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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

May 3, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: W. R. SMYSER
SUBJECT: Call on the Vice President by
Korean Chief Justice Min

The State Department has proposed a meeting between the Vice President and Korean Chief Justice Min Bok Ki (Tab B).

State's purpose in requesting this meeting is to underline our support of Korean "regular and traditional judicial institutions" at a time of "increasing authoritarian rule and government" in Korea.

I see no reason why we should involve the Vice President in political maneuvers designed to influence Korean internal affairs.

Mrs. Davis concurs.

Recommendation:

That you authorize Jeanne Davis to sign the memorandum to Mr. Springsteen at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____



1b

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Call on the Vice President by
Korean Chief Justice Min

The Vice President is unable to receive Chief Justice Min Bok
Ki of the Korean Supreme Court.

We recommend that alternate arrangements be made for the
Korean Chief Justice to meet with members of the U. S.
Judicial Branch.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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7401738

April 30, 1974


MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Call on the Vice President by Korean
Chief Justice Min

Chief Justice Min Bok Ki of the Korean Supreme Court will visit the United States during May under A.I.D. auspices.

Chief Justice Min is a highly respected Korean jurist. At a time when Korea is experiencing increasingly authoritarian rule and government by Presidential decree we are interested in strengthening the regular and traditional judicial institutions in the ROK and in giving support to those who have a similar view. We believe that Chief Justice Min is in this category. It would be useful if the Vice President could see him during his stay in Washington. A biographic report on Chief Justice Min is enclosed.

He will be available on May 14 and the Department of State recommends that the Vice President receive a courtesy call from Chief Justice Min on that date.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Biographic sketch



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032794

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBiography

DESCRIPTION Re Republic of Korea Official

CREATION DATE 05/1974

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700247

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

May 10, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD T. KENNEDY
 FROM: DAVID M. RANSOM
 SUBJECT: Korea

In the course of a meeting today of the Interagency Steering Group for the Korean Modernization Program (see attachment), Dick Sneider made it clear he thought major changes were going to be necessary in both how and what we funded in this program. He disclaimed a desire to recast the Presidential commitment; he merely wanted to make it achievable.

-- How we fund: Sneider wants to program much more FMS relative to MAP. (DOD and OMB agree.) He pointed to the growing shortfall in the Mod program, which is now in its fourth year. Instead of a billion dollars, by the end of FY 74 we will have provided something over \$600 million in MAP. Congressional sympathy for MAP was continuing to decline, and it was unlikely we could end the Mod program before FY 78 at the earliest. Sneider said NSSM 227 in effect, locked in the USG not only to low FMS levels but also to low MAP levels. If we gave up the quest for high MAP levels, Sneider believes, there is a good chance that we could get much higher FMS credit levels from Congress. Sneider specifically recommended asking for a line-item, three year program of credits for Korea to supplement what we already have in the FY 75 budget for Korea.

-- What we fund: Sneider wants to rethink the equipment mix, in line with what he says are changing Korean interests. We are wed, he feels, to a package of equipment may be growing obsolete, in Korean eyes. He pointed out the Koreans want to expand this package with purchases of aircraft --- perhaps from third countries. (DOD again agreed.)

I said there was little flexibility I could see in the aims the President is pursuing in offering Korea a modernization program. However, there

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

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NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
 By MA NARA, Date 12/6/12



was flexibility where the means were concerned, as evident in the willingness to make the program open-ended. I added I questioned whether it was wise, when we were trying to renegotiate security arrangements on the Peninsula, to tell the Koreans that we were no longer seeking grant funds as agreed -- better to let Congress fail to provide the funds we seek.

Sneider said our failure to provide funds was jeopardizing the credibility of the President's commitments, which could have its own consequences for the negotiations we were trying to carry out. He preferred a closed end package that we (1) could deliver and (2) use to get full Korean understanding of our position, starting in September when the UNC outcome might be in sight. Talking to the Koreans candidly would reduce another danger he foresaw: Korean purchases prompted by less and less faith in our ability to deliver MAP. Sneider alluded to numerous reports of equipment that Park reportedly wanted --- none on the USG priority list and some from third countries. (I question the latter point, but the observations about funding strike me as accurate and important.)

Sneider said the Koreans F-4 request (which the Country Team had recommended) put us on the spot. They want credits. This is likely to be the first of a series of FMS credit proposals, including perhaps A-7's from co-production facilities. These items are not on our priority list.

I said we had made the move last year to change the priority from ground to air defense. DOD reps said the study had just arrived from CINCPAC and Korea. I went on that the priority list could therefore change if both sides agreed. DOD said a new priority list, negotiated with the Koreans, was also in the wings. At this point it was agreed to defer further discussion of the equipment issue until the two studies were in hand. ?

One more issue was discussed: how much money (and what equipment) would be added to Korea before the end of this fiscal year. The DOD rep agreed to draw up illustrative programs assuming different levels of increase (up to \$40 million).

Comment: We are just where we were last summer: everyone but NSC thinks the program is "a mess" because of the high MAP requirements. They insist the "mess" is getting worse although there is \$52 million in FMS credits in FY 75 (vice \$25 million in FY 74). I discouraged them from seeking an end to our commitment to seek MAP but as a practical matter I strongly agree we must come up with more credits in FY 75 to cover some of our MAP shortfall.

The equipment mix and the final funding level this year are also questions we must (and can) solve. The more serious question, however, is how do we serve the President's wishes if the MAP shortfall continues to accumulate without offsetting credit increases?

cc: Smyser
Froebe

IASG Meeting on ROK Forces Modernization Program

Friday, May 10 at 10:30, Room 6210

STATE EA - Richard L. Sneider
 EA/K - Donald L. Ranard
 EA/K - Howard F. Newsom
 PM - Jonathan F. Ladd (Fred)
 RA/PMU - Richard Finch
 ACDA - Jan Kalicki

DOD Gen. Arthur Hanket
 David L. Evans
 Robert Vandegrift
 Col. Samuel Adams
 Cdr. James Moore
 Paul Flint

OMB Paul Baltay

NSC David Ransom



IASG Agenda

Background

MAP Funding for FY 1974 (as of March 29, 1974)
Grant MAP Shortfall

F-4E Aircraft

A-7 Aircraft

F-5B Aircraft

FMS

Annual Review



General

MAP Funding for FY 1974 (as of March 29, 1974)

Total Grant Allocation: \$134.3 million

New Equipment	\$110.1
Training	2.2
Supply Op	22.0


Funded MAP Grant FY 1974 \$ 62.75

Unfunded 49.55

Unfunded Items (\$ thousand)

F-5B Aircraft	15,880
F-5B AGE	1,323
Landing Vehicle, Amphib.	420
Trucks	1,017
AA Guns	2,484
Aircraft Support Equip.	1,024
Ship Overhaul (in-country)	737
Other Weapon and Ordnance Equip.	20
Ammunition	3,161
Missile Support Equip.	3,561
Communications Equip.	3,923
Other Support Equip.	1,268
Spare Parts	
Aircraft	3,410
Ship	380
Weapons	1,173
Commo	1,470
Missile	2,288
Automotive	952
TA and Spec Sves	539
Repair and Rehab.	3,595
Sale of Excess	39
Training	886
	<u>\$49,550</u>

If MAP grant should be reduced by \$19 million, F-5B aircraft and AGE would be excluded plus an unidentified \$800,000. A larger reduction would cause deferment until FY 75 of other items.



29 March 1974

FY 74 KOREA MAP
(\$ Thousands)

ITEM DESCRIPTION	TOTAL PROGRAM		FUNDED PROGRAM	
	QTY	COST	QTY	COST
Aircraft Fighter F-5B	8	15,880		
F-5B AGE, Engines & CSP		2,323		1,000
Aircraft Fighter F-5E	24	38,400	24	38,400
F-5E AGE, Engines & CSP		19,303		19,303
Landing Vehicle Amphib	3	420		
Miscellaneous Boats & Craft	1	No cost	1	No cost
Trailers (Excess)	69	22	52	22
Trucks (Excess)	1,370	121	157	121
Trucks (Non-Excess)	82	1,017		
Ambulances (Excess)	4	2	3	2
Anti aircraft Guns	8	2,484		
Cranes (Excess)	2	No cost		
Tractors (Excess)	10	5	7	5
Major Construct Eqp Items	5	6	4	6
Aircraft Support Eqp		1,024		
Ship Overhaul (In-country)		737		
Other weapons & Ordnance Eqp		20		
Ammunition		3,161		
Missile Support Eqp		4,286		725
Communications Eqp		3,923		
Other Support Eqp		1,435		167
Spare Parts:				
Aircraft		3,518		108
Ship		405		25
Weapons		1,173		
Commo		2,264		794
Missile		2,495		207
Automotive		963		11
Tech Assistance & Spec Svcs		712		173
Repair and Rehabilitation		3,595		
UN Forces support In Korea		300		300
Sale of Excess In Korea		100		61
Training		2,206		1,320
Total MAP		112,300		62,750

} 57.7

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E.O. 12958 (a) (1) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 500000, State Dept. Guidelines, Add Directive 5200.30
By JA NARA, Date 12/6/10

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Cumulative Funding Data

Grant MAP Shortfall

Funding of the entire allocation in FY 74 will still leave the MAP Modernization Program \$311 million behind the initially planned five year schedule. (Following table in \$ million)

Grant	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>Total</u>
Plan	295	280	250	215	1040
Funding	292	152.5	149.5	134.8	728.8
Difference	-3	-127.5	-100.5	-80.2	-311.2
FMS	15.0	17.0	24.2	25.0	
EDA					
Plan	158.9	24.9	19.7	11.5	215.0
Actual	46.9	75.6	9.3	n.a.	131.8 (add na
Difference	-112.0	+50.7	-10.4	n.a.	-71.7 (add na

Recapitulation

Funded FY 71-73	594.0	
Allocated FY 74	134.8	
FMS charged to Modernization Program FY 73	1.2	
FMS charged to Modernization Program FY 74	14.8	
Total through FY 74	744.8	
FMS approved by NSDM 227 FY 75*	45	
FMS approved by NSDM 227 FY 76	65	
FMS approved by NSDM 227 FY 77	<u>90</u>	200.0
MAP Grant Required FY 75-77		<u>305.2</u>
		1250.0

*\$12 million FMS for FY 75 is for items not included in the MOD Plan, namely PG ships: \$5 million; M-16: \$3 million; Ammo plant: \$4 million. The CPD for FY 75 provides for \$52 million FMS.

FY 74

Category A - Highest Priority -- \$127.0 million

- Conversion 1 bn basic Hawk to Improved Hawk
- Chapparel batteries and missiles
- Vulcan guns
- Hardening of POL facilities and aircraft shelters
- F-5E (24)
- Gap filler radar
- Harden radar sites
- F-4D
- PG Co-Production (FMS)*
- M-16 Co-Production (FMS)*
- PRC-77 Co-Production (FMS)*

Category B - Middle Priority -- \$52.0 million

- Improved command and control for ADA
- F-5B (4)
- CPIC
- C-123K (repair and rehab)
- Forward area radar
- Hawk TOE and terminal equipment
- Commo and radar (ROKAF)

Category C - Lowest Priority -- \$13.0 million

- Repair and Modernize 3 NIKE-HERC batteries
- PLL/ASL (Army)
- Weapons (LAW)
- Commo equip (Navy and MC)
- Shipyards MOD
- Vehicles
- UH-1H Helicopters
- O&M support
- Attrition Equip.

FY 75

Category A - Highest Priority -- \$111.0 million

- Conversion 1 bn basic Hawk to Improved Hawk
- Chapparel batteries and missiles



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Aircraft shelter and harden POL storage

Harden radar sites

PG Co-Production*

M-16 Co-Production*

PRC-77 Co-Production*

Category B - Middle Priority -- \$102.0 million

Commo Equip (Army)

Forward area radar

CPIC

F-5E (24) **

F-5B (12) **

Commo and radar (ROKAF)

ASL/PLL, tools

Category C - Lowest Priority -- \$26.0 million

Attrition equip

O&M support

Vehicles

Navy spt and shipyard MOD

UH-1H

* Prior-year FMS commitments

** Highest priority within Category B. Could be split with a portion of these aircraft bought in FY 75, remainder 76 or 77. F-5E in category A complete 4 squadrons in MOD Plan.

NOTE: Items within categories are not listed in priority sequence.



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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03 SS-20 RSC-01 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 AEC-11 COME-00 EB-11 TRSE-00 ACDA-19
PA-04 PRS-01 USIA-15 DRC-01 OMB-01 SCI-06 SAJ-01 L-03
H-03 IO-14 /153 W

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R 130316Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3745
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPAC

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JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS KS

SUBJECT: LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT ASSISTANCE TO ROK DEFENSE INDUSTRY

1. ROKG AGENCY FOR DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT (ADD) HAS ASKED LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS FOR THREE SEPARATE JOINT VENTURES WITH KOREAN COMMERCIAL FIRMS AND FIVE PROPOSALS FOR ASSISTANCE TO ADD ITSELF IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

2. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH CHIEF JUSMAG AND AT EMBASSY LOCKHEED VICE PRESIDENT FOR ASIA, WILLIAM R. TUCK, SAYS ADD HAS REQUESTED PROPOSALS FOR: A) PROPELLENT PILOT PLANT AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES FOR PROPELLENTS BOTH TO BE OPERATED BY ADD; B) TRAINING PROGRAM FOR ADD PERSONNEL IN PROPELLENT R AND D, DESIGN, ENGINEERING, AND PRODUCTION; C) CONSTRUCTION OF A 4' X 4' WIND TUNNEL TO BE OPERATED BY ADD; D) TRAINING PROGRAM FOR ADD PERSONNEL IN FIRE

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CONTROL SYSTEMS DESIGN, ENGINEERING, SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND PRODUCTION; E) AN ADD/LOCKHEED PARTNERSHIP OR JOINT VENTURE TO RESEARCH, DESIGN, ENGINEER, BUILD AND TEST MISSILE PROTOTYPES. IN ADDITION TO DIRECT SUPPORT FOR ADD, BLUE HOUSE OFFICIALS AND ADD HAVE ALSO ASKED LOCKHEED TO EXAMINE POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT VENTURES WITH KOREAN COMMERCIAL FIRMS TO PRODUCE: A) A SMALL MISSILE; B) FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS; C) COMBAT VEHICLES OBJECT OF THESE LATTER JOINT VENTURES WOULD BE TO DEVELOP ROK CAPABILITY TO DESIGN, ENGINEER, TEST AND PRODUCE THESE TYPES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. ACCORDING TUCK, REQUEST FOR JOINT VENTURE PROPOSALS STILL RATHER VAGUE. HE BELIEVES ROKS THINKING ABOUT ANTI-TANK ROCKETS, AIR TO GROUND MISSILES, SOMETHING



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State Dept Guidelines

By W NARA, Date 12/6/10

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TO COUNTER RUSSIAN MADE STIX MISSILE AND FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR VULCAN B. JUSMAG CHIEF HAS BEEN TOLD BY MND THAT ROKG IS INTERESTED INITIALLY IN ESTABLISHING MISSILE MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY AS ITS FIRST PRIORITY IN MISSILE FIELD.

3. WHILE TUCK HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HIS DISCUSS FNS WITH KOREANS ARE STILL IN PRELIMINARY STAGE HE INDICATES KOREAN ANXIOUS TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY. PROPELLENT PILOT PLANT DISCUSSIONS ARE APPARENTLY ALREADY PROCEEDING AT LOCKHEED HEADQUARTERS AND ADD IS NOW PREPARING DETAILED EXPLANATION OF TRAINING PROGRAM IT WISHES FOR ITS PERSONNEL IN PROPELLENT RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION. TUCK HAS HIMSELF GIVEN US PAPER OUTLINING YEAR LONG TRAINING PROGRAM FOR FOUR TO FIVE ADD ENGINEERS IN RESEARCH, DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM. TUCK HAS ALSO SUGGESTED TO ADD THAT AGENCY AND LOCKHEED FORM A JOINT STUDY TEAM TO WORK OUT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT COMPANY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON AND TO DEVELOPE A KOREAN MISSILE CAPABILITY.

4. WHILE EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO UCK FOR KEEPING

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US INFORMED, EMBASSY AND JUSMAG HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT DETAILED REVIEW IN WASHINGTON WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE NECESSARY APPROVALS, LICENSES AND SECURITY CLEARANCES INVOLVED IN THESE EXTENSIVE PROPOSALS CAN BE DECIDED ON. TUCK HAS INDICATED FULL APPRECIATION OF THIS FACT. HE EVINCES HIMSELF SOME SURPRISE AND DOUBTFULNESS ABOUT THE EXTENSIVE NATUE OF THE PROPOSALS LOCKHEED IS BEING REQUESTED TO SUBMIT AND THE COMPLEXITY OF SOME OF THE PROJECTS BEING PROPOSED.

5. COMMENT: SOME OF VAGUENESS TUCK HAS FELT ON ROK SIDE UNDOUBTEDLY DUE FACT KOREANS ALSO BEGINNING TO TALK ABOUT THESE AND OTHER PROJECTS TO A NUMBER OF OTHER US AIRCRAFT COMPANIES, INCLUDING BOEING, NORTHROP, LTV, SIKORSKY, AND MCDONNELL DOUGLAS. ROKG CLEARLY SHOPPING AT THIS STAGE AND WISHES TO SEE WHAT PROPOSALS VARIOUS CAMPANIES WILL COME UP WITH WHILE NOT COMITTING THEMSELVES.

6. IN GENERAL, ROKS EXEHLORATION OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY POSSIBILITIES IS HEALTHY SIGN THAT THEY MOVING RAPIDLY IN THIS AREA TOWARD GREATER SELF-RELIANCE AND IN KEEPING WITH SECRETARY CLEMENT'S DISCUSSIONS WITH MND YU AT SECURITY CONSULTATION MEETING SEPT 1973, DUIRNG WHICH SECRETARY ENCOURAGED ROK JOINT VENTURES WITH US INDUSTRY. WE ARE SKITTISH ABOUT COMPLEXITY AND ECONOMIC WISDOM OF SOME OF PROJECTS CONTEMPLATED HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY IN HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED ELECTRONICS AND MISSILE BUILDING

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AREAS, WHERE THEY APPEAR TO BE BITING OFF MORE THAN
THEY WILL BE ABLE TO DIGEST. ROKG MAY REACH THIS
CONCLUSION ON ITS OWN.

7. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT SOME OF PROJECTS BEING
CONSIDERED BY ROKG, PARTICULARLY IN MISSILE FIELD,
MAY POSE SIGNIFICANT POLICY QUESTIONS. THEREFORE FOR
THE PRESENT RECOMMEND WASHINGTON AGENCIES ADOPT CAUTIOUS,
NON-COMMITTAL APPROACH TO ANY US COMPANY
PROPOSALS IN MORE SENSITIVE, OVERLY SOPHISTICATED
FIELDS UNTIL ROKG HAS MORE CLEARLY DEFINED ITS

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REQUESTS.

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12/67

ACTION EA-14

INFO	OCT-01	ISO-00	CIAE-00	PM-07	H-03	INR-10	L-03	NSAE-00
	NSC-07	PA-04	RSC-01	PRS-01	SP-03	SS-20	USIA-15	ACDA-19
	MC-02	AID-20	IGA-02	OMB-01	EB-11	COME-00	TRSE-00	
	SAJ-01	IO-14	DRC-01	/160 W				

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3819
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECT GARBLED TEXT THROUGHOUT)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS KS

SUBJECT: ROK DEFENSE PROCUREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

REF: A. SEOUL 3053 B. SEOUL 3015

JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE ROKG IS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY THROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES. IN THIS SITUATION THE ROKG DOES AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK OUR BEST ADVICE ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT WILL ALSO SET ITS OWN PRIORITIES AND ACT ON THEM. END SUMMARY.

1. REF A. GIVES THE BACKGROUND ON RECENT ROKG ACTIONS TO BEGIN SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY THROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES. REF B. REPORTS CURRENT ROKG

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THINKING ON R&D AREA.

2. ROKG MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION IS NOT UNEXPECTED AND IS ESSENTIALLY A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT. THE ROKG CLEARLY HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ANY LIKELY FUTURE MAP GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS WILL BE TOO LOW TO MEET ROK DEFENSE NEEDS. AND ROKG VIEWS GRANT ASSISTANCE AS INCREASINGLY PROBLEMATICAL GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES. CONSEQUENTLY, UNDER THE PERSONAL DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT PARK, GOVERNMENT HAS BEGUN THE PROCESS OF PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FOR ITS PROCUREMENT NEEDS IN THE MID-70S.

3. THESE ROKG ACTIONS DO NOT MEAN THAT ROKG HAS FORMALLY ABANDONED ITS EXPECTATIONS RE MOD PLAN OBJECTIVES. AND IT HOPES FOR SOME LEVEL OF US GRANT ASSISTANCE IN NEAR TERM. ROKG WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS US ON QUESTION OF UNFULFILLED MOD PLAN LEVELS IN HOPE OF EXACTING AS MUCH GRANT ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, ROKG HAS NO SERIOUS EXPECTATIONS THAT GRANT



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By WA NARA, Date 12/6/10

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ASSISTANCE WOULD CONTINUE BEYOND MOD PLAN IN ANY EVENT. FURTHER, MND FULLY AWARE OF, AND HAS ACCEPTED, IMPLICATIONS OF SECDEF CLEMENT'S STATEMENT AT LAST SCM THAT FMS AS WELL AS GRANT ASSISTANCE WILL BE USED IN COMPLETING MOD PLAN. IN THIS SITUATION ROKG APPEARS TO BE MOVING REALISTICALLY AND QUICKLY TO TAKE UP POST-MOD PLAN PROCUREMENT BURDEN AS WELL AS TO MEET WHAT IT VIEWS AS ITS OWN HIGH PRIORITY DEFENSE NEEDS WHETHER THEY ARE IN MOD PLAN OR NOT.

4. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS INCUMBENT ON USG ALSO TO REALISTICALLY ASSESS FUTURE DIRECTION OF OUR MAP. IN OUR PARA CONTRIBUTION (SEOQNR JEAUELN COUNTRY TEAM POINTED OUT THAT: ROKG IS INCREASINGLY ABLE TO BEAR COSTS OF ITS OWN DEFENSE; ROKG IS COMPLYING AWARE OF DOWNWARD DIRECTION OF US GRANT ASSISTANCE; AND IT HAS ACCEPTED THAT PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WILL BE ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITY. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THAT FORMER DOMINANT US ROLE IN DETERMINING ROK MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WILL INEVITABLY CHANGE, AND

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THAT ROKG WILL INCREASINGLY EXPECT TO MAKE ITS OWN FINAL DETERMINATIONS.

- 5. GIVEN CURRENT ROKG ACTIONS, WE BELIEVE PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTIONS OUTLINED IN OUR PARA SUBMISSION CONTINUE TO REMAIN A VALID STATEMENT. AS OUTLINED IN THAT PAPER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE USG SHOULD:
 - A. CONTINUE TO MEET OUR MOD PLAN OBJECTIVES BY A COMBINATION OF GRANT ASSISTANCE AND FMS WITH A TARGET COMPLETION DATE OF FY 77.
 - B. CONTINUE TO TRANSFER DEFENSE COSTS TO THE ROK BY USING INCREASED FMS CASH AND CREDIT FACILITIES.
 - C. PROJECT ADEQUATE FMS LEVELS TO MEET MAJOR AGREED ROK PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS.
 - D. WORK TOWARD A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ROK IS ABLE TO USE NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PROCUREMENT AND, AS THE ROK MOVES TOWARDS COMMERCIAL CREDIT PROCUREMENT, WORK TO ASSURE THAT US EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION.

6. WITHIN THE POLICY FRAMEWORK OUTLINED ABOVE, ESSENTIAL PROBLEM NOW FACING US IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FIELD IS NOT A BOOKKEEPING APPROACH TO MOD PLAN FUL-FILLMENT. ROKG HAS INTERPRETED OUR PAST COMMENTS RE MOD PLAN STRENGTH-OUT, AND INCREASING USE OF FMS TO MEET MOD PLAN AS SIGNS THAT ORIGINAL MOD PLAN CONCEPT IS IN EFFECT WITHERING AWAY. ROKG WOULD NOT WISH TO PUBLICLY ABANDON MOD PLAN BUT, IT HAS NO SERIOUS EXPECTATIONS THAT REQUISITE GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS WILL BE FORTHCOMING. RATHER IT SEES ESSENTIAL PROBLEM AS BEING THE AVAILABILITY OF A HIGH LEVEL OF FMS CREDIT IN THE



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FY 75-80 PERIOD.

FROM ROKG POINT OF VIEW, ITS
CONCESSIONAL CREDIT NEEDS ARE BEYOND MOD PLAN LEVELS
AND INVOLVE MANY ITEMS NOT IN MOD PLAN.

7. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE THAT IN THE MONTHS BEFORE

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PAGE 04 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z

THE NEXT SCM IN SEPT, WASHINGTON AGENCIES MUST SERIOUSLY
CONSIDER PRESENTING ROKG WITH REALISTIC PICTURE OF
GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUTURE. FURTHER, AND MORE
IMPORTANTLY, WE SHOULD FOCUS ON QUESTION OF FMS CREDIT
LEVELS OVER NEXT FEW YEARS TO ALLOW A NEEDED TRANSI-
TION FROM THE LARGE SCALE GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
OF THE PAST TO A SITUATION IN WHICH ROK IS ABLE TO USE
NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PROCUREMENT.

8. THE FMS CREDIT LEVELS WHICH WE WOULD SEE IN THE
FY 75-78 PERIOD WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THE PRESENT
POM LEVELS. IF USG WERE IN A POSITION TO BE FORTH-
COMING ON THE FMS CREDIT ISSUE, BELIEVE THAT KOREANS
WOULD IMPLICITLY ACCEPT SITUATION IN WHICH MOD PLAN
REQUIREMENTS WOULD GRADUALLY BE ABSORBED IN COURSE OF
TIME IN AN EXPANDED FMS CREDIT PROGRAM WE WOULD IN
EFFECT HAVE A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN WHICH GRANT ASSISTANCE
ELEMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR AND AT SOME POINT IN PROCESS
WE WOULD BE IN POSITION TO STATE THAT MOD PLAN
HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED.

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19
MC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00
SAJ-01 IO-14 DRC-01 /160 W

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R 160908Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3820
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/2

9. SPECIFICALLY WE RECOMMEND FOLLOWING APPROACH
ON KEY POLICY QUESTIONS:

A. MOD PLAN FUTURE: WITH REGARD TO MOD PLAN
FUTURE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEAL REALISTICALLY AND
HONESTLY WITH ROKG ON PROSPECTS. USG SHOULD USE FORTH-
COMING SCM TO POINT OUT TO KOREAN SIDE THAT WE WILL
CONTINUE TO DO BEST WE CAN TO MEET REMAINING MOD PLAN
OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL REALITIES,

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MILLS CHARLES N
74 SEOUL 3134

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WE CANNOT BE HOPEFUL ABOUT GRANT ASSISTANCE COMPONENT AND THEREFORE WE AND ROKG WILL HAVE TO GIVE PRIMARY EMPHASIS TO FMS CREDIT AND CASH PURCHASES FOR REMAINING MOD PLAN HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS.

B. O&M QUESTION: WE ARE SCHEDULED TO BE OUT OF GRANT ASSISTANCE FOR O&M BY FY 76. IN LIKELY EVENT FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW \$112 MILLION, WE MAY WELL ALREADY BE OUT OF O&M BUSINESS IN FY 74. GIVEN ROKG WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO CONSIDER MAJOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ITEMS OUT OF ITS OWN FUNDS, THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING GRANT O&M. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD TELL ROKG NOW

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z
THAT THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT O&M GRANT ASSISTANCE IN FY 75 AND WHATEVER OUR EVENTUAL FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVEL WE WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED TO USE IT FOR PROCUREMENT OF INVESTMENT ITEMS, NOT O&M. THIS WILL ALLOW MND TO REALISTICALLY PLAN ITS FUTURE O&M REQUIREMENTS. (IN VIEW OF LEAD TIME REQUIRED TO EFFECTIVELY ARRANGE AND IMPLEMENT SSA & FMS CASH CASES FOR CRITICAL SUPPORT OF ESSENTIAL HIGH PRIORITY, WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SOME GRANT AID O&M SUPPORT MAY BE REQUIRED).

C. FMS CREDIT LEVELS: USG SHOULD ON PRIORITY BASIS ADDRESS QUESTION OF LIKELY FMS LEVELS AVAILABLE TO ROK IN COMING YEARS. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO PROVIDE EXPANDED FMS LEVELS NOT ONLY FOR SECURITY REASONS BUT ALSO TO ASSURE THAT, AS ROKG INCREASINGLY BEARS ITS OWN DEFENSE COSTS, US EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION IN KOREAN PROCUREMENT.

D. ROK THIRD-COUNTRY PROCUREMENT: AT PRESENT ROKG STILL ESSENTIALLY ORIENTED TO PROCUREMENT OF US EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS. HOWEVER, AS ROKG INCREASINGLY MAKES ITS OWN DECISION IT IS ALREADY BEGINNING TO SHOP AROUND. THIRD-COUNTRY REPS ARE ALREADY QUIETLY BUT ACTIVELY TRYING TO MOVE IN ON WHAT THEY SEE AS A NEW MARKET. IN OUR VIEW, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE A FIRM LINE THAT AS LONG AS THERE IS MAJOR USG CONCESSIONAL MAP PROGRAM HERE, ROKG MUST GIVE US EQUIPMENT HIGHEST PRIORITY. ROKG WILL UNDERSTAND THIS. AT SAME TIME WE DO EXPECT ROKG TO PRESS US FOR UNDERSTANDING AND APPROVAL OF LIMITED PROCUREMENT OF THIRD-COUNTRY ITEMS WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE ESSENTIAL TO THEIR NEEDS AND WHICH ARE EITHER UNAVAILABLE IN US INVENTORIES OR IN THE ROK VIEW INADEQUATE. WE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THESE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS THEY ARISE (E.G. SWISS OERLIKON AA GUNS). HOWEVER, AS STATED ABOVE WE NO NOT BELEIVE USG SHOULD COUNTENANCE MAJOR ROK ARMS PURCHASES FROM THIRD-COUNTRIES WHILE WE ARE IN

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EFFECT STILL UNDERWRITING SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE
ROK DEFENSE COSTS.

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10. BEYOND THE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS NOTED
ABOVE, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT OUR
MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH KOREA IS ALREADY
IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION. THE ROKG IN ITS OWN WAY
IS ATTEMPTING TO REACT REALISTICALLY TO WHAT IT SEES
AS THE PHASE DOWN OF THE USG'S MASSIVE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE PAST. THIS REALIZA-
TION

HAS NOT LED THE ROKG TO PANIC OR TO UNDUE RECRIMINA-
TIONS DIRECTED AGAINST US. IT HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH
OUR PERFORMANCE IN PAST YEAR ON MANY MILITARY
ASSISTANCE MATTERS AND HAS SAID SO. IN THE SCM WE
CAN EXPECT SOME COMMENT ON ON-FULFILLMENT OF OUR
PROMISES. AT SAME TIME, ROKG HAS NOT IGNORED THE
TRENDS OF EVENTS AND IS NOT TRYING TO TURN CLOCK BACK.

11. FOR OUR PART THIS MEANS THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THAT
THE ROKG INCREASINGLY WILL TELL US WHAT IT WANTS IN
THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT FIELD. THE ROKG
WILL CONTINUE TO ASK OUR ADVICE ON MILITARY
PROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT IT WILL SET ITS OWN
PRIORITIES AND ACT ON THEM. HOWEVER, THE ROKG IS
IN THE PROCESS OF MOVING FROM A PAST DEPENDENT STATUS
IN WHICH, IN EFFECT, IT ACCEPTED OUR DETERMINATIONS
SINCE WE WERE PAYING THE FREIGHT TO A SITUATION IN
WHICH IT SEES ITSELF AS BEARING ESSENTIALLY THE MAJOR
COSTS OF ITS DEFENSE BY THE MID-70s.

12. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.

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ACTION EA-14

INFO	OCT-01	ISO-00	CIAE-00	PM-07	H-03	INR-10	L-03	NSAE-00
	NSC-07	PA-04	RSC-01	PRS-01	SP-03	SS-20	USIA-15	ACDA-19
	MC-02	AID-20	IGA-02	OMB-01	EB-11	COME-00	TRSE-00	
	SAJ-01	IO-14	DRC-01	/160 W				

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P R 241000Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3968
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 3335
JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, KS

SUBJECT: OUTSTANDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE/MILITARY PROCUREMENT
ISSUES

REF: A SEOUL 3134 B. SEOUL 3053 C. SEOUL 2684

SUMMARY: MND HAS BEEN PRESSING FOR USG RESPONSE TO
SEVERAL MAJOR MAP MILITARY PROCUREMENT MATTERS. EMBASSY/COMUSK
BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD RESPOND TO ROKG REQUESTS ALONG LINES
RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED THIS MESSAGE.

1. IN PAST WEEKS MND HAS BEEN PRESSING STRONGLY FOR
USG RESPONSE ON SEVERAL MAJOR MAP MILITARY PROCUREMENT
MATTERS.

2. LATEST DISCUSSION WAS MAY 21 MEETING BETWEEN MND
ASST. MINISTER PAIK SEOK CHU AND JUSMAG CHIEF. DISCUSSION
COVERED FY 74 MAP LEVELL, O&M QUESTION, AND
MAJOR ROK MILITARY PROCUREMENT REQUESTS. THESE

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 03335 01 OF 02 241102Z

INCLUDE F4E PROCUREMENT, TOW FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
CREDIT CASE, STANDARD MISSILE PROCUREMENT AND AIM-9E
PROBLEM. PAIK ALSO BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF ROK PRO-
CUREMENT OF OERLIKON 35 MM AA GUNS WHICH BEING
REPORTED SEPARATELY.

3. ON QUESTION OF FY 74 GRANT LEVEL, APIK WAS
TOLD THAT PROSPECT LOOKED BLEAK AND THAT THERE WILL
BE FURTHER REDUCTION IN LEVEL BELOW THAT ALREADY
CONVEYED TO ROKG. ON QUESTION OF FY 74 O&M, PAIK
TOKD BY JUSMAG CHIEF THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO
EXPECT LITTLE OR NO O&M FOR FY 74. PAIK DID NOT
REACT STRONGLY, INDICATING THAT MAJOR MND CONCERN
NOW IS TO GET FIRM FIX ON HOW MUCH GRANT ASSISTANCE
WILL BE AVAILABLE SO THAT MND CAN TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS
TO COMPENSATE. PAID INDICATED MND WILL BE REQUESTING FUNDS
TO COMPENSATE FOR O&M SHORTFALL IN SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGETARY
REQUEST LATER IN YEAR.



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines

By [Signature] NARA, Date 12/6/10

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4. HOWEVER, PAIK WAS EMOTIONAL AND ADAMANT IN CONVEYING SENSE OF URGENCY WHICH EXISTED WITHIN MND, JCS, AND BLUE HOUSE REGARDING MAJOR PROCUREMENT ITEMS WHICH KOREANS HAVE ALREADY REQUESTED FROM US AND NEED FOR INCREASED OUTYEAR FMS CREDITS. PAID SAID BLUE HOUSE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND MND'S INABILITY TO SECURE REQUISITE INFORMATION ON COST AND AVAILABILITY AND TO BEGIN PROCUREMENT PROCESS.

5. FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANCE OF PAIK'S COMMENTS RE SPECIFIC MAJOR PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS:

A. F4ES: PAIK STRESSED THAT ROKG ANXIOUSLY WAITING FOR LETTER OF OFFER ON F4ES. HE REQUESTED THAT LETTER BE EXPEDITED AND PRESENTED TO ROKG NO LATER THAN THE END OF MAY. PAIK STATED THAT FIRM DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO PURCHASE ONE F4E SQUADRON PRODUCED IN U.S. AND TO REQUEST FMS CREDIT FUNDING FOR THEIR PURCHASE. REQUIRED ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT WILL BE ASSEMBLED IN ROK UNDER JOINT VENTURE ARRANGEMENT WITH MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS. PAID INDICATED ROKG FULLY AWARE THAT FUNDING FOR JOINT VENTURE F4E ASSEMBLY WOULD HAVE TO BE DIRECT

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COMMERCIAL FINANCING. (DISCUSSION RE JOINT VENTURE IS ALREADY UNDERWAY BETWEEN ROKG AND MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS. COMPANY REPS HAVE INDICATED TO US INFORMALLY THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.)

B. TOW FMS CASE: PAIK SAID THAT IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF TOW REQUIREMENTS HAS LED MND TO CONCLUSION ONLY SIX COMPANIES ARE REQUIRED. THEREFORE, IN ADDITION TO THE TWO COMPANIES INCLUDED IN FY 74 PHASE II FMS CREDIT PROGRAM, ROKG WISHES TO PURCHASE FOUR ADDITIONAL COMPANIES (18 PER COMPANY). PAIK STRESSED MND MUST RECEIVE IN TIMELY FASHION INFORMATION EARLIER REQUESTED CONCERNING PRICE, AVAILABILITY AND FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TOW PURCHASE. SAID THIS INFORMATION ESSENTIAL SO THAT MND CAN MAKE PROPER BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS.

C. STANDARD MISSILES: PAIK INDICATED THAT ROKG'S DESIRE TO PURCHASE 40 STANDARD MISSILES REMAINS FIRM. MND HOPES THAT THESE CAN BE PURCHASED FROM U.S. NAVY THROUGH FMS CREDIT. MND WORKING DIRECTLY WITH GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. TO PURCHASE EIGHT LAUNCHERS. JUSMAG CHIEF POINTED OUT FY 74 CREDIT LEVEL COULD NOT ACCOMMODATE PURCHASE OF MISSILES. PAIK EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING, BUT SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL FMS FUNDS FOR THIS. IF FMS CREDIT NOT POSSIBLE, PAIK SAID ROKG PREPARED MAKE CASH PAYMENT. HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO KNOW HOW MUCH THE 40 MISSILES WOULD COST AND WHAT TERMS OF PAYMENT WOULD BE. PAIK ALSO REQUESTED THIS INFORMATION ON PRIORITY BASIS.

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MILLS CHARLES N
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D. AID 9E PROJECT: MND REQUESTS EARLIEST POSSIBLE USG ACTION ON AID-9E PROJECT. AS WASHINGTON AWARE, PHILCO FORD CORPORATION HAS INFORMED ROKG OF THEIR INTENT TO STOP ACTIONS ON CURRENT CONTRACT EFFECTIVE 1 JUNE 74 UNLESS PAYMENT OF \$3.3 MILLION MADE PRIOR. IN VIEW OF FACT WE ENCOURAGED ROKG TO GO FMS ROUTE ON THIS PROJECT, THEY SIGNED CONTRACT IN AUGUST 1973 AND HAVE BEEN PAYING \$12,000 MONTHLY INTEREST SINCE THAT DATE FAILURE TO PROMPTLY APPROVE FMS CREDIT PREVIOUSLY

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REQUESTED AND IN CURRENT FY 74 PROGRAM, WOULD BE EXTREMELY EMBARRASSING AND IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN ADEQUATELY TO ROKS (PHILCO FORD CORPORATION HAS ALREADY STOPPED SHIPMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND PARTS AGREED TO IN INITIAL CONTRACT).

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 MC-02
ACDA-19 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00
IO-14 SAJ-01 DRC-01 /160 W

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P R 241000Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3969
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO CINCPAC

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6. COMMENT: PAIK CLEARLY UNDER HEAVIEST PRESSURE FROM BLUE HOUSE AND MND TO GET SOME MOVEMENT FROM US ON ROKG PROCUREMENT REQUESTS. ROKG DOES NOT UNDERSTAND CONTINUING DELAY ON OUR PART IN EVEN PROVIDING COST AND AVAILABILITY INFORMATION REQUESTED BY MND. THIS IS CREATING SERIOUS IRRITATION AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF ROKG. RECOGNIZE THAT SOME OF ROKG REQUESTS REQUIRE MAJOR DECISIONS ON OUR PART AND CANNOT BE ACTED UPON INSTANTLY AS ROKG OBVIOUSLY WISHES. HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE RESPOND SOONEST TO AT LEAST SOME OF THE ROKG REQUESTS LISTED ABOVE.

7. TO MEET OUR NEEDS HERE, EMBASSY/USFK WOULD RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING APPROACH:

A. WASHINGTON AGENCIES PROVIDE SOONEST PROCUREMENT INFORMATION REQUESTED BY MND ON TOW FMS CASE AND ON THE STANDARD MISSILES AND AT SAME TIME, INFORM MND OF RELEASE PHASE II FMS CREDIT FUNDS FOR AID-9E MISSILES. (IF WE COULD ALSO INFORM MND OF RELEASE ALL OF PHASE II FY 74 FMS CREDIT

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FUNDS THIS WOULD DO MUCH TO MEET OUR MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH MND.)

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B. EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF ROKG REQUEST FOR F4E LETTER OF OFFER. AS WE SEE IT, THERE ARE TWO QUESTIONS INVOLVED: FIRST IS POLICY DETERMINATION THAT WE WILL ALLOW SALE OF F4ES TO ROKG; SECOND IS QUESTION OF FMS FUNDING. WITH REGARD TO POLICY CONSIDERATION, EMBASSY/USFK BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD INFORM ROKG NOW THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SALE OF F4ES. WE HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED BACKGROUND ROKG DECISION ON THIS. QUESTION OF HOW MANY F4ES ROKG WILL PROCURE STILL UNDER DEBATE WITHIN GOVERNMENT. BUT AT MINIMUM KOREANS WANT TO PURCHASE ONE SQUADRON NOW AND TO EVENTUALLY CO-PRODUCE ONE OR TWO ADDITIONAL SQUADRONS IF JOINT VENTURE ARRANGEMENT WORKS OUT. ON QUESTION OF FMS FINANCING, BELIEVE THAT ROKG WILL RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT AN INITIAL USG RESPONSE INDICATING THAT EARLY ANSWER NOT POSSIBLE SINCE WE MUST STUDY ROKG REQUEST AND WEIGH IT IN TERMS OF OTHER COMPETING PRIORITIES.

8. ACTION REQUESTED:

A. REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES ACT IMMEDIATELY ALONG LINES RECOMMENDED IN PARA 7A ABOVE.

B. WITH REGARD TO RECOMMENDATION RE F4ES, REQUEST WASHINGTON GIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION THIS PROBLEM AS REQUESTED IN PARA 7B ABOVE AS WELL AS AUTHORIZE US NOW TO INFORM MND THAT EARLY REPLY WILL BE FORTHCOMING.

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Blake of UPS
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May 8, 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. John Marsh
Assistant to the Vice President
for Defense Affairs

SUBJECT: Call on the Vice President by Korean
Chief Justice

The State Department has recommended that the Vice President receive Korean Supreme Court Chief Justice Min Bok Ki for a courtesy call on May 14 (Tab A). The Chief Justice, who is visiting the U.S. under the auspices of AID, has not requested an appointment with the Vice President but he would, of course, be pleased if an appointment were arranged.

State's purpose in requesting the meeting is to underline our support of Korean "regular and traditional judicial institutions" at a time of "increasing authoritarian rule and government" in Korea.

The NSC staff recommends against the appointment. We believe it is inappropriate to involve the Vice President in political maneuvers designed to influence Korean internal affairs. Nor do we believe it necessary to offer a meeting with such a high official of the Executive Branch and would plan to recommend to State that they arrange appointments with appropriate ranking members of the U.S. Judiciary.

Will you please let me know the Vice President's wishes in this regard so that we may take the necessary steps with the State Department.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary



CC: Mr. Smyser

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

May 3, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: W. R. SMYSER
SUBJECT: Call on the Vice President by
Korean Chief Justice Min

The State Department has proposed a meeting between the Vice President and Korean Chief Justice Min Bok Ki (Tab B).

State's purpose in requesting this meeting is to underline our support of Korean "regular and traditional judicial institutions" at a time of "increasing authoritarian rule and government" in Korea.

I see no reason why we should involve the Vice President in political maneuvers designed to influence Korean internal affairs.

Mrs. Davis concurs.

Recommendation:

That you authorize Jeanne Davis to sign the memorandum to Mr. Springsteen at Tab A.

Approve



Disapprove

R. FORD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines 3/2/03
By W NARA, Date 12/6/10

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ACTION EA-14

INFO	OCT-01	ISO-00	CIAE-00	PM-07	H-03	INR-10	L-03	NSAE-00
	NSC-07	PA-04	RSC-01	PRS-01	SP-03	SS-20	USIA-15	ACDA-19
	MC-02	AID-20	IGA-02	OMB-01	EB-11	COME-00	TRSE-00	
	SAJ-01	IO-14	DRC-01	/160 W				

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R 160908Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3819
SECDEF WASHDC
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NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECT GARBLED TEXT THROUGHOUT)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS KS

SUBJECT: ROK DEFENSE PROCUREMENT; IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

REF: A. SEOUL 3053 B. SEOUL 3015

JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE

BEGIN SUMMARY; THE ROKG IS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY THROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES. IN THIS SITUATION THE ROKG DOES AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK OUR BEST ADVICE ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT WILL ALSO SET ITS OWN PRIORITIES AND ACT ON THEM. END SUMMARY.

1. REF A. GIVES THE BACKGROUND ON RECENT ROKG ACTIONS TO BEGIN SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY THROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES. REF B. REPORTS CURRENT ROKG

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THINKING ON R&D AREA.

2. ROKG MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION IS NOT UNEXPECTED AND IS ESSENTIALLY A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT. THE ROKG CLEARLY HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ANY LIKELY FUTURE MAP GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS WILL BE TOO LOW TO MEET ROK DEFENSE NEEDS. AND ROKG VIEWS GRANT ASSISTANCE AS INCREASINGLY PROBLEMATIC GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES. CONSEQUENTLY, UNDER THE PERSONAL DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT PARK, GOVERNMENT HAS BEGUN THE PROCESS OF PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FOR ITS PROCUREMENT NEEDS IN THE MID-70S.

3. THESE ROKG ACTIONS DO NOT MEAN THAT ROKG HAS FORMALLY ABANDONED ITS EXPECTATIONS RE MOD PLAN OBJECTIVES. AND IT HOPES FOR SOME LEVEL OF US GRANT



1 ASSISTANCE IN NEAR TERM. ROKG WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS
2 US ON QUESTION OF UNFULFILLED MOD PLAN LEVELS IN HOPE
3 OF EXACTING AS MUCH GRANT ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE.
4 HOWEVER, ROKG HAS NO SERIOUS EXPECTATIONS THAT GRANT
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ASSISTANCE WOULD CONTINUE BEYOND MOD PLAN IN ANY
EVENT. FURTHER, MND FULLY AWARE OF, AND HAS ACCEPTED,
IMPLICATIONS OF SECDEF CLEMENT'S STATEMENT AT LAST
SCM THAT FMS AS WELL AS GRANT ASSISTANCE
WILL BE USED IN COMPLETING MOD PLAN. IN THIS SITUATION
ROKG APPEARS TO BE MOVING REALISTICALLY AND QUICKLY
TO TAKE UP POST-MOD PLAN PROCUREMENT BURDEN AS WELL
AS TO MEET WHAT IT VIEWS AS ITS OWN HIGH PRIORITY
DEFENSE NEEDS WHETHER THEY ARE IN MOD PLAN OR NOT.

4. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS INCUMBENT
ON USG ALSO TO REALISTICALLY ASSESS FUTURE DIRECTION
OF OUR MAP. IN OUR PARA CONTRIBUTION (SEOQNR JEAUELN
COUNTRY TEAM POINTED OUT THAT; ROKG IS INCREASINGLY
ABLE TO BEAR COSTS OF ITS OWN DEFENSE; ROKG IS
COMPLTCH AWARE OF DOWNWARD DIRECTION OF US GRANT
ASSISTANCE; AND IT HAS ACCEPTED THAT PROCUREMENT OF
MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WILL BE ITS OWN
RESPONSIBILITY. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE MUST
ACCEPT THAT FORMER DOMINANT US ROLE IN DETERMINING
ROK MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WILL INEVITABLY CHANGE, AND

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THAT ROKG WILL INCREASINGLY EXPECT TO MAKE ITS OWN
FINAL DETERMINATIONS.

5. GIVEN CURRENT ROKG ACTIONS, WE BELIEVE PROPOSED
COURSE OF ACTIONS OUTLINED IN OUR PARA SUBMISSION
CONTINUE TO REMAIN A VALID STATEMENT. AS OUTLINED
IN THAT PAPER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE USG SHOULD:

- A. CONTINUE TO MEET OUR MOD PLAN OBJECTIVES
BY A COMBINATION OF GRANT ASSISTANCE AND FMS WITH A
TARGET COMPLETION DATE OF FY 77.
- B. CONTINUE TO TRANSFER DEFENSE COSTS TO THE
ROK BY USING INCREASED FMS CASH AND CREDIT FACILITIES.
- C. PROJECT ADEQUATE FMS LEVELS TO MEET MAJOR
AGREED ROK PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS.

D. WORK TOWARD A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ROK
IS ABLE TO USE NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PRO-
CUREMENT AND, AS THE ROK MOVES TOWARDS COMMERCIAL
CREDIT PROCUREMENT, WORK TO ASSURE THAT US EQUIPMENT
AND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION.

6. WITHIN THE POLICY FRAMEWORK OUTLINED ABOVE,
ESSENTIAL PROBLEM NOW FACING US IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE
FIELD IS NOT A BOOKKEEPING APPROACH TO MOD PLAN FUL-
FILLMENT. ROKG HAS INTERPRETED OUR PAST COMMENTS RE
MOD PALN STRETHC-OUT, AND INCREASING USE OF FMS TO
MEET MOD PLAN AS SIGNS THAT ORIGINAL MOD PLAN CONCEPT
IS IN EFFECT WITHERING AWAY. ROKG WOULD NOT WISH TO



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PAGE 04 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z
THE NEXT SCM IN SEPT, WASHINGTON AGENCIES MUST SERIOUSLY
CONSIDER PRESENTING ROKG WITH REALISTIC PICTURE OF
GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUTURE. FURTHER, AND MORE
IMPORTANTLY, WE SHOULD FOCUS ON QUESTION OF FMS CREDIT
LEVELS OVER NEXT FEW YEARS TO ALLOW A NEEDED TRANSI-
TION FROM THE LARGE SCALE GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
OF THE PAST TO A SITUATION IN WHICH ROK IS ABLE TO USE
NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PROCUREMENT.

8. THE FMS CREDIT LEVELS WHICH WE WOULD SEE IN THE
FY 75-78 PERIOD WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THE PRESENT
POM LEVELS. IF USG WERE IN A POSITION TO BE FORTH-
COMING ON THE FMS CREDIT USSUE, BELIEVE THAT KOREANS
WOULD IMPLICITLY ACCEPT SITUATION IN WHICH MOD PLAN
REQUIREMENTS WOULD GRADUALLY BE ABSORBED IN COURSE OF
TIME IN AN EXPANDED FMS CREDIT PROGRAM WE WOULD IN
EFFECT HAVE A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN WHICH GRANT ASSISTANCE
ELEMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR AND AT SOME POINT IN PROCESS
WE WOULD BE IN POSITION TO STATE THAT MOD PLAN
HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED.

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67

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19
MC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00
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INFO CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/2

9. SPECIFICALLY WE RECOMMEND FOLLOWING APPROACH
ON KEY POLICY QUESTIONS:

A. MOD PLAN FUTURE: WITH REGARD TO MOD PLAN
FUTURE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEAL REALISTICALLY AND
HONESTLY WITH ROKG ON PROSPECTS. USG SHOULD USE FORTH-
COMING SCM TO POINT OUT TO KOREAN SIDE THAT WE WILL
CONTINUE TO DO BEST WE CAN TO MEET REMAINING MOD PLAN
OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL REALITIES,

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PAGE

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WHITE JOYCE A
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WE CANNOT BE HOPEFUL ABOUT GRANT ASSISTANCE COMPONENT AND THEREFORE WE AND ROKG WILL HAVE TO GIVE PRIMARY EMPHASIS TO FMS CREDIT AND CASH PURCHASES FOR REMAINING MOD PLAN HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS.

B. O&M QUESTION: WE ARE SCHEDULED TO BE OUT OF GRANT ASSISTANCE FOR O&M BY FY 76. IN LIKELY EVENT FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW \$112 MILLION, WE MAY WELL ALREADY BE OUT OF O&M BUSINESS IN FY 74. GIVEN ROKG WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO CONSIDER MAJOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ITEMS OUT OF ITS OWN FUNDS, THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING GRANT O&M. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD TELL ROKG NOW

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z
THAT THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT O&M GRANT ASSISTANCE IN FY 75 AND WHATEVER OUR EVENTUAL FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVEL WE WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED TO USE IT FOR PROCUREMENT OF INVESTMENT ITEMS, NOT O&M. THIS WILL ALLOW MND TO REALISTICALLY PLAN ITS FUTURE O&M REQUIREMENTS. (IN VIEW OF LEAD TIME REQUIRED TO EFFECTIVELY ARRANGE AND IMPLEMENT SSA & FMS CASH CASES FOR CRITICAL SUPPORT OF ESSENTIAL HIGH PRIORITY, WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SOME GRANT AID O&M SUPPORT MAY BE REQUIRED).

C. FMS CREDIT LEVELS; USG SHOULD ON PRIORITY BASIS ADDRESS QUESTION OF LIKELY FMS LEVELS AVAILABLE TO ROK IN COMING YEARS. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO PROVIDE EXPANDED FMS LEVELS NOT ONLY FOR SECURITY REASONS BUT ALSO TO ASSURE THAT, AS ROKG INCREASINGLY BEARS ITS OWN DEFENSE COSTS, US EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION IN KOREAN PROCUREMENT.

D. ROK THIRD-COUNTRY PROCUREMENT; AT PRESENT ROKG STILL ESSENTIALLY ORIENTED TO PROCUREMENT OF US EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS. HOWEVER, AS ROKG INCREASINGLY MAKES ITS OWN DECISION IT IS ALREADY BEGINNING TO SHOP AROUND. THIRD-COUNTRY REPS ARE ALREADY QUIETLY BUT ACTIVELY TRYING TO MOVE IN ON WHAT THEY SEE AS A NEW MARKET. IN OUR VIEW, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE A FIRM LINE THAT AS LONG AS THERE IS MAJOR USG CONCESSIONAL MAP PROGRAM HERE, ROKG MUST GIVE US EQUIPMENT HIGHEST PRIORITY. ROKG WILL UNDERSTAND THIS. AT SAME TIME WE DO EXPECT ROKG TO PRESS US FOR UNDERSTANDING AND APPROVAL OF LIMITED PROCUREMENT OF THIRD-COUNTRY ITEMS WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE ESSENTIAL TO THEIR NEEDS AND WHICH ARE EITHER UNAVAILABLE IN US INVENTORIES OR IN THE ROK VIEW INADEQUATE. WE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH



THESE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS THEY ARISE (E.G. SWISS OERLIKON AA GUNS). HOWEVER, AS STATED ABOVE WE NO NOT BELEIVE USG SHOULD COUNTENANCE MAJOR ROK ARMS PURCHASES FROM THIRD-COUNTRIES WHILE WE ARE IN

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PAGE 4

WHITE JOYCE A
74 SEOUL 3134

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EFFECT STILL UNDERWRITING SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE ROK DEFENSE COSTS.

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10. BEYOND THE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS NOTED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH KOREA IS ALREADY IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION. THE ROKG IN ITS OWN WAY IS ATTEMPTING TO REACT REALISTICALLY TO WHAT IT SEES AS THE PHASE DOWN OF THE USG'S MASSIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE PAST. THIS REALIZATION

HAS NOT LED THE ROKG TO PANIC OR TO UNDUE RECRIMINATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST US. IT HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH OUR PERFORMANCE IN PAST YEAR ON MANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE MATTERS AND HAS SAID SO. IN THE SCM WE CAN EXPECT SOME COMMENT ON ON-FULFILLMENT OF OUR PROMISES. AT SAME TIME, ROKG HAS NOT IGNORED THE TRENDS OF EVENTS AND IS NOT TRYING TO TURN CLOCK BACK.

11. FOR OUR PART THIS MEANS THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THAT THE ROKG INCREASINGLY WILL TELL US WHAT IT WANTS IN THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT FIELD. THE ROKG WILL CONTINUE TO ASK OUR ADVICE ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT IT WILL SET ITS OWN PRIORITIES AND ACT ON THEM. HOWEVER, THE ROKG IS IN THE PROCESS OF MOVING FROM A PAST DEPENDENT STATUS IN WHICH, IN EFFECT, IT ACCEPTED OUR DETERMINATIONS SINCE WE WERE PAYING THE FREIGHT TO A SITUATION IN WHICH IT SEES ITSELF AS BEARING ESSENTIALLY THE MAJOR COSTS OF ITS DEFENSE BY THE MID-70S.

12. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
ERICSON

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NNN



→ FROEBE
FYI rok 6a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505


June 13, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter for Korean National
Assemblyman (S/S 7410736)

I enclose a slightly revised version of the reply to Mr. Row
and suggest it be signed by a State Department officer.


Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

Attachment

Dispatched 6/13/1974 (adc)



66
SUGGESTED LETTER

Honorable Chin Hwan Row
National Assembly of the
Republic of Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Row:

I have been asked to respond to your letter to the President, in which you express your appreciation for the visit of Mr. John Nidecker, Special Assistant to the President, to Korea.

We are indeed pleased that you found Mr. Nidecker's visit helpful. For his part, Mr. Nidecker benefited considerably from his visit and has provided us with a valuable report of developments in Korea and of his visit. We are grateful that he was so well received.

Sincerely yours,

FBIS 63

DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER ATTACKS ROK-U.S. OBSTRUCTION OF REUNIFICATION

B231011 PYONGYANG KCNA IN ENGLISH 0800 GMT 23 JUN 74 B

(TEXT) PYONGYANG JUNE 23 (KCNA) -- A GRAND PYONGYANG REPORT MEETING WAS HELD AT THE PEOPLE'S PALACE OF CULTURE SATURDAY EVENING TO MARK THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE PUBLICATION OF "LET US PREVENT A NATIONAL SPLIT AND REUNIFY THE COUNTRY", THE HISTORIC SPEECH MADE BY THE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG.

PUT WITH DUE RESPECT ON THE PLATFORM AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF A HUGE DEEP BLUE AND RED FLAG OF THE REPUBLIC WAS A PORTRAIT OF THE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG, THE GENIUS OF REVOLUTION AND THE SUN AND SAVIOUR OF OUR NATION.

PRESENT AT THE REPORT MEETING WERE FUNCTIONARIES OF PARTY AND POWER ORGANS, WORKING PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC BODIES AND MEN OF SCIENCE, EDUCATION, CULTURE AND ART AND THE PRESS AS WELL AS WORKING PEOPLE IN THE CITY AND SERVICEMEN OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY.

THE PLATFORM WAS TAKEN BY COMRADES SO CHOL AND CHONG CHUN-KI; HO CHONG-SUK, DIRECTOR OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE FATHERLAND FRONT; KANG CHANG-SU, CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHONDOIST CHONGU PARTY; KIM SONG-YUL, VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY; HONG KI-MUN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND; MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE FATHERLAND FRONT; KANG HUI-WON, CHAIRMAN OF THE PYONGYANG MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE; AND RESPONSIBLE FUNCTIONARIES OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS.

Deputy Premier

COMRADE CHONG CHUN-KI DELIVERED A REPORT AT THE MEETING.

THE REPORTER SAID: THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION ADVANCED BY THE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG IS A MOST PATRIOTIC PROPOSITION FOR REUNIFICATION CORRECTLY REFLECTING THE URGENT DEMAND OF THE PREVAILING SITUATION AND THE ARDENT DESIRE OF THE ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL REUNIFICATION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, AND A FAIR AND REALISTIC NATIONAL SALVATION PROPOSITION IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH.

HE CONTINUED: THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS THE CHUCHE-ORIENTED, GREAT PROPOSITION FOR PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION WHERE THE GREAT CHUCHE IDEA THAT PEOPLE ARE THE MASTER OF THEIR OWN DESTINY AND THEY HAVE ALSO THE CAPACITY TO HEW OUT THEIR OWN DESTINY HAS FOUND A BRILLIANT EMBODIMENT IN THE QUESTION OF REUNIFICATION AND AN INSPIRING BANNER OF ACTIVELY SEEKING A SHORTCUT TO NATIONAL REUNIFICATION BY THE EFFORTS OF OUR PEOPLE THEMSELVES THROUGH THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL THE PATRIOTIC FORCES OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH.

THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION NEWLY CLARIFIED BY THE GREAT LEADER IS ALSO A PROPOSITION OF INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE UNANIMOUS DESIRE OF THE WORLD PROGRESSIVE PEOPLES TO SEE PEACE IN KOREA AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION AND WITH THE TREND OF THE PRESENT TIME WHEN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF WORLD PEOPLE ARE TAKING THE ROAD OF INDEPENDENCE.

THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION CLARIFIED BY THE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG IS A HISTORICAL NATIONAL SALVATION PROPOSITION POINTING TO THE ONLY WAY TO SHAPE THE DESTINY OF THE COUNTRY AND THE NATION BY THE EFFORTS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES AT THE GRAVE HISTORIC JUNCTURE WHEN THEY ARE AT THE CROSSROADS OF REUNIFICATION OR PERMANENT SPLIT, A REUNIFICATION DECLARATION BRINGING DOWN A SLEDGE UPON THE HEADS OF A TINY HANDFUL OF NATIONAL SPLITTISTS WHO CAME OUT WITH THE "SPLITTING DECLARATION" AND (WORD INDISTINCT) REFLECTING THE ASPIRATION OF THE NATION FOR REUNIFICATION AND A GREAT MILITANT PROPOSITION POWERFULLY ROUSING THE ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE TO THE SACRED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE DIVISION AND TREACHERY AND FOR REUNIFICATION AND PATRIOTISM.

(MORE)

23 JUN 1808Z BG/MC

DAF R145 P10007

(P)

LIBRARY OF SENATOR R. FORD

W

FIRST ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)

XXX-REUNIFICATION AND PATRIOTISM.

*Harvey
Miller
7507
6068*

DATE 1/1/5 1968

(P)

(TEXT) ONE'S APPROACH TOWARDS THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS THE TOUCHSTONE TESTING WHETHER HE WANTS REUNIFICATION OR NOT, WHETHER HE RESPECTS OR NOT THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION WHICH THE NORTH AND SOUTH PLEDGED TO FULFIL BEFORE THE NATION, THE REPORTER SAID, AND CONTINUED:

IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG ADVANCED IT AS A NATIONAL SALVATION MEASURE OF GREATEST URGENCY TO REMOVE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND EASE TENSION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, TO BEBEN WITH.

THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:

"TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF KOREA AND ACCELERATE THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY, IT IS NECESSARY, FIRST OF ALL, TO ELIMINATE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND EASE TENSION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH".

THIS PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY THE LEADER IS A MOST REASONABLE AND FAIR ONE FOR ELIMINATING THE SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISTRUST BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, IMPROVING THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE NATION AND CREATING PRECONDITIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY.

THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE AGREED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT TO ACHIEVE REUNIFICATION IN A PEACEFUL WAY. BUT WHEN WE PRACTICALLY PUT FORWARD A CONCRETE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND EAST TENSION, THEY CAME OUT WITH THE STEREOTYPED SOPHISM THAT "IT IS STILL PREMATURE" AND "NOW IS NOT THE STAGE TO SETTLE THIS MATTER" AND WENT THE LENGTH OF REFUSING TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER.

AND THEY TOOK THE ROAD OF SPEEDING UP WAR PREPARATIONS AND FURTHER KEYING UP TENSION, WHILE REINFORCING THE ARMED FORCES, EXPANDING ARMAMENTS, BEGGING FOR THE PERMAMENT STATIONING OF THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR TROOPS AND INTRODUCING LARGE QUANTITIES OF NEW TYPE WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

THE DARK DESIGN PURSUED BY THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE BEHIND THE SIGNBOARD OF "PEACE" AND "CO-EXISTENCE" HAS BEEN MORE FULLY REVEALED IN THE "NON-AGGRESSION PACT" BROUGHT FORWARD BY THEM.

THE "NON-AGGRESSION PACT" BRAZEN-FACEDLY PUT FORWARD BY THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE IS NOTHING BUT A SMOKESCREEN TO COVER UP THEIR CRIMINAL WAR POLICY AND TURN DOWN OUR PROPOSAL FOR PEACE AGREEMENT. IT AIMS ONLY AT MAINTAINING THE PRESENT SITUATION FRAUGHT WITH THE DANGER OF WAR AS IT IS.

AS LONG AS THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR TROOPS, THE SOURCE OF WAR IN OUR COUNTRY, STAY ON, PEACE IN OUR COUNTRY CANNOT BE GUARANTEED NOR CAN THE DANGER OF WAR BE REMOVED THERE NO MATTER WHAT SIGNBOARD MAY BE PUT UP TO "JUSTIFY" THEIR OCCUPATION OF SOUTH KOREA AND NO MATTER WHAT EMPTY "DECLARATION" BE MADE.

IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION, THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG ALSO CLARIFIED A NATIONAL SALVATION PROPOSAL TO REALISE MANY-SIDED COLLABORATION AND INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH.

THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT AS FOLLOWS:

"TO IMPROVE THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND EXPEDITE THE COUNTRY'S REUNIFICATION, IT IS NECESSARY TO MATERIALIZE MANY-SIDED COLLABORATION AND INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH IN THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FIELDS".

TO IMPROVE THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND SETTLE THE REUNIFICATION QUESTION IN A PEACEFUL WAY, MANY-SIDED COLLABORATION AND INTERCHANGE MUST BE REALISED BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH FOR CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST, RESOTRING THE SEVERED NATIONAL LINKS IN AN ALL-ROUND WAY AND PROMOTING THE INDEPENDENT AND UNIFORM DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY.

BUT THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE WHO HAD BEEN TRYING TO USE THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AS AN IMPLEMENT FOR PERMANENT DIVISION OBSTINATELY OPPOSED TO GIVING A CONCRETE SHAPE TO AND TRANSLATING INTO PRACTICE NORTH-SOUTH COLLABORATION THOUGH THEY AGREED ON IT AND PERSISTENTLY PURSUED THE LINE OF "CONFRONTATION" AND "COMPETITION".

(MORE)

23 JUN 1815Z BG/GS

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Handwritten notes: 7507, 6068, and other illegible scribbles.

SECOND ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)

XXX "CONFRONTATION" AND "COMPETITION".

(P)

T (TEXT) THE CRIMINAL MOVES THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE ARE STEPPING UP IN PURSUANCE OF "CONFRONTATION" AND "COMPETITION" BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, TURNING AWAY THEIR FACE FROM COLLABORATION AND INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS, ARE TREACHEROUS ONES TO PROLONG THE DIVISION, NOT REUNIFICATION, AND INCITE ANTAGONISM, NOT UNITY.

IN HIS HISTORIC JUNE 23 SPEECH THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG PROPOSED IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION TO CONVENE A GREAT NATIONAL CONGRESS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF PEOPLE OF ALL STRATA AND POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH.

THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:

"IN ORDER TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF THE COUNTRY'S REUNIFICATION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE WILL AND DEMAND OF OUR PEOPLE, IT IS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE MASSES OF PEOPLE OF ALL STRATA IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NATIONWIDE PATRIOTIC WORK FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION".

IN VIEW OF ITS NATURE THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS NOT A MATTER PERTAINING TO THE INTERESTS OF ANY ONE CIRCLE OR POLITICAL GROUPING BUT AN ALL-PEOPLE, NATIONWIDE WORK IN WHICH ALL CLASSES AND CIRCLES, ALL PARTIES AND GROUPINGS OF OUR COUNTRY DESIROUS OF REUNIFICATION ARE VITALLY INTERESTED.

FROM THE FIRST DAYS OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH THE WORKERS PARTY OF KOREA, THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, THE CHONDOIST CHONGU PARTY AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE NORTHERN HALF PROPOSED THAT BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL CONTACTS BE REALISED AMONG ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH AND A NORTH-SOUTH POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE BE CONVENED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY FOR REUNIFICATION, THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY, THE DEMOCRATIC UNIFICATION PARTY AND ALL OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES AND PERSONAGES OF ALL STRATA IN SOUTH KOREA ALSO CEASELESSLY DEMANDED MANY-SIDED CONTACTS AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH.

~~BUT THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE MONOPOLIZED A DISCOURSE ON THE REUNIFICATION QUESTION IN SOUTH KOREA AS IF IT WERE THEIR EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY, DOGGEDLY OPPOSED OUR PROPOSAL ON HOLDING POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS AND HARSHLY SUPPRESSED EVEN THE DEMAND OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES, ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL PERSONAGES OF SOUTH KOREA FOR CONTACTS WITH US FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY.~~

THIS SHOWS HOW MUCH THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE ARE AFRAID OF THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION BY THE EFFORTS OF OUR PEOPLE THEMSELVES AND WHAT A BASE TRICK THEY ARE RESORTING TO TO PERPETUATE THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG NEWLY PROPOSED IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION TO INSTITUTE A NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION UNDER THE SINGLE NAME OF THE CONFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF KORYO.

THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:

"WHAT IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TODAY IN SPEEDING UP THE COUNTRY'S REUNIFICATION IS TO INSTITUTE A NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION UNDER THE NAME OF A SINGLE COUNTRY".

ORIGINALLY, THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS ONE TO BE SETTLED PEACEFULLY ON AN INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE. THE BASIC WAY OF ITS SOLUTION IS TO ESTABLISH A UNITED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH NORTH-SOUTH GENERAL ELECTIONS. THIS PROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION HAS BEEN INVARIABLY MAINTAINED BY OUR PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC FROM THE FIRST DAYS OF THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

AS THIS FAIR AND ABOVEBOARD PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION HAS NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES, THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION WAS PROPOSED AS A TRANSITIONAL STEP FOR ACHIEVING REUNIFICATION. THIS IS A MOST CORRECT PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION TAKING INTO FULL ACCOUNT THE OBJECTIVE REALITIES IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH WHERE THERE EXIST THE TWO DIFFERING SYSTEMS.

(MORE)

23 JUN 1831Z BG/GS



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THIRD ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)

XXX TWO DIFFERING SYSTEMS.

(TEXT) IT CANNOT BUT BE A MOST REASONABLE MATTER OF URGENCY TO INSTITUTE THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION AFTER CONVENING A GREAT NATIONAL CONGRESS AND ACHIEVING GREAT NATIONAL UNITY, UNDER THE CONDITION IN WHICH THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS HAVE BECOME EVER MORE UNDISGUISED IN THEIR "TWO KOREAS" PLOTS. M

BUT, THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE TURNED DOWN EVEN THIS JUST PROPOSAL OF OURS TO INSTITUTE THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION UNDER A SINGLE NATIONAL TITLE, CRYING THAT THE CONFEDERATION IS "POSSIBLE ONLY BETWEEN THE MULTI-NATIONAL STATES WITH ONE AND THE SAME SYSTEM" AND IT IS AN "UNREALISTIC" PROPOSAL WHICH IS "INFEASIBLE" BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH WHERE THERE ARE TWO DIFFERING SYSTEMS.

THE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES' REFUSAL TO INSTITUTE THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION UNDER A SINGLE NATIONAL TITLE ON THE PRETEXT THAT THERE IS THE DIFFERENCE OF SYSTEMS PATENTLY SHOWS THAT THEY ARE A PACK OF TRAITORS TO THE NATION, SEEKING THE SPLIT, GOING AGAINST THE ARDENT DESIRE OF THE NATION FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION.

IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION OF THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG THAT THE NORTH AND SOUTH SHOULD WORK TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITY.

THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:

"WE CONSIDER THAT OUR COUNTRY SHOULD BE PREVENTED FROM BEING SPLIT INTO TWO KOREAS PERMANENTLY AS A RESULT OF THE FREEZING OF NATIONAL DIVISION AND THAT THE NORTH AND SOUTH SHOULD ALSO WORK TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITY".

ONLY WHEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH WORK TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITY IS IT POSSIBLE TO PREVENT OUR NATION FROM BEING SPLIT INTO TWO AND PROVIDE A FIRM INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE FOR RESOLVING ALL PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COUNTRY'S REUNIFICATION.

IN SPITE OF OUR JUST PROPOSAL THAT THE NORTH AND SOUTH WORK TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITY, THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE COMMITTED SUCH UNPARDONABLE SPLITTING ACTS AS DECLARING THE "TWO KOREAS" PLOT AS THEIR "POLICY" AND BRINGING THE "MOTION CALLING FOR SEPARATE UN MEMBERSHIP FOR TWO KOREAS" BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE "TWO KOREAS" PLOT OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND THEIR STOOGES, HOWEVER, TOTALLY MISCARRIED AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST YEAR.

THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE DO NOT HESITATE TO MAKE EYES AT SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, ADVOCATING THE "OPEN-DOOR POLICY" IN AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE "TWO KOREAS" AT ANY COST. BUT, IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYONE THAT THIS TRICK CAN NEVER SUCCEED.

THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND ALL THE EFFORTS MADE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GREAT FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION CLEARLY SHOW WHO TRULY WANTS PEACE IN OUR COUNTRY AND HAS STRIVEN FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION AND WHO HAS ACTUALLY SOUGHT A WAR AND PERMANENT DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY, WHO HAS BEEN TRULY FAITHFUL TO THE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION LAID DOWN IN THE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT AND WHO HAS VIOLATED THESE PRINCIPLES AND CLEARLY TELL WHO IS TO BLAME FOR THE PRESENT DEADLOCK OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, THE REPORTER NOTED, AND CONTINUED:

PAK CHONG-HUI MADE PUBLIC ON THE 22ND A "STATEMENT" IN WHICH HE DID NOT GIVE UP THE "TWO KOREAS" POLICY THAT HAD BEEN OPENLY DECLARED IN THE "SPECIAL STATEMENT" ONE YEAR AGO AND "PLEGGED HIMSELF" TO CARRY ON HIS MANOEUVRES TO PERPETUATE THE DIVISION, DEFYING THE DENUNCIATION OF THE WHOLE NATION.

THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE ARE ONLY SEEKING THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, PERMANENT NATIONAL SPLIT AND FRATRICIDAL WAR, WITH THE BACKING OF OUTSIDE FORCES, VIOLATING THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND TURNING DOWN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION, A GREAT PROPOSITION OF THE NATION TO EMBODY THE THREE PRINCIPLES. THEY ARE THE VICIOUS SPLITTISTS UPSETTING THE ASPIRATION OF THE WHOLE NATION FOR PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION, A PACK OF DESPICABLE TRAITORS SELLING OUT THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY AND THE NATION AND WICKED BELLICOSE ELEMENTS DISTURBING PEACE IN THE COUNTRY.

(MORE)

23 JUN 1841Z BG/MC



FBIS 68

FOURTH AND LAST ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)

XXX IN THE COUNTRY.

(TEXT) THE SOUTH KOREAN FASCIST CLIQUE ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED THOUSANDS OF PATRIOTIC STUDENTS AND DEMOCRATIC FIGURES WHO FOUGHT FOR DEMOCRACY AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION ON CHARGES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE FAKED-UP "CASE OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF YOUTH AND STUDENTS FOR DEMOCRACY" AND SENT OVER 250 OF THEM TO THE "EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY TRIBUNAL" ON CHARGES OF VIOLATION OF THE "ANTI-COMMUNIST LAW" AND "EMERGENCY MEASURES" AND ARE STAGING EVERY DAY A TRIAL OF 34 OF THEM, TO BEGIN WITH, IN AN ATTEMPT TO PUNISH AND MURDER THEM RUTHLESSLY.

ALL THE TREACHEROUS MANOEUVRES STEPPED UP BY THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE UNDER THE SLOGAN OF "ANTI-COMMUNISM" HAVE ORIGINATED FROM THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY AND "TWO KOREAS" PLOT OF THE U.X. AND JAPANESE IMPERIALISTS AND ARE ZEALOUSLY BACKED BY THEM.

THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS HAVE OBSTRUCTED FROM ITS VERY START THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, DESPERATELY HAMPERED THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA, SUPPLIED WEAPONS FOR AGGRESSION TO THE SOUTH KOREAN BELLICOSE ELEMENTS AND CEASELESSLY KEYED UP THE TENSION IN KOREA WITH AN EYE TO KEEP A HOLD ON SOUTH KOREA AS THEIR PERMANENT COLONY AND MILITARY BASE.

THE 3RD SESSION OF THE 5TH SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, DIRECTING DEEP ATTENTION TO THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' POLICY OF AGGRESSION ON KOREA, PROPOSED TO CONCLUDE A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO CREATE PREREQUISITES TO THE ACCELERATION OF THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY.

~~BUT THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY PROPER RESPONSE OR GIVEN ANY REPLY TO OUR PEACE-LOVING PROPOSAL.~~ ON THE CONTRARY, THEY ARE TAKING THE ROAD OF FURTHER INTENSIFYING THEIR AGGRESSIVE AND SPLITTIST MANOEUVRES AGAINST OUR COUNTRY.

THE JAPANESE MILITARISTS, TOO, ARE NOW PURSUING THE POLICY OF AGGRESSION ON KOREA AND ZEALOUSLY EGGING THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE ONTO THE "TWO KOREAS" PLOT. THEY ARE ZEALOUSLY PLAYING IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA THE ROLE OF "DETACHED FORCE" TO KEEP KOREA SPLIT INDEFINITELY.

THE ONLY WAY OF SAVING THE COUNTRY AND NATION FROM THE DANGER OF PERMANENT SPLIT AND PROMOTING THE CAUSE OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS TO BRING TO REALISATION THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION ADVANCED BY COMRADE KIM IL-SONG, THE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER AND THE GREAT SUN OF THE NATION, THE REPORTER DECLARED. HE WENT ON:

WE, AVAILING OURSELVES OF THIS OPPORTUNITY, EXTEND POWERFUL SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE JUST AND PATRIOTIC STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE AND SOLEMNLY DECLARE THAT WE WILL ACTIVELY SUPPORT THEIR STRUGGLE WITH ALL OUR EFFORTS FROM THE STAND OF SHARING ALWAYS WITH THEM THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR STRUGGLE.

THE ENTIRE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE SHOULD VIGOROUSLY STRUGGLE TO PUT AN END TO THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' OCCUPATION OF SOUTH KOREA AND THEIR COLONIAL RULE AND DRIVE THEM OUT OF OUR COUNTRY.

THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE SHOULD WAGE A POWERFUL STRUGGLE TO FRUSTRATE THE JAPANESE MILITARISTS' REINVASION, HOLDING HIGHER THE BANNER OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST JAPANESE MILITARISM AND FOR NATIONAL SALVATION.

TO HASTEN NATIONAL REUNIFICATION A STRUGGLE SHOULD BE WAGED ALSO AGAINST THE NATION-SPLITTISTS OF SOUTH KOREA, FAITHFUL STOOGES OF THE U.S. AND JAPANESE AGGRESSORS.

NO ONE SHOULD SEEK THE PERMANENT DIVISION OF KOREA OR UPSET THE UNANIMOUS DESIRE OF OUR NATION FOR THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY. THERE IS NO GROUND OR PRETEXT WHATSOEVER FOR THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS TO REMAIN IN SOUTH KOREA. *M*

THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS MUST GIVE UP AT ONCE THEIR POLICY OF AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRY AND "TWO KOREAS" PLOT, WITHDRAW FORTHWITH FROM SOUTH KOREA TAKING ALONG ALL THE LETHAL WEAPONS, AND ACCEPT WITHOUT DELAY THE DPRK GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE AGREEMENT AIMED AT CREATING PREREQUISITES TO PEACE IN KOREA AND HER PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. *||*

THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD STRIP THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AGGRESSOR FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA OF THE "UN FORCES" BERETS ~~AND TAKE STEPS FOR~~ THEIR WITHDRAWAL. THE JAPANESE MILITARISTS MUST STOP THEIR REINVASION OF SOUTH KOREA, GIVE UP THE HOSTILE POLICY AGAINST THE DPRK AND CEASE INTERFERING WITH THE CAUSE OF THE REUNIFICATION OF OUR COUNTRY. *☆*

THE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES MUST RENOUNCE THE ANACHRONISTIC WAY OF THINKING TO LIVE BY RELYING ON THE OUTSIDE FORCES, DISCONTINUE THE TREACHERIES OF SELLING OUT THE COUNTRY AND THE NATION AND THE FASCIST REPRESSION OF PEOPLE, STOP SEEKING THE PERMANENT NATIONAL SPLIT, ACCEPT OUR FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION AND TAKE HONEST APPROACHES TOWARD THE DIALOGUE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT. IF THE U.S. AND JAPANESE AGGRESSORS AND THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE PERSIST IN THE AGGRESSIVE MANOEUVRES AND TREACHERIES AND KEEP FOLLOWING THE ROAD OF NATIONAL SPLIT, GOING AGAINST THE TREND OF THE TIMES, THEY WILL CERTAINLY SUFFER A SHAMEFUL DESTRUCTION BEFORE HISTORY AND THE NATION, THE REPORTER WARNED.

(ENDALL)

23 JUN 1857Z BG/MC



8a
Rok

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 5, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: W. R. SMYSER *WR*
RICHARD T. KENNEDY

SUBJECT: Proposed Sale of F-4 Squadron to
Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea has asked us to sell it 57 F-4Es, or three squadrons, as an FMS cash purchase. State and Defense have in principle approved the sale of one squadron of F-4Es, and they recommend that the question of selling two more squadrons be considered as part of the current annual review of the Korean Force Modernization Plan. A cable to Embassy Seoul (Tab A) would give effect to their recommendations.

We agree with this basic State/Defense recommendation, though we have some reservations. You should be aware that this action would in a sense go beyond the President's decision a year ago on the Korean Force Modernization Plan (Tab B). His decision in effect approved the State/Defense recommendation that the Plan include another three squadrons of F-5Es rather than a second squadron of F-4s. The President had, however, in 1971 approved a second F-4 squadron which was found not to be available. So the second squadron is not in absolute contravention of his wishes.

For us to put a second squadron of F-4s back into the plan now, in addition to the three additional squadrons of F-5Es, would add somewhat to Republic of Korea air defense capabilities. We believe this addition is acceptable because it would not be enough to destabilize the basic political-security balance on the Korean Peninsula postulated by last year's review of the Modernization Plan. Moreover, the squadron would not physically be turned over to the Republic of Korea until well after the F-4 squadron now on bailment to the Republic of Korea is withdrawn next spring. (It is not, however, accurate to speak of the second F-4 squadron as replacing the bailed squadron, as the State/Defense draft cable does. The F-5As on loan to Vietnam will replace the bailed squadron under the Enhance Plus Agreement when they are returned to the Republic of Korea. We have, therefore, deleted that sentence from the draft cable.)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (or amend.) SEC 3.3 *See Directive 200,30*
NSC Memo, 2/20/76, Code Dept. Guidelines; *side rev. 10/1/76*
By *MA* NARA Date *12/6/12*

A final consideration is the timing of any publicity given to our agreement to sell a second F-4 squadron to the Republic of Korea. We do not want such publicity to undercut our approach to the PRC on the termination of the U.N. Command. We have amended the draft cable to make this clear.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the draft State/Defense cable at Tab A as amended.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____



~~SECRET~~

86

PRIORITY

Material which has been lined through is that which we recommend be deleted. Material in square brackets is that which we recommend be added.

TO: CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAI
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOREA

INFO: AMEMB SEOUL KOREA
CJUSMAG SEOUL KOREA
CSAF WASH DC

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: F-4E Aircraft for ROK

REF: STATE 109114, dtd 232357Z May 74

1. Ref advised that the F-4 matter is extremely involved and too many issues are at hand for the USG to move on short notice. The Inter-Agency Steering Group (IASG) has met twice and is continuing to review all issues associated with ROK's decision to purchase 57 F-4Es.
2. At this time, it is considered prudent to withhold a letter of offer on the entire 57 F-4 aircraft for ROK until the IASG has finished its review and made its recommendations. However, to be forthcoming with the ROK's, a letter of offer is approved for nineteen F-4E aircraft (one squadron, one attrition aircraft), provided the purchase is on a dependable undertaking cash basis. At this time, no commitment can be made on the use of FY 75/76 FMS credit for the F-4E program. These aircraft, in effect, would replace the bailed squadron of F-4Ds. Monies as expended repeat expended will be counted against the MOD plan balance.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

GDS

EO 12958, SEC 33 DoD Directive 5201.30
NCO Plans, DoD, State Dept. Guidelines; state rev. ew 9/17/03
By ll NARA, Osto 12/6/10

3. ~~The P&A data is being formulated and will be forwarded soonest.~~

[Until you receive further instructions, no repeat no publicity whatsoever should be given to the contemplated transfer. We would strongly request ROK cooperation in this request.] You will be advised of the results and recommendations of the IASG.



8c

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

July 27, 1973

National Security Decision Memorandum 227

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Korean Force Modernization Plan

The President has reviewed the Under Secretaries' memorandum on Re-examination of the Korean Force Modernization Plan and has decided:

-- Air defense should be emphasized in modernizing ROK forces in order to assist the ROK in moving toward combat self-sufficiency for defense against the North Korean threat.

-- Modernization of ROK divisions beyond the 16 active and three ready reserve divisions recommended in the military study should receive low priority but the ROK should not be told the U. S. will not support modernization of additional divisions.

-- NSDM 129 continues in effect but no termination date should be established for grant MAP assistance.

-- Planning for grant MAP and requests to Congress should not be precipitously reduced nor should assistance be switched rapidly to FMS (Option Two of the Steering Group's Report is approved).

-- Before high performance aircraft beyond replacement aircraft in the original modernization plan are funded, a complete review of the threat and air defense requirement should be undertaken and recommendations submitted to the President.


~~SECRET~~
GDS

DECLASSIFIED

Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

AUTHORITY NSC memo 1/30/09
BY lm DATE 12/16/10

Subject to the foregoing the recommendations of the Under Secretaries' Committee are approved and the Korean Force Requirements Study should be the general basis for military assistance planning.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Acting Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 18, 1973

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula

The President has approved the following as interim guidance on our basic policy toward the Korean Peninsula:

- We shall continue to reassure the ROK of U.S. support for its timely and constructive foreign policy initiative announced in President Park's speech of June 23.
- The U.S. will make no further adjustments in its present force levels in the ROK except in the context of the overall security situation on the Peninsula. We will consult with the ROK well in advance of any further force reductions.
- The U.S. will continue military assistance to the ROK, and in particular will complete the Five Year Modernization Plan, although Congressional funding limitations will require that U.S. assistance on this plan be stretched out through FY 1977. We also believe that the emphasis in the plan should be shifted from ground forces to air defense. The other recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee on the plan are presently under consideration; pending decision we should avoid further detailed discussion of U.S. military assistance.
- We are keenly aware of President Park's desire that we discuss the Korean question with the PRC and the Soviet Union, and can assure the ROK that we have that desire very much in mind. We will do nothing that will harm South Korean vital interests, and will consult with the ROK to the maximum extent possible.
- We should avoid attempting to force the pace of the South-North talks -- either by suggesting a reduction of our support for the ROK, or by pressing on the ROK a series of initiatives that it might take up with

DECLASSIFIED


E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By NARA, Date 12/6/10

~~SECRET~~

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R0K 1973 file



state rev: ewr 9/17/03


Pyongyang. Beyond lending every encouragement to the ROK to persist in the talks, and assuring the ROK of continued support, U. S. direct intervention with Seoul should be limited to averting any threatened break-down in the talks.

-- We accept the proposition that the termination of UNCURK would be a very useful step in helping avoid a confrontation at next fall's UNGA. Any termination of UNCURK, however, should be without prejudice to its past activities. We should seek to persuade the members of UNCURK to recommend termination in their annual report. A decision on whether to seek a UNGA resolution formally accepting the report, however, will not be made until we have more certain indication of the intentions of the other side.

-- We are reviewing the status of the UNC and will consider the possibility of terminating this body, provided that the related aspects of existing security arrangements can be adjusted in a way that will not diminish the security of the ROK. Since this is a delicate and complex undertaking, we should proceed with caution and are confident that we can defend the UNC against a possible hostile resolution in the next UNGA.

-- As to U. N. membership for the two Koreas, we support the position taken by President Park in his June 23 speech. We will continue to consult closely with the ROK and other friendly nations on the tactics we will adopt on the Korean question in next fall's UNGA.

The President has asked that you use the above interim guidance in your contacts with ROK officials and others, and that you not go beyond this position pending further guidance from him.


Henry A. Kissinger





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 11563 261600Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 ID-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03
INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03
SS-20 USIA-15 DRC-01 NIC-01 /128 W

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R 261450Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1160
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 11563

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, KN, KS, AS, UR
SUBJ: SOVIET VIEWS ON KOREA

1. IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH KAPITSA, DEPARTMENT HEAD IN MFA, AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR SOLICITED SOVIET VIEWS ON KOREA. KAPITSA STRESSED THAT NORTH KOREA IS "FRIEND AND ALLY" OF SOVIET UNION AND THIS IS MAJOR CONSIDERATION FOR LATTER. AT SAME TIME, KAPITSA COMMENTED THAT SOVIETS REALIZE THAT NORTH KOREAN OBJECTION TO ENTRY OF BOTH KOREAS INTO UN IS INCONSISTNET WITH MEMBERSHIP OF BOTH IN UN SPECIALIZED ORGANIZATIONS. KAPITSA SAID THAT SOVIET UNION HAD GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO RECOGNIZING SOUTH KOREA AND ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH HER BUT HAD DECIDED AGAINST THIS AFTER BALANCING BENEFITS AND LOOSES. SOVIETS FELT THAT GAINS FROM RECOGNIZING SOUTH KOREA WOULD BE LESS THAN THE LOSSES IT WOULD SUFFER IN INFLUENCE IN AND SUPPORT FROM NOTH KOREA. KAPITSA SAD THAT, EVEN NOW, SOVIETS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTIES WITH NORTH KOREA BECAUSE SOVIET UNION PERMITS ENTRY OF SOUTH KOREANS FOR PARTICIPATION IN SPORTS EVENTS AND



EO. 12958
State Dept. Guidelines; State rev. aw 9/17/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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By WA NARA, Date 12/6/10



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 11863 281800Z

CONFERENCES.

2. WHEN AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT ONE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING BOTH KOREAS IN UN WOULD BE RECOGNITION OF TWO INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES, WHICH WOULD MEAN THAT ATTACK BY ONE AGAINST THE OTHER WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AGGRESSION, KAPITSA SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ATTACK BY SOUTH KOREA AGAINST NORTH KOREA IF U.S. DID NOT WANT IT. LIKEWISE THERE WOULD BE NO ATTACK BY NORTH KOREA AGAINST SOUTH KOREA IF CHINESE AND SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT IT. AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF CHINESE AND SOVIET UNION DID NOT AGREE, AND KAPITSA SAID CHINA WOULD NOT WANT TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION OR THE U.S. AT PRESENT.

3. AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT AUSTRALIAN RECOGNITION OF NORTH KOREA WOULD TAKE PLACE IN NEAR FUTURE. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED, BUT AN AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR WILL NOT BE RESIDENT IN PYONGYANG. STOESSER



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ad W.D.M. 11
J.P. Kim
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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

July 29, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 262

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Use of U.S. Bases in Japan in the Event of
Aggression Against South Korea


The President has reviewed the memorandum of the Deputy Secretary of State of April 27, 1974 which proposed a modification in the guidance contained in NSDM 251 concerning extension of the 1961 Kishi Minute on the Use of U.S. Bases in Japan in the Event of Aggression Against South Korea.

The President has approved the recommendation in Option 3 of the memorandum, i. e., with the purpose of retaining at least the effect of the Korean Minute without seeking an explicit, formal extension of the Minute, we should:

-- Not raise the question of the Korean Minute itself directly with the Japanese Government.

-- Rather, during discussion with the Japanese Government on the future of the U.N. Command, take the position that we are confident termination of the U.N. Command will not adversely affect our ability to deter a North Korean attack, even though the U.N. cover and the U.N. SOFA for Japan are terminated, and that no further formal U.S. -Japanese actions are required.

Accordingly, the guidance contained in NSDM 251 is amended in this respect.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NSC memo 1/30/89
BY: [signature] DATE: 12/6/10

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032795

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME John E. Nidecker

RECEIVER'S NAME General A. M. Haig, Jr

DESCRIPTION Re US-Republic of Korea Relations

CREATION DATE 07/29/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700247

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032796

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇLetter

CREATOR'S NAME Philip C. Habib

RECEIVER'S NAME Mr. John E. Nidecker

RECEIVER'S TITLE Special Assistant to the President

DESCRIPTION Re US-Republic of Korea Relations

CREATION DATE 07/15/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700247

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032797

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇLetter

CREATOR'S NAME John E. Nidecker

CREATOR'S TITLE Special Assistant to the President

RECEIVER'S NAME The Honorable Philip C. Habib

RECEIVER'S TITLE Ambassador

DESCRIPTION Re US-Republic of Korea Relations

CREATION DATE 07/03/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700247

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032798

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇLetter

CREATOR'S NAME John E. Nidecker

CREATOR'S TITLE Special Assistant to the President

DESCRIPTION Re US-Republic of Korea Relations

CREATION DATE 07/03/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700247

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE Korea (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

Subj

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

August 2, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT: South Korean Ambassador Requests to Call on the Vice President

The Vice President's office has informed me that they have been informally approached by the Korean Embassy for a call on the Vice President for their Ambassador.

I recommend against the Vice President's receiving Ambassador Hahm at this juncture. Ambassador Hahm undoubtedly wants to seek the Vice President's understanding and sympathy for President Park's handling of his currently sensitive political situation. Ambassador Hahm since his return from Seoul recently has been mounting a campaign around town to counter Congressional interest in reducing our military assistance to South Korea as a means of inducing Park to relax his authoritarian controls. It is true that the Vice President could merely hear Hahm out and could refuse to make substantive comment on the question. However, Ambassador Hahm might misconstrue any comments the Vice President would make, and the mere fact of the Vice President's seeing Hahm in the present context might be misinterpreted. On balance, I believe that we have little to gain and something to risk by the Vice President's receiving Ambassador Hahm at this time.

Attached at Tab A is a draft memorandum from Mrs. Davis to Mr. Marsh recommending against the Vice President's receiving Ambassador Hahm.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve Mrs. Davis' sending the draft memorandum at Tab A to Mr. Marsh.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

GDS

RECLASSIFIED
 EO 13526, (b) (7) SEC 3.3
 NSC Memo, Sec. 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.7, 1.2.8, 1.2.9, 1.2.10, 1.2.11, 1.2.12, 1.2.13, 1.2.14, 1.2.15, 1.2.16, 1.2.17, 1.2.18, 1.2.19, 1.2.20, 1.2.21, 1.2.22, 1.2.23, 1.2.24, 1.2.25, 1.2.26, 1.2.27, 1.2.28, 1.2.29, 1.2.30, 1.2.31, 1.2.32, 1.2.33, 1.2.34, 1.2.35, 1.2.36, 1.2.37, 1.2.38, 1.2.39, 1.2.40, 1.2.41, 1.2.42, 1.2.43, 1.2.44, 1.2.45, 1.2.46, 1.2.47, 1.2.48, 1.2.49, 1.2.50, 1.2.51, 1.2.52, 1.2.53, 1.2.54, 1.2.55, 1.2.56, 1.2.57, 1.2.58, 1.2.59, 1.2.60, 1.2.61, 1.2.62, 1.2.63, 1.2.64, 1.2.65, 1.2.66, 1.2.67, 1.2.68, 1.2.69, 1.2.70, 1.2.71, 1.2.72, 1.2.73, 1.2.74, 1.2.75, 1.2.76, 1.2.77, 1.2.78, 1.2.79, 1.2.80, 1.2.81, 1.2.82, 1.2.83, 1.2.84, 1.2.85, 1.2.86, 1.2.87, 1.2.88, 1.2.89, 1.2.90, 1.2.91, 1.2.92, 1.2.93, 1.2.94, 1.2.95, 1.2.96, 1.2.97, 1.2.98, 1.2.99, 1.2.100
 By *WA* NARA Date *12/6/10*



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ACTION

August 2, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. MARSH

FROM: JEANNE W. DAVIS

SUBJECT: South Korean Ambassador's Request
to Call on the Vice President

Colonel Walker has informally informed Mr. Froebe that the South Korean Embassy informally sought a call on the Vice President for Ambassador Hahm. Although we understand the purpose of the call was not specified, Ambassador Hahm's intention in all probability is to seek the Vice President's understanding and sympathy for President Park's handling of his current sensitive domestic political situation. The Park Government recently has been particularly concerned about mounting Congressional criticism, and about the proposal being discussed in committee to reduce U. S. military assistance to South Korea as a means of trying to induce the Park Government to relax these controls.

We would recommend against the Vice President's receiving Ambassador Hahm. The mere fact of Ambassador Hahm's calling on the Vice President could be misinterpreted in this context. In addition, any comments that the Vice President might make in response to Ambassador Hahm's presentation would be subject to misinterpretation.

~~SECRET~~ GDS

EO 12958-1
NSC Memo, Sec. of State Dept. Guidelines
By WJ NARA, Date 12/6/10

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTIONSECRET/SENSITIVE

September 11, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Sneider
on September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m.

You have agreed to meet with Ambassador Richard L. Sneider on September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m. As you know, Mr. Sneider is departing shortly to take up his new post in Seoul.

Current Crisis in South Korean - Japanese Relations. The two sides within the past day or so now seem to have broken the Gordian knot. The Japanese have agreed to the basic South Korean demand that Prime Minister Tanaka's letter be carried by a ranking Japanese emissary and that it be addressed to President Park. Final language of the letter is now being worked out as regards the issues of Japanese acknowledgment of responsibility of the assassination attempt against President Park and the killing of Mrs. Park, the Japanese investigation of the assassination plot, and the question of Chosen Soren's (the organization representing North Korea in Japan) involvement.

We have played a key role in the resolution of this crisis -- we have effectively set limits on the lengths to which both parties could go, and we have acted as a traditional Asian go-between in conveying the substantive proposals to each of the parties. (We played a similar role in the resolution of the Kim Dae-jung case earlier this year.) The outcome has thus avoided serious adverse consequences for the South Koreans, the Japanese, and ourselves -- which could have only benefited such as North Korea.

U. S. Continued Strong Support of South Korea. As the State EA Deputy Assistant Secretary concerned with Korea, Dick Sneider has at times in the past year floated the idea of U. S. troop reductions in South Korea and pressed for a reduction of our military assistance to South Korea. Defense has now picked up the cudgel again on this latter issue -- in preparation for the U. S. - ROK annual security consultative meeting later this month, Deputy Secretary Clements has sent Secretary Kissinger a memo proposing an end to U. S. grant MAP to the ROK after FY76. The memo was

SECRET/SENSITIVE

By JA NARA, Date 12/16/76
 NSC/Secy, Guidelines, State rev. end 9/02

not coordinated with State -- we have asked DOD to do so -- and seemed somehow to have been picked up in its substance in a New York Times piece earlier this week.

Presidential Visit to South Korea. As you know, the President has not yet decided finally whether he will visit South Korea immediately following his visit to Japan in mid-November. Secretary Kissinger believes he should, primarily because of commitments to this effect that he (Secretary Kissinger) and former President Nixon have made to the South Koreans.

I will not plan to sit in on the meeting.

Recommended Talking Points

-- We are relieved that the most recent crisis in South Korean-Japan relations now seems well on the way to solution. We believe State's EA Bureau and our Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo played a highly skillful role in resolving this imbroglio, which could have played into North Korea's hands at a most unpropitious time.

-- We believe that we must maintain strong support for the ROK through the completion of the UNC termination negotiations, until the post-UNC termination arrangements are solidly in place, and until the North Koreans decide to pull back from their military option. In this last regard, we will be particularly interested in the North Korean reaction to Secretary Kissinger's recent proposal to the Romanian intermediary -- that we will consent to direct contacts with the North Koreans as long as they do not attempt to exploit this politically against Seoul and if Moscow and Peking are willing to undertake similar contacts with Seoul.

-- Although the President has not yet made a final decision, he probably will visit Korea immediately after his visit to Japan. This will carry obvious dividends for our relations with South Korea particularly at this juncture, but will inevitably detract to some extent from the President's visit to Japan. What suggestions do you have as to how we might minimize the adverse effect of the Seoul visit after the President's visit to Japan?

-- As regards South Korea's internal political problems, we believe we should carefully stick to the neutral middle ground Ambassador Habib has staked out -- maintaining an equal distance between President Park and

his domestic critics. At the same time, we must when necessary call to the Park Government's attention whatever substantial adverse impact his handling of internal politics may be having on our Congress in so far as this threatens our military assistance and other support for the ROK.

Concurrence:

Mr. Smyser

WBS / JTK



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MEMORANDUM

3915 POK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION

September 18, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ELLIOTT

FROM: JEANNE W. DAV ~~W~~

SUBJECT: Proposed Reply to Mr. Darrell C. Schroeder Responding to Your Letter on South Korea

Attached at Tab A is a draft reply from you on behalf of the President to Mr. Darrell C. Schroeder, who wrote the President recently asking him to express gratitude to the South Korean Government for their help in reuniting his adopted Korean daughter with her brother and sister. The reply has been coordinated with the State Department.



UNCLASSIFIED

105
Dear Mr. Schroeder,

I have been asked to respond to your letter of August 15, 1974, to the President in which you describe the extensive assistance that General Kim, Colonel Park, Mr. Woon and others gave in helping you reunite your adopted daughter with her brother and sister in the Republic of Korea. I can well understand your deep feelings of gratitude to these people for the strenuous efforts they made in your behalf.

It would not, however, be appropriate for the President to express gratitude on your behalf and to the Government of the Republic of Korea. I believe that it would be appropriate, and much appreciated, if you yourself wished to call the attention of the Korean Government to the manifold efforts which these individuals have made. You could do so by writing to the Embassy of the Republic of Korea, 2320 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008.

Sincerely,

Roland L. Elliott
Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Darrell C. Schroeder
Evans-Mills-Gardner
108 W. Monroe
Bloomington, Illinois 61701

105

MEMORANDUM

Froelbe FY1 4009-X ¹⁶
ROR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 11, 1974

(P)

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT *Thanks*

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF* *BS*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Sneider
on September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m.

You have agreed to meet with Ambassador Richard L. Sneider on September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m. As you know, Mr. Sneider is departing shortly to take up his new post in Seoul.

Current Crisis in South Korean - Japanese Relations. The two sides within the past day or so now seem to have broken the Gordian knot. The Japanese have agreed to the basic South Korean demand that Prime Minister Tanaka's letter be carried by a ranking Japanese emissary and that it be addressed to President Park. Final language of the letter is now being worked out as regards the issues of Japanese acknowledgment of responsibility of the assassination attempt against President Park and the killing of Mrs. Park, the Japanese investigation of the assassination plot, and the question of Chosen Soren's (the organization representing North Korea in Japan) involvement.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

NSC Memorandum Guidelines, State X / new 9/02
By *JA* NARA Date *12/10*

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Presidential Visit to South Korea. As you know, the President has not yet decided finally whether he will visit South Korea immediately following his visit to Japan in mid-November. Secretary Kissinger believes he should, primarily because of commitments to this effect that he (Secretary Kissinger) and former President Nixon have made to the South Koreans.

I will not plan to sit in on the meeting.

Recommended Talking Points

-- We are relieved that the most recent crisis in South Korean-Japan relations now seems well on the way to solution. We believe State's EA Bureau and our Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo played a highly skillful role in resolving this imbroglio, which could have played into North Korea's hands at a most unpropitious time.

-- We believe that we must maintain strong support for the ROK through the completion of the UNC termination negotiations, until the post-UNC termination arrangements are solidly in place, and until the North Koreans decide to pull back from their military option. In this last regard, we will be particularly interested in the North Korean reaction to Secretary Kissinger's recent proposal to the Romanian intermediary -- that we will consent to direct contacts with the North Koreans as long as they do not attempt to exploit this politically against Seoul and if Moscow and Peking are willing to undertake similar contacts with Seoul.

-- Although the President has not yet made a final decision, he probably will visit Korea immediately after his visit to Japan. This will carry obvious dividends for our relations with South Korea particularly at this juncture, but will inevitably detract to some extent from the President's visit to Japan. What suggestions do you have as to how we might minimize the adverse effect of the Seoul visit after the President's visit to Japan?

-- As regards South Korea's internal political problems, we believe we should carefully stick to the neutral middle ground Ambassador Habib has staked out -- maintaining an equal distance between President Park and

his domestic critics. At the same time, we must when necessary call to the Park Government's attention whatever substantial adverse impact his handling of internal politics may be having on our Congress in so far as this threatens our military assistance and other support for the ROK.

Concurrence:

Mr. Smyser *wls/jm*


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

September 25 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: W. R. SMYSE 

SUBJECT: Proposed Reply From the President to South Korean President Park Chung Hee Accepting His Invitation for the President To Visit South Korea Following His Japan Visit

At Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President attaching a proposed reply from the President to President Park Chung Hee responding to President Park Chung Hee's letter of September 10, 1974, inviting the President and Mrs. Ford to visit South Korea following their visit to Japan. The President's draft reply simply conveys the President's formal acceptance of President Park's invitation which has already been relayed to Park through normal diplomatic channels.

The President's draft reply has been coordinated with Paul Theis' office.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the draft memorandum to the President at Tab I.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

NSC Memorandum Guidelines
 By WR NARA, Date 12/6/10



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Proposed Reply From You to the South
Korean President Park Chung Hee
Accepting His Invitation To Visit Korea
Following the Japan Visit

At Tab A is a draft letter from you to President Park Chung Hee of Korea. In that letter you formally accept his invitation (Tab B) for you and Mrs. Ford to visit Korea.

The draft reply has been coordinated with Paul Theis' office.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the draft reply to President Park at Tab A.

NSC Memorandum
By HK NARA, Date 12/6/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(P)

October 1, 1974

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of September 10, 1974, and your most gracious invitation to Mrs. Ford and me to visit the Republic of Korea. We are delighted to accept and look forward to seeing you at that time and to discussing issues of common concern.

Sincerely,

Donald R. Ford

His Excellency
Park Chung Hee
President of the
Republic of Korea
Seoul

RECEIVED



대한민국 대통령

1974. 9. 10.

각 하,

본인은 금년 11월말, 또는 12월초 각하의 편리한 시기에 각하 내외분께서 우리나라를 방문해 주실 것을 요청하는 정중한 초청을 드리게 됨을 영광으로 생각합니다.

본인은 각하의 한국 방문이 우리 양국간의 우호관계를 더욱 증진하는데 크게 공헌할 것임을 확신합니다.

본인은 각하 내외분을 서울에서 뵈 수 있게 되기를 바라고 있습니다.

각하께 거듭 최대의 경의를 표합니다.

박정희

박 정 희

미 합중국 대통령

제럴드 포드 각하





President of the Republic of Korea

(Translation)

September 10, 1974

Excellency:

I have the honor to extend my cordial invitation to Your Excellency and Mrs. Ford to visit my country in late November or early December this year at Your Excellency's convenience.

I am confident that Your Excellency's visit to Korea will greatly contribute to further strengthening the friendly relations between our two countries.

I look forward to the pleasure of welcoming Your Excellency and Mrs. Ford in Seoul.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

/s/ Park Chung Hee

His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D. C.

18a
BOK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 27, 1974

TOP SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

(P)

FROM: W. R. Smyser

SUBJECT: Memorandum of your Conversation with Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo, September 27, 1974

At Tab A is a memorandum of your conversation with Korean Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo on September 27, 1974.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

EO 1.35
NCC
By MS NAPA, Date 12/6/10
Guidelines

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TOP SECRET/NODIS - XGDS

186

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Kim Dong-jo, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea
 Lee Sang-ock, Director of the American Affairs Bureau in the Korean Foreign Ministry
 Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
 W. R. Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC
 Donald L. Ranard, Dir, Korean Desk

DATE, TIME September 27, 1974; 5:00 p.m.
PLACE: The Secretary's Office, State Department

SUBJECT: U. S. -Korean Relations

Kim: I have talked today to Messrs. Sisco and Buffum to see if we can get the Arabs to help us at the United Nations.

Kissinger: We will do what we can to help you with them. I am not sure if it will work. The North Koreans give pilots to the Arabs. Whenever I fly around the Middle East they meet me.

Kim: President Park asked me to convey his appreciation for your assistance in settling the dispute between us and Japan. The President looks forward to seeing you. I will be the Chairman of the Welcoming Committee.

Kissinger: Please express my condolences to the President for the tragedy of the loss of his wife. Also, please tell him that I am glad I shall see him soon. We had good talks the last time I was in Seoul.

Kim: How are things going in your talks with the Chinese?

Kissinger: We gave our proposal to them, which you know. They rejected a non-aggression treaty. We have discussed the United Nations Command and keeping the armistice arrangements. They have not replied so far.

TOP SECRET/NODIS - XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, SEC 3.3
 NSC Memoranda, Classified Under Exempt Guidelines
 By MA NARA, Date 12/6/10

still rev. cov 9/17/03

I will see Chiao in New York next Wednesday and I expect to get an answer then.

Kim: We think that in New York our resolution is acceptable to many countries. We have gained 21 co-sponsors.

I have already spoken to Mr. Habib about the admission of South Korea to the United Nations. We would like to ask your good offices in your talks with the PRC to help us get us in the UN, together or separately.

Kissinger: You mean North Korea first?

Habib: No. South Korea. North Korea can join with South Korea or it can stay out.

Kissinger: Then not North Korea first.

Habib: No. It is North Korea that says it does not want to go into the United Nations.

The resolutions now before the UN are designed to let the other side know we will deal on the UNC. If we do not get anywhere with our private proposal, we can still use it and surface it if necessary. We are talking from a strong position.

Kissinger: I always talk from a strong position.

Kim: President Park has already talked to Ambassador Habib in Korea about the next subject I want to raise. What is the situation with regard to military aid? What are your long-range plans?

Kissinger: We are not ready to answer you on that right now. We will be able to do so by the President's visit to Korea. We will study the matter. We will study it sympathetically. I belong to the minority who believe our allies should come first.

Kim: I appreciate that.

On another matter, President Park has decided that he would like to meet with foreign newsmen. He would welcome them. If you have any suggestions, please let us know. We had troubles with Elizabeth Pond, but we have now decided we will let her return to Korea.

Kissinger: That seems good.

I want you to know that we will support you strongly in the United Nations. We will study aid sympathetically. (Turning to Mr. Smyser) Let's get a NSSM out on that question.

Habib: Our planning is, of course, dependent on the Congress.

Kim: Next week I shall return to Washington and I shall see a number of Congressmen.

Kissinger: I will let you know what the PRC says.

Habib: We are fully in agreement. We can go ahead.

Kissinger: We are getting feelers all over the world for North Korea to talk to us. We are not accepting. We have nothing we want from them. We want to keep them quiet, of course. But we will talk to you before we do anything.

Kim: Good.

Kissinger: You are our ally and we back you. We only tell you this because we do not know what they are saying and what is reaching you.

Kim: How are things going with the Soviet Union on our proposal?

Kissinger: I spoke to Gromyko a few days ago and told him of the proposal. They want to get the PRC out of Panmunjon. He asked me who was there under our proposal. I told him four countries. Then he asked me why. But he did not reject it.

I said we would work it out with the PRC.

Kim: If the PRC worked out something with you, would the Soviet Union accept it?

Kissinger: No. But the PRC is more important.

I think things look good in New York. And, even if we lose there, it is not a disaster. We will still keep what we have.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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KOK

(Mrs. Davis
attn: student.)

~~TOP SECRET~~ GDS

ACTION

September 30, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS. DAVIS

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT: Declassification of 1949-50 Korean Papers

I agree to the release of all of the attached 1949-50 Korean papers, with the exception of the following:

1) NSC 8/1 and 8/2. I most strongly recommend against the release of these two documents at this time. Their release would carry a considerable risk that North Korea would misinterpret U. S. intentions on the Korean problem at the present time, and that South Korea might see the release as presaging a decline in U. S. support. This risk would be produced by the fact that these two NSC studies, the conclusions of which were adopted as basic U. S. policy toward Korea, recommended the removal of the remaining 7,500 U. S. troops in Korea, even though the study recognized that the withdrawal involved a substantial risk that North Korea, supported by the Soviets or the Chinese, would thereby be encouraged to attack South Korea. Specifically,

. The Joint Chiefs took the position that the U. S. had little strategic interest in maintaining its troops and bases in South Korea.

. The study recognized that the removal of U. S. troops might be followed by a North Korean attack on South Korea.

. The study held that the "... extension of Soviet-backed Communist control throughout all of Korea would enhance the political and strategic position of the USSR with respect to both China and Japan and adversely affect the position of the U. S. in those areas and throughout the Far East."

. The study took note of the fact that the U. S. had decided less than six months earlier to postpone the withdrawal of the remaining U. S. forces in part because of the dangers just cited.

~~TOP SECRET~~ GDS

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12958, SEC 3.3

NSC 104-1, 104-2, 104-3, 104-4, 104-5, 104-6, 104-7, 104-8, 104-9, 104-10, 104-11, 104-12, 104-13, 104-14, 104-15, 104-16, 104-17, 104-18, 104-19, 104-20, 104-21, 104-22, 104-23, 104-24, 104-25, 104-26, 104-27, 104-28, 104-29, 104-30, 104-31, 104-32, 104-33, 104-34, 104-35, 104-36, 104-37, 104-38, 104-39, 104-40, 104-41, 104-42, 104-43, 104-44, 104-45, 104-46, 104-47, 104-48, 104-49, 104-50, 104-51, 104-52, 104-53, 104-54, 104-55, 104-56, 104-57, 104-58, 104-59, 104-60, 104-61, 104-62, 104-63, 104-64, 104-65, 104-66, 104-67, 104-68, 104-69, 104-70, 104-71, 104-72, 104-73, 104-74, 104-75, 104-76, 104-77, 104-78, 104-79, 104-80, 104-81, 104-82, 104-83, 104-84, 104-85, 104-86, 104-87, 104-88, 104-89, 104-90, 104-91, 104-92, 104-93, 104-94, 104-95, 104-96, 104-97, 104-98, 104-99, 104-100

By *JAF* NARA, Date *12/6/10*

Side review 9/17/03

These two documents should be withheld in their entirety, since the objectionable passages constitute the essence of the study and of the subsequent policy decision.

2) 1950 Documents, Document No. 4, Memorandum of July 10, 1950 from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense: This document should be withheld in its entirety, since the essence of it is, as stated in paragraph 3, that the Korean Peninsula is of "slight strategic importance" to the United States. If released at this time, this document would risk seriously misleading North Korea and others as to the basic importance the U. S. attaches to the Korean Peninsula.

3) 1950 Documents, Document No. 6, Memorandum of July 25, 1950 from the NSC Executive Secretary: I recommend the deletion of the first two sentences of paragraph 3. These sentences repeat and comment on the argument made by the Joint Chiefs in their memorandum of July 10, 1950, to the effect that Korea is of slight strategic importance to the United States.

4) 1950 Documents, Document No. 24, Memorandum of November 9, 1950 from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense: I recommend the deletion of paragraph 5(c) and of paragraphs 11(d) and (e). In these paragraphs the Joint Chiefs make the same argument as in their memorandum of July 10, 1950, an argument that would entail the risk to the United States' interests described above.