

The original documents are located in Box 35, folder “Korean Military Situation (Working File) (2)” of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 033638

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION Re North & South Korea
CREATION DATE 08/15/1975
VOLUME 52 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700537
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER 35
FOLDER TITLE Korean Military Situation (Working
File) (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/11/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

7

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 033639

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

DESCRIPTION Re North Korea
CREATION DATE 01/30/1976
VOLUME 7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700537
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER 35
FOLDER TITLE Korean Military Situation (Working
File) (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/11/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

open in part 6/5/07

~~Top Secret~~ 23
(Security Classification)

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
REMARKS:			
604701			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE


CONTROL NO

25X1

[Handwritten signature]

*Golden 77
RIP
8/20/80*

25X1



Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted NSC/State Guidelines
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-18-6-3-3 6/5/2007
BY MFO NARA, DATE 9/20/2011


Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MORI/CDE

NIO M 76-003J

~~Top Secret~~
(Security Classification)
E2 IMPDET

25X1



30 January 1976

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Recent North Korean Military Developments*


Summary and Conclusions

1. In the past six months, North Korean military activities have continued to reflect two basic patterns, central to Pyongyang's strategy for some time:

- Across-the-board strengthening of military capabilities so as to enable the North Korean armed forces to implement a variety of military options with maximum effectiveness. The general effort is as much defensive as offensive and is obviously related -- although not on a one-to-one basis -- to similar efforts at force improvement on the ROK side.
- Maximizing the capability to move rapidly, undetected, and in strength from forward positions in close proximity to the DMZ. Given the geography of the peninsula, the offensive implications of such moves are stronger than the defensive ones.

2. Recent naval and air activities have strengthened already impressive North Korean forward capabilities in the southwest coastal area as well as on the militarily less important east coast; we have not noted similar ground activities

25X1



3. We see no evidence either in these military developments or in North Korea's political posture to suggest the


* This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the NIO/ Japan Pacific. It was drafted in part by CIA/OSR which consulted with other elements of CIA.

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted NSC/State Guidelines

AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-18-6-3-3 6/5/2007

BY MHO NARA, DATE 9/20/2011~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1





25X1


25X1



25X1



imminence of an invasion or a major military probe. Pyongyang is now in a somewhat better position to support militarily a decision to carry out probes in the vicinity of the western islands or to respond more belligerently to unplanned incidents at sea during the fishing season which begins in the spring. However, there have also been changes and improvements in the ROK military posture in this area, which the North would have to take into account. In the past, while both sides have seemed to come close to the brink in responding to unplanned incidents in and over the southwestern waters, they have in fact exercised great care to leave open the option to edge back.



25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~



25X1



25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

9. Since early 1975 new formations of fire support boats have been deployed near South Korean waters on both coasts. These boats are armed with 122-mm rocket launchers and have participated in live-fire exercises, including a simulated attack on an aircraft carrier.

10. These deployments on both coasts increase the potential threat to South Korean naval units, permit Pyongyang to react even more quickly, and with greater firepower, in the event of naval incidents, and place the navy in a better position to support an amphibious assault against the western is^{25X1}lands.

25X1

11. [REDACTED] Pyongyang is continuing fleet modernization. A fourth locally-produced R-class submarine has been launched from the Sinpo South shipyard on the east coast. The North Koreans now have four R-class boats on each coast, although the east coast units are not yet fully operational. Pyongyang also has four older W-class submarines on the east coast. The additional R-class units improve North Korea's ability to interdict shipping in contiguous waters and pose a greater threat to South Korean and US naval ships operating in the Sea of Japan. The new R-class units would also permit Pyongyang to retire or "mothball" the older W-class boats, but this probably will not happen for some time.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]


25X1



12. Ground Force Activity Relatively Static.




25X1



25X1

15. Recent Developments Fit Long-Standing Patterns. The military developments observed over the past six months are consistent with a pattern that emerged after Pyongyang abandoned its large-scale harassing operations in the late 1960s. Program decisions, probably made at the 5th Party Congress in 1970, called for strengthening military capabilities and domestic arms production; in 1972, after the achievement of "Fortress Korea" had been proclaimed, some greater stress on offensive capabilities became apparent. These developments probably reflected the expectation that by 1975 US troops would be out of South Korea, the ROK would be substantially weakened, and a military move to unify the peninsula would be much more likely to succeed.



~~TOP SECRET~~




25X1

25X1



16. Events have not worked out as Pyongyang planned. To be sure, the North is now in a stronger position to launch conventional operations across the DMZ with little or no warning than it has ever been before. But Kim obviously feels frustrated by the continued US presence and Pyongyang is keenly concerned over military developments in the South to which it pays close attention.

25X1



undoubtedly is well aware of the growing strength of its adversary. Pyongyang's recent blast at General Hollingsworth's public statements about repulsing a North Korean attack is but the latest indication of the attention Pyongyang gives to developments in the South. Thus, while the basic elements of North Korea's force development strategy seem to date from the early 1970s, implementation of these long-standing plans to maximize defensive and offensive capabilities is undoubtedly influenced by the developments Pyongyang observes across the DMZ.

17. And Political Indicators Remain Unchanged. North Korea's strengthened military capabilities have not led to any perceptible shift in the essentially political strategy it has been following for some time. It continues to be deterred from an outright assault by the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, the presence of US troops, the lack of an across-the-board superiority over ROK forces, especially if they are supported by US tactical air and naval elements, and the need for support from either Moscow or Peking in a sustained, large-scale conflict. Moreover, it has reason for satisfaction with the progress of its political strategy. Although its hopes for the development of serious political instability in the South have been disappointed, UN endorsement of the pro-North Korean resolution favoring dissolution of the UN Command underscores the extent to which Pyongyang's diplomatic struggle with the South has been successful. But, despite the vote, the North has continued to participate in the UN Armistice Commission and to recognize the validity of the Armistice while calling for its replacement with a peace treaty.



- 5 -


25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1



25X1



- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~



25X1



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 033640

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

DESCRIPTION Re North Korea

CREATION DATE 04/1976

VOLUME 15 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700537

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 35

FOLDER TITLE Korean Military Situation (Working
File) (2)


DATE WITHDRAWN 05/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

open in part 6/5/07

606348

~~Top Secret~~



Gold 47
R10
G-5-57

NSC 146860

Jay Taylor

Intelligence Memorandum

North Korea's Military Forces

NGA Review Completed.

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted NSC/State Guidelines
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2 6/5/2007
BY W/O NARA, DATE 9/20/2011



MORI/CDF

~~Top Secret~~

SR 76-10116.1
April 1976

25X1


Copy 4 4

25X1



Page Denied





North Korea's Military Forces

Key Findings

For several years, North Korea has been pursuing a military policy designed to give its armed forces greater strength and flexibility and, consequently, an increased capability for offensive operations. Each of its services has improved its standing relative to its South Korean counterpart.

- The army is smaller than that of South Korea, but it has an edge in firepower and is far superior in armor.
- The North Korean Air Force, with more than 600 tactical jet aircraft, outnumbered its South Korean counterpart in air strength and has a better air defense capability.
- The navies of both Koreas continue to have a primary mission of coastal defense, but the North Korean Navy, with its larger inventory of patrol boats, landing craft, and fire support boats, has a growing capability for limited offensive operations against coastal areas and shipping.

The North Koreans have obtained most of their arms from the Soviet Union and China. Unlike the South Koreans, however, they have begun producing much of their own equipment in recent years—including submarines, a guided-missile boat, frigates, and armored vehicles.

25X1



~~Top Secret~~



SR 76-10116J
Apr 76



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1976

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

North Korea's Military Forces



Preface

Throughout the 1970s, North Korea has been engaged in various programs to improve its military capabilities. These efforts--including innovations in training, acquisition of new equipment, and some domestic production of ships and land armaments--have benefited all three services. This memorandum reviews the present status and capabilities of North Korea's ground, air, and naval forces. It also discusses improvements in training and the country's efforts to reduce its dependence on imported arms by producing weapons at home.

The memorandum does not attempt any extensive comparative analysis of North and South Korean military capabilities, but does provide (on the reverse of this page) a table listing the manpower strengths and principal equipment of each country's army, air force, and navy.



25X1

Comments and queries regarding this memorandum are welcome. They may be directed to  of the Regional Analysis Division, Office of Strategic Research, 

25X1



25X1


25X1



SR 76-10116J
Apr 76

~~Top Secret~~

Page Denied






25X1

Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Ground Forces	5
Air Force	7
Navy	9
Training	10
Domestic Military Production	10



25X1



25X1



3

~~Top Secret~~

SR 76-10116J
Apr 76

Page Denied



25X1

Ground Forces

The North Korean Army has an estimated strength of 386,000 main-force troops and 40,000 unconventional-warfare forces. Main-force units include 20 infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, three motorized infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and three AAA divisions. Most of these are positioned within 50 miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The unconventional-warfare forces, many of whom are trained in airborne and amphibious assault operations, are organized generally into 11 light infantry brigades and five airborne battalions. The ground forces are backed up by a militia reserve of some 1.3 million men.

Since the late 1960s the North Koreans have been involved in a major effort to strengthen their ground forces, especially in the areas of armor, field artillery, and ground mobility. Major items in their arms inventory now include:

- 1,500 medium tanks (mostly Soviet T-54/55s and Chinese Type 59s)
- 2,600-2,700 field artillery pieces
- 300 light tanks and assault guns
- 700 multiple rocket launchers.

The ground forces also have Soviet-supplied FROG (free rocket over ground) and antitank weapons.

In 1969 the North Koreans began to emphasize the strengthening of defenses along the DMZ and both coasts. The firepower of frontline units was increased, and armor and artillery reserves were dispersed to forward units. This served to strengthen defensive capabilities along the DMZ, but the dispersal of armor assets reduced North Korea's capability for a concentrated offensive thrust against the South.

It now appears that Pyongyang has altered that strategy. Since 1973 the North Koreans have strengthened their entire armor structure. They have formed a second armored division, with over 250 medium tanks, within a




25X1

5

~~Top Secret~~SR 76-10116J
Apr 76

Page Denied



25X1



day's march of the DMZ. Located midway between the traditional invasion corridors to South Korea, this new division represents a departure from the concept of dispersing armor assets and constitutes a force capable of spearheading an offensive or launching a counter-offensive in the event of a South Korean attack.

Air Force

The North Korean Air Force is organized into five fighter divisions, a bomber division, a transport division, various reconnaissance and training elements, and an air academy. The backbone of the air force is its 120 MIG-21 interceptors, the most modern aircraft the North possesses. These are supplemented by about 90 MIG-19 fighters, 22 SU-7 fighter-bombers, and some 300 older MIG-15/17 fighters. The bomber force consists of 85 IL-28 jet light bombers.

The primary mission of the air force is air defense of the mainland and coastal areas, but it does have a capability for offensive operations in support of ground and naval forces. Indeed, over the past few years the the North Koreans have placed increasing emphasis on ground support.


North Korea has 22 permanent-surface airfields capable of handling jet aircraft. Nineteen currently are operational and two more--Hyon-ni and Taetan--are expected to reach that status soon. The North also has 25 transport/utility fields and 18 highway air strips for aircraft dispersal. At major fields, aircraft storage tunnels and hangarages have been constructed to provide for greater aircraft survivability in case of attack. Tunnels or hangarages now are present at 18 of the 22 permanent-surface airfields.

The air force is almost completely dependent on outside assistance to maintain its effectiveness. All of its aircraft and most of its other equipment are of Soviet origin or design, although China has,


25X1



7

~~Top Secret~~


Page Denied



25X1



since the late 1960s, taken an increasingly larger role as a supplier.




25X1

Navy

The navy has about 400 combat ships and is divided into two fleets, one on each coast. The East Coast Fleet traditionally has been the stronger, but the North Koreans have considerably strengthened their western fleet in recent years. The major warships in the navy include 2 indigenously designed and built frigates, 19 guided missile boats, 8 torpedo attack submarines (5 more may become operational in 1976), and a wide variety of patrol, torpedo, fire support, and landing craft.

In recent years the North Korean Navy has surpassed that of the South in terms of firepower, readiness, and training. Concurrently, it has placed greater emphasis on fleet modernization. During hostilities, the navy could support limited offensive operations against coastal areas of the South, provide rear-area coastal security, and interdict shipping in the northern portions of South Korean waters, particularly near the off-shore islands.

Construction and expansion of naval facilities are continuing apace




25X1

North

Korea also has two major missile support facilities, one on each coast.

9

25X1

~~Top Secret~~

25X1

Training

25X1

[REDACTED] the armed forces in the last two years have developed a high degree of proficiency and combat readiness through extensive training.

Since 1973, ground force training has stressed armor and artillery as well as unconventional warfare scenarios, including exercises involving large- and small-scale infiltration. No large-scale training by other conventional ground forces has been noted in the last two years, but it probably is continuing.

Naval training has grown appreciably. In 1975 there were nine extensive training exercises by units of both fleets. (In 1974, no large-scale naval exercises were noted.) Last year's training included a number of offensively oriented exercises, many involving amphibious landings and fire support.

In recent years, air force training has emphasized ground support to a greater degree. The air force has also been working more closely with the navy to improve coordination between the two services. This should enhance the ability of the North Koreans to react quickly to naval incidents in waters near South Korea.

Domestic Military Production

Over the past several years the North Koreans have significantly improved their ability to produce military equipment. Their capabilities in the field far exceed those of South Korea, which relies mostly on the US for its arms. The program is in accord with Kim Il-song's *Chuche* (self-reliance) concept and will reduce North Korea's dependence on the USSR and China.


North Korea is considered self-sufficient in the manufacture of infantry weapons and ammunition to meet its peacetime requirements. It currently produces

10


25X1

Top Secret

25X1



its own small arms, rocket launchers, mortars, recoil-less rifles, some light and medium artillery, military vehicles, communications equipment, ammunition, and probably the Snapper antitank missile.



25X1

An extensive shipbuilding effort has been under way since the late 1960s. This is the country's largest program for producing military equipment. The program not only permits fleet growth but also allows for a continual upgrading of the navy as older units are replaced.

Before 1969 North Korean shipyards were engaged mostly in producing patrol escorts and torpedo boats. In 1969, however, the North began construction of two frigates. Since then the shipbuilding effort has burgeoned to include submarines, a guided missile boat, submarine chasers, and a variety of landing and fire support craft.



25X1

~~Top Secret~~

