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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Problem - in meeting said

Coral Sea not available  
until Friday - Cambodia time.

- said in 2 or 3 days  
later holiday - how does

this fit with objectives was

Dufrenoy trying to clear Res. -

relationship to B-52's which Res.  
wanted - but Sec Def did not.

What did orders to Coral Sea

reveal about this.

were there air strikes during Maine insertion



WMS  
NOTES

~~WSD Book~~

~~Red Gypsy  
Mason's~~

McDonough  
on  
CAS'S

Refuse

No orders to CS to turn around, or to  
Hood or within the room.  
No man's room w/ floors or other things.

1st meeting

Send several more part - not time + not  
ff correct option of all.

2d meeting + 2nd. (25 hrs)

CS very, too clearly for therapy (Caldwell) outside  
Hood to it ff option.

~~only at last~~

Only later will that it could make it = time (x  
omit 2-52's)

Others = getting messages to the wrong.  
Suggest for Union building was late.

3rd meeting

Refer report on committee.



2nd meeting option, even.

Constant looks

but no word but a few reports for some.  
< that can happen.

The central question addressed was central:

- ① How fast & accurate was info?
- ② How <sup>fast</sup> efficient & accurate was attention.

Focus on 1914.

What I will have more immediate, more of which we are put into effort now, and there will be kept in mind for next year.

STATUS CRISIS

THAILAND



DID NOT TURN CS  
AROUND.

No written orders on orders

## CONTROL



SOMETHING WENT DOWN  
NSC meeting and the center.

Why:

- 1 - Not fully clarified - meeting as a final order.
- 2 - 1000 reps do not understand it  
Orders are not that subtle.



For example:

As one of your NSC, should finally  
put orders.

NSC staff have to see arrangements.  
White House — = NMCC.




Issues

- why were there not heavier air strikes against Kamping Sam
- Why did the first wave of planes not K. Sam not release their ordinance
- why were some planes going to K. Sam diverted to Koh Tang
- why were there not more planes sent to attack K. Sam as DoD said there would (7090 - 35 vs 15 actual)
- why were strikes terminated against K. Sam.
- Was the CORAL Sea slowed down or speeded up intentionally (ETA's misrepresented) so that military operations (esp B-52s) would not be conducted.
- Why were ~~Defense~~ the Pres orders not carried out immediately. (Phone vs paper messages.)
- Why was the Pres. not notified immediately of the event.



- MiG + Aircraft at Ream
- No of planes off Coral Sea to hit Konyu Son

1. Intelligence alerting system works well - but reporting to most senior officers is stopped by a bottle neck.
2. There was ~~no need~~ <sup>justification</sup> for a major alert prior to the seizure of the Mayaguez.
3. Early reporting on the situation was confused and uncertain - should not have been considered reliable. - e.g. report that the ship was being towed to Konyu Son - this then became an accepted fact.
4. ~~The~~ Bureau reacted well and reconnaissance was initiated very soon after initial reports were received. Also other agencies were questioned on information available. Order went to Philippines to debrief refugees.
5. USS Hult + Vega - dispatched to the area by Commander of the 7th Fleet.
6. When were <sup>Pres.</sup> orders to plan a mining operation carried out? (12 May)
7. Ship was not positively identified until 9:16 pm on May 12. Orders had been given by NSC prior to that - how certain was the identification?
8. ~~On~~ <sup>early</sup> Morning of May 13, reports reach WASH. that Mayaguez is underway - en route to Konyu Son. - actually Mayaguez was not moving.



9. May 13/14 NSC meeting - Pres directed that a press statement be made ~~by~~ on the meeting and outline steps we are taking to ~~be~~ ~~with~~ ~~it~~.  
No mention of it in the ~~speech~~ ~~speeches~~.
10. Not clear why the attack of Maine was against the island & not Kompong Som - since intell put the US crew on K. Som.
11. No record of action over K. Som being carried out - as specified by May 13/14 NSC meeting.
12. Ultimatum to KC (Pg. 22) - also discussed previously - who authorized this - what was it to say.
13. <sup>(1932)</sup> ~~note~~ - Cincpac to USAAG - 8:58 on 14 May - proceed with strike as planned (bypass ~~ordnance~~ ~~expended~~ ~~of~~ why not?) ~~US~~ still need ~~practice~~ ~~FD~~ on ~~deck~~ ~~of~~ ships before hitting - have authority to use Coral Sea Tac Air to support GSF (who gave this).
14. At NSC Jones said 51 aircraft on Coral Sea - 70% of aircraft would be used to attack K. Som - actually only 15 <sup>air</sup> ~~expended~~ - 18 sorties on CAP/ESent - 14 sorties against Koh Tang.
15. USAAG is told twice by Cincpac (one confirmed by JCS) that Coral Sea A/C can be diverted to block who gave that authority.
- 16 - 2124 <sup>FDT</sup> (NSMCC log) on 14th reference of Olympia touch passing message released by White House.





- 17. Question to be answered - why were Coral Sea  
Assets able to be diverted to Island.

17. Tape to be passed to Combat Apple ready at 2126  
on 14th - why was it not used. 2245 - tape  
was released. 2300 hr message forwarded for execution



1. Responsiveness of bureaucracy to Pres. directive from NSC meetings + orders from WH.

- - - Mostly involved DOD

- - - Generally very good and rapid

- example - decision to south bomb Kampung Som

- some question surrounding the bombing of

Kampung Som - first wave did not attack release ordnance; some later planes were frogged to Koh Tong.

- termination of studies against K Som.

- DOD said would use 50% of ~~aircraft~~ aircraft

~~the other~~ - - ~~Other~~ ~~bureaucratic~~ carried out orders promptly

on the Coral Sea to hit Kampung Som - but only 15 hit.

- (see p. 15 of NSC meet. 14 May. for Problem on First strike at K. Som.

- Order going from JCS to Cripoc (142142Z) execute message for op to create host authorizes use of "tac air" from the Coral Sea against Koh Tong Island

- Cripoc message <sup>+ USAF</sup> 140837Z - reprov. planning for op - says place MAXIMUM emphasis on use of Coral Sea for close air support and minimum reliance on availability of Thai based air.

- Cripoc msg to USAF - 142310Z - execute landing op at Koh Tong - as specified in JCS message 142222



First wave did not strike K. Som

- Clear that intent was to strike
- ~~was an additional intent that said~~
- however - NSC minutes do open one contradictory section following Pres. admonition to not strike neutral shipping. - Defense says will have first wave check it out and second wave hit.
- also ops was turned off just prior to strike beginning - when turned on warning was again passed to not hit non-Cambodian shipping. USAAC said may not get much BDA
- Seems likely to conclude first wave exercised extreme caution -

Planes frozen from K. Som to Island - JCS ~~see~~ told Cribac & USAAC that this was in their authority - decision to freeze was seemingly made at the tactical level. - also probably prompted by lack of <sup>real reaction</sup> threat from K. Som and paucity of military targets + situation on the island - Plan as written gave authority to use Tomahawk from Coral Sea against Tay Island while it was clearly stated in orders that planes from Thailand were not to be used against Cambodia, there is no similar order to be found which specified that carrier planes would ~~only~~ strike K. Som exclusively and not also support the island. Result is that what was expected <sup>since</sup> ~~however~~ strikes against mainland; while USAAC says orders as just not to use Thai planes against mainland



### Observations

- first info received is likely to be incorrect  
should not act in response to it.

Ability to televise briefings from Pentagon to WH  
by cable.

televised <sup>PMCC</sup> ~~at~~ room maps & charts to Sit room + WH

- KC intention - Pres asked why ~~it~~ <sup>was</sup> taken off ship -  
no one could answer adequately - need a KC expert  
in there.

- None knew KC 3rd Division was on Koh Tang Island.

Keeping times straight is a big problem

14 May NBC mtg

Defense said it would use 20 % of the planes in  
the Coral Sea - 51 planes = 35



# Situation Room - WH

- setup for intelligence service and technical operations.

- 9. issuing of an ultimatum is discussed several times - get questioning how long it would take for KC to get the message + react is more raised.

WH SR - need to be plugged into A101WON

Audio + visual secure hookup between all Sit Rooms

State Working Group continually answers orders & authorities given by NMCC / JCS.

Copies of all execute messages to WH SR - etc.

No record that White House saw, reviewed or approved DOD/PCS execute orders.

Initial info may be bad info.



Tues.

8

Christison - G 8271

Roh Tang QA Making map now;  
All Yungla cover; doesn't  
seem to have habitation  
One end cloud cover.

Photography 4/30

Masters miffed @ being uninformed.

1115

50ft boats moving back  
& forth between vessel  
and island.

Colby - Report on pending up  
at cases on IC staff.

12:30

AF CH53 loaded with Air  
Police down 40m from NKP  
enroute Utapao; All pax  
assumed casualties.

4 crew 1 chiet 18 m.p.s



1245

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CH-53

36 KM FROM NKP

4 CREW

1 CREW CHIEF

18 SECURITY POLICE  
(AIR POLICE)

FIELD  
~~REPORT~~ REPORTS VIA PHONE

INDICATES NO SURVIVORS.

HOWEVER, HELICOPTER ENROUTE  
TO SCENE OF CRASH.

NO REASON KNOWN FOR  
CRASH.

CH-53 BELIEVED MOVING FROM  
NKP TO UTAPAO AS PART  
OF TASK GROUP.

JF



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012287

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Note  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Ken Quinn  
TITLE . . . . . information concerning Panamanian ship  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/1975?  
VOLUME . . . . . 1 page  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700190  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 30  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Handwritten Notes  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/07/2000  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . LET

*Exempt 8/01*  
*dal*