

The original documents are located in Box 6, folder “China, unnumbered items - (35), 10/2/76 - 10/8/76” of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

October 2, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM GLEYSTEN *WJ*

SUBJECT: Current State of Play in China, Foreign Policy Implications

The President may be interested in our latest assessment of the China picture before he leaves for California.

We might have made it more exciting by engaging in speculation about the outcome of the present power struggle, but frankly, we think the evidence is too thin to warrant that.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.


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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY ER, NARA, DATE 7/3/08



16
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028083

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME Brent Scowcroft
RECEIVER'S NAME The President
DESCRIPTION re leadership struggle in China
CREATION DATE 10/02/1976
VOLUME 4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200156
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES
BOX NUMBER 6
FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (35)
DATE WITHDRAWN 08/14/2008
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S
1976 OCT 8 AM 10 06

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

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NODIS

To: The Secretary
Through: P - Mr. Habib
From: EA - Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.
S/P - Winston Lord

Your Meeting with PRC Foreign Minister Chiao


This supplements our memorandum of October 4 on your meeting with Chiao, covering several events since that time: Chiao's UN speech, the Ford-Carter foreign policy debate, the nuclear test fall-out issue, approval of the CODEL Curtis visit, and an exchange visit imbroglio. It also mentions USLO office space, which Chiao conceivably might raise, and the CDC case.

Chiao's UN Speech

Chiao's October 5 General Debate statement said nothing specific about Sino-US bilateral relations, although he did confirm Mao's "revolutionary foreign policy line" (which includes the opening to the US) and he did repeat the litany that China is determined to liberate Taiwan.

Generally, Chiao reserved his major blasts for the Soviets, but he did come down rather hard on us as a superpower, and he specifically attacked detente, the US threat to veto Vietnam's UN membership and our stance on world economic "interdependence." He criticized superpower "rivalry" in Africa, and implicitly attacked your efforts in South Africa by supporting the "armed struggle" of the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. While he said the usual about US troops in South Korea and about the UN Command, he eschewed any comment upon your proposal for a conference to resolve Korean issues. The speech gives us no cause for satisfaction but it preserves the existing Chinese perception of the USSR as the worse

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Rev 3/2/04* XGDS-3
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *Hr*, NARA, DATE *7/31/08*



of the two superpowers and was roughly consistent with past Chiao performances at the UNGA, excepting, of course, for the panegyrics about Chairman Mao.

In referring to Chiao's speech, you may wish to comment that he let off some cannon shots at the Soviets. You might complain that, on the one hand, the Chinese accuse us of appeasement and, on the other, they attack us when we are actually working against the Soviets.

Presidential Debate


Statements about normalization by each candidate in Wednesday's debate exacerbate problems already facing you at this meeting. Chiao may well refer to the President's remarks, taking issue specifically with the President's statement that a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question was "agreed" in the Shanghai Communique. He might also refer to the President's statement that "for the next four years" we will continue to move for normalization of relations, thus implying that we do not expect early completion of the process.

If Chiao mentions the President's assertion that peaceful liberation was "agreed" in the Shanghai Communique, you could respond that the important points were the President's reaffirmation of the policy of normalizing relations and his confirmation that our relations would continue to be based on the Shanghai Communique.

If Chiao complains about the President's reference to our "obligation" to the people of Taiwan, you could take the line that you are surprised that Chiao would find this to be a new or startling idea and could go on to drive home the point that the President was only reflecting the serious U.S. public concern with which any American President must deal. You could tell Chiao also that the Chinese should be the last ones to complain about our language in an unrehearsed debate, given their (carefully prepared) rhetoric in international forums and the press. (A transcript of the China policy portion of the debate is at page 5.)

Chinese Nuclear Fallout

You undertook, in your Wednesday press guidance, to "make our position clear once again" to the PRC on the



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question of atmospheric testing. We suggest that you take the occasion of this meeting to do so, since we are getting press queries about whether we have said anything to the Chinese. If you do raise it with Chiao, we will want to tell the press afterwards, if asked, that you have done so.

CODEL Curtis

PRCLO informed the White House this week that Peking has agreed to our proposal that the earthquake-deferred visit of CODEL Curtis (six Senators and wives) take place early next month. You might volunteer to Chiao that you are pleased that this visit will take place since such Congressional trips, if they are handled correctly, can be useful in building support in Congress for our policy of normalizing relations.

USLO Office Space

We do not expect Chiao to mention the USLO office space problem and do not recommend that you raise it. However, because Ambassador Gates did discuss it with Chiao last summer and because the PRC recently offered us two additional apartments for office space (which we accepted), Chiao may say something about it to you or Gates. If he does, you should indicate your awareness of the Chinese decision and express appreciation; but you should note that we still hope for a more satisfactory solution to our space problem.

PRC Volleyball Imbroglia

✓ A scheduling conflict in which Chinese mens' and womens' volleyball teams will be performing in Pasadena, Texas, on October 9, the same night that an ROC chamber music orchestra is performing at Rice University in near-by Houston, could result in cancellation of the PRC volleyball show there. (The Chinese teams played matches in Fairfax, Virginia, Thursday night.) As of Thursday afternoon, the problem, which is being discussed between the Chinese and the National Committee for U.S.-China Relations, had not been sharply focused and the Chinese had not made a direct complaint. If they do so before your meeting, we will inform you.

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
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CDC Computer

As you know, a White House decision on the computer sale has been kept in abeyance. We don't think you will want to raise the issue at this meeting even though it was a talking point in our October 4 memorandum.

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Transcript of Foreign Policy Debate China Policy Statements

QUESTION: Mr. President, the policy of your administration is to normalize relations with mainland China. That means establishing at some point full diplomatic relations and obviously doing something about the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. If you are elected, will you move to establish full diplomatic relations with Peking, and will you abrogate the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan? And, as a corollary, would you provide mainland China with military equipment if the Chinese were to ask for it?

THE PRESIDENT: Our relationship with the People's Republic of China is based upon the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, and that communiqué calls for the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic. It doesn't set a time schedule. It doesn't make a determination as to how that relationship should be achieved in relationship to our current diplomatic recognition and obligations to the Taiwanese government.

The Shanghai Communiqué does say that the differences between the People's Republic on the one hand and Taiwan on the other shall be settled by peaceful means.

The net result is this Administration, and during my time as the President for the next four years we will continue to move for normalization of relations in the traditional sense, and we will insist that the dispute between Taiwan and the People's Republic be settled peacefully, as was agreed in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972.

The Ford Administration will not let down, will not eliminate or forget our obligation to the people of Taiwan. We feel that there must be a continued obligation to the people, to the some 19 to 20 million people in Taiwan. And as we move during the next four years those will be the policies of this Administration.

QUESTION: And sir, the military equipment for the mainland Chinese?

THE PRESIDENT: There is no policy of this Government to give to the People's Republic, or to sell to the People's



Republic of China, military equipment. I do not believe that we, the United States, should sell, give or otherwise transfer military hardware to the People's Republic of China, or any other Communist nation, such as the Soviet Union and the like.


MODERATOR: Governor Carter.

CARTER (after commenting on Israel): In the Far East I think we need to continue to be strong, and I would certainly pursue the normalization of relationships with the People's Republic of China.

We opened up a great opportunity in 1972, which has pretty well been frittered away under Mr. Ford, that ought to be a constant in connection toward friendship, but I would never let that friendship with the People's Republic of China stand in the way of the preservation of the independence and freedom of the people in Taiwan.

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Drafted: EA:OArmstrong/EA/PRCM:HETThayer:mfr
10/7/76: ext. 26300

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028084

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME Arthur W. Hummel and Winston Lord

RECEIVER'S NAME The Secretary

DESCRIPTION re your meeting with PRC Foreign
Minister

CREATION DATE 10/04/1976

VOLUME 11 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200156

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 6

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (35)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/14/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

Courtesy Points

-- Since we last met, the Chinese people and your government have been going through a most difficult period. I think I have some understanding of the loss you must feel from the death of Premier Chou, Chairman Chu and, above all, of Chairman Mao. I have sent condolences, but I want to say personally that you have my sincerest sympathy.


-- The earthquake, I am sure, has created additional difficulties for you. While for reasons we understand--indeed, reasons we admire--you have declined our offer of assistance, you have our good wishes as you cope with the effects of that catastrophe.

-- I gather you did not bring your wife with you. Please give her my regards, and my wife's, when you return.

-- (Chi Chao-chu, who was a counselor at PRCLC for two years and frequently interpreted for Huang Chen, is accompanying Chiao. After returning to Peking, he became deputy director of the office handling UN affairs, and interpreted in Mao's meetings with Lee Kuan Yew and Bhutto. You will recall that he, along with Nancy Tang, was the chief interpreter in all your early meetings with Chou and was Mao's primary interpreter in the late 1950's and 1960's. If he is present, you should greet him as an old friend. I want to welcome Mr. Chi (GEE) back to our country. Unfortunately, I guess your stay will be too brief, and you will be too busy, to revisit your and my alma mater, Harvard.

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Africa

-- (Review our African strategy, your recent trip and how you think the situation will now develop.)

-- Note that the Chinese press has correctly commented that a major objective of our diplomacy is to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the area. In addition to our diplomatic efforts, we are providing military and economic assistance to anti-Soviet African countries, e.g. Zaire, Kenya, Zambia.

-- (Ask about PRC views of the situation in Southern Africa.)

-- (Ask for Chinese parallel efforts where they have influence - e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and Zaire.)

Soviet Union


-- (Comment on the current state of our relations with the Soviet Union, and what you envisage for the near future, including the SALT negotiations.)

-- (Since the Chinese continue to refer viciously to the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," you should correct their misinterpretation.)

-- (Pursue your earlier remarks to Ambassador Huang as to why we oppose Communist Party participation in West European governments and probe the Chinese attitudes.)

Middle East

-- (Explain your views of the Middle East situation; our continuing intention to exclude the Soviets from meaningful participation in the negotiations; the forces at work in the Lebanese conflict and the likely implication for Soviet influence and changing coalitions; and what we have in mind for the



future.)

-- We welcomed the Chinese response to Egypt's request for assistance after the break with the Soviets.

South Asia

-- (Give your appraisal of the situation, including our relations with Pakistan.)

-- (Note our continuing efforts to sell arms to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to counter Soviet influence in the area.)

-- (Note the improvement in Afghan-Pakistani relations which we think is a trend which can serve to reduce Soviet influence.)

-- What further developments in Sino-Indian relations are likely following the exchange of ambassadors?

Japan

-- The Japanese have stood up firmly to the Soviets in the MIG-25 case. I understand that as a result, Foreign Minister Kosaka's meeting with Gromyko was rather stormy. He told me that the Soviets didn't even give him a glass of water during their 1-1/2 hour meeting.

-- Did you have a good meeting with Foreign Minister Kosaka?

-- How do you think the political situation in Japan will develop and what do you think the effect on their foreign policy will be?



Korea

-- We are gratified that a useless debate on the Korea question was avoided this year.

-- As you know, we have made a number of proposals, which always reflect Chinese interest in this issue. In my speech last week I suggested a new phased approach to talks. We remain open to any counter-suggestions.

-- We hope the North Koreans will show some interest in taking some concrete steps to ease tensions, but we have no intention of yielding to their unreasonable demands; we sincerely hope progress can be made.

-- Do you see any prospects for reducing tensions in the Korean peninsula?

Southeast Asia

(We see no need for you to volunteer comments about our withdrawal from Thailand or our base negotiations with the Philippines.)

-- You are familiar with the obstacles in improving relations with Vietnam, particularly Hanoi's refusal to provide an accounting of the MIAs.

-- We can only assume that Vietnam is not particularly interested in improving relations with us. We can wait, and maybe their attitude will change eventually.

-- We also see no interest on the part of Cambodia in even having any contact with us, although we followed up on the suggestion you made during our last meeting in New York. I had Phil Habib talk to the Cambodian Foreign Minister but they never responded to his offer for talks or to the practical suggestions he made. We are in no hurry, but would welcome any further suggestions you may have.

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Puerto Rico

(Optional)-- Frankly, we were surprised that you felt it necessary this year to support those who wanted to discuss Puerto Rico in the Committee of 24. We consider this issue to be strictly domestic and not a matter for international consideration.

Bilateral Points

Normalization


-- I know I don't have to remind you that both of us are in the midst of important developments on the domestic front. This makes our meeting a particularly appropriate occasion to review our relationship.

-- As I have mentioned to Ambassador Huang, and as Ambassador Gates told Premier Hua, we have been acutely alert to the quadriennial reality that there would be things said in this election year that would not be helpful to our relationship.

-- Unfortunately, this has proved to be the case. The Republican platform, certain statements by the Democratic candidate, by some other politicians, and by the American press--we understand if these are not met with great enthusiasm on your side.

-- There should be no misunderstanding, however, about one point: we remain committed to the principles of the Shanghai Communique--in every respect. Specifically, we remain committed to completing the process of normalization at an early time.

-- The President has asked me to reassure you that he remains committed to the course which has been discussed with your leaders, including during his visit to Peking.



-- On the other hand, if Carter is elected, I and others within the Republican administration who have worked to build our new relationship will continue to work as effectively as we can to support efforts to strengthen our bilateral relationship.


-- In any event, as I said in my United Nations speech, our relationship began--and will continue--on the basis of the self-interest of both sides, particularly with respect to opposing hegemony. If each side respects the other's concerns, there is a solid foundation for a growing and durable relationship.

-- There is no question about the strong support in the US for normalization of relations.

-- I know you have been disturbed by some of the public discussion in this country about the Taiwan problem. This is a very real, and deeply held concern. It is a concern that requires any US Administration to act prudently, to insure that any action taken with regard to China is able to hold the support of the American Congress and people. It is not something that can be wiped out by a simple Presidential action.

-- It is not for our side to instruct yours on how to conduct itself in this connection. Nevertheless, just as we have a common interest in normalization, so we hope that your actions can contribute to a climate in which normalization can be achieved.

-- In my meeting with Ambassador Huang in August, we discussed the report by Senator Scott. Frankly, I would not have conducted the conversations in the same manner that Senator Scott did. But some of the statements regarding the Taiwan problem that were made to him during his visit, and that have been purposely relayed to our media on several occasions, are likely to have the effect of handicapping our efforts to normalize relations.



Military Drawdown

-- You will recall that while in Peking, the President mentioned our intention to continue the drawdown of our military personnel on Taiwan. We are in the process of implementing such drawdowns.

Computer Sale

-- As Mr. Hummel recently told Ambassador Han Hsu, we have made a special effort and approved the sale of a rather large computer which you intend to use for seismological work. This reflects our conversations in Peking.

Schlesinger (best handled in private discussion between you and Chiao)

-- Frankly, some of us in the Administration were perplexed that you felt it necessary to invite a former member of the cabinet to visit China. Some Americans have understandably interpreted it as an affront to the Administration (e.g. your exclusion of our Liaison Office from all aspects of the visit; -and the contrast between the treatment the Schlesinger party and our official delegation received at the ceremonies for Chairman Mao.) Did you find his visit a useful one?

Congressional Visit

-- I understand that although the details are not firm, a group of Senators led by Senator Curtis will make their visit to China in November, after the earthquake made an August visit inconvenient. These Congressional visits, if they are handled correctly, can be useful in building support in Congress for our policy of normalizing relations.



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028085

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇSummary

DESCRIPTION re China after Mao

CREATION DATE 09/13/1976

VOLUME 8 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200156

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 6

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (35)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/14/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison
OfficeMr. Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison
OfficeMs. Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter, PRC Liaison
Office

Secretary Kissinger

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Assistant Secretary, EA
Winston Lord, Director, S/P

William H. Gleysteen, National Security Council

DATE, TIME

& PLACE:

August 18, 1976

5:00 p.m.

Secretary's Office

Distribution:

S, S-RA, S/S, WH-PR, EA-Hummel, S/P-Lord

Kissinger: When I asked to see you I saw no particular urgency but thought we would benefit from an exchange of views.

Huang: I agree.

Kissinger: We have already expressed our sympathy for the earthquake and the self-reliant approach you have taken in dealing with it.

Huang: Thank you.

Kissinger: It is certainly an unusual attitude in this day.

Huang: The earthquake was very serious, but under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of our Party and with the support of the people, we have learned to overcome great hardships.

Kissinger: Perhaps it would be helpful if I were to review a few issues and bring you up to date on our thinking.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/2/04

NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY 142 NARA, DATE 7/31/08S/2-1/1
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Huang: Since our last meeting I think you have visited Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Kissinger: Correct. I think you may remember my talk with Chairman Mao where I emphasized the great importance and stabilizing influence of Iran in terms of the Soviet Union. During this trip we discussed continuing military relations and also a considerable expansion of our technological and industrial relations. I visited Afghanistan because the brother of the President said Afghanistan wanted to be more independent of the Soviet Union and hoped for more visible support from the United States. If we can conquer our bureaucracy, we will commence certain projects over the next few months. One of these is a power project and another is an engineering school. We need a cultural revolution in our bureaucracy. (Laughter) Seriously, you know the importance of Pakistan and Prime Minister Bhutto to us. We are also working with Pakistan to improve our various relationships but these are affected by the nuclear issue on which our Congress has inhibitions.


Huang: Dr. Kissinger must still remember Chairman Mao's comment about forming a horizontal curve. You have just visited three of the countries. This is fine.

Kissinger: My visit was very much in the spirit of my conversation with Chairman Mao.

Huang: During that talk Chairman Mao singled out Iraq as a point of particular interest. What is the current situation there?

Kissinger: Iraq is becoming somewhat more dubious about the value of its connection with the Soviets. When the head of our interests section returns to Iraq, he will talk to them on re-establishing relations. Throughout the Middle East the Soviets have proceeded with their usual method of threats such as cutting off aid. Where they do, it has always had a bad effect as we have seen in Syria.

We have also been somewhat active in Africa working particularly with Tanzania and Zambia as well as putting pressure on South Africa to bring about a settlement in Rhodesia and Namibia. A settlement is a possibility, and depending on the prospects I may go to Africa in the first half of September.



Huang: After Angola I have the impression that Soviet influence has been expanding in an even more pronounced way in Africa.

Kissinger: Correct, but we are trying to counteract it. That is why we are giving arms aid to Zaire and Kenya.

Huang: Some time ago Castro claimed, I think through the Swedes, that he would soon withdraw Cuban troops from Angola. By now we can see that this was nothing but a false profession.

Kissinger: Right. That is why we will not accept them (Angola) in the UN. Angola is occupied by Cuba and they cannot maintain themselves without Cuban arms.

Huang: In the long run we believe that foreign forces cannot control and plunder countries such as Angola.

Kissinger: In the long run you are correct though we wish to avoid a repetition of the Angolan situation in Rhodesia and Namibia where the Soviets may otherwise be tempted.

Huang: In the press we have seen some discussion of this possibility.

Kissinger: Yes, but we think we have a chance of defeating such Soviet moves if we succeed with our policies.

I also wish to discuss the matter of communist party participation in West European governments. We oppose such participation. I recognize that you are perhaps not an ideal target for our views, because we once opposed communist participation in the Chinese government. (Laughter). People say that the West European communist parties are independent of Moscow. I don't know if one can judge this to be the case when it is so much in their (communist parties) interest to pretend this. I am suspicious, for example, of the French Communist Party which has always been one of the most loyal Stalinist parties, when it voted overwhelmingly 120 to 0 for a posture of independence. I would have been far more impressed by a closer vote. But the 120 to 0 vote suggests the largest mass conversion in history. I remember the time when the East European communist parties were saying the same thing that we are now hearing from the West European communist parties. I have had a compilation made of these statements and will send one along to you if you like. (Lord to send copy)



In any event our principal concern is that the communist parties will come into power with positions and the kind of public support that will undermine West European defense and lead to the Finlandization of Europe. This is what we are trying to prevent. If you believe the statements you have made to us that the Soviets' basic objective is to make a feint toward the East while attacking the West, I think you must share our concern.

Huang: During our last conversation we also talked about this. Our views are still the same. We think you are too worried about this matter. We believe the West European parties are not simply tools of the Soviets. In saying this I should point out, nevertheless, that we don't have connections with the French and Italian communist parties.

Kissinger: I just wanted to explain our position.

Huang: As we see it the problem faced by Western Europe is the Soviet expansionist threat. The Soviets operate under the banner of detente.

Kissinger: I agree that expansion is the Soviet strategy. The question is how do we deal with it.


Huang: Foreign Minister Chiao recently said to Senator Scott that a policy of detente with the Soviet Union is less and less effective. In any event we do not think the West European communist parties can be viewed simply as a Soviet fifth column.

Kissinger: I must say your Foreign Minister was effective in somehow managing to get his own views across during his discussions with the Senator. Senator Scott has his own ideas and his own solutions. I read with interest the reports of his conversations with your leaders.

Huang: What did you think of Senator Scott's report?

Kissinger: The Senator raised a number of topics too insistently and he advanced certain solutions we would not have proposed. He was so persistent that he seems to have prompted some of your people into firing off some cannons. I say this on the basis of our reports though I recognize it is possible the reports were not accurate.

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Huang: I would like to say something about this (Taiwan). Recently people in the United States have made many official and non-official comments about Sino-U.S. relations.

Kissinger: Which have been official? I don't consider the Republican Party platform official.

Huang: (interrupting) I wish to say something. I have something to say. The United States invaded Taiwan (the interpreter incorrectly translated this as "committed aggression against Taiwan") thus owing China a debt. The U.S. must fulfill the three conditions of breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdrawing its military forces from Taiwan, and abrogating its defense treaty with Taiwan. There can be no exception about any of these conditions, and there is no room for maneuver in carrying them out. The delay in normalizing relations is entirely the responsibility of the United States. The method and the time for liberating Taiwan is an internal affair of China and is not discussable. The Chinese position was clear to you even before you sought to re-open relations with us. Now Americans are saying that China's liberation of Taiwan will cripple the development of Sino-U.S. relations. They (Americans) are saying that Sino-U.S. relations will prosper only if the Chinese side takes into account U.S. concerns. This is a premeditated pretext. It is a flagrant threat against China, and we cannot accept it.


Kissinger: What is a threat?

Huang: Vice Premier Chang Chun-chiao and Foreign Minister Chiao told Senator Scott very clearly (what is a threat). I think I should stop here.

Kissinger: I should point out that the statement about taking U.S. views into account doesn't apply principally to the Taiwan issue but rather to our broader cooperation. Certainly I thought reciprocity was a basic Chinese policy.

Huang: I hope we can proceed on the basis of the Shanghai Communique as Vice Premier Chang pointed out to Senator Scott.

Kissinger: It is our firm purpose to do so. We will act on this basis, and not on the basis of what is written in this or that platform. (This was translated in a way suggesting the Chinese did not make the connection to the party platforms.)



Huang: You remember Chairman Mao told you in 1973 that we would have to liberate Taiwan and that we do not believe in peaceful liberation. Vice Chairman Chang explained to Scott that the Shanghai Communique did not specify that the solution to the Taiwan problem would be peaceful or otherwise. May I remind you that I did not come (to see you) for this discussion but I had to say something (about the Taiwan issue).

Kissinger: I appreciate your comments. Basically Vice Premier Chang did not say anything new. Chairman Mao and others have made the same points to us before. We appreciate that this is your basic view. Quite frankly we would not have recommended that Senator Scott open this issue with you as he did. As we told you last year, these election months in the United States are not the time for working out an agreement on normalization of our relations. We must instead move not long after our elections. I assure you we will maintain our support for the Shanghai Communique and will work to complete normalization. Nobody is authorized to speak for us. When we do it, we will do it at this level. I recognize there is not unlimited time. On our side we are doing our utmost to curb unhelpful discussion. We feel private discussion is better than public discussion.


Huang: Is there anything else? Are you going elsewhere in the near future?

Kissinger: Maybe to Africa, depending on the progress of discussions. And I am playing with the idea of going to the Philippines in October to discuss our base negotiations.

Huang: The Philippines also had an unfortunate earthquake.

Kissinger: We have offered them assistance. May I raise one or two bilateral matters. I remember a conversation with your trade minister and the President also mentioned that in certain special trade matters such as the sale of computers, we wish to be helpful to you. But the trouble is that you deal at a very low level through commercial channels. If you approach Mr. Lord or Mr. Hummel we will do our best to make special arrangements to help you. We have problems such as our procedures for dealing with the Soviets, but if we know what you want, we may be able to make exceptions.

Huang: (Following a query to Chien) As Chien says, President Ford did raise this issue with us, and he also points out that we have already replied that we will deal with these matters through commercial channels.



Kissinger: Yes I understand, but this creates infinite problems. I suggest instead that you informally tell Mr. Lord so we can watch and try to be helpful. We know your attachment to private enterprise (laughter), and we are not saying that you should avoid commercial channels. We are simply suggesting that you supplement these by keeping us privately informed.

Huang: All right. I understand and will report your suggestion to Peking.

Kissinger: On Korea. It would of course be best if we could avoid a confrontation. I realize you don't have instructions on the matter, but I should note that there was an event in Korea today in which two Americans were beaten to death. This is a serious matter which could have grave consequences if restraint is not shown.

Huang: I heard about it on the radio, but I don't have any details. As for solution of the Korean question, I think our respective views are well-known to each other. Although I am not informed about the latest incident I can say that we know the Koreans pretty well since they are friendly to us. The Korean people will put up a strong self-defense when they are provoked.

Kissinger: Two U.S. officers are dead and we know from very good pictures that no Koreans were killed. The U.S. officers couldn't have beaten themselves to death.

Huang: Why were the cameras ready?

Kissinger: That is a good question.


Huang: Having the cameras there makes it look as though you were prepared for the incident.

Kissinger: The reason for the cameras is that the observation post nearby the site of the incident takes photographs constantly. Our people were trying to cut down trees which obstructed their view.

Huang: I see.

Kissinger: When is the Foreign Minister coming to the United Nations for the General Assembly?

Huang: I have no news of it so far.



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Kissinger: Will you invite him to come down to Washington? I know he will not accept my invitation but he may accept yours.

Huang: As long as the Chiang Kai-shek Embassy is here, he will not come.

Kissinger: We can offer him Camp David.

Huang: We would prefer to come in through the front gate.

Kissinger: I hope we can have our annual exchange.

Huang: Sure we can in New York!

Kissinger: Of course.

Huang: Are you going to Kansas City? We have watched quite a bit of television lately. Last night I watched until 12, although I gave up after the voting.

Kissinger: All the rest was quite unimportant.

Huang: I won't take any more of your time.

Kissinger: You have had many visitors. I think you will have many visitors in September, won't you?


Huang: To whom are you referring?

Kissinger: I think Senator Mansfield is going, and I understand that my former colleague Schlesinger will be inspecting your fortifications during September.

Huang: He will not be making an inspection; rather he has asked to get around the country, and we are trying to accommodate him. Moreover, Senator Mansfield will go to even more places.

Kissinger: I don't object.


Huang: You remember that we invited him (Schlesinger) in 1974. Don't be jealous. You have been to China nine times I believe. You even said you yourself wanted to go to Inner Mongolia.



Kissinger: But I did get there. I wanted to go see the musk ox of Mongolia.

Huang: There is only one left. The Mayor of San Francisco offered us a second one, and it was reported to the State Department. But, there has been no action. I understand that the musk ox in San Francisco is related to the one we have in China.

Kissinger: Either we didn't like the musk ox's political attitude or we feared incest. (laughter) But, we will look into it.



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RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT PASS HONG KONG, MOSCOW, TAIPEI AND TOKYO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, CH, US, OVIP (SCHLESINGER, JAMES)

REFS: A) PEKING 1776 B) PEKING 1948

1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION (PERLE, WHITSON, WEST AND BENoit) MET FOR TWO HOURS AND FORTY MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 28 WITH PRC PREMIER AND PARTY FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN HUA KUO-FENG. THE CHINESE SIDE ALSO INCLUDED FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA, MFA AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING, AND NANCY TANG (INTERPRETER). ACCORDING TO AN ORAL BRIEFING FROM NOTES BY ONE DELEGATION MEMBER (SUPPLEMENTED BY OBSERVATIONS FROM SCHLESINGER AND OTHERS), THE SESSION WAS DOMINATED BY AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON GLOBAL STRATEGY. FOLLOWING IN THE MAIN FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO'S STANDARD BRIEF (REF A), HUA SCORED SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, CONDEMNED THE "MURKIN MENTALITY," AND CALLED FOR A "POOLING OF EFFORTS" TO CONTAIN MOSCOW. THIS VIEW, HUA ADDED, HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED BY THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. HUA INDICATED CHINESE SATISFACTION AT PRESIDENT FORD'S DROPPING OF THE WORD "DETENTE"; HE CITED APPROVINGLY THE POLICIES EXEMPLIFIED AND PROMOTED BY THE WEST GERMAN CDU, FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF MERY, THE "PRESENT GOVERNMENTS" OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, THE BRITISH OPPOSITION LEADER THATCHER; BUT HE

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept* SECRET

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Rev 3/2/04*

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *7/31/08*





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SCATHINGLY DENOUNCED MIKI-MIYAZAWA POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. HUA DID NOT RAISE SINO-US BILATERAL RELATIONS, NEVER MENTIONED TAIWAN, AND EVIDENCED NO CURIOSITY ABOUT THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. NO LIGHT WHATSOEVER WAS SHED ON THE PRC LEADERSHIP OR HUA'S ROLE WITHIN IT, THOUGH SCHLESINGER AND OTHERS WERE IMPRESSED BY HUA'S AURA OF COMMAND AND APPARENT INTELLIGENCE. END INTRODUCTORY AND SUMMARY.

2. THE INVITATION. HUA OPENED THE SESSION BY REVIEWING THE BACKGROUND OF THE CHINESE INVITATION TO DR. SCHLESINGER. THE NEW SINO-US RELATIONSHIP HAD BECOME POSSIBLE THROUGH THE "WISE DECISION OF CHAIRMAN MAO"; PRESIDENT NIXON, HUA ADDED, HAD "ALSO MADE HIS CONTRIBUTION." IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP EVOLVING "BY TWISTS AND TURNS," CHAIRMAN MAO HAD PERSONALLY DIRECTED IN 1974 THAT THEN-DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER BE INVITED TO VISIT CHINA. (SCHLESINGER SAYS THAT HE FIRST LEARNED OF THIS INVITATION FROM PRC LO CHIEF HUANG CHEN JUST BEFORE DEPARTING FOR CHINA. THROUGHOUT HIS TRIP CHINESE OFFICIALS ALLUDED OFTEN TO "CHAIRMAN MAO'S INVITATION.") WHEN SCHLESINGER LEFT OFFICE IN 1975, CHAIRMAN MAO INDICATED THAT THE INVITATION SHOULD REMAIN OPEN.

3. COOPERATION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. HUA EMPHASIZED THE INSATIABLE EXPANSIONIST APPETITE OF THE SOVIET UNION NOW MORE GREEDY THAN THE OLD TSARISM WITHOUT CALLING FOR A FORMAL PACT OR SYSTEMATIC COOPERATION AMONG COUNTRIES OPPOSED TO SOVIET HEGEMONY, HUA IMPLICITLY ARGUED FOR AN ANTI-SOVIET FRONT INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES -- A "POOLING OF OUR EFFORTS TOGETHER AGAINST THE POLAR BEAR." WITH THIS IN MIND:

--THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP HAD PROPOSED TO PRESIDENT NIXON "A LINE" RUNNING THROUGH CHINA, JAPAN, PAKISTAN, IRAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, THE THIRD WORLD, WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES "TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM."

--CHAIRMAN MAO HAD "TRIED TO PERSUADE DR. KISSINGER TO STAY IN JAPAN" AND "TO WORK WITH JAPAN." (HUA DID NOT SPECIFY THE TIME FRAME, BUT DELEGATION MEMBERS INFERRED THAT HE MEANT 1973.) WITH RESPECT TO JAPAN, HUA CONCLUDED, RELATIONS WITH

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THE UNITED STATES CAME FIRST AND WITH CHINA SECOND.

--CHINESE LEADERS HAD "URGED" SECRETARY KISSINGER TO "HELP" PAKISTAN "WHEN HE WAS HERE" -- BUT "HIS RECENT TRIP INDICATES THAT HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL."

--THE CHINESE HAD "URGED" THE UNITED STATES "TO USE BOTH HANDS" IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BZO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES WHILE MAINTAINING ITS TIES WITH ISREAL. HUA EMPHASIZED THAT THE CHINESE BELIEVED "COMPLETE" SUPPORT OF ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE IN AMERICAN INTERESTS.

THOUGH ALL OF THESE EVENTS WERE DESCRIBED IN THE PAST TENSE, HUA LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT CHINESE THINKING HAS NOT ALTERED, THAT THIS SORT OF INFORMAL ENTENTE TO CONTAIN SOVIET EXPANSIONISM IS THE CORRECT AND ONLY VIABLE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY.

4. STATE OF THE WORLD. HUA DELIVERED A TOUR D'HORIZON FOCUSSING ON THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE CONTEMPORARY ANTI-SOVIET STRUGGLE; HUA ADHERED CLOSELY TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO'S STANDARD BRIEF AND DIFFERED FROM PUBLIC CHINESE POSITIONS ONLY IN THE SOMETIMES ACIDUOUSLY CANDID DISCUSSION OF WORLD PERSONALITIES.

5. HUA DERIDED THE "SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE," CRITICIZE THE HELSINKI ACCORDS AND CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE AS CREATING THE "FALSE IMPRESSION" THAT THERE EXISTS EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND CONDEMNED ALL AS EVIDENCE OF "MUNICH THINKING" -- A CAPITULATION TO THE SOVIET UNION WHICH IS "OUT TO FINLANDIZE" EUROPE. (TO THIS, DR. SCHLESINGER SUGGESTED THAT "POLANDIZE" MIGHT BE A MORE ACCURATE CHARACTERIZATION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS.) JUST AS IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CRITICIZE AND EXPOSE THE "MUNICH MENTALITY,"

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SO THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS SHOULD NOT BE "COMPLETELY RELIANT ON THE US, FOR THIS WOULD SURELY ERODE THEIR SELF-CONFIDENCE."

6. HUA SPOKE CONTEMPTUOUSLY OF JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER MIKI'S POLICIES AND OBSERVED ACIDLY THAT FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA "WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF SURRENDER HAD HE BEEN A CHINESE LEADER." HUA MADE CLEAR THAT HE REFERRED TO THE MIKI-MIYAZAWA STANCE ON THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE SPECIFICALLY AND TO JAPANESE POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION MORE GENERALLY. ASKED BY DR. SCHLESINGER IF MIYAZAWA'S TOUR OF THE NORTHERN ISLANDS AREA DID NOT CONSTITUTE A HARDENED -- AND THEREFORE IMPROVED -- JAPANESE POSTURE, HUA REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE, TERMING THE INSPECTION "ONLY A SHOW." WITHOUT ELABORATING, HUA INDICATED THAT THE CHINESE FAVOR "DEVELOPMENT" OF THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE.


7. ELSEWHERE HUA SAW ENCOURAGING GLOBAL TRENDS:

--PRESIDENT FORD PUBLICLY DROPPED THE WORD "DETENTE" FROM HIS VOCABULARY;

--SOVIET PLUMPING FOR AN AFSAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM HAD HAD "NO EFFECT." MOREOVER, HUA EXTOLLED "THE PRESENT GOVERNMENTS" OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND FOR REMAINING "VIGILANT" AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT.

--IN WEST GERMANY, OSTPOLITIK HAD GRADUALLY "FALLEN APART." HUA PRAISE THE CDU FOR ITS "LUCID" STANCE ON THE QUESTION

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OF RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.


-IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER THATCHER HAD "PUT THE MATTER (OF POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIETS) FORWARD VERY ACUTELY."

--FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF MERY HAD POINTED OUT DURING HIS JUNE VISIT TO CHINA THAT THE FRENCH DEFENSE EFFORT WAS INCREASING.

8. CHINESE SELF-RELIANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. HUA DELIVERED AN IMPASSIONED DEFENSE OF CHINESE SELF-RELIANCE ALONG FAMILIAR LINES: IMPERIALISTS HAD INFLICTED OPIUM UPON CHINA, CHINA WAS ALL-TOO-ACCURATELY CHARACTERIZED AS THE "SICK MAN OF ASIA," AND CHINESE SELF-CONFIDENCE WAS CONSEQUENTLY IMPAIRED. BUT FOLLOWING 27 YEARS OF "EARTHSHAKING CHANGES," THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAD SHED THEIR INFERIORITY COMPLEX AND BEGUN TO BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD ACHIEVE WHAT FOREIGN COUNTRIES HAD. YET CHINESE SELF-CONFIDENCE WAS STILL INCOMPLETE EVEN TODAY. FOR THIS REASON, AND BECAUSE THE POST-LIBERATION "YOUNGER GENERATION" COULD NOT WHOLLY COMPREHEND THE SITUATION EXISTING BEFORE 1949, THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP ATTACHED A HIGH PRIORITY TO EDUCATING THE MASSES CONSTANTLY IN THE MEANING OF "SELF-RELIANCE." THE CHINESE, HUA SAID, ARE STRIVING "TO BUILD A MODERN CHINA BY THE END OF THE CENTURY." (DELEGATION MEMBERS AGREE THAT HUA DID NOT ADD THE WORD "SOCIALIST" HERE BEFORE CHINA AS IN THE STANDARD FORMULATION.) IN SO DOING, THE FOCAL POINT OF DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE THE SMALL TOWNS IN THE CHINESE INTERIOR, NOT THE DEVELOPED URBAN CENTERS.

9. IMPRESSIONS OF HUA. DR. SCHLESINGER AND HIS DELEGATION WERE FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY HUA. EXPECTING A RATHER UNSOPHISTICATED AND TENTATIVE APPARATCHIK UNSCHOOLED IN THE INTRICACIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THEY DETECTED INTELLIGENCE, CONFIDENCE, AND AN AURA OF LEADERSHIP. CHINESE OFFICIALS PRESENT TREATED HUA WITH DEFERENCE AND RESPECT (THE PRECEDING DAY, DR. SCHLESINGER OBSERVED, SOME OF THE SAME OFFICIALS HAD REGARDED YEH CHIEN-YING WITH "VENERATION") (REF B). HUA HAD MASTERED HIS BRIEF, REFERRING RARELY TO THE TEXT BEFORE HIM BUT LOOKING TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO FOR OCCASIONAL GUIDANCE WHEN REQUIRED TO ADDRESS UNANTICIPATED

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QUESTIONS.

10. HUA OFFERED NO COMMENT ON THE CHINESE INTERNAL SCENE, HIS OWN POSITION WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP, OR CHINESE PLANS FOR THE FORTHCOMING NATIONAL DAY.
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
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DEPARTMENT PASS CINCPAC/POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR OVIP CH US (SCHLESINGER, JAMES)
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER MEETING WITH PRC DEFENSE MINISTER YEN CHIEN-YING

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Rev 3/2/04*
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *1/31/08*

1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES SCHLESINGER AND FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION MET FOR 2-1/2 HOURS ON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 27 WITH PRC DEFENSE MINISTER AND PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN YEN CHIEN-YING. ACCORDING TO ORAL BRIEFING OF USLO OFFICER BY ONE OF THE DELEGATION MEMBERS, YEH'S PRESENTATION WAS CANDID, NONIDEOLOGICAL, AND NARROWLY FOCUSSED ON MILITARY AFFAIRS; HE SPOKE THROUGHOUT AS A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY MAN, NOT A PARTY LEADER, SETTING OUT FOR DR. SCHLESINGER CHINA'S CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND ITS CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR MILITARY RESPONSE TO ANY SOVIET ATTACK. YEH'S SOLE REFERENCE TO THE US WAS A PERFUNCTORY CLOSING QUESTION ABOUT NOVEMBER ELECTION PROSPECTS; HE MADE NO MENTION OF SINO-US RELATIONS, THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, OR TAIWAN. YEH IMPRESSED DELEGATION MEMBERS AS PHYSICALLY FRAIL BUT MENTALLY SHARP. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

2. THE SOVIET THREAT. YEH LEFT NO DOUBT THAT CHINA REGARDS THE

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
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SOVIET UNION AS ITS PRIMARY CONTEMPORARY ENEMY. WITHOUT DIRECTLY CHALLENGING THE OFFICIAL LINE SANCTIFIED AT THE AUGUST 1973 PARTY CONGRESS THAT MOSCOW IS "FEINTING TO THE EAST BUT ATTACKING TO THE WEST," YEH SPOKE NOT AT ALL OF SOVIET AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS IN WESTERN EUROPE. HE PROPOSED INSTEAD THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT DARE ATTACK CHINA OUT OF CONCERN FOR THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY OF ITS REAR. A THRUST AGAINST CHINA, YEH INTIMATED, WOULD LOOSEN THE SOVIET HOLD OVER ITS EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITES AND WOULD INVITE A PUNISHING NATO COUNTERATTACK.

3. CONTINGENCIES AND CHINESE STRATEGY. IF DESPITE ALL LOGIC THE USSR DID ATTACK, CHINA WOULD INSTANTLY ADOPT A "PEOPLE'S WAR" STRATEGY. SCHLESINGER QUESTIONED THE FEASIBILITY OF PEOPLE'S WAR, HYPOTHESIZING THAT A THRUST INTO CHINA WAS LESS LIKELY THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, A MOVE TO LOP OFF A PIECE OF CHINESE TERRITORY SUCH AS SINKIANG. YEH ALLOWED THAT CHINESE PLANNERS HAD ENVISAGED SUCH A POSSIBILITY, WOULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH A "NIBBLING OPERATION" SUCH AS THE JAPANESE HAD ADOPTED IN THE 1930S, AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH AN "ALL-OUT ATTACK" ON THE USSR. (YEH DID NOT AMPLIFY ON THE FORM SUCH AN ATTACK MIGHT TAKE. HE DID STRESS CHINA'S APPRECIATION OF THE NEED FOR MODERN WEAPONS AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, POINTING TO THE RECENT NUCLEAR TEST AS EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS IN THAT AREA.)

4. SCHLESINGER NOTED THAT SOVIET TANKS WERE NUMEROUS AND FORMIDABLE, SUGGESTED THAT "PEOPLE'S WAR" WOULD BE AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO A MASSIVE SOVIET TANK PUSH ACROSS THE BORDER, AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT PROFIT FROM A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI TANK CAMPAIGN DURING THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST WAR. TERMING SUCH ADVICE "FRIENDLY," YEH RESPONDED THAT CHINA RECOGNIZED ITS WEAKNESSES AND, HAVING THESE IN MIND, HAD ALREADY STUDIED CAREFULLY THE LESSONS OF THAT CAMPAIGN.

5. THE SCHLESINGER DELEGATION MEMBER PRIVATELY EXPRESSED TO USLO OFFICER THE DELEGATION'S SURPRISE AT YEH'S RATHER OFFHAND ASSUMPTION -- PRESUMABLY REFLECTING HIGH-LEVEL ESTIMATES -- THAT THE SOVIETS LACK THE LOGISTICAL WHEREWITHAL TO SUSTAIN A PROTRACTED WAR AGAINST CHINA. WHEN YEH SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED A SOVIET SHORTAGE OF PETROLEUM AND FOOD, SCHLESINGER POINTED OUT THAT THE USSR IS CURRENTLY A NET EXPORTER OF PETROLEUM AND WOULD DOUBTLESS BE "LESS GENEROUS" IN EVENT OF WAR. YEH SEEMED GENUINELY ASTONISHED AT THIS ASSESSMENT, SEEKING FROM SCHLESINGER SOMEWHAT LATER IN THE CONVERSATION



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SATION A REITERATION OF HNIS' VIEW.

6. THE MILITIA. YEH SPOKE BRIEFLY OF THE MILITIA AS ANOTHER INPUT TO PEOPLE'S WAR, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ONE MILLION MEMBERS OF THE MODEL SHANGHAI MILITIA HAD ONLY ONE THOUSAND ARTILLERY PIECES.

7. SINO-US RELATIONS. YEH MADE NO MENTION WHATSOEVER OF BILATERAL SINO-US RELATIONS, TAIWAN (EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF JAPANESE ISLAND STRATEGY DURING WORLD WAR II), OR THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. IN FACT, YEH'S ONLY REFERENCE TO THE US WAS A CLOSING INQUIRY IN THE CHOU EN-LAI STYLE: MORE A FLATTERING DISPLAY OF DETAILED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE VISITOR'S COUNTRY THAN A QUESTION POSED TO ELICIT USEFUL INFORMATION, NOTING THAT THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WOULD BE HELD IN NOVEMBER 2 AND THAT CURRENT POLLS SHOWED DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE CARTE R AHEAD IN 30 STATES, YEH ASKED FOR SCHLESINGER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBABLE OUTCOME.

8. STYLE, HEALTH, AND ATMOSPHERICS. THE 77-YEAR-OLD YEH, WHO HAD STOOD ERECT IN PUBLIC VIEW FOR THE ONE HALF HOUR MEMORIAL CEREMONY FOR MAO A WEEK EARLIER, ENTERED THE ROOM SUPPORTED BY AN ATTENDANT, BUT DESPITE HIS EVIDENT PHYSICAL INFIRMITIES YEH CAME ACROSS AS MENTALLY ACUTE. HE MADE A CURSORY GLANCE AT HIS ONE-PAGE BRIEFING PAPER AFTER SEATING HIMSELF BUT CARRIED ON THE SUBSEQUENT DIALOGUE WITHOUT REFERENCE TO NOTES OR COLLEAGUES PRESENT. SURPRISINGLY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF YANG CHENG-WU OFFERED IDEOLOGICAL INTERJECTIONS RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE MILITARY CLARIFICATIONS. (YEH WAS GUILTY OF ONE GLARING BUT INTRIGUING SLIP. MISQUOTING MAO'S DICTUM AS "DIG TUNNELS DEEP, STORE GRAIN EVERYWHERE, AND PREPARE AGAINST WARFARE," YEH WAS HASTILY CORRECTED BY YANG, WHO SUPPLIED THE CORRECT THIRD PHRASE "NEVER SEEK HEGEMONY.")

DEAN



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INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY

MR. HUMMEL HAS SEEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1776

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Rev 3/2/04*
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *Hr*, NARA, DATE *7/31/08*

EXDIS

F.R. 11052; XGDS-3
TARS: OVIP (SCHLESINGER, JAMES) PFOR CH US TW
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO



REF: (A) PEKING 1754, (B) PEKING 1761

1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES SCHLESINGER AND "SUBSTANTIVE" MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY (ACCOMPANYING PRESS AND USLO WERE NOT INVITED) TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA ON THE AFTERNOONS OF SEPTEMBER 7 AND 8 FOR A TOTAL OF FOUR HOURS. A DELEGATION MEMBER PASSED US--IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE--HIS RECOLLECTIONS OF MEETING HIGHLIGHTS. (WE DO NOT YET HAVE MINUTES OF EITHER MEETING. WE HAVE A TENTATIVE OFFER OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS SUBJECT TO FINAL APPROVAL BY SCHLESINGER.) ON TAIWAN, CHIAO EXPOUNDED STANDARD, NON-AGGRESSIVE LINE: U.S. MUST FULFILL ALL THREE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION; LIBERATION OF TAIWAN IS AN INTERNAL CHINESE MATTER; AND THE U.S. OWES A "DEBT" TO THE PRC REGARDING TAIWAN. CHIAO WARNED AGAINST THE DANGER OF A MUNICH-TYPE WESTERN SELL-OUT TO THE SOVIET UNION; AFFIRMED THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ENDURING SINO-SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT; AND ADDED A CRYPTIC--AND NOVEL TO US--REFERENCE TO "SOME WESTERN LEADERS" WHO SPEAK TO DIVERGE SOVIET AGGRESSION TOWARDS THE EAST. CHIAO REITERATED PRINCIPLED CHINESE SUPPORT FOR NORTH KOREAN POSITION ON REUNIFICATION AND HE APPLAUDED THE SUCCESS OF U.S. DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AT THE CLOSE OF THE SECOND SESSION, CHIAO ANNOUNCED THAT THE GROUP WOULD MEET DEFENSE MINISTER AND PARTY

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VICE CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEH-YING ON SEPTEMBER 10, AND WOULD HAVE A SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 11 WITH ANOTHER TOP LEADER (THE GROUP SPECULATES THAT THIS WILL BE PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG). END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.


2. ON SEPTEMBER 7 SCHLESINGER PARTY HELD THE FIRST OF TWO AFTERNOON SESSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO. THE TWO-HOUR SESSION WAS LARGELY CONSUMED BY READING OF FORMAL PREPARED STATEMENTS BY THE TWO SIDES. CHIAO'S REMARKS WERE STANDARD FARE, SETTING FORTH THE CHINESE WORLDVIEW, INTRODUCING NO NEW THEMES, AND FAILING TO MENTION EVEN IN PASSING EITHER THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OR TAIWAN.

3. THE SEPTEMBER 7 EVENING BANQUET HOSTED BY CHIAO (ADDRESSEES WILL HAVE SEEN NCNA COVERAGE) FOLLOWED THE PATTERN SET AT THE NOON WELCOMING BANQUET. CHIAO'S RECITATION OF FAMILIAR PRC POSITIONS IN HIS TOAST WAS LACED WITH THE USUAL METAPHORS. SCHLESINGER ADDRESSED THE POINTS AND THE METAPHORS ONE BY ONE. ("WE AGREE THAT THERE IS GREAT CHAOS UNDER HEAVEN, BUT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE SITUATION EXCELLENT.")

4. FOLLOWING A MORNING VISIT BY ALL DELEGATION MEMBERS TO HOTBED OF RADICALISM TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY, WHERE THE GROUP HEARD THE CANNED BRIEFING ON TSINGHUA'S ROLE IN SPURHEADING THE ANTI-TENG CAMPAIGN, THE DELEGATION DIVIDED INTO SUBSTANTIVE AND PRESS CONTINGENTS. THE LATTER TREKKED AROUND SUBURBAN COMMUNES, WHILE THE FORMER REASSEMBLED AT THE GREAT HALL TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH CHIAO. AS DURING THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON, THE PARTY WAS SEATED IN NEGOTIATING STYLE, FACING THEIR CHINESE HOSTS ACROSS A LONG TABLE RATHER THAN IN THE USUAL "RELAXED" MODEL SEMICIRCULAR ARRANGEMENT OF OVERSTUFFED CHAIRS. CHIAO HAD PREPARED NOTES IN FRONT OF HIM, AND SEEMED TO REFER TO THEM FOR SPECIFIC LANGUAGE FROM TIME TO TIME. HIGHLIGHTS OF THAT TWO-HOUR SESSION FOLLOW.

5. TAIWAN. AFTER EMPHASIZING THAT CHINA SEES THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF U.S.-PRC RELATIONS AS CENTRAL, CHIAO MOVED TO BILATERAL MATTERS AND RAISED THE TAIWAN ISSUE--"ALMOST PERJUDICATORILY" ACCORDING TO ONE DELEGATION MEMBER. --CHIAO DECLARED THAT THE U.S. MUST FULFILL ALL THREE COMPONENTS OF THE JAPANESE FORMULA AS A PRECONDITION FOR NORMALIZATION.

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
Department of State

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HE STRESSED THAT "LIBERATION" OF TAIWAN IS AN INTERNAL CHINESE MATTER, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

HE INDICATED THAT THE U.S. "OWES CHINA A DEBT" ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE--POINTING THERE WAS A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT--AND MUST NOT "BACK AWAY" FROM THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. TO THIS SCHLESINGER (WHO HAD MADE A PREFATORY DISCLAIMER OF ANY ABILITY OR INTENT TO SPEAK FOR THE USG) REPLIED THAT HIS PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE U.S. HAD COMMITTED ITSELF IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE TO A GRADUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES ON TAIWAN "AS TENSIONS IN THE AREA DIMINISHED" AND THAT THE U.S. HAD FULFILLED THIS COMMITMENT. CHIAO DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS.

6. PRC-USSR RELATIONS. CHIAO PRESENTED THE STANDARD HARD LINE ON THE SOVIETS: THE PRC WAS PREPARED FOR WAR, WILL ADOPT A STRATEGY OF "LURING IN THE INVADERS AND "DROWNING THEM IN PEOPLE'S WAR", AND (QUOTING MAO) FORESEES TEN THOUSAND YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE ADDED THAT "WE MUST TRY TO IMPROVE OUR STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS." WHEN THE INTERPRETER INCORRECTLY RENDERED THIS AS "WE MUST IMPROVE OUR STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS," CHIAO CAME IN FORCEFULLY TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. CHIAO WARNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF A MUNICH-TYPE SELLOUT TO MOSCOW, AND ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A WESTERN DUNQUERQUE. SCHLESINGER REPLIED THAT THE U.S. HAS MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SOVIET UNION IS WELL AWARE OF THIS, AND THE KREMLIN LEADERS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE RASH. IN CLOSING, CHIAO REFERRED CRYPTICALLY TO "SOME WESTERN LEADERS WHO SEEK TO TURN THE FOCUS OF SOVIET AGGRESSION TO THE EAST." (COMMENT: IF ACCURATELY QUOTED, THIS LINE IS NEW TO US. OUR SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE ENTIRE U.S. SIDE TOOK THIS AS A BARR DROPPED AT SECRETARY KISSINGER. SCHLESINGER IMMEDIATELY REPLIED, DECLARING THAT HE WAS AWARE OF NO ONE IN THE WEST WHO HELD THAT POSITION.)

7. KOREA. CHIAO PASSED LIGHTLY OVER KOREA, MERELY REITERATING CHINESE PRINCIPLED SUPPORT FOR THE "VERY REASONABLE" NORTH KOREAN PROPOSALS FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA.

8. MIDDLE EAST. CHIAO TOOK CREDIT FOR SUGGESTING TO UNSPECIFIED U.S. LEADERS THAT WASHINGTON OUGHT TO ADOPT A MORE EVENHANDED APPROACH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MAINTAINING TIES WITH ISRAEL WHILE OPENING A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. WHEN CHIAO COMMENTED APPROVINGLY ON THE SUCCESS OF THAT POLICY, SCHLESINGER



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OBSERVED THAT CHINA MIGHT ADOPT THE SAME POLICY WITH SIMILAR EFFECT, CHIAO DECLARED THAT "HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES" MADE THAT OPTION IMPOSSIBLE FOR CHINA TO CONSIDER.

0. ADDITIONAL MEETINGS. AT THE CLOSE OF THE SEPTEMBER 8 SESSION, CHIAO ANNOUNCED THAT A SEPTEMBER 10 MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED WITH DEFENSE MINISTER AND PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEN-YING. SEPTEMBER 11 HAS BEEN LEFT OPEN FOR A SESSION WITH "ANOTHER SENIOR OFFICIAL," WHO THE GROUP SPECULATES WILL BE PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG, SINCE THE CHINESE USUALLY ORCHESTRATE OFFICIAL VISITS SO AS TO SAVE THE HIGHEST RANKING LEADER UNTIL THE FINAL DAY, IT SEEMS PLAUSIBLE TO US THAT PREMIER HUA WILL INDEED MEET WITH THE GROUP.
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, CR, US
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER VIEWS ON CHINA

SUMMARY: COMMENTING ON TRIP TO CHINA, FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER ASSESSED CHINESE LEADERSHIP AS CAPABLE AND PROBABLY COHESIVE, THOUGH FACED WITH VERY DIFFICULT TASK OF GOVERNING HUGE COUNTRY WITH STRONGLY DIVERGENT REGIONAL AND RACIAL INTERESTS. PROPAGANDA STRESSING CHINESE SOLIDARITY WITH MINORITY NATIONALITIES IS COVER FOR PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF HAN EFFORTS TO CONTROL TRIBAL CULTURES. TIBET IS NOTHING MORE THAN OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND OTHER SO-CALLED AUTONOMOUS REGIONS LITTLE BETTER THAN CHINESE PROVINCES. SINO-SOVIET BORDERS STILL SCENE OF CONTINUOUS LOW-LEVEL FRICTION. PRC FOREIGN POLICY DOMINATED BY PRE-OCCUPATION WITH USSR TO POINT WHERE CHINESE PROPOSED TO SCHLESINGER ADOPTION OF DULLES-STYLE CONTAINMENT STRATEGY. "MUNICH MENTALITY" FAVORING APPEASMENT OF SOVIETS LARGEST OBSTACLE TO CONTAINMENT. CHINESE BELIEVED. CHINESE VIEW JAPAN AS LEADING EXPONENT OF MUNICH MENTALITY. TAIWAN MENTIONED



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BY *NR*, NARA, DATE *7/31/08*



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ONLY ONCE AND CLEARLY AS SECONDARY ISSUE. SCHLESINGER BELIEVED US POLICY SHOULD BE TO ACKNOWLEDGE IMPORTANCE OF QUESTION TO PRC BUT DO NOTHING MUCH ABOUT IT. SCHLESINGER HAS SOME DOUBTS ABOUT CHINESE ABILITY CARRY THROUGH PEOPLES WAR STRATEGY BUT BELIEVES SOVIETS WOULD BE ILL-ADVISED TO TEST THEIR VALIDITY. SOME CHINESE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES MAKE LITTLE SENSE ECONOMICALLY BUT ARE EFFECTIVE AS MEANS OF MOBILIZING POPULATION BEHIND REGIME, END OF SUMMARY.

1. AT BREAKFAST WITH AMBASSADOR AND IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH ENBOFFS DURING TOKYO STOPOVER SEPTEMBER 29-30, FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER DISCUSSED IMPRESSIONS GAINED DURING HIS VISIT TO CHINA. HIGHLIGHTS AS FOLLOWS:

2. LEADERSHIP

SCHLESINGER'S ASSESSMENT WAS THAT CHINESE LEADERSHIP WOULD STICK TOGETHER. IT HAD NO CHOICE. BEFORE MAO'S DEATH FACTIONAL DISPUTES COULD BE CARRIED ON BELOW MAO'S LEVEL. NOW THAT HE WAS GONE, THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE BODY POLITIC NEEDED EACH OTHER TO REINFORCE LEGITIMACY AND MAINTAIN CONTROL. SCHLESINGER WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE QUALITY OF THE CHINESE LEADERS HE MET, PARTICULARLY PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEN-YING. IN CONTRAST TO MOST OFFICIALS THAT HE MET, YEH SPENT 95 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON SUBSTANCE AND ONLY ABOUT 5 PERCENT ON PROPAGANDA. SCHLESINGER ALSO GOT THE IMPRESSION FROM HIS CONVERSATIONS, INCLUDING THAT WITH HWA KUO-FENG, THAT LEADERSHIP WOULD OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF COMPROMISE AND CONSENSUS RATHER THAN CHARISMA. THE NEW CROP OF LEADERS WOULD TAKE THEIR LEGITIMACY FROM THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION RATHER THAN THE LONG MARCH, BUT MOST OF THEM WERE POLITICIANS RATHER THAN IDEOLOGUES WHO WOULD SEEK TO USE MAO'S PRECEPTS RATHER THAN BE GOVERNED BY THEM.

3. REGIONAL FRAGILITY

SCHLESINGER CAME AWAY FROM CHINA WITH A SENSE OF THE VAST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VARIOUS REGIONS, THE PREOCCUPATION OF REGIONAL OFFICIALS WITH THEIR

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OWN PROBLEMS RATHER THAN THOSE OF THE CENTER, AND A FEEL FOR HOW DIFFICULT THE COUNTRY WAS TO GOVERN. THE FURTHER AWAY ONE WENT FROM THE CENTER, THE LESS LIP SERVICE WAS PAID TO CENTRAL PROPAGANDA THEMES. SCHLESINGER BRIEF STAY IN CHENGTU GAVE HIM THE IMPRESSION THAT SZECHWAN WAS A SEPARATE COUNTRY, RICH, CUT OFF, SELF-CENTERED. OFFICIALS WITH WHOM SCHLESINGER SPOKE PREFACED THEIR REMARKS WITH RITUAL DENUNCIATIONS OF TENG HSIAO-PING DELIVERED IN MONOTONE, THEN TURNED IN MORE ANIMATED FASHION TO LOCAL IRRIGATION AND PRODUCTION PROBLEMS. JUDGING FROM THE HEAVY SECURITY THAT SURROUNDED HIS VISIT AND THE PERVASIVE PRESENCE OF MILITARY VEHICLES ALONG HIS ROUTE, SCHLESINGER DREW CONCLUSION THAT AUTHORITIES HAD PROBLEMS KEEPING ORDER IN SZECHWAN.

PRC PROPAGANDA ABOUT HAN SOLIDARITY WITH CHINA'S MINORITIES WAS NOTHING MORE THAN A FACADE FOR TROUBLED RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINESE AND TRIBAL GROUPS THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. LHASA GAVE HIM THE IMPRESSION THAT TIBET WAS AN OCCUPIED AREA PURE AND SIMPLE. IN SINKIANG, MINORITIES SEEMED STRONGER. HE ARRIVED IN IYING NEAR THE SOVIET BORDER AT 9 AM. LOCAL INHABITANTS KNEW THAT FOREIGNERS WERE GOING TO VISIT BUT SCHLESINGER'S IDENTITY WAS KEPT SECRET AND ONLY A FEW CURIOUS ONLOOKERS WERE STANDING BY. BY AFTERNOON, ACCORDING TO SCHLESINGER, WORD WAS OUT WHO WAS VISITING AND LARGE NUMBERS OF UIGHURS AND KAZAKH TRIBESMEN APPEARED ALONG THE ROADSIDES. SCHLESINGER INTERPRETED THEIR APPEARANCE AS A SPONTANEOUS DEMONSTRATION AIMED AT SHOWING DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM HAN RULERS. HIS CHINESE ESCORTS WERE VISIBLY NERVOUS AND APPARENTLY ANNOYED WHILE THIS WAS HAPPENING, AND IN FACT WERE SKITTISH AND SHORT-TEMPERED THROUGHOUT VISITS TO MINORITY AREAS. SCHLESINGER LEARNED WHILE IN IYING THAT LIFE ALONG SINO-SOVIET BORDER NOT PEACEFUL BUT RATHER MARKED BY STEADY LOW-LEVEL HOSTILE ACTIVITY, INCLUDING SHELLING AND AGENT DROPS.

4. FOREIGN POLICY.

SCHLESINGER FOUND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY THINKING PREOCCUPIED AS USUAL WITH SOVIET UNION.



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PREMIER HWA KUO-FENG SPENT MUCH OF HIS TWO AND A HALF HOUR MEETING WITH SCHLESINGER DISCUSSING IN TERMS REMINISCENT OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES THE FORMATION OF AN ARC OF COUNTRIES AROUND USSR UNITED BY PARALLEL INTEREST IN CONTAINING SOVIET EXPANSION, HWA FELT THAT "MUNICH MENTALITY" WAS GREATEST THREAT TO THIS BROAD SCHEME AND THAT JAPAN UNDER MIKI LED LIST OF COUNTRIES INCLINED TO APPEASE SOVIET UNION. JAPANESE HANDLING OF HEGEMONY ISSUE IN PEACE-AND-FRIENDSHIP TREATY NEGOTIATIONS CITED AS EVIDENCE. FORMER FOMIN MIYAZAWA SINGLED OUT BY HWA FOR TURNING CHINESE SUPPORT ON NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE. WHEN SCHLESINGER DEFENDED MIYAZAWA, CITING RECENT TRIP TO NORTHERN TERRITORIES AS SIGN DEFIANCE TOWARDS SOVS, HWA DISMISSED MIYAZAWA VISIT COMPEMPTUOUSLY AS DOMESTIC POLITICAL PLOY AND SAID, "IF MIYAZAWA WERE IN CHINA HE WOULD BE CONSIDERED ONE WHO HAD ALREADY SURRENDERED." SCHLESINGER COMMENTED TO ENBOFF THAT MIYAZAWA REMARKS TO SENATOR HANSFIELD PROBABLY AT ROOT OF CHINESE PIQUE TOWARD FORMER JAPANESE FOMIN. HWA TOLD SCHLESINGER THAT HE FAVORED INCREASE IN JAPANESE

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MILITARY SPENDING FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AND HOPED US COULD INFLUENCE GOJ TO STEP UP EFFORTS. US-JAPAN RELATIONS SHOULD BE AHEAD OF US-CHINA RELATIONS ON AMERICAN LIST OF FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES, HWA SAID.

TAIWAN QUESTION CAME UP ONLY ONCE DURING ENTIRE VISIT AND THEN ONLY IN STANDARD FASHION. SCHLESINGER TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT MOST EFFECTIVE WAY FOR US TO HANDLE TAIWAN QUESTION WOULD BE TO ACKNOWLEDGE IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE TO CHINESE AND THEN DO NOTHING ABOUT IT. US COULD NOT HOPE TO GAIN CHINESE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT ISSUE IS SECONDARY OR COMMITMENT ON MODALITIES OF ULTIMATE SOLUTION. THERE IS NO QUESTION HOWEVER THAT US ROLE IN STRATEGIC BALANCE VIS-A-VIS SOVIETS IS KEY DETERMINENT OF WASHINGTON-PEKING RELATIONSHIP.

5. DEFENSE STRATEGY.

SCHLESINGER SAID HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER CHINA HAD THE CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT SUCCESSFULLY A PEOPLES' WAR STRATEGY AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. QUESTION NOT REALLY ANSWERABLE FOR SO MUCH DEPENDED ON HOW WELL INDOCTRINATION OF POPULATION WOULD STAND UP UNDER ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES IMPOSSIBLE TO SIMULATE. SOVS CERTAINLY CAPABLE DETACHING UNDERPOPULATED MINORITY AREAS OF CHINA-SINKIANG, ETC. SUCCESSFUL PEOPLES' WAR REQUIRED DENCE POPULATION, HE FELT. SCHLESINGER WONDERED IF FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT PRESENCE OF SOVIETS IN CHINA MIGHT NOT UNDERMINE ABILITY GOVERNMENT MOBILIZE POPULATION FOR SUCH A WAR? WHATEVER HIS DOUBTS, SCHLESINGER DID NOT RECOMMEND TESTING THEIR VALIDITY.

6. SCHLESINGER FOUND CHINESE LESS THAN PERFECTLY INFORMED ON SOVIET CAPABILITIES. THEY LABORING UNDER ASSUMPTION, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOVIET TANK WARFARE IN CHINA WOULD BE INHIBITED BY FUEL SHORTAGES. SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENT THAT SOVS WERE NET OIL EXPORTER CAME AS GENUINE SURPRISE EVEN TO YEH CHIEN-YING.

7. ECONOMICS.

SCHLESINGER FELT THAT MANY ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES THE CHINESE ENGAGED IN DID NOT MAKE MUCH SENSE FROM A PURELY ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW. GROWING RICE NORTH OF THE YANGTZE IS ONE OF THESE AS ARE MANY OF THE WATER-CONSERVENCY PROJECTS HE SAW WHICH ARE USELESS MUCH

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OF THE YEAR DUE TO RAINFALL PATTERNS. MANY OF THESE ACTIVITIES NON-
EVER, ARE IMPORTANT FROM THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW
AS MEANS OF ENERGIZING POPULATION AND PROVIDING PEOPLE WITH
SENSE OF PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATION.
HONGSON



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Remarks

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SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Chiao Kuan-hua, PRC Foreign Minister
Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Permanent
Representative to the United Nations
Lai Ya-li, Deputy PRC Permanent Representative
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Kuo Chia-ting, Notetaker

Secretary Kissinger
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Thomas Gates, American Ambassador
to the PRC
Arthur Hummel, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asia
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
William Gleysteen, National Security Council
(Notetaker)

DATE, TIME & PLACE: October 8, 1976, 8:30 - 11:30 p. m.
PRC Mission to the United Nations

Chiao: Is this your first time here at our Mission headquarters?

Kissinger: It is my first time in this room. I was downstairs once. I was trying to be helpful finding a place for you. Ambassador Huang did better himself without my help. Do you find it satisfactory?

Huang: It is very convenient for both work and living.

Kissinger: I agree. Mr. Chi won't have time to go back to his alma mater? Both of us studied chemistry there. I got extremely high grades in chemistry but it reflected memory, not understanding of the subject.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2/04*
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *HJR*, NARA, DATE *7/31/08*



Those who deplore my political views could perhaps have spared the world by keeping me in chemistry. I once asked Professor Kistakowsky whether I should keep on in chemistry, and he answered that anyone who had to ask such a question shouldn't. (Laughter)

Chiao: If you had continued your studies in chemistry, it might have benefited your political activities more.

Kissinger: My accomplishments in chemistry were just the result of brute memory. I remember once in the laboratory doing an elaborate experiment where I got results which were precisely opposite from the ones I was supposed to get. Perhaps the professor who analyzed how I managed to do this went on to get a Nobel Prize. (Laughter)

Chiao: How is Mrs. Kissinger?

Kissinger: She is fine and asks after Mrs. Chiao.

Chiao: She didn't go with you to Africa did she?

Kissinger: Yes she did.

Chiao: (Turning to Gates) How long have you been here?

Gates: I have been here since last week, and I am returning to Peking next week.


Chiao: (To Lord) How is your wife?

Lord: Fine, thank you.

Chiao: (Turning back to the Secretary) We last met in December, I believe.

Kissinger: Yes, when I was with President Ford in Peking. Before we go on, I would like to extend my personal condolences on the death of Chairman Mao. He was a great man in the history of our era. All of us who knew him felt that it was a great event in our lives.

Chiao: Thank you very much. I would also like to thank many of your friends who went to our offices to extend condolences. General Scowcroft was among them here in Washington and Ambassador Gates, of course, did so in Peking.



Of the Americans who knew Chairman Mao, you are probably one of the ones who saw the most of him.

Kissinger: Yes, five times. The first meeting was with President Nixon in 1972; then I met him in February 1973 and November 1973 when I had my long talk with him; and then again last year in October and with the President in December.

Chiao: He had a great effect on the Chinese people.

Kissinger: Surely. I remember during our meeting in October 1975 that while he had great difficulty speaking, the content of his thought was profound.

Chiao: He had difficulty speaking, but his thoughts were clear.

You have seen from our public statements and documents that the Chinese Government is determined to carry on the policies of Chairman Mao.

Kissinger: I saw it in your speech.

Chiao: Actually, since liberation, our policy has always been grasped and looked after by Chairman Mao. I noted that President Ford also mentioned that Chairman Mao looked after (was responsible for) the opening of our relationship.


Kissinger: I remember that during our negotiations Chinese leaders would go to Chairman Mao at crucial points and return with instructions.

Chiao: Chairman Mao always kept an eye on many matters, not only major strategic issues.

Kissinger: I remember during negotiation of the Shanghai Communique when Premier Chou went to see Chairman Mao and came back with some rather firm proposals which permitted us to proceed successfully.

Chiao: Yes, that was the first part of the Shanghai Communique. It was a good method because it did not hide anything.

Kissinger: It was an original method which suited the circumstances.



Chiao: Not covering up contradictions is the beginning of their solution. Then, the agreements which follow are genuine.

Kissinger: Yes, the points of agreement then have more meaning. Mr. Foreign Minister, how do you propose to proceed tonight?

Chiao: Let's proceed as usual. I would like to take the opportunity to hear your views. Why don't you start? You have been to so many places.

Kissinger: Because we are in your place tonight. (Laughter)

Chiao: We have two sayings. One is that when we are the host, we should let the guests begin, and the other is that when we are guests, we should defer to the host.

Kissinger: You can always use this so I have to start in any event. (Laughter) But I will be glad to start. First, perhaps I could make a general assessment of the relations between us. Then I might say something about the world situation, and finally, we might discuss some specific issues.


Chiao: Quite alright.

Kissinger: I might begin in the spirit of the Foreign Minister's comment that pointing out contradictions may help their solution. Speaking frankly and as someone with some sentimental involvement in the start of our relationship -- I was the first senior U. S. official visitor to China, my impression, and that of my colleagues, is that there has been a certain deterioration in our relationship since the time of President Ford's visit. It is seen in the way we exchange views and hear Chinese views much more through Chinese statements to visitors than official representatives.

Chiao: What we say to non-official visitors is at one with what we say to you officially.

Kissinger: True. But it is often at greater length and higher levels. Moreover, these delegations will usually repeat what you say so that it practically constitutes a form of public pressure on us.

Chiao: Can it be so said?



Kissinger: Despite the fact that I am attacked directly or indirectly, I still feel that the opening to China is the most important thing I have done in my public life. If the Foreign Minister will permit me to use it as an example, his speech to the General Assembly is a reflection of the problem. Some of his speech was so subtle that only a few people understood who was being attacked. But I can assure him that they knew. Don't worry, your efforts weren't wasted. I will pass on your views to Mr. Sonnelfeldt the next time I see him. (Laughter) If my father ever sits next to you at dinner, you can be sure he will explain his views on the subject.

As I understand it, you said in your speech that when the U. S. negotiates with the Soviets, it is engaging in appeasement and pushing the Soviets toward China. But when the United States resists the Soviets, it is engaging in a rivalry of the superpowers against which all mankind should unite. Under those conditions we are playing under rules where we cannot possibly win. It reminds me that the British Foreign Minister has a game where only he knows the rules. He keeps a point score. Every day he tells me of the score. Every day I'm defeated and the only question is the extent of my defeat. (Laughter) Possibly we have different assessments of the Soviet Union, but I doubt that the difference is so large. It is a tactical difference. Fundamentally, if you criticize our negotiations with the Soviet Union as appeasement and describe our efforts to resist them as superpower rivalry, then what did your Prime Minister have in mind when he suggested to Schlesinger that we "pool our efforts"?


Chiao: Right.

Kissinger: What do you mean by right?

Chiao: I mean the reference to pooling our efforts is right.

Kissinger: We are ready to pool our efforts, but I don't see how we can proceed when you attack us for our policy, e. g. in Europe and Africa. When we conduct negotiations out of tactical considerations you attack us. If you do so, how, in your view, can we oppose the Soviets?

Chiao: Your comments are too general. We are never against negotiations with the Soviet Union. We are negotiating with them now. We are not opposed to negotiations. The problem is the basic position from which one negotiates. You will recall that Chairman Mao discussed with you



the problem of the Helsinki Conference. After Helsinki the Soviets went on a large scale offensive in Angola and we believe this was caused by the weak attitude you adopted at Helsinki toward the Soviets. In the Middle East, as you know, we have supported dual tactics. You adopted dual tactics and we supported them. We did not attack.

Kissinger: You couldn't attack us because you suggested it.

Chiao: We did not suggest it, but we put it forward for your consideration.

Kissinger: But you have opposed us in Africa.

Chiao: We have had doubts.

Kissinger: What doubts?

Chiao: We have doubts that you will reach your objective.

Kissinger: We have two objectives in Africa. One is the liberation of black Africa. The other is to prevent Soviet intervention of a direct or indirect kind. We must try to separate the issue of liberation from Soviet intervention.

Chiao: We have always separated these issues. In Angola we supported liberation and after the Angolans won a victory the Soviets moved in.

Kissinger: What we want -- and it is a complicated process -- is to create a basis for resisting Soviet intervention while not obstructing liberation movements.

Chiao: Just not opposing liberation movements is not enough.


Kissinger: We are supporting them.

Chiao: I have doubts that you are. You are not thoroughgoing, speaking quite frankly.

Kissinger: You said so publicly in your speech!

Chiao: Not quite.

Kissinger: What would be thoroughgoing? Or what should we do differently?



Chiao: You should support the demands of the blacks.

Kissinger: We are supporting them.

Chiao: The procedures you are adopting in Zimbabwe won't achieve their aim.

Kissinger: There are two ways events could develop in Zimbabwe. One is straight armed struggle which would bring in outside forces and add to the credit of those outside forces. If this were to occur, we could not resist those outside forces because we could not go to the support of white regimes against blacks. So we are trying the second way to bring together the black forces of Mugabe, Muzorewa, and Nkomo in one black government that we can support to resist the intervention of outside force. I consider Smith's position only the opening move.

Chiao: You can try, but we have our doubts.

Kissinger: Maybe there are grounds for doubt. But we had to get control over events so we would have some basis to resist outside forces. We are not asking you to do anything but we are asking that you not oppose us.

Huang: You should analyze carefully the attitudes of the five front line African countries. If you do not (satisfy them), they will be forced to accept Soviet assistance.


Kissinger: That is just what we are trying to do. And we need help in doing so. I think we have the support of at least four of the five front line governments.

Huang: At most four.

Kissinger: We can't have more than four because Angola will never support us. It would be like trying to get the support of Outer Mongolia.

Chiao: I don't want to go into details, but your efforts are only half measures. You may keep on trying, but you may find that the result is the opposite of what you expect. You may end up angering the blacks.

Kissinger: What, in your opinion, would be thorough-going measures?



Chiao: That would be going into detail. All I want to stress is the importance of attitude. Is the key, in your opinion, the interim government?

Kissinger: We can only have an interim government if the blacks will support it.

Chiao: The situation may not develop that way.

Kissinger: What is the alternative?

Chiao: As for the specific method, I cannot say that you should do this or that. But fundamentally, you must stand on the side of the blacks.

Kissinger: There are two approaches among the blacks. The bulk of the blacks are not happy about fighting and would like to find a way to avoid it. But there is a minority which is ready to fight with Soviet help.

Chiao: I do not think it is fair to look on proponents of guerrilla warfare as supporters of the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: I don't say that they are -- at this time. But if developments proceed toward control by these elements, it will go that way.

Chiao: We will have to see.

Kissinger: I'm hopeful that Mugabe, Muzorewa, and Nkomo are going to join forces.


Chiao: We will have to see. We have reservations.

Kissinger: I see you have no better strategy.

Chiao: It is your problem.

Kissinger: It is more than our problem. I remember in November 1973 when Premier Chou spoke to me regarding the need for global equilibrium to prevent Soviet expansionism.

Chiao: That is your summation of his views, is it not?



Kissinger: To be sure, Premier Chou made many other points. But if expansionist countries gain advantages, eventually other countries will suffer.

Chiao: Yes. We recognized this in the Shanghai Communique where we said that we would not seek hegemony ourselves and would oppose the efforts of any others seeking hegemony. This was a common point between us.

Kissinger: But we are having difficulty putting it into practice. Let us leave Africa and discuss another issue which you have raised repeatedly; namely, the accusation that we are following a Munich-like policy of appeasement or that we are pushing to deflect the Soviets to the East, and so on. I have explained it to you before but let me summarize it again. I do it for you once a year and quite obviously it has never made a lasting impact.

I see Soviet expansionism as a geo-political problem not limited to one region. There is no solution where we can allow a push in one place and preserve our interests in another. I see the following as the Soviets' strategic problem: they face powerful countries in the West; potentially powerful countries in the East, in the case of China and Japan; and confusion and weakness to their south and in the Middle East. The Soviets have an inefficient bureaucratic system; they cannot create real power. They don't conduct a brilliant foreign policy. They are rather good at amassing physical power but they don't know what to do with it. The Red Army seems effective only when used against Soviet allies, not enemies. Soviet forces have not achieved a diplomatic success for the Soviet Union.


Chiao: Didn't the Soviets win a diplomatic victory at Helsinki?

Kissinger: I don't agree.

Chiao: Why did President Ford make those remarks (about Eastern Europe) at San Francisco?

Kissinger: You don't think this was the result of Helsinki! (Laughter) Actually, it reflected panic. In this case, the President transcended his advisors. (Laughter)

Let me get back to strategy and how the Soviets can be contained. As for their strength, the latest plane that we got in Japan shows that they




are really quite backward. The plane is about 10 percent better than our planes of 14 years ago. If this achievement is the result of a high priority project in the Soviet Union, I hate to think of the outcome of their low priority projects. (Laughter)

As I look at the Soviet Union, they have certain opportunities for the next ten-fifteen years. After that, their circumstances will prevent expansionism. In the Middle East, whatever they touch turns into disaster. All sides in Lebanon are fighting with Soviet weapons and the Soviets don't know which end to touch. The Soviets may try to break out of the situation at some point, though not under the present leadership which is too bureaucratic and too old. But they may try to break out under Brezhnev's successors. But the consequences will be the same for us wherever they try to break out.

I believe, personally -- if the elections turn out the wrong way, you won't see me again and may not care about my personal views. In any event, I believe that if the Soviets attack, it would be best if they attacked in the West. Because if they do attack in the West, our political possibilities for resistance are very great. My strategic nightmare is that they will attack in the East -- I recognize this would not be consistent with the line in your speeches and papers. If the Soviets attack in the East and have an initial success, it would have a massive impact on Japan and even in Europe and would contribute to the hegemonial effect we want so much to avoid. My own conviction is that if the Soviets were to attack in the East, the United States would still have to oppose them whether asked to or not. We would be doing it because of our own interests and not as a favor. But the psychological and political conditions for U.S. action would hardly be ideal. Nor is it our view that we can buy off the Soviet Union with little concessions in the West to deflect them toward the East. I agree with what you say about the importance of a strong West.

Even though you may not agree with my political analysis, I want the Soviets to negotiate first with us, not Europe, because we are stronger politically. If some of the people you admire come to power in the U.S. and are able to destroy our diplomatic flexibility, the Soviets will be able to move to negotiations with Europe and threaten Europe by a process of selective negotiations. They have recently approached the Germans and the French and they will surely approach the British. All are searching for concessions they can make to the Russians as a way of dealing with their internal pressures. Since the beginning of our detente policy in 1971, the defense effort in Europe is larger than before because we have been able to paralyze these compromising elements in Europe who oppose defense efforts.



Chiao: What is the logic of that? You took the lead in detente so you can hardly blame the Europeans for moving in the same direction.

Kissinger: No. We insist that we proceed toward detente together with no one going out in front. You can see the objective results of our policy on defense efforts as they are reflected in the United States, Germany, and to some extent throughout NATO. You just need to look at statistics to see what I mean.

Chiao: It is important not to confuse negotiations and strength.

Kissinger: I agree completely.

Chiao: For example, early this year you used strong language about Angola, but then you went ahead with negotiations on SALT. If you behave this way why do you think the Soviets will heed your warnings?


Kissinger: I was almost alone in the U. S. over Angola. Let me explain what I was trying to do. I forced the U. S. to do something about Angola. By December 1, we were on the verge of assembling a force which, when deployed, would have exhausted the Cubans. Several countries were involved. On December 8, President Ford called in Ambassador Dobrynin and told him to stop arms shipment to Angola. A few days later, the Soviets did stop shipments. We were prepared to have a resolution in the January 12th meeting of the OAU. Then on December 19, Congress voted to cut off all money for Angola, and there was no prospect of our using force. On December 24, the Soviets resumed armed shipments. When the time came for me to go to Moscow in January, the only thing left for me to use was a bluff and I tried it. It didn't work. Since then I have made violent attacks on the Soviets. In Angola we were defeated by our own people. I know this is no consolation to you. But I wanted to explain.

Chiao: When did you go to Moscow?

Kissinger: At the end of January.

Chiao: Our view is that the Soviets, through Helsinki, see your weakness.

Kissinger: Really, Mr. Foreign Minister, I don't want to be impolite. but I don't agree. We are not weak. Rather, we are temporarily weak until after our elections. We have gone through a period of temporary weakness when the forces which overthrew Nixon have been dominant in this country. But that will end on November 2.



Frankly, we considered the Helsinki Conference a second-rate enterprise. We gave instructions to our delegation to stay one-half step behind the Europeans and to take no initiative. Maybe I'm lacking in imagination, but I really can't see what you think the Soviets gained from Helsinki. All they got was just words.

Chiao: I know your views. You mentioned them in the car to me last year. I considered them seriously.

Kissinger: And rejected them!

Chiao: No, but we don't agree with you.

Kissinger: What is the Soviet victory at Helsinki?

Chiao: I don't want to be impolite. The Soviets, through Helsinki, have come to feel that the West is anxious to reach agreement. This is a long-range problem and nothing very terrible but it is a fact that the Soviets have reached such a conclusion.

Kissinger: I think you know the Soviets. Gromyko's strength is to pursue something relentlessly. I find that Gromyko persists even when it makes no sense whatsoever.


Chiao: We understand Gromyko's practice. We will persist in resisting this practice of Gromyko. This is our policy in our talks with them.

Kissinger: The Soviets started agitating for Helsinki in 1963-64. At that time they tried to exclude the U. S. and to push for abolishment of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Finally, we decided to go along in 1971, and the talks dragged out four years. The Soviets got nothing out of the Conference; only empty principles. If they had made a demand on Berlin, I would advocate total resistance. In practice, however, they got nothing. Their foreign policy is ineffective. Helsinki didn't in any way affect the legal situation in Europe.

Chiao: I don't think it can be put this way. At least the Soviets gained your agreement that their boundaries can't be changed.

Kissinger: By force.

Chiao: Why not use the policy of non-recognition?



Kissinger: Because European borders were already set long before Helsinki. The Baltic borders were set in 1946-47 and then other borders were accepted by both Germanies in the 1960's. How could the U. S. oppose things accepted so long ago?

Huang: Why did President Ford have to go to Helsinki to give overall recognition to the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe?

Kissinger: He didn't give such recognition. Maybe we are stupid and not as intelligent as you. I remember once Premier Chou told me that I was intelligent. I said that he meant by Chinese standards I was not very intelligent. He didn't protest -- he just laughed. (Laughter) I grant it may be just an example of our mediocre comprehension that led us to Helsinki. But it was not we who agreed to go. It was the British, French and Germans who agreed to go. If we had stayed away, it would not have helped. Of course, we would have stayed away if the conference had involved basic principles. But it didn't. Apparently this is also the Soviet interpretation because they have never mentioned any principles. As for the countries of Eastern Europe that the President so helpfully mentioned the other night, (laughter) they were the ones who were eager for the conference. Did you know we have a new campaign slogan on liberating Eastern Europe? We discovered the other night that we have already carried out the Republican platform of 1952 without anyone noticing it. (Laughter)


Chiao: Perhaps we should drop this.

Kissinger: In our view, the Helsinki agreements were rather irrelevant documents. The issues were drawn out for four years. At any rate, whether we were right or wrong, the matter is irretrievable.

Chiao: Regarding the policy...

Kissinger: There is a question of perception and a question of execution with regard to overall policy toward the Soviet Union. As for our perception, I have tried to explain our view -- though without apparent success. In execution of our policy, we may make mistakes. Even with people on our staff like Mr. Lord who has a Chinese wife, we occasionally make mistakes.

But back to the matter, you mentioned to the recent unofficial visitor -- the question of pooling efforts.



Chiao: Chairman Mao mentioned that the U. S., China, Europe, Japan, Pakistan, and Iran should unite to oppose the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: I agree, but your criticism of our policy affects our ability to do this.

Chiao: We have mentioned our concerns because in our view we cannot adopt a weak attitude toward the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: We don't adopt a weak attitude toward the Soviet Union.

Chiao: You have your own attitude. We have ours. The real question is when, under what conditions, and with what objectives one negotiates with the Russians.

Kissinger: I agree there are differences in our approach. Your tactic is one of firmness with relatively little flexibility. Ours is one of protracted negotiations which don't achieve anything. We don't ask you to adopt ours; and I admire yours. However, we must adapt to our own requirements. The end result should be the same -- no Soviet expansionism.

Chiao: Tactics must obey strategy. If they are divorced there can be no talk of tactics.

As for your "nightmare", that is one way of putting it, but I don't agree either with your nightmare or your way of thinking.

Kissinger: If we are really serious about the danger of Soviet expansionism, we must be prepared to look in all directions.


Chiao: On this we don't disagree.

Kissinger: Let's talk concretely. How should we do it?

Chiao: On the one hand, I agree there is Soviet expansionism all over, but the point of emphasis is in the West.

Kissinger: I won't dispute that.

Chiao: But the point of emphasis is important because it affects strategy. Before the end of the war in Vietnam, we told you that your forces were too scattered. The Soviets took advantage of the situation to expand elsewhere.



As for China, we have not neglected Soviet expansionism towards China. We have preparations, and, as Chairman Mao has said, we are all on the defensive against the Russians. We don't want to attack the Soviet Union. The point of emphasis is important, however, and I can't agree with your statement about your nightmare. Our defense posture is not less than others.

Kissinger: If the Soviets expand militarily in Europe, the political problems of a military response would be much easier for the U.S. The political problems would be much more difficult if the attack were to come in Asia. If it were to come in Asia, we should respond anyway. But creating the proper political conditions to do so is what makes it a nightmare. I am not referring to your military preparations, and I am not suggesting that you lack resolve or vigilance. Clearly you do not.

Chiao: I noted something in your General Assembly speech about relations between our two countries that I don't agree with. Roughly speaking you said that you will take account of the interests and concerns of China in the conduct of your relations and that China must exhibit a similar attitude toward the United States. Your remarks seem to me to exceed what was said in the Shanghai Communique.


Kissinger: In what way?

Chiao: In the case of Taiwan?

Kissinger: No.

Chiao: On Taiwan, you owe us a debt.

Kissinger: These are separate issues. First, there is the Taiwan issue and second, there is the question of the conduct of our relations on a global basis. As for Taiwan, the problem has complexities... And in my speech I did not mention normalization in the same context as the need for mutuality in our approach to global issues. In the global context, you must understand our needs just as we try to understand yours. Of course, you can if you wish attack me for something I did not intend to say... On normalization, it seems to me that after our elections we should take an extremely serious look, keeping in mind the things that you have been saying recently -- you can rest assured that we have gotten the message. As for the conduct of our relations on a global basis and our common resistance to hegemony, there has been no progress, only a barrage of



attacks on us through unofficial delegations to Peking and sometimes even foreign delegations. We are trying to understand your position. You must try to understand ours. But this is quite separate from the problem of normalization.

Chiao: The first section of your speech dealt with normalization. The latter part with this global question.

Kissinger: The first part was on normalization, the second was on expanding global cooperation.

I might interject that I believe that Senator Scott did enormous damage with his letter from the President and the impression he conveyed that he had been sent by the President to negotiate with you and to make specific proposals. Scott did not reflect the views of the Administration. In fact, before he left, I told him not to discuss the matter of normalization because it was not a suitable issue to talk about before our elections.

Chiao: We were not clear about what you told Senator Scott. Our attitude was one of sincerity since he raised questions with us.


Kissinger: You had no choice, and we did not object to what you said.

Chiao: What we said to Scott was the same as what we have said to you. To normalize relations you must break diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdraw all U. S. military forces from Taiwan, and abrogate your Defense Treaty. This has been our position all along. We have always said that how we liberate Taiwan is our internal affair. We have never agreed to peaceful means.

Kissinger: Correct. The President was wrong in his reference to the Shanghai Communique. He was referring to what we said, not what you said. This was an inadvertent, incorrect statement which will not be repeated by any U. S. official. I think we can guarantee that.

Huang: But what about the misunderstanding that has been caused?

Kissinger: We will arrange to have a question next week which will allow us to clarify our position. We can do it on Monday or Tuesday. Monday is a holiday so perhaps we should do it on Tuesday. We will have a question regarding the legal status of the Shanghai Communique in this regard. We will do this if you like. Or you yourselves could do it.



Chiao: It is better for you to do it since it was in your public debate.

Kissinger: I agree.

Chiao: I saw it myself and the President was obviously incorrect.

Kissinger: The President compressed a paragraph of the Shanghai Communiqué a little too much. (Laughter)

Chiao: It really affected our legal interest.

Kissinger: After our 1974 discussions in Peking, I saw no possibility of progress on the Taiwan issue before our elections. I haven't raised the issue since that time because I did not want to engage in fruitless discussion. I understand what you have said and what Chairman Mao has said. We could not do what would be necessary before our elections. After our elections, we must study very carefully what we can do. However, in addition to Taiwan, we have our global relations and that is what I was addressing in my speech. Incidentally, I was confident my words would get your attention. (Laughter)


Chiao: Right. What Chairman Mao said...

Kissinger: Your suffering days may soon be over. I believe we share your general strategic outlook. In the last two years, we have tended to drift apart because of the consequences in this country following Nixon's overthrow. After our elections, we will see if we cannot once again get together for some frank exchanges which will permit carrying out the kind of global cooperation we have in mind.

Chiao: Global cooperation is the big matter; Taiwan is the small matter. As for the former, we have never covered up our differences of view.

Kissinger: I never said you did! (Laughter) Our government must make decisions, and if everybody is told by you that our policy amounts to a Munich or a Dunkirk -- even foreigners are told this -- then a malaise will develop in our relations with you. Of course, we can each go ahead with our separate policies, but there will be no collaboration.

Chiao: As for coordinated actions between our countries, I have explained before that our social organization and ideologies are different. We use our method to oppose Soviet expansionism and you use yours. Only in this way can our policies be as one.



Kissinger: Yes, but our policies must be in harmony.

Chiao: Yes. We will tell you when we see things we think are wrong. These will be our views and you will have to decide what to do.

Kissinger: I think to improve the situation we should tell you about events in advance, not after the event on U.S. television. Then you can choose either method.

Chiao: What do you mean?

Kissinger: We will keep you informed in good time before we initiate actions. You might sometimes do the same with us and perhaps take this into account in your actions. Recently we feel we have had pressure from you rather than discussions and this has led to the deterioration which I mentioned quite frankly at the beginning of our talk tonight.

Chiao: We have not -- as I have said several times -- said anything differently to our American guests from what we have said to you.

Kissinger: I have made my point. If we told everybody else what we have told you it would add a new dimension to our relations.

Chiao: Things aren't really that way. People come to Peking and ask our views. Then we tell them. If we didn't it wouldn't be good. It is quite different from what you have said. Furthermore, you know we haven't told them everything.

Kissinger: Not quite!

Chiao: We can't obscure the major strategic outlines of our relations.

Kissinger: If you study my remarks tonight, you will understand the pattern of our mutual relation as it appears to us. However, I want to assure you that even if the election goes against us, I attach the greatest importance to progress in U.S. -PRC relations and I would do my best to work for progress.

Chiao: To be quite frank, in global affairs you act as though everything is up to you and the Soviets to decide. In your General Assembly speech you referred first to the Soviets then Europe, Japan, and only then to the PRC. We were like this in importance (holding up his little finger).



Kissinger: I mentioned Western Europe, Japan, and then the Western hemisphere first.

Chiao: My impression is...

Kissinger: Of course, we do attach great importance to these areas.

Chiao: We recognize this and it's quite proper. You recall Chairman Mao told you about the importance of U. S. relations with Japan. Furthermore, we approve of your relations with Western Europe.

Kissinger: As for the Soviet section of my speech, most people thought it was very harsh. In the case of China, the speech unfortunately had to reflect the fact that there is not much going on. Our relations with the Soviet Union are in a different category from our relations with you. The Soviet Union is an adversary with whom we co-exist. China is an ideological opponent but a country that in strategic terms we cooperate with globally. In my conception, I attach an importance to China comparable to that of Western Europe as a factor on the world scene. But in the case of our bilateral relations there is nothing going on, and I think this is a mistake.

Chiao: Whose fault is it?


Kissinger: Frankly, it depends on your viewpoint. If you say there can be no progress in this area until normalization, then the fault lies with us. But if you say that we need to progress in this area to create the basis for normalization, then we both have responsibility.

Chiao: That is probably not a fair statement. On bilateral relations the responsibility is on your side. On other questions, such as our criticism of you, we have done it frankly giving our thoughts from a strategic point of view as to the best way to deal with our opponent. Don't take them (the opponent) lightly.

Kissinger: Precisely. Why was my statement unfair?

Chiao: From the beginning the Taiwan problem has been your affair. You said you had to maintain diplomatic relations, keep troops on Taiwan, and maintain the treaty.

Huang: How about the Olympics?



Chiao: It is true there has been some deterioration in our relationship, but the source of it is you. Why did you take your position on the Olympics?

Kissinger: If you must know the truth, because of the Republican Convention.

Huang: And perhaps the Taiwan lobby?

Chiao: And then we have Governor Scranton's remarks about welcoming Taiwan into the UN.

Kissinger: What's that?

Chiao: (Reading from a transcript of the October 3 NBC Meet the Press)

"Mr. Hunt: Just one more question, Bill. You mentioned the idea of universality, that every sovereign government should be a member of UN. On that basis, why should not Taiwan be readmitted?"

Scranton: In my judgment, I would be glad to have them."

Kissinger: Ridiculous, outrageous! Perhaps you can't believe me when I say I didn't know about this until you told me just now.

Chiao: This reflects a trend.


Kissinger: Yes, in public opinion.

Chiao: Not only in your society but in your government too.

Kissinger: Governor Scranton is a friend of mine. He is a fine man. I have no idea why he said what he did.

Chiao: I smile bitterly.

Kissinger: You have several choices. You can say that it was all a plot and smile bitterly. Or you can believe what I have said sincerely about our being in the last stages of the post-Watergate confusion. The day after the election you will see discipline and cohesion beginning in the United States. I recommend that you think in terms of the latter.



Chiao: I don't want to attach too much importance to these things.

Kissinger: You should attach no importance to them.

Chiao: Perhaps a little?

Kissinger: No, really none. Governor Scranton hadn't thought through what he was saying. I must say, however, that in the kind of cooling atmosphere that has been created there is less vigilance in this country about such remarks. But don't worry. I promised Premier Chou in 1971 that we wouldn't support two Chinas. We won't go back on this statement.

Chiao: The language on the Shanghai Communique on this point was your creation.

Kissinger: Scranton should have said that we don't recognize the Government on Taiwan as the Government of Taiwan.

Chiao: Yes. The cooling of relations is not our responsibility.

Kissinger: You have some responsibility for what has happened. Some Chinese actions have had a negative impact on developments.

Chiao: I don't agree. Our criticism of you proceeds from our common objective. If it were not for the common objective there would be no need to say anything. Do you remember in 1971 Premier Chou told you that China was ready to deal with the enemy from all sides.


Kissinger: Yes, it was in the Fukien Room.

Huang: Chairman Mao told some Germans that we wanted Europe to be strong and united. The Germans said then the Soviets would turn to the East. Mao said we were ready for them.

Chiao: Up to now, we have supported a strong Western Europe and strong U.S. West European relations.

Kissinger: Let us both reflect on this conversation and see if we can begin a dialogue on a governmental level to analyze the situation.

Chiao: (Turning to Huang and speaking in Chinese) Is there anything else we should raise?



Huang: At the beginning, Secretary Kissinger mentioned Soviet problems in developing their power. Do you foresee a period of protracted peace?

Kissinger: No. Up to 20 years I think it will be very dangerous. We are heading into a period of increasing danger. If we get through it, then there may be an era of peace.

Chiao: As for the Soviet threat, the Soviets are internally soft but one should not underestimate their expansionist ambitions. When we say there is a danger of war increasing, it is because we have given it very serious thought. The question is how to deal with the USSR. They bully the soft but fear the tough.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, we have talked with each other for almost five years. You can't believe we are soft. We have to devise a strategy which suits our own and our allies' domestic requirements. It must be sustainable for the longest period of time. We would have won in Angola had it not been for Watergate in the United States. Please give us credit. We have no illusions.

Chiao: We have discussed this many times. Your tactical concepts negate your strategic objective.

Kissinger: I don't agree. We have held the Western Alliance in better shape than it was four years ago.

Chiao: We have criticized Munich thinking because it corrodes.

Kissinger: But we don't have Munich-like thinking. Frankly, we find it insulting. At Munich the allies sacrificed others. We have not.

Chiao: There is not much change in the trend of appeasement.

Kissinger: Repeating twice something we find insulting doesn't make it true. (Laughter) The increase of our Defense budget, our actions in Portugal, Angola, the Middle East, and Africa and the sale of arms hardly amount to a Munich.

Chiao: We have not opposed your Middle Eastern and Iranian policies, but you created some trouble for yourselves in Pakistan.

Kissinger: What trouble?



Chiao: I have been reading some things about trouble.

Kissinger: Bhutto wouldn't agree with you. Why don't you ask him?

Chiao: We approve of U.S. -Pakistan relations. It is good that they are improving.

Kissinger: If we keep on repeating these arguments, we will only create a controversial frame of mind.

Chiao: We should concentrate on the common objectives.

Chairman Mao said you have interests which you want to preserve; the Soviets have expansionist desires. The Chairman said this to you. Some here tonight may not know that these were his words.

Kissinger: You used them in your speech. I agree with you about the danger of war. Our defense budget has increased 25 percent in two years.

Chiao: These are material means, but weapons are made for man and man must have high morale.

Kissinger: Yes. But each side must decide for itself what is best for its morale.

Chiao: I agree.

I have brought along this volume of Chairman Mao's poems. It includes the two final poems he wrote. It is in both Chinese and English.

Kissinger: Thank you so much. I recently read a beautiful poem by Chairman Mao. I believe it was the last one he wrote.

Chiao: This is the complete, polished edition of Chairman Mao's poems.

Kissinger: I'm very touched and deeply moved by Chairman Mao's poems and I thank you very much for your volume.

Chiao: I promised it to you and I'm glad I remembered to bring it.

(Chiao then escorted the Secretary downstairs to the door of the PRC mission and the two bade a warm farewell.)

