

**The original documents are located in Box 5, folder “China, unnumbered items - (16), 7/6/75 - 7/23/75” of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

### **Copyright Notice**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028050

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum of Conversation

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Jerry Bremer

CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Notetaker

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re China

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/06/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200136

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (16)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/12/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

*declassified with portions exempted*

MR 97-8 #3

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary, Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant Secretary Habib  
Mr. Winston Lord  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Gleysteen  
Mr. Richard Solomon, NSC  
Jerry Bremer, Notetaker *WV*

SUBJECT: China

DATE: July 6, 1975

DISTRIBUTION: S, LPB, Memcon Book, NSC - Rodman

---

The Secretary: I don't really have that much to say. I have read your paper and I just won't do it that way. It's exactly the same paper you presented me last year.

Lord: No, it isn't. The question is: On your advance trip do you make some serious effort to find their security requirements?

The Secretary: For political reasons it's just impossible for the US to go for normalization before '76. If there's any one thing that will trigger a conservative reaction to Ford, that's it.

Lord: We recognize that and felt that if the terms were decent enough perhaps it's less of a political problem.


The Secretary: I've got a problem with Panama and China. I don't even agree with your intellectual thesis -- that this is the right time to force it.

Lord: The last time they didn't want to discuss it.

The Secretary: Even if they did, what they said to the Professor was for domestic consumption. You can't hold a government to what they say for domestic consumption.

Lord: Presumably we would make our own statement.

The Secretary: What is our legal basis for defending part of one country?



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED *with portions exempted*

AUTHORITY *MR 97-8#3 State Dept 9/4/97*

BY *LR* NLE DATE *7/2/08*

*KBH 10123197*

Gleysteen: There is none.

The Secretary: If that's the case, we can't afford to have it in a campaign.

Solomon: They have clearly indicated in seven or eight places recently their desire to be flexible. They're afraid Ford will cancel his trip.

The Secretary: The trip is clear. They are anxious for it but I see no flexibility on Taiwan.

Lord: We recognize there is not much room for maneuverability. The only issue is whether you try to see the terms.

Habib: It's difficult to avoid discussing during your trip.

The Secretary: But suppose they give us generous terms? What do I do then? Pocket it and say, "We'll have no deal for two years." Anyway can they go beyond what they've told this guy?

Gleysteen: No, the question is what kind of relationship would they permit.

The Secretary: We can consider that when we have to sell this to Congress. What do we say then, by the way? Are we going to continue to send arms?

Gleysteen: You have to be able to say yes.

The Secretary: But do we have a legal basis?

Gleysteen: There is no legal barrier if the host government tolerates it. That's the most crucial aspect.

Habib: They would have on a sales basis. No credit.

The Secretary: But then it is essentially within their power to stop it at any point.

Lord: We have always had this dilemma from the time we started this relationship. You have to make it clear in your unilateral statement.



The Secretary: I'm wondering where we'll be if we go down this road. I'll try to raise it with the President but I know the answer. Those guys over there won't even take on Panama right now.

Lord: The paper argues the importance of doing this from our international position, and also argues that there is a need for some serious discussion when you go there in August.

The Secretary: Who said I was going in August? I am certainly not going in August.

Lord: If they give you a bad deal in return, your position would be strengthened. But if it generates an offer then I agree we have a bind.

The Secretary: What if they go to the limit?

Gleysteen: I think the chances are not very high they'd go that far. I think the terms in the pre-visit will be very tough.

The Secretary: I think we're better off saying we don't think we're quite ready. We've told them what we need.

Lord: I think we can be more concrete and say that we cannot do it without satisfaction on security.

Habib: I don't think they'll give you their last position when you are there. Won't they hold that out for the President?

Lord: No.

The Secretary: It is not their way of negotiating.

Solomon: They might make the Presidential trip conditional on something.

The Secretary: No. How would they react if he visited other countries in Asia do you think -- like the Philippines and Indonesia?

Habib: If he did it on the way back, it would be no problem at all. I think that's a good idea.

The Secretary: Then it's not a special trip to China. What about Malaysia?



Habib: I think the essential ones are the Philippines and Indonesia.

The Secretary: How about Australia?

Habib: It depends on what's happening there.

The Secretary: Can they do Australia and not New Zealand?

Habib: It's difficult. The New Zealanders wouldn't understand.

The Secretary: [REDACTED]

Habib: That's because we never have any problems with them. All they ever talk about is cheese and butter.

The Secretary: And mutton. What do I want from them this evening?

Lord: Do you want to discuss your trip?

The Secretary: They have to make a proposal to us.

Lord: Since the last time you've seen them, they are more nervous.

The Secretary: I noticed that whatever you said to them about Schlesinger didn't get through. They told a group of Iranians that they thought Rumsfeld's and Hartmann's influence was rising over mine. That's just stupid. Rumsfeld I can see, but Hartmann I don't understand at all.

Solomon: They're fed by third countries.

The Secretary: Hartmann is slipping in the White House and certainly has no relation to me.

Lord: It should be up to them to suggest something on your trip. (Secretary is interrupted for a phone call.)

Habib: On the visit, you did put some suggested times for the President's trip and they answered that any time was all right. I suppose you could mention a specific time now.

The Secretary: Why can't they raise the visit?





Habib: I think they probably think that they've already replied to you.

Solomon: If you really want to raise their anxieties, don't mention it at all. Otherwise, you could just mention your trip which will make them only slightly less nervous.

Lord: Or ask if they've had any further word from Peking.

Habib: His answer will be -- "It's up to you."

The Secretary: I won't go next time unless they understand that I am to see Mao. I will not go through that BS again with our press.

Lord: I agree that we should not explore normalization unless we're prepared to go through with it.

The Secretary: My experience with the Chinese is to tell them exactly what our position is. Be frank with them.

Lord: Our concern is that the relationship is apt to unravel if nothing happens in the next two years.

The Secretary: I don't know. In my view, the relationship is based on their fear of the Russians.


Gleysteen: It is, but our people interpret it differently.

Habib: Another problem is your relationship to the process itself and to the understandings they've developed with you. You're the only one left. And that has meaning to them.

Gleysteen: One point that is not made in the paper is that the period of six months to a year now is a good one in Taiwan where the people are braced for a change.

The Secretary: If we could find a step toward normalization, I'd be receptive to it. But what kind of steps are there?

Lord: Things like lowering Taiwan to a Chargé level and lowering our arms supplies.



Gleysteen: You could get into some domestic problems with that.

The Secretary: Perhaps you could strengthen the unity point and find some formula to do that.

Solomon: That is always the strongest card with them. That's the core of normalization. I think they could be playing Teng as the front man.

The Secretary: If that's what they want, then we can do something along those lines.

Habib: I think you want to start this afternoon anyway with a review of what you're going to say to Gromyko and then go on the trip.

Solomon: There's only one argument for doing something and that is that if their situation dissipates so badly there, that they were to turn to the Soviets. Doing something might enable Chou and Mao to hold their domestic constituency for our relationship.

The Secretary: Well, I'm willing to find some step short of normalization.





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office  
in Washington  
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor  
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter  
Yang Yu-yung, Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State  
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,  
Department of State  
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member,  
National Security Council

DATE, TIME,  
AND PLACE:

July 7, 1975; 5:35 p.m. - 6:15 p.m.  
Department of State

SUBJECT:

Discussion of the Secretary's Forthcoming Trip  
to Europe; the President's China Trip

Ambassador Huang: You will be leaving again!

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, Wednesday morning -- for Paris, Geneva,  
Bonn, and London.

We are going to announce tomorrow that I will see the Israeli Prime  
Minister while I am in Bonn. So it will be a very hectic trip.


What is the news from our friends in Peking?

Ambassador Huang (pointing to the staff present): Some of you read  
our newspapers in Peking, or our broadcasts. (To the Secretary)  
Your colleagues must know [what the news is].

Secretary Kissinger: You have no secrets? You must be following  
our practice. (Laughter)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/21/04  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08



Ambassador Huang: What needs to be broadcast will be broadcast; what needs to be published will be published.

Secretary Kissinger: So you have nothing to add?

Ambassador Huang: According to Dr. Kissinger's usual arrangement, I will be pleased to listen to your views.

Secretary Kissinger: I know that as a good general the Ambassador doesn't commit his reserves too early.

There were no especially urgent matters to discuss. It is just that as we have not met for several months I thought it would be useful to have a general review.

We have read a number of statements by your leaders to our journalists and others. We have paid attention to these.

As you know, I am going to see Foreign Minister Gromyko on Thursday evening, and Friday. He will want to discuss with us the Middle East, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the European Security Conference to a limited extent.

On the Middle East: As I told you last time, our effort is to gain some control over events and reduce the possibilities of some other power increasing its influence in the region. Since we last met, we have restored some momentum to our diplomacy. Therefore, I won't have very much to discuss with Gromyko in the way of concrete steps that the U.S. will be prepared to take with the Soviet Union [regarding the Middle East].

We still want to leave open the possibility of agreement between Israel and Egypt, and therefore we are not prepared to assemble the Geneva conference until that possibility is exhausted. So, for the time being, we will still pursue a separate course in the Middle East.

On the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Soviet Union owes us an answer, and I find it hard to predict if there will be some movement. But as I stated publicly, we will not have a summit meeting in Washington if there is no agreement on Strategic Arms Limitation.

Then, the European Security Conference will meet at the end of July. I was never a great enthusiast for it. At this moment we think it will produce mediocre results.



Beyond that, as I have said, whether Brezhnev comes or not depends on where we make significant progress -- and there are no areas where this might happen other than those you know about.

In other parts of the world, our relations with our European friends are better than they have been in many years. If there is a European Security Conference, the President will probably stop in Bonn on the way -- and he will also visit Warsaw, Belgrade, and Bucharest [on the way back] to make it clear that we do not accept a dividing line -- a sphere of influence -- that ends in the middle of the continent.

On other areas, in India, we notice not without interest Madame Ghandi's recent actions. I do not think I will be attacked in the U.S. for being hard on her, as I was several years ago.

In Indochina, we are not playing any particular role at this moment. We hope that other countries won't use it for military bases -- but we are not active in any way.


We have noted that your government has restored relations with the Philippines and with Thailand. We believe that this is commensurate with present realities.

I am sure you are familiar with the proposal we made with respect to Korea in the United Nations. (Mr. Lord hands the Secretary a piece of paper, which he pauses to read.)

With respect to Japan, we are pursuing compatible policies. You know that Prime Minister Miki is coming here in August; and the Emperor will come in October. But we won't discourage Japan from pursuing its friendly relations with China.

These are the major areas I wanted to cover. You know our friendly relations with Pakistan, our desire to help them. So these are the major trends in our foreign policy right now.

Ambassador Huang: I would like to put this question to Mr. Secretary: We know that you started your reassessment of your Middle East policy for a long time. Has anything come out of it? We know that Mr. President, and the Secretary, met with Mr. Sadat [in Europe in June]. We have also learned from the press today that the cabinet of Israel will



wait a week before deciding [on their position regarding the negotiations with Egypt]. And Mr. Secretary has just now told us he will also meet Mr. Rabin in Bonn.

Another question, which is related to the first, is what prospect do you see for your step-by-step diplomacy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we will never formally announce the conclusion of the step-by-step approach, as it is too much fun answering press questions. But as you no doubt are aware, being located here in Washington, this [Middle East diplomacy] is partly a domestic question. You know that we have moved to a much more impartial position [between Israel and the Arabs] than several years ago; and we are urging very strongly progress on all parties concerned, especially Israel. But I think that the chances of making some further step forward have improved in recent weeks.

Ambassador Huang: Chairman Mao once said that it is important to follow a policy of two hands in the Middle East, to be even-handed.

Secretary Kissinger: I remember his comment very clearly. This is our policy, with our reassessment, to pursue an even-handed policy more actively.


Ambassador Huang: What prospects do you then see for the step-by-step approach?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it has improved. In fact, I am receiving the Israeli ambassador later this evening. He will give me his government's formal position -- we have not yet received the content of their position.

Ambassador Huang: We have learned from the press that the U.S. side is thinking that if a step-by-step approach does not produce results then you will go in for an overall settlement in the framework of the Geneva Conference.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but we would have to put forward our own plan. So we would prefer to hold off for a while as Sadat has invested so much in another step. We will work with him, and later we will work in the Geneva framework.

On our bilateral affairs, have you heard any reflections on the possible Presidential visit to China?



Ambassador Huang: I already discussed this problem the last time we met. Our attitude has been very clear all along. That is -- Mr. Secretary also mentioned that our leaders had a discussion with American friends visiting China, with the newspaper editors. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing said that if President Ford would like to visit China we will welcome him. The Vice Premier said that if he comes to discuss matters it is all right; or if he prefers not to discuss matters that is all right too. If their minds meet in discussions that is fine; but if there is no meeting of minds, that is also fine. So on the question of the visit of the President, Vice Premier Teng said that this matter is up to the President to decide.

Secretary Kissinger: So let me ask you frankly if we should consider this statement of the Vice Premier's as official? You have already answered my question (Huang interjects: Doubtlessly [the Teng statement is official]; without question.)

One possibility is whether there can be intermediate points between a full meeting of the minds and no progress at all.

Ambassador Huang: Perhaps Doctor remembers what Chairman Mao told [Edgar] Snow before President Nixon visited China. Chairman Mao made several statements to the same effect [as the recent Teng statement]. So it is my personal opinion that we will not bring any difficulties on our guests.


Secretary Kissinger: So, I will discuss this conversation with the President. When I return [from the forthcoming European trip] we will further discuss this question more concretely.

Our idea would be that about six to eight weeks before the President goes, I would go to work out preliminary arrangements and understandings. But we will make a concrete proposal to you.

Ambassador Huang: We will wait until you come back, and then have a further discussion. When will you return?

Secretary Kissinger: This will be a quick trip. I leave on Wednesday and will be back Saturday night.

Ambassador Huang: Are there any other points?



Secretary Kissinger: We appreciate the Congressional visits that will be taking place. We will try to prepare them -- but then you have handled so many different delegations, and after Senator Magnuson you are prepared for anything. (Laughter)

Ambassador Huang: There will be two Congressional visits in August.

Secretary Kissinger (to Mr. Solomon): Are you going with one of the groups, Dick?

Mr. Solomon: I'll see how busy I am then with other things.

Ambassador Huang: So we will see you when you get back.

[At this point the discussion ended and Mr. Solomon escorted the Chinese party to the door.]



647

\*\*\*\*\* ~~TOP SECRET~~ \*\*\*\*\* COPY

OP IMMED  
DE WTE #3633 1941840  
O 131754Z JUL 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//WASH 107//

TO USLO PEKING

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE WH51231

WASH 107

TO: AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH  
USLO PEKING

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

1. THE SECRETARY CALLED IN PRCLD CHIEF HUANG CHEN ON JULY 7 FOR A 45 MINUTE PREVIEW OF HIS FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN TRIP, AND A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES COVERED.

2. THE SECRETARY BEGAN BY COMMENTING THAT HE HAD NOTED VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY CHINESE LEADERS TO OUR PRESS AND OTHERS ABOUT U.S.-PRC RELATIONS (AN INDIRECT REFERENCE TO TENG HSIANG-PIING'S COMMENTS TO THE ASNE EDITORS, AND THE CHOU-C.P. LI DISCUSSION.) HE THEN TURNED TO A REVIEW OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS, COMMENTING THAT THERE IS NOW SOME RENEWED MOMENTUM TO "STEP-BY-STEP" DIPLOMACY, HE SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD PROCEED WITH UNILATERAL EFFORTS TO GAIN ANOTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT BEFORE CONSIDERING A RESORT TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. HE COMMENTED TO HUANG THAT HE WILL BE MEETING WITH ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER RABIN DURING HIS STOP IN BONN LATER THIS WEEK.

3. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN EUROPE TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE MOVEMENT ON SALT, THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, AND PERHAPS THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. HE STRESSED THAT THERE WOULD BE

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2104*

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *KR*, NARA, DATE *7/7/08*



PSN:054692

PAGE 01

TOR:194/18:40Z

DTG:131754Z JUL 75

\*\*\*\*\* ~~TOP SECRET~~ \*\*\*\*\* COPY



NO SUMMIT MEETING LATER IN THE FALL WITHOUT SOME AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS.


4. THE SECRETARY THEN VERY BRIEFLY REVIEWED PROGRESS IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. HE SAID IT WAS LIKELY TO CONVENE AT THE END OF JULY, BUT THAT IT IS LIKELY TO PRODUCE NO MORE THAN MEDIOCRE RESULTS. HE THEN TOUCHED ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA, NOTED THAT THE PRC HAD ESTABLISHED RELATIONS WITH THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND, AND OBSERVED THAT WE (THE U.S. AND PRC) CONTINUE TO PURSUE COMPATIBLE POLICIES REGARDING JAPAN.

5. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT HE ASSUMED THE CHINESE SIDE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE PROPOSAL THE U.S. HAD RECENTLY MADE AT THE U.N. WITH RESPECT TO KOREA. HUANG MADE NO REPLY IN RESPONSE.

6. HUANG MADE FEW REMARKS DURING THE PRESENTATION, BUT AT THE END PRESSED THE SECRETARY FOR A MORE PRECISE ESTIMATE OF PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DIPLOMATIC MOVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE EMPHASIZED CHAIRMAN MAO'S BELIEF THAT THE U.S. SHOULD FOLLOW AN EVEN-HANDED POLICY IN DEALINGS WITH THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL.

7. TURNING TO BILATERAL AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY INQUIRED WHETHER HUANG HAD RECEIVED ANY REFLECTIONS FROM PEKING ABOUT THE POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT. HUANG NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD BEGUN THE CONVERSATION BY COMMENTING THAT HE HAD SEEN VARIOUS COMMENTS BY PRC LEADERS IN THE PRESS. HE EXPLICITLY REFERRED TO VICE PREMIER TENG HSIANG-PING'S COMMENTS TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS' DELEGATION. HUANG REPEATED TENG'S COMMENT THAT IF THE PRESIDENT WISHES TO VISIT THE PRC, THE CHINESE WILL WELCOME HIM. HE FURTHER ELABORATED THAT IF THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO COME TO DISCUSS MATTERS THAT IS ALL RIGHT; OR IF HE PREFERS NOT TO DISCUSS MATTERS THAT IS ALL RIGHT TOO. IF THERE IS A MEETING OF MINDS IN THE DISCUSSIONS, ADDED HUANG, THAT IS FINE; BUT IF THERE IS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS, THAT IS ALSO FINE. THE SECRETARY INTERJECTED THAT PERHAPS THERE WERE INTERMEDIATE STEPS BETWEEN A FULL MEETING OF MINDS AND NO PROGRESS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

8. THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED WHETHER HE SHOULD CONSIDER TENG'S PUBLIC STATEMENT AUTHORITATIVE. HUANG RESPONDED, "DOUBTLESSLY; WITHOUT QUESTION." HE THEN RECALLED FOR THE SECRETARY CHAIRMAN MAO'S COMMENTS TO EDGAR SNOW BEFORE THE NIXON VISIT TO PEKING WHICH MADE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POINT (THAT A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT NEED NOT RESULT IN ANY PARTICULAR OUTCOME.) HUANG CONCLUDED BY SAYING, "SO IT IS MY PERSONAL OPINION THAT WE WILL NOT BRING



ANY DIFFICULTIES ON OUR GUESTS." THE SECRETARY THEN CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD REPORT HUANG'S REMARKS TO THE PRESIDENT AND THEN DISCUSS CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS WITH HUANG AFTER HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE.

9. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE HUANG'S REMARKS ARE ABOUT AS DIRECT A CONFIRMATION AS WE MIGHT RECEIVE THAT PRC OFFICIALS ARE WILLING TO RECEIVE THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT PRECONDITION, AND THAT THEY WILL NOT CAUSE HIM ANY POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT IF THE TRIP DOES NOT RESULT IN A DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-PRC BILATERAL RELATIONS.

STRICTLY FYI: THE SECRETARY IS NOW THINKING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ADVANCE TRIP TO PEKING IN OCTOBER SHORTLY AFTER THE VISIT TO THE U.S. OF THE JAPANESE EMPEROR, BUT BEFORE THE BREZHNEV SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON. IF THE ADVANCE TRIP IS SATISFACTORY, THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WOULD PRESUMABLY OCCUR SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS LATER; THAT IS, SOMETIME IN LATE NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER. THE SECRETARY IS ALSO CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTIAL STEPS THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT TAKE SHORT OF A FULLY NORMALIZED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRC WHICH WOULD SUSTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, BUT WHICH WOULD NOT REQUIRE A BREAK IN FORMAL RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. THESE LAST TWO POINTS ARE OBVIOUSLY VERY SENSITIVE, AND ARE STRICTLY FOR YOUR EYES AT THIS POINT. THEY SHOULD NOT BE REFLECTED IN ANY CONTACTS YOU MIGHT HAVE WITH THE CHINESE. END FYI.

10. WARM REGARDS,  
0925



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

4  
DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2/04*  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Senator Jacob K. Javits  
Senator James B. Pearson  
Senator Claiborne Pell  
Senator Charles H. Percy  
Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, III

Representative John B. Anderson  
Representative Paul Findley  
Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.  
Representative John Slack

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for  
East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State  
for Congressional Relations  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning,  
Department of State  
Oscar V. Armstrong, Director, People's Republic  
of China and Mongolia Affairs, Department of  
State  
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member,  
National Security Council

DATE AND TIME:


Tuesday, July 22, 1975; 6:45 - 8:00 p.m.

PLACE:

Madison-Monroe Room  
Department of State

SUBJECT:

Secretary Kissinger's Briefing of  
Congressional Delegates Before Their Visit  
to the People's Republic of China



Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate your coming. Let me give you our impressions of our relations with China, and then I will be glad to answer your questions. None of you have been there before?

Let me give you my experience. When I first met the Chinese I found them the most fascinating, intelligent and charming people I had known. To some extent

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE


this is true, but I can add to it now that they are the most self-centered, the most cold-blooded, analytical people I have encountered. I'd say that nothing in my experience matches it. Whether it's talking with a counter girl at the Shanghai Airport, or with Chou En-lai, everything seems to have one grand design. Nothing is accidental. Dealing with them is like one endless negotiation. I don't know if this is true when a Congressional delegation travels but it has been my experience. They make the totally planned appear spontaneous.

Even their sight-seeing is a totally planned activity. For example they will take you out to the Ming Tombs or the Great Wall. You can set your clock on the schedule they follow, but when you are there no one is looking at their watches; there is no sense of pressure. I asked their protocol chief Han Hsu how they did it. He replied: (1) they don't give a detailed schedule to the guests, and (2) they estimate what their guests will do and then segment the activity into eight minute segments. If the guests do more in any given segment then they just take out some of the later segments; if they do less, they just add on some segments. I am not sure what this says about their view of the attention span of foreigners. All this is done without using walkie-talkies.

When I have reviewed the records of my talks in China, in retrospect you can see how it fits into one grand scheme. The first time that President Nixon met Chairman Mao I thought -- with my characteristic humility -- that it was a "B" conversation; there was nothing spectacular. Mao just seemed to ramble from one subject to another. Two weeks later I reread the record of the conversation. Mao's comments were like the overture to a Wagner opera. Every theme discussed during the week [of the Nixon visit] had its predicate in the Mao conversation. Every other statesmen in the world would say, "I have fifteen points I want to make," and then he would read them. Mao just rambled along. He didn't say, "Remember this point." They are not like the Soviets: "Here are ten points" and a baseball bat. Someday I expect to be in an elevator in the Soviet Union and to push a button and I will over load the whole system.

On the negative side, they [the Chinese] basically don't give a damn about what you think. They truly consider themselves the Middle Kingdom. They have such a feeling of arrogant self-sufficiency.

Those things that they see as essential to their survival they study with meticulous attention. They give the most cold-blooded, amoral attention to




the geopolitical factors of containing the Soviet Union. Mao and Chou En-lai have been through the revolution from the beginning, on the Great March. They are men of principle, of great conviction. They combine the ideological level with a cold-blooded pragmatism. Teng might not impress you this way, but if you were to meet Chou, you would see this combination of principle and cold-bloodedness. Their basic reason for moving to us has nothing to do with Formosa. It has everything to do with their fear of the Soviet Union. They don't want to appear to want us, rather they will warn everyone about the Soviet threat. Their basic interest in the U.S. is in maintaining a world balance of power. If they loose this view, they will loose interest in us. I believe the Turkish aid situation has had an impact on them. Everytime I have seen Mao he talks about a tier of states to the south of the Soviet Union. This will affect their perception of our ability to affect our own survival.

Everytime I see Mao he gives a magnificent explanation of the geopolitical situation and talks of the need to take actions to control the Soviet Union -- Chou En-lai also. You don't see the bureaucratic factor in Chou.

Formosa: Of course we have discussed it, but it is not central. If they make a list of topics they put it last. They are not eager, partly because they don't want to create complications for us. It is not the central issue in our relationship. As the Shanghai Communique says, we have to move toward a new relationship; but whether it is this year or next, or later, it is not critical.

There is one school of thought that says you have to move while Mao and Chou are alive. I don't fully agree with this view as they haven't offered us a better deal. The mistake of many visitors is that they try to solve the Taiwan problem. It is not excessively helpful for people to try to solve it now. The Chinese have said that the President will be welcome regardless of the Taiwan problem. If you raise this question they may be compelled to take some action.

Their overriding concern is with the Soviets having new openings in Indochina. Indochina was a moral defeat for the U.S., but a geopolitical defeat for the Chinese. They now have on their southern border a country of 45 million trying to create an empire of 90 million -- if you include the Laotians and the Cambodians. This may spill over into Thailand. The Chinese look at international affairs in terms of power relationships -- as De Gaulle did. If they [the North Vietnamese] succeed, China will be in the unenviable position of having a major military power on every border. They know that the Vietnamese historically distrust China. Hanoi leans on the Soviets



because of this. The Chinese are the only foreign power active in Cambodia -- the only country in Indochina trying to insulate Cambodia against the Vietnamese. They are anxious to keep us in Asia.

They are not interested in -- unlike my academic friends -- cultural exchanges and trade. They want us to be strong in Asia, strong in the world. They are our best NATO allies. Every European leader [who visits China] gets a lecture on maintaining NATO. Everytime I go there I get scolded for not maintaining good relations with our allies.

They have certain parallel interests with us. They want us to have strong relations with Europe, want to have good relations between the United States and Japan. But we shouldn't delude ourselves. In five years if they become strong they could just cold-bloodedly push us away. Someday they may treat us like the Soviet Union, like an enemy. But for the foreseeable future, their fear of the Soviet Union is the basis of their assessments.


They are endlessly fascinating.

Representative McCloskey: If they want us to maintain NATO, do they not want us in Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: On the one hand they don't want us involved. They have certain obligations to North Korea, as they did in Indochina. They will tell you that they want our troops out. But they would be very disturbed if Japan struck out on an independent and militaristic path -- which would happen if we withdrew from Korea. They will restrain North Korea from making an attack, but will support them in the U.N.

Senator Javits: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could tell us what their aspirations are for their country; and what is their attitude toward Japan.

Secretary Kissinger: I only know Chinese in their 60s and 70s. I don't know younger people there. It sounds ridiculous to say that I only know Mao, Chou, Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Very few Americans have conversations with these people outside of their senior officials. Mao, Chou, and Teng have enormous pride in their accomplishments. They remember the Long March. I remember Marshal Yeh Chien-ying -- their acting Defense Minister, now their Defense Minister -- on my first trip. He made some comments that sounded spontaneous. He said, "When I joined Mao, I never thought I was doing anything for the present generation. When I joined the revolution, I thought I was joining a teacher, yet here we are and here you are." He saw Mao just as a teacher.



not a military man. They want economic advancement, but also an egalitarian society. Mao has a conception that if you have Communism you create a bureaucracy, a new Mandarin class. Mao believes in permanent revolution, that every ten years you have to do away with it all. He is right.

On my first trip to China Chou En-lai talked to me about their Cultural Revolution. I said, "This is your domestic problem." He said, "No, no, you have to understand." They want permanent revolution; this is a major issue of principle to them. If you appeal to their principles they are happy. Not the Soviets. They are happy only when they are chisseling you. My experience is that the Chinese give you an honest position and then stick to it. When we were drafting the Shanghai Communique, the Chinese included several sentences we felt were inappropriate to a document that the President would sign. I said to Chou En-lai that if you take out these sentences, I'll give you several of ours that are objectionable to your side. Chou said, "Keep your sentences, I don't want them. You tell me why you find our sentences offensive. If you can convince me, I will take them out." So we talked about them and they later took out those sentences. But the Chinese are very thrifty. A short time later they used these same sentences in a speech that Ch'iao Kuan-hua gave at the United Nations.

Those who knew China before are impressed that visible poverty has been eliminated; it is not like India. There is no squalor, plenty of food. And they have done it without foreign help.

Japan: They are ambivalent. The first time I came they were very hostile toward Japan. Now they want a positive relationship with the Japanese, and they never attack our relations with Japan. In one of my meetings with Mao he asked if I had been in Japan. I said I had been there for a day and a half. Mao said that that was not enough that I should not offend the Japanese. But they are afraid of a nationalistic Japan. In five years, they might try to move Japan away from us, but not now. They could raise hell by forcing Japan to chose between China and the U.S.

Senator Percy: What are they up to in Vietnam and Cambodia?

Secretary Kissinger: The Chinese are now saying that the Soviets have military bases in Indochina. This is not their governmental people but some of their people in Hong Kong. According to our information that is not correct. I don't believe Hanoi won the war to become a Soviet stooge. They are just playing them both off (the Chinese and the Soviets). The Chinese are trying to gain a foothold in Cambodia. Hanoi sustains the heritage of Ho Chi Minh. His vision of a united Indochina. The Vietnamese hope to gain control of Cambodia. Le Duc Tho told us this in Paris. So at present there is greater Soviet influence than Chinese in Hanoi, but Hanoi isn't a Soviet stooge.





The Chinese nightmare is of a Soviet security system coming down to surround them. They see India as a Soviet stooge, an extension of the Soviet Union. They have contempt for them. They think India started the border war. This is the view expressed by Neville Maxwell in his book on the border war. In Indochina the Chinese are supporting the Cambodians; they warn the Thai against the North Vietnamese. I have the impression that the Chinese did not urge the Thai to get rid of the United States. This was also the position they took with the Filipinos.

Senator Pearson: Are they likely to have a succession crisis?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't have any idea of what will happen after Mao and Chou die. Anyone who tells you that he does is full of nonsense. For example, Chou En-lai's situation: We don't know whether he is in the hospital; whether he is hiding in the hospital during a purge; or whether he is there masterminding the purge. We don't know who will emerge. Mao and Chou are going to die. Mao is slipping. With Chou it is very hard to know. He came out of the National People's Congress in a dominant position. There is evidence that his health is failing. Mao a year and a half ago was intellectually in good shape. Teng Hsiao-p'ing now is the dominant figure. But we don't know what will happen when that age-group goes.

Mr. Solomon: We believe Chang Ch'un-ch'iao may be an important figure in the succession. Teng Hsiao-p'ing has some major political liabilities.


Secretary Kissinger: It's like the guessing when Stalin was alive. No one picked Khrushchev. The military could be influential in a succession struggle.

Senator Pell: What are their objectives regarding nuclear weaponry?

Secretary Kissinger: They say that they have no intention of using nuclear weapons first. They also say they will not accept any limitations on nuclear weapons short of their total destruction. Since this won't happen, they are proceeding with their nuclear weapons program. They are building a submarine and ICBMs.

Mr. Habib: They are having problems with their ICBM program.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets are in range of a number of their rockets. It is a minor number; less than a hundred. But it is growing. We used to estimate that by 1978 the Soviets would not be able to strike China without suffering unacceptable damage.



Mr. Lord: They are very sensitive to the U.S. nuclear balance with the Soviets.

Secretary Kissinger: They like Schlesinger's tough statements about maintaining our strength.

I would like to meet with you when you get back. They will take seriously what you have to say. I hope you will take full notes. They are likely to drop things into the conversation that they assume will get back to us. They assume that we will see a full report on your conversations.

Senator Stevenson: Whom do you think we'll see? Do you have any suggestions about topics we might raise?

Secretary Kissinger: I think you will find the Foreign Minister -- Ch'iao Kuan-hua -- more rewarding than Teng.

Anything that your conscience would enable you to say about the United States maintaining a global role in Asia and Europe they will welcome. They don't want us to collapse in the Middle East or to collaborate with the Soviet Union. You could emphasize that we will not collapse; that it's not just that we support Israel but that we will also compete with the Soviets for the moderate Arabs. Their major concern is that the Soviets will inherit the Middle East.

You might convey a sense of continuity in our foreign policy, that if the Democrats win there will be no change in our foreign policy.

Taiwan: It would not be helpful for you to push suggestions. They have already rejected a number of them, like our leaving a Liaison Office in Taipei. This is not a question of finding some gimmick. There is one point: If we had some assurance that they would not use force then we could make progress. If they won't, we will have difficulty in turning over 15 million -- especially in the year when we lost Indochina. This issue is more important than what we call our office in Taipei.

They told us that the Jackson formula -- switching our Liaison Office and Embassy -- was unacceptable before we raised it as a proposition. Our representation in Taiwan will not be a problem. Our problem is the future relationship of Taiwan with the mainland. This is the basic problem. If you raise this, this point would be helpful. Stress the desire for a peaceful settlement of this issue, that there be no use of force. Especially in a bipartisan group this might help them move in that direction.



Senator Percy: Han Hsu told me that they want more normal relations with the Soviet Union and are willing to be reasonable, but the Soviets are hostile toward them. Where's the truth?

Senator Javits: Huang Hua says just the opposite.

Secretary Kissinger: All of them say that the Soviets are hostile to China. Some of the issues could be easily settled. But what bothers the Chinese is the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in 1960 which paralyzed the Chinese economy. Secondly, they see the Soviets as basically expansionist. If they could concentrate enough force they could go after China. Mao, and to some extent Chou, are psychopathic on this point. I think the next generation may be less hostile to the Soviets; somewhat more accommodating. From the Soviet point of view, there are over 800 million highly disciplined Chinese. There will be ups and downs, but a 3,000 mile border is a geopolitical fact. They will continue to be competitive powers.

Do any of my colleagues want to add anything? Win.

Mr. Lord: They are now stressing that the Soviet threat is directed at Europe. This is partly for tactical effect, but they do see the CSCE conference as weakening Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: The Chinese are against popular front governments in Europe. Phil, did you want to add anything?

Mr. Habib: Regarding Korea, you might reinforce the thought that North Korea should not engage in any adventurism against the South.


Senator Percy: Do you think they will be troubled by the fact that we were recently in the Soviet Union? I took pains to be as open with them about our recent trip as possible. Han Hsu seemed to have been fully briefed on it.

Mr. Solomon: I don't think you will find them upset about this. They seem to have great confidence that they will outshine the Soviets. Virtually every group I have talked to who has been to both Russia and China has found the Chinese much more sophisticated and appealing.

Representative Findley: Have they expressed any interest in getting MFN?

Secretary Kissinger: Some newsmen asked the Chinese what they thought of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The Chinese responded that they will be glad to export 30 million Chinese to the United States any time we are interested. They are not pushing us on this.

I look forward to seeing you when you get back.



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT INFORMATIONSECRET/SENSITIVE

July 23, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
 FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RS*  
 SUBJECT: Chinese Interest in U.S. Support for  
 Admission of the Two Vietnams to the U.N.


During an informal conversation at the PRC Liaison Office on July 21, Political Counselor Tsien Ta-yung pointedly raised with me the question of the U.S. supporting the admission of North and South Vietnam to the U.N. Tsien urged the U.S. to "accept the realities" of the situation in Vietnam, and said that "flexibility" on this question would be helpful in dealing with the problem of hegemony. (He didn't specify whether he had Soviet or North Vietnamese hegemony in mind.)

I responded in non-committal fashion, recalling your remarks to Ambassador Huang on May 9 that the U.S. would consider cooperative actions which would stabilize the situation there if there appeared to be some chance of such actions being effective. At the same time I mentioned your comment to Huang that it was helpful to our relationship to avoid confrontations on "peripheral issues" like Korea. I said it might be difficult for us to be "flexible" and "accept realities" on the Vietnam situation if at the same time we were having a confrontation on a problem like Korea which had its own realities as well as implications for the problem of hegemony. Tsien did not answer my inquiry whether the Chinese side could show similar flexibility and accept realities in considering the Korean situation.

The Chinese appear to have two motives in raising the Vietnam representation issue with us. At a time when the Soviets are becoming active on this question at the U.N., Peking may not want to leave the field entirely to the Russians. If the Chinese can "deliver" U.S. support (a non-veto) on this issue, it would help them sustain some influence in Hanoi. Peking probably also sees its interests served by a prolongation of the current "two Vietnams" situation, and may calculate

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/2/04  
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
 BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08




that dual admission to the U. N. will sustain for a period of time the current division of the country by giving the South a forum which will enhance its identity as a separate political entity.

The tactical question for the U.S. is whether we can draw on this expression of PRC interest in American support on the Vietnamese representation issue to modify Peking's position on dual admission for the two Koreas. Our own interests would be well served if we could box in the North Koreans by trading Soviet and Chinese support (a non-veto) for admission of the two Koreas in return for American non-vetoing of admission of the two Vietnams. I understand that State has just put before you an options paper on this issue. Hence, I report this indication of Chinese interest to you for consideration in the context of a possible "linking" strategy.

From what we know of the Chinese position on the Korean question and their current relations with Pyongyang, I frankly think we are unlikely to be successful in working out a big power deal which would bring the two Vietnams and two Koreas into the U. N. at the same time -- as desirable as this would be in helping to stabilize the Korean situation. The core of the problem is the way contention between Moscow and Peking plays itself out over the Korean situation and "third world" politicking in the U. N. If we ask Peking for support on a Vietnam - Korea admission deal, the Chinese will above all be concerned about the position the Soviets will take. If Moscow is unwilling to support joint admission the Chinese will also reject it, both to avoid straining their position with Pyongyang and its "non-aligned" clique, and to avoid Soviet charges of U.S.- PRC "collusion" on this issue. If the Russians support a joint admission deal, however, then Peking will probably turn the tables and oppose it both to embarrass the Russians and to sustain their relatively strong relations with the North Koreans. The Chinese will calculate that they have only a marginal amount to gain with Hanoi for facilitating their admission to the U. N. through a great-power deal, and will lose a considerable amount of capital with the North Koreans and "third world" countries to Moscow's advantage. Thus, under any likely scenario which links admission of the two Vietnams to the two Koreas, we will probably end up having to veto the admission of the Vietnams for lack of PRC and/or Soviet support on the Korean side of a deal.

Despite this pessimistic analysis, it is interesting that the Chinese have actively indicated to us their desire for support on the Vietnam



admission issue -- in order to minimize Soviet influence and prolong the current division of Vietnam. On balance I believe it will be to our advantage to press the Chinese (and Russians) for support on the Korean admission issue by linking it to Vietnam. While there is little chance of success in this approach, it will emphasize to Peking that they cannot expect the U.S. to be "flexible" and "accept realities" in one situation while they are supporting a confrontation on another. (And then, what do we gain from the admission of the two Vietnams if the Communist side violates the universality principle with respect to Korea?)

