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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UNSC PFOR CY GR TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS IN SC

By HR 3/29/74

CONFIRMING BUFFUM-SCALI TELCON, FOLLOWING ARE INSTRUCTIONS FOR SC MEETING THIS MORNING ON CYPRUS.

1. WITH FIGHTING STILL IN PROGRESS AND IMMINENT DANGER OF GREEK MILITARY RESPONSE TO TURKISH ATTACK, WE BELIEVE MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT IS FOR CEASEFIRE AND INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS. IN LATTER CONNECTION UK HAS PROPOSED CONFERENCE OF GUARANTOR POWERS IN LONDON AND WE WISH GIVE THIS UTMOST SUPPORT.

2. TO EXERT MAXIMUM CONTROL OVER OUTCOME, WE WISH TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN DEVELOPING RESOLUTION SOONEST WHICH, AFTER PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE EXPRESSING CONCERN AT OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES AND THREAT TO PEACE

(A) CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND

(B) REQUESTS GREECE AND TURKEY TO ACCEPT IMMEDIATELY THE UK PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE GUARANTOR POWERS LOOKING TOWARD RESTORATION OF PEACE AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN CYPRUS. WE PREFER TO HAVE THIS

RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY UK; HOWEVER, YOU AUTHORIZED JOIN

*****WHHR COMMENT*****

KENNEDY, LL--NOT SENT TO SC

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THEM AS CO-SPONSOR IF THEY WISH.

3. WE WISH TO TAKE INITIATIVE LEST OTHERS TAKE UNHELPFUL RES SUCH AS ONE WHICH INCLUDES CONDEMNATORY LANGUAGE, SUPPORT FOR RESTORATION OF MAKARIOS OR OTHER PROVISIONS NOT CONSISTENT WITH OUR CURRENT EFFORTS.

4. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST YOU CONSULT UKDEL IMMEDIATELY ALONG ABOVE LINES. INGERSOLL
BT



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
DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted **State Dept. Guidelines**
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-3-30-1-4
BY MHO NARA, DATE 3/11/2011 9/29/2004



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


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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
July 20, 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM


CYPRUS

Situation Report Number 15
(As of 1500 EDT)

(All times cited are Nicosia time, unless otherwise specified)

GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION

1. Turkish forces have moved down the main road from the port city of Kyrenia toward Nicosia and probably have linked up with paratroop elements dropped north of the capital. Ankara has augmented its forces on the island both by land and sea. The US defense attache in Nicosia estimates that Turkish forces on the island now number over 6,000. Turkish aircraft continue to bomb Greek Cypriot National Guard positions near the capital, and ships offshore are providing fire support to Turkish ground force elements. Heavy fighting occurred between the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Turkish paratroopers at certain areas in and around Nicosia, especially near the airport, but fighting tapered off late in the afternoon apparently as a result of UN efforts to obtain a cease-fire in Nicosia. Many civilians are trapped in hotels where the fighting is heavy.



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2. On the mainland, Athens has declared a general mobilization and is moving at least two infantry divisions into Thrace toward the Turkish border.

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GENERAL POLITICAL SITUATION

3. Secretary Sisco made a round trip flight today between Athens and Ankara in an effort to establish a dialogue between the two countries. The US embassy in Athens reports that the Greek government is waiting for Secretary Sisco to bring word of the Turkish reaction to the latest US proposals before making a final decision on its military response. Ambassador Tasca comments that as time goes on without a cease-fire the risk grows appreciably that Greece will move militarily.

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
FIGHTING ON CYPRUS

[Redacted]

Nicosia reportedly slackened at 1700 hours when a cease-fire arranged by UN forces on Cyprus was to go in effect.

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

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
8. Reports of Turkish units landing on the southern coast at Famagusta and Limassol have not been confirmed. Intercommunal fighting, however, is occurring in both cities. Turkish Cypriots have thrown up roadblocks west of Limassol on the road to Paphos.

9. There is no evidence to support earlier indications that the Turks landed at Kokkina on the northwestern coast of Cyprus.

MAINLAND MILITARY PREPARATIONS

10. In Turkey, there is no evidence of any large-scale Turkish mobilization efforts, although some additional gendarmerie units in the First and Second army areas apparently were mobilized. Newly deployed gendarmerie units were reported in Ankara, Istanbul, and in areas in the western part of Turkey.

11. The general situation on the Turkish mainland remained calm throughout the day, although several security measures have been implemented. Dusk to dawn






blackouts have been ordered for Istanbul, Ankara, and in all mainland provinces bordering the Aegean Sea. Turkish air space has been closed to civil flights. Vehicular and pedestrian traffic were less than usual in Istanbul, but public transportation continued to run normally. Shops were open, and beaches and parks were crowded.

12. Activity in Greece is considerably more intense. An armed-forces-wide alert was ordered shortly after midnight, and the government announced a general mobilization by mid-day. Athens' airport was closed at that time. Elements of at least two divisions began moving toward the border with Turkey in Thrace. The Greek navy reportedly assumed strategic positions in the eastern Aegean earlier last night.





about 60 miles east of the city. Hundreds of tanks, armored cars, trucks, and ambulances were seen streaming toward the border in Thrace, according to press reports. The border reportedly was sealed off. According to



15. The Greek armed forces have not sent military reinforcements to Cyprus since hostilities began, according to a [redacted] He said that Greece has little capability to do so because of the closure of the airport at Nicosia, and because

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[REDACTED]

of Turkish air power and interdiction capabilities over Cyprus. The general also said that Greece would reluctantly be forced to go to war unless the Turks compromise.

16. The UN Special Representative on Cyprus told the US embassy that he had agreement from both sides-- after several failures--to observe a cease-fire beginning at 1700 local time along the "green line" which separates the Greek and Turkish communities in Nicosia. At last report the cease-fire appeared to be working as of 1730. A three and one half hour truce arranged in Limassol to permit evacuation of British dependents has been only partially effective.

17. The UN representative told US Ambassador Davies that the scheduled cease-fire would cover a large part of Nicosia but probably not the area around the US embassy and the Hilton hotel which are in an outlying area of the city. The ambassador earlier had sought assurances from the Turks that they would avoid heavy fighting around the Hilton hotel where a large number of US civilians are currently staying. The Greek Cypriot National Guard had established a command post on top of the hotel, but withdrew after intercession by the foreign minister of the Sampson government.

EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS

18. Contingency arrangements are being made for the evacuation of the approximately 650-700 US citizens on Cyprus. The US embassy in Beirut is exploring the possibility of chartering aircraft to fly Americans out of Cyprus and the US Sixth Fleet has the capability to evacuate Americans on the island by sea. There have been no reports of casualties to Americans in Cyprus.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

POLITICAL COMMENTARY

20. Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit this morning told a press conference that the operation on Cyprus was a peaceful one and did not constitute aggression. He read a short message in which he said that Turkey is fulfilling its legal responsibility and that armed action was used only after peaceful means had failed to produce any results. Ecevit called on Greek Cypriots to join with their Turkish brethren to "create a free, new and happy Cyprus."

21. In a question and answer session that followed Ecevit avoided any specific replies to questions about Turkey's objectives in Cyprus. He evaded a question on what the final settlement should be and when asked if Turkey wanted to restore Makarios to power he answered only that it was Turkey's purpose to "restore the status of Cyprus and the freedom of the people," and that his interest was not in individuals.

22. Deposed President Makarios denounced today the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, saying the decision to invade was not at all justifiable. At the same time, he blamed the military rulers of Greece for leading Cyprus into what he termed a tragic and catastrophic situation.



SOVIET MILITARY REACTION

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
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


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ROMANIAN MILITARY REACTION



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SOVIET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

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3

30. The US Embassy in Moscow has commented that the speed with which TASS dealt with the Turk invasion suggests that the Soviets not only may have been informed by the Turks in advance but may even have been given assurances by them that their objective is Cypriot independence. There is no evidence of signif-

however. The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow has told US officials that his discussions with the Soviets have mainly dealt with UN Security Council actions.

31. Soviet approval of the Turkish action will be limited, however, if it becomes clear that Ankara's objective is a partition of Cyprus. In their initial reportage, the Soviets appear to have misquoted Ecevit; reporting that he called for a return to the status quo. In so doing, they may have been indicating to the Turks that while their military action is not unwelcome, they should seek a return to the previous constitutional arrangements protecting Cypriot independence.

32. Press reports indicate the Soviets, at the UN today, have taken a cool attitude toward the US and British call for an immediate cease-fire. Instead, Soviet UN representative Safronchuk reportedly said he favors immediate action on the UN resolution in circulation for the last few days calling for the removal of Greek officers heading the national guard. It is possible that the Soviets want to head off any UN cease-fire call that might amount to a de facto partition of the island.

WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION

33. Most of the NATO countries are responding to US requests that they weigh-in with Athens and Ankara, urging restraint, de-escalation, and a return to diplomacy. The joint demarche that the EC countries are contemplating will specifically support the UK initiative in inviting the Greeks and Turks to London for negotiations. It will add that the EC-Nine do not consider preservation of the Sampson government in Nicosia consistent with a restoration of constitutional rule.

34. Greece and Turkey traded charges as to who was responsible for the situation on Cyprus at an emergency meeting of the Atlantic Council of NATO today. After two and one half hours of deliberation the council issued a statement that was considered by some NATO officials to be surprisingly weak. The statement said that there was broad support of US and British pleas for restraint and mediation between Greece and Turkey. The statement was reportedly watered down when Greece insisted that a paragraph be deleted that said the aim of negotiations over Cyprus should be the reestablishment of the island's constitution.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
July 20, 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Same as
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State Guidelines
BY HR DATE 3/29/11 *9/29/04*


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FIGHTING ON CYPRUS

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


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
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
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
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
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
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SOVIET MILITARY REACTION



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ROMANIAN MILITARY REACTION

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
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

32. Press reports indicate the Soviets, at the UN today, have taken a cool attitude toward the US and British call for an immediate cease-fire. Instead, Soviet UN representative Safronchuk reportedly said he favors immediate action on the UN resolution in circulation for the last few days calling for the removal of Greek officers heading the national guard. It is possible that the Soviets want to head off any UN cease-fire call that might amount to a de facto partition of the island.

WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION

33. Most of the NATO countries are responding to US requests that they weigh-in with Athens and Ankara, urging restraint, de-escalation, and a return to diplomacy. The joint demarche that the EC countries are contemplating will specifically support the UK initiative in inviting the Greeks and Turks to London for negotiations. It will add that the EC-Nine do not consider preservation of the Sampson government in Nicosia consistent with a restoration of constitutional rule.



34. Greece and Turkey traded charges as to who was responsible for the situation on Cyprus at an emergency meeting of the Atlantic Council of NATO today. After two and one half hours of deliberation the council issued a statement that was considered by some NATO officials to be surprisingly weak. The statement said that there was broad support of US and British pleas for restraint and mediation between Greece and Turkey. The statement was reportedly watered down when Greece insisted that a paragraph be deleted that said the aim of negotiations over Cyprus should be the reestablishment of the island's constitution.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034934

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus

CREATION DATE 07/20/1974

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200174

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 7

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/26/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 9ZCZCSCS267
*****ZZ WTE12
DE WTE 4859 2011532
Z 201532Z JUL 74
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 165//
TO MCFARLANE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ZEM
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ WH42479

TOSCO 165

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM EMBASSY NICOSIA

1. FIRING HAS DIED DOWN IN NICOSIA, PERHAPS IN ANTICIPATION
LIMITED GREEN LINE CEASEFIRE ARRANGED COMMENCE 1700 LOCAL. AS
WE UNDERSTAND IT, NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING CEASEFIRE EXTREMELY
DELICATE AND MAY BREAKDOWN MOMENTARILY.


2. FBIS REPORTS GREEK CYPRIOT POLICE, MILITARY, AND PARALIMITARY
GROUPS SETTING UP LAST DITCH DEFENSE IN KYRENIA TOWN. TURKS
REPORTEDLY HAVE ADVANCED AS FAR AS AYIOS YEORYIOS, LAST VILLAGE
BEFORE KYRENIA PROPER. GREEK GROUPS DO NOT RPT NOT APPEAR
TO BE ORGANIZED. REPORTEDLY, THEY ARE URGING CIVILIAN INHABITANTS
MOVE OUT OF KYRENIA. SOME PANIC EVIDENT.

0137
4859

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
EO. 13526, 13527, 13528
BY HR DATE 3/29/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Sec
7


... X ITOZCZCSCS268
*****ZZ WTE12
DE WTE 4860 2011534
Z 201534Z JUL 74
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 166//
TO MCFARLENE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ZEM
UNCLAS WH42480

TOSCO 166

NICOSIA 1569
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS COUP

1. AMB WECKMANN AT 1415 LOCAL INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD AGREEMENT ON BOTH SIDES TO A CEASEFIRE AT 5:00 P.M. ALONG GREEN LINE.
 2. I PRESSED HIM AS TO WHAT AREA THIS WOULD ENCOMPASS AND HE SAID THERE NO PRECISE DEFINITION BUT IT WOULD COVER LARGE PART OF NICOSIA.
 3. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONS, HE SAID AREA AROUND AIRPORT AND BEYOND EMBASSY AND HILTON PROBABLY NOT INCLUDED. IN ANY EVENT, HE THOUGH TURKS WOULD SHORTLY CONTROL AIRPORT GIVEN LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA.
- DAVIES
0126
4860

NNNN



~~SECRET~~

8

~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

FLASH
DE RUQMAT #4678 2011600
Z 201555Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4283
WESTERN WHITE HOUSE FLASH

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 3283
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH 2739
AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH 2493
USUN NEW YORK FLASH 1099

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 4678

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPPS, PFOR, GR, TU, CY
SUBJECT: CYRPUIS; URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR CEASEFIRE
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
ANKARA FOR SISCO

1. AT PRESENT TIME WITH GREEK SIDE WAITING FOR TURKISH
REACTION TO LATEST U.S. PROPOSALS FROM UNDER SECRETARY
SISCO, FINAL GREEK DECISION ON MILITARY INTERVENTION IS
IN ABEYANCE.

2. IT THEREFORE OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE THAT AN ALL
OUT EFFORT BE MADE TO PERSUADE THE GOT TO AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE
CEASEFIRE. SUCH AN EFFORT SHOULD INCLUDE ALL ORGANS,
BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL SUCH AS UN, NATO, EEC ETC.
AS TIME GOES ON WITHOUT A CEASEFIRE BEING EFFECTED, THE
RISK GROWS APPRECIABLY THAT GREECE WILL INTERVENE
MILITARILY.

TASCA
BT



DECLASSIFIED
NO. 1207 (EXEMPTED) 2014
BY HR DATE 3/29/11

***** * * * * * WHSR COMMENT * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

KENNEDY, LL---SENT TO SC

PSN: 054934 RECALLED PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR: 201/16718Z DTG: 201555Z JUL 74

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034935

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE 07/20/1975

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200174

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 7

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/26/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY



25X1

1 AMEMB NICOSIA

1 DIRNSA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


25X1

UNFICYP REPORTS (AND OTHERS CONFIRM) THAT TMT IN LIMASSOL AS SURRENDERED. FIGHTERS REPORTEDLY IN CUSTODY UNFICYP TROOPS; TO BE INCARCERATED IN FOOTBALL STADIUM.

FIGHTING IN NICOSIA CONTGDUES DESPITE CEASE-FIRE. RE CEASE-FIRE, HAVING HELD UNTIL 7:00 P.M. THERE IS NOT SHOOTING LONG THE GREEN LINE AGAIN. ACTION CONCENTRATED AROUND AIRPORT WHICH NOT RPT NOT YET INTURK CRNTROL) AND AREA WEST OF TURK YPRIOT ENCLAVE. ARTILLERY, MORTARS, AND MACHINE GUNS ENGAGED.

FROM BEST INFO AVIALBLE -- AND THIS IS SKETCHY -- TURKS PPEAR TO BE IN CONTROL OF NORTH COAST FROM WEST OF KARAVAS P TO, AND PERHAPS INCLUDING, AZRENIA. ADDILSONALLY, TURKS AVE APPARENTLY SUCCESSFULLY LINKED NICOSIA ENCLAVE TO HATOS. WZT OF CITY, SITUATION LESS CLEAR, THOUGH TURKS EEM TO BE IN PREDOMINANT POSITION.

OBSERVATIONS FROM EMBASSY, AND BEST INFO AVAILBLEEN NDICATE TURKS ARE ENGAGED IN LIMITED O ITARY OPERATION. PPEARS THEY INTEND SEIZE SIZEABLE CHUNK OF NORTHERN CYPRUS, NCLUDING ACCESS TO SEA AND NICOSIA AIRPORT, BEFORE SITTING OWN TO NEGOTIATE IN EARNEST. AT THE MOMENT, IT PPEARS THAT THEY WILL ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES BEFOV ORNING.



DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt

AUTHORITY RAC NLF-K-S_WWOF-7-6-3-4 9/21/05

BY llh ^{NSC/State & Middle East} NLF DATE 7/9/09

*****WH&R COMMENT*****

KENNEDY, LL -- NOT SENT TO SC

PSN: 055030 RECALLED PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR: 201/19713Z DTG: 201757Z JUL 74

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Presidential Library Review of NSC/State Equities is Required

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Department of State

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CA0063

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 ANKARA 05745 201909Z

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47
ACTION CCO-00

INFO OCT-01 PASS-00 /001 W

Z 201831Z JUL 74 ZFF-0
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0185
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH
AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH
USMISSION USUN FLASH
USMISSION NATO

000552

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 0745

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS POLTO 37

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

EO 11652
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CYPRUS



SUMMARY: I SAW ECEVIT AND LAYD IT ON THE LINE IN THE TOUGHEST LANGUAGE, GIVING HIM CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL CONTAINED POLTO 35, TELLING HIM ALL OF HIS CONDITIONS FOR STARTING TALKS HAD BEEN MET, AND LETTING HIM KNOW CLEARLY THAT PROLONGATION OF CONFLICT RISKED NOT ONLY WAR WITH GREECE BUT GRAVEST DAMAGE TO US-TURKISH RELATIONS. HEXEGAN BY SAYING HE COULD NOT TALK TO MILITARY AND CABINET BEFORE TOMORROW. HE ENDED BY PROMISING TO MEET THEM RIGHT AWAY AND SEE ME AGAIN WITHIN TWO OR THREE HOURS. END SUMMARY.

1. IT TOOK ME ONE HOUR AFTER ARRIVAL TO BRING ABOUT A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND ANOTHER TWENTY MINUTES TO PRESSURE HIM INTO PRODUCING PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT WHO WAS IN MIDDLE OF PARLIAMENT SESSION. I REFUSED TO ENGAGE THE FM WHO TRIED TO FILIAUSTER. THIS WAS ORYTOUS CONTINUATION OF STALLING GAME TURKS HAD TRIED PLAY EARLIER BY WITHHOLDING AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE. I USED SAME FORCING TACTIC TO GET AUDIENCE WITH PM I USED TO GET AIRPLANE CLEARANCE (I.E., PUTTING PLANE ON

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RECEIVED TO State Review
EO 11652 3/3/04

BY *HR* 3/29/11

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Department of State

TELEGRAM



~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ANKARA 05745 201909Z

COURSE WITHOUT CLEARANCE AND INFORMING TURKS I WAS ON THE WAY).

2. IN TALKING TO FONMIN, WHO OBVIOUSLY UNDER INSTRUCTIONS
 STALL, I ASKED HIM HOW HE THOUGHT AMERICAN PEOPLE
 AND GOVERNMENT WOULD REACT IF GREECE SHOULD DECLARE WAR WHILE
 SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF PRESIDENT UNABLE SEE PRIME MINISTER
 TO PRESENT PROPOSAL HE CARRYING FOR STOPPING THE SHOOTING AND
 STARTING THE TALKING. I SAID IT HARDLY SEEMED NECESSARY BUT
 PERHAPS I SHOULD RECALL THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING OUR
 ALLIANCE AND FRIENDSHIP WITH TURKEY. FONMIN WITTED AND SO DID
 PM WHO APPEARED (TO CHEERS OF CROWD OUTSIDE) FROM PARLIAMENT.
 ECEVIT IS OBVIOUSLY RELISHING THE ACCLAIM HERE FOR HIS DECISION.

3. WHEN ECEVIT ARRIVED, I WENT RIGHT AFTER HIM, WASTING NO TIME
 ON PLEASANTRIES. I SAID THAT FOLLOWING MY LAST TALK WITH HIM,
 JUST BEFORE ACTION AGAINST CYPRUS BEGAN, YOU HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO
 PROCEED TO ATHENS AND SEE GREEK LEADERS. IN TALKING TO THEM I HAD
 BEEN VERY MINDFUL OF WHAT ECEVIT HAD ASKED OF US, NAMELY THAT
 WE USE OUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE GREECE "NOT TO SHOOT". GREEKS
 OPENED MEETING BY THREATENING TO DECLARE WAR AND ENOSIS UNLESS
 TURKS WITHDRAW RIGHT AWAY, TAKING ACTION WITH GREECE OF EXTREMELY
 FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS, OF WHICH ECEVIT HAD BEEN INFORMED
 BY AMBASSADOR MACOMBER. THE USG HAD CONVINCED GREEKS TO
 DEFER FOR MOMENT, DECLARATION OF WAR. HOWEVER, THE GREEKS WILL
 NOT WAIT MUCH LONGER. IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO TURKEY,
 THE UNITED STATES, TO NATO AND TO FUTURE STABILITY OF AREA
 THAT THE FIGHTING STOP AND THE TALKING START. I GAVE HIM COPY
 OF CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL CONTAINED POLTO 35.

4. ECEVIT SAID THAT ONCE MILITARY OPERATIONS BEGAN THEY TOOK
 ON LOGIC AND TIMING OF THEIR OWN AND COULD NOT BE STOPPED
 PREMATURELY. CERTAIN OBJECTIVES WERE SET AND HAD TO BE
 ACHIEVED. NOTHING COULD BE DONE TONIGHT BUT HE WOULD MEET
 TOMORROW WITH MILITARY AND CABINET TO CONSIDER OUR PROPOSAL.
 HE WAS SIMPLE POLITICIAN AND COULD NOT DECIDE ALONE FOR TURKEY.

5. I RAISED TONE OF MY VOICE AND PUT ON DISPLAY OF CONTROLLED
 ANGER I THINK YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF. I TOLD ECEVIT
 HE HAD ASKED USG TO LET TURKEY DO IT THEIR WAY (INSTEAD OF
 FORCING GOT NOT TO FIGHT AS IN 1964), HAD ASKED USG TO
 PERSUADE GREECE NOT TO ENTER HOSTILITIES, AND HAD SAID THAT ONCE
 TURKISH FORCES ACHIEVED A BALANCE WITH GREEK FORCES ON CYPRUS,

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Department of State

~~SECRET~~

~~TELEGRAM~~

PAGE 03 ANKARA 05745 201909Z

GOT WOULD BE READY TO ENTER TALKS WITH UK AND GREEKS IN SPIRIT OF LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENT. ALL OF THESE THINGS HAD COME TO PASS. WE ASSUMED ECEVIT HAD BEEN SPEAKING FOR TURKEY AND WE EXPECT TO SEE TURKEY AGREE TO CEASE-FIRE BEFORE GREEK GOVT WAS FORCED INTO HOSTILITIES. WE HAD DONE OUR PART, AND WE HAD A RIGHT TO EXPECT THAT HE KEEP HIS WORD AND DO HIS PART. SHOULD TURKEY NOT RESPOND POSITIVELY TO OUR APPROACH, GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES COULD OVERTAKE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US AND TURKEY, INCLUDING OUR MILITARY AID, RELATIONSHIP WHICH ECEVIT AND I HAD BEEN TRYING SO HARD TO PRESERVE DURING THIS CRISIS. I TOLD ECEVIT THIS WAS VIEW OF HIGHEST US OFFICIALS. ECEVIT HAS VISIBLY SHAKEN, BOTH BY MESSAGE ABOUT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND BY CHALLENGE TO HIM TO MAKE GOOD ON WHAT HE HAD SAID AFTER WE HAD DELIVERED ON WHAT ASKED OF US (I.E., NO GREEK INTERVENTION). HE PROMISED TO CONSULT TURKISH MILITARY LEADERS AND HIS CABINET RIGHT AWAY AND MEET WITH ME AGAIN LATE TONIGHT. (UK AMBASSADOR MADE SIMILAR DEMARCHE TODAY BUT NEVER GOT PAST FONMIN AND HAS HAD NO REPLY WHATSOEVER.) I AM NOW CALLING ON MY OLD FRIEND, FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER BAGULHEN, WHO IS SENIOR GOV COUNSELOR NOW. I SHALL BE EVEN MORE BRUTAL WITH HIM -- HE IS THE SORT OF GUY WHO UNDERSTANDS THIS KIND OF THOUGHT.

SISCO

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034936

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation; 2 copies of report

CREATION DATE 07/20/1974

VOLUME 19 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200174

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 7

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/26/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

~~SECRET~~ NODIS 30 JUL 74Z 21

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Department of State

~~SECRET~~

CA0100

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 04700 202149Z

ACTION CCO-00

INFO OCT-01 PASS-00 /001 W

Z 202125Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4295

067312

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 4700

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

P.O. 116521 XGDS
TAGS: MOPS, PFOR, CY, TU, OR
SUBJECT: CYPRUS; AN OPTION

State Review
3/13/24
NR 3/30/11

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR TAGCA

1. I CONSIDER UNDER SECRETARY SISCO'S APPROACH TO TURKS THIS EVENING (ANKARA 5745) EXCELLENT AND HARD-HITTING ON EXACTLY RIGHT POINTS. AS SISCO POINTED OUT, TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND THE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION CONFRONTING US IS NEED FOR MOST IMMEDIATE ACTION BY TURKS ON CEASEFIRE.
2. TO HELP BRING THIS ABOUT, I STRONGLY BELIEVE AS PART OF OUR OVERALL STRATEGY, WE SHOULD CONSIDER ALONG WITH OTHER OPTIONS AND PRESSURE POINTS POSSIBILITY OF AUTHORIZING UNDER SECRETARY SISCO TO TELL TURKS THAT THE U.S. IS NOW REVIEWING THE SITUATION AND MUST NOW CONSIDER, IN LIGHT OF GRAVE THREAT TO PEACE, POSSIBILITY OF INTERPOSING UNITS OF THE SIXTH FLEET BETWEEN MAINLAND TURKEY AND CYPRUS. WE ARE IN NO POSITION TO JUDGE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF OPTION, BUT ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD HAVE POSITIVE VALUE. IT WOULD SERVE TO REMIND TURKS OF PRESENCE OF SIXTH FLEET IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS BEING ONE OF THE STRONGEST ELEMENT FOR PEACE IN MEDITERRANEAN AND PERHAPS THE FINAL USG BARGAINING LEVER SHOULD ALL OTHER EFFORTS FAIL TO ACHIEVE CEASE FIRE.
3. AS TIME PASSES WITHOUT MOVEMENT ON CEASEFIRE, RISK OF GRECP EXPANDING CONFLICT BEYOND CYPRUS INCREASES.
4. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS FLASH TO ANKARA FOR SISCO. TAGCA



~~SECRET~~ NODIS

~~SECRET~~

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NO DISSEMINATION

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034937

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE 07/20/1974

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200174

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 7

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/26/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR


Letter from State 151
at 10:10 P.M. 7/20/74

July 20, 1974.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have the honor to enclose herewith the message of His Excellency Fahri S. Korutürk, President of the Republic of Turkey, to His Excellency Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America. I would appreciate it very much if this message could be forwarded to its high destination.


Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Melih Esenbel
Ambassador of Turkey

Encl: as stated

The Honorable
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.



150
July 20, 1974

His Excellency Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Mr. President,

I acknowledge receipt of your message which was transmitted to me on July 20, 1974 by the Ambassador of the United States in Ankara.

The military intervention undertaken by Turkey in Cyprus on July 20, 1974, as it has been explained to Mr. Sisco, arised from a most grave action of Greece with the purpose of the annexation of the island within the context of a series of fait-accomplis which the Greek Government continued to create since 1963. The aim of the intervention is to safeguard the territorial integrity and constitutional rights of the independant Republic of Cyprus and to secure peace in the island and region.

As you are aware, the international treaties make obligatory for Turkey the fulfillment of this duty.

The Republic of Turkey still keeps open the channels of negotiation which did not produce so far any result in her efforts to safeguard by peaceful means the independence of the Republic of Cyprus and the constitutional rights of the communities in the island.

I appreciate the efforts of Your Excellency, as well as those of all our allies, in order that the action which we undertook on July 20, 1974 would not bring about a breach in the NATO alliance. I hope that these efforts will be successful and I wish wholeheartedly to contribute to them as a true friend and strong ally.

State Review
3/3/04

EO

By *NR*

3/30/11



I hope you will understand that the Government of the Republic of Turkey has lived through experiences in the past in Cyprus which showed that it cannot solely depend on political consultations, thus becoming a spectator to a possible act of genocide and that she has obligations and responsibilities.

The main question is to prevent a confrontation between the armed forces of Turkey and Greece.

It would be befitting that the weight of the American influence be directed to that end as indicated in your message.

Sincerely,

Fahri Korutürk
President of the Republic
of Turkey



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034938

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport

DESCRIPTION re Cyprus Situation

CREATION DATE 07/20/1974

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200174

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 7

FOLDER TITLE Cyprus Crisis (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/26/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Anne

Marilyn *BM*

17

Do you have a copy of this in file? See file? (No hurry)

EVCMZCZCSCS206

OO RUEADWW

DE RUQMGU 5710 2002345

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 202303Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5168

RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 5710

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

POLTO 27

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (SISCO, JOSEPH J.)

SUBJ: SECOND MEETING WITH GREEK PRIME MINISTER

DEPT PLEASE PASS ATHENS, LONDON, USUN

WHITE HOUSE FOR EAGLEBURGER PASS SECRETARY KISSINGER

1. IN 1800 SECOND SESSION WITH PM ANDROUTSOPOULOS, HE WAS SUPPORTED BY ACTING FONMIN KYPREAS, GEN BONNANOS, CINCHELOR, MG HANOTIS (INTERPRETER FOR BONNANOS), AND THREE DIRECTORS FROM FONOFF, METAXAS, MIGLIARESSIS, AND PAPZIOANNOU. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMB TASCA, ELLSWORTH, DILLON, OAKLEY, BOYATT, COLLINS AND PUGH.
2. ANDROUTSOPOULOS BEGAN WITH EXTENSIVE QUOTATIONS FROM UPI TICKER ITEM REPORTING DEPARTURE OF LARGE TURKISH NAVAL AND AMPHIBIOUS LIFT GROUP FROM PORT OF MERSIN, ALLEGEDLY CONFIRMED TO REPORTER BY MINISTER OF INFORMATION BIRGIT. HE SAID THAT IF THIS DONE TO SCARE GREEKS, OR CREATE ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR, IT WAS NOT THE RIGHT IDEA. HE DECLARED THAT IF TURKS IN FACT MOVED TO CYPRUS, THEY WOULD FIND GREEK CYPRIOTS FIGHTING FOR ENOSIS RATHER THAN INDEPENDENCE OF CYPRUS. SUCH TURKISH MANEUVERS WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON GREECE.

State Review

3/3/04

3/30/11



~~SECRET EXDIS~~

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

3. ANDROUTSOPOULOS NOTED THAT GOG WAS READY AND WILLING TO AGREE, AND HAD NEVER REFUSED IN PAST, TO PERMIT ROTATIONS OF ELDYK AND TURDYK TO BE CHECKED AND CONTROLLED BY UNFICYP, AS PROVIDED BY TREATY (SIC). HE THEN REFERRED TO GOG ANNOUNCEMENT IN NAC THAT IT WOULD REPLACE GREEK OFFICERS SERVING WITH NATIONAL GUARD (NG). AN INVESTIGATION WAS UNDER WAY, AND THOSE IMPLICATED (PRESUMABLY IN COUP) WOULD BE REPLACED RIGHT AWAY, AND THE REMAINDER NOW SERVING IN THE NG WOULD BE REPLACED GRADUALLY.

4. TURNING TO TURKISH CYPRIOT POPULATION, ANDROUTSOPOULOS CLAIMED THEY WOULD ENJOY COMPLETE PROTECTION OF GREECE. NOTHING WOULD BE DONE AND NO MEASURES TAKEN TO ENDANGER THEIR STATUS. HOWEVER, FREE COMMUNICATIONS ON CYPRUS DEPENDED UPON TURK CYPRIOTS OPENING ENCLAVES, AND HE SAID GREECE SAW NO OTHER WAY IN WHICH THIS COULD BE DONE. AT THIS POINT, KYPREOS INTERJECTED THAT GOC RATHER THAN GOG WOULD GUARANTEE THIS, TO WHICH ANDROUTSOPOULOS HASTILY AGREED.

THIS FREEDOME OF COMMUNICATION WOULD BE ON SAME BASIS FOR TURK AND GREEK CYPRIOTS, LAWS OF GOC (I.E. PASSPORT AND CUSTOMS CONTROLS, ETC.) IT WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE TO HAVE IT OTHERWISE, SINCE THEN THERE WOULD BE NO SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT AND UNITARY CYPRUS.

5. I ASKED IF GOG WERE WILLING FOR UN TO SUPERVISE ACCESS TO SEA FOR TURK COMMUNITY. METAXAS REITERATED GOG VIEW THAT GOC LAWS WOULD APPLY TO ALL INHABITANTS OF BYPRUS. I REPEATED THAT TURKS WERE INTERESTED IN CONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEA AND ASKED GOG'S VIEW OF UN SUPERVISION OF CERTAIN AIRPORTS AND SEAPORTS TO PREVENT CLANESTINE ENTRY OF ARMS AND MEN.

I STRESSED THE THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO BULD CONFIDENCE THROUGH DEEDS RATHER THAN WORDS, SINCE LATTER HAVE WAY OF ASSUMING DIFFERING MEANINGS. ANDROUTSOPOULOS AGAIN DEMURRED, ARGUING THAT OPENNESS WOULD PRECLUDE DANGER OF ILLICIT ARMS AND MEN IN ISLAND WHERE EVERYTHING KNOWN.

6. I AGAIN ASKED IF GOG WERE WILLING TO SIT DOWN UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES TO WORK OUT CONCRETE MEASURES TO BRING ABOUT UN SUPERVISION OF ACCESS TO CERTAIN PORTS AND AIRFIELDS. ANDROUTSOPOULOS BALKED AT WORD "SUPERVISE," BUT I PERSISTED IN SEEKING THEIR REACTION TO CONCEPT. KYPREOS ONCE MORE OBJECTED THAT THIS MATTER FOR GOC, WHIC I ACKNOWLEDGED. BONNANOS, SPEAKING THROUGH INTERPRETATION OF HANIOTIS, REITERATED WELL-KNOWN PROVISIONS OF LONDON-ZURICH ACCORDS REGARDING SUPERVISED ROTATION (SIC) OF ELDYK AND TURDYK, ADDING THAT EVERYTHING NOT PROVIDED FOR IN AGREEMENTS WAS MATTER FOR GOC.

7. I PRESSED GREEKS FOR EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE ON GOC TO SEE THAT CONCRETE MEASURES ARE EXPLORED AND AGREED TO. BONNANOS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE BUT STATED THAT BEFORE GOG COULD AGREE DEFINITELY IT WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS WITH GOC, SAYING THAT SUCH ACTION MIGHT BE CONTRARY TO THRUST OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.



~~SECRET EXDIS~~

8. TO MAKE THE RECORD TOTALLY ACCURATE, I THEN SET FORTH IN DETAIL THE POINTS I WOULD MAKE WITH GOG SAME NIGHT.
-- GREECE AGREES TO USE OF ITS INFLUENCE WITH GOG TO WORK OUT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN ROLE OF UN ON FOL QUESTIONS:

- A. TO ASSURE ACCESS TO SEA OF TURK COMMUNITY.
 - B. TO WORK OUT UN CONTROL OF CERTAIN SEAPORTS AND AIRFIELDS IN ORDER TO ASSURE AGAINST TROOPS, MUNITIONS, ETC., FROM COMING INTO ISLAND CLANDESTINELY.
 - C. TO ASSURE TIGHTER U.N. CONTROL OF REGULAR ELDYK/TURDYK ROTATIONS.
- KYPREOS COULD NOT AGREE TO FIRST POINT, ONCE MORE REFERRING TO RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOG. I ASKED WHETHER OTHER POINTS AGREEABLE TO GOG, TO WHICH KYPREOS AGREED.

9. I TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF GOG CONSULTATION WITH HMG IN LONDON. AND ANDROUTSOPOULOS WOULD ONLY AGREE TO CONSIDER, SAYING THEY HAD HAD INSUFFICIENT TIME TO CONSIDER AND COULD NOT RESPOND UNTIL FOLLOWING DAY. I PRESSED, ASKING IF THEIR DECISION LIKELY TO BE AFFIRMATIVE. ANDROUTSOPOULOS SAID HE FELT AN AFFIRMATIVE DECISION IN PRINCIPLE LIKELY. I PRESSED FURTHER AND ANDROUTSOPOULOS FINALLY AGREED THAT THEY WOULD CONSULT WITH HMG, BUT NOT UNTIL MONDAY. THEY UNDERTOOK TO INFORM HMG.

10. I REFERRED TO TURK DESIRE TO RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND KYPREOS RESPONDED THAT EVENTS ON CYPRUS WERE WITHIN CONSTITUTION. JUST AS TURK CYPRIOTS HAD REPLACED ONE PERSON WITH ANOTHER (DENKTAS FOR KUCUK), SO GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD CHANGED LEADER.

11. BONNANOS ASKED ME AT END OF MEETING TO CONVEY MESSAGE TO TGS CHIEF SANCAR TO EFFECT THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR BOTH ALLIES TO LOWER TENSIONS BY REFRAINING FROM DEMONSTRATIVE MILITARY MOVEMENTS, ETC. HE STATED THAT GOG HAVING DIFFICULTY CONTAINING PUBLIC OPINION AND SPIRIT, POINTING OUT THAT 82 PERCENT OF CYPRIOTS WERE GREEK. SISCO

BT


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


National Intelligence Daily
20 July 1974

Turkish Troops Land on Cyprus in Air-Sea Move



The US embassy in Nicosia reports that Turkish paratroops are being dropped in the vicinity of Nicosia, including the Turkish sectors of the city, roads leading to the landing areas on the northern coast, and the airport. Evidently, the Turks plan to secure an area in the capital and then to link with forces advancing inland from the coast. They are apparently attempting to secure the main road from the landing area to Nicosia.



Turkish Goals

Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit, in a public announcement this morning, said the decision to invade was made after Ankara had explored all diplomatic means to solve the problem caused by the Greek-engineered coup on Monday. Turkey's immediate goals are to stabilize its forces on the island and then to negotiate. Ecevit said Turkish forces would not fire unless fired upon.


Turkish leaders reportedly do not
(See Cyprus... Page 4)

care who is president of Cyprus as long as he is a moderate. Most Turks agree, however, that they would not support the return of Archbishop Makarios. Of all the prominent Greek Cypriot politicians, the Turkish Cypriots would be most comfortable with Glafcos Clerides, president of the House of Deputies and Makarios' constitutional successor.

Turkey's ultimate objective is probably partition of the island between Greece and Turkey.

Greek Reaction

Greek officials informed Assistant Secretary Sisco this morning that unless there is an immediate Turkish cease-fire on Cyprus, Greece will declare enosis with Cyprus and war against Turkey.



The United Nations

The special session of the Security Council yesterday listened to Archbishop Makarios' appeal, but passed no resolution. Support appeared to be eroding for the strong resolution that Makarios demanded calling for the withdrawal of Greek National Guard officers and recognition of himself as the legitimate head of government.

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BY MCO NARA, DATE 3/11/2011

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Imperative for Cyprus

It was salutary for members of the Security Council and a great many other United Nations delegates yesterday to hear President Makarios of Cyprus personally pin responsibility for the putsch that overthrew his elected Government where it belongs: on the military dictatorship in Greece.

As it has been from the onset of the crisis, the overriding objective of the United Nations and every concerned party must be to head off war between Greece and Turkey. But the first step in preventing that disaster must be the recall of the 650 Greek officers who—unquestionably on instructions from Athens—ordered the National Guard to rise against its own Government.

This prompt recall will go part of the way toward persuading Turkey and the Turkish Cypriote minority that "the road to Enosis [union of Cyprus and Greece] is not open," as Rauf Denktash, the political leader of the Turkish Cypriotes, put it yesterday. This, along with strong reaffirmation of support for constitutional government on Cyprus, and for the independence and territorial integrity of the island, is the urgent business now before the Security Council.

For the moment, Washington still seems more concerned not to offend the shaky military despotism in Athens and its bloody-minded stooges on Cyprus than it is to do the decent and logical thing at Turtle Bay. It is mildly encouraging if Secretary of State Kissinger has moved from his original "tilt" in favor of the unspeakable Nikos Sampson and against Archbishop Makarios to the recognition that Sampson is unacceptable to anyone. But the need, to repeat, is to prevent a Greek-Turkish war that would destroy NATO's southern flank and a great deal more. And the first step is to put maximum pressure on Athens to bring its officers home.

Will the United States help apply that pressure?


19
NY Times
July 20,
1974

[FYI: No Post
editorial today
on Cyprus]



CYPRUS SITUATION MAP

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July 29 74

Kissinger to Meet Makarios as U.S.

Seeks to Avert Intervention by Turkey

Aides Feel Archbishop Provoked Cyprus Crisis

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 19—Secretary of State Kissinger will meet here Monday with Archbishop Makarios, the State Department announced today, as high Administration officials said that the main American diplomatic effort was now being directed toward deterring a Turkish intervention in Cyprus.

At the same time, other officials said that the American Embassy in Athens recently dispatched a cable to Mr. Kissinger that detailed the direct involvement of the Greek military junta in the coup against the Archbishop.

Nevertheless, the officials said, it was the general opinion in the State Department that the Archbishop and not the Greek Government was responsible for forcing the situation in Cyprus to the point of crisis and bringing on the coup of last Monday.

The Kissinger-Makarios meeting was arranged through the Cypriote Embassy and was requested by the Archbishop, the State Department spokesman, Robert Anderson, said at a news briefing. Mr. Anderson repeatedly declined to say whether Mr. Kissinger would be seeing the Archbishop in his capacity as president of Cyprus.

"The main effort now," a State Department official said in an interview, "is to prevent the whole situation from falling apart and, specifically, to prevent Turkish military action."

The Turkish Government, he said, regards the present situation as de facto enosis, or union of Cyprus with Greece, and therefore as a violation of the 1960 treaty establishing the independence of Cyprus.

This treaty was signed by Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, with London pledging itself to side against any side seeking to violate the agreement.

Meanwhile, the defense department maintained today that it had no independent confirmation of press reports that a Turkish fleet set sail this morning with troops and landing barges. The Pentagon spokesman, Gerald Friedheim, said that no American reconnaissance flights had been carried out over international waters between Cyprus and Turkey.

Situation Called 'Dangerous'

Unofficially, however, it was said that the Administration does believe that a Turkish fleet is at sea and has the military capability to land about 1,500 men on Cyprus.

The officials declined to speculate about the chances of a Turkish landing, but said the situation was "dangerous."

The officials would not talk about the details of Washington's present diplomatic course, but they did make the following points:

¶The United States is working closely with the British Government in diplomacy but London has special responsibilities in view of obligations as a treaty guarantor.

¶The United States is not saying whom it favors for the future Government of Cyprus but is seeking a return "to some previous situation."

¶Bringing back Archbishop Makarios to power is a possibility, one official said, but "the question you have to ask yourself is how?"

The Makarios alternative is being kept open despite a clear belief among officials that much of the responsibility for the coup rests on his shoulders. These officials cited the fact that the Archbishop had insisted on the withdrawal of Greek officers from the Cypriot national guard and for a reduction in the size of the Greek-controlled guard forces.

While these officials accuse the Archbishop of having provoked the coup, they are quick to add that the military junta in Greece moved to take advantage of the situation.

Other officials revealed that yesterday or Wednesday, the United States Ambassador to Athens, Henry J. Tasca, cabled Washington with the details of junta involvement in the coup. The details could not be learned.

The officials who told of this cable maintained that the Greek junta had tried to manage the situation from Athens . . . but soon found that events were out of its control. Nikos Georgiades Sampson, the rebel President of Cyprus was not the Greek junta's choice, these officials claimed.

Officials would not discuss this cable, saying only "I know you're talking about," or "I can't discuss that."

Sisco Studies Possibilities

mission of Undersecretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, one of the high officials said. "One purpose is to distinguish between what is possible and what is desirable, and to see what our influence on the parties actually is."

The officials also acknowledged that Washington had been aware of the deteriorating situation in Cyprus, based on communications from Ambassadors in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Mr. Kissinger had authorized the Ambassadors, the officials said, to discuss the situation with their host countries. The officials would not say anything about the substance of these discussions.

One of the officials explained that Washington's main concern prior to the coup was not the situation in Cyprus but the Greek-Turkish confrontation in the Aegean Sea. The Turkish Government, he explained, had been drilling for oil in the Aegean and the Greek Government reacted strongly.



U.S. Puts Pressure on Greeks and Turks

By ALVIN SHUSTER

Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, July 19—The United States applied diplomatic pressure today on the Greek and Turkish Governments in an effort to prevent a military clash between the two North Atlantic allies.

Under Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, flew to Athens for a day-long series of meetings with Greek civilian and military leaders and then rushed to Ankara, Turkey. The talks took place as some 30 Turkish assault-landing craft were seen leaving the Mediterranean port of Mersin, but diplomats here reacted calmly to the news.

While there was no official word on the substance of Mr. Sisco's talks, it is believed that his proposals include the following:

Greece should quickly help ease from office the newly proclaimed President of Cyprus, Nikos Giogiades Sampson, who took over Monday after the ouster of Archbishop Makarios. Favored as a successor is Glafkos Clerides, the president of the House of Representatives in Cyprus and the man legally in line to succeed the Archbishop as President.

Greece should provide Turkey with more guarantees regarding the safety of the island's ethnic Turkish minority, outnumbered four to one by ethnic Greeks.

Greece should spell out more clearly her acceptance in principle of the British proposal to replace the 650 Greek officers of the Cypriote National Guard who led the coup against the elected President. Greece announced yesterday that she would replace the officer, but there is some concern that she has been too vague on how soon the officers would be replaced and how the shifts would be supervised.

Although Turkey rejected the offer to replace the officers and

insisted on total withdrawal, Mr. Sisco was expected to urge the Turks to yield on this demand in return for other concessions, including guarantees of the continued independence of Cyprus and the rejection of enosis, or union with Greece.

The American argument is that pulling out all the Greek officers would leave in uncontrolled force of 10,000 Greek Cypriote soldiers in the National Guard who could be a serious threat to the minority Turks. Greek officials were understood to have told Mr. Sisco that they would not consider withdrawal in any event.

One factor behind the ouster of Archbishop Makarios was a request that the Athens Government remove the officers on grounds that they were plotting to overthrow him, a charge justified by the military coup on Monday.

The question of restoring the presidency to Archbishop Makarios was apparently not discussed here by Mr. Sisco. American and British officials have taken the view that there seems no way to restore the 67-year-old Archbishop to power now without using force.

Sampson Unacceptable

But Mr. Sisco stressed the American interest in maintaining the independence and "constitutional arrangements" on the island. He is understood to have suggested that the assumption of the presidency by Mr. Sampson, once a commander of a terrorist assassination squad and a rigid supporter of uniting Cyprus with Greece, was unacceptable to many nations besides Turkey.

Diplomats here said that there was no doubt that the Athens leaders could easily dismiss Mr. Sampson. "They can do anything they want with him," said one diplomat. "He takes orders from the Greek officers."

In the view of American and British officials, the elevation to the presidency of Mr. Clerides, who is constitutionally next in line of succession, would help ease the crisis, convince the Turks that moderates were in charge and give the new Cyprus government an appearance of legitimacy.

Diplomats here suggested that the American officials left to the Greek leaders the decision on how best to achieve the presidential change. One proposal calls for moving up the date for presidential elections, perhaps with Mr. Clerides running unopposed. The House president is regarded as politically acceptable in Cyprus and has a large following, even among some Turks. He has been in charge of the talks initiated by Archbishop Makarios on new arrangements for the two communities to share power.


No Tough Line by U.S.

In contrast, Mr. Sampson has been denounced by Turkey as a murderer who once boasted of a massacre of Turks on the island.

No one here suggested that Mr. Sisco took a particularly tough line with the Greek leaders. He reportedly preferred instead to outline the dangers of failing to ease the crisis by some conciliatory move.

The Americans apparently have not pushed the Greek Government too hard out of fear of angering the military leaders and jeopardizing the crucial American naval bases here.

This cautious approach has been followed by the United States since the army colonels seized power here in 1967 and ended parliamentary democracy. Pressure by Washington on those colonels and on their successors has often been described in Athens as "gentle nudges."



Makarinos Asks U.N. To Act on Cyprus

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS, July 19 — Archbishop Makarios charged at the U.N. Security Council today that the coup in Cyprus "was organized by the military regime of Greece and . . . put into effect by Greek officers" serving in the Cypriot National Guard.

The Greek junta, he said, "has extended its dictatorship to Cyprus."

The replacement of the Greek officers in the National Guard would be futile, Makarios said, since "their replacements will also follow instructions from the Athens regime."

Greece has agreed to replace the officers, a course favored by the United States which fears a power vacuum if they are withdrawn completely.

Makarinos appealed to the Security Council to "use all ways and means at its disposal so that the constitutional order in Cyprus and the democratic rights of the people of Cyprus can be reinstated without delay."

Makarinos, who was seated at the council table as the legitimate representative of Cyprus while a delegation representing the island's new leaders, headed for New York, spoke softly in English.

The council chamber was

filled with a standing-room-only crowd.

But the drama was missing. Many felt Makarios was making his last speech as president of Cyprus. Some said they were attending a funeral, for the ouster of the archbishop appeared to have been accepted as a fait accompli.

Most delegates seemed to believe that if there was to be any action at all on the problem of Cyprus it would occur outside the halls of the United Nations.

One speaker after another, from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania, urged the restoration of Makarios to power. There was no doubt, they repeated one after the other, that the coup was engineered from outside by the military government in Athens.

The representative of Greece, denied complicity, calling Makarios a demagogue who was "always running a one-man show surrounded by puppets."

U.S. Ambassador John Scali urged restraint in reaching any conclusions, saying that a real settlement of the problem "can only be accomplished by discussions among the parties which are themselves directly involved."

These talks are already underway in London, Scali said.

Further talks are to be held Sunday.

"The United States considers it a serious error to rush to judgment," he said. "We need to allow time for the peaceful resolution of the crisis."

The Americans have tried to buy time during the discussions leading up to this meeting of the Security Council. Meanwhile, Under Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco was attempting to get negotiations started between the Greeks and Turks.

Soviet delegates pressed for immediate action, but raised no objection when the council was adjourned until Saturday at 11 a.m.

Before adjourning the meeting early this evening the ambassador of Peru, Javier Perez de Cuellar, who is the council president, introduced a draft resolution that he said could be voted on Saturday.

It would demand the immediate end to foreign military intervention on Cyprus and would request the "immediate withdrawal of all foreign military personnel" beyond what is permitted in the 1960 agreement. The United States sought throughout the day to amend this clause to call for the replacement of the Greek officers in the National Guards.

Scali urged the council to "weight the implications" of withdrawing these officers.

"Would it lead to a more unstable situation?" he asked. Scali stressed that the United States does not consider "enosis," or the union of Cyprus with Greece, a solution to the problem. The United States, he said, "continues to support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the existing constitutional arrangements."

The coup, Makarios said, was "clearly an invasion from outside." Greek officers he said "recruited many members of the terrorist organization, EOKA-B whom they armed with weapons of the National Guard." EOKA-B was made up of Greek Cypriots who wanted the island to become part of Greece and who opposed Makarios' policy of nonaligned independence.

After the coup, Makarios said, "the agents of the Greek regime in Cyprus appointed a well-known gunman, Nikos Sampson, as president." In turn, Sampson "appointed as ministers known elements and supporters of the terrorist organization EOKA-B."

Makarinos said he had documents to prove that EOKA-B is an "appendage of the Athens regime" and that it received funds and "detailed directives" from Greece. Makarios said he had sent a letter July 2 to the president of Greece asking for the dissolution of EOKA-B and for the withdrawal of the Greek officers of the National Guard. The Athens government refused, saying that the withdrawal of the Greek officers would "weaken the defense of Cyprus in case of danger from Turkey."

"As things developed," Makarios said, "I considered the danger from Turkey of a lesser degree than the danger from them. And it was proved that my fears were justified."



Tom Bruden

Cyprus: Where Were the U.S. Watchmen?

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger thinks of himself from time to time as a kind of watchman on the tower, a man with a powerful glass whose job it is to spot a small brush fire in the forest, estimate its potential and then take steps to crush it in the greenwood before it gets to the dry.

But such a brush fire broke out in Cyprus earlier this month, and one of the lessons to be learned from it is that watchmen have to keep watching, even on the weekend of the fourth.

When Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus accused the Greek government over that weekend of plotting the overthrow of his regime, neither the chief watchman nor his assistants happened to have their eyes at the glass.

Kissinger was busy briefing European leaders on the results of the Moscow summit conference. John Day, chief of the Greece desk, was on vacation. So was Thomas Boyatt, head of the Cyprus desk.

In addition, Roger Davies, the new ambassador to Cyprus, had just arrived and not yet presented his credentials; his counterpart in Greece, Henry Tasca, cabled his firm view that he should not attempt to advise the Greek government until Davies was firmly established and could coordinate policy.

In short, the United States was caught celebrating and there was no watchman on the tower. The United States gave the Russians an opening they might still decide to seize. Moreover, this country missed a golden opportunity to shake itself loose from the tawdry Greek regime run out of the hack room by Brig. Gen. Dimitri Ioannides.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Ioannides, who controls the Greek government through command of the military police (an astonishing 17 per cent of the Greek army), planned the take over in Cyprus to coincide with

the holiday in this country. When Makarios got wind of it and issued an appeal to Greece's puppet president, Kaldon (Ghizikis), the coup had to be postponed, a circumstance to which Makarios may owe his life.

But when that blow struck a week later, the Russians moved speedily to denounce it, and so did the British. The United States, caught blinking its eyes, issued a weak response which deliberately did not endorse Makarios, gave Ioannides reason to believe that we approve of him and even suggested that Ioannides was not to blame.

Lower-level desk officers in the State Department fought hard for a tougher line. They saw the coup as a chance to topple Ioannides from power, an event which the rest of the Greek army would look upon favorably and which might lead to the restoration of a partially democratic regime.

But they were unable to get their views through to Kissinger. "We've lost our chance to disassociate ourselves from those bastards," one of them said when it was all over.

Indeed, it may not be over yet. Makarios cannot have been pleased by the U.S. response.

If, despite his U.N. trip, the coup should go against him, Makarios might, as a last-grasp alternative to defeat, invite Russian troops to make a landing in order to protect the interests of "legitimate government."

It is an unlikely nightmare, but the nightmare is only worse than the daytime fact. Which is that the United States missed a chance to oust the Greek brigadier who rose to power through expertise in torture and who now has reason to believe that he is so essential to this country that he can provoke war in the Mideast and retain nonetheless our firm support.



~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1974

TO: General Scowcroft for
Secretary Kissinger

FROM: R.T. Kennedy

Herewith is Director Colby's
briefing presented at this mornings
WSAG meeting.

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