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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5264

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 0402

NODIS

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CP US
SUBJECT: NOMINATION OF NEW USLO CHIEF

REF: STATE 65655

1. IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH USLO WIVES AND FEMALE STAFFERS AT WOMEN'S DAY EVENT MARCH 8, NANCY TANG NOTED MATTER OF FACTLY: ". . . YOU HAVE A NEW CHIEF NOW."

2. WE SURMISE THAT CHINESE OFFICIALS WILL NOW BE MENTIONING THIS ALSO TO OTHER IN THE PEKING COMMUNITY AS OCCASIONS PERMIT.
TRAYER

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
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BY MC, NARA, DATE 7/11/08



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

STATE 058671

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NOV 19 1951

TO: HONG KONG

INFO: HONG KONG

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TO USLP BEKING
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SECRET STATE 058671

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P.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, CB, US

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO PROLO ON PEOPLE'S DAILY SUPPORT FOR
CAMBODIAN BOMBING CHARGE

1. WITH APPROVAL OF SECRETARY, ARMSTRONG OF EA/PRCM
CALLED IN FIRST SECRETARY SHEN JO-YUN OF PROLO MARCH 9 TO
DELIVER ORAL STATEMENT REGRETTING CHINESE PUBLIC BACKING
FOR CAMBODIAN ALLEGATION THAT US AIRCRAFT BOMBED SIEM
REAP.

2. TEXT OF STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS, QUOTE:

PEOPLE'S DAILY HAS CARRIED A COMMENTARY SUPPORTING THE
CAMBODIAN CHARGE THAT A U.S. AIRCRAFT BOMBED SIEM REAP AND
STATING THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE "STRONGLY DENOUNCE THE
AGGRESSIVE ACT OF U.S. IMPERIALISM." THE CAMBODIAN CHARGE
IS COMPLETELY FALSE. NOT ONLY DID NO U.S. PLANE BOMB
CAMBODIA WE WOULD HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO REASON FOR DOING SO.

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PAGE 02 STATE 050671

WE REJECT THAT THE PEOPLE'S DAILY HAS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE CAMBODIAN CHARGE WITHOUT ASCERTAINING THE FACTS. IF CHINA WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS MATTER, WE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED IT TO HAVE CHECKED THE FACTS WITH US.

LAST FALL, IN NEW YORK, FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO URGED SECRETARY KISSINGER TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE CAMBODIANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND THE UNITED STATES. WE IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED THE SUGGESTION AND MADE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE CAMBODIANS TO WHICH THEY HAVE NOT RESPONDED.

WE ARE STILL WILLING TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA, BUT THE BOMBING CHARGE BY CAMBODIA, AND CHINESE SUPPORT FOR THAT CHARGE, CERTAINLY MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH WOULD FACILITATE AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA. END QUOTE

3. SHE REJECTED OUR COMPLAINT, ASSERTING THAT PEOPLE'S DAILY WOULD SURELY HAVE VERIFIED ITS FACTS BEFORE SUPPORTING THE CAMBODIAN CHARGE. SHE STATED, "BESIDES, YOU KNOW OUR CONSTANT POSITION IS TO SUPPORT THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND TO BUILD A COUNTRY OF NEUTRALITY, PEACE, AND SOVEREIGNTY." SHE ACKNOWLEDGED FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO'S SUGGESTION LAST FALL THAT WE EXPLORE BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE CAMBODIANS, BUT SAID THAT THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH CAMBODIA "IS UP TO YOU AND CAMBODIA." A BIT OF GIVE-AND-TAKE FOLLOWED, WITH BOTH SIDES ESSENTIALLY RESTATING THEIR POSITIONS.

4. PROLO WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REPORT OUR STATEMENT TO PEKING, WHICH MAY INSTRUCT PROLO FORMALLY TO REJECT OUR COMPLAINT (SHEN WAS AD LIBBING), BUT THE CHINESE MAY DECIDE NOT TO PURSUE THE ISSUE WITH US ANY FURTHER. KISSINGER

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SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
 Thomas S. Gates, Chief-Designate of
 U. S. Liaison Office in Peking
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, March 19, 1976
 10:10 - 10-25 a.m.

[A press session takes place first for the public announcement. Then the press leaves.]

The President: The Ambassador issue is complicated. I can only grant it for six months.

Gates: That would be fine. I gather it was in part because you plan some movement and want to signal the Chinese.

Kissinger: They will interpret it that way.


Scowcroft: It will be a sign of the importance we ascribe to them.

The President: We do have to begin some movement, perhaps in 1977. But we do have to bite the bullet sometime after the election.

Kissinger: They are cold, pragmatic bastards. The President is right -- we will have to move after the election. I would like to give Tom a letter either to Mao or Hua. Then we could have a verbatim report of what they say, to see if there are nuances of change. Nixon didn't record enough detail to be helpful.

Gates: Hua may not have the confidence to make a policy statement.

Kissinger: Even if he reads it, it would be good. And I will give a lunch for you and invite the Chinese and put myself squarely behind you. I could also have Bush and Bruce there.

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DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2/04*

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
 BY 132, NARA, DATE 7/11/98

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEETING WITH THOMAS S. GATES
CHIEF-DESIGNATE OF THE U.S. LIAISON OFFICE IN PEKING

Friday, March 19, 1976
10:15 a.m. (30 Minutes)
The Oval Office

From: Brent Scowcroft 

I. PURPOSE

To express your personal support for Mr. Gates in his new position as Chief of our PRC Liaison Office; to indicate your interest in this important post; and to signal to the Chinese Mr. Gates' personal access to you.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

- A. Background: Mr. Gates, who was Secretary of Defense during the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, recently accepted your offer to become Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking. He will replace George Bush, who held that post from October 1974 to December 1975.
- B. Participants: Mr. Gates and Brent Scowcroft.
- C. Press Arrangements: Meeting to be announced. Press photo session.

III. TALKING POINTS

- 1. I am extremely pleased that you have been able to accept this important assignment. You are doing your country a real service, and I personally appreciate it.
- 2. You will be building on the work of two distinguished incumbents, David Bruce and George Bush. They found their stay in Peking to be quite fascinating; they helped to lay

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BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08



the groundwork for a relationship with the Chinese that is still rather fragile, but exceptionally important to our overall foreign policy.

3. You will be going to Peking at a time when the Chinese internal political scene is unstable. Apparently the death of Premier Chou En-lai touched off a succession struggle. Brent Scowcroft and his staff, and the other governmental agencies, will give you our best assessment of the internal situation before you go. But we will look to your mission to provide us your own assessment of what is going on in their internal political scene, and its implications for our relations with the Chinese. Chairman Mao, who is now 83, will probably also die before long; and that holds the prospect of even greater internal instability.
4. Mao is enfeebled, and apparently had a stroke which limits his ability to speak; but he has a clear concept of world political developments and what he wants for his country. He also knows what he wants from us, which is pressure against the Soviets.
5. Mao has been behind the establishment of relations with the U.S. since the current phase of contact began in 1970. The Chairman's primary purpose in dealing with us is to encourage the U.S. to be a counterweight against Soviet pressures. He wants us to maintain an active, anti-Soviet policy which will put pressure on the Soviets from Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and Japan.
6. One of your problems will be to convince the Chinese of the wisdom of our policy of pursuing negotiations with the Russians on SALT and other security issues and developing commercial and scientific ties, in combination with our defense efforts.



Our Soviet strategy is very complex in contrast to the frontal approach the Chinese have taken; but it best serves our needs and purposes.

7. Our bilateral relations with Peking are not very active right now. We have a minimal scientific and cultural exchange program, and trade is about \$400 million per year; but the development of these relations is limited by a combination of their internal political instability and concern about not appearing too active with us until relations are fully normalized. Mao and other senior leaders repeatedly told us that Taiwan is a secondary issue in our relations, relative to the Soviet problem, and that they are patient about the pace of normalization. But we believe they are under some pressure from other elements in the leadership for more movement on the bilateral political front. In any event, they would not want to appear to be too eager on the Taiwan question as this would weaken their bargaining position.
8. We want the future of the island to be resolved peacefully. My guess is that Peking will see it in its own advantage to have the U. S. maintain some ties to Taiwan. They don't want the island to go independent or move toward the Soviets. But we have yet to work out with the PRC the details of a normalization agreement. I will appreciate your thinking on this subject, as it may be one of the major issues we will have to confront during your tenure in Peking.
9. Over the coming year I anticipate that we will reduce our military presence on Taiwan from its present level of about 2,800 to something less than 1,400. This will help to position us for future developments, and indicate to Peking our good faith on normalization.
10. My appreciation to you again for taking this post. I know you will do an outstanding job, and I hope this will be a worthwhile personal experience to add to your distinguished career.



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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT CH
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN TIEN AN MEN
REF: PEKING 0599

1. SITUATION AS OF 1600 HOURR LOCAL APRIL 6, FAR MORE PEOPLE THAN NORMAL TIMES, BUT ONLY A FEW THOUSAND AT MOST, MOVED THROUGH AND MILLED ABOUT IN TIEN AN MEN SHUARE ON APRIL 6. THEY CONCENTRATED AT THE MARTYRS MONUMENT (WHERE A SINGLE, TOKEN WREATH REMAINED IN PLACEBL AND NEAR THE BUILDING IN THE SOUTHEAST CORNER THAT HAD BEEN SACKED AND PARTLY BURNED (INTERIOR OF THE FRONT ENTRANCE AREA) THE EVENING BEFORE. FOREIGNERS VISITING THE SQUARE, PARTICULARLY JOURNALISTS WHO SINCE YESTERDAY HAVE BEEN RUNNING COOPERATIVE COVERAGE OF THE SCENE THERE, SENSED THAT THEY WERE WELL ADVISED TO KEEP MOVING. A FEW FOREIGNERS GOT INTO HASSLES WITH ROVING TEENAGERS. REPORTEDLY THERE WAS ONE MINOR INCIDENT IN WHICH PLA GUARDS REPULSED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY A SMALL BAND OF YOUTHS TRYING TO GAIN ENTRY INTO EITHER THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE OR THE HISTORY MUSEUM. ALONG THE APPROACHES TO THE SQUARE, MANY IDLERS SAT OR STOOD WAITING OR SOMETHING TO HAPPEN AND PERHAPS JUST GNEERALLY SAVORING THE CHANGE FROM PEKING'S USUAL MONOTONY. WU TEH'S SPEECH (REFTEL) WAS REBROADCAST IN THE SQUARE SEVERAL TIMES AT MID-DAY.

2. THE FINAL CLEARING OF THE SQUARE LAST NIGHT APPARENTLY DID NOT OCCUR UNTIL AROUND 0030 HOURS. ACCORDING TO A WESTERN DIPLOMAT WHO WITNESSED IT, MILITIA "SLICED INTO" DEMONSTRATORS WHO HAD REMAINED IN THE SQUARE, , CHIEFLY AT THE MARTYRS' MONUMENT, AND MARCHED THEM, SURROUNDED, IN GROUPS OF 40 TO 60 INTO THE IMPERIAL CITY. MILITIA CARRYING PICKHANDLES OR STAVES WERE SEEN AS LATE AS 0500 IN THE SOUTHERN APPROACHES TO THE SQUARE, BUT RETIRED FROM VIEW

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

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SOON THEREAFTER, THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE AMPLE FORCES CLOSE BY, BUT THESE ARE NOT ON DISPLAY.

3. THE WESTERN DIPLOMAT CITED IN PARA 2 ALSO SAW CARS IN FRONT OF THE GREAT HALL AT 0030 AND MANY LIGHTED WINDOWS IN THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE BUILDING, INDICATION OF A LEADERSHIP MEETING IN PROGRESS. USLO OFFICERS WHO DROVE PAST THE HALL AT 2300 APRIL 5 HAD NOT SEEN ANY CARS, ALTHOUGH A LARGE ROOM IN THE SAME CORNER OF THE BUILDING WAS FULLY LIT. AROUND 1000 APRIL 6 THE DEMONSTRATORS HAD APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT A LEADERSHIP MEETING WAS UNDER WAY INSIDE THE HALL.

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PAGE 02

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AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1216

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PEKING 596

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, CH
SUBJECT: DISTURBANCES IN TIEN AN MEN SQUARE

1. A TRUCULENT AND UNRULY CROWD, ESTIMATED AT MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND, JAMMED TIEN AN MEN SQUARE TODAY, APRIL 5, IN AN UNEXPECTED AND APPARENTLY UNAUTHORIZED CONTINUATION OF THE CHING MING FESTIVAL THAT HAD SEEN THE MARTYRS MONUMENT THERE PILED HIGH WITH WREATHS MOURNING CHOU EN-LAI DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS.

2. ACCORDING TO CURB-SIDE ORATORS OVERHEARD BY USLO OFFICERS IN THE SQUARE, INITIAL CLASHES WITH THE SECURITY FORCES IN THE SQUARE, INITIAL CLASHES WITH THE SECURITY FORCES IN THE SQUARE HAD BEEN SPARKED BY THE REMOVAL AT ABOUT 1:30 THIS MORNING OF WREATHS, DEDICATED TO CHOU EN-LAI, SOME OF WHICH WERE MARKED "LEAVE STANDING UNTIL APRIL 6." ACCORDING TO ANOTHER SPEAKER, PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU FORCES HAD INJURED ONE OF THE CIVILIAN MEMBERS OF THE CROWD IN A CLASH EARLIER TODAY.

3. BY NINE THIS MORNING A "SIT-IN" WAFKN PROGRESS AT THE MONUMENT AND SEVERAL WREATHS TO CHOU HAD BEEN REPLACED. AT ABOUT TEN O'CLOCK A RATHER DISORGANIZED AND UNDIRECTED EFFORT WAS MADE BY THE CROWD TO BREAK INTO THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE, AN EFFORT THWARTED BY AN UNARMED COMPANY OF REGULAR PLA TROOPS, WHO MANAGED TO INSERT THEMSELVES BETWEEN THE CROWD AND THE GLASS DOORS. USING SIMILAR METHODS, A SECOND COMPANY WAS SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING A BREAK-IN OF THE HISTORICAL MUSEUM ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE SQUARE TWO HOURS

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, LL

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LATER.

4. TWO CARS AND A SMALL BUS WERE OVERTURNED AND BURNED BY THE CROWD. PLA FORCES DEPLOYED NEARBY MADE NO EFFORT TO INTERVENE. USLO OFFICERS ALSO OBSERVED SEVERAL PEOPLE BEATEN BY THE CROWD, INCLUDING AT LEAST ONE PLA OFFICER WHO HAD ATTEMPTED TO LECTURE CIVILIANS TRYING TO BREAK A PLA CORDON. WITH THESE EXCEPTIONS, HOWEVER, NO SERIOUS PERSONAL INJURIES OR PROPERTY DAMAGE IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OCCURRED THIS MORNING. SEVERAL FOREIGNERS HAD FILM REMOVED FROM THEIR CAMERAS BY THE CROWD, AND AT LEAST FOUR WERE "ESCORTED" OUT OF TIEN AN MEN SQUARE BY ELEMENTS OF THE CROWD. SOME STUDENTS WERE WARNED TO LEAVE THE AREA. USLO OFFICERS WHO WERE NOT CARRYING CAMERAS WERE NOT MOLESTED.

5. AT THIS TIME, 2:00 P.M., THE CROWD CONTINUES TO OCCUPY THE SQUARE, WHICH HAS BEEN CORDONED OFF RATHER INEFFECTIVELY BY UNARMED PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ABOUT 300 UNARMED PLA TROOPS, NOW GUARDING THE STEPS TO THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE, NO OTHER SECURITY FORCES ARE IN SIGHT WITHIN THE SQUARE. AS OF NOW, THE DISTURBANCES HAVE NOT SPREAD BEYOND THE SQUARE, AND WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY INVOLVEMENT OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY.

THOMAS
BT



PN:050556 RECALLED PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:095/09:27Z DTG:050900Z APR 76

J Chi Exm

I. 7 Apr 76 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
NATIONAL AFFAIRS

TENG HSIAO-PING DISMISSED FROM ALL PARTY POSTS

Peking NCNA in English 1208 GMT 7 Apr 76 OW

[Text] Peking, April 6, 1976 (HSINHUA)--Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on dismissing Teng Hsiao-ping from all posts both inside and outside the party:

Having discussed the counter-revolutionary incident which took place at Tienanmen Square and Teng Hsiao-ping's latest behaviours, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China holds that the nature of the Teng Hsiao-ping problem has turned into one of antagonistic contradiction. On the proposal of our great leader Chairman Mao, the Political Bureau unanimously agrees to dismiss Teng Hsiao-ping from all posts both inside and outside the party while allowing him to keep party membership so as to see how he will behave himself in the future.

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,

April 7, 1976.

HUA KUO-FENG NAMED 1ST CCP VICE CHAIRMAN, PREMIER

Peking NCNA in English 1200 GMT 7 Apr 76 OW

[Text] Peking, April 7, 1976 (HSINHUA)--Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the appointment of Comrade Hua Kuo-feng to be first vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

On the proposal of our great leader Chairman Mao, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China unanimously agrees to appoint Comrade Hua Kuo-feng first vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

April 7, 1976.



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AMEMBASSY TAIPEI NIACT IMMEDIATE 649
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PEKING 623
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINT, CH
SUBJECT: APPOINT OF HUA KUD FENG AND DISMISSAL OF TENG, HSIAD PING

1. NCNA ANNOUNCED AT AROUND 2000 HOURS LOCAL APRIL 7 THAT THE
POLITBURO OF THE CCISP ON THE PROPOSAL OF CHAIRMAN MAO, HAD UNANIMOUS
LY

AGREED TO:
-- APPOINT HUA KUD FENG AS FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY AND
PREMIER OF THE STATE COUNCIL;
-- DISMISS TENG HSIAD PING FROM ALL HIS POSTS, BUT ALLOW HIM TO KEEP
HIS PARTY MEMBERSHIP "SO AS TO SEE HOW HE WILL BEHAVE HIMSELF
IN THE FUTURE."

2. RADIO PEKING CURRENTLY IS BROADCASTING THE OFFICIAL VERSION
OF THE EVENTS IN TIEN AN MEN SQUARE ON APRIL 5. THIS HAS NOT
YET COME OUT IN NCNA ENGLISH, BUT WE ASSUME FBIS IS TEXTING. THESE
EVENTS, AND TENG'S "LATEST BEHAVIORS" ARE CITED IN ABOVE ANNOUNCEMENT
ON TENG IN EXPLANATION OF POLITBURO'S FINDING THAT TENG PROBLEM HAS
CHANGED INTO ONE OF "ANTAGONISTIC CONTRADICTION."

3. ADDRESSEES WILL HAVE NOTED REAPPEARANCE TODAY OF LI HSIEN NIEN.

4. DECISIONS ON HUA AND TENG PRESUMABLY WERE TAKEN AT A LEADERSHIP
MEETING AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE THAT APPARENTLY ENDED BETWEEN
1830 AND 1930 HOURS LOCAL APRIL 7.

THOMAS
BT

*****WHSP COMMENT*****

SCOWROFT, HYLAND, LL

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BY NR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1976


Dear Mr. Premier:

Please accept my congratulations and good wishes on your appointment as Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

I have repeatedly emphasized my belief in the importance of our two countries maintaining an authoritative dialogue on many issues of common concern in the world. Let me take this opportunity to reaffirm that view, and to say that I am pleased that Mr. Thomas S. Gates will be going to Peking next month as my personal representative to assume the position of Chief of our Liaison Office. I have the highest confidence in Mr. Gates and know he will effectively represent the views of my Administration in our official dealings.

The normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China is in the interest of the peoples of both countries, and I am confident that through our joint efforts relations between our two countries will continue to advance. On this occasion let me again reaffirm the determination of the United States to complete the normalization of our relations on the basis of the Shanghai Communique.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Hua Kuo-feng
Premier of the State Council
People's Republic of China
Peking



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AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1226

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 0635

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT CH
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN PEKING
REF: PEKING 0623, 0622

1. SITUATION AS OF 1600 HOURS APRIL 8, PEKING'S CIVILIAN POPULATION HAS BEEN RAPIDLY MOBILIZED TO CELEBRATE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO'S RESOLUTIONS NAMING HUA KUO-FENG AS PREMIER AND PARTY VICE-CHAIRMAN, AND DIVESTING TENG HSIAD-PING OF ALL POSTS, WITHIN AN HOUR OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT AT 2000 HOURS APRIL 7 OF THE POLITBURO'S DECISIONS ON LEADERSHIP CHANGES, A FEW LORRIES BEGAN CRUISING PEKING'S STREETS LOADED WITH CELEBRANTS BANGING AWAY ON DRUMS, GONGS AND CYMBALS. BY SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT THE FIRST COLUMNS OF MARCHERS WERE ON THE MOVE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE CITY, AND A STEADY STREAM OF TRUCKS WAS CRUISING UP AND DOWN CHANGAN AVENUE. BY THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 8 THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAD MARCHED TO TIEN AN MEN, MADE A U-TURN AND MARCHED BACK ALONG THEIR ORIGINAL ROUTE WAS PROBABLY WELL OVER TWO MILLION; THE INTENTION APPEARS TO BE TO HAVE PRACTICALLY EVERY CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION IN PEKING, EVEN NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS, SHOW THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE LEADERSHIP CHANGES. THE SCENE IS COLORFUL, WITH MANY BANNERS AND FLAGS ON THE LORRIES AND CARRIED BY THE PARADERS, AND NOISY WITH DRUMS, CYMBALS AND GONGS IN CONSTANT USE. THERE IS A HOLIDAY MOOD; PEOPLE ARE FRIENDLY TO FOREIGNERS, BUT ADULT PARTICIPANTS FOR THE MOST PART SEEM TO BE JUST GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS.

2. POSTERS AND SLOGANS DENOUNCING TENG HSIAD-PING BY NAME HAVE APPEARED OVERNIGHT ON PEKING STREETS. ONE LARGE SLOGAN PASTED UP JUST OPPOSITE THE INTERNATIONAL CLUB SAYS:

*****WHHR COMMENT*****

SECHROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, LL

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BY NR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08



"DECISIVELY CRITICIZE TENG HSIAO-PING'S REVISIONIST LINE." MANY OF THE UNITS MARCHING TO THE SQUARE CARRIED PORTRAITS OF CHAIRMAN MAO AND BANNERS WITH THE WORDING "RESOLUTELY PROTECT (OR SUPPORT) THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE." THE SAME SLOGAN WAS ALSO PASTED ON THE SIDES OF LORRIES INVOLVED IN THE CELEBRATION. THE CONTRAST WITH LAST WEEK'S SILENT PROCESSIONS CARRYING WREATHS FOR CHOU EN-LAI --MANY WITH CHOU'S PICTURE--IS STRIKING,, AND WE THINK NOT ACCIDENTAL.

3. LIGHTING PATTERNS INSIDE THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE AS LATE AS 0230 APRIL 8 MAY HAVE BEEN A SIGN OF CONTINUING LEADERSHIP MEETINGS.

4. SEVERAL SCHEDULED DOMESTIC FLIGHTS FROM PEKING AIRPORT, INCLUDING ONE TO CANTON, WERE HELD UP UNTIL AROUND NOON. THE REASON GIVEN IN THE CASE OF THE CANTON FLIGHT: "WEATHER."
THOMAS

BT



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DE RUFNPS #0485/01 1001546

P.R 091544Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9682

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1397

USLO PEKING 0288

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 5679

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8142

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 10485

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, FR, VN, US, SU

SUBJECT: LUNCHEON WITH PRC AMBASSADOR APRIL 7

SUMMARY: PRC AMBASSADOR TSENG TIAO AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF HAD LUNCHEON WITH ME AND MEMBERS OF MY STAFF AT THE RESIDENCE ON APRIL 7. THE CHINESE WERE QUITE RELAXED, AND TSENG SPOKE FREELY -- AND IN GENERAL PREDICTABLY -- ON A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS. MOVEMENT ON U.S./PRC NORMALIZATION WAS NOT SO RAPID AS THE PRC WOULD WISH, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF TAIWAN. THE SOVIET THREAT WAS OF GREAT INTEREST, AND TSENG REQUESTED OUR VIEW OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NON-NUCLEAR U.S./USSR OR WESTERN EUROPEAN/USSR CONFLICT. TSENG UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND NOTED THAT THE ITALIAN AND FRENCH PARTIES SERVED SOVIET INTERESTS. TSENG WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FRENCH 1978 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION PROSPECTS. TSENG THOUGHT THE DRV WAS STAUNCHLY INDEPENDENT AND WOULD NOT BE A SOVIET PAWN. THE U.S. SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE TOWARD GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE DRV. TSENG SAID CHINESE INTERNAL DEBATE WAS FOLLOWING MAO'S LINE AND WOULD RESULT IN STRENGTHENING CHINA. THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY, AND IN PARTICULAR NO POSSIBILITY OF SOFTENING OF THE LINE TOWARD THE USSR. THE EXCHANGE WAS USEFUL, AND TSENG EXTENDED A RETURN INVITATION.

1. I INVITED THE PRC AMBASSADOR AND MEMBERS OF HIS

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STAFF (INCLUDING HIS WIFE WHO IS ALSO FIRST COUNSELOR) TO LUNCHEON AT THE RESIDENCE APRIL 7. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS FRIENDLY WITH NO SIGNS OF ANY STRAIN DESPITE THE DISTURBANCE IN PEKING. WE HAD NOT YET HEARD THE DIVESTITURE OF TENG HSIAC-P'ING OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND PARTY POSTS, BUT THE CHINESE MAY HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THIS NEWS. AMBASSADOR TSENG WAS PREPARED TO ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE ABOUT CHINESE INTERNAL POLITICS. HE RESPONDED ALONG LINES FAMILIAR TO THE DEPARTMENT AND GAVE LITTLE INSIGHT INTO THE RECENT EVENTS IN PEKING. HE CONTINUES TO IMPRESS ME AS SOMEONE AWARE OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN HIS OWN COUNTRY AND WITH THE ASSURANCE TO SPEAK ON ALMOST ANY SUBJECT. HE SAID HE WISHED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE AT HIS EMBASSY.

2. U.S./CHINESE RELATIONS. I NOTED THAT I HAD KNOWN WELL THE PREVIOUS HEADS OF OUR LIAISON OFFICE IN PEKING AND COULD ASSURE TSENG THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND AMBASSADOR GATES A WORTHY SUCCESSOR, SOMEONE CAPABLE OF FURTHER IMPROVING U.S./CHINESE RELATIONS. I NOTED THAT AS A FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES WOULD PROVIDE A SYMPATHETIC EAR IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT AND WOULD BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN ABLY THE U.S. POSITION. TSENG REPLIED THAT THE PRC SAID IT FELT THAT WHILE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES WERE GOOD, PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION WAS TOO SLOW. THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM REMAINED TAIWAN. THIS WAS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE PRC WOULD NOT ALTER ITS POSITION. THE PRC COULD ACCEPT SOME FORMULA SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH JAPAN HAD ACCEPTED, A FORMULA WHICH WOULD INCLUDE RENUNCIATION OF THE U.S./ROC TREATY, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. FORCES, AND THE ENDING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIPEI. I NOTED THAT THE TAIWAN PROBLEM HAD DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, AS

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

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INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1398

USLO PEKING 0289

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 5680

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8143

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HAD OVERALL U.S./CHINESE RELATIONS IN THE PAST. TSENG SAID HIS GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THIS AND WAS PREPARED TO BE PATIENT.

3. U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS. I TOLD TSENG HIS GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED BY THE PRESS DISTORTIONS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS SURROUNDING THE WORD "DETENTE". THIS ADMINISTRATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY, DOES NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE THREAT POSED TO US BY THE SOVIET UNION. I NOTED THAT DESPITE ALL OF THE ACCUSATIONS BEING MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN, THE ADMINISTRATION WHICH WOULD EMERGE FROM THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE ONE DEVOTED TO STRONG MILITARY CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE USSR. TSENG ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONVENTIONAL WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR, OR A CONVENTIONAL WAR BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE USSR WITHOUT U.S. PARTICIPATION. I NOTED THAT THE CONFLICT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT TAKE EITHER FORM. THE USSR WOULD WISH TO AVOID A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. AND WOULD THEREFORE SEEK TO PROFIT FROM WEAKNESSES AND DIVISIONS, AND WORK THROUGH THE INTERPOSITION OF THIRD COUNTRIES -- AS IT HAS DONE WITH THE CUBANS IN ANGOLA. TSENG PRESSED THE USUAL CHINESE CONCERNS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, BUT DID NOT REMARK THAT BY ADOPTING THE HELSINKI PACKAGE WE WERE LACKING IN SENSITIVITY TO THE SOVIET MENACE.

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4. COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. I EXPLAINED THE PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD ARISE FOR THE U.S. FROM COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. I NOTED THE CURRENT DRIFTING, PARTICULARLY IN FRANCE AND ITALY, WHICH MIGHT PERMIT THE COMMUNIST PARTIES TO PROFIT AT THE POLLS. TSENG NOTED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF FRANCE AND ITALY WERE UNDER SOVIET CONTROL (DESPITE RECENT PLOYS BY BOTH PARTIES TO MASK THIS CONTROL) AND IMPLIED THAT OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WERE ALSO NOT INDEPENDENT, NATIONAL PARTIES. HE AGREED THAT THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE EXCESSIVELY DIVIDED AND HENCE UNABLE ADEQUATELY TO PLAY A ROLE IN CONTAINING SOVIET EXPANSIONIST IMPERIALISM. IN DISCUSSING THE RECENT EC MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG, TSENG AGREED WITH OUR ANALYSIS THAT THE FAILURE REPRESENTED THE WEAKNESSES OF THE EC GOVERNMENTS, WHO WERE MORE CONCERNED WITH THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS OF REMAINING IN POWER THAN WITH THE LONGER TERM INTERESTS OF EUROPE AS A WHOLE.

5. INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICS. TSENG ASKED FOR OUR EVALUATION OF FRENCH INTERNAL POLITICS. WE NOTED THE CURRENTLY DIFFICULT PREDICAMENT IN WHICH PRESIDENT GISCARD FINDS HIMSELF, IN PARTICULAR THE FAILURE OF HIS ATTEMPT TO WOO THE CENTER. BY 1978 THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION SHOULD AMELIORATE HIS ELECTION PROSPECTS. IN ADDITION, MITTERRAND AND SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES WERE NOT FULLY AWARE OF SOME OF THE RISKS OF WORKING WITH A MOSCOW-CONTROLLED COMMUNIST PARTY, AND THE SITUATION WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE CLEARLY DANGEROUS TWO YEARS HENCE. THE PROSPECTS FOR THE ELECTIONS WERE THEREFORE NOT ENTIRELY GLOOMY. TSENG APPEARED SOMEWHAT REASSURED BUT STILL CONCERNED.

6. PRC VIEW OF THE DRV. I ASKED TSENG ABOUT THE DRV, WHICH APPEARED TO US TO BE SERVING THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. TSENG SAID THE VIETNAMESE ARE VERY INDEPENDENT AND PROUD PEOPLE AND HE DOUBTED THAT AFTER 40 YEARS OF WAR THEY WILL BECOME DEPENDENT ON OR SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE U.S. WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH HANOI. WE NOTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE EASIER TO ACCOMPLISH ONCE WE WERE CONVINCED HANOI WAS NOT BEING EXPANSIONIST, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE USSR. TSENG REMINDED US THAT THE U.S. ACTIONS IN KOREA AND VIETNAM WERE "MISTAKES" WHICH HAD LEFT THE SOVIET UNION STRONGER IN THE AREA THAN IT HAD BEEN BEFORE. (I DID NOT NOTE THAT CHINESE ACTIONS HAD FACILITATED THE OUTCOMES WHICH HAD FAVORED THE USSR.) COMMENT: FROM



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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9684

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1399
USLO PEKING 0290
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 5601
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8144

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THEIR USUAL HEAVY-HANDEDNESS AND PROMPT THE VIETNAMESE TO REASSERT "INDEPENDENCE", AS CHINA HAD DONE IN THE LATE 1950'S AND EARLY 1960'S.

7. INTERNAL CHINESE RELATIONS. I MENTIONED THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS AND ASKED ABOUT THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA. TSENG SAID THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN HAD GROWN OUT OF THE EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY CAMPAIGN OF LAST YEAR AND WAS FOLLOWING CHAIRMAN MAO'S LINE WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO LEAD TO A STRONGER, MORE DEVELOPED, AND BETTER CHINA. TSENG NOTED HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH CHAIRMAN MAO FOR 40 YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT HE WAS SELECTING THE LINE WHICH WOULD BEST SUIT CHINA. TSENG SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY FEARS ABOUT THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN IN CHINA; ONLY THE SOVIET "POLAR BEAR" NEED FEAR THIS CAMPAIGN, SINCE IT WOULD RESULT IN A STRONGER CHINA. I NOTED THAT WE OF COURSE WERE NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED BY CHINESE INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND INDEED THOUGHT THAT ANYTHING WHICH STRENGTHENED CHINA SERVED THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN ASIA AND THE WORLD. TSENG SAID THAT THE CURRENT DEBATES IN CHINA WOULD RESULT IN NO CHANGE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY WHICH WAS CHARTERED BY CHAIRMAN MAO AND FOLLOWED HIS CONSISTENT LINE. IN PARTICULAR, THERE WOULD BE NO SOFTENING OF THE PRC OPPOSITION TO SOVIET EXPANSIONIST IMPERIALISM. TSENG INDICATED THE PRC POSITION TOWARD USS IMPERIALISM IS ROOTED IN THE

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CHINESE PEOPLE, AND NO ATTER WHO IGH T BE IN A LEADER-
SHIP ROLE IN CHINA IN THE FUTURE -- THE PEOPLE WOULD
NOT ALLOW ANY OTHER POSITION BUT TOTAL OPPOSITION.

8. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EURPE. I EXPLAINED
THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME PRESS MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT
U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE WHICH HAD FOLLOWED
ARTICLES ON SONNENFELDT'S ALLEGED REMARKS IN LONDON. I
NOTED THAT BOTH FOR FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND
INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS THE U.S. WOULD NOT
ACQUIESCE IN, MUCH LESS ENCOURAGE, SOVIET DOMINANCE IN
EASTERN EUROPE. WHILE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID A
NUCLEAR WAR, WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO ABANDON OUR
EFFORTS FOR GREATER INDEPENDENCE FOR THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FROM SOVIET DIRECTION BY ANY MEANS
SHORT OF WAR. WE WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT
POSSIBLE SOVIET EFFORTS TO EXTEND ITS CONTROL BY
MOVING INTO YUGOSLAVIA AT TITO'S DEATH. THIS WOULD BE
A VERY BLATANT EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF SOVIET IMPERIAL-
ISM WHICH WE AND THE CHINESE OPPOSE.

9. COMMENT: TSENG MAY WELL HAVE HAD SOME SPECIFIC
GUIDANCE FOR HIS REMARKS, BUT HIS SELF-CONFIDENT MANNER
IMPLIED HE WOULD IN GENERAL KNOW WHAT TO RESPOND EVEN
WITHOUT IT. IN ANY CASE, HE AVOIDED ANY INDISCREET
DETAILS CONCERNING INTERNAL POLITICS. THE TONE
WAS ALWAYS FRIENDLY AND UNDERSTANDING, AND HE REFRAINED
FROM ANY SHARP CRITICISMS OF CURRENT U.S. POLICY (SUCH
AS "DETENTE"), ALTHOUGH HE GENTLY CRIDED US ON SEVERAL
OCCASIONS, AS WHEN HE NOTED THAT CHINA'S GREAT
DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE REVOLUTION HAD BEEN DONE DESPITE
FIRST THE AMERICAN AND THEN THE SOVIET EMBARGO. TSENG
QUITE FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO CHAIRMAN MAO AND HIS
SPECIFIC POLICIES AS WELL AS HIS GENERAL THOUGHT, NO
DOUBT IN ORDER TO SHOW HE WAS FOLLOWING THE ORTHODOX
LINE.

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TSENG'S REMARKS, ONE COULD GATHER THAT THE PRC WAS HAVING ITS OWN PROBLEMS WITH THE VIETNAMESE SPIRIT OF "INDEPENDENCE", BUT THEY INTEND TO HANDLE THE SITUATION WITH PATIENCE IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THE SOVIETS WILL OVERPLAY THEIR ROLE IN THE AREA WITH

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9731

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 10628

EXDIS
E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFDR, VN
SUBJECT: U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM
REFS: (A) PARIS 8943; (B) STATE 072569

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1. DRV FIRST SECRETARY (CULTURAL AFFAIRS) PHAN HUY THONG, ACCOMPANIED BY THIRD SECRETARY NGO NGUYEN PHUONG, CAME TO THE EMBASSY AT 16:00 APRIL 12 TO DELIVER DRV FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH'S LETTER REPLYING TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER OF MARCH 26. THE ENGLISH VERSION OF THE TEXT IS QUOTED IN PARA 2; THE ORIGINALS, VIETNAMESE AND ENGLISH VERSIONS, ARE BEING POUCHED TO EA/VLC. THONG ASKED WHETHER WE INTENDED TO RELEASE THE TEXT OF THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS. HE SAID THAT HANOI WISHED TO KNOW OUR INTENTIONS, SINCE IT WOULD WISH TO MAKE ITS OWN RELEASE OF TEXT -- AND BY IMPLICATION COMMENTS -- IF WE WISHED TO GO PUBLIC. THE DRV WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP THE TEXTS CONFIDENTIAL IF WE SO PREFER. THONG SUGGESTED THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THE DEPARTMENT COULD INFORM THE PRESS THAT A REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND THE TEXT IS BEING STUDIED. THE DRV HOPES TO BE INFORMED BEFORE WE GO BEYOND SUCH A CONTEMPORIZING LINE WITH THE PRESS.

2. BEGIN TEXT: "HANOI, APRIL 10, 1976. MR. SECRETARY OF STATE,
I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR NOTE DATED MARCH 26, 1976. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS REPEATEDLY DECLARED ITS WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AN EARLY SETTLEMENT ON THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. RELATING TO VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE WAR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM, SUCH AS THE US CONTRIBUTION TO THE HEALING OF THE WOUNDS OF WAR AND

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THE POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION IN THE TWO ZONES OF VIETNAM;
THE SEARCH FOR INFORMATION ABOUT US M.I.A.'S; THE EX-
HUMATION AND REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINS OF THE DEAD
AMERICANS... ON THIS BASIS, THE DRV WILL NORMALIZE ITS
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN KEEPING WITH THE
SPIRIT OF ARTICLE 22 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS
ALWAYS SHOWN BY PRACTICAL DEEDS ITS SERIOUS ATTITUDE AND

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EXDIS

ITS GOOD-WILL IN THE CARRYING OUT OF THIS VERY REASONABLE POLICY.

IT IS VERY REGRETTABLE THAT UNTIL NOW THE US SIDE HAS SHIRKED ITS OBLIGATION OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE HEALING OF THE WOUNDS OF WAR AND THE POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION OF VIETNAM, AND THAT IT HAS EVEN TAKEN HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND MADE DISCOURTEOUS AND TENDENTIOUS STATEMENTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

IF YOUR GOVERNMENT IS REALLY WILLING TO NEGOTIATE A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE DRV, IT SHOULD ADOPT A GOOD-WILLED AND SERIOUS ATTITUDE LIKE THE DRV. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT.

BEST REGARDS, NGUYEN DUY TRINH, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM." END TEXT
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

NODIS

DATE: April 14, 1976

SUBJECT: U.S.-PRC Relations

PARTICIPANTS: People's Republic of China

Han Hsu, Acting Chief
Chang Tsien-hua, Counselor
T'ien Yu, First Secretary
Shen Jo-yun, First Secretary
Yang Yu-yung, Third Secretary

United States

The Secretary
Thomas S. Gates, Chief, United States Liaison Office
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
David K. E. Bruce, Former Chief, United States Liaison
Office
George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence Agency
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary, EA
Winston Lord, Director, S/P
William Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA
Richard Solomon, National Security Council
Oscar Armstrong, Director, EA/PRCM, Notetaker

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(Note: The occasion was a luncheon in the James Madison Room given by the Secretary in honor of Ambassador Gates, newly appointed Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking. Most of the conversation

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- 2 -

at the luncheon table was non-substantive. The following remarks were interspersed during the lunch.)

The Secretary: We have given Ambassador Gates a letter to Prime Minister Hua, and hope he will have an opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister. (Han Hsu did not respond.) I don't believe we have met the Prime Minister. Has he attended any functions? (The reference was to banquets or other functions during official visits.)

Han: He has attended some National Day receptions. (In a brief exchange, Han indicated he was referring to PRC National Day receptions on October 1.)

The Secretary: Ambassador Gates is a good friend of the President and a good friend of mine.

Han: We welcome him to China.

The Secretary: Will Foreign Minister Ch'iao be attending the UN this fall?

Han: We don't know yet.

The Secretary: At the recent meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, I was asked if we had lost an opportunity to normalize our relations with China. I said it wasn't true, and that it is our policy to complete the process of normalizing relations.

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- 3 -

The Secretary: At that meeting, George Ball talked about the Middle East. He doesn't seem to understand the importance of keeping the Russians out of the area.

The Secretary (in toast): Mr. Ambassador. No diplomatic post has had such a successive group of chiefs as the United States Liaison Office: Ambassador Bruce, Ambassador Bush, now Ambassador Gates. It is the ablest group we have had anywhere--one of great dedication. Ambassador Gates has had to disengage himself from other activities. He has done so because of the enormous importance we attach to our relations with the People's Republic of China. Ambassador Gates is well-qualified, having once served as Secretary of Defense. He is a confidant and friend of the President's and mine, and can speak for us. We are grateful to him for accepting the appointment.

We have told him that discussions with Chinese leaders will not be idle conversation. The discussions may not be frequent, but they are significant.

It has been four years since the Shanghai Communique, which committed our two countries to normalize relations. Not everything has been done as fast as some may have expected, but the Shanghai Communique is being implemented, and we will complete the process. Ambassador Gates will be prepared to discuss not only normalization but the whole range of issues of interest to our two countries.

The President said we can act in parallel ways, and work together in various situations.

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- 4 -

Ambassador Gates will have our views, which he can discuss with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.

We wish Ambassador Gates a very successful mission.

Gates: I am grateful to you for this luncheon, and also for your confidence. I am honored by the appointment, and am looking forward to it. I am in full sympathy with the President's foreign policy, including a strong national security policy. Foreign policy and security policy are long-range; there must be a strategic picture and balanced judgements. I will do my best to represent our country and United States policy. I am fortunate in starting my job with the support of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. I hope my efforts will help us move to a more peaceful world.

The Secretary: There is no real debate in the U.S. about maintaining a strong defense.

Gates: After the publicity given my appointment I was struck by how many Americans are interested in China.

(There was a brief exchange about American delegations visiting China, and the fact that there are no students studying in each other's country.)

The Secretary: Another Congressional group will be going soon (a reference to the group led by Mel Price, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee). These visits are very useful.

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- 5 -

Han: We receive many requests from Congress.

Gates: Senator Sparkman hopes to go in the fall.

Han: He has written to us, but we have not yet replied. Senator Scott is going in July, and Senator Mansfield may go in the fall.

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: UNDP, FAID, UN, VN, VS, CB

SUBJECT: NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

REFS: A) BANGKOK 8236; B) USUN 5109 C) USUN 1545

1. U.S. POLICY ON AID TO INDOCHINA IS AND REMAINS THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE AID EITHER BILATERALLY OR THROUGH MULTILATERAL CHANNELS TO ANY OF THE FOUR INDOCHINA STATES.

2. IN CASE OF MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING AID THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, OUR POLICY IS THAT WE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE OR CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRAMS OR FUNDS WHICH ARE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED OR AIMED AT THE FOUR INDOCHINA COUNTRIES. WHERE OUR CONTRIBUTIONS GO TO GENERAL FUNDS OF MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS, SOME OF WHICH MAY BE USED FOR PROGRAMS OR PROJECTS IN INDOCHINA, THE SITUATION IS SOMEWHAT MORE COMPLEX.

3. OUR POLICY BASICALLY IS THAT IN THE LATTER INSTANCE WE WOULD NOT OPPOSE AID TO BE GIVEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO THE INDOCHINA STATES IF: A) SUCH AID IS REQUESTED; B, IS WITHIN THE NORMAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE ORGANIZATION; C) IF APPROPRIATE, THE RECIPIENT HAS LIVED UP TO THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATION; AND D) THE AID IS WITHIN REASONABLE AMOUNTS. CONSISTENT WITH THESE GUIDELINES WE WILL CONSIDER EACH PROPOSED PROJECT ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. OUR ABILITY TO PURSUE THIS POLICY WAS AND CONTINUES TO BE SOMEWHAT INHIBITED BY THE RESTRICTIVE LANGUAGE CONCERNING INDOCHINA FUNDING CONTAINED IN THE CONTINUING RESOLUTION OF JUNE 1975. HOWEVER, THIS DIFFICULTY SHOULD BE GREATLY ALLEVIATED BY THE PRESENT FY-76 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION WHICH IS NOW AWAITING FINAL ACTION BY THE CONGRESS. KISSINGER

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BY HR2, NARA, DATE 2/11/08



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~
CONTAINS CODEWORD

April 17, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Information Items

Hanoi Releases Partial Text of Nixon 1973 Letter to Pham Van Dong: Both Radio Hanoi and Nhan Dan on April 16 assailed the U.S. attitude toward our recent exchange of notes on the normalization of relations. The North Vietnamese commentary criticized Secretary Kissinger for his "slandorous allegations" and accused you of merely posturing for domestic political purposes while not having any real desire to improve relations. Their articles also emphasized that we still have an obligation to provide reconstruction aid to Vietnam under the Paris Agreement, and implied that in return for such aid the North Vietnamese would resolve the issue of our men still missing in Indochina. The implication was that as long as we refuse to provide aid, there can be no normalization. The stories also contained the following passages of President Nixon's February 1, 1973 letter to Premier Pham Van Dong:

"The government of the U.S. of America will contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without political conditions. "Preliminary U.S. studies indicate that the appropriate programs...will fall in the range of \$3.25 billion of grant aid over five years. Other forms of aid will be agreed upon between the two parties."

The shrill North Vietnamese tone and their revelation of the Nixon letter seems to be in retaliation for the State Department's "leaking" to Murrey Marder the text of North Vietnam's recent note to us. A senior North Vietnamese diplomat delivered an oral complaint on April 16 to our embassy in Paris correctly stating that we had agreed not to divulge the context of our diplomatic notes without prior coordination. He claimed that the State Department's briefing of Marder violated this agreement.

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AUTHORITY RAC NLF - CODEWORD - 3-20-1-5

BY MLO NARA DATE 3/9/2011 9/7/2004

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5525

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 3289
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 349
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 660
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1256

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 4 PEKING 736

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS=1
TAGS: PFOR, CH, US, UR, PINT, OREP (PRICE, MELVIN)
SUBJECT: CODEL PRICE MEETING WITH CHANG CHUN-CHIAO
REF: PEKING 723
SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT. IN NEARLY TWO-HOUR CONVERSATION
APRIL 20 WITH CODEL PRICE, VICE PREMIER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO WAS
QUESTIONED RATHER CLOSELY ON THE PRC'S DEFENSE POLICIES AND PLANNING.
HE LARGELY REITERATED THE FAMILIAR POLICY POINTS MADE TO THE GROUP
BY FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA, INCLUDING THE KEY ONE,
WHERE THIS GROUP WAS CONCERNED, THAT CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY IS
ESSENTIALLY SELF-RELIANT. HE WAS GENERALLY EVASIVE ABOUT DETAILS
OF CHINA'S DEFENSE BUDGET AND ITS IMPORTS OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY,
BUT SAID THE BUDGET HAD INCREASED IF TUNNEL-BUILDING AND
MILITIA COSTS WERE INCLUDED, WHICH THEY NORMALLY ARE NOT.
HE INDICATED THE TUNNELS WERE AS MUCH FOR FIGHTING SOVIET
GROUND FORCES AS FOR AIR DEFENSE. HE REVEALED THAT NO ONE
HAD BEEN NAMED TO REPLACE TENG HSIAO-PING AS CHIEF OF THE
PLA GENERAL STAFF, BUT PLAYED DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS
POSITION AND CLAIMED TENG HAD DONE LITTLE DURING
HIS INCUMBENCY. CHANG HIMSELF, PERHAPS IN PART TO GET OUT
FROM UNDER THE PERSISTENT QUESTIONING ON DEFENSE MATTERS,
RAISED THE TIEN AN MEN SQUARE INCIDENT, BUT HE MINIMIZED
ITS IMPORTANCE AND THEN WENT ON TO STRESS THE CONTINUITY OF
CHINESE POLICY AS DETERMINED BY CHAIRMAN MAO. AT THE
OUTSET CHANG (UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE THAT THE CODEL
HAD BEEN FAVORED WITH A PERFORMANCE OF THE TAIWAN SONG WHILE
VISITING A PLA INFANTRY DIVISION HEADQUARTERS) POINTED OUT

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SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, LL

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DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/2/04
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08



3. (in box)
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THAT NEXT DOOR TO THEIR MEETING PLACE IN THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE WAS THE ROOM RESERVED FOR TAIWAN PROVINCE, HE DID NOT RETURN TO THE SUBJECT OF TAIWAN, HOWEVER, THE CODEL WAS NOT PLEASED WITH CHANG'S PERFORMANCE, FINDING IT CONSIDERABLY LESS DIPLOMATIC THAN CHIAO'S HAD BEEN (PARA 16). THE CODEL MEMBERS FOR THEIR PART CHALLENGED A NUMBER OF THE STAPLE CHINESE THESES ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT, REI

M WOLFF TOLD CHANG IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS (PARA 9) THAT WHILE WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. MIGHT BEGIN AS A CONVENTIONAL WAR, THE US WOULD USE EVERY MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO ASSURE VICTORY.

THE CODEL WAS DISAPPOINTED AT NOT MEETING WITH PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG, WHO (AS A CHINESE OFFICIAL POINTED OUT TO US) WAS BUSY WITH THE EGYPTIAN VICE PRESIDENT, BUT WHERE THE CHINESE PUBLIC AND WORLD AUDIENCE ARE CONCERNED, THE WELL-PUBLICIZED MEETING, BRINGING TOGETHER FOR THE FIRST TIME ONE OF THE TOP FIGURES OF THE PRC'S POLITICAL LEFT FOR A "FRIENDLY TALK" WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS, MAY HAVE BEEN MEANT TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE.

TANG WEN-SHENG (NANCY TANG), MFA DEPUTY DEPARTMENT

ADIREITOR, (=, 9, 10, 8, 9, 10, 8)'S INTERPRETER SEVERAL TIMES TO MAKE SURE CHANG GOT THE MAIN POINTS OF A CODEL MEMBER'S REMARKS, VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG WAS, AS SHE USUALLY IS ON SUCH OCCASIONS, A SILENT OBSERVER, END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.

1. TAIWAN. CODEL EARLIER HAD THAT AFTERNOON BEEN TAKEN ON A TOUR OF THE GREAT HALL, PICKING UP A REFERENCE TO THIS BY REP. PRICE IN THE OPENING PLEASANTRIES, CHANG SAID: OUR NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS IS HELD HERE, EACH PROVINCE HAS ITS OWN, OVER THERE (POINTING) IS THE PROVINCE OF TAIWAN, BEYOND THIS DOOR, WHEN THE NPC IS IN SESSION, DEPUTIES FROM THE DIFFERENT PROVINCES MEET IN THEIR OWN HALLS, WHICH ARE DECORATED WITH SPECIALITIES FROM THEIR OWN PROVINCE, THE BEST WAY TO TRAVEL IN CHINA IS TO TOUR THE VARIOUS HALLS HERE.

2. ASKED BY REP. PRICE HOW HE THOUGHT THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD WORK TOGETHER IN THE AREA OF DEFENSE, AND WHAT THE REQUIREMENTS WERE FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE QUESTION OF SECURITY IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD, CHANG SAID:

ON DEFENSE QUESTIONS OUR POLICY HAS BEEN STATED BY FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO, IN OUR COUNTRY, THE MILITARY LINE IS SUBORDINATE TO THE DEFENSE LINE, (WE WORK FOR) SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND BUILDING UP OUR COUNTRY, WE ALSO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE OUTSIDE THREAT, AT

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PAGE 02

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PRESENT THE BIGGEST THREAT COMES FROM OUR NEIGHBOR TO THE NORTH. OUR WAY OF DEALING WITH THIS IS TO RELY ON OURSELVES. IT IS CLEARLY STATED IN OUR CONSTITUTION THAT CHINA FAVORS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, SUPPORTS REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES AND WILL TAKE ACTIVE MEASURES AGAINST IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION. I HAVE A QUESTION: WHAT IS THE U.S. DOING IN THE PACIFIC, SINCE IT IS AGAINST THE U.S. THAT THE USSR IS DIRECTING ITS SPEARHEAD IN THE PACIFIC?

3. REP. PRICE'S RESPONSE NOTED THE PRIMACY OF NON-MILITARY CONCERNS IN THE US AND THE CONSEQUENT DIFFICULTIES OF KEEPING ADEQUATE US FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AND ELSEWHERE. IT ENDED WITH TWO QUESTIONS (THE FIRST OF WHICH CHANG DID NOT GET AROUND TO ANSWERING): WHAT WAS PRC'S ATTITUDE TOWARD US EFFORTS IN DIEGO GARCIA, AND "WHAT SHOULD WE BE DOING THAT WE ARE NOT DOING?"J

4. CHANG SAID HE THOUGHT FOCUS OF US-USSR CONTENTION WAS IN EUROPE AND THAT THE US SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO EUROPE. THE SOVIETS HAD ACHIEVED THE LEAST IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, BUT HAD MADE SOME HEADWAY IN AFRICA AND EUROPE. SOME PEOPLE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO ENCIRCLE CHINA, BUT THE CHINESE DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS ENCIRCLEMENT. WHAT INFORMATION DID THE AMERICANS HAVE?
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PSN:011378 RECALLED PAGE 03 OF 03 TOR:113/16:26Z DTG:221313Z APR 76

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 350
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 661
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1257

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 4 PEKING 736

EXDIS

5. REPRESENTATIVE PRICE ASKEDSIF CHINESE HAD NO CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET'S PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THEIR BUILDING OF A POWERFUL NAVY. CHANG SAID THAT THIS FORST OF ALL CONCERNED THE US AS THE SOVIET NAVAL EXPANSION SHOW D THAT THE DANGER OF WAR WAS GROWING.

6. REP WOLFF OBSERVED THAT ALTHOUGH THE VICE PREMIER HAD SAID THE SOVIETS DIDN'T POSE A THREAT OF ENCIRCLEMENT, THERE WERE MANY SOVIET DIVISIONS ON CHINA'S BORDERS. IF THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TROOPS INTHE WEST, FACING EUROPE, WERE LESSEDED, IT WOULD MEAN MORE AVAILABLE TO FACE CHINA, SO THAT THERE WAS A OBLANIONSHIP. CHANG SAID HE AGREED, OF COURSE THERE WAS A RELATIONSHIP, BUT ASIED IF IT WASN'T SO THAT THE MAIN BODY OF SOVIET TROOPS WAS IN EUROPE. REP. PRICE ASKED IF CHANG WAS SAYING THERE WAS NO CONCERN IN CHINA OR IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD OVER A THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

7. CHANG INSISTED THAT FROM A GLOBAL POINT OF VIEW, THE FOCUS OF THE SOVIET THREAT REMAINED IN EUROPE. REP. STRATTON COMMENTED THAT THE CODEL'S REASON FOR BEING HERE WAS ITS RECOGNITION OF A SOVIET THREAT TO PEACE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, AND ITS FEELING THAT CHINA SHARED THIS VIEW. THEO

WAS MV SENSE UN ARGUING OVER WHETHER THE THREAT WAS IN EUROPE OR THE PACIFIC; THOSE WHO RECOGNIZED THE THREAT SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO DETER IT FROM ERUPTING HERE OR THERE. HE INVITED CHANG'S SUGGESTIONS ON DEALING WITH THE

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SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, LL

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THREAT, CHANG:

WE ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE A THREAT TO THE WORLD AND NOT JUST TO A SPECIFIC REGION. WHERE YOU DON'T AGREE WITH US IS ON THE POINT THAT THE FOCUS IS IN EUROPE. ... SINCE MOST OF YOU ARE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE YOU MUST CONSIDER THAT WAR BREAKS OUT WHERE THE FOCUS IS. ANY MILITARY MAN UNDERSTANDS THIS. THERE'S NO NEED FOR ARGUMENT ON THIS POINT. EACH SIDE (THE US AND PRC) SHOULD ACT IN ITS OWN WAY. WE CANNOT MAKE SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE US SHOULD BUILD ITS FORCES, AND VICE VERSA. WE HAVE DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS. ONE POINT IN COMMON IS THAT WE MUST DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

B. REP. STRATTON SAID THE CODEL HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM EARLIER CONGRESSIONAL GROUPS THAT THE PRC FELT THE US SHOULD REMAIN IN THE PACIFIC AND NOT WITHDRAW ITS FORCES BECAUSE OF DETENTE. IF THE US REMAINED STRONG IN THE PACIFIC THIS WOULD REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR. TO SAY THAT THE PRC DIDN'T CARE WHAT THE US DID SUGGESTED THE PRC'S POSITION HAD CHANGED; THAT IT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE IF THE US WITHDREW FROM KOREA AND GUAM BACK TO PEARL HARBOR. WAS THIS REALLY THE PRC POSITION? TANG WEN-SHENG INTERJECTED THAT THE QUESTION WAS ESPECIALLY ON WHETHER PRC POLICY HAD CHANGED, CHANG:

WE HAVE STATED OUR POSITION OFTEN ON THIS QUESTION AND OUR VIEWS HAVE NOT CHANGED. AS FOR KOREA, WE HAVE ALSO STATED OUR POSITION. SINCE THE KOREAN PEOPLE DON'T APPROVE OF YOUR PRESENCE, HOW CAN WE SAY WE APPROVE. AS I'VE SAID, IN THE PACIFIC THE SPEARHEAD OF THE SOVIETS IS DIRECTED AT THE U.S. AND THE US OUGHT TO FIND A WAY TO DEAL WITH IT. YOUR PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC IS A FACT AND THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO SQUEEZE YOU OUT. WE ALSO FAVOR FRIENDLY US-JAPAN RELATIONS. WE DON'T SAY THIS QUESTION IS OF NO CONCERN TO US. THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEAN.

STRATTON, FOLLOWING UP, PRESSED FOR BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY POLICIES, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH POSITIONS COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE PACIFIC THAT WOULD DETER THE SOVIETS. HE REMARKED THAT IF THE US WITHDREW FROM KOREA AND JAPAN THIS WOULD BE AN INVITATION FOR THE SOVIETS TO MOVE IN, CHANG:

I THINK WE SHOULDN'T ARGUE THE POINT. IN KOREA THE PEOPLE WILL SETTLE THE QUESTION. WE DON'T BELIEVE IN A VACUUM THERE. (NOTE: CHANG APPARENTLY MEANT CHINESE DO NOT BELIEVE US WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA WOULD CREATE A VACUUM THERE.)

REP. DICKINSON, NOTED PRESSURES ON CONGRESS AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE FOR PAST SEVERAL YEARS TO WITHDRAW TROOPSFROM EUROPE AND PACIFIC AND ESPECIALLY KOREA. HE ASKED WHAT CHINESE REACTION WOULD BE IF US FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN FROM

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PAGE 02

TOR:113/16:15Z

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KOREA. TANG "CLARIFIED" THE QUESTION, CHANGE:
 AT PRESENT YOU ARE NOT PREPARING TO WITHDRAW TROOPS,
 IF YOU WITHDRAW THEM, THE KOREAN PEOPLE WILL BE
 PLEASED. WE CANNOT ADVISE YOU ON EVERY QUESTION OF
 WHERE YOU SHOULD AND SHOULDN'T WITHDRAW, BUT ON THE
 WHOLE THE US HAS SCATTERED ITS STRENGTH THROUGHOUT
 THE WORLD. THE QUESTION IS, WHERE IS THE FOCUS. IN A
 WAR, IF YOU DON'T KNOW WHERE THE FOCUS IS, HOW CAN
 YOU FIGHT? SHOULD THE US CLOSE TEN FINGERS TO FORM
 A FIST OR SHOULD IT TRY TO HOLD DOWN TEN FEELS WITH TEN
 FINGERS?

REP. WILSON COMMENTED THAT THE FOCUS OF THE US WAS
 ON SOVIET INTENTIONS. CITING THE EXTRA FUNDS VOTED BY CONGRESS
 FOR SHIPS INCLUDING THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE, HE NOTED THAT IF
 THE SOVIETS GAINED NAVAL SUPREMACY THEY COULD INTERDICT THE
 MOVEMENT OF OIL TO JAPAN THROUGH MALACCA STRAITS. CHANG
 ASKED IF THE US OR THE USSR WERE STRONGER IN NAVAL
 FORCES. REP. PRICE SAID THE US WAS STRONGER; REP. WILSON
 ADDED "AT PRESENT." REP. PRICE SAID WE WERE TAKING STEPS, E.G.,
 THE NAVAL BUDGET INCREASES, TO SEE THAT THIS CONTINUED
 TO BE THE CASE. CHANG ASKED WHICH SIDE WOULD BE STRONGER,
 THE USSR OR THE US AND ITS ALLIES, IF THERE WERE A
 CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE. REP. PRICE SAID IT WAS A QUESTION OF
 POTENTIAL FORCES, NOT THOSE NOW IN BEING. HISTORY HAD SHOWN
 THE US COULD BUILD UP ITS FORCES QUICKLY WHEN FIGHTING STARTED.
 WE HAD ENTERED BOTH WORLD WARS WITH NO FORCES TO SPEAK OF.
 SINCE WORLD WAR II WE HAD MAINTAINED HIGHER FORCES THAN USUAL
 BECAUSE OF THYSSOVIET THREAT. THE US COULD EXPAND ITS FORCES
 QUICKLY BUT INTHE MEANTIME MUST KEEP UP ITS R & D EFFORTS.
 THEN CHANG COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD "CONSIDERABLY
 LARGE" FORCES INEASTERN EUROPE, PRICE AGREED, ADDING THAT IS
 WHERE ONE WOULD EXPECT TO FIND THEM. US FORCES WERE IN
 EUROPE AS PART OF THE NATO ARRANGEMENTS, BUT WE WERE NOT
 MAINTAINING LARGE FORCES THERE OR ANYWHERE ELSE EITHER.

9. REP. WOLFF THEN SAID WE COULD ASSUME THAT IF WAR AROSE IT
 WOULD NOT BE SELECTIVE; THERE WAS NO CONTROLLING WHERE THE DOGS
 OF WAR WOULD BITE ONCBHYHEY WERBRUNLEASHED. WORLD
 WAR II HAD STARTED AS A CONVENTIONAL WAR BUT ENDED WITH USE OF
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AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 662
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1258

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EXDIS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ONE COULD ASSUME THAT THERE WOULD BE NO US-SOVIET WAR THAT WOULD NOT ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR WAR. RECALLING THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO HAD SAID WAR WAS INEVITABLE, REP. WOLFF SAID THAT INSTEAD OF ENGAGING IN POLEMICS OVER WHERE THE WAR WOULD START, HE SHOULD TRY TO FIND MEANS OF POSTPONING IT, BECAUSE IF WAR CAME IT WOULD BE A DISASTER FOR THE WHOLE WORLD. NEITHER CHINA NOR THE US COULD STAY OUT. THOUGH HE WAS OPPOSED TO NUCLEAR WAR AND HAD BEEN A DOVE ON VIETNAM, WOLFF SAID, THE US WOULD NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE USSR AND WOULD RESORT TO ANY MEANS TO ACHIEVE VICTORY. TANG EXPLAINED THE MEANING OF "DOVE," CHANG: WHEN WAR BREAKS OUT, IT WILL DEVELOP ACCORDING TO ITS OWN LAW. THERE IS ALSO A LAW OF DEVELOPMENT AS TO WHERE THE DOGS WILL BITE. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE DOGS TO BITE IN EVERY CORNER OF THE GLOBE. I THINK IT WILL BITE IN EUROPE. THE OVERALL SITUATION IS TENSE, IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE. CHANG ARGUED THAT A POLICY OF ACCOMMODATING, APPEASING THE SOVIETS WOULD ONLY ACCELERATE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. HE WENT ON: FROM OUR EXPERIENCE WITH THEM, WE SEE THAT THE SOVIETS BULLY THE SOFT AND FEAR THE TOUGH. WE HAVE SAID THAT CHINA IS A PIECE OF MEAT THAT THE SOVIETS WANT TO BITE. BUT THE BONES IN THE MEAT ARE TOO TOUGH. THEY WILL BREAK OFF THE SOVIETS' TEETH, THIS IS OUR VIEW.

10. REP. WHITEHURST ASKED WHAT AREAS CHINA CONCENTRATED ON TO MAKE THE SOVIETS UNWILLING TO ATTACK. WOULD CHINA INCREASE

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, LL

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ITS MILITARY BUDGET AS THE US WAS DOING? MENTIONING THE CODEL'S VISIT TO AN INFANTRY DIVISION (SEPTTEL), HE ASKED WHAT OTHER AREAS THE PRC WAS CONCENTRATING ON-- DID THEY ENVISAGE A GUERILLA WAR TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET THREAT, OR MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS? CHANG:

OUR POLICY IS VERY SIMPLE: IT IS PEOPLE'S WAR, THIS INCLUDES CONVENTIONAL WAR AND GUERILLA WARFARE, YET YOU SAW OUR DIVISION; OBVIOUSLY IT WILL FIGHT A REGULAR WAR, BUT OUR LARGEST FORCE IS OUR MILITIA, TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, THOSE WITH THE GREATEST EXPERIENCE OF WAR ARE AT LOCAL LEVELS, IF WE CALL FOR MOBILIZATION, WE CAN MOBILIZE TENS OF MILLIONS OF TROOPS IN A SHORT TIME. - #=13 ., 6 :-343 285#

3/8348: 3 B, 2-4. HOW WE FIGHT WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE WAR ARISES, IT'S NO SECRET WE CONCENTRATE OUR FORCES AGAINST THE NORTH.

REP. WHITEHURST AGAIN ASKED IF THE PRC MILITARY BUDGET, LIKE THE US WAS INCREASING. CHANG:

OUR BUDGET LIKE YOURS IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE, IT IS HARD TO TELL WHAT IS MILITARY AND WHAT ISN'T THE CONCEPTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES DIFFER, WE ARE BUILDING MANY AIRRAID SHELTERS WHICH ARE NOT IN THE BUDGET, OUR MILITIA EXERCISE DAILY; THIS IS NOT IN THE BUDGET, OUR MILITARY INDUSTRY ALSO MANUFACTURES CIVILIAN PRODUCTS, AND CIVILIAN INDUSTRIES CAN MAKE GUNS, ORDINARY FACTORIES ARE ABLE TO MAKE RIFLES AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY.

MANY MILITIA CAN REPAIR THEIR OWN WEAPONS AND COMMUNES CAN MAKE MINES AND GUNPOWDER, ALL THIS IS NOT IN THE BUDGET, OUR BUDGET FLUCTUATES LITTLE, AND EVEN IF IT INCREASES THE AMOUNT WON'T BE MUCH, BUT IF YOU INCLUDE AIRRAID SHELTERS AND MILITIA IT IS A BIG INCREASE, IN THDJUS THERE IS DEBATE IN CONGRESS OVER INCREASING THE BUDGET, THAT DOESN'T HAPPEN IN CHINA, YOU HAVE TO VOTE, WE DON'T.

11. REP. ICHORD OBSERVED

THAT IT WAS HARD FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S POLITICAL PROCESS, TENG HSIAO-PING BEING NO LONGER PLA CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, HAD THE POSITION BEEN FILLED, AND BY WHOM? CHANG:

OUR MILITARY AS FOUNDED BY CHAIRMAN MAO IS ALWAYS UNDER PARTY LEADERSHIP, OUR CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S MILITARY COMMISSION IS IN CHARGE OF THE ARMED FORCES; ITS CHAIRMAN IS CHAIRMAN MAO, I CAN SAY THAT TENG IS NO LONGER CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO NEW APPOINTMENT, IT DOESN'T MATTER WHETHER WE HAVE A CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, IN OUR COUNTRY WE DON'T HAVE ONE FOR SEVERAL



YEARS. I CAN SAY THAT WHEN TENG WAS CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF HE DID LITTLE IN THAT CAPACITY, BUT PLEASE DON'T LET THIS GET OUT.

12. RESPONDING TO AN APPROVING COMMENT BY REP. WILSON ON THE PRC'S TUNNEL PROGRAM, AND REP. WILSON'S SUGGESTION THAT CHINA EXPECTED SOME NUCLEAR WARFARE WITH THE RUSSIANS, CHANG SAID:

WHEN WE DIG TUNNELS, WE ASSURE NOT ONLY AT PREVENTING AIR RAIDS, WE ASSURE EVERY CITY MUST FIGHT THE WAR, WHEN THE SOVIETS COME, EVERY CITY MUST FIGHT, THE

YUUMMS ARE PART OF OUR PREPAREDNESS FOR FIGHTING, DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION MANY VILLAGES HAD UNDERGROUND TUNNELS, THE JAPANESE HAD THEIR FORH

ESSES ABOVE, BUT THEYKOULDN75 35-?)8# 19,549). AS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OF COURSE WE CARRY ON REASEARCH, MAINLY BECAUSE IF WE DON'T SOME PEOPAE WILL ZJY TODDULVQ AND INTIMIDATE US, NOW WE CAN SAY YOU HAVE THEM(NUCLEAR WEAPONS) AND WE HAVE THEM, BUT WE HAVE ONLY A FEW, AND EVEN IN THE FUTURE WE WON'T HAVE AS MANY AS YOU, YOU AND THE SOVIETS HAVE A GREAT MANY, MORE THAN CHINA HAS, BUT IF THERE ARE TOO MANY, THERE IS NOT MUCH USE FOR THEM.

13. CHANG THEN IMMEDIATELY CHANGED THE SUBJECT, ASKING IF THE CODEL HAD SEEN "GREAT TURMOIL" SINCE COMING TO PEKING, REPS PRICE AND WILSON COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD NOT, REP. WILSON WENT ON TO MENTION THE CODEL'S PLEASURE AT BEING THE FIRST TO SEE AN INFANTRY UNIT, THE CODEL WOULD BE GOING TO DARIEN TO SEE A NAVAL UNIT, (SOMEONE ON THE CHINESE SIDE INTERJECTED: "TOTE THE HARBOR,") REP. WILSON CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT NOTHING WOULD AFFECT THID OOR OPENED TO FRIENDSHIP AND EXHCHANGES, CHANG: I ASKED BZDAUSE AT THE TIME OF YOUCADEPARTURE FROM THE US THERE WERE A LOT OF NEWS REPORTS ABOUT DISORDERS IN TIEN AN MEN SQUARE AND GREAT TURMOIL IN CHINA, I WANTED TO KNOW YOUR IMPRESSIONS, AS FOR THE CHANGES BT



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AMEMBANCY MOSCOW PRIORITY 352
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 663
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1259

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 4 OF 4 PEKING 736

EXDIS
IN OUR GOVERNMENT, THERE IS SPECULATION THAT THESE
WILL BRING PROBLEMS AND CHANGES IN POLICY, IMPACT
AND CHANGE IN PREMIER CAME ABOUT BECAUSE PREMIER
CHOU DIED, AND NOT BECAUSE OF ANY GREAT INTERNAL
PROBLEMS. THE CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENTAL LEADER-
SHIP AND STAFF MEMBERS ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED
WITH POLICY. IN OUR COUNTRY THE LINE AND POLICY ARE
FORMULATED BY CHAIRMAN MAO. CHAIRMAN
MAO FORMULATED OUR LINE AND POLICY ON MARXIST-
LENINIST PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD
SITUATION. I WILL GIVE YOU EXAMPLES TO SHOW THAT CHANGES
IN PERSONNEL WON'T MEAN CHANGES IN POLICY. TAKE SINO-
SOVIET RELATIONS. WHEN WE HAD FRIENDLY RELATIONS,
CHOU EN-LAI WAS PREMIER. WHEN CHINA AND THE USSR
HAD A FALLING OUT, CHOU EN-LAI REMAINED PREMIER. THE
SAME PERSON WAS PREMIER BUT THE POLICY CHANGED. IT
CHANGED BECAUSE THE SITUATION CHANGED, BOTH THE ONE IN
CHINA. AND IN THE SOVIET UNION, BREZHNEV REPLACED
KHRUSCHEV, BUT THE LINE AND POLICY WERE NOT CHANGED.
SO, IN THIS QUESTION LOOK AT THE LINE AND POLICY OF A
COUNTRY, NOT AT CHANGES IN PERSONNEL, I READ THAT
BREZHNEV IS IN POOR HEALTH AND WILL BE REPLACED AND
THEN THERE WILL BE A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY. I THINK
THEIR POLICY WON'T CHANGE. US-PRC RELATIONS
CHANGED WHILE CHOU WAS THE PREMIER, BECAUSE THE
SITUATION CHANGED. I'VE EXPLAINED THIS POINT.



14. REP. RANDALL, AFTER TOUCHING ON VARIOUS POINTS COVERED

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCONCROFT, HYLAND, LL

PSN:011373 PAGE 01 TOR:113/16:24Z DTG:221313Z APR 76

EARLIER IN THE CONVERSATION, ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT THE PRC WAS BUYING SOME ARMAMENT MATERIALS FROM ABROAD. CHANG: OUR POLICY, AS YOU UNDERSTAND WELL, IS SELF-RELIANCE AND INDEPENDENCE. AS FOR MILITARY MATERIALS, WE BUY SOME AND WE SELL SOME. WE SELL SOME MILITARY MATERIALS AND WE BUY SOME. IT IS HARD TO DEFINE WHICH ARE MILITARY MATERIALS AND WHICH ARE NOT. SOME SAY THIS OR THAT IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND WE MAY NOT CONSIDER IT SO. OTHERS THINK SOME THINGS ARE NOT OF A STRATEGIC FUTURE AND WE THINK THEY ARE. GRAIN IS AN IMPORTANT STRATEGIC MATERIAL. IF SOLDIERS CAN'T EAT, THEY CAN'T FIGHT. IT IS TRUE THAT WE BUY SOME MILITARY MATERIALS BUT WE MAINLY RELY ON OURSELVES. FROM OUR EXPERIENCE OF TWO DECADES, WE RELY ON OUR OWN EFFORTS TO BUILD OUR MILITARY INDUSTRY, NUCLEAR INCLUDED. IF THERE IS A BLOCKADE AND PEOPLE REFUSE TO SELL US WEAPONS, WE ARE PLEASED BECAUSE WE'LL RELY ON OURSELVES AND WHEN WE RELY ON OURSELVES WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THESE TASKS. "NOTHING IS HARD IF YOU DARE TO SCALE THE HEIGHTS," AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE ARE DOING THIS.

15. REP. PRICE EXPRESSED THANKS ON BEHALF OF ALL. CHANG SAID HE TOO HAD APPRECIATED THE CANDID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, WHICH WOULD PROMOTE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, BUT BECAUSE THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN SO FRANK, HE REQUESTED THAT IT NOT BE PUBLISHED. REP. PRICE ASSURED HIM THE DISCUSSION WOULD NOT BE PUT ON THE RECORD. CHANG ADDED: IF YOU DON'T PUBLISH AND IF YOU COME AGAIN WE CAN HAVE A FREE EXCHANGE. IF YOU PUBLISH, WE WILL REFRAIN FROM TALKING (FRANKLY) NEXT TIME.

16. ATMOSPHERICS. NCHN'S REPORT OF THE MEETING DESCRIBED IT AS A "FRIENDLY TALK" AND THE SHORT FILM CLIP SHOWN IN PEKING TELEVISION SHOWED A SMILING CHANG ENERGETICALLY SHAKING HANDS WITH EACH MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN PARTY AND THEN EXCHANGING INITIAL PLEASANTRIES WITH REP. PRICE. BUT CHANG, THOUGH TAKING THE SAME SUBSTANTIVE LINE WITH THE CODEL AS CHIAO HAD EARLIER, CAME ACROSS TO THE CODEL AS MUCH LESS DIPLOMATIC. REPS. PRICE AND WOLFF BOTH COMMENTED TO US THAT THEY FELT AT TIMES CHANG WAS NEEDLING THE CODEL. ASIDE FROM THE CONTENTS OF HIS REMARKS, WHICH SEEMED AT TIMES UNNECESSARILY DIDACTIC OR GRATUITOUSLY NEGATIVE, A COUPLE OF CHANG'S PERSONAL MANNERISMS DID NOT GO OVER WELL. HE GIGGLED FREQUENTLY, AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF LOOKING AT, AND PLAYING TO, THE OTHER CHINESE PRESENT MORE THAN TO HIS INTERLOCUTORS.

THOMAS
BT



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIALINFORMATION

April 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT ✓

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON RHTS ✓

SUBJECT: PRC Liaison Office Farewell Dinner
for Ambassador Gates

Han Hsu, Acting Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, gave a farewell dinner on April 26 for Tom Gates. Attending the dinner, in addition to myself, were Phil Habib, Bill Gleysteen, and Oscar Armstrong from State (and wives). The dinner was a low-key affair; the Chinese were relaxed and friendly, but the conversation was for the most part desultory and non-substantive.

Han Hsu gave a toast with standard themes: He opined that US-PRC relations would continue to advance as long as earnest efforts were made to implement the Shanghai Communique. He asserted that such a development would be welcomed by, and would serve the interests of, the peoples of China and the US. Gates gave an appropriate off-the-cuff toast in reply, although he did not include some of the key "code phrases" that have become standard in our rhetoric in official contacts with the Chinese -- such as a reference to the Shanghai Communique. [Gates' style may provide a bit more variety in our discourse with the Chinese, although they probably will wonder if this doesn't represent some official design, as opposed to our less formal approach to dealings with them.]

The most interesting touch came after the meal, when Han Hsu maneuvered Gates, Habib, and myself to a small reception area for a brief chit-chat which he explicitly characterized with good humor as a "business meeting". Obviously acting on official instruction, Han remarked that he had read Ambassador Gates' testimony before the Senate on April 26. He quoted explicitly from Gates' statement that he (Gates) had said he hoped that the two "countries" of China and Taiwan would be able to resolve their differences peacefully. Han

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then observed that this characterization of "our province of Taiwan" as a "country" was not in conformity with the Shanghai Communique; and as for ^{the} means that the Chinese people would use to achieve the liberation of Taiwan, that was strictly an internal affair that brooked no foreign interference. Gates took the bracing with apparent good humor, and Phil Habib further defused any tension by joking about Han's "special briefing".

Gates then pointed out how he had long been an advocate of improved relations between the US and "Red China", and referred back to his 1965 off-the-record speech in which he called for an official dialogue between Washington and Peking. Han did not respond to his use of the term "Red China".

I report these atmospherics only because I think we may face an incident or two in the coming months as Ambassador Gates becomes acclimated to his new post in Peking and the particular qualities of our official dialogue with the Chinese. Moreover, given Gates' doubts about the normalization policy -- or, more specifically, how we might handle the Taiwan question -- I have a sense that he may air his misgivings to the Chinese somewhat more openly than might be desirable.

I believe this situation requires that we brief Gates' new Deputy all the more carefully so that he is prepared to exercise as much purposeful guidance as possible over our contacts with the Chinese at the Peking end of the line.

