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1048

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTIONLIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 22, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT: Proposed Letter from the President to the South Korean President Asking that He See Mr. Henry Kearns

At Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President attaching a proposed letter from him to President Park Chung-hee of South Korea, asking that he receive Mr. Henry Kearns. Mr. Kearns, now President of his own consulting firm, is making a trip through East Asia. Although he has met President Park, he has asked for such a letter from the President to help him secure a call on President Park.

We understand that Mr. Kearns is not expected to engage in any activities in Korea that might embarrass the President. I have no objection to such a letter. The proposed letter has been coordinated with Dave Gergen.

Since Mr. Kearns is leaving today (March 22), I suggest that the text of the President's letter be cabled to Embassy Seoul.

Recommendation:

That you sign the draft memorandum to the President at Tab I.

## Concurrence:

Mr. Smyser *WRS/OTK*

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GDS



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONACTIONLIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Proposed Letter from You to the  
President of South Korea Asking  
That He See Mr. Henry Kearns

At Tab A is a proposed letter from you to President Park Chung-hee suggesting that he receive Mr. Henry Kearns. Mr. Kearns, now President of his own consulting firm, is making a trip through East Asia. Although he has met President Park, he has asked (Tab B) for such a letter from the President to help him secure a call on President Park.

I have no objection to such a letter. The proposed letter has been coordinated with Dave Gergen.

Recommendation:

That you sign the draft letter to President Park at Tab A.

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GDS



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Mr. Henry Kearns, the former President of the Export-Import Bank, is visiting your country on a private business trip. I understand that he has already made your acquaintance, but know that he would appreciate the opportunity of calling on you in this instance.

May I take the occasion of Mr. Kearns' visit to extend to you my warmest personal regards, and my good wishes for your continued health and well-being.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Chung-hee Park  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul



1048

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date 3/15/74

To General Scowcroft

From Rose Mary Woods

*Rmw*

FYI \_\_\_\_\_

Please Handle ✓

*If this is o.k. I  
hope we can do this  
for Henry because he  
did a great job head  
of Export Import  
Bank.*



Y  
Henry Kearns

Kearns International

March 14, 1974

Dear Rose:

If this is too presumptuous please dump in waste basket.

Next Friday, the 22nd, I am leaving for my first trip abroad since leaving ExIm Bank.

My travels take me to Tiawan, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore and Jakarta.

I have some very definite views that may be very helpful to Korea.

My question: Could I have a note addressed to President Chung Hee Park -- of greeting? I have met him on several occasions but my Korean friends advise that such a note will insure a hearing.

Our plans are slowly developing. As you can see we are gradually getting our offices opened. Marge and I plan to live in San Francisco. Have purchased a beautiful apartment with a world of view -- sold our house in Spring Valley. When you get out of this "vale of tears" we are saving a room for you.

Love,

Henry /s/



KEARNS INTERNATIONAL

Henry Kearns, President

March 14, 1974

Dear Rose:

It this is too presumptuous  
Please dump in waste basket.

Next Friday the 22nd I  
Am leaving for my first trip  
Abroad since leaving Exm bank.  
My travels take me to Taiwan,  
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Singapore & Jakarta.

I have some very definite  
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KEARNS INTERNATIONAL

Henry Kearns, President

19  
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Our plans are slowly developing,  
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have purchased a beautiful apartment  
with a world of view - still own  
house in Spring Valley - When you  
get out of this "Cub at Texas" we  
are saving a room for you.

Love,





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Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . W.R. Smyser, Richard Solomon, Richard  
T. Kennedy

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

TITLE . . . . . Reclame on Two Issues in NSSM 190:  
Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/22/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700245

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ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

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CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Henry A. Kissinger

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TITLE . . . . . Negotiations on Terminating the United  
Nations Command in Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/1974

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2c

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

National Security Decision Memorandum

**TO:** The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

**SUBJECT:** Termination of the U. N. Command in Korea

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency comments thereon, and has made the following decisions:


1. Negotiating Package

To maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek:

- The transfer of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) into the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) framework. U. S. and ROK military commanders would be substituted for the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command as our side's signatory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK and North Korean representatives would become the principal members of the MAC.
- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U. S. force presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return for a Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce and ultimately withdraw U. S. forces as the security situation on the Peninsula is stabilized.
- PRC opening of contacts with the ROK, and Soviet expansion of contacts with that country. The U. S. will undertake a gradual expansion of contacts with North Korea. In the process, we will consult closely with Japan and will keep the ROK informed.
- A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
- U. N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package of substitute security arrangements.
- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

XGDS 5b(3)  
BYAUTH H. A. Kissinger



EO 1.285.200  
NSC 11630  
BY WA NARA, DATED 12/6/10

2. Negotiating Strategy

The United States should pursue a negotiating strategy along two tracks. The Seoul-Pyongyang track should be primary. In the second track, we should make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should:

- Consult with the ROK before raising the proposals with any of the major powers. We should also seek ROK agreement to the organization, upon the termination of CINCUNC, of a contingency U. S. - ROK combined command to take operational control in the event of hostilities.
- Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling role or direct Soviet involvement.
- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an explicit agreement from the Japanese Government that would extend the secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U. S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty following termination of the UNC, but (b) not seek any extension in Japan of third country basing rights under the U. N. Status of Forces Agreement following termination of the UNC.

The minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating approach is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible debate of the Korean issue in the U. N. General Assembly this coming fall.

3. U. S. Force Presence in South Korea

There should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of our forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security arrangements following termination of the UNC.

Henry A. Kissinger

TOP SECRET

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
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RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . The President

TITLE . . . . . Negotiations on Terminating the United  
Nations Command in Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/1974

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22

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS~~

National Security Decision Memorandum

**TO:** The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

**SUBJECT:** Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency comments thereon, and has made the following decisions:

1. Negotiating Packages

To maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek:

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- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return for a Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce and ultimately withdraw U.S. forces as the security situation on the Peninsula is stabilized.
- A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
- U.N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package of substitute security arrangements.
- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.

2. Negotiating Strategy

A two-track negotiating strategy should be pursued, with the Seoul-Pyongyang track being primary. In the second track, the U.S. should

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E.O. 11652, SEC 3.3  
NSC Memos, etc. are to be classified  
BY W NARA Date 12/6/10



make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC, Soviet Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should:

- Consult with the ROK before making proposals to any of the major powers. We should also seek ROK agreement to transfer operational control of ROK forces from CINUNC, upon its termination, to a new U.S. - ROK combined command under a senior U.S. military officer.
- Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling role or direct Soviet involvement.
- After contacts with the PRC, inform other members of the UNC Liaison Group, as well as allies which contributed forces to the UNC.
- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an explicit agreement from the Japanese Government which would extend the secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty following termination of the UNC, but (b) not seek any extension in Japan of third country basing rights under the U.N. Status of Forces Agreement following termination of the UNC.

The minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating approach is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible debate of the Korean issue in the U.N. General Assembly this coming fall.

3. U.S. Force Presence in South Korea

There should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of our forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security arrangements following termination of the UNC.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director of Central Intelligence  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
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WITHDRAWAL ID 032793

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Richard H. Solomon, John A. Froebe  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

TITLE . . . . . The Korean Situation: Moving on the  
U.N. Command in the Wake of the UNGA  
Debate

CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/20/1973

VOLUME . . . . . 12 pages

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3  
DPRK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBIS TRENDS  
27 MARCH 1974

- 21 -



# K O R E A

## DPRK PROPOSES DIRECT PEACE TALKS WITH UNITED STATES

A North Korean announcement on 25 March that Pyongyang was ready to enter direct talks with the United States on a peace agreement to replace the "outdated" 1953 Korean armistice agreement appears to stem in part from DPRK dissatisfaction with its sporadic negotiations with Seoul. The proposal also seems to be a tactical maneuver aimed at regaining the propaganda initiative seized by Seoul on 18 January, when it called for a North-South nonaggression pact. The proposal for U.S.-DPRK negotiations was announced by Foreign Minister Ho Tam at a 25 March session of the Supreme People's Assembly.

The substance of the Pyongyang proposals suggests they were made largely for propaganda advantage: the DPRK offer is predicated on the elimination of U.S. military and political influence in South Korea, demanding a virtual capitulation of U.S. positions in the ROK as a precondition for a North Korean "pledge"--with no provisions for enforcement--that it would not attack the United States nor expand its military capabilities. Under Pyongyang's proposal, the United States would be committed to withdraw all U.S. troops from South Korea "at the earliest possible date along with all their weapons" and to agree not to interfere "in any form" in the internal affairs of Korea. The proposal recommends the appointment of delegates at "a rank higher than those of the Korean Military Armistice Commission" to attend talks at Panmunjom or in a third country.

Pyongyang has made no secret of its dissatisfaction with the North-South Korea talks over the past year, but there is no indication in the new proposal that these stalemated talks would be interrupted in favor of U.S.-DPRK negotiations. The fifth session of the current series of North-South meetings of the Coordination Committee's vice chairmen was held on 27 March and another is scheduled for 24 April. Ho Tam's reference to the talks sounded a pessimistic note regarding the level of antagonism between the two sides, warning that "the dialog between the North and South has come to the verge of rupture and the situation is moving to division, not reunification, and to war, not peace."

Thus far there has been little communist comment on the DPRK proposal, though NCNA has transmitted extensive excerpts of the SPA letter and pertinent excerpts from Ho Tam's report. TASS has

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NLF, DATE 1/6/09



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FBIS TRENDS  
27 MARCH 1974

- 22 -

carried three brief dispatches on the letter, and a TASS review of IZVESTIYA for 27 March noted that a Yuriy Shtykanov article hailed the "new, major initiative" as being in the interest of peace. A PAP report of a DZIENNIK LUDOWY commentary expressed hope that U.S. officials would examine the SPA document "without emotions or prejudices."

BACKGROUND For the past 17 years official North Korean efforts to prompt a U.S. withdrawal have centered on the conclusion of a peace agreement with South Korea. In September 1957 North Korean president and party leader Kim Il-song proposed that an agreement be signed and the armed forces of the two sides "be reduced drastically after all foreign troops are withdrawn from our country." In a more specific offer, the North Korean Government announced in June 1970 that after a U.S. withdrawal the two sides could conclude an agreement and reduce the size of their armed forces to 100,000 or less. Two years later Pyongyang modified its position, asserting that an agreement could precede withdrawal. In a report to the SPA session in April 1973, Premier Kim Il proposed the conclusion of a peace agreement that would guarantee among other things the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. As a further inducement, a letter sent to all foreign governments and parliaments by the SPA at the same time announced that "if the U.S. forces pull out of South Korea, we are willing to reduce our army strength to 200,000 or less of our own accord."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 26, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PL-480 Illustrative Country Distribution for AID Congressional

On March 23 I met with Under Secretary Sisco and representatives of the various State regional bureaus. Privately Sisco apologized for not having coordinated fully with the NSC staff earlier. After extensive discussion, including consultations on Monday, it was agreed that:

- it is important to show \$150 million for Korea; although AID has a calculation of the Korean commitment at \$135 million per year, this is less than has been discussed with the Koreans;
- there is a substantial but manageable Congressional problem in showing a large program for Chile;
- if the totals for Pakistan and Bangladesh are close, it would be preferable to have Pakistan equal or higher than Bangladesh.

The \$50 million increase for Korea is being obtained by reducing:

Vietnam	\$15 million
Chile	\$15 million
Bangladesh	\$ 6 million
Philippines	\$ 6 million
Cambodia	\$ 3 million
Sri Lanka	\$ 2 million
Small amounts in other countries	\$ 3 million

The Chileans will be informed at a high level that we hope to provide about \$70 million in PL-480 although only \$35 million is being shown in this illustrative presentation.

*John A. Bushnell*  
John A. Bushnell

cc: Cooper/Kennedy/Scowcroft/  
Smyser/Horan/Saunders/Low

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 11652, SEC 2.3  
NSC Manual, Chapter 1, 1.4.2, Guidelines  
By MA NARA, Date 12/6/10

*LC: Cooper to: WLS JAF*  
*12*  
*4*



# RESEARCH STUDY

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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INTELLIGENCE.

March 29, 1974

NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES:  
GRADUAL GROWTH

## Summary

Possibly stimulated by the perennial crop of rumors that North Korea plans a summer invasion, South Korean officials have expressed concern that in recent months the North has:

- redeployed its ground forces toward South Korea "in a major way";
- modernized its air, tank, and artillery forces with the same kind of equipment that the Soviet Union supplied the Arab countries before the Middle East War;
- constructed new forward air bases, aircraft shelters, and antiaircraft and missile emplacements;
- built new naval ports near the DMZ; and
- stepped up the rate of naval patrols and undertaken military and diplomatic efforts to reassert its authority over five South Korean-held islands off the North Korean coast.

Although Pyongyang has substantially increased its military capabilities over the course of the past few years, we see no evidence to support the contention that a recent acceleration has taken place or that Pyongyang has acquired equipment comparable to that possessed by the Arabs.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE E.O. 11652: 5a. (2) \*  
(Classified by D. Mark)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines; still review 9/17/03

By     NARA, Date 12/6/10

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Given Pyongyang's desire neither to strengthen Park against his critics nor to displease the Chinese and Soviets unnecessarily, Northern moves which might seriously destabilize the situation in the peninsula are unlikely. A renewed infiltration campaign would be low-cost but probably ineffective, a seizure of one of the ROK-held islands off the Northern coast would risk delaying the departure of the UN Command, and a ground invasion of the South would involve daunting risks and uncertainties for Pyongyang.

Prepared by D. T. Jones  
x22574

FORN DISSEM

The Army

The North Korean Army (NKA), with an estimated strength of 386,000 today compared with 371,000 in 1969, has grown slowly over the past decade--remaining a relatively constant 3 percent of the population. There has been no evidence during this period of rapid force buildups or extended mobilization of reserves.

Building on extensive fortifications dating from the later stages of the Korean war, the North has continued a vigorous military construction program along the DMZ, today probably the world's most heavily fortified area. The miles-deep defensive positions include bomb-proof troop shelters, stockpiles in caves and tunnels, and extensively interconnected trenches, bunkers, and defensive positions.

The NKA is a well-armed force, but this stems from effort dating at least as far back as the mid-1960's, not from any recent crash reequipment program. Much of its military hardware is produced at home. For more than 10 years, the North has provided its own light infantry weapons, basic munitions, mortars, light trucks, and field communications equipment. More recently, it has begun producing medium and heavy trucks.

Armor, in which North Korea outstrips the South, is imported. Relatively modern T-54 (USSR) and T-59 (PRC) medium tanks delivered in recent years are outnumbered by World War II-vintage Soviet T-34's and assault guns. The more modern Soviet T-62 medium tank has not been supplied to the DPRK, nor does the rate of Soviet and Chinese deliveries appear to have accelerated notably during the past two years.

Anti-tank weapons are mostly low-power (82mm) recoilless rifles and light AT guns (57mm). But the USSR has also provided its earliest model wire guided anti-tank missile, the Snapper/Swatter, 27 units of which were shown at the 1972 North Korean Army anniversary parade.



For many years dependent on the Soviet Union for artillery, the North began making the Chinese-designed 107mm rocket launcher several years ago, and possibly the 130mm field gun as well. The current inventory of its well-organized and effective artillery force consists of about 2,000 "tubes," mostly 76mm and 85mm divisional guns.

### Navy

Although still the smallest of the three services, the North Korean Navy has grown rapidly from a personnel strength of 9,400 in 1966 to 14,600 in 1972 and 17,500 today; it is now markedly superior to the ROK navy. Although still primarily a coastal defense force, its guided missile boats and submarines give it a modest capability to interdict shipping in the Sea of Japan.

The navy is divided into separate fleets for east and west coasts, and the vast majority of its 300 units are small motor gun boats (61), motor torpedo boats (121), or other light craft. The navy also includes Soviet/PRC-supplied submarines and subchasers, however, and Pyongyang's fleet of 8 Osa and 10 Komar units, delivered by the Soviets over a period of several years, gives the North the world's fourth-largest guided missile boat force. In the late 1960's, the North launched a naval construction program. The construction of motor torpedo boats and a new type of rocket firing boat is being emphasized, but two destroyer escorts have also been completed.

### Air Force

Primarily designed to defend North Korean airspace, the NKAf fighter force consists largely of obsolete MIG-15/17's, supplemented by approximately 110 Soviet-supplied high performance MIG-21's, the large majority of which have been in service since the late 1960's. Substantial numbers of MIG-19's from the PRC, useful for ground attack, are supplemented by 70 aging IL-28 light bombers and 24 more recently delivered Soviet SU-7's. There is an extensive SAM defense system, but the North Koreans do not appear to possess surface-to-air missiles as sophisticated as those supplied by the Soviets to Middle Eastern nations.

For over a decade the North has been protecting its air force by hardening existing air bases, constructing individual

4. 10. 72

revetted hangerettes and caves for aircraft. Underground storage facilities for airfields have also been built; three of these are close to the DMZ, but construction has been desultory and two are still incomplete after several years of effort.

### Recent Military Activity

North Korean naval operations late in 1973 gave some cause for concern about Pyongyang's longer term intentions. Throughout 1973 the North had expanded naval patrols and operations. In October, for the first time, DPRK naval patrol operations were mounted south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the unofficial US-ROK extension of the DMZ westward into the Yellow Sea. After several DPRK penetrations of the three-mile "contiguous waters" around five ROK-held island groups near the NLL, Seoul protested at a December 1 Military Armistice Commission meeting. While not challenging the South Korean presence on the islands, Pyongyang claimed that they lie in North Korean territorial waters, and took the position that Seoul should seek Pyongyang's permission for ship visits to the islands. Ignoring Pyongyang's demand, the ROK continued resupply missions with additional naval protection.

Thereafter, the confrontation receded. Except for minor harassment, the North avoided the ROK supply convoys; having laid the apparent groundwork for claiming legal jurisdiction over the area when the UN Command is abolished, Pyongyang has stated that Seoul's supply convoys will not be bothered if they "come and go quietly." Isolated incidents, such as the February 15 sinking of an ROK fishing boat, may still occur,\* but DPRK patrol craft have generally stopped harassing ROK vessels and, since January 5, have not entered ROK-claimed waters contiguous to the islands.

### Capabilities and Intentions

Intensified training and modernized military forces give

---

\*From time to time over a period of years the North has seized small fishing boats, Japanese and South Korean, which it claims have violated its coastal waters. The February 15 sinking of one ROK fishing boat and capture of another, apparently unpremeditated by Pyongyang, thus falls within an established pattern of behavior.



North Korea the theoretical capability of undertaking any of several offensive actions against the South: renewing infiltration/guerrilla efforts of the type pursued in the 1960's; launching an amphibious assault against the ROK-held islands off the North Korean coasts; or opening a limited conventional attack across the DMZ.

Certain elements in the current situation could lead Pyongyang into offensive action against the South. There are tenuous but persistent indications that the military now has a stronger role in the North Korean hierarchy, and that Pyongyang expects no further gains in North-South negotiations. Kim Il Sung, who reportedly believes that the North missed a golden opportunity for intervention during the 1960 student uprisings, conceivably might see similar opportunities in current domestic unrest in the ROK.

Outweighing these considerations, in our estimation, are a number of constraints on any aggressive impulses in Pyongyang:

- the uncertain reaction of Peking and Moscow, whose support Pyongyang needs, and who both, while generally standing behind Pyongyang's positions, clearly prefer not to see the Korean situation flare up;
- the desire to avoid moves that would be likely to impede North Korean efforts to win wider international recognition; and
- possible recognition that pressure on the ROK may strengthen the Park regime by creating greater internal cohesion.

These constraints would appear to be least effective against a renewed infiltration effort, which the North could readily mount by utilizing existing manpower and support capabilities. Pyongyang would regard such an effort as involving little risk of ROK or US retaliation and would expect to avoid adverse international reactions by denying responsibility for what they would describe as locally-generated insurgent activities.

Under present circumstances, however, an infiltration campaign would be a nuisance rather than a serious threat to Seoul. Notwithstanding Park's growing unpopularity, there is no evidence of significant sympathy for Pyongyang



in the ROK. In all probability an effort to stimulate insurgency today would fail as completely as Pyongyang's effort to do so in the 1960's, and in addition would rally support for Park. Nonetheless, should the domestic situation in the South substantially worsen, Pyongyang could view infiltration as a low-cost opportunity to fish in troubled waters.

A seizure of one or more of the offshore islands would carry similar likelihood of strengthening Park against his domestic critics, and in addition could directly jeopardize Northern hopes of seeing the UN Command terminated in the near future. These constraints could diminish, however, if Park visibly brought his internal problems under control and the UN Command were terminated. The islands' value is psychological rather than strategic. In Pyongyang's eyes the seizure of even the smallest would be a significant victory that could be achieved at relatively low cost, since the North will have naval and air superiority even after the South completes current measures to strengthen the islands' defense.

The last and least likely contingency is a Northern invasion of the South. ROK officials continue to express concern that a sudden seizure of Seoul, followed by a cease-fire agreed to in response to external pressure, would leave the North in a position to extract concessions, such as US troop withdrawal. But the North Korean leaders would obviously also be strongly conscious of the difficulties of crossing the fortified defenses north of Seoul and of the risks of being thrown back by South Korean forces supported by US units.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS~~

March 29, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 251

TO: The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency comments thereon, and has made the following decisions:

1. Negotiating Packages

To maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek:

- Substitution of U.S. and ROK military commanders for the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command as our side's signatory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK and North Korean representatives should then become the principal members of the Military Armistice Commission.
- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return for a Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce and ultimately withdraw U.S. forces as the security situation on the Peninsula is stabilized.
- A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
- U.N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package of substitute security arrangements.
- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.

2. Negotiating Strategy

A two-track negotiating strategy should be pursued, with the Seoul-Pyongyang track being primary. In the second track, the U.S. should

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ATTACHED NSC MEMO 130/09  
BY [signature] DATE 12/6/70




make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC, Soviet Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should:

- Consult with the ROK before making proposals to any of the major powers. We should also seek ROK agreement to transfer operational control of ROK forces from CINCUNC, upon its termination, to a new U.S. - ROK combined command under a senior U.S. military officer.
- Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling role or direct Soviet involvement.
- After contacts with the PRC, inform other members of the UNC Liaison Group, as well as allies which contributed forces to the UNC.
- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an explicit agreement from the Japanese Government which would extend the secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty following termination of the UNC, but (b) not seek any extension in Japan of third country basing rights under the U.N. Status of Forces Agreement following termination of the UNC.

The minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating approach is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible debate of the Korean issue in the U.N. General Assembly this coming fall.

3. U.S. Force Presence in South Korea

There should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of our forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security arrangements following termination of the UNC.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director of Central Intelligence  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

