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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GSS SENS. MIDDLE EAST (4)  
S/S 7413795

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 24, 1974

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: US: Secretary Kissinger  
 William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary  
 for International Organization Affairs  
 Robert O. Blake, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (Notetaker)  
 John Scali, U.S. Representative to the United Nations

UN: Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations  
 Brian E. Urquhart, Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs  
 Roberto E. Guyer, Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs

Date & Time: July 24, 1974, 3:00 p.m.

Place: Secretary Kissinger's Office

Subject: Cyprus; Middle East

Distribution:

Secretary General Waldheim: I am sorry to be late. My problem was that I had to talk with the Turkish Foreign Minister by phone.

Secretary Kissinger: You may know that Prime Minister Ecevit was a student of mine.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



*State Review*  
 EO. 12812 3/3/04  
 By HR 4/5/11

Secretary General Waldheim: I find him an excellent man to talk to. My question, though, is whether the Turkish military are following his instructions.

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Secretary General Waldheim: An additional problem is the Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia who seems to be stirring up things very much.

Secretary Kissinger: He is a crazy man. Ecevit told me that he is assigning two liaison officers that speak English to work with the UN forces. They will start working right away.

Secretary General Waldheim: I also asked Ecevit to assign liaison officers, and he agreed.

Secretary Kissinger: I had a long talk with Ecevit on Saturday, and one of the problems is the fantastic Turkish ideas of what the Greeks are doing. He told me that there was a Greek fleet about to attack Cyprus. I agreed to find out what the situation was by sending out Sixth Fleet aerial surveillance. The word came back that there was a Turkish fleet but no Greek fleet in the area. When I told Ecevit this, he said that this was Greek treachery, that there were Greek ships flying Turkish colors. I suggested that if this were so why didn't he sink this fleet? He seems to have done just this and found later they were Turkish ships.

Secretary General Waldheim: Yes, that is the report we have, based in part on the fact that an Israeli ship rescued many Turkish sailors.

Under Secretary General Guyer: In fact, the Turks sank two out of their own ten ships.

Secretary General Waldheim: The latest information which I received just before 2:00 is that the Turks are about to take over the Nicosia airport.



Secretary Kissinger: We had the same report and I just finished discussing this with Ecevit. Ecevit said that there are two theories about the airport. One is that the airport is in UN hands, but surrounded by Turkish forces. The other view, which the Turks hold, is that the Turks control the airport but that there is one corner of the field where there are still some British troops under the UN flag. Ecevit said whatever the situation is, it would not be changed by the Turkish forces. He also said that there was no possibility that the Turks would attack UN forces. I wonder whether the Turks know what an airport is. I still don't understand how the Turks could have landed at the airport on Saturday and not have taken it. Anyway, I told Ecevit that I did not want to get into a debate about who held the airport as long as the airport did not change hands and as long as the Turks did not attack the UN troops. Ecevit gave me his pledge on those two points.

As UN Secretary General, you will very soon be commanding the third largest army in the world.

Secretary General Waldheim: Will I get more troops? Is it possible that, given Soviet approval, you could contribute some U.S. forces (jokingly)?

Secretary Kissinger: I will give you any number of forces you want as long as you put them in the uniforms of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Army. I was always impressed by the Imperial Army because its highest decoration went only to a man who had shown great bravery in defiance of established orders. That is why there were so many daring attacks and so few victories.

Secretary General Waldheim: You are only partly right on this point. The highest decorations were given for bravery in defiance of orders but only if the operation in which the soldier was engaged was successful.

Secretary Kissinger: <sup>Callaghan</sup> Returning to the Cyprus situation, I have just talked to Callaghan. I talked to him many times over the last few days. This is worse than dealing with the Arabs and Israelis. What's the exact situation now at the Nicosia airport?



Under Secretary General Urquhart: We spoke to the UNFICYP commander two hours ago and at that time the airport was still in UN hands. If Ecevit keeps his promise and does not allow the Turks to move or to fire on the UN forces, then there should be no doubt that the UN will remain in control of the airport. The problem is whether Ecevit is in control of his army. Do you have enough UN forces in Cyprus to carry out your part of the operation?

Secretary General Waldheim: The troop situation in Cyprus is easier than with the Middle East peace-keeping forces. I don't need to go to the Security Council for authorization to increase the forces in Cyprus. All I need to do is to consult with the parties and with the guarantors, which I have already done.

Secretary Kissinger: How many troops do you have?

Secretary General Waldheim: We now have about 2,300 soldiers and I need to increase the force to between 4 and 5,000.

Secretary Kissinger: You know, Cyprus was one problem I promised myself I would never take on. When I was in Cyprus recently for talks with the Russians on the Middle East, Makarios reminded me that I should turn my attention next to Cyprus. I told him that I had always said that I would stay away from two problems, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Makarios can say that now I only have Northern Ireland to concern myself about.

Where are the Turkish forces in Cyprus right now?

Secretary General Waldheim: Despite all kinds of reports, it appears that the Turkish forces only took over a part of the coast near Kyrenia, plus a ten-mile corridor linking the Turkish northern enclave with Nicosia. Their objective was apparently also to take over the airport. They want to control the Turkish part of Nicosia plus the airport, plus an outlet to the sea which would also connect to the Turkish enclave.

Under Secretary General Guyer: It is doubtful whether they even control Kyrenia yet. At least they do not control the Venetian fort there.



Secretary General Waldheim: Our idea is to try to keep the Turks from splitting out from the lines from which they occupied at the time of the cease fire by placing UN troops on both sides, the British on one side and the Finns on another.

(Note: There was an interruption while Secretary Kissinger spoke with the British Foreign Minister.)

Secretary Kissinger: <sup>Callaghan</sup> Callaghan has nothing new to add. In fact, he is operating on information we had over an hour ago. The British are too nervous. If the Turks have decided to attack, there is little in that we can do now. Either Ecevit will keep his word or he can't.

Secretary General Waldheim: The British should, of course, try to reinforce their positions at the airport.

Secretary Kissinger: They are very <sup>Callaghan</sup> excitable in London. Last week they were ready to go to war with Greece. Now, they're ready to fight Turkey. Callaghan told me they are flying 600 more British soldiers to Cyprus right away.

Ambassador Scali: They need more heavy weapons.

Under Secretary General Urquhart: The British have heavy weapons already, and they are also getting ready to send up a British marine batallion from their base on the island.

Secretary General Waldheim: The heavy weapons have an important psychological effect. If they display them, it is possible that the Turks will not attack.

Secretary General Waldheim: May I go through some of the other questions on my list? Originally, I was more interested in the Middle East than I was in Cyprus because of my coming trip. I'm grateful for your taking all the time to discuss these matters with me.

Secretary Kissinger: We have appreciated all of your co-operation very much. We couldn't have done without it.

Secretary General Waldheim: I think we have shown how multi-lateral and bilateral diplomacy can best be coordinated.

Secretary Kissinger: Precisely.

Secretary General Waldheim: One of the UN's problems is to look into the Turkish claims about National Guard atrocities against the Turkish minority. Our forces have done a lot of work on this and so far they can't find any evidence of atrocities. That doesn't mean that there have not been any, but it does mean that the situation of the Turkish minority cannot be as bad as the Turks, including Ecevit are saying.

Secretary Kissinger: How many enclaves do the Turks have?

Secretary General Waldheim: They have three enclaves, two of which are very small. There are also Turkish villages and areas throughout the island, plus a lot of mixed villages. Of the 600,000 Cypriots, roughly 80% are of Greek origin. The Turks are obviously working for a federated system, with divided power. The Greek Cypriots said at the earlier conference on Cyprus that they were not ready to give control over half the Government to the Turk Cypriots when they only represented 20% of the population.

Finding a new formula for the Turks and Greeks to live together in Cyprus will be the main task of the Geneva Conference. I have asked Guyer to go to that conference to represent me. This will be a very long process.

Secretary Kissinger: My impression is that the Turks want two completely separate communities.

Under Secretary General Guyer: Clerides opposes this very strongly. Even more strongly than Makarios perhaps.

Secretary Kissinger: (To Sisco) Did we recognize Clerides as Acting President today?

Under Secretary Sisco: Yes, we made the agreed announcement at the noon press briefing.

Secretary Kissinger: (Reading from a telegram handed to him) We have a message which says that four tanks are approaching a UN roadblock. Your man, Ambassador Weckman, has told us that if the Turks attack the UN forces, they will resist.



Secretary General Waldheim: The movement of the tanks seems to prove that either Ecevit is not telling the truth or that he is not in control of the Turkish forces.

Secretary Kissinger: There is nothing more dangerous than an incompetent military operation. I despair about the military. What I want to find is a competent general some place. I used to think there were competent Israeli generals, but I'm not sure any more.

Secretary General Waldheim: How do we see the future of Archbishop Makarios? I have some problems on this. The Security Council voted to hear him for purposes of their debate, and because of this I decided to see him.

Secretary Kissinger: We want the views of the parties about Makarios before we go any further. Last week the Turks wanted Makarios back in office but with Clerides on the horizon now, we just don't know what their present attitude is toward Makarios.

Secretary General Waldheim: Ambassador Weckman reports that Clerides had a very good talk with Denktash yesterday. This is encouraging.

Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. above all doesn't want to get too far out in front about Makarios. We would like to wait until the parties have a clear idea of what they want. However, if the Soviets start pushing for Makarios, we will have to dig our heels in. We have no reason to oppose Makarios and I told him so when I saw him the other day, but we must know both what the parties want and what it would take to put Makarios back in power. | 2

(Note: At this point, Waldheim took a call from the Turkish representative to the UN. Waldheim asked why the latter wished to talk with him so urgently. Waldheim told the Turkish representative, after a long silence, that the Nicosia airfield was still in the hands of the UNFICYP; that the Turks were repeatedly violating the cease-fire; that Ecevit had said that the Turks would not attack UN forces under any conditions; and that he was not in a position to debate this matter with the Turkish representative in view of the assurances given by Ecevit to both Secretary Kissinger and himself.)





Secretary General Waldheim: The Turkish Ambassador just told me that he has instructions to protest strongly that the UN troops have no right to be on the Nicosia airfield, and that they should leave right away. He insisted that the possession of this airfield is a matter between the Turks and the National Guard. I said I could not enter into a debate on this point in view of what Ecevit had just told me, and that is why I slammed down the phone.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought you handled that very well. I would not have been so discreet.

Ambassador Scali: I consider this conversation a very menacing one. It shows me that Ecevit must have lost control of his military.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I agree this is bad. Either Ecevit is telling the truth, in which case we will have no real problems; or he is not telling the truth, in which case we will have a very serious problem; or he is telling the truth and is not in control or does not know what the situation is, in which case, we will have an extremely serious problem.

Secretary General Waldheim: Perhaps Ecevit had already given instructions for the Turks to take the airport, but because of his talks with you will now countermand these orders.

Secretary Kissinger: That is a possibility and I hope that is so, but if not, it is too late for us to do anything now.

Going back to Makarios, it is not in anyone's interests to take a strong stand on him, at least until we hear from Greece. Our interests in Cyprus are to calm the situation down and stop the killing. We have an excellent Ambassador there and he advises me that it would cause chaos if we tried to bring Makarios back now.

Secretary General Waldheim: The Greeks, including Vlachos from Athens, have told me that Makarios is absolutely unacceptable.

Secretary Kissinger: If this is true, then why should we try to get ourselves out in front?

Secretary General Waldheim: In my view, Clerides is the best bet for peace.



Secretary Kissinger: Clerides is obviously the man for the moment but we'll have to wait until later before we take any final decision.

(Note: Ambassador Kissinger has another phone call.)

Secretary General Waldheim: One very serious matter is the financial difficulty the UN is in on peace-keeping forces. I desperately need between \$10 and \$20 million. We already have our deficit from UNEF and UNDOF, and now we have the problem of paying for the expanded Cyprus peace-keeping forces. We need your help.

Secretary Kissinger: I can see your problem. We will submit a request for a supplemental appropriation to Congress on this matter. Also while we are about it, we might as well go for a larger amount --including what you need for UNDOF and UNEF. The creation of UNDOF was my greatest act of statesmanship. Who else could have created an organization with a name like this?

Secretary General Waldheim: We also need help from you in airlifting the troops to Cyprus.

Ambassador Buffum: We have already agreed to your request to airlift the Finnish contingent, which is all we have been asked to do. On the question of who pays for this airlift, we need a formal request from the UN that we not charge you for it.

Secretary General Waldheim: Our financial situation, as you can see, is very difficult. We don't yet have the full amount to pay for UNDOF's first six months and only about a third of the money we need for its second six months.

Ambassador Scali: Can't you get the French or the UK to help pay part of the new cost?

Secretary General Waldheim: The British have been very helpful but I don't know how much more they can do.

Could you give me a better idea of your thinking about the Middle East Conference at Geneva?

Secretary Kissinger: I can give you a better idea after I have talked with the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned. Right now, it is too early to say precisely when the Conference will be reconvened, but I can't imagine anything taking place before mid-October. We would expect

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(Secretary Kissinger Cont'd:) to follow this same format as before, with the UN being represented. I realize your problems, and I'll keep you informed. Will you be in New York?

Secretary General Waldheim: No, I hope to leave for Lisbon as soon as possible. The Portuguese are determined to have me visit there, and I'm anxious to get them to move quickly for a settlement in Guinea-Bissau. After Lisbon, I plan to go to the World Population Conference in Bucharest. However, all of this is dependent on what happens on Cyprus. If I'm needed here, I'll stay.

Secretary Kissinger: Wherever you are, we'll find you, and we will let you know about every two weeks what is happening. I really appreciate your cooperation on these big matters and I want you to know how well we think you have handled all of them.

Secretary General Waldheim: I appreciate that and of course will continue to give you every possible cooperation.

Secretary Kissinger: You can count on me for the same kind of cooperation. Your actions have made me a believer in the UN. I wouldn't have known where to start on this Middle Eastern problem without your help.

Secretary General Waldheim: All of this is very encouraging to hear. What can you tell me about the Palestinian question? How will this come up in Geneva? Sadat told me that there has to be a state set up for the Palestinians on the East Bank of the Jordan. I know that the Jordanians are against it, and I know the reservations of Israel. Can you shed any light on your thinking on this?

Secretary Kissinger: Not yet. This is one of the questions that we will have to discuss with the Foreign Ministers.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~-NICOSIA 1730

NO INFO...  
BY NR 4/5/11

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFDR PINT CY  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS SITUATION  
SITREP

1. AS OF 1430 LOCAL QUIET REIGNED THROUGHOUT NICOSIA. EMBOFF DROVE THROUOUT CITY (CONCENTRATING ON AREAS NEAR CONFRONTATION POINTS) AND OBSERVED LIFE RELATIVELY NORMAL. FEW CIVILIANS IN STREETS, BUT THOSE THERE PURSUING NORMAL ACTIVITIES, E.G., SHOPPING, SUNBATHING AND PLAYING BASKETBALL.
2. AT FAMAGUSTA GATE, FEW TROOPS FROM EITHER SIDE PRESENT. NUMBER OF SENTRIES APPEARED NORMAL-- AND THEY MAKING NO EFFORT REMAIN UNDER COVER.
3. OPPOSITE USIS AND PAPHOS GATE POLICE STATION NUMBER OF TANKS OBSERVED (AMATEURISHLY CAMOFLAGED) WITH GUNS POINTED AT TURKISH SECTOR.
4. GREEK EMBASSY APPEARS INTACT. FROM STREET, NO EVIDENCE OF ANY DIRECT MORTAR OR ARTILLERY HITS. GLASS IN WINDOWS FACING STREET INTACT.

5. AREA JUST SOUTH OF BRITISH HICOM ALSO QUITE WITH FEW

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TROOPS IN SIGHT. NO TURKISH TROOPS IN EVIDENCE. BRITS SAY THEY HAVE PULLED BACK FROM HICOM VICINITY.)

6. AREA TOWARDS AIRPORT ONLY LOCATED WHERE EMBOFF SAW EVIDENCE OF MORTAR/ARTILLERY/BOMB DAMAGE. ALL OF THESE EXPLOSIVES APPEAR TO HAVE IMPACT IN OPEN SPACES AND NO BUILDINGS SHOWED OBVIOUS EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE. MUCH GRASS BURNED; ONE KIOSK DESTROYED. (NICOSIA FORTUNATE IN THAT LITTLE WOOD IS USED IN CONSTRUCTION AND THERE HAVE BEEN FEW FIRES.)

7. EMBOFF DROVE AS FAR AS AIRPORT ROUNDABOUT WITHOUT ENCOUNTERING TURKISH TROOPS. UNIFICYP (POLAD MILES) INSISTED AIRPORT UNDER UN SUPERVISION. CURRENTLY TAKING FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS TO AIRPORT TO PROVE THIS. ACCORDING MILES, TURKISH TROOPS HAVE PULLED BACK TO MORPHOU ROAD. DATT VISITED ATHALASSA NG CAMP; OBSERVED LITTLE OR NO DAMAGE. TURKISH AIR STRIKES DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN OVERLY ACCURATE.

8. FIGHTING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN HEAVIER IN OMORPHITA. TURKS HAVE ASKED UNFYCYP TO ARRANGE REMOVAL TO GREEK SECTOR OF 20 GREEK BODIES. THIS IMPLIES THAT TURKS IN FULL CONTROL OF OMORPHITA AND NOW DIRECTING THEMSELVES TOWARD CONSOLIDATING POSITION.

9. COMMENT: FROM CURSORY OBSERVATION IT APPEARS THERE NO CONTINUOUS LINE OF CONTACT BETWEEN GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES. IN NICOSIA ALL SIDES OBSERVING CEASEFIRE FOR FIRST TIME SINCE FIGHTING BEGAN. AS IN LAST WEEK'S COUP, CASUALTIES WOULD APPEAR TO BE SLIGHT FOR AMOUNT OF AMMO EXCHANGED. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO VERIFY.

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EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: CY  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

1. CALLAGHAN'S OFFICE HAS INFORMED EAGLEBURGER THEY HAVE INCREASING REPORTS THAT TURKS "PLANNING MISCHIEF" IN AREA OF NICOSIA AIRPORT. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED THAT AT 1500 GMT CALLAGHAN SPOKE TO ECEVIT, TELLING HIM THAT IF GREEKS ATTACK THE AIRPORT AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IF THEY ATTACK BRITISH TROOPS, THERE WILL BE "GREAT DIFFICULTY" AND THERE WILL BE NO MEETING IN GENEVA TOMORROW.

2. CALLAGHAN'S OFFICE HAS ALSO SAID THAT, IN THE EVENT REPORTS OF TURKISH ACTIVITIES AROUND THE NICOSIA AIRPORT ARE IN ERROR, CALLAGHAN EXPECTS TO DEPART FOR GENEVA TOMORROW MORNING. THEY ALSO HAVE WORD THAT GUNES WILL ARRIVE IN GENEVA TOMORROW MORNING, AND THAT MAVROS IS EXPECTED IN GENEVA TOMORROW EVENING.

3. FOR MACOMBER: WE ASSUME YOU ARE FOLLOWING UP WITH TURKS, BOTH IN POLITICAL AND MILITARY CHANNELS.

4- FOR TASCA: YOU SHOULD NOT RAISE ABOVE WITH GOG, BUT IF YOU ARE CONTACTED YOU SHOULD TELL THEM OF CALLAGHAN'S MESSAGE TO ECEVIT. KISSINGER  
BT



\* \* \* \* \* W H S R C O M M E N T \* \* \* \* \*

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*State Review*  
BO. 3/3/04

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/24/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 8 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200183

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (17)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



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TELEGRAM

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AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH

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EXDIS: DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MOPS, CY, TU  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS - SITUATION AT NICOSIA AIRPORT

REF: STATE 160320

1. AT 7:05 LOCAL TIME I TELEPHONED PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT PURSUANT INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL. I BEGAN CONVERSATION BY MAKING PRECISE POINTS OUTLINED FIRST TWO SENTENCES PARA 2 REFTEL.
2. PRIME MINISTER GAVE ME CATEGORIC ASSURANCE THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD TURKISH TROOPS ATTACK BRITISH AND/OR OTHER UN FORCES. HE SAID THIS WAS "ABSURD" AND ABSOLUTELY "OUT OF THE QUESTION". HE ADDED THAT STRICTEST ORDERS TO THIS EFFECT HAD BEEN SENT BY TGS TO TURKISH COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND.
3. DETAILS OF CONVERSATION FOLLOW.

HACOMBER

NOTE BY CC/TI: CCO DELIVER TO OFF-LINE FOR PROCESSING.

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
BY *HR* 9/5/11

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Department of State

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**TELEGRAM**

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EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

F.O. 11052: GDS  
TAGSIMOPS, CY, TU  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS-SITUATION AT NICOSIA AIRPORT

REF: (A) NICOSIA 1741; (B) NICOSIA 1743

1. UPON RECEIPT OF INFO COPIES OF AMBASSADOR DAVIES MOST RECENT REPORTS (NICOSIA EMTPLS 1741 AND SUBSEQUENT CRITIC MESSAGES), I IMMEDIATELY TELEPHONED PRIME MINISTER AND READ HIM ALL PERTINENT EXCERPTS. PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT (A) TURKISH AMBASSADORS NOT IN COMMAND OF TURKISH TROOPS IN CYPRUS. TURKISH COMMANDERS ARE IN COMMAND, AND THESE HAVE BEEN GIVEN ORDERS NOT TO ATTACK UN FORCES UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BY TGS. (B) GOT STILL THOUGHT THAT IT HAD CONTROL OF AIRPORT BUT PRIME MINISTER CONCEDED THAT THIS "MIGHT BE OVER OPTIMISTIC". IN ANY EVENT HE AGAIN REPEATED THAT TURK FORCES WILL NOT ATTACK ANY UN FORCES.

2. PRIME MINISTER ASKED ME TO GET TO HIM AT ONCE COPIES OF DAVIES' REPORTS WHICH I HAD JUST READ HIM. THIS I AM NOW DOING. IN CALL TO MAJOR GENERAL WEICKHAM, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT SECDEF, I HAVE APPROVED IMMEDIATE CALL BY GENERAL GOODPASTER TO GENERAL SANCAR, CHIEF TGS. I AM NOT REPEAT NOT MAKING SEPARATE BACK-UP APPROACH TO MILITARY CHANNEL HERE AS I BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. IF MILITARY ARE PREPARED TO BAMBOOZLE

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ECEVIT, IN PASSIONS OF MOMENT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO DEFER TO US. ON OTHER HAND IF ECEVIT AND TGS ARE IN CANOOTS, WHICH I CANNOT RULE OUT, SEPARATE MILITARY CHANNEL APPROACH FROM HERE WOULD BE POINTLESS.

3. COPIES OF DAVIES' MESSAGES HANDED DIRECTLY TO PRIME MINISTER 2311 LOCAL TIME. MACOMBER


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Z 242101Z JUL 74  
FM ANEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 520R  
INFO ANEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH  
AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH  
USMISSION USUN FLASH

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 0800

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGSIMOPS, CY, TO  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS - SITUATION AT NICOSIA AIRPORT

REF: ANKARA 0800

I HAVE JUST CONTACTED GENERAL GOODPASTER AT PEASE AIR FORCE  
BASE IN NEW HAMPSHIRE AND EXPLAINED THE SITUATION HERE.  
HE WANTS TO BE HELPFUL AND TOLD ME HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY CALL  
MAJOR GENERAL WEIDKHAM (EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT SECDEF) FOR  
GUIDANCE FROM HIM. I RECOMMENDED THAT HE GET IN TOUCH WITH  
GENERAL SANCAR IMMEDIATELY, AND HE IS DISPOSED TO DO THIS  
IF PENTAGON APPROVES.  
MACOMBER

SECRET NODIS



By *HR* 4/5/11

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PRIORITY  
ESA426ATA883  
DE ROOMAT #4962 2051725  
P 241720Z JUL 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

~~SECRET~~

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4471

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 4962

EXDTS  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PRR GR  
SUBJ: FIRST CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER KARAMANLIS

1. I CALLED ON PM KARAMANLIS TO DELIVER LETTER FROM PRESIDENT. AFTER READING LETTER HE EXPRESSED HIS DEEP GRATIFICATION FOR CONTENTS AND STATED HE WOULD BE TRANSMITTING A REPLY WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. PRIME MINISTER SAID GREECE FACED SERIOUS PROBLEMS INDEED AND HE COUNTED ON THE AID OF ITS GREAT FRIEND, THE US, DURING DIFFICULT PERIOD AHEAD. I SAID THAT I KNEW PRESIDENT HAS ALWAYS HAD THE HIGHEST REGARD FOR HIM AND HIS ACHIEVEMENTS AND THAT PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY KISSINGER WERE LOOKING FORWARD KEENLY TO THE CLOSEST COOPERATION WITH HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT.

2. KARAMANLIS SAID COUNTRY'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE NEEDED TO BE REBUILT TO AVOID THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH PLAGUED GREEK DEMOCRACY PRIOR TO '67 COUP. I RECALLED HIS PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE EARLY SIXTIES, MAKING PERSONAL OBSERVATION THAT IF THEY HAD BEEN ADOPTED THE BREAKDOWN OF GREEK DEMOCRACY MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

3. HE THEN WENT DOWN THE LIST TO DATE OF CABINET MEMBERS, REMARKING HE WAS MAKING HIS SELECTIONS PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF QUALIFICATIONS RATHER THAN POLITICAL NEED. HE ALSO STATED HE HOPED TO PERSUADE JOHN PEZMAZOGU TO BECOME MINISTER OF FINANCE, WITH ZOLDTAS AS MINISTER OF COORDINATION, I NOTED THE GOG WOULD HAVE TWO ABSOLUTELY FIRST-RATE ECONOMISTS IN THE KEY GOG POSITIONS IN THIS SECTOR.



4. ON LEAVING I MET NEW MINISTER OF DEFENSE AVEROFF WHO EXPRESSED GENUINE SATISFACTION WITH THE FRIENDLY LETTER FROM TURKISH PM ECEVIT TO KARAMANLIS.

\*\*\*\*\* WSHR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

KENNEDY,LL--SENT TO SC

PSN:002459

PAGE 01

~~SECRET~~

17:55Z

DTG:241720Z JUL 74

State Review  
3/3/04

4R 4/5/11

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~~SECRET~~

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5. AT APPROPRIATE TIME, AND EARLIER RATHER THAN LATER, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL AND IMPORTANT TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST IN THIS AREA IF SECRETARY KISSINGER COULD VISIT BOTH ANKARA AND ATHENS. I ALSO THINK THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER TELLING KARAMANLIS THAT THE PRESIDENT WISHES TO INVITE HIM TO VISIT WASHINGTON AT SOME MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY DATE. I WOULD HOPE THIS WOULD BE NO LATER THAN NEXT FALL. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PROSPECT OF SUCH A VISIT, I BELIEVE, WOULD HELP STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF KARAMANLIS VIS-~~A~~-VIS THE MILITARY.

TASCA  
BT



~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034994

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/24/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200183

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (17)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

OP IMMEN  
ESA465ATA895  
DE RUQMAT #4965 2051804  
O 241800Z JUL 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4474  
INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 2798  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 3353

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 4965

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR CY TU GR  
SUBJ: GOG REPORTS OF ADDITIONAL TURKISH CEASEFIRE  
VIOLATIONS  
REF ATHENS 4961

1. MFA CYPRUS DIRECTOR METAXAS INFORMED EMBASSY AT 1900 HOURS  
JULY 24 THAT MINISTRY JUST LEARNED THAT FIGHTING TAKING PLACE  
15 MILES S.E. OF KYRENIA IN VILLAGE OF KOUTSOVENDI WHICH IS  
UNDER TURKISH MORTAR AND MACHINE GUN FIRE. METAXAS SAID SAME  
REPORT MENTIONED ELEVEN TURKISH NAVAL UNITS, SOME SAILING  
TOWARD KYRENIA AND OTHERS ALREADY ENGAGED IN LANDING  
OPERATIONS. FURTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORT INDICATED EIGHT  
TURKISH TANKS AND FIVE APC'S SEEN N.W. OF NICOSIA AIRPORT  
HEADED TOWARD YEROLAKOS.

2. WE INDICATED ABOVE REPORTS WOULD BE RELAYED IMMEDIATELY.  
TASCA  
BT



*State Review*

3/3/04

By *LR* 4/5/11

\*\*\*\*\*WHHR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

KENNEDY,LL--SENT TO SC

PSN:002589 PAGE 01 OF 01 PFOR:205/18:35Z DTG:241800Z JUL 74

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034996

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/24/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200183

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (17)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



**SECRET NODIS**

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*Lat - WTT*



Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

CAD032

PAGE 01 STATE 100320

AD  
ORIGIN CCU-00

INFO DCY-01 PASS-00 1001 R

DRAFTED BY 7/24/74 CTF:HEKIRBY  
APPROVED BY FUR MR. STABLER  
CTF:KONTOS  
S/SR MR. FRY

Z 241027Z JUL 74 ZFFG  
FM OFSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH  
AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH

105095

*State Review*  
3/3/74  
*4/5/11*

~~SECRET~~ STATE 100320

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

C.O. 110521  
TAGS: MOPS, CY, TH  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS - SITUATION AT NICOSIA AIRPORT

1. BRITISH EMBASSY HAS JUST READ DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM FROM U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER NICOSIA DISPATCHED 1213 ZUTU, STATING THAT IN JUDGMENT OF HIGH COMMISSIONER AND BRIGADIER COMMANDING BRITISH CONTINGENT IN UNFYCYP, TURKS ARE PREPARING TO ATTACK NICOSIA AIRPORT. INDICATIONS ARE THAT IF ATTACK OCCURS, UNFYCYP WILL RESIST. HIGH COMMISSIONER URGED THAT HMG WEIGH IN STRONGLY WITH EGYPT. (FYI, HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT HMG COMMIT BRITISH AIRPOWER STATIONED ON CYPRUS TO ASSIST AIRPORT IF ATTACK OCCURS. END FYI.)

**SECRET NODIS**



2. PLEASE GET TO EGYPT IMMEDIATELY. TELL HIM WE HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS OF POSSIBLE IMMINENT TURKISH ATTACK ON AIRPORT, AND TELL HIM SUCH ATTACK WOULD BE TOTALLY CONTRARY TO ARRANGEMENTS GDT GAVE YESTERDAY. POINT OUT THAT ATTACK ON UNFYCYP WOULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR TURKEY

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 100000

IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT  
TURKISH MILITARY MAY BE KEEPING SOME DETAILS OF MILITARY  
OPERATIONS/INTENTIONS FROM CEVIT AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP,  
YOU SHOULD USE MOST APPROPRIATE MEANS OF GETTING THIS SAME  
MESSAGE TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL BANCAR. KISSINGER



~~SECRET~~ NODIS

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034997

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/24/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200183

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
   KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
   FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (17)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

FLASH /OP IMMED  
ESA467AAB8916  
DE RUQMCG #1741 2051800  
Z O 241800Z JUL 74  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9070  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 4044

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NICOSIA 1741

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEOR CY TU GR UN  
SUBJECT: TURKISH INTENTION TO ACCUPY NICOSIA AIRPORT

1. I TELEPHONED TURKISH AMBASSADOR INHAM AT 1945 LOCAL TO INFORM HIM THAT I HAD RECEIVED MOST DISTURBING NEW WHICH H HOPED HE WOULD DENY THAT TURKISH FORCES INTENDED TO ATTACH TONIGHT NICOSIA AIRPORT WHICH WAS HELD BY UNFICYP FORCES.
  2. INHAM REPLIED THAT THERE WAS A NUANCE NOT COVERED BY MY STATEMENT: TURKISH FORCES INTENDED TO OCCUPY THE AIRPORT AND HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM WITH UNFICYP. HE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH WECKMAN AND PREM CHAND AND WAS ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT.
  3. TOLD HIM MY GOVERNMENT ON THE BASIS OF MY UNDERSTANDING OF ASSURANCES WE HAD FROM HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE APPALLED AND WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND THIS MOVE WHICH COULD BE SO DISRUPTIVE OF J AXGUNG THAT BEEN ACHIEVED.
  4. INHAM REPEATED THAT HE HAD HIS INSTRUCTIONS, I COULD REPORT TO MY GOVERNMENT, AND THAT HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO TROUBLE. COMMENT: I FIND THIS MOVE INCREDIBLE AND HOPE DEPARTMENT WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVERT THIS NEW FOOLISHNESS ON THE PART OF THE TURKS.
- DAVIES  
BT



*State Review*  
3/3/04

By HR 4/5/11

\*\*\*\*\* W H S R C O M M E N T \*\*\*\*\*

KENNEDY,LL--SENT TO SC


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECALLED  
PSN:002593 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:205/18:39Z DTG:241800Z JUL 74

24 JUL 74Z 19

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~~SECRET~~ NODIS *WHL*

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 05897 241939Z

ACTION CCO-00

INFO OCT-01 PASS-00 /001 W

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Z 241905Z JUL 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0278  
INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH  
AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH  
USMISSION USUN FLASH

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 5897

ZADIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

R.O. 116521 GDS  
TAGS: MOP3, CY, TU  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS - SITUATION AT NICOSIA AIRPORT

REF: (A) STATE 160320 (B) ANKARA 5896

1. FOLLOWING IS MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF MY 7:45 P.M. (LOCAL TIME) JULY 24 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER, MOST IMPORTANT POINTS OF WHICH WERE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED IN REF 6.
2. I BEGAN BY MAKING PRECISE POINTS OUTLINED FIRST TWO SENTENCES PARA 2 REF A. PRIME MINISTER'S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WAS THAT IT WOULD BE "ABSURD" AND "ABSOLUTELY OUT OF THE QUESTION" FOR TURKISH TROOPS TO ATTACK BRITISH FORCES. I SAID THAT IT WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO RECEIVE SIMILARLY CATEGORIC ASSURANCES REGARDING ANY UN TROOPS. PRIME MINISTER SAID "OF COURSE" AND THEN STATED THAT STRICTEST ORDERS HAD BEEN SENT BY US TO TURKISH COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND DIRECTING THAT, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD TURKISH TROOPS ATTACK BRITISH AND/OR OTHER UN FORCES.
3. I SAID THAT I WAS CONFUSED AS TO WHAT WAS THE MILITARY SITUATION, ON OR AROUND THE AIRPORT. I ASKED PRIME MINISTER WHAT

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3/3/04

*hr*


4/5/11

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~~SECRET~~ NODIS



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Department of ~~SECRET~~ **NOVIS** TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 05007 241030Z

HE UNDERSTOOD THE CURRENT SITUATION TO BE. HE RESPONDED THAT IT WAS "HIS UNDERSTANDING" THAT THE AIRPORT HAD BEEN IN TURKISH HANDS FOR SOME TIME. THEREFORE, HE SAID, THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF TURKISH TROOPS ATTACKING UN FORCES TO GAIN CONTROL OF AIRPORT; THEY ALREADY WERE IN CONTROL OF AIRPORT. I SAID THIS CONTRARY TO INFORMATION I WAS RECEIVING FROM ISLAND. HE RESPONDED THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT I WAS HEARING, FACTS AS HE UNDERSTOOD THEM WERE THAT TURKISH FORCES, FOR ENTIRELY JUSTIFIABLE REASONS -- NAMELY, THAT GREEKS HAD USED THE AIRPORT FOR MILITARY RESUPPLY AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE -- HAD THEMSELVES AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE TAKEN CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT. HE SAID THE TURKS HAD THEN ASKED THE UN FORCES TO COME AND TAKE THE AIRPORT OVER, BUT THAT FOR A LONG TIME THE UN FORCES DID NOT COME. THIS CREATED A VACUUM, HE SAID, THAT THE TURKS FELT THEY HAD TO FILL. WHEN THE UN DELATELY ARRIVED ON THE SCENE, IT WAS AT THAT POINT "TOO LATE TO TURN IT OVER TO THEM."

4. I QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT THE SEEMING ILLOGIC OF THESE STATEMENTS. I SAID THAT IF THE TURKS WERE WILLING WHEN THEY FIRST TOOK CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT TO GIVE IT TO THE UN FORCES, WHY, JUST BECAUSE THOSE FORCES ARRIVED SOMEWHAT DELATELY, WERE THEY NOT PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE TURN-OVER. WHAT, I ASKED, HAD CHANGED THEIR MIND? I DID NOT RECEIVE A SATISFACTORY REPLY. ECIVIT'S RESPONSE WAS "WHY GIVE IT UP WHEN YOU HAVE IT." I POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE IT UP EARLIER "WHEN HE HAD IT" AND THAT I STILL DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT HAD CHANGED HIS MIND. EVENTUALLY THE PRIME MINISTER IMPLIED THAT ORIGINALLY THE TURKS HAD "HELD" THE AIRPORT BY SURROUNDING IT, AND AT THE POINT THEY WOULD HAVE PERMITTED THE UN FORCES TO PASS THROUGH THEIR LINES AND TAKE THE AIRPORT. HE SAID IT WAS HIS "UNDERSTANDING" THAT WHEN THE UN'S ARRIVAL WAS DELAYED TURKISH FORCES ACTUALLY TOOK CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT, NOT SIMPLY BY SURROUNDING IT BUT BY ACTUALLY OCCUPYING IT.

5. (DURING THIS PORTION OF OUR CONVERSATION, I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS NOT AT ALL CLEAR ON THE FACTS WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTUAL SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND THAT THE FOREGOING RATIONALIZATION WAS IMPROVISATION IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONING.)

6. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 05897 241939Z

PLEASED BY BRITISH DECISION TO RELEASE TROOPS FOR AUGMENTATION OF UNFCYP IN ORDER THAT TURK CYPRIOTS IN OUTLYING AREAS OF ISLAND COULD BE BETTER PROTECTED. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE AND OTHER UN TROOPS HAD GONE TO AIRPORT WHERE THERE NO TURK CYPRIOTS. MOREOVER, HE COMPLAINED, THE UN'S INTEREST IN AIRPORT HAD BEGUN ONLY AFTER TURK ACTIVITIES COMMENCED THERE, THEY SHOWED NO INTEREST WHEN GREEKS WERE USING AIRPORT FOR IMPROPER POST-CEASE-FIRE REINFORCEMENT.

7. PRIME MINISTER SAID THE BRITISH CLEARLY HAVE CERTAIN RIGHTS AT THE AIRPORT, AND THESE WOULD BE RESPECTED. AGAIN SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS WERE BEING SENT "TO OUR PEOPLE IN NICOSIA" TO THIS EFFECT. I ASKED HIM WHAT THESE RIGHTS WERE. HE SAID HE WAS NOT HIMSELF CERTAIN WHAT THEY WERE, BUT THEY WERE ENTITLED TO SOME FACILITIES AND THIS SPELLED OUT IN APPENDIX 1 TO LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS, MAP 4. APART FROM THAT, HE ADDED, THE AIRPORT WILL REMAIN UNDER TURKISH CONTROL.

8. TOWARDS CLOSE OF CONVERSATION I TOLD PRIME MINISTER THAT WHILE I WAS IN NO POSITION TO KNOW WHAT REALLY GOING ON IN AIRPORT AREA, HE SHOULD KNOW THAT REPORTS I RECEIVING STRONGLY SUGGESTED THAT UN FORCES, NOT TURKISH FORCES, PRESENTLY CONTROL AIRPORT. I FURTHER STATED THAT MY INFORMATION WAS THAT LEADERS OF THOSE FORCES EXPECTED IMMINENT TURKISH ATTACK, OUR CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH PRIME MINISTER REITERATING CATEGORIC ASSURANCES THAT TURKISH TROOPS WOULD BE REPEAT NOT ATTACK ANY UN FORCES.

MACOMBER

CCO DELIVER OFF LINE FOR PROCESSING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034998

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/24/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200183

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (17)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR





~~SECRET~~ NODIS  
Department of State

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Control: 7005Q  
Received: July 24, 1974 622P.M.

Z 242150Z JUL 74 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0475  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 4967

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, GR, TU, CY  
SUBJECT: POTENTIALLY GRAVE TURKISH VIOLATIONS OF CYPRUS CEASEFIRE  
PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

1. I HAVE JUST DISCUSSED THIS SITUATION WITH MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE. WE BOTH AGREE THAT AT THIS JUNCTURE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE METHOD OF CURTAILING FURTHER TURKISH VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE IS FOR US TO RESORT TO A CONVINCING THREAT OF FORCE. OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH ECEVIT DEMONSTRATES THAT HE IS NOT IN CONTROL OF THE TURKISH MILITARY, AND THAT HIS WORD ON WHAT IS HAPPENING OR WHAT IS INTENDED BY THE TURKS CANNOT BE RELIED UPON. I THEREFORE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE STRONGLY IN THE NECESSITY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE IT CLEAR IN MILITARY TERMS TO THE TURKS THAT VIOLATIONS MUST STOP, AND THE CONVINCING WAY OF DOING THIS IS THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. SIXTH FLEET.

2. I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT I PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF U.S. CREDIBILITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND WITH THE SOVIET BLOC WILL BE AFFECTED BY A LACK OF PROPER RESPONSE ON OUR PART IN THIS SITUATION. IN THIS CONNECTION I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT HE IS RECOMMENDING THAT HMG MAKE IT CLEAR ON THE ISLAND IN MILITARY TERMS THAT THEY WILL NOT TOLERATE FURTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE. IN THE EVENT THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO MAKE USE OF THE SIXTH FLEET FOR THIS PURPOSE, HE IS ALSO RECOMMENDING THAT UNITS OF THE BRITISH FLEET BE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS MOVE.

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3/3/04



By HA 4/5/11 ~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ NODIS



**SECRET NODIS**  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

~~-2 - SECRET~~ Athens 4967 July 24, 1974

3. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE GREEK MILITARY CONTINUES TO BE IN FULL CONTROL OF THE GREEK SITUATION. THEY HAVE CONSENTED TO ALLOW A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER KARAMANLIS TO ATTEMPT TO GOVERN GREECE AT THE PRESENT TIME. GENERAL IOANNIDES IS STILL IN ATHENS ALONG WITH HIS SUPPORTERS, THE MAJORS AND THE CAPTAINS. I THINK WE MUST ASSUME THAT IF THE MILITARY LEADERS BECOME CONVINCED THAT, IN FACT, KARAMANLIS HAS NOTHING BETTER TO OFFER THAN THE GOVERNMENT WHICH HE REPLACED, THE ALTERNATIVE OF CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT ITSELF MAY BE FULLY DISCREDITED. IN THAT EVENT WE COULD SEE A VERY RAPID DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, AS WELL AS THE EXIT OF GREECE FROM THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. THE NEW REGIME LIKELY TO COME IN WOULD BE DEEPLY RESENTFUL OF BOTH THE U.S. AND GREAT BRITAIN, AND MIGHT BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. AND BRITAIN HAD TRICKED IT BY STAYING GREECE'S HAND WHERE ITS BASIC INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE, AND BY GIVING AT A CRITICAL MOMENT A DECISIVE ADVANTAGE TO TURKISH AGGRESSION.

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#4967



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 035000

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/24/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200183

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (17)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/30/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

P: JJSISCO: BDF  
7/24/74 EXT 22471  
THE SECRETARY

S/S -

FLASH

ATHENS

IMMEDIATE  
USNATO IMMEDIATE  
NODIS

ANKARA, NICOSIA IMMEDIATE, LONDON IMMEDIATE.

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CY, GR, TU  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO KARAMANLIS  
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

S/S  
JJS  
S/S

3. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE  
PRESIDENT TO KARAMANLIS IMMEDIATELY.

WHEN THIS HAS BEEN DONE SINCE WE WISH TO HAVE ZIEGLER  
MAKE THE LETTER PUBLIC IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.

2. ! BEGIN QUOTE. DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

YOU HAVE MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS AS YOU ASSUME YOUR HIGH  
OFFICE. YOU ARE RETURNING TO THE HELM AT A TIME OF GREAT  
CHALLENGE. I AM CONVINCED THAT IT IS ALSO A TIME OF GREAT  
OPPORTUNITY, FOR OUR DEDICATION TO PEACE AND SECURITY AND  
FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. YOU CAN COUNT ON MY GOVERNMENT'S  
FULLEST SUPPORT IN THE EFFORT TO REESTABLISH PEACE AND  
HARMONY ON CYPRUS, IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, AND IN THE  
ALLIANCE. WE WILL WORK TOGETHER WITH YOU TO STRENGTHEN THE  
ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS BEEN THE BEDROCK OF OUR  
SECURITY AND THE ANCHOR OF PEACE FOR A GENERATION. I LOOK  
FORWARD TO CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE NEW LEADER  
OF GREEK DEMOCRACY. SINCERELY, RICHARD M. NIXON END QUOTE

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BY HR 4/5/11