

**The original documents are located in Box 7, folder “Cyprus Crisis (7)” of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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# Gerald R. Ford Library

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1. Obtain the Presidential Libraries Mandatory Review Request Form (NA Form 14020).
2. Complete Sections I, II, and III of NA Form 14020.
3. In Section III, for each document requested, simply provide the Executive Standard Document Number (ESDN) in the Document Subject/Title or Correspondents column. The ESDN will be printed on the top and bottom of the document, and written on the declassification authority stamp, and will follow this format:

NLF-NSC\_ILCC-5-2-4-3

~~TOP SECRET~~

1<sup>1a</sup>


1572

DECLASSIFIED w/porions exempted State Dept. Guidelines  
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-3-28-2-6 9/29/2004  
BY MAO NARA, DATE 3/11/2011




**WARNING**

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DIA review(s) completed

Presidential Library Review of State Equities is ~~TOP SECRET~~





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
July 19, 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM


CYPRUS

Situation Report Number 11  
(As of 0700 EDT; updates NIB)

(All times cited are Nicosia time, unless otherwise specified.)


THE POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Turkish public support for intervention in Cyprus is increasing. Opposition politicians, business and labor leaders and newspapers are urging the government to take decisive action. Premier Demirel, the head of the leading opposition party, said Turkey would not concede to Greece on this issue. Other political leaders have recommended immediate military action. The chambers of commerce and industry announced that "the Turkish private sector with all its resources" was at the disposal of the armed forces. The biggest labor federation offered to halt all strikes in support of government policy on Cyprus.



3. In Cyprus, UN officials have told the US Embassy

Presidential Library Review of State Equities is Required



[REDACTED]

that unscheduled Olympic Airlines flights on July 15 and 16 delivered 30 "civilian" passengers to Nicosia. A US Embassy officer saw a similar unscheduled flight arrive on July 18. The 20 persons who disembarked were whisked away in military vehicles. The Embassy comments that these flights could represent reinforcement of the Greek military on Cyprus.

4. A Soviet official on Cyprus has said that individuals entering or leaving his Embassy are being searched by National Guard forces. US officials have confirmed that the Soviet Embassy, unlike most other diplomatic missions, is under armed surveillance. A top Soviet Foreign Ministry official said on July 17 that communications with the Embassy in Nicosia had been cut.

#### MILITARY SITUATION

5. Cyprus apparently remained quiet during the night. Turkish Cypriot forces in the eastern end of the island mobilized reserve personnel yesterday and implemented contingency plans. These appear to include setting up defensive positions and ensuring communications and supplies of food and ammunition.

6. It has not been possible to confirm the report that 16 Turkish ships are concentrated in an area between Rhodes and Cyprus. Although there are indications that Turkish troops and gendarmarie units continue to move towards southern Turkish ports, it is not yet known if the Turkish troops observed embarking at Mersin yesterday have left that port.

7. There is an unconfirmed report that Athens has moved nine F-5 fighters to Crete. A US military attache is now en route to the island to verify the report.


#### SOVIET REACTION

[REDACTED]


- 2 -

[REDACTED]






25X1




guided missile cruisers continue to move towards Cyprus. They are now west of Crete and have been joined by one of the destroyers that were anchored off Tunisia. Aside from these developments there have been no significant changes in the status of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron since yesterday afternoon.

LATE ITEM

11. UPI reports that a Turkish fleet, including amphibious craft, sailed today from the southern part of Mersin.



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
DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted  
AUTHORITY RAC NLF - CODEWORD - 3-28-2-6 9/29/2004  
BY Who NARA, DATE 3/11/2011

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25X1

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


State Dept. Guidelines  
DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted  
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-3-28-3-5  
BY *MIC* NARA DATE 3/11/2011 9/29/2004

DIA review(s) completed

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Presidential Library Review of State Department Equities is Required





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#### SOVIET REACTION



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034915

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200172

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/24/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



July - 21/74  
3

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

O 193144Z JUL 74 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0969  
BT

5 3 0 2 Q  
19 JUL 74 212 55

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17572

MODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CYP  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

~~SECRET~~ State Review  
NO. 11652: GDS 3/3/04  
BY LR 3/25/11

REF: (A) STATE 156312 (B) ANKARA 154148

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES RECEIVED ME FIRST THING THIS MORNING PRIOR TO HIS BEGINNING FULL DAY OF BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH WILSON AND CALLAGHAN OF UK. I PROVIDED RUNDOWN OF CURRENT USG THINKING AS TRANSMITTED REFTEL (A) AS WELL AS GIST OF TURKISH POINT OF VIEW CONTAINED REFTEL (B). I SAID THAT SECRETARY INSTRUCTED ME TO DISCUSS CYPRUS WITH HIM HIS DUAL CAPACITY AS FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRESIDENT OF EC-NINE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, AND THAT HE SHOULD FEEL FREE TO TRANSMIT OUR ANALYSIS TO THE EC-NINE GOVERNMENTS AT APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVELS.

2. SAUVAGNARGUES ASKED ME TO EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY FOR SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. VIEW. HE AGREED WITH OUR OBJECTIVES AND OUR VIEWS AS TO THE DE FACTO SITUATION IN CYPRUS AS WELL AS THE DANGERS OF FURTHER DESTABILIZATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN IF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS NOT ARRIVED AT QUICKLY. HE STRESSED THAT THE TURKS EXPRESS A SENSE OF FRUSTRATION WITH THE WESTERN POWERS GENERALLY AND SOME BITTERNESS TOWARD THE U.S. WHEN THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR PRESENTED THE EC-NINE DEMARCHE CALLING FOR RESTRAINT (PARIS 17563). HE SAID THE FRENCH FEAR LOSS OF TURKISH ADHERENCE TO THE ALLIANCE IF SOMETHING IS NOT DONE QUICKLY TO GIVE THE TURKS THE PERCEPTION THAT THE ALLIES ARE TAKING TURKISH VIEWS ABOUT CYPRUS SERIOUSLY. IN THIS CONTEXT, SAUVAGNARGUES FEELS THE GREEKS HAVE A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS. SAUVAGNARGUES SAID HE FOUND THE ABSENCE OF ANY EMPHASIS ON GREEK RESPONSIBILITY TO CORRECT AN ALREADY DESTABILIZED SITUATION TO BE THE MAJOR VOID IN OUR

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Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 17572, JUL 19, NODIS

ANALYSIS. HE HOPED THAT THE USG WOULD BE PLACING UN-AMBIGUOUS PRESSURE ON THE GREEK REGIME TO TAKE THE TYPE OF ACTION THAT WOULD ASSUAGE TURKISH FEARS AND THEREBY PRECLUDE UNILATERAL TURKISH INTERVENTION WHICH THE GOF CONSIDERS WOULD BE LEGAL PURSUANT TO THE ZURICH ACCORDS.

3. I RESPONDED BY POINTING OUT THAT U.S. OBJECTIVES AS STATED IN OUR ANALYSIS DO NOT DIFFER FROM THOSE OF THE FRENCH OR THEIR EC-NINE PARTNERS, AND THAT UNDER SECRETARY SISCO'S CURRENT ROUND OF MEETINGS WITH THE BRITISH, GREEKS AND TURKS ARE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THE TYPE OF JOINTLY AGREED ACTIONS WHICH THE FRENCH UNDERSTANDABLY FEEL ARE NECESSARY TO AVOID UNILATERAL TURKISH INTERVENTION. I CONCLUDED THAT WHILE IT IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE TURKS TO PERCEIVE THAT THE ALLIES ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR POINT OF VIEW, IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT NONE OF US BECOME LOCKED INTO PUBLIC POSITIONS WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE TWO OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN YOUR ANALYSIS.

4. SAUVAGNARGUES WAS PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY INDICATION REFTEL (8) THAT TURKS MIGHT BE WILLING TO LIVE WITH ALTERNATIVE TO MAKARIOS PROVIDED SECURE ACCESS TO TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY COULD BE ASSURED. SAUVAGNARGUES CHARACTERIZED THIS AS "OBVIOUS TURKISH FALLBACK POSITION".

5. REFERRING BACK TO SISCO'S CURRENT VISIT TO ATHENS, SAUVAGNARGUES SAID THAT IN VIEW OF TURKISH SUSPICIONS, HE STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT SISCO GO TO ANKARA IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARD IN ORDER TO KEEP GOF INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

6. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH AS EVENTS UNFOLD.  
IRWIN

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034916

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . The Situation Room

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . General Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200172

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/24/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

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O 121250Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8908

CONTROL: 5340Q  
EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY 19 JUL 74 11Z

BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1520

NOOIS

DEPT FOR THE SECRETARY, PLEASE PASS ATHENS AND ANKARA (INFO IMMEDIATE) FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PINT CY

SUBJECT: CYPRUS; COMMENTS OF GLAFKOS CLERIDES

1. FOR REASONS OF HIS PERSONAL SAFETY, CLERIDES' COMMENTS ON PRESENT SITUATION SHOULD BE MOST CLOSELY HELD.
2. I CALLED ON CLERIDES AT HIS RESIDENCE MORNING JULY 19. I STRESSED TO HIM OUR CONCERN BOTH THAT CONFLICT BETWEEN OUR TWO ALLIES BE AVOIDED AND THAT CIVIL WAR ON CYPRUS NOT GIVE ELEMENTS UNFRIENDLY TO THE FREE WORLD OPPORTUNITES TO EXPLOIT. I NOTED CURRENT ACTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE TALKS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND TURKEY, AS WELL AS JOE SISCO'S EFFORTS IN ATHENS AND ANKARA. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING IT SEEMED TO ME THAT ANSWER TO WHATEVER MIGHT HAPPEN ON CYPRUS WOULD NOT BE FOUND NOW ON ISLAND BUT IN EFFORTS WITH TWO POWERS MOST IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED, GREECE AND TURKEY.
3. CLERIDES RESPONDED THAT HE WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT. THERE MUST NOW BE CONCESSIONS ON PART OF BOTH ATHENS AND ANKARA. GREEKS MUST BE BROUGHT TO REALIZATION THAT TURKS NOW MUST HAVE SOMETHING FROM ATHENS TO SAVE TURKISH FACE IN A SITUATION PRECIPITATED BY ATHENS. TURKS MUST REALIZE THAT THE JUNTA CAN MOVE ONLY SO FAR WITHOUT PRECIPITATING ITS OVERTHROW AND POSSIBLE CHAOS IN GREECE.
4. IN RECALLING OUR CONVERSATION JULY 12, HE SAID IT WAS CLEAR NOW THAT HIS FEAR WAS JUSTIFIED THAT THE ARCHBISHOP HAD MISASSESSED THE JUNTA IN FEELING THAT ITS WEAKNESS PREVENTED ITS MOVING IN CYPRUS. IT WAS THE FACT OF ITS WEAKNESS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE MOVE. ALTHOUGH AGREEING THAT THE ANSWER TO PROBLEM HERE MUST BE FOUND IN A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ATHENS AND ANKARA, SUCH A SETTLEMENT WAS IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS IT INVOLVED

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*State Review*  
3/3/84

By LR 3/25/11

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1520, JUL 19

REMOVAL OF THE "ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT NICOS SAMPSON."

5. CLERIDES SAID NICOS SAMPSON WAS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO TURKS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HE WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO VAST MAJORITY OF GREEK CYPRIOTS AND COULD BE MAINTAINED IN POWER ONLY BY MILITARY FORCE. HE ELABORATED BY SAYING THE POLICE FILE ON SAMPSON WAS THICKER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER CRIMINAL IN CYPRUS. HE WAS GUILTY NOT ONLY OF MURDER BUT ALSO OF COMMON THEFT AND BURGLARY, AND THIS IN THE DAYS AFTER THE TROUBLES WITH THE TURKS. HE CITED INCIDENTS IN OMORPHITA IN 1963-64 TROUBLES WHEN SAMPSON WOULD ROUND UP TURK CYPRIOTS AND FORCE THEM TO SHOUT "LONG LIVE MAKARIOS." IF THEY DID NOT HE SHOT THEM; IF THEY DID, HE SHOT THEM AS TRAITORS TO THEIR TURKISH FATHERLAND. SUCH WAS THE COMPLETELY DISREPUTABLE NATURE OF SAMPSON THAT EVEN IF TURKS WERE TO SIT DOWN AT A TABLE WITH HIM, HE, CLERIDES, WOULD REFUSE.

6. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS, UNLESS SAMPSON WERE REMOVED, HE, CLERIDES, WOULD ANNOUNCE HIS WITHDRAWAL FROM HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND AS INTERLOCUTOR IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HE HAD CONSENTED TO DIMMY DIMITRIOU'S PLEA THAT HE GO ALONG WITH ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WAS WILLING TO CONTINUE IN TALKS BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH TO ADD TO DIFFICULTIES OF CYPRUS DURING THIS TURBULENT WEEK. SAMPSON, HE REPEATED, WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE AS PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS. HIS ASSUMPTION OF THAT ROLE WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH PRESCRIBED THAT PRESIDENCY WENT TO NEXT IN LINE, I.E., PRESIDENT OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. THE TURKS WERE QUITE CORRECT IN THEIR STATEMENT THAT SAMPSON'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER WAS IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTION AGREED TO IN 1960.

7. CLERIDES SAID HE BELIEVED MAKARIOS COULD NOT RETURN UNLESS BY OUTSIDE INTERVENTION AND SHOULD NOT RETURN EITHER AS PRESIDENT OR ARCHBISHOP. HE HAD BEEN OPPORTUNISTIC IN SEEKING SUPPORT FROM LEFTISTS AND COMMUNISTS. FACT NOW BEING DISCLOSED THAT HE HAD ACQUIRED AND HIDDEN LARGE STORES OF ARMS ILLEGALLY WITH COOPERATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND, UNDOUBTEDLY, SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THOSE HE HAD AROUND HIM WERE SUCH AS TO DIS-

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TELEGRAM

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~~-3- SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1520, NODIS, JUL 19

ILLUSION MANY WHO PREVIOUSLY HAD SUPPORTED HIM. VOCIFEROUS  
SOVIET SUPPORT FOR HIM SINCE THE COUP WAS ANOTHER FACTOR.  
IF HE RETURNED, IT WAS LIKELY HE WOULD RELY EVEN MORE HEAVILY  
ON THE EAST. HIS RETURN ALSO WOULD REVIVE ECCLESIASTIC PROBLEM ON  
ISLAND.

8. CLERIDES SAID THE ANSWER TO CYPRUS INTERNAL PROBLEM WAS  
REMOVAL OF NICOS SAMPSON AS HEAD OF GOVT. HE DID NOT THINK  
OTHER MEMBERS OF PRESENT GROUP NEED GO; INDEED HE THOUGHT  
INVOLVEMENT OF THE DIMITRIOS AND SEVERAL OTHERS WAS DE-  
SIRABLE IN FUTURE POLITICAL EVOLUTION. IN RESPONSE TO MY  
QUESTION, HE SAID REMOVAL OF SAMPSON COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE  
THROUGH A DECISION TO DO SO IN ATHENS. INTERNALLY THERE  
COULD BE A PROCEDURE POSSIBLY INVOLVING PARLIAMENTARY ACTION  
WHICH COULD RESTORE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER TO THE ISLAND.  
HE FELT A COMMITMENT TO RETURN TO A CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER  
WOULD EAST PROBLEM WITH THE TURKS. REALISTICALLY, IT MUST  
BE ACCEPTED THAT TURKS WOULD SEEK TO IMPROVE TURK CYPRIOT  
POSITION ON CYPRUS. IF HE WERE A TURK HE WOULD MOST CERTAINLY  
SEEK TO CAPITALIZE ON OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED BY COUP.

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~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

0 191250Z JUL 74  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8909  
BT

CONTROL: 5335Q  
RECD: 19 JUL 14 06Z

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 1520

NOOIS

DEPT FOR THE SECRETARY, PLEASE PASS ATHENS AND ANKARA (INFO IMMEDIATE) FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO

9. I TOLD HIM HIS VIEWS WOULD BE VALUED BY THE SECRETARY AND JOE SISCO, AND THAT I WOULD ASSURE THEY WERE MOST CLOSELY HELD. I SUMMED UP BY SAYING I UNDERSTOOD HIM TO FEEL PRESENT SITUATION WAS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS, THAT NICOS SAMPSON WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO TURK CYPRIOTS AND TURKEY AS PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS, AND PROBABLY UNACCEPTABLE TO MAJORITY OF GREEK CYPRIOTS, THAT THE RETURN OF ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS WAS PROBABLY NOT IN INTERESTS EITHER OF CYPRUS OR WEST, THAT A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER ON CYPRUS WAS ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR DEFUSING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ATHENS AND ANKARA OVER CYPRUS ISSUE, AND THAT HE, UNLESS SAMPSON WERE OUSTED, WOULD NOT REMAIN AS PRESIDENT OF HOUSE OF REPS OR AS GREEK CYPRIOT INTERLOCUTOR IN TALKS. CLERIDES AGREED WITH SUMMATION BUT SUGGESTED I COULD DROP THE "PROBABLY" IN BOTH CASES ABOVE. I TOLD HIM I HAD CALLED ON HIM WITH AUTHORIZATION OF THE SECRETARY, THAT HIS VIEWS WERE VALUED AND WE WISHED TO STAY CLOSELY IN CONTACT WITH HIM. HE SAID HE WAS ANXIOUS WE DO SO AND HE COULD BE AVAILABLE ANY TIME AT HOME BUT HAD NOT BEEN AT HIS OFFICE SINCE HE DID NOT WANT TO FURTHER IMPRESSION HE WOULD BE WILLING TO SERVE UNDER A MAN SUCH AS SAMPSON.

10. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY SINCE HE WAS NEXT IN LINE OF SUCCESSION, CLERIDES VIEWS COULD BE SEEN AS SELF-SERVING. GIVEN REALITIES OF PRESENT SITUATION HOWEVER I THINK MOST DISINTERESTED OBSERVERS WOULD COME TO CONCLUSION SIMILAR TO HIS. IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS PRESENTATION THAT HE CONSIDERED RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSION PRE-REQUISITE TO GREEK-TURKISH AGREEMENT AND THAT PARLIAMENTARY ACTION AT SOME POINT DOWN THE ROAD COULD BE UTILIZED TO RESTRUCTURE GOVERNMENT IF NECESSARY.

DAVIES

BT  
#1520  
NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T - 7/19/74

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034917

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . BG Guay

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Gen Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Egypt

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200172

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/24/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDSINFORMATION

July 19, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

Jeanne W. Davis *JW*

SUBJECT:

Minutes of the Washington Special Actions  
Group Meeting Held July 19, 1974

Attached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting held July 19, 1974 to discuss Cyprus.

Attachments

cc: Gen. Scowcroft  
Mr. Kennedy  
Mr. Saunders



UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS



76

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034918

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMinute

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Washington Special Actions Group  
Meeting

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200172

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/24/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034919

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇBriefing Paper

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Briefing for July 19 WSAG Meeting

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200172

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/24/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR


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AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 2440  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 2046  
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USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY  
USDOCOSOUTH PRIORITY  
CINCUSAFE PRIORITY  
COMSIXTHFLT PRIORITY  
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, CY TU, GR, NATO  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKS REJECT GREEK WITHDRAWAL GESTURE IN JULY 19 NAC  
REF: A) USNATO 3973 B) STATE 155454  
ATHENS FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO  
SUMMARY: ANKARA'S FINDING THAT GREEK DECISION TO REPLACE NATIONAL  
GUARD OFFICERS WAS INADEQUATE PROVOKED SHARP RETORT FROM GREEK  
PERMREP, LEADING TO BITTER EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN NAC.  
NETHERLANDS PROPOSED THAT GREEK OFFICER CONTINGENT BE PROGRESSIVELY  
DIMINISHED DURING REPLACEMENT PROCESS. NAC WILL DISCUSS CYPRUS  
AGAIN IN AFTERNOON AFTER SYG'S RETURN. END SUMMARY.

1. IN MORNING SESSION OF NAC ON JULY 19 CHAIRED BY ACTING SYG DE STAERCKE, TURKISH CHARGE TULUMEN SAID HE HAD RECEIVED CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS FROM ANKARA CONFIRMING HIS PERSONAL REACTIONS PREVIOUS EVENING (REFTEL). JULY 18 DECLARATION BY AMBASSADOR CHORAFAS DID NOT SATISFY TURKISH AUTHORITIES IN ANY RESPECT. GREEK OFFICERS WERE IN CYPRUS ILLEGALLY, AND MERELY REPLACING THEM WOULD NOT FULFILL GREECE'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTY. (FULL TEXT OF TULUMEN'S STATEMENT BY SEPTTEL.)
2. GREEK PERMREP CHORAFAS RESPONDED THAT ATHENS HAD MADE CLEAR ITS

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~~SECRET~~ State Review  
3/3/04  
By HR 3/25/11



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INTENTION TO HEED INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, AND ASKED WHAT MORE IT COULD DO. GREEK OFFICERS HAD BEEN STATIONED ON CYPRUS AT REQUEST OF HOST GOVERNMENT, IN CONTRAST WITH THE TURKISH GARRISON, WHICH HAD BEEN INTRODUCED AGAINST THE WILL OF THE PAST AND THE PRESENT GOVERNMENTS. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD APPEARED TO WANT REPLACEMENT; HE WAS SORRY THAT TURKS WERE NOT SATISFIED, BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT THEM TO BE SATISFIED WITH ANYTHING. HE DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN REINFORCEMENTS FROM GREECE.

3. TULUMEN REJECTED CHORAFAS' POINTS ABOUT PAST AND PRESENT GOVERNMENTS. HE OBSERVED THAT THE MAKARIOUS GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK OFFICERS IN NATIONAL GUARD. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER CHORAFAS REFERENCE TO "PRESENT GOVERNMENT" MEANT THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS SPEAKING FOR OR IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH DE FACTO REGIME IN CYPRUS.

4. AT THIS POINT EXCHANGE BECAME HEATED, WITH TULUMEN AND CHORAFAS TRADING CHARGES OF INTERVENTIONISM. CHAIRMAN INTERRUPTED THEM TO CALL ON UK REP, WHO HAD ASKED FOR FLOOR EARLIER.

5. LOGAN (UK) PROMISED REPORT ON JULY 18 CONVERSATIONS IN LONDON FOR SECOND NAC MEETING IN AFTERNOON, AT WHICH SYG LUNS WOULD BE PRESENT. HE THEN ASKED CHORAFAS ABOUT HIS REFERENCE TO GREEK RESPECT FOR ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. THIS PHRASE HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN GREEK FONMIN'S PUBLIC STATEMENT, AND UK AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS HAD SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED GREEK FONMIN TO CLARIFY THE POINT IN A SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT. HAD SUCH A STATEMENT NOW BEEN MADE? CHORAFAS' REPLY WAS THAT RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WAS IMPLIED BY FIRST GREEK PUBLIC STATEMENT, EVEN IF IT WAS NOT EXPLICIT.

6. SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS CHARGE BUWALDA CHARACTERIZED GREEK STATEMENT PREVIOUS EVENING AS A GESTURE TO REDUCE TENSIONS, BUT NOTED THAT TIME SCHEDULE FOR REPLACEMENT OF OFFICERS WAS VAGUE. DUTCH HOPE GREEKS WILL MOVE WITH ALL POSSIBLE SPEED. IN ORDER TO FURTHER "DEPOLARIZE" THE SITUATION ON THE ISLAND, NETHERLANDS ALSO HOPES THAT REPLACEMENT WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A "GRADUAL DIMINISHMENT" OF GREEK OFFICERS ON THE ISLAND. BUWALDA AGREED WITH RUMSFELD'S VIEW THAT ALLIES SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC POSITIONS AND ALLOW DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO TAKE ITS COURSE. HOWEVER, HE SAID, GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD UNIQUE RESPONSIBILITY AND POSSIBILITY TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION.

7. CHORAFAS REPLIED TO BUWALDA THAT REPLACEMENT WAS EXPECTED TO BE PROMPT, BUT WITH VERY SHORT DELAYS IN BETWEEN STAGES. ALL THE OFFICERS COULD NOT BE REPLACED AT ONCE. DE STAERCKE SUGGESTED THAT GREEKS PROVIDE A SCHEDULE TO SYG.

8. RUMSFELD (U.S.) REPORTED ON RESULTS OF JULY 17 DEMARCHES AS

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RLIER INSTRUCTED, AGAIN DREW ON GUIDANCE IN REF B, AND  
 PHASIZED POINT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO NEW ALLIANCE STATEMENTS  
 THE PRESS. (TEXT OF RUMSFELD STATEMENT SEPTEL.) DE STAERCKE  
 ACTING SYG AGREED THAT PRESS STATEMENT SEEMED INAPPROPRIATE  
 FOR THE MOMENT, SO AS TO ALLOW GREATER DIPLOMATIC FLEXIBILITY.  
 RE FACT THAT NAC WAS MEETING DAILY OR MORE OFTEN ON CYPRUS  
 WOULD GIVE PRESS AN ADEQUATE INDICATION OF ALLIANCE CONCERN.

MENZIES (CANADA) CIRCULATED TEXT OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT  
 STATEMENT RELEASED TO PRESS JULY 18 IN OTTAWA, WHICH CALLS FOR  
 ACTION BY GREEKS TO SUBSTANTIATE PUBLICLY DECLARED POLICY OF GOG.  
 ON PERSONAL BASIS, MENZIES SUPPORTED NETHERLANDS SUGGESTION FOR  
 GRADUAL DIMINISHMENT OF GREEK CONTINGENT,  
 RUMSFELD



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
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
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PFDR, CY, GR, TU



1. JULY 19 1700 TURKISH TRT NEWS BROADCAST CITES REPORT BY  
"NEWS AGENCIES" THAT UNDER SECRETARY SISCO HAS BROUGHT TO GREECE  
AND TURKEY AN "AMERICAN PLAN" FOR SOLVING CYPRUS CRISIS.  
ACCORDING TO TRT, PLAN ENVISAGES:  
A. REPLACING CURRENT HEAD OF CYPRUS REGIME SAMPSON WITH  
MORE MODERATE AND INFLUENTIAL PERSON, WHO COULD BE CLERIDES;  
B. CHANGING GREEK OFFICERS ON CYPRUS INVOLVED IN THE COUP.

MACOMBER  
BT



By ldr 3/25/11

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

KENNEDY,LL

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AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD-3-28-1-7 9/29/2004  
BY MJO NARA, DATE 3/11/2011


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DIA review(s) completed

Presidential Library Review of State Department Equities is Required

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
July 19, 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM


CYPRUS

Situation Report Number 12  
(As of 1600 EDT)

(All times cited are Nicosia time, unless otherwise specified.)


MILITARY SITUATION

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



4. Press reports indicate that over 30 ships and landing craft left the port of Mersin this morning. One observer reportedly saw 20 medium landing craft, five small landing craft, five destroyers, and two large troop transports. He counted 30 tanks onboard the landing craft, and saw camouflaged troops

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


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on the troop transports.



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
7. The assistant US naval attache from Ankara reported seeing almost 700 airborne troops on July 18 in a west-bound convoy near Mersin. Another US source reported seeing three C-47 aircraft with 70 airborne troops aboard arriving on July 18 at Incirlik, about a half hour's flying time from Cyprus.

8. The Greek armed forces also moved to advanced states of readiness today. US military personnel report Hellenic navy units at Salamis naval base and at Souda Bay were put on alert. Several air force units also went on alert and military leaves were cancelled. US personnel noted Greek air force personnel arming aircraft with missiles and rockets at four fields. Base air defenses were also activated.

POLITICAL SITUATION


9. Both the Greek and Turkish cabinets met today. The Greek session was characterized in a press report as a meeting to plan for action in the event Turkey decides to militarily







intervene in Cyprus. It was attended by the Armed Forces chiefs. A late wire service report indicates that the Greek Government has agreed in principle to consultations in London on the Cyprus problem.

10. In Ankara, a government spokesman announced after the meeting that the cabinet discussed the authorization it will seek from parliament tomorrow. He said that the government will seek an authorization of "wider scope" than they did during the two previous Greek-Turkish crises over Cyprus.



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
17. The scheduled rotation of Greek troops on Cyprus began today. The US embassy in Nicosia reports that it learned through a UN source that a Greek ship disembarked 440 troops, took on 275, and prepared to leave. When members of the UN force observing the operation protested, additional troops were brought to the docks but at last report it was not certain that they are boarding the ship.

CYPRUS INTERNAL

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19. The new regime's ambassador designate to the UN, Loukis Papafilippou, reportedly said last night that most members of the new Greek Cypriot "Council of Ministers" acknowledged that the selection of Nicos Sampson as President



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was a mistake but because the selection was made by Athens, they must support Sampson temporarily. Papafilippou said the maximum concessions he is prepared to make at the UN are:

- the new "government of national salvation" would agree to be identified as a transitional government
- Sampson would be replaced by someone acceptable to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, probably Glafkos Clerides
- the present "Council of Ministers" would remain in the transitional government
- free elections would be held within an agreed upon time, probably within four to five months
- Makarios would be free to return to Cyprus as Archbishop but would not be permitted to engage in politics

Papafilippou would not say whether the maximum concessions described above had the approval of the entire "Council of Ministers" or of the Greek government.

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#### SOVIET REACTION

22. Moscow's public reaction to the events in Cyprus continues to be moderate, although it is clear that the Soviets find the Sampson government unacceptable. The Soviets are pressing strongly at the UN for a vote today on a resolution attacking Greece and supporting Makarios.

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[REDACTED]

23. TASS today again voiced support for the people of Cyprus in their efforts to determine their own destiny and again called for an immediate stop to foreign meddling in the island's domestic affairs. TASS quoted a New York Times article equating Sampson to Al Capone and described Sampson's rise to prominence as leader of a terrorist group. His close contacts with "rightists" in Athens were noted. Pravda today explained that the goal of the coup is enosis.

24. Soviet party leader Brezhnev reportedly sent a message to Yugoslavian President Tito today dealing with the situation in Cyprus. [REDACTED]

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

25. In light of the possible movement of an additional US carrier to the Mediterranean from the US East Coast, the Soviets may decide to send naval TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft to Havana and/or Conakry to monitor its movement. TASS today quoted a US official as saying that the US Navy plans to increase its carrier force in the Mediterranean to three. In the past, naval TU-95's flying from Cuba and Guinea have reconnoitered US carriers en route to the Mediterranean.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

OTHER SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY ACTIVITY

[REDACTED]

30. The US attache in Budapest has again reported overflights of what appear to be multi-engine turboprop aircraft, although in fewer numbers than he previously reported occurring daily between July 11 and 18. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

31. US military attaches in Sofia toured Bulgaria yesterday to determine the validity of rumors that Bulgarian armed forces were mobilizing and moving towards the Greek border. Small numbers of reservists were seen in all of the major cities visited. Troops at some installations were seen wearing steel helmets and battle dress. There were no indications of a significant mobilization or of any deployments. It is likely, however, that Bulgarian armed forces are on some type of alert. A US attache is now driving towards the Turkish-Bulgarian border to check on possible troop movements there.

[REDACTED]

UN DEVELOPMENTS


33. In an informal, closed session this morning, the UN

-7-

[REDACTED]



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


OTHER SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY ACTIVITY




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
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[REDACTED]

Security Council confirmed the decision it made yesterday to give Makarios a hearing with full honors accorded a head of state. Thus, the Council has implicitly decided, for the time being, not to receive as the legitimate representatives of Cyprus the new UN delegation being sent by the Sampson regime. The new delegation is not due to arrive in New York until 1800 EDT, and it is not clear whether the Security Council will still be in session then. If the new delegation does arrive in time for today's meeting, there would not have to be a credentials fight in the Council, since Sampson's group could be heard as representatives of a non-UN member.

34. The Security Council convened at 1530 today in open, formal session to hear Makarios give his version of the coup that toppled him and call for a strong Security Council resolution on the Cyprus situation. The US delegation is trying to persuade other Council members not to vote on a resolution this afternoon, but the Soviets are demanding a vote, and others may be inclined to go along. The key, apparently, is Makarios; if he requests action on a resolution this afternoon, USUN thinks the Council will agree.

LATE ITEM

35. The US defense attache in Athens reports that six submarines left the Salamis naval base late this afternoon. Greece has a total of 19 submarines. One destroyer escort also departed to the south, and one destroyer was preparing to get under way. None of the landing ships normally located at Salamis were in port.



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DIA review(s) completed.

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AUTHORITY **RAC NLF-CODEWORD-3-28-4-4 2/8/2007**  
BY MHO NARA, DATE 3/11/2011


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
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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
July 19, 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM


CYPRUS

Situation Report Number 12  
(As of 1600 EDT)

(All times cited are Nicosia time, unless otherwise specified.)



MILITARY SITUATION

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8. The Greek armed forces also moved to advanced states of readiness today. US military personnel report Hellenic navy units at Salamis naval base and at Souda Bay were put on alert. Several air force units also went on alert and military leaves were cancelled. US personnel noted Greek air force personnel arming aircraft with missiles and rockets at four fields. Base air defenses were also activated.

#### POLITICAL SITUATION


9. Both the Greek and Turkish cabinets met today. The Greek session was characterized in a press report as a meeting to plan for action in the event Turkey decides to militarily

25X1

-2-




25X1



intervene in Cyprus. It was attended by the Armed Forces chiefs. A late wire service report indicates that the Greek Government has agreed in principle to consultations in London on the Cyprus problem.

10. In Ankara, a government spokesman announced after the meeting that the cabinet discussed the authorization it will seek from parliament tomorrow. He said that the government will seek an authorization of "wider scope" than they did during the two previous Greek-Turkish crises over Cyprus.





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




25X1



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


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
17. The scheduled rotation of Greek troops on Cyprus began today. The US embassy in Nicosia reports that it learned through a UN source that a Greek ship disembarked 440 troops, took on 275, and prepared to leave. When members of the UN force observing the operation protested, additional troops were brought to the docks but at last report it was not certain that they are boarding the ship.

25X1


CYPRUS INTERNAL



19. The new regime's ambassador designate to the UN, Loukis Papafilippou, reportedly said last night that most members of the new Greek Cypriot "Council of Ministers" acknowledged that the selection of Nicos Sampson as President



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was a mistake but because the selection was made by Athens, they must support Sampson temporarily. Papafilippou said the maximum concessions he is prepared to make at the UN are:

- the new "government of national salvation" would agree to be identified as a transitional government
- Sampson would be replaced by someone acceptable to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, probably Glafkos Clerides
- the present "Council of Ministers" would remain in the transitional government
- free elections would be held within an agreed upon time, probably within four to five months
- Makarios would be free to return to Cyprus as Archbishop but would not be permitted to engage in politics


25X1


Papafilippou would not say whether the maximum concessions described above had the approval of the entire "Council of Ministers" or of the Greek government.

### SOVIET REACTION

22. Moscow's public reaction to the events in Cyprus continues to be moderate, although it is clear that the Soviets find the Sampson government unacceptable. The Soviets are pressing strongly at the UN for a vote today on a resolution attacking Greece and supporting Makarios.

25X1





23. TASS today again voiced support for the people of Cyprus in their efforts to determine their own destiny and again called for an immediate stop to foreign meddling in the island's domestic affairs. TASS quoted a New York Times article equating Sampson to Al Capone and described Sampson's rise to prominence as leader of a terrorist group. His close contacts with "rightists" in Athens were noted. Pravda today explained that the goal of the coup is enosis.


24. Soviet party leader Brezhnev reportedly sent a message to Yugoslavian President Tito today dealing with the situation in Cyprus.



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
SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

25. In light of the possible movement of an additional US carrier to the Mediterranean from the US East Coast, the Soviets may decide to send naval TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft to Havana and/or Conakry to monitor its movement. TASS today quoted a US official as saying that the US Navy plans to increase its carrier force in the Mediterranean to three. In the past, naval TU-95's flying from Cuba and Guinea have reconnoitered US carriers en route to the Mediterranean.



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




OTHER SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY ACTIVITY

29.

30. The US attache in Budapest has again reported overflights of what appear to be multi-engine turboprop aircraft, although in fewer numbers than he previously reported occurring daily between July 11 and 18.



25X  
25X

31. US military attaches in Sofia toured Bulgaria yesterday to determine the validity of rumors that Bulgarian armed forces were mobilizing and moving towards the Greek border. Small numbers of reservists were seen in all of the major cities visited. Troops at some installations were seen wearing steel helmets and battle dress. There were no indications of a significant mobilization or of any deployments. It is likely, however, that Bulgarian armed forces are on some type of alert. A US attache is now driving towards the Turkish-Bulgarian border to check on possible troop movements there.

25X1



UN DEVELOPMENTS

33. In an informal, closed session this morning, the UN

-7-



25X1



Security Council confirmed the decision it made yesterday to give Makarios a hearing with full honors accorded a head of state. Thus, the Council has implicitly decided, for the time being, not to receive as the legitimate representatives of Cyprus the new UN delegation being sent by the Sampson regime. The new delegation is not due to arrive in New York until 1800 EDT, and it is not clear whether the Security Council will still be in session then. If the new delegation does arrive in time for today's meeting, there would not have to be a credentials fight in the Council, since Sampson's group could be heard as representatives of a non-UN member.

34. The Security Council convened at 1530 today in open, formal session to hear Makarios give his version of the coup that toppled him and call for a strong Security Council resolution on the Cyprus situation. The US delegation is trying to persuade other Council members not to vote on a resolution this afternoon, but the Soviets are demanding a vote, and others may be inclined to go along. The key, apparently, is Makarios; if he requests action on a resolution this afternoon, USUN thinks the Council will agree.

LATE ITEM

35. The US defense attache in Athens reports that six submarines left the Salamis naval base late this afternoon. Greece has a total of 19 submarines. One destroyer escort also departed to the south, and one destroyer was preparing to get under way. None of the landing ships normally located at Salamis were in port.





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

15

Z 191707Z JUL 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4269  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 4658

CONTROL: 5421Q  
RECD: 19 JUL 17 49Z

NOO:IS

POLTO 20

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

*State Review*  
3/13/04  
*HR* 3/25/11

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SELECTED POSTS AND TO SCHLESINGER AND CLEMENTS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP (SISCO, JOSEPH J)  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS - DISCUSSION WITH GOG LEADERS

1. I HAVE JUST COMPLETED LONG DISCUSSIONS WITH GOG LEADERS (PM AND FM) AND INCLUDING SURPRISE AND UNANNOUNCED PARTICIPATION OF GENERAL IOANNIDES AND GENERAL BONANOS, #2 IN THE COUNTRY.

2. I GO WITH SOMETHING FROM THE GREEKS TO ANKARA SINCE I BELIEVE THEY ARE BEGINNING TO REALIZE HOW SERIOUS THE SITUATION IS AND HOW EQUALLY SERIOUS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR ME TO GO TO ANKARA EMPTY-HANDED. WHAT I BRING IS PROBABLY NOT ENOUGH, BUT I HAVE SOMETHING. I HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE GOG TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING TO THE TURKS.

A. GREECE HAS AGREED TO GO TO LONDON TO CONSULT THE UK AS A GUARANTOR POWER IN THE SPIRIT OF THE LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENT. THE PM SAID HE HAD IN MIND FOR TALKS TO TAKE PLACE ON MONDAY.

B. GREECE AGREES TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS TO WORK OUT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE UN ON: EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF CERTAIN SEAPORTS AND AIRPORTS IN ORDER TO INSURE AGAINST IMPORTATION OF CLANDESTINE TROOPS, ARMS AND MATERIAL COMING INTO THE COUNTRY, AND TO ASSURE REGULAR ROATATION BY GREEK AND TURKISH UNITS.

3. I GOT NOWHERE ON THE QUESTION WHICH INTERESTED THE TURKS MOST, NAMELY, A WILLINGNESS TO GIVE THE TURKISH COMMUNITY

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~2 - SECRET~~ ATHENS 4658, NODIS, JUL 19

ACCESS TO THE SEA AT SOME PORT OR PORTS UNDER UN SUPERVISION. AS I EXPECTED, GOG SAW THIS PROPOSAL AS A FORM OF SEPARATISM OR PARTITION (WHICH IT IS) AND IT WAS THEREFORE POLITELY BUT FIRMLY REJECTED. GOG REJECTED ANYTHING SMARTING OF PARTITION, AND I DID NOT THEREFORE PUT FORWARD OUTRIGHT PARTITION PROPOSAL WHICH ECEVIT GAVE ME IN MY SECOND MEETING YESTERDAY. SINCE IT MIGHT HAVE COOLED THEM ON GOING TO LONDON.

4. I WILL OF COURSE MAKE THE MOST OF ALL OF THIS WITH THE TURKS AND ARGUE THAT THE ABOVE CAN CONSTITUTE THE BEGINNING OF A SERIOUS PROCESS AND THAT WE WILL MAINTAIN A CONTINUING INTEREST AS UK CONTINUES CONTACT WITH GOG AND TURKS AS A GUARANTOR POWER IN THE SPIRIT OF THE LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENT. I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL BE ENOUGH, AND I BELIEVE IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO LAUNCH MY RECOMMENDATION OF LAST NIGHT RE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (CLERIDES) IN ORDER TO BULWARK THE ABOVE AND TO TRY TO SECURE A COMMITMENT FROM GOT THAT IT WILL NOT INTERVENE MILITARILY.

5. FINALLY, I HAVE THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT NO MATTER WHAT IS DONE IN THIS SITUATION, THE TURKS SEE IT AS AN IDEAL TIME TO ACHIEVE BY MILITARY INTERVENTION A LONGSTANDING OBJECTIVE, NAMELY, DOUBLE ENOSIS.

SISCO

BT  
#4658

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4269  
BY  
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CONTROL: 5421Q  
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NODIS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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#4658



NODIS

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 034920

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200172

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/24/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Athens

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . State

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus situation

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200172

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/26/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇIntelligence Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200172

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/26/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇCable

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Cyprus

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200172

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/26/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

LDX To: San Clemente

To: Eagleburger for KISSINGER

McFarlane for SCOWCROFT

## Off Course on Cyprus

Against the strong recommendations of experts in his own Department and elsewhere, Secretary of State Kissinger has evidently set the United States on a Cyprus course that carries maximum danger for everyone concerned—including the United States.

It is a course that runs the greatest risk of provoking a legal Turkish military intervention on Cyprus that could ignite war between Greece and Turkey, shattering the southern flank of the NATO alliance—the very disaster that Mr. Kissinger presumably would move mountains to prevent.

It is a course that could open undreamed-of diplomatic and military possibilities for the Soviet Union in the sensitive eastern Mediterranean and Aegean, eventually imperiling even the limited progress toward peace between Israel and the Arab states that Mr. Kissinger has worked so hard to achieve.

It is a course that over the longer run will surely put in jeopardy those American bases in Greece—about which the Secretary of State seems obsessed to the exclusion of every other factor in the Cyprus picture—and even the durability of Greece's commitment to NATO and the West.

It is a course likely to unravel all the limited progress made recently by the Nixon Administration in repairing relations with this country's NATO partners, likely in particular to give lasting offense in Britain, which has sovereign bases on the island and a special role as guarantor of its independence and integrity.

Not least important, the Kissinger course, if persisted in, can only erode further the effectiveness of the United Nations and diminish the hopes of small countries that must depend on it to protect them against aggression.

As the United Nations awaits the dramatic appearance of President Makarios to plead the cause of a constitutional government overthrown by forces directed from Greece, the question asked incessantly by bewildered delegates is: Why?

Why is the United States threatening to block any Security Council resolution that only states the obvious fact: the Cyprus National Guard was ordered into rebellion by Greek officers whose replacement had been demanded of Athens by Archbishop Makarios nine days before the coup?

Why is the United States unwilling to support the request, already made of Athens by Britain and backed by thirteen NATO members, as well as many other nations, for the prompt withdrawal of those Greek officers to the mainland?

Why is Washington unable to perceive the opening it is handing to the Soviet Union to pose—with nauseating hypocrisy in light of Moscow's brutal interventions in East Germany, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, etc., etc.—as champion of an elected government, the implacable foe of both the military tyrants in Athens and their gangster agents on Cyprus, and even as the backer of a legal military intervention on the island by Turkey?

Is Washington's intelligence so faulty that it has not detected the growing insecurity of the oppressive Greek regime and thus the strong probability that the Cyprus putsch was mounted as a diversion to rally support from restless and unhappy Greeks?

These questions are being asked not only at the United Nations and at chanceries around the world, but at high levels of the United States Government. They deserve some clear answers from the Secretary of State.

N. Y. Times

19 July 1974

Christian Science Monitor  
Friday, July 19, 1974

# Kissinger insists on U.S. caution on Cyprus

By Dana Adams Schmidt  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington  
U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is maneuvering to preserve peace in the eastern Mediterranean by preventing the Turkish armed forces, now poised for action, from moving to invade Cyprus to restore Archbishop Makarios as chief of government.

But in his maneuvers Dr. Kissinger is finding himself at odds, not only

with the Turks but with Britain and the Soviet Union.

He faces the probability of a Security Council resolution calling for recall or replacement of the 650 Greek officers who are believed to have overthrown the Archbishop and installed Nikos Giorgiades Sampson as prime minister.

The real U.S. position, one Western diplomat said, seemed to be to preserve peace at any costs, even at the expense of Archbishop Makarios.

It is apparent to correspondents

covering the State Department that working-level U.S. officials also would have preferred a more forthright American position, and had been overruled by the Secretary of State.

And in Washington, Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has invited Archbishop Makarios who arrived in New York Thursday afternoon, to visit the Senator in Washington immediately. He issued the invitation after consultation with Dr. Kissinger with whom, according to

some Senate sources, he differs on the State Secretary's extreme restraint.

## Extraordinary situation

For a chief of government whom the U.S. technically still recognizes to come to Washington at the invitation of a Senator rather than of the Secretary of State or President is an extraordinary situation, which indicates the direction of Dr. Kissinger's policy.

The overriding consideration in Dr. Kissinger's policy, as diplomats here understand it, is not only to prevent violence, but to avoid risking the safety of American military interests in Greece. These are "home port" arrangements for a part of the U.S. Sixth Fleet — Pyraeus base rights for the Navy and Air Force at Suda Bay on Crete.

\*Please turn to Page 5





# ★ U.S. caution on Cyprus

Continued from Page 1

Without these positions in Greece, the Sixth Fleet would find it difficult to operate in the eastern Mediterranean. For the Defense Department, the American positions in Greece appear to be more vital than the base rights the U.S. also enjoys in Turkey.

## Officials critical

At the working level, some U.S. officials were critical of the United States decision to seek a postponement of the Security Council meeting from Monday until Friday, ostensibly to wait until all the facts were in. The delay, according to the officials, gave the insurgents the time they needed to consolidate their positions.

Had the Security Council ordered an immediate cease-fire, these officials suggest, Archbishop Makarios might have succeeded in holding a part of the island. Now that the Sampson regime is in full control, however, the question of de facto recognition by the United States arises.

U.S. spokesman Robert Anderson reasserted Thursday that the question of recognition is still in abeyance.

## Thursday called crucial

Thursday appeared to be a crucial day for Dr. Kissinger.

In London, Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, began negotiations with the British, and with Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. The British were far out ahead of the U.S. in their demand that the Greeks immediately withdraw or replace their officers, but agreed with the State Department in seeking to restrain the Turks.

The Turks, while insisting on their



UPI photo

## Kissinger: rifts to heal

right under the 1960 treaty governing Cyprus's political status to intervene unilaterally, seem to be willing to consider a possible diplomatic solution.

## Compromise possible

In Washington, some Western diplomats believed that a compromise might be worked out if the new Cypriote President, Nikos Giorgiades Sampson, was willing to step aside in favor of someone else acceptable to the Turks as well as the Greeks.

The Greek Government and Mr. Sampson in Cyprus appeared to be bending over backwards to avoid giving the Turks any excuse for action. Both have issued statements upholding the independence of Cyprus under its present constitution and assuring the Turkish minority that it has nothing to fear.





~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

190

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1974

TO HAK 13

DELIVER IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO  
GENERAL SCOWCROFT EYES ONLY.  
RETAIN NO FILE COPIES.

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DICK KENNEDY *[Signature]*

Per our conversation.

Attachment: ~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS



~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇPlan

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Attachment to #19a; re Cyprus options

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200172

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Cyprus Crisis (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/26/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



~~SECRET~~

*Handwritten:* 6.15 p.m. on 7/19/74  
BRITISH EMBASSY.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. *20P*

EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

19 July 1974

The Honorable  
Henry A Kissinger  
Secretary of State  
State Department  
Washington DC

*Dear Henry*

I have been requested by my Secretary  
of State to pass on a personal message from  
him which is enclosed with this letter.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Peter Ramsbotham*

(Peter Ramsbotham)

ENC

~~SECRET~~

EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY



*State Review*  
EO. 12958 3/3/04

By *HR*

*3/25/11*

~~SECRET~~

EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

Dear Henry

I am very grateful to you for sending Joe Sisco to London so quickly. We had very useful talks and as I told him I start from the position of wanting to coordinate views with you. If we can work closely together I believe that we can keep this situation under control but you will realise that in some respects we are in a different position from you in that we are a guarantor of the 1960 Treaty arrangements.

Let me first give you the background to the situation as I see it and then I will try to suggest more specific lines of policy.

Whether or not we will ever get evidence which we can use publicly I have no doubt that Makarios was removed from power either with the connivance of or at the instigation of one of the guarantor powers. Inevitably this has brought into question the whole complex of arrangements which were agreed in 1960 and has given the Turks a very strong incentive to act unilaterally. I am sure after our conversations with the Turks in London - and I think Joe Sisco will bear this out - that we would be wrong to think that if the Sampson regime consolidates its position in Cyprus and there are no more disturbances for the time being, the situation will settle down and the Turks will

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EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

/become



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EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

become reconciled to it. Even if the Turks do not invade now (and I hope that our efforts and Joe Sisco's will have contributed to holding them back) they will not acquiesce in a new regime in Cyprus which they are convinced is committed to what they call unnamed and I call creeping enosis. While Sampson will no doubt avoid any public declaration of such intent, any practical moves to draw Cyprus closer to Greece or any constraints on the Turkish/Cypriot community will put the Turkish Government under ever increasing pressure to act in the days or weeks ahead. The removal of Makarios as the legitimately elected President is not only a thoroughly undesirable act in itself but has led the Turks to call in question once again the whole relationship between Cyprus and Greece. As you know, the 1960 arrangements have often come under strain and the position of the Turkish community has been precarious. I am sure you will agree that in terms of wider strategy Turkey is at least of as much importance to Western interests as Greece and it is led at present by a much sounder based Government than the regime of the Greek colonels in Athens.

I come now to what I think is the policy we should pursue.

- (a) We should continue to assert the legitimacy of President Makarios without becoming committed to him for all time.
- (b) We should work for the disappearance of the

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/Sampson

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EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

Sampson regime and the return of arrangements which are at least constitutional and more stable. If it turns out that Makarios is not able himself to act as President there is proper machinery under the constitution for appointing a successor until such time as new elections are held. I, like you, am worried about the danger of increased soviet involvement in the area. I feel sure myself that a regime which is seen to be an extension of that in Athens will increase this danger rather than reduce it. Akel may go underground but will get more clandestine Russian support.

- (c) We should enter into discussions with the Turks and I hope with the Greeks too about what should be the system [about] military arrangements within Cyprus (National contingents and local forces). This is not something which I would have wanted to embark on myself but the intervention of the Greek officers of the National Guard has reawakened the Turks to the importance of this. If they are to be held back from acting unilaterally we may have to work towards a new package which could contain some new security arrangements. We should [have] to start bilaterally but in spite of Turkish reluctance we should aim for

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EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

a trilateral meeting of the guarantor powers eventually.

- (d) It may be necessary to think in terms of other modifications to the constitutional arrangements although I have not yet identified those areas where changes might be made.
- (e) If we are to get anywhere on the above lines very great pressure must be exerted on the Greeks. The hard fact is that you are better able to achieve this than anyone else. I hope that they will accept our invitation to talks and we will begin the process then but we will need your strong backing.
- (f) As regards the United Nations I think that there will have to be a resolution eventually. Provided Makarios and the other parties mainly concerned are able to make their statements I would not object if thereafter there was time for reflection before any resolution is passed and particularly if you and we are actively engaged in consultations with the Turks and the Greeks. As regards the substance of the resolution I am broadly content with the draft put forward by the non-aligned. I am not keen to weaken the paragraph requesting withdrawal of the foreign military personnel serving

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in the National Guard but this could perhaps be put in the wider context of improving the system of military security within Cyprus to which I referred above, and of the need for a phased withdrawal. There will be no doubt, in any case, the usual intensive discussion about the text.

To sum up then, we must work for restraint and a peaceful outcome. To achieve this we will have to provide something both in our bilateral consultations and at the United Nations which will satisfy the Turks and sufficient pressure must be put on the Greek Government to ensure that it moves in the right direction.

I am sorry that this has turned out to be such a long message but I wanted to let you have my thinking.

Since dictating this I have had some disquieting intelligence reports about Turkish movements which makes the need for heavy pressure on the Greeks all the more necessary.

If the Turks do invade it will be a new ball game. Otherwise what I have already said still holds.

All good wishes,

~~SECRET~~

Jim  
EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

