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June 13, 1973.


UNDERSTANDING ON CAMBODIA

1. On the basis of respect for the principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Cambodia that recognizes the Cambodian people's fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam reaffirm that the settlement of the Cambodian problem falls under the sovereignty of the Cambodians.

2. The United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam reaffirm the obligations of Article 20 of the Paris Agreement. All foreign troops, military advisers, and military personnel shall be withdrawn from Cambodia, as required by Article 20(b) of the Agreement.

3. The United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam will exert their best efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian problem.






June 13, 1973.

*Handed to Huang  
Chen  
6/14/73*

UNDERSTANDING ON LAOS

1. On the basis of respect for the principles of the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos and the Agreement on restoring peace and achieving national concord in Laos signed on February 21, 1973, the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam reaffirm their strong desire that the current negotiations between the two Lao parties will promptly come to a success.



2. The United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam have been informed by the Lao parties that:


(a) The formation of the Provisional Government of National Union would be achieved by July 1, 1973 at the latest.

The U.S. and DRV will exert their best efforts in that direction.

(b) Within a period of no more than 60 days after the date of the establishment of the Provisional Government of National Union, the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign military personnel, regular and irregular troops, and the dismantling of military and paramilitary organizations of foreign countries, including the

"special forces" organized, equipped, trained and commanded by foreign countries, must be completed.

(c) After the return of all persons, regardless of their nationality, who were captured, and those who were imprisoned for cooperating with the other side in wartime, each Lao party has the obligation of getting and supplying information to the other party about the missing in action in Laos.





given to  
Huang Chien  
6/14/73  
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The United States side is prepared to support a proposal for the suspension of UNCURK at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The U.S. side understands that the Government of the Republic of Korea is prepared to make such a motion for suspension. The U.S. side will exert its best efforts to have this proposal framed to call for the dissolution of UNCURK. If the proposal for dissolution cannot be achieved, the proposal for suspension will be made at this next meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The U.S. side then will seek to have a proposal for dissolution presented to the General Assembly at its next following meeting. This is the two-step process to which the U.S. side has referred. The U.S. side understands that neither the suspension or dissolution of UNCURK shall in any way call into question the validity of its original establishment or of its original purposes.

After this has been completed, and before the 1974 session of the United Nations General Assembly, the U.S. side will be prepared to discuss with the PRC side ways in which the question of the United Nations Command might be resolved. The U.S. side does not believe the present moment to be an appropriate time for such discussions.



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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/27/08

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Handed to  
Henry Ches  
6/14

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BILATERAL COOPERATION

The US-USSR bilateral agreements to be signed during General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the United States embody the following understandings.

--US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean

The agreement recognizes that oceanographic research provides information and data of great importance not only to the US and USSR but to all people. Under the agreement, a US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in World Ocean Studies is to be established to oversee the joint planning, development and implementation of US-USSR basic and applied ocean research programs. Cooperative projects will initially deal with ocean-atmosphere interaction, ocean currents, geochemistry and marine chemistry, deep sea drilling, biological productivity and intercalibration and standardization of oceanographic instrumentation and methods.


--US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation

The agreement expresses the belief that the combined efforts of the two countries can contribute to more rapid and efficient solutions of transportation problems than would be possible through separate parallel national efforts. A US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in Transportation will be established to oversee implementation. Initially, the focus of bilateral cooperation will be on such projects as bridge and tunnel construction, including the problems of cold climate construction; railroad transport; civil aviation, including cooperative projects aimed at increasing efficiency and safety; marine transport; and automobile transport, including problems of traffic safety.

--US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture

This agreement is still under negotiation as of June 11. With successful negotiations, the agreement would be as follows.

The agreement recognizes the desirability of expanding in the field of agricultural research and cooperation as well as the desirability of laying a stable foundation for an expanded relationship in agricultural trade. It provides for the establishment of US-USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation. In the research and development field, cooperation will focus on livestock sciences, mechanization of agriculture, soil sciences and plant science and entomology. A side letter accompanying the agreement deals with agricultural economics and trade, in which both



sides make a commitment to exchange information on current and forward estimates of production, consumption, demand and trade of major agricultural products.

-- US-USSR Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

As augmented, this agreement will run for six years and will provide the overall umbrella for US-Soviet contacts, information exchanges, cultural activities and bilateral cooperation -- replacing the earlier two year cultural exchanges agreement. The agreement includes an annex providing detailed provisions with regard to bilateral exchanges during 1974-1976, and provides in Article XVII for amendments to the list of exchanges for the period 1977-1979.

-- US-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

The agreement takes note of the need to satisfy rapidly growing energy demands in the US and USSR as well as in other countries of the world and recognizes that the development of certain nuclear technologies such as controlled thermonuclear fusion and fast breeder reactors may offer solutions to the energy problem. The agreement provides for the establishment of a US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to oversee initial cooperative efforts in the fields of controlled thermonuclear fusion, with the aim of developing prototype and demonstration-scale thermonuclear reactors; fast breeder reactors; and research in high, medium and low energy physics on the fundamental properties of matter.

-- US-USSR Convention on Matters of Taxation

As the result of negotiations carried out under the aegis of the US-USSR Commercial Commission, a tax treaty has been negotiated providing detailed provisions for US-USSR tax relations, aimed at avoiding double taxation and promoting expanding US-USSR relations in economic and other fields.

-- Augmented US-USSR Agreement on Civil Air Transport

Negotiations have been undertaken on the possible augmentation of the US-USSR Civil Air Transport Agreement. The issues being considered include possible bilateral increases in the number of Aeroflot and PanAm flights between New York and Moscow each week; possible expansion of services to Leningrad and Washington; improved charter arrangements; use of different sized aircraft on different legs of the flight; and agreement



by the USSR on use of wide-bodied aircraft such as the 747 on the NY-Moscow run. It is not certain that an augmented agreement will be concluded in time for the meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev.





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June 14, 1973

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER  
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU,  
L.I. Brezhnev, and the President of the United States, Richard Nixon,


Having thoroughly considered the question of the further limitation  
of strategic arms, and the progress already achieved in the current  
negotiations,

Reaffirming their conviction that the earliest adoption of further  
limitations of strategic arms would be a major contribution in reducing  
the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and in strengthening inter-  
national peace and security,

Have agreed as follows:

First. The two Sides will continue active negotiations to work out  
a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation  
of strategic offensive arms, as well as their subsequent reduction,  
proceeding from the Basic Principles of relations between the USSR  
and the United States signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972, and from the  
Interim Agreement between the USSR and the United States of May 26,  
1972 on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic  
Offensive Arms.

Over the course of the next year the two Sides will make serious  
efforts to complete the provisions of the permanent agreement on more



complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms with the objective of signing it in 1974.

Second. New agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments will be based on the principles of the Soviet-American documents adopted in Moscow in May, 1972 and the agreements reached in Washington in June 1973; and in particular, both Sides will be guided by the recognition of each others equal security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations between the USSR and the United States.

Third. The limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons can apply both to their quantitative aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement.

Fourth. Limitations on strategic offensive arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means.

Fifth. The modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms would be permitted under conditions which will be established in the agreements to be concluded.

Sixth. Pending the completion of a permanent agreement on more complete measures of strategic offensive arms limitation, both Sides are prepared to reach agreements on separate measures to supplement the existing Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972.



Seventh. Each Side will continue to take necessary organizational and technical measures for preventing accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control in accordance with the agreement of September 30, 1971 between the USSR and the United States.


Washington, D. C., " " June, 1973

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

FOR THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA

General Secretary of the  
Central Committee of the CPSU

President of the United  
States of America





1978






Handed to  
Huang Chen  
6/14

The negotiations that have produced this agreement have lasted for more than a year during which we have had many frank exchanges on the complex and delicate issues involved. Both of us will of course be expected to assess and interpret the meaning and significance of our agreement.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding, let me therefore tell you briefly the view that I shall express. It would be my hope that we could both express ourselves in similar terms since any significant differences would detract from what we have been able to accomplish.


My view is that we have set forth an objective and certain modes of conduct applicable to the policies of each of our countries in the years ahead. In doing this, we have not agreed to ban the use of any particular weapons but have taken a major step toward the creation of conditions in which the danger of war, and especially of nuclear war, between our two countries or between one of our countries and others, will be removed. In short, the obligations we have accepted toward each other we have also accepted as applicable to the policies which each of us conducts toward other countries. In subscribing to the agreement and, in particular, in agreeing to consult with each other in certain circumstances, we have made commitments to each other but have in no sense agreed to impose any particular obligation or solution upon other countries. At the same time, we have left the rights of each of our two countries, and obligations undertaken by each of them, unimpaired.

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BY 412, NARA, DATE 6/27/08



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Handek TO  
HUADGCHEN  
6/14

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON  
THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,  
herein after referred to as the Parties,

Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and  
international security,


Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences  
for mankind,

Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the  
danger of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the world would be  
reduced and ultimately eliminated,

Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United  
Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat  
or use of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with the  
agreements to which either Party has subscribed,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of relations between the  
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
signed in Moscow on 29 May 1972,

Reaffirming that the development of relations between the USA and  
the USSR is not directed against other countries and their interests,



Have agreed as follows:

## ARTICLE I

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries.

## ARTICLE II

The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.



### ARTICLE III


The Parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this Agreement.

### ARTICLE IV

If at any time relations between the Parties or between either Party and other countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the USA and the USSR or between either Party and other countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk.

### ARTICLE V

Each Party shall be free to inform the Security Council of the United Nations, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Governments of allied or other countries of the progress and outcome of consultations initiated in accordance with Article IV of this Agreement.



ARTICLE VI

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair:

- (a) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as envisaged by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
- (b) the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including those relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and
- (c) the obligations undertaken by either Party towards its allies or third countries in treaties, agreements, and other appropriate documents.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.



ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Done at the City of Washington, D. C. on June , 1973,  
in two copies, each in the English and in the Russian languages, both  
texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

For the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

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President of the United States  
of America

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General Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the CPSU



Received  
14 June 1973

In its message of May 27, 1973, the Chinese side made clear its view of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. It still maintains this view. The Chinese side disagrees to U.S. signing of the agreement out of its own consistent position, fearing that the United States would create a great posture of peace for the Soviet Union and arouse a false sense of security in the world, which would lead Europe to feebleness and demoralization instead of strength. The European countries would then either become Finland or lean on the United States, and there would be still less security and balance to speak of. China fears neither isolation nor hegemony by nuclear powers. The Chinese people have long been prepared to accept such a challenge. It is Dr. Kissinger's firm belief that this movement will serve to gain time and that the Soviet Union can be enmeshed by peace and commitments. But we believe that this precisely meets Soviet needs, making it easier for the Soviet Union to mask its expansionism, attack soft spots and take them one by one. The joint declaration proposed by Dr. Kissinger on May 29 does not go beyond the scopes of the Shanghai Communique in principle, but on the contrary would, in effect, provide the Soviet Union with a pretext to peddle its bi-lateral agreements and Asian security system. It is therefore inappropriate to adopt this course.

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 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/1/04*  
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
 BY *HZ*, NARA, DATE *6/27/08*



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*Handwritten:* 13  
Huang Chen 6/19/73

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1973

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been following the discussions between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Huang Chen with great attention and I have also studied the notes that have been sent to us by the Chinese Government with respect to the proposed draft agreement. As you know, we differ in our assessment of the consequences of the agreement, though not in the purposes it is supposed to serve. It remains our view that this agreement confers no special rights on the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. -- and we would oppose any such claim. On the other hand, there is no way recourse to force can be initiated by the U.S.S.R. without violating this agreement and thus creating a legal basis for resistance. As we have told your representatives and also other governments we intend to use this agreement to obtain greater scope for actions in areas not now covered by formal obligations.

Whatever our disagreement as to tactics, I want to use this occasion to tell you formally that the U.S. will oppose a policy that aims at hegemony or seeks to bring about the isolation of the People's Republic of China. For this reason Dr. Kissinger has assured Ambassador Huang Chen on my behalf that the U.S. will not change its vote at the United Nations on the issue of the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

I understand the hesitation of the Chinese side to sign a formal declaration along the lines proposed by Dr. Kissinger on May 29. Let me, therefore, state our policy unilaterally: The U.S. will not engage in consultations that could affect the interests of the People's Republic of China without a full prior discussion with the Chinese Government. Specifically,

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


any consultation under Article 4 of the agreement will be fully discussed with the Chinese Government before it is initiated and will not be concluded before the Chinese Government has an opportunity to express its view. In no case will the U.S. participate in a joint move together with the Soviet Union under this agreement with respect to conflicts or disputes where the People's Republic of China is a party.

Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to repeat our opposition to hegemony and our readiness for full consultation publicly on the occasion of his visit in August if the Chinese Government should consider it appropriate.

I recognize that the Chinese Government will reserve the right to express its views on this agreement. I hope, however, that it will do so in a manner that will not complicate the fixed course of the U.S. policy which is to oppose hegemonial aspirations no matter what their pretext.

Sincerely,



Chou En-lai  
Premier of the State Council of  
the People's Republic of China  
Peking

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Handed over  
June 13, 1975

The U.S. side wishes to inform the Chinese side that the Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK), with the encouragement and support of the United States, has initiated a major review of its foreign policy, particularly regarding the role of the United Nations on the Korean Peninsula, its relations with North Korea, and its dealings with the other major powers. Once this review has been completed, the leadership of the Republic of Korea will state publicly its reconsidered positions. We anticipate such a public statement in the near future.

For its part, the United States is recommending to the Republic of Korea and will lend its support for the following specific policies:

-- The United States will not attempt to forestall a debate on the Korean issue in the 28th session of the UN General Assembly this fall, or object to the participation of North Korea in such a debate in an observer status. The United States will use its influence to insure that any such debate will not be acrimonious, but will contribute to an orderly and constructive evolution of the Korean situation.

-- As indicated in a previous message, the United States is prepared to urge the termination of UNCURK, or ~~at least~~ the suspension of its functions, with the proviso that such termination or suspension would be without prejudice to UNCURK's past activities.


-- Following the 28th session of the UN General Assembly, the United States will be prepared to discuss ways in which the question of the UN Command might be resolved, with the understanding that any adjustment of security arrangements will not result in a diminution of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

-- With regard to both nongovernmental and governmental contacts with North Korea, including the matter of diplomatic recognition, the United States is prepared to move forward as far in its dealings with North Korea as the Chinese side is prepared to move in its contacts with the Republic of Korea. Our objective is to see the evolution of a balance in the international positions of the two Korean governments.

-- The United States will support and encourage the ROK to seek negotiated solutions to future military and political arrangements on the Korean Peninsula with North Korea in the context of the North-South talks.


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The U.S. side presents these policy positions to the Chinese side in confidence. We have reason to believe that these guidelines, for the most part, will be acceptable to the ROK. We hope that the Chinese side will use its influence with its allies to insure that discussions between the two Korean governments regarding the future of the Peninsula evolve in a constructive manner, and that any UN debate or actions will contribute to an orderly resolution of the Korean issue.



~~SECRET~~



15  
June 12, 1973

~~Attachment~~ :

On June 14, 1973, the Soviet Foreign Minister met with the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, proposing that China and the Soviet Union conclude a treaty of non-aggression, and handing us a copy of the draft treaty.

As the U.S. side is aware, the Soviet Union had in the past proposed the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet treaty of mutual non-use of force, which was rejected by the Chinese side. As the present draft treaty put forward by the Soviet side is, in essence, not different from its past proposal, the Chinese side will not agree to it. Logically, since there is already a "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" between China and the Soviet Union, which, though trampled under foot by the Soviet side, is not abrogated, would it not be tantamount to open negation of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, if such a "treaty of non-aggression" were to be concluded on top of it? Moreover, the Chinese and Soviet Premiers reached in September 1969 an understanding to the effect that, in order to relax the tension and to ensure that the Sino-Soviet boundary question could be settled through negotiations free from any threats, the two sides should first of all reach an agreement on the provisional measures for maintaining the status quo of the border, averting armed conflicts and disengaging armed forces of the two sides in the disputed areas along the border. Through over three years of prolonged negotiations, the Soviet side has all along obstructed the signing of this agreement, and now in proposing the conclusion of such a "treaty of non-aggression", it is in fact aimed at heading off the agreement on the provisional measures. The purpose of the Soviet proposition

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BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/27/08





is obviously not for the settlement of the actual issues existing between China and the Soviet Union, but for covering up these issues, deceiving the people and fooling the public opinion. In putting forward its proposal right on the eve of Brezhnev's departure for the United States, the Soviet motive is crystal clear to all. It is believed that the U.S. side is also aware of it.

Now we would like to provide the U.S. side with a copy of the "draft treaty of non-aggression between the Soviet Union and China" proposed by the Soviet side, for its reference.



TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE  
UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(draft)


The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and  
the People's Republic of China have agreed as follows:

Article I

The contracting parties undertake not to commit  
aggression, or resort to threat of aggression, against  
each other with any kind of weapons on land, on sea or  
in the air.

Article II

The present treaty does not affect the rights  
and obligations derived from bilateral and multilateral  
treaties and agreements concluded by the two contracting  
parties.



Article III

The treaty remains valid for a period of 20 years  
as from the date of its coming into force. Upon its  
expiration, the two parties shall hold discussions on  
the extension of the present treaty.

Article IV

The present treaty is subject to ratification.  
The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall

be done in .....

For the Union of the Soviet  
Socialist Republics

For the People's Republic  
of China.