

The original documents are located in Box 5 , folder “Korea (7)” of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032799

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME W.R. Smyser, Richard T. Kennedy

RECEIVER'S NAME Secretary Kissinger

TITLE Proposed NSSM on U.S. Military
Assistance to South Korea

CREATION DATE 10/04/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET~~ GDSACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Proposed NSSM On U. S. Military Assistance to South Korea

Attached at Tab A is a draft NSSM requesting, in your name, a quick study of future U. S. military assistance to South Korea. The South Koreans have been pressing us in recent months for clearer indications as to the future of our military assistance program in light of tightening Congressional constraints. Foreign Minister Kim raised this question with me here on September 27, and President Park can be expected to broach the matter with you when you visit Seoul next month.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my signing the draft NSSM request at Tab A.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

~~TOP SECRET~~ GDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/88, State Dept. Guidelines
By lh NARA, Date 12/7/10



1c
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~ GDS

National Security Study Memorandum

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U. S. Security Assistance to the
Republic of Korea

The President has requested a study of our Security Assistance Program to the Republic of Korea. The study should define basic U. S. objectives as regards our security assistance to South Korea, and should then lay out the policy options that will give effect to these objectives.

The study should assume no significant changes in the level or missions of U. S. forces in the Republic of Korea during the period of transition to new security arrangements following the termination of the UNC.

The study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, consideration of the following issues:

--Should we fix a termination date for grant military assistance, and if so what should that date be?

--Should we accelerate the rate of shift from grant military assistance to FMS credits defined in NSDM 227, and if so what should the new rate be?

--What types and numbers of high performance aircraft should be included in the Korean Force Modernization Program?

--What modifications, if any, should be made in the five year Modernization Program for the Republic of Korea prescribed in NSDM 129?

~~TOP SECRET~~ GDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By AA NARA, Date 12/7/10

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia. The study should be submitted no later than October 15, 1974, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its consideration by the President.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032800

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S TITLE CINCPACREP GUAM

RECEIVER'S TITLE Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the
Joint Chief of Staff

DESCRIPTION Re US-Republic of Korea Relations

CREATION DATE 09/27/1974

VOLUME 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2 ROK
(also listed
in JAF working
J folder)
⑩

TOP SECRET (GDS)

October 8, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 211

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of Korea

The President has requested a study of our Security Assistance Program for the Republic of Korea. The study should define basic U.S. objectives as regards our security assistance to South Korea, and should then set forth the policy options that will give effect to these objectives.

The study should assume no significant changes in the level or missions of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea during the period of transition to new security arrangements following the termination of the United Nations Command.

The study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, consideration of the following issues:

-- Should a termination date be set for grant military assistance, and if so, what should that date be?

-- Should the rate of shift from grant military assistance to FMS credits, defined in NSDM 227, be accelerated and, if so, what should the new rate be?

-- What types and numbers of high performance aircraft should be included in the Korean Force Modernization Program?

-- What modifications, if any, should be made in the five-year Modernization Program for the Republic of Korea prescribed in NSDM 129?


TOP SECRET (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY NSC memo 1/30/09
BY W DATE 12/7/10



The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia. The study should be submitted no later than November 1, 1974, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its consideration by the President.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. A. Kissinger". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
October 18, 1974

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: W. R. Smyser
SUBJECT: The President's Trip to Korea

We have now received the State memorandum regarding the President's trip to Korea (Tab B). The memorandum states objectives for the trip and outlines a program.

We have recast State's paper as a memorandum from you to the President.

RECOMMENDATION:


That you sign the attached memorandum to the President (Tab A).

DECLASSIFIED

EO 1.35

By llh NARA, Date 12/7/10
SECRET
nrx ginkhmas

~~SECRET~~ GDS



WASHINGTON

ACTION~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Your Visit to Korea

Your visit to Korea comes in circumstances very different from those that marked the visits of President Eisenhower in 1952 (as President-elect) and 1960, and of President Johnson in 1966.

Then we were in the midst of the Cold War and the Vietnam War. Now we are in a period of detente, improving our relations with Korea's two large Communist neighbors.

Then North and South Korea were sworn enemies confronting each other in immutable hostility. Now they have established some contact and they have made limited gestures toward each other, though they remain intensely distrustful of each other.

Then we were providing considerable help from what we saw as virtually unlimited resources while Korea was struggling to establish its economy. Now we have to curtail our aid but South Korea is more able to take care of itself.

Then U. S. public opinion was prepared to accept the blemishes of our allies. Now it is quicker to insist that allies should be models of democracy. The Korean opposition knows this. It and the Government will both try to gain some advantage from your visit.

While all this has changed, one geographic imperative remains constant: Korea lies between three great powers, China, the Soviet Union and Japan. Each would rather have us there than either of the others.

The Republic of Korea remains one of our closest friends, but we are living in a different time. Our problem is to keep our alliance a strong and effective deterrent in this different time, making the necessary adjustments without changing the basic relationship and its contribution to stability, and yet to continue to move toward a lowering of tensions in Korea and elsewhere.

~~SECRET~~ - GDS

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12958, EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, GDS 33

SECRET

By WA NARA, Date 12/1/12

Basic Purposes of Your Visit

In the context of our changing relationship, your visit has the following basic purposes:

-- To keep North Korea and its allies on notice that our support for South Korea continues undiminished and that our interest in detente will not lead to our disengagement from the peninsula.

-- To reaffirm for Seoul our commitment to the Republic of Korea as well as our readiness to maintain our alliance relationship, while providing the Korean leadership with a direct appreciation of our reduced resources.

-- To maintain an equal distance between President Park and his opposition as regards internal South Korean political affairs.

Means of Achieving these Purposes

We do not expect to conclude any new agreements with the Koreans. You will, nonetheless, want to have a substantive meeting with President Park and to meet with other Korean leaders both in the government and in the opposition.

You will also want to meet with American troops to underline our continued presence, and you will want to make appropriate public appearances.

Your Program: Substantive Meetings

You will probably spend much of the afternoon after your arrival in private discussions with President Park. There should also be time for a brief wind-up meeting the next morning which will include issuance of a joint communique. We are doing a NSSM study on future military assistance levels to help prepare you.

There should also be a visit to the National Assembly and a brief televised address before that assembly.

Protocol Events

There are a few protocol requirements that the Koreans regard as essential:

-- Airport arrival and departure ceremonies.

CONFIDENTIAL

-- Wreath-laying ceremonies at the tombs of Mrs. Park and of the Unknown Soldier.

-- A reception and a formal dinner hosted by President Park.

-- If your arrival schedule permits it, there may also be a brief lunch, which could be a formal working lunch with Park or a somewhat larger formal luncheon.

Your Program: Public Events

To underscore the American presence in Korea, there are two public events:

-- A visit to the U. S. Second Infantry Division on the morning of November 23.

-- A brief meeting with American staff and community representatives.

We are preparing a separate program for Mrs. Ford, though we expect that she will join in at least some of your activities.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize us to plan for your visit along the lines outlined above.

Approve _____ Approve as Amended _____



1941

3c

~~SECRET~~

October 18, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Planning for the President's
Visit to KoreaSetting

The President's visit to Korea will be the first Presidential visit since that of President Johnson in October 1966. It will occur at a time when the Korean government is greatly concerned that the long standing close relationship with the U.S. may be in for fundamental changes. This concern is motivated in part by our new relationships with the PRC and USSR but also by public and congressional criticism of Korea's recent domestic policies. The visit will serve to reassure that the basic American attachment to Korea continues.

In addition to this symbolic aspect, the visit will provide opportunity for consultation on common issues at the highest level. These include: the anticipated dissolution of the United Nations Command; future relationships with North Korea, the USSR and the PRC; our changing relationship with the ROK and the nature of support and military assistance (including troop levels) we will be able to maintain.

The visit to Japan and Korea comes as the two countries are seeking to restore normal relations which had been strained almost to the breaking point by events surrounding the assassination attempt which resulted in Madam Park's death. The pause in the confrontation between President Park and his critics occasioned by the tragic death of his wife has ended. The forecast is that the visit also will occur at a time of heightened domestic tension in Korea resulting from the Government's renewed efforts to stifle political dissent.

~~SECRET~~

XDS-3

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By

NARA, Date

12/7/10



All Koreans welcome the visit. But both sides -- the government and its critics -- will be seeking to use it to their own ends: President Park by attempting to portray the visit as U.S. backing despite criticism of his excesses; and his critics by attempting to focus world attention on the need for reform of his authoritarian rule. The latter will seek to create conditions through protest and demonstration prior to the visit, and possibly during it, that will highlight their position. As a minimum their objective will be to block Park's attempt to use the visit to demonstrate U.S. support of his rule, notwithstanding its authoritarian cast. As a maximum they will wish to use the visit to force Park to move away from repressive government.

In sum, the visit provides a timely opportunity for a forceful reiteration of the American commitment to the security and welfare of the Korean people. To demonstrate these convictions against a background of internal dissension in Korea and increasing American public concern over Park's disregard for human rights will not be easy.

Korean Government Objectives

The ROKG wants the visit to:

- reaffirm the continuity of our unique commitment to Korea, putting to rest public apprehension over what is feared as an intention to disengage from Asia.
- assure that we will continue to give priority to Korea, notwithstanding other demands on our resources. And in this connection that we will give highest priority to the completion of the ROK Armed Forces Modernization Program. Moreover, that we will continue to station forces in Korea as clear evidence of our intention to defend the South from aggression.
- demonstrate to Park's domestic critics that we will not dissociate ourselves from President Park whatever the criticism of our press and Congress.
- result in the acceptance of the Korean felt need for additional F-4 aircraft beyond those mutually projected in the modernization program.



-- result in recognition of the ROK view that the threat from North Korea is increasing rather than subsiding and that we should caution the Japanese whom Koreans see as moving closer to the North.

Our Objectives

We expect the visit to:

-- reaffirm our commitment to the ROK in a time of rapidly changing circumstances which prompt Korean anxiety. At the same time to provide the Korean leadership with an increased appreciation of our limited resources available.

-- to keep Pyongyang and its allies on notice that U.S. support for the ROK continues undiminished.

-- demonstrate that we are not partisan in our reaction to on-going Korean/Japan disputes and remind that the security interests of the two countries are interdependent.

-- assure that the anticipated dissolution of the United Nations Command will not lessen our cooperation in mutual security matters.

-- reassure that we have no present plans for substantial reductions in our force levels.

-- encourage the ROK to make more positive efforts to open a substantive dialogue with the North.

Elements of the Visit

Substantive Meetings

Most of the afternoon of November 22 will be devoted to private discussions with President Park. These may be preceded by a small working lunch with Park, depending on time of arrival, which has not yet been established. There also will be time for a brief wind-up meeting the next morning, which will include issuance of a joint communique.

Also planned is a visit to the National Assembly to call on the Speaker and the leadership of both the government and opposition parties. We have under consideration



a Korean proposal that the President make a brief address to the National Assembly.

Social/Protocol Events

The following have been proposed by the ROKG:

-- Airport arrival ceremony at which the President will make a brief statement. The event will be televised.

-- On the way from the airport the President to lay wreaths at the tombs of Madam Park and the Unknown Soldier.

-- A reception and a formal dinner hosted by President Park on the evening of November 22.

Other Events

-- A visit to the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division the morning of November 23, which will allow the President to meet our forces in the field.

-- Brief meeting with American staff and community representatives.

-- Brief departure ceremony to include farewell remarks by the President.

Recommendation

That we be authorized to proceed with planning and coordination with the Koreans on the basis of the above objectives and events.

Intermittent Deans
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary *for*



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032801

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME Jeanne W. Davis

RECEIVER'S NAME Secretary Kissinger

TITLE Talker for Meeting with Secretary
Schlesinger, October 22

DESCRIPTION Re US Force Levels in Thailand and
South Korea, and Military Aid for
Vietnam

CREATION DATE 10/21/1974

VOLUME 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032802

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

TITLE Long-Term US Military Force Levels in
Thailand (FY 1976 and Beyond)

CREATION DATE 10/11/1974

VOLUME 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

~~SECRET~~

4c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

July 9, 1974

9 JUL 74 19 16z

NMCC-LDX

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral Thomas J. Bigley
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, ISA

SUBJECT : Comments on DoD Memorandum Entitled "Long-Term
U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand
(FY 1976 and Beyond)"

As noted in our previous response (dated June 25, 1974), the Central Intelligence Agency believes that the extent of the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Thailand recommended in Option II may lead Hanoi to conclude that the U.S. is no longer a restraining factor against a renewal of major hostilities in South Vietnam. Reflecting this concern, the Central Intelligence Agency does not concur in recommending Option II. The CIA's position is as follows:

A. The Central Intelligence Agency believes that an option calling for a gradual reduction of U.S. forces in Thailand during FY 76 to a level somewhere between Options I and II would be less likely to lead Hanoi to conclude that the U.S. was not intending or able to respond to a major Communist attack than the recommended Option II. Such a variation would include the retention of a couple of airfields on standby, the continued presence of some B-52s at U-Tapao with the necessary support equipment and personnel, and an understanding with the Thai government that the U.S. would rotate units to Thailand from time to time.

B. While granting that the U.S. military presence in Thailand is not in and of itself the controlling deterrent against North Vietnamese military action in South Vietnam, a sharp reduction would represent a signal to Hanoi of U.S. intentions. The Intelligence Community has recently

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY RAC NLF-NSC-EA-PA-5-6-4-2
Date Rev. 9/18/03, NSC Decisions 4/24/07
NSR NLF DATE 4/6/09




~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

estimated (NLB 53/14.3-1-74, May 23, 1974) that the North Vietnamese will at some point shift back to major warfare in an attempt to achieve their objective of gaining control of South Vietnam. The pace of the U.S. drawdown in Thailand -- and Hanoi's perception thereof -- could affect the timing of a North Vietnamese decision to launch a major offensive. This could be particularly important during the 1975-76 dry season period. With U.S. presidential elections coming up in 1976, Hanoi might reason -- as it did in 1968 and 1972 -- that recourse to major military action was especially propitious. CIA is concerned that the drawdown recommended in Option II might lead Hanoi to conclude that the U.S. was no longer a restraining factor on Communist military plans and actions and that the likelihood of a resurgence in the U.S. presence in Thailand was exceedingly low or even non-existent.

C. We would not anticipate serious problems with the Thai government in retaining a U.S. force level in Thailand in excess of 7,000 during FY 76. From the Thai perspective, the important matter is showing progress in reducing the U.S. presence, not in reducing it to any particular level. Indeed, there is a general acknowledgment within the Thai government, especially among the military leaders, of the value of the U.S. presence and a concern that it not be reduced too quickly.

D. The Thai leaders, however, are concerned over what they can expect to get out of the continued presence of U.S. forces in Thailand. (This concern applies to any of the options under consideration.) In short, the Thai want to know what the quid pro quo is for permitting U.S. forces to remain on Thai soil, but its cost would not necessarily be high. For example, the establishment or expansion of joint Thai-U.S. activities (such as assistance on highway and railroad modernization projects, joint intelligence operations, etc.) would help to make a continued U.S. presence more palatable to the Thai.


W. B. Colby
Director

cc: Mr. John B. Dexter, Dept. of State



~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

(C)
4d

~~SECRET~~ - GDS

March 23, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 249

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State

SUBJECT: U. S. Deployments in Thailand

The President has reviewed the studies submitted in response to NSSM 171, related studies, and the views of the concerned Departments and Agencies. He has directed that the following actions be taken:

The Secretary of Defense should:

- Withdraw unessential non-strike aircraft (EC-121's and C-130's) by June 1, 1974.
- Withdraw US combat forces between May 15 and December 31, 1974, to a residual level of nine tactical air squadrons, one AC-130 gunship squadron and 17 B-52's, as outlined in the plan presented by the Secretary of Defense. These withdrawals should be spaced over the period in question, with the precise timing of the withdrawals to be determined in consultation with the Thai Government.
- Reduce MACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI and U. S. Army Support Command manpower by 30 percent by August 31, 1974, consolidate headquarters wherever possible and eliminate all unessential headquarters and support units.

The Deputy Secretary of State should:

- Immediately initiate consultations with the Royal Thai Government on the foregoing withdrawal plans, on means of reducing the economic dislocation caused by these withdrawals, and on securing re-entry rights.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; NSC memo 1/30/09
By NARA, Date 12/7/10


~~SECRET~~ - GDS



The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Deputy Secretary of State, should prepare and submit for the President's consideration no later than May 1, 1974, recommendations as to equipment and facilities associated with US forces in Thailand that can be made available for turnover to the Thai as US forces are withdrawn.

The Secretary of Defense should also prepare and submit for the President's consideration no later than May 1, 1974, alternative plans and recommendations on the transfer of EC-47 aircraft to either South Vietnam or Thailand or some combination of the two.

The Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Secretary of State should submit recommendations on alternative long term (FY 76 and beyond) US military force levels in Thailand and proposed withdrawal plans to support each of the alternatives. These recommendations should be submitted not later than June 30, 1974, for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director, Office of Management and Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032803

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME J.R. Schlesinger

CREATOR'S TITLE Secretary of Defense

RECEIVER'S NAME Secretaries of the Military Departments
et al

TITLE FY 74-SO Planning Guidance for
Southeast Asia Force and Activity
Levels

CREATION DATE 01/22/1974

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032804

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME J.R. Schlesinger

RECEIVER'S TITLE Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

TITLE U.S. Deployments in Thailand

CREATION DATE 01/22/1974

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032805

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME J.R. Schlesinger
RECEIVER'S TITLE Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
TITLE Carrier Alert Posture in Southeast Asia
CREATION DATE 01/1974
VOLUME 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER 5
FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 21, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: U. S. Deployments in Thailand

After considering Deputy Secretary Clements' memorandum of October 13, 1973, the President has decided that, in light of the threat of a North Vietnamese offensive, there should be ~~no withdrawal of forces from Thailand~~ ~~at the conclusion of the FY 74 dry season.~~

It is requested that the Department of Defense prepare a plan for withdrawal of forces to the force level goal common to both Options 1 and 2 of the Defense study. ~~The withdrawals should begin immediately and~~ ~~beginning dry season and be completed by the end of FY 75.~~ The timing of the withdrawals should take into account projected requirements for the FY 75 dry season. This plan should be submitted by January 31, 1974, and should include recommended sortie surge capabilities and the key decision points for modification of the withdrawal plan.

It is also requested that a contingency plan be prepared for the possible withdrawal of some unessential, non-strike capabilities (e.g. RB-66, EC-121, O-2) during the next few months on relatively short notice. This would provide some flexibility to withdraw forces should internal pressures on the RTG make this desirable during the coming dry season. This plan should be submitted by December 15, 1973. Neither of these plans should be discussed with Thai officials.

Directly related to these withdrawals is the question of the equipment which could be left behind for turnover to the Thais as the units are withdrawn. In order to determine the extent to which we may respond to Thai requests, the President has directed a review of the equipment of all U. S. forces to be withdrawn through FY 75. The review should be submitted by December 15, 1973, and should identify:

- Equipment which the Thai military would like to acquire.



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as-amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By *[initials]* NARA, Date *12/7/10*

nsc guidelines 9/17/03


~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont No. 7-58

~~SECRET~~

- Equipment for which DOD believes Thailand has a valid military need (particularly as regards counter-insurgency operations) and the capability to support and maintain, with explanations where DOD judgment differs from Thai desires.
- Equipment required to support U.S. capability for rapid reintroduction of forces into Thailand.
- Significant legal, operational, or budgetary constraints on turning the identified equipment over to the Thais.

It is also requested that the requirement for the numerous headquarters and support units in Thailand be examined. Recommended manning levels and timing of reductions where applicable should be submitted for each unit. Headquarters and supporting units should be eliminated or consolidated where possible. Special attention should be given to reducing excessive military presence in Bangkok. Recommendations together with supporting rationale should be submitted by December 15, 1973.


Henry A. Kissinger

~~SECRET~~



→ Frische 5

THE WHITE HOUSE

4236

WASHINGTON

(p)

~~CONFIDENTIAL - GDS~~

October 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Reduction in Manpower Authorization, Joint
U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea

The manpower authorization reduction proposed in your memorandum of September 19, 1974, has been reviewed and is approved. However, no action should be taken prior to completion of the President's trip to Korea.

Brent Scowcroft
Henry A. Kissinger


~~CONFIDENTIAL - GDS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652 (rev. 5-8-72) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/76, State Dept. Guidelines

By MA NARA, Date 12/7/10



→ ~~From FY1~~
ROR 6a

WRS

5072

(10)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: Nov. 4, 1974

MEMO FOR: JEANNE DAVIS

FROM: ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
WARREN RUSTAND

The attached is for your appropriate handling.
(Ltr. from Seoul, Korea, with signed
Thank you. petitions re: conditions, welfare,
and development of Korea)

76
*audience
(Korea trip)*
GP

66

The Honorable Mr. Gerald R. Ford
President of The United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

October 11, 1974
Seoul, Korea
T/D _____
SCHEDULE BD. _____
DATE RECEIVED
NOV 4 1974
MESSAGE _____
SPEAKERS BUREAU _____
OTHER *RSC*
APPOINTMENT OFFICE

Dear Mr. President:

The signers of this letter are all men and women living and serving in the Republic of Korea. Out of our deep concern for the welfare and development of Korea and its people, we wish to bring to your attention the critical situation now existing in this nation.

We are sure that you are aware of the imprisonment of scores of students, Christian clergymen, social leaders, lawyers and common citizens. These men and women have been arrested on false political charges. The military courts that have tried them have prostituted even military court standards, let alone standards of normal civil procedures. Sentences of several years to death have been handed down despite absence of evidence. Eight men are to die for their part in a so-called conspiracy which the government has not been able to prove ever existed.

In addition to these dramatic violations of human rights, countless citizens are under the ruthless surveillance of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency; professors at universities are examined lest they have "disloyal" ideas; businessmen are under constant police pressure to make political "contributions"; workers have had their rights to collective bargaining and collective action taken away; and ordinary citizens in the markets, tea rooms and other public places must carefully guard their speech lest they be overheard to offend the government in some manner.

These crimes against human rights and civil liberties are, however, only the by-product of a more fundamental problem; that being the "Yushin" Constitution ("Revitalizing Reforms"). This constitution, forcefully pressed upon the Korean people under a decree of martial law in October of 1972, eliminated democratic legislative government in Korea; made one man, Park Chung Hee, virtual dictator for life; and allowed Mr. Park and his C.I.A. to suspend any person or group of their civil liberties at any time. The tragic events of 1974 are a consequence of this Yushin constitution. Therefore large numbers of the Korean people are demanding that the Yushin constitution be withdrawn and the democratic constitution which existed up to 1972 be reinstated. This is a just demand



which must be recognized if Korea is to return to the path of democracy and development.

Some rationalize that the Yushin constitution and the suppression practiced by Park and his C.I.A. are necessary in order to defend the country against a threatened invasion from North Korea. In fact, however, the observable results are the exact opposite. South Korea is so filled with mistrust and fear arising from Park's constitution and the resultant policies, that the social unity needed to defend against the North has certainly been weakened. Modernization of Korea's military cannot restore the confidence of the citizens in their government. Park's government has undermined its own military forces as well as those of the United States which just recently have again been pledged to defend the Republic of Korea.

How will the rest of the world react to America's continuing support of Park's dictatorial policies? The recent Congressional Hearings have clearly pointed out not only a shift in U.S. public opinion, but also the grave disadvantages of the U.S. continuing its unconditional support of the Park regime. We too are of the strong opinion that it would be in the best interest of both Korea and the U.S.-- diplomatically, economically, and militarily--to convey strong disapproval of the trend of events in this country over the last few years. We feel that your visit, if it does not include this expression of disapproval, will only prove to millions of observers that the U.S. government does, in fact, fully support the oppressive policies of the present Korean government.

Mr. President, we are writing this letter out of love and commitment to the people of Korea. We wish you to be fully informed of these facts when you make your visit here in November. Already Korean newspapers have said that the government is likely to release some political prisoners before your visit. Of course, if this occurs, we, along with the people of Korea, will rejoice at such a move. However, at the same time we must recognize this act for what it is: only a gesture to impress the world and particularly the United States. We would mourn the fact that it was done with such motivation rather than as a genuine attempt to restore the integrity of this nation.

In light of these facts we ask that you strongly urge the leaders of the Republic of Korea to release all the political prisoners apprehended since October, 1972; to rescind the remaining Emergency Measures; and to abolish the Yushin Constitution, reinstating in its place the democratic constitution which existed up to October, 1972. We also strongly suggest that you meet with opposition religious, social, and political leaders.



We, the signers, representing various churches, agencies, and organizations, will be glad to meet with you or any of your accompanying party to discuss these matters directly. We pray that your visit will have some influence in healing the present tragic situation.

Sincerely yours,

The Undersigned



Signature	Position	Organization	State
George Ogle	Social Action Director	Professor, Methodist Mission	Pa.
Harriet P. Morn	Social Worker	U.S. Army	Conn.
Martin J. Lowry, m.m.	Parish Priest	Maryknoll Fathers Mission	Illinois
Suzanne B. Rice	Adviser - Consultant Girls' Welfare Association	United Presbyterian	New York
Alfred V. Keane m.m.	Regional Coordinator	Maryknoll Fathers	New York
Very Rev. J.P. Linnott	Vicar General	Inchon Diocese	New York
Louise M. Dupst	Teacher	Methodist Mission	Iowa
Gene Matthews	Student Worker	Methodist Mission	Iowa
John Corcoran	Regional Director	Maryknoll Missions	R.I.
J. D. Goodwin, Jr.	Missionary	Baptist Mission	N.C.
Walter Kurat, Jr.	Missionary	Methodist Mission	Colo.
Paul M. Price	Professor	Society of Jesus	Calif.
Robert J. Kelly	Missionary Professor	Society of Jesus	Wisconsin
Willa Berner	Missionary	United Church of Canada	Sask.
Jo-anne Fisher	Secretary - N.E.C. Korea	" " " "	B.C.
Dorothy Ogle	Nurse	Methodist Mission	Illinois

Signature	Position	Organization	State
Sr. Ann Hayden	Professional Nurse	Maryknoll Sisters	Kentucky
Sr. Segrud Christine Orta	Social Worker	Maryknoll Sisters	New York
Sr. Dolores Congdon	Public Health Nurse	Maryknoll Sisters	New York
Sr. Mary Hack	Pediatric Nurse	Maryknoll Sisters	Pa.
Sr. Rita Bonnin	L.N.	Maryknoll Sisters	Mass.
Sr. Patricia Keathlyk	Secretary	Maryknoll Sisters	Mass.
Sr. Jean Maloney	Vice-President Korean Sisters Association	Maryknoll Sisters	N.Y.
Sr. Madeline Lindt	Professional Nurse	Maryknoll Ss.	New York
H. H. H. H. H.	Nurse	International Catholic Auxiliaries	BELGIUM
Sr. Anne Marie Curran	Pediatrician	Francoise Thrononais Sister	FRENCH
Sr. Maria			
Sr. Dolores Duni	University Teacher	Maryknoll Sisters	New York
Sr. Esther M. Kelly	Pharmacist	Maryknoll Sisters	Pa.
Sr. Joyce Funn	Nurse	Maryknoll Sisters	New York
Christine Groffe	Prof. Spous. Mtr.	Yousei Univ.	Calif.



Signature	Position	Organization	State
Donald J. Gullet M.M.	Pastor	Maryknoll Fathers	Maine
Charles Bobak M.M.	Missionary	Maryknoll Fathers	Mass.
Benedict Zuber M.M.	Missionary	Maryknoll Fathers	Maine
August E. Eichmann M.M.	Missionary	Maryknoll Fathers	New York
James J. Peters M.M.	Missionary	Maryknoll Fathers	New York
Frank J. Finell M.M.	Missionary	Maryknoll Fathers	New York
Richard B. Kolwe M.M.	Missionary	Maryknoll Frs.	Mich.
Linda Huffman Jones, M.Ph.	Researcher	Yonsei University	Illinois
John A. ...	Professor/Missionary	Yonsei University	South Dakota
Edward W. ...	Professor	Methodist Theol. Seminary	Mass.
Peter Van ...	Professor at Yonsei University	United Presbyterians Mission	Mich.
Elna A. Harper	Missionary	Board of Global Ministries	Illinois
Charles W. Harper	Professor, ^{Methodist} McKean College	United Methodist Church	Illinois



Signature	Position	Organization	State
Nancy Nelson	Teacher	Presbyterian Mission	Illinois
Dirk Nelson	Visiting Professor	Presby. Mission	Illinois
C. H. Stanley	Teacher	Presby. Mission	Virginia
Betty Upchurch	Professor	Presby. Mission	Ill.
Ju. Duxton	Missionary	Presby. Mission	Wis.
W. R. Hanscomb, Jr.	Missionary	Presby. Mission	NEW YORK
David W. Jones	Urban Researcher	Presby. Mission	Illinois



Signature	Position	Organization	State
John Gulec J.	High School Teacher	Society of Jesus	Wisconsin
Mr. J. Daniels	administration	Society of Jesus	Wis
Richard F. McCluskey, S.J.	Missionary Professor	Society of Jesus	Nebraska
August C. Kollmann, S.J.	professor	Society of Jesus	Iowa
John D. Mace, S.J.	professor	Society of Jesus	Nebraska
Robert K. McElroy, S.J.	Catholic priest	Society of Jesus	Wisconsin
Walter J. Burns	Professor	Sogang University	Florida
Edward J. Farnen, S.J.	Priest - Professor	Sogang University	Pennsylvania



Signature	Position	Organization	State
Genevieve Poitras	Professor at Ewha University	United Methodist Church	Massachusetts
Sofia Giesberg	Lecturer at Sogang University	I. C. A.	W. Germany
Colette Nour	Lecturer at Koryo University	Inter Cultural Association	France



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

November 5, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JOHN A. FROEBE, JR.

SUBJECT:

Request by Eight Congressmen to Call on the President Prior to his Visit to South Korea

→ Froebe 7a h
 +YI
 5254
 Gen S handled verbally w/ Nicholson.
 Basic correspondence (Tab A) returned to Nicholson by hand 11/14/74
 245

Eight Congressmen have written the President (Tab A) asking to meet with him prior to his visit to South Korea in order to discuss their concerns about President Park's handling of his internal political situation. Mr. Timmons has given the Congressmen an interim reply (also at Tab A), saying that the President's heavy schedule for the near future makes a call unlikely but that he would refer the matter to the Appointments Secretary.

I recommend strongly against the President's seeing the eight Congressmen before his Japan-Korea trip. The Congressmen include some of those who have been the most strident critics of the Park Government and who have been at the forefront of Congressional efforts to pressure the Park Government through reduced military assistance. Indeed, in this letter they go even farther, suggesting that the President tell Park that "unless human rights are restored to the Korean people, the U. S. will begin to disengage from South Korea." It seems to me that for the President to meet with the Congressmen before his trip could complicate tactically our handling of this problem both with the Congress and with the Park Government.

I recommend that, instead, you suggest to Mr. Rustand that he inform the Congressmen that the President's schedule regrettably does not in fact allow him to see them before his trip to Korea, but that the President will be writing the Congressmen about this question in the very near future. I would intend to forward a draft Presidential reply to you within the next few days as soon as we are clearer on the scheduling possibilities for the President to address the South Korean National Assembly and to meet with non-governmental leaders in Seoul.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By NARA, Date 12/7/10



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


RECOMMENDATION:

That you call Mr. Rustand suggesting that he inform the eight Congressmen as suggested above.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Concurrence:

Mr. Janka 

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5254 1b

October 30, 1974

ACTION:	
T/D _____	
SCHEDULE CD. _____	
DATE RECEIVED	
NOV 1 1974	
MESSAGE _____	
SPEAKERS BUREAU _____	
OTHER _____	
DEPARTMENT OFFICE	

Dear Tip:

I would like to acknowledge and thank you for your October 24 letter to the President in which you and seven of your colleagues request a meeting with him before his departure for South Korea.

The President's schedule is extremely heavy at this time and will continue to be for the next several weeks. However, I shall call your letter to his early attention as well as to the Appointments Secretary, and I am sure that every consideration will be given to your request for a meeting. Also, I shall make your concerns known to the President's foreign policy advisors.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William S. Simmons
Assistant to the President

*KOREAN
NAT. ASSEMBLY*

The Honorable Thomas F. O'Neill
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

WST:EF:frw

bcc w/inc to Warren Rustand for further action
bcc w/inc to General Scowcroft - FYI
bcc w/inc to Shirley Hays - FYI

Same ack sent to all signees



100-170

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

October 24, 1974

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Your decision to visit South Korea in November carries some grave risks for U.S. foreign policy. The situation with respect to human rights in South Korea has received extensive consideration both by the Foreign Affairs Committee during the hearings and mark-up of the foreign aid bill, as well as during joint hearings by the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Movements and on Asian and Pacific Affairs. We would greatly appreciate having the opportunity to meet with you to discuss the Korean trip and how it can best reflect the common aspirations of the Korean and American people for the attainment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

As you are aware, President Park Chung Hee has in recent years placed severe restrictions on the exercise of fundamental civil rights and liberties. At the present time, approximately 200 people are in prison for violating decrees which made it a crime to propose revisions in the Constitution or for students to engage in political activity. Those imprisoned include Protestant and Catholic clergyman, university professors, and political leaders. A former President of South Korea received a suspended sentence and the opposition candidate for the Presidency in 1971 (who received about 46% of the vote) was kidnapped from Japan and is under house arrest.


We are sure you would not want your visit to South Korea to be interpreted as approving or even condoning the unwarranted excesses of governmental power exercised by President Park. On the contrary, we hope that you will use this opportunity to convey to President Park the growing concern Americans have about the destruction of democracy in Korea. President Park should be informed that unless human rights are restored to the Korean people, the United States will begin to disengage from South Korea. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have placed restrictions on military assistance to South Korea because of the oppression in that country.


The President
The White House
Page 2

As you may be aware, members of the opposition political parties, as well as church and university officials, are advocating a revision of the Constitution to restore political freedoms. A debate has commenced in the National Assembly. Although President Park has lifted two emergency decrees he has not shown any sign of responding positively to these demands. If, during your visit, you should meet only with leaders in the government, the Korean people would interpret this behavior as indicating approval for continuing the present authoritarian government. We therefore strongly urge you to address the National Assembly and meet privately with opposition political party leaders, as well as church and university officials.

We sincerely hope that you will be able to meet with us before making your trip to South Korea.


Sincerely yours,

Dear Mr. B-

Jonathan B. Bingham

Dear Mr. Fraser

Donald M. Fraser


Dear Mr. Hamilton


Lee H. Hamilton

Dear Mrs. Mink

Patsy T. Mink

Dear Mrs. Udall
DMF:gw

cc: Hon. Henry Kissinger - Secretary of State
Hon. Philip C. Habib - Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Mr. Donald L. Ranard - Director Korea Office, Department of State


Dear Mr. Lloyd Meeds

Lloyd Meeds

Dear Sir

Thomas P. O'Neill

Dear Mr. Udall
Morris K. Udall

Dear Mr. Whalen

Charles W. Whalen

Dear Mr. Whalen


RECEIVED
1972
LIBRARY

MEMORANDUM

5315

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*gop 8a
- ROK
(also filed
in gup)*

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

November 6, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT:

Preparation for the President's
Japan and South Korean Visits

At Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President attaching background reading materials for his visits to Japan and Korea as he has requested. I have also included in the memorandum a brief resume of other aspects of the preparations for his visit to Japan and Korea which will involve him next week.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By *WA* NARA Date *12/7/12*



~~TOP SECRET~~

8B

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032806

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

RECEIVER'S TITLE The President

TITLE Preperation for Your Japan and South
Korean Visits

CREATION DATE 11/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

November 15, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials for Counsellors
Hartmann and Rumsfeld

You have asked me to assemble State Department briefing materials on Korea and Japan that would be appropriate for Counsellors Hartmann and Rumsfeld.

Les Janka informs me that State is putting together a comprehensive fact book for all persons accompanying the President on the trip. I believe this should meet Messrs. Hartmann and Rumsfeld's needs as I understand them. To provide more would get into the substantive briefing materials, which you said you did not think it necessary to provide.

EO 1.35
NSC Memoranda, Secretariat, Dept. Guidelines
By M NARA Date 12/1/10

1974 B. FORD LIB.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032808

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME David Elliott

RECEIVER'S NAME General Scowcroft

TITLE Sale of Canadian Nuclear Reactor to
South Korea

CREATION DATE 11/18/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032807

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇIntelligence Report

DESCRIPTION Re Canada and South Korea

CREATION DATE 11/16/1974

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

MEMORANDUM

5478

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 25, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. ELLIOTT

FROM:

JEANNE W. DAVIS *jwd*

SUBJECT:

Suggested Reply to Mr. LeRoy Brown
Concerning His Recommendation that
Dr. Kyo R. Jhin Accompany the
President to South Korea

Attached at Tab A is a draft reply from you to Mr. LeRoy Brown,
who wrote the President recommending that Dr. Kyo R. Jhin accompany
the President on his visit to South Korea.

116
Dear Mr. Brown:

I have been asked to respond to your letter of November 11, 1974, to the President recommending that he include Dr. Kyo R. Jhin in his party for his visit to the Republic of Korea.

I can assure you that we gave careful consideration to your recommendation, and that we appreciated Dr. Jhin's qualifications. Regretfully, however, it was not possible to bring Dr. Jhin into the preparations for the visit.

May I express our appreciation for your taking the time to bring Dr. Jhin's talents to our attention.

Sincerely,

Roland L. Elliott

Mr. LeRoy Brown
State Superintendent of Education
Department of Education
State Office Building
Montgomery, Alabama 36104

FOR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032809

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME J.A. Froebe

RECEIVER'S NAME W.R. Smyser

TITLE North Korean Tunneling

CREATION DATE 11/29/1974

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700248

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

~~SECRET~~

7/11/74 (1/11/74)
11/29/74
K. 12

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT ON HIS VISIT TO KOREA

-- My Korean visit was marked by a genuine welcome of the kind we do not see much any more. There must have been 2 million people lining the streets between the airport and the hotel.

-- I think it was very important for me to have gone to Korea. If I had not gone, the North Koreans might have underestimated our determination to support our friends as well as our commitment to stability in the area.

-- What the Koreans have done economically is just astonishing. Seoul looks like a modern American city, with skyscrapers, cars, and an obviously thriving economy.

-- I was also very impressed by our troops in Korea. From all that I could see, their moral and their training are very high. I am glad I visited them so that they do not think that we have forgotten them.

-- It is clear that President Park believes he is directly menaced by North Korean aggression. He spoke of the tunnel that was recently discovered as evidence of this. I think we have to recognize that he is going to want all the military aid that we can give him. More importantly, he regards the sustained level of our forces as vital, at least for the near term. He wants us to complete our program of assistance to the Modernization Plan for South Korean forces as soon as possible. I reaffirmed our support for the Plan, and said we hoped to speed up our military assistance in support of the Plan.

-- I told President Park that he can count on us to keep our forces in Korea at present levels and that he can count on our continued military and economic assistance subject to Congressional funding limitations.

-- I also pointed out that we maintain our commitments in an era of detente and that we will not take actions that affect their interests without consulting them.

-- I did not dwell on President Park's internal policies and problems. I merely pointed out to him the possible impact of such problems on our ability to continue to support him.

SECRET

SECRET
NSC Memorandum, etc. Guidelines
By AK NARA, D20 12/7/10



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION

November 29, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

W. R. Smyser *WRs/jmc*

SUBJECT:

My Meeting with American Missionaries
in Korea

I met in Seoul on November 23 with the American missionaries opposed to the Park regime, as you instructed.

Attached (at Tab A) is the requested report for the President on the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memorandum for the President (Tab A).

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Meeting of the American Missionaries
in Korea with a Member of the NSC
Staff

One of the members of the NSC Staff met with a group of American missionaries in Korea after our departure. He met with them at their request to hear their views opposing the policies of President Park.

The missionaries, who belong to various Christian denominations, made the following principal points:

-- The Korean people feel alienated from the Park Government. But they are not against the Government. They just favor things that the Government opposes, like certain democratic liberties.

-- The opposition does not want to overthrow the Government but to change its nature. It offers no alternative regime.

-- The principal opposition demand is to eliminate the new constitution (which permits Park to rule beyond his original two terms).

-- President Park believes that all his opposition is linked to the communists, and he labels it as such. This is not correct.

-- The United States shares responsibility for events in Korea because we lost nearly 40,000 men and because we have been there since the armistice in 1953.

-- The Korean Government regards your visit and the communique with great satisfaction, but other Koreans are deeply disappointed.

-- President Park may become even tougher with the opposition now that he has been bolstered by the visit of the American President. This would be seen by Koreans as a direct insult to the United States, and the United States should speak out.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The NSC staff member said that he would report the views of the American missionaries, as he had been commissioned to do.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

15
VIA LDN
J

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
ATTACHMENT


November 29, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to President Park

Will you please transmit the attached cable to Embassy Seoul
for delivery to President Park.


Jeanne M. Davis
Staff Secretary

Attachment

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ATTACHMENT

NOV 29 1974

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TO: AMEMBASSY SEOUL

Please pass the following message for President Ford to President Park:

Begin text

Dear President Park:

Please let me express my appreciation for the cordial hospitality that you and the people of the Republic of Korea extended to me during my visit. The warmth of the welcome by so many of the Korean people was truly overwhelming.

I appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with you during our meetings and to greet other Korean leaders at the reception and dinner that you kindly gave for me.

I believe that the United States and Korea will remain firm friends in the future as they have been in the past. I was pleased to reaffirm the depth of our friendship and of our ^{defense} commitment during this visit.

With best wishes,

Gerald Ford

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

