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
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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 1461Q

DATE: OCT. 4, 197

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RUZHKU/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6886
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INFO RUESNG/USLO PEKING PRIORITY 3753
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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, KS, KN, US, CH
SUBJECT: PRC VIEWS ON UNC

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. AS RESULT OF OUR CONVERSATION WITH PRC OCTOBER 2, IT APPEARS THAT THE OTHER SIDE IS PREPARED FOR A CONFRONTATION IN THE UN, AND IS NOT WILLING, AT LEAST AS YET, TO COMPROMISE ON DIFFERING KOREAN RESOLUTIONS AND ALSO DOES NOT YET ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL ON UNC AND ARMISTICE. IT IS POSSIBLE BUT NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT THE PRC IS SOMEWHAT MORE DISPOSED THAN IS NORTH KOREA TO SEEK MIDDLE GROUND, BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THERE WILL BE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE DURING PRESENT GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

2. WE MUST NOW CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS TOWARD SUCCESS FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION IN THE UN. WE BELIEVE WE HAVE MARGIN FOR VICTORY AND WE INTEND TO PROCEED WITH REPRESENTATIONS NECESSARY TO WIDEN FAVORABLE MARGIN TO DEFEAT HOSTILE RESOLUTION. VICTORY FOR OUR POSITION WOULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF UNC ISSUE LATER ON, OR ALTERNATIVELY (ALTHOUGH NOT VERY LIKELY) COULD FORCE OTHER SIDE TO ACCEPT OUR COMPROMISE ON UNC AND ON SAFEGUARDING ARMISTICE BEFORE VOTING TAKES PLACE. WE DO NOT INTEND TO GO PUBLIC WITH RESPECT TO ANY PART OF OUR DISCUSSIONS TO DATE WITH THE PRC, BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO

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TELEGRAM

-2- STATE 220134, OCT, 4 '74

NOTE THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF OUR RESOLUTION CLEARLY MEANS WE ARE WILLING TO DISSOLVE UN COMMAND PROVIDED WE CAN MAINTAIN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS GUARANTEE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE PENINSULA.

3. FOR SEOUL: KIM DONG JO HAS BEEN INFORMED OF SUBSTANCE OF ABOVE AND PRESUMABLY HAS REPORTED THESE VIEWS TO FONOFF. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH ROKG YOU SHOULD REMIND KOREANS THAT THEIR ASSESSMENT AS WELL AS OURS INDICATES WE HAVE COMFORTABLE MARGIN IN FAVOR OF OUR RESOLUTION AND WE INTEND TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN IT. YOU SHOULD DO WHAT APPEARS ADVISABLE TO RESTRAIN KOREANS IF THEY SHOW TENDENCY TO GET PANICKY. WOULD APPRECIATE ROK VIEWS ON TACTICS OF HANDLING UN ITEM.

4. FOR TOKYO: YOU MAY INFORM FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS WITH WHOM YOU HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT ON THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE AND SEEK TO OBTAIN THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH US IN WHATEVER REPRESENTATIONS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE UN.

5. FOR USUN: WE WILL WANT YOUR VIEWS AS TO STEPS WE SHOULD NOW TAKE TO ENSURE SUCCESS AT UN IN NOVEMBER.

6. REQUEST ALL RESPONSES ASAP. ANY STEPS WE DECIDE TO TAKE TO STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION MUST BE TAKEN WELL IN ADVANCE OF DEBATE TO BE CREDIBLE. KISSINGER


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WASHINGTON POST 5 OCTOBER 1974 (6)

Peking Says Soviet Threat Has Eased

By John Burns

Toronto Globe and Mail

PEKING, Oct. 4 — The Peking leadership no longer believes that China is in imminent danger of attack by the Soviet Union and has written off the chances of negotiating a peaceful settlement with Taiwan so long as Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, remain in control on the island.

These and other insights into the changing perspectives of Chinese foreign policy emerged during a series of background discussions over the past ten days between high-ranking officials of the Peking government and members of a visiting group of Canadian journalists.

The officials, who insisted that their remarks be unattributed, said that current Chinese policy proceeded from the belief that the Soviet Union regarded the United States as its main enemy and, in any event would not attack China until it had secured its rear by establishing domination over Europe and the Middle East.

On Taiwan, the officials said that China continued to favor a peaceful settlement but regarded this as impossible under the Chiangs. It was not an urgent matter and could be solved by the next generation if not by this, the officials said, but a military solution could not be ruled out if a peaceful one was not forthcoming.

Observers believe the latest remarks may be an attempt to step up pressure on the island government now that the diplomatic battle has essentially been won.

The remarks on Taiwan and on Sino-Soviet relations are a significant departure from the perspectives set forth in public statements over recent years. Similar observations have been made in recent weeks to visiting dignitaries, but it is the first time that they have been made for wide dissemination.

Until now, Peking's public position has been that China faces the danger of sudden attack by the Soviet Union and must take all necessary precautions against it. The warnings have come from China's top leadership, including Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai and have been an insistent theme ever since the border clashes that erupted in the spring and summer of 1969.

The officials said that there was no progress whatsoever in talks with the Soviets on border demarcation which began in the Chinese capital in October 1969.

In the discussions this week, the officials said that the danger of a Soviet attack could not be discounted entirely because the Soviet Union was an imperialist power and it was the nature of imperialism to make war. Furthermore, they said there was a tense situation on the frontier that had not yielded to five years of negotiations and this required a high level of military preparedness.

One official, who is close to the latest thinking on the problem said: "At the moment we do not think there is a possibility of the Soviet Union launching an immediate war against us. We hold that the strategic emphasis of the Soviet Union at the moment is in Europe... and that they will not dare to launch a war against China until they have the control of Europe and the Middle East."

He added: "The border situation is not being eased, so the possibility of small scale conflicts along the border can take pace at almost any time. However, large-scale war is hardly possible at the moment."

The official acknowledged that Soviet frontier forces continue to conduct exercises "with the spearhead pointed against us" and this raised the possibility of "small scale clashes at any

time." But he insisted that the troop buildup posed a bigger threat to the United States and Japan than to China.

"We say that the million troops along the border are mainly directed against the U.S. and Japan and not so much against China," he said. "Of course, if they want to launch an attack against China, a million troops is not enough."

Asked to clarify the reference to the United States and Japan, the official answered obliquely by citing reports of recent Soviet naval activity near the Pacific Island of Midway and around the Hawaiian Islands. These were units of the Soviet forces in the Far East, "and it is clear that their activity is not directed against China."

It was clear from this and other signs, the official said, that the Soviet Union regarded the United States as its main enemy.

This exposed the sham of detente, to which both Moscow and Washington paid lip service, "while in fact what they are thinking about is how to weaken it other so as to drown it" and proceed unchallenged in what he termed their bullying and manipulation of smaller countries.

In his remarks about the Soviet Union, the official referred more than once to Moscow's attempts at "subversion" within China, a theme that has received more emphasis since two alleged spying incidents earlier this year, the first when five Soviet embassy personnel were expelled after allegedly being caught with a Soviet-trained Chinese spy and the second when a Soviet military helicopter was captured in the western province of Sinkiang.

The Soviets repeatedly have demanded the release of the crew but in the discussions with the Canadians the Chinese hinted strongly that the crew members are being prepared for trial.

Said one official: "There is nothing more to say on this incident at the moment. But the helicopter in question came over to China to undertake espionage, so we shall deal with it according to law." He admitted "that it is possible" that the crew will be sentenced.

In earlier statements on the matter, Moscow warned Peking of unspecified consequences if the crew was not returned. But officials in Peking downplayed the importing it as "a minor incident" tance of the issue, described and comparing it to the more important questions that are outstanding, such as the demarcation of an agreed frontier.



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WITHDRAWAL ID 028009

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

RECEIVER'S NAME John H. Holdridge

DESCRIPTION re Secretary's meeting with Ch'iao
Kuan-Hua

CREATION DATE 10/14/1974

VOLUME 9 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200125

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/06/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Ambassador George Bush, Chief-designate
of U. S. Liaison Office, Peking
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

TIME AND DATE: Tuesday, October 15, 1974
12:30 - 12:40 p. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: You will be leaving soon.

Bush: The day after tomorrow. Don't ask me about China! I had a good dinner last night with Ambassador Scali, Secretary Kissinger and the Chinese. They said they approved me quickly. The big thing will be the Kissinger trip in November. David Bruce said the big thing was the one thing that was never discussed with him--Taiwan.

President: That will be a political issue to manage domestically here.

Bush: I konw you're busy. I just wanted to say goodbye.

President: We couldn't have found anyone more qualified.

Bush: If there is anything I can do to help you politically as '76 approaches, just let me know.

President: Thanks. I may try to visit you there by then.

Bush: That would be great! Many thanks for the time.



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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMO TO
THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
FOR GEORGE BUS * USLO PERI *
THROUGH GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER

1. THANK YOU FOR BEKING 74.

2. PLEASE TELL CHIAD KUAM HUA THAT I WILL BRIEF HUANG CHEH AS
SOON AS I RETURN TO WASHINGTON. ALSO, YOU SHOULD STRONGLY
REAFFIRM THE POLICY THAT I STATED AT DINNER IN NEW YORK.


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BY [Signature] NLF DATE 1/21/09



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EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CH
SUBJECT: INITIAL CALL ON VICE MINISTER CH'IAO KUAN-HUA

1. ON THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 29, I PAID MY INITIAL CALL AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO KUAN-HUA. ALSO PRESENT ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG, AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN P'ING, AOAD DEPUTY DIRECTOR TANG WEN-SHENG, U.S. AFFAIRS SECTION CHIEF TING YUAN-HUNG, AMERICAN SECTION DEPUTY DIRECTOR CHAO CHI-HUA AND FUNCTIONARY LIEN CHUNG-PAD, AND ACTING PROTOCOL CHIEF CHU CH'UAN-HSIEN.



2. CH'IAO WAS CURIOUS AS TO WHETHER THERE WERE ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND ON THE PRICE OF OIL. "I HAVE READ PRESS REPORTS," HE SAID, "THAT THE SAUDIS MAY BE WILLING AND ABLE TO LOWER PRICES. IN EUROPE MANY OF OUR FRIENDS ARE BECOMING QUITE ANXIOUS. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IS RELATIVELY BETTER OFF BUT FRANCE IS FEELING THE PINCH. GISCARD D'ESTAING HAS RECENTLY PROPOSED THAT A GROUP OF 10 TO 20 COUNTRIES BE FORMED WHICH WOULD CONSIST OF PRODUCERS, CONSUMERS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WHAT DOES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THINK OF THIS PROPOSAL?"

3. I REPLIED TO THE VICE MINISTER'S REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE OIL PRICE BY DRAWING ON MY GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT, SAYING I HAD NOT RECEIVED A SPECIFIC REPORT OR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS HE HAD RAISED. I ASSURED HIM THAT THE QUESTION OF MID-EAST OIL WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WAS RECEIVING PRIORITY ATTENTION. I REMARKED THAT I WAS

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SURPRISED AFRICAN DEVELOPING NATIONS HAD NOT COMPLAINED MORE LOUDLY ABOUT HIGH OIL PRICES AND WONDERED IF THE THIRD WORLD MIGHT NOT EVENTUALLY SPLIT INTO THE THIRD AND FOURTH WORLDS SINCE THERE WERE SUCH GREAT DIFFERENCES IN THEIR INTERESTS.

4. "IN PRIVATE CONTACTS WITH SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS," REPLIED CH'IAO, "I HAVE HEARD EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ABOUT HIGH OIL PRICES. IF THESE NATIONS HAVE NOT COMPLAINED IN PUBLIC, IT IS PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THEIR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THIRD WORLD SOLIDARITY, BUT WE HOPE THAT THE PRODUCING NATIONS ARE ABLE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS TO REACH A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT WITH THE VARIOUS CONSUMING NATIONS. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT OIL PRICES MIGHT GO UP STILL HIGHER? AND, ARE THE AUSTERITY MEASURES RECENTLY ADOPTED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PROVING EFFECTIVE?"



5. "AS FOR PRICES," I REPLIED, "WE FEEL THAT THEY WILL COME DOWN, BUT THE TIMING WILL DEPEND TO SOME DEGREE ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS. AS FOR AUSTERITY MEASURES, WE HAVE NOT YET TAKEN ANY DRASTIC ACTION BUT PRES. FORD IS VERY SERIOUS AND I BELIEVE THAT MORE POSITIVE MEASURES MAY BE POSSIBLE AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE MADE AFTER THE NOVEMBER 5 ELECTION IN BOTH INCREASING OUR OWN SUPPLY AND DECREASING IMPORTS."

6. AT THIS POINT THERE ENSUED PREDICTABLE EXCHANGE CONCERNING PLD REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS, AT THE CONCLUSION OF WHICH CH'IAO TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF DR. KISSINGER'S UPCOMING VISIT TO PEKING.

7. "I STRONGLY BELIEVE," I REPLIED, "THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA WHICH HAS BEEN WORKED OUT FOR THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS STILL ENJOYS VERY WIDE SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES. SOME PEOPLE, EVEN INCLUDING SEVERAL AMBASSADORS WITH WHOM I HAVE SPOKEN HERE IN PEKING, I BELIEVE THAT THE RELATIONSHIP HAS 'LEVELED OFF'. I MYSELF DO NOT BELIEVE THIS, BUT I HOPE THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S MEETINGS WITH CHINESE LEADERS IN PEKING NEXT MONTH MAY SHOW SOME PROGRESS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AFTER THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE THERE WAS RAISED IN SOME PEOPLE'S MINDS AN UNREALISTIC EXPECTATION OF INSTANT PROGRESS, BUT I WOULD NOT BE HERE, I SAID, UNLESS I THOUGHT THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WAS SOLIDLY FOUNDED AND WOULD GO FORWARD IN THE FUTURE."

8. CH'IAO REPLIED, "AWHILE BACK SOME DIPLOMATS ASKED ME IF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. WAS DETERIORATING BUT RECENTLY NONE HAVE ASKED THIS. MANY PEOPLE DO NOT

UNDERSTAND OUR RELATIONSHIP. CHAIRMAN MAO HAS DISCUSSED THIS WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER AND AGREED THAT OUR COMMON VIEWS ON MAJOR ISSUES OUTWEIGH WHATEVER DIFFICULTIES THERE MAY BE. OF COURSE, THERE ARE SOME PEOPLE IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES IN PEKING WHO WANT TO SEE A SORSENING IN OUR MUTUAL RELATIONS."

9. CH'IAO NEXT RAISED THE SUBJECT OF JAPAN, SAYING THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER WILL BE GOING THERE BEFORE HIS VISIT TO PRC. HE WONDERED IF I HAD ANY IDEAS ABOUT REPORTS HE HAD HEARD THAT PRIME MINISTER TANAKA WAS MEETING WITH DIFFICULTIES. I REPLIED THAT I KNEW LITTLE ABOUT THIS SUBJECT, BUT FELT CERTAIN THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE AS SCHEDULED. CH'IAO AGREED, STATING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WOULD HELP TANAKA.



10. I INQUIRED OF THE VICE MINISTER WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THE CHINESE POSITION ON KOREA OR CAMBODIA SINCE WE HAD LAST SEEN ONE ANOTHER IN NEW YORK. CH'IAO REPLIED VERY BRIEFLY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO BASIC CHANGE.

11. THIS WAS THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR CONVERSATION ASIDE FROM A FEW PLEASANTRIES ABOUT MY FAMILY, CHINESE LESSONS AND OUR RECENT NEW YORK MEETING.

12. IN CONTRAST TO VICE MINISTER YU CHAN YESTERDAY, CH'IAO CONDUCTED THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION HIMSELF. THE MEETING, ATTENDED BY ANDERSON AND MCKINLEY IN ADDITION TO MYSELF ON THE AMERICAN SIDE, WAS FRIENDLY AND RELAXED. CH'IAO WAS HIS NORMAL ENGAGING SELF, THOUGH HE DID SEEM SERIOUSLY BENT ON PROBING THE MID-EAST AND OIL QUESTIONS. AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR CALL, ACTING PROTOCOL CHIEF CHU CH'UAN-HSIEN, IN ESCORTING US TO THE DOOR, ANNOUNCED THAT CH'IAO AND WANG HAI-JUNG WOULD HOLD A BANQUET EVENING NOVEMBER 1 IN HONOR OF OUR ARRIVAL.

13. SINCE CH'IAO IS CLEARLY INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING THE MID-EAST AND OIL PRICES, I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING WHATEVER GUIDANCE THE DEPARTMENT MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ME ON THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY BOTH ON MID-EAST IN GENERAL AND OIL IN PARTICULAR. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING REPLY BEFORE I SEE CH'IAO ON NOVEMBER 1.

BUSH
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Corrected copy: Para 3, line 8, word 3 reads region vice reason

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E O 11652 GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: CHINESE INQUIRIES - OIL PRMFCS
SEC TO 271 REF: PEKING 1893



FOR THE AMBASSADOR BUSH FROM THE SECRETARY

1. CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S INQUIRIES ON THE MIDDLE EAST/OIL PRICE SITUATION ARE VERY REVEALING. THEY DEMONSTRATE THAT, THEIR PUBLIC BACKING ON THE OIL WEAPON NOTWITHSTANDING, THE CHINESE ARE CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEM ON AN ECONOMIC UNRAVELLING OF THE US, EUROPE AND JAPAN, AND THE CONCOMITANT RISE IN RELATIVE SOVIET POWER. THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY ALSO WORRIED ABOUT A MIDDLE EAST IMPASSE AND A CONSEQUENT REVIVAL OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION.
2. IF CHAID RAISES THESE SUBJECTS AGAIN, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT I WILL BE PREPARED TO GO INTO THEM IN DEPTH DURING MY FORTHCOMING VISIT.
3. ON THE MIDDLE EAST YOU CAN TELL HIM THAT WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED A FULL ACCOLNTING OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMIT, THROUGH IT WOULD APPEAR THAT IT HAS COMPLICATED OUR EFFORTS. NEVERTHELESS, WE REMAIN DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT FOR ALL RDREASONS WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE CHINESE. YOU MAY CONFIRM FOR HIM CONFIDENTIALLY THAT I WILL BE GOING TO THE REGION NOVEMBER 6-9 TO DIGEST THE RESULTS OF RABAT AND PLAN NEXT STEPS.
4. ON OIL OUR BASIC STANCE HAS BEEN CLEARLY LAID OUT IN MY RECENT SPEECHES AT THE UN AND ELSEWHERE. AS YOU AND CHAIO DISCUSSED, THE HARDEST HIT ARE NATIONS IN AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA WHO CAN LEAST AFFORD IT. OIL PRICES WILL HAVE TO COME DOWN AT SOME POINT OR THERE WILL BE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES THAT WILL BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST. THE PRESENT SITUATION FAVORS THE RUSSIANS THE MOST. 4 WE PLAN TO TAKE SERIOUS CONSERVATION MEASURES AT HOME AND ARE WORKING WITH OTHER CONSUMERS ON CONSERVATION, NEW SOURCES OF OIL AND ENERGY, AND FINANCIAL MECHNANISMS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO A COOPERATIVE SOLUTION WITH THE PRODUCERS AS CHIAO WISHES, THOUGH

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
TELEGRAM

310450Z OCT 74

WE THINK THE FRENCH INITIATIVE IS PREMATURE. PP
5. RE YOUR DISCUSSION WITH THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR REPORTED
IN EARLIER MESSAGE, I ASSUME YOU REALIZE THAT YOU SHOULD NOT
ENCOURAGE ANY INTERMEDIARY ROLE BY ANYONE THERE ON
CAMBODIA.

6. PLEASE SLUG AS SECRET/NO DIS REPORTS OF CONSERVATIONS
SUCH AS THE ONE YOU HAD WITH CHAIO.

KISSINGER



~~SECRET~~