the two Koreas. Rather, he would base our rejection of the North Korean demand on our rights of access to the islands as conferred by the Armistice Agreement. He would also not make a legal defense of the Northern Limit Line (see map at Tab C), which the UNC declared unilaterally in the mid-1950s but which North Korean naval patrols began penetrating in late October. Rather, to solve the question of overlap between the "contiguous waters" (the term used in the Agreement) of the islands and those of North Korea we would use a median line, which is the customary solution under international law.

I have no objection to the legal case proposed in the cable, but would propose deleting the second sentence of paragraph 5, and reword the preceding sentence to eliminate reference to reference B. I disagree with the draft cable's assertion that the talking points contained in reference B which were used with the ROKs are appropriate for our UNC representative's use in the MAC meeting.

-- The proposed comments on the ROK memorandum defending its position on the island situation (Tab B) are aimed at bringing the ROK memorandum in line with the legal position proposed in Tab A -- that we not attempt to defend the legality of the Northern Limit Line. We would

~~SECRET~~

GDS



DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526 (or successor) SEC 3.3  
 NSC Memo, 9/30/00, State Dept, Guidelines, State review 12/14/03  
 By WAC NARA, Date 2/4/11

inform the ROK that we believe that the U. S. and ROK must take consistent positions on the legal aspects of the island issue. I have no objection to this draft cable.

Recommendation:

That you approve the draft State-Defense cables at Tab A (as amended) and Tab B.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



FORM DS 322(OCR)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

L/EA - MISS VERVILLE:DPW  
22/21/73 EXT. 23039

L/EA - MR. LEITZELL

JCS - COL. ADAMS

S/S -

RO&RIMMEDIATE SEOUL

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3, DoD Directive 5200.31  
State Dept Guidelines: State U.S. Int 12/4/03  
By            NARA, Date 2/1/11

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PBOR, MARR, KS, KN  
SUBJ: QUESTIONS REGARDING NORTHERN LIMIT LINE  
REF: (A) SEOUL 8450 (B) ~~SEOUL 8512~~ (C) SEOUL 8574  
(D) SEOUL 8575

RLS 7  
EV 2  
DLR 3  
TL 2  
NSC  
RV 8  
REA 2  
S/S

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS RAISED PARA 6 REFTEL A, AND IN CONNECTION WITH MAC MEETING, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP WELL IN MIND DISTINCTION BETWEEN ISSUES OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS (I.E., QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS AND RELATED L/W OF THE SEA ISSUES) AND QUESTIONS OF RIGHTS UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, AS SUGGESTED BY EMBASSY, THAT IT IS HIGHLY PREFERABLE TO LIMIT US/UNC POSITIONS TO INTERPRETATIONS AND ~~THE~~ OF AND ASSERTION OF RIGHTS UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND TO AVOID UNNECESSARY AND POSSIBLY PROVOCATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. IN THIS REGARD, CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED TO AVOID BRINGING OUR POSITION ON SUPPORT OF ROK CLAIMS TO OR RIGHTS IN "TERRITORIAL SEA" OR "TERRITORIAL WATERS" AROUND ISLANDS WHICH TERMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW CONNOTE SOVEREIGNTY AND RAISE COMPLEX LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES. INSTEAD OUR ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE CAST IN TERMS OF UNC RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 23 OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL OVER ISLANDS AND TO DPRK OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 25 TO RESPECT THE "WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO" THE ISLANDS. LIMIT

MILITARY  
ADDRESSES  
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OF "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" AROUND THE ISLANDS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE LIMIT OF "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" OF THE COAST OF THE ROK AND WHERE "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" OF ISLANDS OVERLAPS THOSE OFF THE COAST OF NORTH KOREA, A MEDIAN LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN SINCE THAT IS THE USUAL METHOD OF DELIMITING MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN OPPOSIT OR ADJACENT STATES.

2. THIS APPROACH, WITH BACKGROUND AND MORE DETAIL, GEARED TO ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD BY DPRK, WOULD BE OUTLINED AS FOLLOWS:

{A} WE REJECT THE DPRK'S ASSERTION THAT PARAGRAPH 13 {B} OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHES PAENGYONG-DO, TRECHONG-DO, SOCHONG-DO, YONPYONG-DO AND U-DO AS WITHIN DPRK COASTAL WATERS. PARAGRAPH 13 {B} DOES NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF "TERRITORIAL WATERS". THE ONLY REFERENCE TO WATERS IN PARAGRAPH 13 {B} IS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES OF BOTH SIDES FROM "THE COASTAL ISLANDS AND WATERS OF KOREA OF THE OTHER SIDE". THERE IS NO ATTEMPT TO DELINEATE SUCH "COASTAL" WATERS OR TO REFER TO THEM FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY LINE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 13 {B} SERVES ONLY AS A CONVENIENT MEANS OF DESCRIBING WHICH ISLANDS ARE UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF WHICH SIDE, NEITHER AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO DIVIDE WATERS. THIS LIMITED PURPOSE OF THE LINE IS MADE CLEAR IN THE TEXT OF MAP 3, VOLUME 2 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, WHICH INDICATES THAT THE SEAWARD EXTENSION OF THE PROVINCIAL LINE DRAWN ON THE MAP IS SOLELY TO INDICATE THE CONTROL OF COASTAL ISLANDS ON THE WEST COAST OF KOREA. THIS LINE HAS NO OTHER SIGNIFICANCE AND NONE SHALL BE ATTACHED THERETO." THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF PARAGRAPH 13 {B} TO THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY IS, OF COURSE, THE FACT THAT IT SPECIFICALLY PLACES THE ABOVE ISLANDS UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF "CINCUNC."

{B} PARAGRAPH 13 {B} WHICH PLACES THE ISLANDS UNDER UNITED STATES AND NATIONS COMMAND "MILITARY CONTROL" MUST BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH PARAGRAPH 15, WHICH REQUIRES THE NAVAL FORCES OF BOTH SIDES TO "RESPECT THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND TO THE LAND AREA OF KOREA UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE OTHER SIDE." IT SEEMS CLEAR, CONTRARY TO THE

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ASSERTIONS OF THE KPA, THAT THE TERM "LAND AREA OF KOREA" AS USED IN ARTICLE 15 INCLUDES OFFSHORE ISLANDS AS WELL AS THE MAINLAND. ABSENT SOME SPECIAL UNDERSTANDING TO THE CONTRARY, WHICH THE KPA DOES NOT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE ASSERT, THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE TERM "LAND AREA" WOULD NOT APPEAR MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THE TERM "COAST", WHICH FOR PURPOSES OF DEFINING MARITIME JURISDICTION WOULD INCLUDE ISLANDS AS WELL AS MAINLAND TERRITORY. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PERTINENT CONVENTIONS, (1958 CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE, 1958 CONVENTION ON THE VPM:11 CONTINENTAL SHELF), ISLANDS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING THE BOUNDARY OF A COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE, AS WELL AS THE BOUNDARY OF ITS CONTINENTAL SHELF. ALSO, ISLANDS FAR OFFSHORE HAVE THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE.

(C) THE DPRK IS, THEREFORE, OBLIGATED UNDER PARAGRAPH 15 TO RESPECT THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE ABOVE-NAMED ISLANDS. I: SINCE THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY FORMULA FOR RESOLUTION OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE OVERLAPPING CONTIGUOUS WATERS OF THE TWO SIDES, SUCH RESOLUTION MUST BE FOUND BY REFERENCE TO GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW USED IN THE DRAWING OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES. SUCH PRINCIPLES DICTATE THE DRAWING OF A MEDIAN LINE EQUIDISTANT BETWEEN THE COAST (INCLUDING LINE EQUIDISTANT BETWEEN THE COAST (INCLUDING NORTH KOREAN ISLANDS) AND THE ISLANDS. THIS PRINCIPLE OF EQUIDISTANCE HAS SERVED AS THE BASIS UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN THE ABOVE-NAMED CONVENTIONS TO DETERMINE VIRTUALLY ALL MARITIME BOUNDARIES SUCH AS THE BOUNDARIES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BETWEEN BOTH OPPOSITE AND ADJACENT ARE:11 STATES.

2. THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO DEFINITION OF "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" IN ARTICLE 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IN THE RECORDS. BASED ON THE RECORDS AND INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US HERE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WE HAVE IN FACT PROJECTED A "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT OF TWELVE MILES OFF THE NORTH KOREAN COAST AS CLAIMED BY NORTH KOREA (EXCEPT WHERE IT CONFLICTS WITH ISLANDS OR CONFLICTING ROK TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS). IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JSAO (JOINT SEA AIR PATROLS) ROK LIKEWISE PATROLS OUT TO AT LEAST TWELVE MILES FROM ITS COAST FOR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PURPOSES.

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UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD APPEAR DIFFICULT TO CLAIM OTHER THAN TWELVE MILES "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT FOR ISLANDS UNDER ARTICLE 15. {THIS, OF COURSE, WOULD BE LIMIT SOLELY FOR PURPOSES OF DEFINITION OF "CONTIGUOUS" IN ARTICLE 15 OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND HENCE FOR DEFINITION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTIES UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, AND WOULD HAVE NO RPT NO IMPLICATION IN TERMS OF TERRITORIAL SEA QUESTION OR CLAIMS.} IN THIS CONNECTION, WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION OF REFERENCE IN PARA 6 {C} REF A THAT UNC/ROK HAVE CLAIMED THREE MILE "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT FOR ISLANDS.

4. FOLLOWING ABOVE APPROACH AND ARGUMENT, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED PARA 6 REF {A} ARE AS FOLLOWS:

{A} THE U.S. DOES NOT RECOGNIZE TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS BEYOND THREE MILES AND PROTESTS SUCH CLAIMS. CONSEQUENTLY WE SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE NORTH KOREAN CLAIMED TWELVE MILE TERRITORIAL SEA LIMIT. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO RESPECT DPRK CLAIMED TWELVE MILE "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT IN AREAS WHERE IT DOES NOT RELATE TO ACCESS TO ISLANDS AND WHERE ROK TERRITORIAL WATERS DO NOT OVERLAP IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT RULES AND AUTHORITIES ISSUED TO U.S. FORCES.

{B} AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, NLL IS UNILATERAL LINE AND IS NOT RPT NOT RECOGNIZED BY NORTH KOREA AS A DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN THE "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" OF THE ISLANDS AND THOSE OF THE NORTH KOREAN COAST FOR PURPOSES OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ON THIS ASSUMPTION WE BELIEVE PATROL LIMIT LINE SHOULD REFLECT MEDIAN LINE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE RATHER THAN NLL.

{C} THE UNC SHOULD TAKE NO POSITION AS TO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS CLAIMS OR EITHER NORTH KOREA OR THE ROK. WITH RESPECT TO UNC CLAIMS REGARDING "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" UNDER ARTICLE 15, SEE PARA 3 ABOVE.

5. [ABOVE GUIDANCE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY PREPARED PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF REFS B<sup>AND</sup> C. [AND D.] [WE CONCUR IN ARGUMENTS OUTLINED REF B FOR PRESENTATION BY SENIOR UNC COMMANDER] OUR COMMENTS ON ROK MEMORANDUM AND NLL FOLLOW SEPTEL.]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

RECEIVED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

'73 DEC 21 PM 6:53

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 021, CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL, NO. PAGES 4

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. TELEGRAM TO SEOUL RE QUESTIONS REGARDING NORTHERN LIMIT LINE

FROM: S/S: SRGAMMON  
Officer Office Symbol Extension Room Number

DELIVER TO: EXTENSION: ROOM NUMBER:

MRS. JEANNE DAVIS - URGENT CLEARANCE PER TELECON

CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

A MUST FOR DISPATCH 008 SAT.

PREPARED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: old for SRGAMMON  
Executive Secretariat Officer





~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
State Dept Guidelines  
By HW NARA, Date 2/4/11  
*State Dept Directive 5200.30*  
*State v. EW 12/4/03*

EA/K:EHKELLY:DPW  
12/21/78 EXT 29330  
EA - MR. SNEIDER

L - MR. ROH  
NSC  
JCS - MR. BEE COL. ADAMS

L - MR. LEITZELL  
JCS - MR. VANDEGRIFT  
S/S  
EA/K - DONALD L. BARNARD

IMMEDIATE                      SEOUL  
PRIORITY                        SEE ATTACHED

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PBOR, KS, KN  
SUBJ: ROKG LEGAL MEMORANDUM ON NORTHWEST COASTAL INCIDENTS  
REF: A. SEOUL 8574; B. SEOUL 8575

8517  
ENE?  
CR  
TL  
REA  
NSC  
BLR  
RV  
S/S

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. CONCUR IN REACTION TO PROPOSED MEMORANDUM. ALTHOUGH ROKG MAY ISSUE MEMO UNILATERALLY, USG (UNDER UNC ROLE) WILL BE CALLED UPON TO DEFEND CONTENTS AT RAC MEETINGS AND POSSIBLY ELSEWHERE. ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE VALID GROUNDS FOR INSISTING THAT OUR VIEWS BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION PRIOR TO RELEASE. FOLLOWING ARE MORE DETAILED COMMENTS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO MOFA.

2. USG AND ROKG MUST BE IN COMPLETE ACCORD ON PUBLIC POSITIONS, PARTICULARLY AS THEY RELATE TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IF ROKG TAKES PUBLIC LINE THAT WE CANNOT SUBSEQUENTLY DEFEND UNDER OUR INTERPRETATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, NORTH KOREA WILL BE QUICK TO EXPLOIT DIVERGENCES EITHER APPARENT OR REAL.

3. WE HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT MOFA'S ATTEMPT TO GIVE NLL VALIDITY AS A "RESPECTED" ELEMENT OF "ARMISTICE REGIME" WHICH HAS DEVELOPED OVER PAST 20 YEARS. WE ARE AWARE OF NO EVIDENCE THAT NLL HAS EVER BEEN OFFICIALLY PRESENTED

MILITARY ADDRESSES ATTACHED

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TO NORTH KOREAS. WE WOULD BE IN AN EXTREMELY VULNERABLE POSITION OF CHARGING THEM WITH PENETRATIONS BEYOND A LINE THEY HAVE NEVER ACCEPTED OR ACKNOWLEDGED. ROKG IS WRONG IN ASSUMING WE WILL JOIN IN ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE NLL ON NK.

4. IF ROKG PROCEEDS WITH MEMO IT SHOULD BE REVISED ALONG FOLLOWING LINES TO AVOID SITUATION ANTICIPATED PARA TWO.

5. PARA L (A) OF REFTTEL B IS ACCEPTABLE RESTATEMENT OF NK POSITION. PARA L (B) SHOULD BE REVISED ALONG FOLLOWING LINES. "SINCE OCTOBER 23, 1973, NORTH KOREAN NAVAL VESSELS HAVE BEGUN CARRYING OUT A SERIES OF PROVOCATIVE NAVAL MANEUVERS IN THE CONTIGUOUS WATERS OFF THE FIVE ISLAND GROUP. IN PARTICULAR, THE NORTH KOREANS NAVAL VESSELS HAVE ILLEGALLY INTRUDED, ON NINE DIFFERENT OCCASIONS, TO POINTS RANGING FROM 5,000 TO 6,000 YARDS IN THE CONTIGUOUS WATERS OFF THE SAID ISLANDS DURING THE PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 19 TO DECEMBER 19, 1973. MOREOVER, NORTH KOREAN VESSELS HAVE BEGUN TO DANGEROUSLY HARASS VESSELS IN TRANSIT TO THESE SAID ISLANDS EVEN THOUGH THE TRANSITING VESSELS HAVE FOLLOWED A LONGER, MORE INDIRECT COURSE WHICH KEEPS THEM BELOW THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE (NLL). THIS LINE WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNC SIDE SOON AFTER THE ARMISTICE IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION BY KEEPING UNC NAVAL AND CIVILIAN VESSELS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR OF NORTH KOREAN SHORELINES TO AVERT INCIDENTS. THE WISDOM OF THIS PRUDENT MEASURE HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE ABSENCE OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS UP UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF RECENT NORTH KOREAN MANEUVERS. END QUOTE.

6. PARA 2(A) AND (B) REQUIRE NO CHANGE.

7. PARA 2(C) SHOULD BE DELETED.

8. IN PARA 3(A) THE VAGUE PHRASE "SEA AREA" SHOULD BE CHANGED TO "CONTIGUOUS WATERS".

9. PARA 3(C) SHOULD BE REVISED AS FOLLOWS QUOTE THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN PRESERVING PEACE IN THE WATERS FOR THE PAST TWENTY YEARS. THE RECENT NORTH KOREAN HARASSMENT OF VESSELS BELOW THAT LINE, CAN ONLY BE REGARDED AS NEW MILITARY PROVOCATIONS LAUNCHED BY THE NORTH KOREANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISRUPTING THE LONG EXISTING AND STABLE SITUATION IN DEFIANCE OF THE SPIRIT AND PROVISIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. END QUOTE.

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10. IN PARA 4(B) THE WORDS "ARMISTICE REGIME" SHOULD BE DELETED AND THE WORDS "E= PEACE AND STABILITY OF KOREA" INSERTED.

11. IN SUM, YOU SHOULD INFORM MOFA THAT WE CONSIDER THE MEMO WILL HAVE LITTLE PUBLIC IMPACT. WE ARE MAINLY INTERESTED IN RESOLVING PROBLEM AND ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THE WORDING AND TONE OF ROKG MESSAGE, UNLESS AMENDED AS ABOVE, WILL EXACERBATE THE DISPUTE. THE ROKG SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT OUR POSITION WILL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH MAKES NO REFERENCE TO NLL. YY

TRANSMITTED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

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RECEIVED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

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LDX MESSAGE NO. 029, CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~, NO. PAGES 3

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. TELEGRAM TO SEOUL RE ROKG LEGAL MEMORANDUM ON NORTHWEST COASTAL INCIDENTS


FROM: S/S:SRGAMMON, Officer, Office Symbol, Extension, Room Number

LDX TO: NSC, DELIVER TO: MRS. JEANNE DAVIS - URGENT CLEARANCE PER TELECON, EXTENSION:                     , ROOM NUMBER:                     


FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: A MUST FOR DISPATCH OOB SAT.

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: add for SRGAMMON  
Executive Secretariat Officer



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*FJB FYI*  
*KP*  
*R. U. - J. - K. -*  
*[10/7/74]*  
*11*

R.M. 1103

KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS PERTAINING TO  
FIVE COASTAL ISLANDS IN THE YELLOW SEA: PAENGYONG-DO,  
TAECHONG-DO, SOCHONG-DO, YONPYONG-DO, AND U-DO

In January 1952, the U.N. Command and Communist delegations negotiating the Korean armistice agreement decided to turn over to staff officers the task of negotiating the technical details of Agenda Item Three--the arrangements for the realization of a ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervisory organization for carrying out the terms of the agreement. Sub-delegations had already agreed that, after the armistice became effective, all armed forces under the control of either side should be withdrawn from coastal islands "which were formerly controlled by the other side and any others specifically and mutually agreed." Within this context, the problem to be solved by the staff officers was to agree specifically and mutually on the disposition of five coastal islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae-do (North Korea) and Kyonggi-do (South Korea). The five islands were Paengyong-do, Taechong-do, Sochong-do, Yonpyong-do, and U-do.

At the first staff officers meeting, January 27, the U.N. Command presented a draft agreement providing that within five days after the armistice agreement had become effective the commanders of the opposing sides would withdraw all forces, supplies, munitions, and implements of war from the rear and from the coastal waters and coastal islands of the other side; the Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command, however, would retain control of, and might continue to occupy, the five islands in question. The U.N. Command proposal defined "coastal waters" as those waters within three miles from shore at mean low tide; it defined "coastal islands" as those islands which, though occupied at that time by one side, were controlled by the other side on June 24, 1950.

During the second and third meetings, January 29 and 30, and in the sixth, February 2, the discussions on this issue revolved around the questions (1) whether the demarcation line between the two provinces should be extended over water as the basis for withdrawal from the five islands and (2) whether, with reference to all coastal islands affected by the armistice, there should be any distance specified in terms of coastal waters.

With regard to the five islands, the Communists stated their belief that those islands which at that time were in their

controlled waters, near to the mainland, should come under Communist control. They presented the following considerations: (1) the location of the military demarcation line, (2) the administrative dividing line over the waters between Hwanghae-do and Kyonggi-do Provinces, and (3) the stability of the armistice and the prevention of the resumption of hostilities.

The U.N. Command maintained that its forces would be withdrawn from all those islands formerly controlled by the Communist side on June 24, 1950, but that those islands that were formerly the territory of the Republic of Korea and under the military control of the U.N. Command would remain under the control of the U.N. Command. As for the five islands specifically named, the U.N. Command stated that, in addition to being under its military control, they were also under the political control of the Republic of Korea; it did not think the islands should "be changed to the other side just because they, at one time, were under the control of a prefecture other than the control they" were under in 1952. The U.N. Command pointed out that these five islands were a considerable distance from the shoreline, and what few forces were on the islands would not present a threat to the armistice. The point was not made that all five islands were located south of the 38th parallel, the dividing line between North and South Korea at the time hostilities began in June 1950.


The Communists argued that to maintain a stable armistice and to prevent a resumption of hostilities both sides should take the dividing line between the two provinces as a basis upon which both sides would withdraw from islands formerly controlled by the other side and others specifically and mutually agreed upon. Therefore, it was their view that there should be a withdrawal from the coastal islands, including the five islands specifically named by the U.N. Command, on the basis of the dividing line over the waters between the two provinces. They asked if it was the intention of the U.N. Command to retain five islands north of the provincial dividing line.

The U.N. Command replied that the demarcation line previously agreed to by the delegations of both sides had not been projected west of where it had been drawn over land. Therefore, the U.N. Command intended to retain control of the five islands even though they lay north and west of the provincial dividing line. Furthermore, these islands had not been formerly controlled by the Communist side and there had been no specific and mutual agreement that U.N. forces should withdraw from them, and there would be none.

As for the issue of the distance of coastal waters, the Communists maintained that it was unnecessary to define a specific distance. They said it was not the task of the military armistice negotiations specifically to decide on questions of high seas navigation or territorial waters. During the armistice, it would be the obligation of both sides to desist from any military naval acts against the other side, including blockade, patrol, and the stationing of naval forces. The abandoning of these actions should not be limited only to the territorial waters; therefore, there was no necessity to stipulate a specific distance. As for individual and specific questions which might arise concerning the coastal waters, the Communists felt they could be handled through the Military Armistice Commission. The U.N. Command said it wanted to prevent unintentional violations of the waters of either side; unless there was some distance specified, it would be difficult for the captain of a vessel to know exactly where he was permitted to go on the high seas.

In reaction to a Communist statement made at the sixth meeting that the staff officers should mutually agree on the islands which remained to be settled, the U.N. Command at the seventh meeting, February 3, proposed that the Communists control all of the islands to the west and north of the provincial line except the five islands in question, which should remain under the control of the U.N. Command. The Communists replied that, with respect to the islands, their side had been of the opinion that all the islands close to Communist-controlled mainland territory would come under its military command after the armistice was signed. For the benefit of the effectiveness of the armistice, however, and in order to resolve this point at issue, the Communists stated that they agreed with the U.N. Command position that those five islands to the west and north of the provincial dividing line would be placed under the military control of the U.N. Command. Both sides then agreed to prepare a new draft on this point which would leave no doubt as to the control of the islands by both sides.

In subsequent meetings various drafts from both sides were submitted and discussed, with a final draft, as it appeared in the armistice agreement in June 1953, being proposed by the Communists and accepted at the fifty-eighth meeting on March 25, 1952. The only difference in the March 1952 text and that of June 1953 was the number of days (five or ten) within which the withdrawal had to take place. Except for disagreements regarding the distance of coastal waters, an issue which remained unresolved, the discussions involved no substantive matters; instead, the negotiators concentrated on revisions in wording, spelling, and precise locations.



During the 1952 discussions the Communists continued to urge that the distance for coastal waters not be specified, stating that, if there had to be a specification, twelve nautical miles would assure the effectiveness of the armistice and would eliminate the possibility of post-armistice disputes within those waters. They indicated that, since all of the coastal islands fell within twelve nautical miles from the shore, to specify a distance of three nautical miles would be inappropriate; the shorter distance would not be sufficient to guarantee the armistice. A deadlock was reached on this issue and after the eleventh meeting, February 7, there was little mention of it. At the twenty-sixth meeting on February 22, the U.N. Command prepared a draft which contained no reference to coastal waters distance.

The pertinent paragraphs of the armistice agreement signed on June 8, 1953, at Panmunjom, are as follows:

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N, 124°40'E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46'N, 124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and U-DO (37°36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations





Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.

Historical Studies Division  
Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs  
Department of State

