


**The original documents are located in Box 5, folder “China, unnumbered items - (22), 10/25/75 - 10/31/75” of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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9/25

Gen: - This message to the Sec. Room  
at 6:10 pm for transmittal  
asap.

hla. 



General Scowcroft:

The Secretary approved the attached back-channel to Peking with some minor changes on page 5. He asks that this message be transmitted ASAP.

 Adams

(Page 5 attached incorporates these changes).

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLYVIA <sup>Voyager</sup> ~~WHITE HOUSE~~ CHANNELS

FOR: AMBASSADOR BUSH

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO THE CHINESE ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT

FYI

Paragraphs one to six are ~~for the Ambassador's information~~ and are not to be passed to the PRC.


1. After thorough review of the results of our discussions with the PRC leaders in Peking, the President has decided on the approach presented in this message. On the basis of the guidance and documentation presented in paragraphs 2-5 below, you are to request a meeting with Foreign Minister Ch'iao as soon as possible, state our position, and ask for a prompt response to our proposal as a basis for proceeding with planning for the President's trip.

2. The President has determined that U.S. interests will be served by sustaining our present relationship with Peking through the vehicle of his trip, but to lower the profile of the visit. At the same time we want to signal to the world and the American people that we have an on-going relationship with the PRC based on mutual interests, despite areas of disagreement.

3. Our objectives in structuring the outcome of the visit are to limit the public airing of our divergent positions on international and bilateral issues and striking a modestly upbeat note on some areas of agreement. We seek to do this by getting the

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
DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
 BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/10/08



Chinese to agree to a joint press statement to be issued at the conclusion of Mr. Ford's trip, rather than a joint communique based on their draft which would tend to highlight our differences and invite comparisons with the Shanghai Communique. At the same time, we will shorten the President's visit to Peking by a day or so, and dilute the uniqueness of the trip by adding brief visits to Manila and Jakarta on the way home. This will place our dealings with the Chinese in a framework more appropriate to our varied interests and relationships in the Asian region and generally strengthen the rationale for his journey.

4. This approach is based in part on our evaluation of the negative domestic and international consequences of a cancellation of the visit, and our assessment that for Peking the fact of the Presidential trip is the important thing. We have also concluded that there is no way to salvage a communique acceptable to us. This could only be done if we substantially beefed-up the positive statements concerning our relationship on bilateral and international issues. But based on my trip to Peking we have absolutely no reason to expect that the Chinese will agree to such an approach.

Our decision to pursue the idea of a low profile press statement is based on the Foreign Minister's comments to me in the car on the way to the airport in which he indicated that such a statement, which




could moderate the expression of our differences, would be acceptable to the Chinese side in lieu of a formal communique. In the proposed statement attached at the end of this message we have included verbatim the positive elements in the PRC draft communique, added a few positive remarks of our own relating to international developments and the state of our bilateral relations, and included a small but significant advance on the normalization issue through an American expression of support for the unity of China.

5. Regarding specific arrangements for the trip, we now envisage an arrival by the President and his party on the afternoon of December 1 with departure on the morning of December 5. The President would not repeat not visit another Chinese city, and would make the emphasis of his stay a series of business-like working sessions with only limited amounts of sightseeing.

6. Based on the above considerations, you should request a meeting with the Foreign Minister ASAP to present our reconsidered position. You should not make the presentation to an official of lower rank than the Foreign Minister.

7. You should make the following points in your presentation:

-- The President has carefully reviewed the results of the Secretary's recent visit to Peking. He reaffirms the importance he attaches to our relations with the PRC, and his belief that if we are to make further progress in dealing with the international concerns we share, and in solving the bilateral issues still between us, it is



essential that the American people perceive some balance between our areas of disagreement and our common perceptions. He is prepared to proceed with his visit on this basis.

-- We have concluded that a Joint Communique of the sort proposed by the Chinese side during the Secretary's visit would serve neither of our interests. From our standpoint the communique submitted by the Foreign Minister could be made acceptable only if sufficient positive elements were added to balance off the differences, and if some of the offensive language in the individual statements were toned down or eliminated. An attempt to achieve this would be too time-consuming and the result would probably be disappointing. We therefore prefer to pursue the idea of a joint press statement as was mentioned by the Foreign Minister to the Secretary on the way to the airport on the last day of his visit. If the Secretary understood the Foreign Minister correctly he said that a press statement could be less formal and would not require the same elaboration of each party's global views. (At this point present to the Foreign Minister the draft press statement included at the end of this message.)

-- In drafting the proposed press statement we have used verbatim the positive elements which the Chinese side included in their draft Joint Communique, and have presented the points on normalization in abbreviated form. We have added an explicit US acknowledgement of the principle of one China, and a generalized statement at the end of the document about future progress in our bilateral relations. We believe this approach should be acceptable



to the Chinese since we have used so many formulations verbatim and have included language dealing with the questions of hegemony, the Chinese side's "three principles for normalization," and direct U.S. acceptance of the principle of the unity of China. While we consider the positive elements to be inadequate for a Joint Communiqué, we could live with them in a press statement that reduces the contentious elements.

-- In view of the limited time which remains for technical planning of the trip, it would be highly desirable to reach agreement on the basic elements of the joint press statement no later than Saturday, November 1 and before then, if possible. We recognize there may be need for some minor adjustments in language in the statement during the visit.


-- If we can agree on this text at least as a basis we are prepared to announce the President's visit on Monday, November 3. We would use the proposed Chinese text except for substituting December 5 as the terminal date.

-- The President has asked that the major emphasis of his visit be working sessions where both sides can continue to exchange views on international and bilateral issues. We do not think it will be necessary for him to visit any city other than Peking. We propose that the President and his party arrive during the afternoon of December 1 and depart on the morning of December 5.

-- We would appreciate confirmation that the President will be treated with the protocol appropriate to a head of state.

-- The President may pay brief visits on the way home to one or two friendly Asian countries. (FYI Philippines and Indonesia)

8. Text of joint press statement (copy text).





October 25, 1975

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

President Gerald R. Ford of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from December 1 to December 5, 1975. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Ford, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials.

(Details of visit)


During the visit, the leaders of China and the United States concentrated on a far-ranging review of the international situation in a friendly atmosphere. The conversations, which they judge to have been constructive, reflected their well-known differences but also confirmed their common perception of certain issues of great significance to both countries.

Both the Chinese and US sides affirmed that the principles agreed upon in the Shanghai Communique remain a guide for both their international conduct and their bilateral relations. In particular, they strongly reaffirmed that neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other part of the world, and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY KJR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08



Both the Chinese and U.S. sides pointed out that since the Shanghai Communique there has been a growth in the exchanges and friendship between the two peoples and an improvement in the relations between the two countries. It conforms to the common desire of the peoples of China and the United States to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Each side reiterated the views it expressed in the Shanghai Communique concerning normalization of relations. In stating its position, the Chinese side said that normalization of relations could be realized only when the United States severs diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdraws all U.S. armed forces and military installations from Taiwan, and abrogates the defense treaty. In stating its position, the U.S. side expressed agreement with the principle of one China. It emphasized its interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.


The two sides agreed that the contacts and exchanges between the peoples of China and the United States in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism will contribute to the enhancement of mutual understanding and friendship. Both sides will facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.



Both sides maintained that it is in the interest of the two peoples to develop bilateral trade step by step on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The two sides agreed to continue to facilitate such trade.

Both sides reaffirmed that despite the profound differences of philosophy and social system which exist between the United States and China, it is nonetheless possible to deepen friendship and understanding between the two peoples, and that mutual efforts will be sustained to complete the normalization of relations between China and the United States on the basis of the Shanghai Communiqué.

President Ford and his party expressed their appreciation to the Government and people of the People's Republic of China for the hospitality extended to them.



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FM THE SITUATION ROOM //WASH 119//

TO USLO PEKING

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WH52052

WASH 119

FOR: AMBASSADOR BUSH

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO THE CHINESE ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT

PARAGRAPHS ONE TO SIX ARE FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S INFORMATION AND ARE NOT TO BE PASSED TO THE PRC.

1. AFTER THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRC LEADERS IN PEKING, THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED ON THE APPROACH PRESENTED IN THIS MESSAGE. ON THE BASIS OF THE GUIDANCE AND DOCUMENTATION PRESENTED IN PARAGRAPHS 2-5 BELOW, YOU ARE TO REQUEST A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, STATE OUR POSITION, AND ASK FOR A PROMPT RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR PROCEEDING WITH PLANNING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP.

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS DETERMINED THAT U.S. INTERESTS WILL BE SERVED BY SUSTAINING OUR PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING THROUGH THE VEHICLE OF HIS TRIP, BUT TO LOWER THE PROFILE OF THE VISIT. AT THE SAME TIME WE WANT TO SIGNAL TO THE WORLD AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT WE HAVE AN ON-GOING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRC BASED ON MUTUAL INTERESTS, DESPITE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT.

3. OUR OBJECTIVES IN STRUCTURING THE OUTCOME OF THE VISIT ARE TO LIMIT THE PUBLIC AIRING OF OUR DIVERGENT POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES AND STRIKING A MODESTLY UPBEAT NOTE ON SOME AREAS OF AGREEMENT. WE SEEK TO DO THIS BY GETTING THE CHINESE TO AGREE TO A JOINT PRESS STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED



\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

MCFARLANE, RODMAN

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AT THE CONCLUSION OF MR. FORD'S TRIP, RATHER THAN A JOINT COMMUNIQUE BASED ON THEIR DRAFT WHICH WOULD TEND TO HIGHLIGHT OUR DIFFERENCES AND INVITE COMPARISONS WITH THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL SHORTEN THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PEKING BY A DAY OR SO, AND DILUTE THE UNIQUENESS OF THE TRIP BY ADDING BRIEF VISITS TO MANILA AND JAKARTA ON THE WAY HOME. THIS WILL PLACE OUR DEALINGS WITH THE CHINESE IN A FRAMEWORK MORE APPROPRIATE TO OUR VARIED INTERESTS AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ASIAN REGION AND GENERALLY STRENGTHEN THE RATIONALE FOR HIS JOURNEY.

4. THIS APPROACH IS BASED IN PART ON OUR EVALUATION OF THE NEGATIVE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CANCELLATION OF THE VISIT, AND OUR ASSESSMENT THAT FOR PEKING THE FACT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TRIP IS THE IMPORTANT THING. WE HAVE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO WAY TO SALVAGE A COMMUNIQUE ACCEPTABLE TO US. THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE IF WE SUBSTANTIALLY BEEFED-UP THE POSITIVE STATEMENTS CONCERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP ON BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. BUT BASED ON MY TRIP TO PEKING WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO REASON TO EXPECT THAT THE CHINESE WILL AGREE TO SUCH AN APPROACH.

OUR DECISION TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF A LOW PROFILE PRESS STATEMENT IS BASED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S COMMENTS TO ME IN THE CAR ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT IN WHICH HE INDICATED THAT SUCH A STATEMENT, WHICH COULD MODERATE THE EXPRESSION OF OUR DIFFERENCES, WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHINESE SIDE IN LIEU OF A FORMAL COMMUNIQUE. IN THE PROPOSED STATEMENT ATTACHED AT THE END OF THIS MESSAGE WE HAVE INCLUDED VERBATIM THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE PRC DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, ADDED A FEW POSITIVE REMARKS OF OUR OWN RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE STATE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND INCLUDED A SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE ON THE NORMALIZATION ISSUE THROUGH AN AMERICAN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE UNITY OF CHINA.

5. REGARDING SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRIP, WE NOW ENVISAGE AN ARRIVAL BY THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY ON THE AFTERNOON OF DECEMBER 1 WITH DEPARTURE ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 5. THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT VISIT ANOTHER CHINESE CITY, AND WOULD MAKE THE EMPHASIS OF HIS STAY A SERIES OF BUSINESS-LIKE WORKING SESSIONS WITH ONLY LIMITED AMOUNTS OF SIGHTSEEING.

6. BASED ON THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, YOU SHOULD REQUEST A MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASAP TO PRESENT OUR RECONSIDERED POSITION. YOU SHOULD NOT MAKE THE PRESENTATION TO AN OFFICIAL OF LOWER RANK THAN THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

7. YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN YOUR PRESENTATION:  
--THE PRESIDENT HAS CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO PEKING. HE REAFFIRMS THE



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PAGE 02

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IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRC, AND HIS BELIEF THAT IF WE ARE TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS WE SHARE, AND IN SOLVING THE BILATERAL ISSUES STILL BETWEEN US, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE PERCEIVE SOME BALANCE BETWEEN OUR AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND OUR COMMON PERCEPTIONS. HE IS PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH HIS VISIT ON THIS BASIS.

-- WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT A JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE SORT PROPOSED BY THE CHINESE SIDE DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT WOULD SERVE NEITHER OF OUR INTERESTS. FROM OUR STANDPOINT THE COMMUNIQUE SUBMITTED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER COULD BE MADE ACCEPTABLE ONLY IF SUFFICIENT POSITIVE ELEMENTS WERE ADDED TO BALANCE OFF THE DIFFERENCES, AND IF SOME OF THE OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE IN THE INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS WERE TONED DOWN OR ELIMINATED. AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE THIS WOULD BE TOO TIME-CONSUMING AND THE RESULT WOULD PROBABLY BE DISAPPOINTING. WE THEREFORE PREFER TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF A JOINT PRESS STATEMENT AS WAS MENTIONED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT ON THE LAST DAY OF HIS VISIT. IF THE SECRETARY UNDERSTOOD THE FOREIGN MINISTER CORRECTLY HE SAID THAT A PRESS STATEMENT COULD BE LESS FORMAL AND WOULD NOT REQUIRE THE SAME ELABORATION OF EACH PARTY'S GLOBAL VIEWS. (AT THIS POINT PRESENT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THE DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT INCLUDED AT THE END OF THIS MESSAGE.)

-- IN DRAFTING THE PROPOSED PRESS STATEMENT WE HAVE USED VERBATIM THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS WHICH THE CHINESE SIDE INCLUDED IN THEIR DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE, AND HAVE PRESENTED THE POINTS ON NORMALIZATION IN ABBREVIATED FORM. WE HAVE ADDED AN EXPLICIT US ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE CHINA, AND A GENERALIZED STATEMENT AT THE END OF THE DOCUMENT ABOUT FUTURE PROGRESS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHINESE SINCE WE HAVE USED SO MANY FORMULATIONS VERBATIM AND HAVE INCLUDED LANGUAGE DEALING WITH THE QUESTIONS OF HEGEMONY, THE CHINESE SIDE'S "THREE PRINCIPLES FOR NORMALIZATION," AND DIRECT U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE UNITY OF CHINA. WHILE WE CONSIDER THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS TO BE INADEQUATE FOR A JOINT COMMUNIQUE, WE COULD LIVE WITH THEM IN A PRESS STATEMENT THAT REDUCES THE CONTENTIOUS ELEMENTS.

-- IN VIEW OF THE LIMITED TIME WHICH REMAINS FOR TECHNICAL PLANNING OF THE TRIP, IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE JOINT PRESS STATEMENT NO LATER THAN SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 1 AND BEFORE THEN, IF POSSIBLE. WE RECOGNIZE THERE MAY BE NEED FOR SOME MINOR ADJUSTMENTS IN LANGUAGE IN THE STATEMENT DURING THE VISIT.

-- IF WE CAN AGREE ON THIS TEXT AT LEAST AS A BASIS WE



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AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IT CONFORMS TO THE COMMON DESIRE OF THE PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES TO REALIZE THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

EACH SIDE REITERATED THE VIEWS IT EXPRESSED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE CONCERNING NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. IN STATING ITS POSITION, THE CHINESE SIDE SAID THAT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS COULD BE REALIZED ONLY WHEN THE UNITED STATES SEVERS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN, WITHDRAWS ALL U.S. ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FROM TAIWAN, AND ADOPTS THE DEFENSE TREATY. IN STATING ITS POSITION, THE U.S. SIDE EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE CHINA. IT EMPHASIZED ITS INTEREST IN THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION BY THE CHINESE THEMSELVES.

THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN SUCH FIELDS AS SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, SPORTS AND JOURNALISM WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND FRIENDSHIP. BOTH SIDES WILL FACILITATE THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES.

BOTH SIDES MAINTAINED THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE TWO PEOPLES TO DEVELOP BILATERAL TRADE STEP BY STEP ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT. THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE TO FACILITATE SUCH TRADE.

BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED THAT DESPITE THE PROFOUND DIFFERENCES OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SYSTEM WHICH EXIST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, IT IS NONETHELESS POSSIBLE TO DEEPEN FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES, AND THAT MUTUAL EFFORTS WILL BE SUSTAINED TO COMPLETE THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE BASIS OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.

PRESIDENT FORD AND HIS PARTY EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR THE HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO THEM.

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PEKING 112                    26 OCTOBER 1975  
FOR:                            SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM:                           GEORGE BUSH

REF: WASH 119  
I HAVE READ THE INSTRUCTIONS AND WILL REQUEST APPOINTMENT  
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER, PROBABLY SEEING HIM TOMORROW AS DISCUSSED  
WITH YOU IN CAR..  
WARM REGARDS

BT



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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

\*\*\*\*\*HHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

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PEKING 113 27 OCTOBER 1975  
TO : SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM : GEORGE BUSH  
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO THE CHINESE ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT  
REF : WASHINGTON 119

1. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO FOR TWENTY MINUTES MORNING OCTOBER 27 TO MAKE INSTRUCTED ORAL PRESENTATION AND GIVE HIM TEXT OF DRAFT PRESS COMMUNIQUE. CHIAO DID NOT READ OUR DRAFT AT THIS MEETING AND INDICATED CHINESE WOULD RESPOND WEDNESDAY AT THE EARLIEST.

2. AFTER I FINISHED RUNNING THROUGH ALL POINTS IN PARAGRAPH SEVEN, WHICH CHINESE TOOK DOWN VERBATIM, CHIAO COMMENTED BRIEFLY AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST, WE HAVE FULLY EXPLAINED OUR POSITION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WITH REGARD TO THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY JOINT COMMUNIQUE, IF THERE IS ONE, SHOULD BE A STEP FORWARD FROM THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND NOT A STEP BACKWARD. OTHERWISE, IT IS BETTER THAT THERE BE NO COMMUNIQUE AND WE CAN DO WITHOUT ONE; BUT I WILL NOT DWELL ON THESE MATTERS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED.

SECOND, I WILL JUST STATE A SMALL FACT. YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE, ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT, RAISED THREE POSSIBILITIES: A JOINT COMMUNIQUE; NO JOINT COMMUNIQUE; A JOINT PRESS COMMUNIQUE. I TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE, REGARDING THE PRESS COMMUNIQUE, THAT THE CHINESE SIDE ALSO HAD CONSIDERED THIS POSSIBILITY, AND THE PRESS COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE MAINLY DESCRIPTIVE, JUST TELLING MORE FACTS IN A CLEAR WAY.

THIRD, REGARDING THE DRAFT PRESS COMMUNIQUE PROPOSED BY THE US SIDE, WE WILL STUDY IT AND REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. CHIAO IN CLOSING EXCHANGE AND NANCY TANG AT DOOR INDICATED THAT CHINESE REPLY WOULD NOT BE READY UNTIL WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY.

4. MEETING WAS CORDIAL BUT CHIAO OFFERED NO SMALL TALK.

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

HAK, SCONECROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

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BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08



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HE FOR THE MOST PART SIMPLY LISTENED WITHOUT EXPRESSION AS I READ THROUGH MY ORAL PRESENTATION, BUT HIS INTEREST SEEMED SUDDENLY TO PERK UP AND HE APPARENTLY LISTENED WITH SPECIAL CARE TO WHAT I, AND THEN THE INTERPRETER, HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO STRESS WORKING SESSIONS AND OUR BELIEF THAT VISITS OUTSIDE OF PEKING WILL BE UNNECESSARY.

5. DCM THAYER ACCOMPANIED ME. IN ADDITION TO NANCY TANG, CHINESE INCLUDED USA DESK DIRECTOR TING YUAN-HUNG, HIS DEPUTY CHAO CHI-HUA AND INTERPRETER SHIH YEN-HUA.

6. WARM REGARDS.  
GEORGE BUSH

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BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/10/08

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PEKING 115 31 OCTOBER 1975  
TO : SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM : GEORGE BUSH  
REF : PEKING 113

1. FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO CALLED ME IN MORNING OF OCTOBER 31. HE READ FOLLOWING REPLY TO OUR OCTOBER 27 PRESENTATION:

"THE CHINESE SIDE HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED THE UNITED STATES MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 27 AND ITS PROPOSED DRAFT JOINT PRESS STATEMENT. THE REPLY OF THE CHINESE SIDE IS AS FOLLOWS.

"THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT AND THERE EXIST MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, IN PRESENT TURBULENT WORLD SITUATION OUR TWO SIDES HAVE CERTAIN COMMON POINTS. THESE WELL KNOWN FACTS REFLECT THE PRESENT STATE OF US-CHINESE RELATIONS, HAVE BEEN THE BASIS OF CONTACTS SINCE THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND THIS CONTINUES AS THE BASIS AND BACKGROUND OF THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT FORD TO CHINA. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT WE HAVE ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION STATED OUR STAND WITH RESPECT TO THE VISIT.

"WE WELCOME THE US SIDE'S PROPOSAL FOR A VISIT TO CHINA BY PRESIDENT FORD AND ARE PREPARED TO RECEIVE HIM WITH COURTESY. IT WILL BE ALL RIGHT WHETHER OR NOT OUR MINDS MEET. THE US SIDE SHOULD BE CLEARLY AWARE OF THIS AND NOT HARBOR ANY ILLUSIONS.

"IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF SINO-US RELATIONS AND IN THE TRADITION OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, WE SUBMITTED ON OCTOBER 22 A DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA. HAD THE US SIDE TAKEN A REALISTIC VIEW OF PRESENT SINO-US RELATIONS, IT SHOULD NOT HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT AT LEAST TO TAKE OUR DRAFT AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

"ON A NUMBER OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE, IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE TWO SIDES TO STATE OUR VIEWS SEPARATELY. IT IS UNJUSTIFIABLE TO TONE DOWN OR



\*\*\*\*\*HHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

HAK, SCOWCROFT, RODMAN, MCFARLANE

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PAGE 01

PSN:002222

TOR:304/10:48Z

DTG:310810Z OCT 75

ELIMINATE LANGUAGE ALLEGED BY THE US SIDE TO BE OFFENSIVE. DURING HIS VISIT IN 1972, PRESIDENT NIXON SAID THAT NEITHER OF THE TWO SIDES SHOULD ASK THE OTHER TO CHANGE ITS PRINCIPLED POSITION. WE APPRECIATE SUCH AN APPROACH.

"AS FOR THE DRAFT JOINT PRESS STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY

END OF PAGE 1

THE US SIDE ON OCTOBER 27, FRANKLY IT IS NOT A PRESS COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORMAL NATURE. IN FACT, IT IS A REFURBISHED VERSION OF THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE SUBMITTED BY THE US SIDE ON OCTOBER 20. THE NAME HAS BEEN CHANGED BUT NOT THE SUBSTANCE. THE PRESENT DRAFT STILL ATTEMPTS TO COVER UP DIFFERENCES IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND CREATES A FALSE IMPRESSION. THIS WILL SERVE NEITHER OF OUR INTERESTS. THE US SIDE HAS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT SENTENCES IN THE CHINESE DRAFT WHICH, AS A RESULT, HAVE LOST THEIR ORIGINAL MEANING. FOR INSTANCE, THE WORDING ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE DISMEMBERS CHINA'S PRINCIPLED POSITION. FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, THIS UNITED STATES DRAFT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHINESE SIDE.

"WE WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE THAT IF THERE IS TO BE A JOINT COMMUNIQUE, IT MUST FAITHFULLY REFLECT SINO-US RELATIONS AND THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES. THEREFORE, WE HOPE THAT THE US SIDE WILL RECONSIDER THE CHINESE DRAFT. IF IT HAS ANY AMENDMENTS TO SUGGEST ON SPECIFIC WORDING, WE ARE READY TO LISTEN.

"AS FOR THE PATTERN AND THE ESSENCE, WE MUST BE CONSISTENT. WE LOOK FORWARD TO A COUNTER-PROPOSAL FROM THE US SIDE ON THIS BASIS.

"WITH REGARD TO THE PART IN THE US MESSAGE ABOUT DATES AND PLACE OF PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT AND THE TIME OF HIS ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE FROM PEKING, WE KNOW THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE US SIDE AND RAISE NO OBJECTIONS.

"THE FOREGOING IS THE REPLY FROM THE CHINESE SIDE AND I HOPE YOU WILL REPORT TO THE US SIDE IMMEDIATELY".

2. I ASSURED CHIAO I WOULD DO SO. I THEN RAISED A QUESTION FOR CLARIFICATION, ASKING IF CHIAO'S REPLY INDICATES THAT NO FORM OF PRESS STATEMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHINESE SIDE. CHIAO REPLIED: "AS I HAVE MADE VERY CLEAR, THE DRAFT JOINT PRESS STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE US SIDE IS NOT A PRESS COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORMAL NATURE. SO I BELIEVE IF YOU WILL MAKE A SERIOUS STUDY OF THE CHINESE SIDE'S REPLY, YOU WILL UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION."

3. DCM THAYER ACCOMPANIED ME. CHIAO WAS FLANKED, AS ON OCTOBER 27, BY NANCY TANG, TING, CHAO AND SHIH.

4. COMMENT: IN MY OPINION WE ARE NOT GOING TO GET ANY EARLY AGREEMENT TO A SATISFACTORY JOINT COMMUNIQUE OR JOINT PRESS STATEMENT CONTAINING ANY SUBSTANCE. MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT AT THIS POINT WE SHOULD ADVISE CHIAO THAT WE ARE AGREEABLE TO NO STATEMENT WHATSOEVER OR TO A VERY SIMPLE



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PSN:002222

PAGE 02

TOR:304/10:48Z

DTG:310810Z OCT 75

PRESS COMMUNIQUE WHICH WOULD SET OUT THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE VISIT: WHO THE PRESIDENT SAW, WHERE HE WENT, ETC., AND PERHAPS INCLUDE A SENTENCE OR TWO ON "FRANK AND FRIENDLY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS," AND REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.

END PAGE 2

5. IF WE ADOPT THE "NO COMMUNIQUE, NO STATEMENT" POSTURE, WE WILL NEED TO DO SOME GROUNDWORK IN THE USA TO LAY TO REST THE "JUNKET" CRITICISM THAT KEEPS SURFACING. THIS CAN BEST BE DONE, IN MY OPINION, BY STRESSING THE FOUR-YEAR INTERVAL SINCE OUR TOP LEADERS HAVE MET.

6. IF THERE IS ANY MAGIC TO A NOVEMBER 3 ANNOUNCEMENT, I THINK WE SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTION BY 8 AM PEKING TIME TOMORROW (NOVEMBER 1) SO THAT I CAN GET BACK TO THE CHINESE. HOWEVER, CHIAO, OF COURSE, IS BUSY WITH THE SCHMIDT VISIT, AND WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILL BE GOING TOMORROW TO NANKING AND/OR URUMCHI WITH THE CHANCELLOR.

7. I WILL FORWARD MY VIEWS ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE VISIT IN A SEPARATE CABLE.

8. WARM REGARDS.

GEORGE BUSH

BT



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
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NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM NOYMIHAN

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: UN, KS, KN, CH  
SUBJ: KOREA AT THE 30TH GA



1. THIS CONCERNS THE CHINESE, AND SO I TAKE THE LIBERTY OF ADDRESSING YOU DIRECTLY.
2. YESTERDAY A MEMBER OF THE CHINESE DELEGATION APPROACHED ONE OF OUR PEOPLE WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST TO POSTPONE ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE KOREAN QUESTION TO THE 31ST UNGA, ADDING THAT THEY COULD DELIVER THEIR COSPONSORS FOR SUCH A MOVE. AT LUNCH TODAY I APPROACHED HUANG HUA AND RELATED THIS EXCHANGE. HE SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THE BEST THING WOULD BE MERELY TO HAVE A REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE'S ACTIONS ADOPTED BY THE PLENARY, WITH MEMBERS EXPLAINING THEIR VOTE AFTERWARDS. I SAID I WOULD TELL YOU THIS.
3. THERE WOULD BE PROCEDURAL NICETIES HERE, BUT IT COULD BE WORKED OUT THAT SUCH A REPORT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY CONSENSUS, OR SOME SIMILAR DEVICE. THIS HAS ATTRACTIONS. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT WE ARE AFRAID THAT WITH THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION HAVING NOW GAINED A MAJORITY IN COMMITTEE BY A MARGIN LARGER THAN OURS, OUR RESOLUTION COULD LOSE IN PLENARY. THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE DEFECTED, AND WE DON'T REALLY SEE MANY POTENTIAL RECRUITS. (THUS THE TWENTY-ONE

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PAGE 02 USUN N 5532 010011Z

PERSONAL MESSAGES YOU SENT OUT BEFORE THE COMMITTEE VOTE, PRODUCED ONLY EIGHT FAVORABLE CHANGES, NINE COUNTRIES REMAINED UNCHANGED, AND FOUR CHANGED FOR THE WORSE.) BUT OBVIOUSLY THIS IS A MATTER I COULD PURSUE WITHOUT YOUR DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS, AND IT MAY BE THAT EVEN IF YOU WANT IT DONE YOU WOULD WANT IT DONE ELSEWHERE.

4. JUST AS OBVIOUSLY, WHATEVER YOU DESIRE, WE MUST GO AHEAD WITH OUR WORLDWIDE CAMPAIGN IN ORDER TO HAVE THE STRENGTH TO MAKE THE OTHER SIDE WILLING TO COMPROMISE.

WARM REGARDS,  
HOYNIHAN

~~SECRET~~

