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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

October 25, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

*MS*

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass you the following report on his meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.

"I had a further three and a half hour meeting with Brezhnev this evening. The atmosphere and tone were again relaxed and friendly but much of the discussion continued in the same serious basically aggrieved vein. Brezhnev continued an accusatory line on MFN, Middle East and ended the meeting with 'two questions' he had obviously written out for himself and with which he sought to dramatize his concerns. He delivered them crisply and even somewhat theatrically and said he wanted me to sleep on them before answering. They were, in brief, (1) what is the meaning of US assertions that it must be the strongest power in the world and (2) do I think there is a possibility of nuclear war between us or anywhere in the world? The implication of Brezhnev's questions seemed to be that despite all the progress of the last two years, our recent policies have reopened these basic questions.

"In earlier portions of the meeting, Brezhnev first requested my private assessment of US domestic scene, something again showing his concerns and unusual for him. I explained the nature of the coalition opposing detente, indicated we will welcome debate on the issues and had every expectation of building consensus once election is over. Brezhnev seemed encouraged when he heard you were actively campaigning. He asked why I was not in the hustings and I explained that it is against our custom for the Secretary of State to inject himself into political campaigns as such.

"Brezhnev continued to bridle at MFN developments, again implying that the 18 month provision in the waiver may not be acceptable to the Soviets. (The original Trade Agreement called for an initial three year duration of MFN.) He also expressed disappointment at

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State visit 9/15/03  
BY ll, NARA DATE 3/1/05



ExIm Bank authorization terms. I told him we had done the best we could. This will remain a very touchy set of issues for the Soviets, but assuming general progress in our relations, they will probably go along.

"On the European Conference, Brezhnev pressed for more US activism. I explained the problems with the Allies but expressed hope that the conference will be ended by March. I also assured him you would be prepared to talk about it in Vladivostok. We left it that after the forthcoming series of East-West and Intra-Western summits in the next two months, we would take stock with the Soviets and see how we can expedite matters. I told Brezhnev frankly that many issues in Geneva had become absurd and were largely the result of domestic politics in Western Europe. But I thought it best on this issue to give him some reassurance that we would try to be helpful.

"We then had a pretty tough Middle East discussion in which Brezhnev complained about our unilateralism and warned of a new war if no progress is made through joint efforts. I told him rather bluntly that as long as Soviets parrot Arab proposals we might as well deal with the Arabs directly, and have no incentive to join with the Soviets, the more so since Soviet positions require us to put pressures on Israel that are bound to be rejected and cause domestic anger in the US. But I assured him of our readiness to coordinate policies on a concrete step-by-step basis and denied we had any intention or capacity to exclude USSR from Middle East. The discussion remained inconclusive and will be resumed. I found it psychologically interesting that Brezhnev, in recalling his vehement warnings of possible war at San Clemente in 1973, denied any advance knowledge or collusion with Arabs in Yom Kippur War -- something supported by our intelligence. Charges to this effect clearly still touch a sensitive nerve with Brezhnev, one of whose traits is his need to have his moral purity certified at regular intervals. He did, however, acknowledge, as Dobrynin had previously implied, that the Soviets had had some kind of notification just before outbreak of war but could not pass it on for fear of provoking Israeli preemptive war.

"This inconclusive exchange on the Middle East then led to Brezhnev's posing his two questions mentioned above. All of this is a prelude to what Brezhnev keeps referring to as the key discussion of SALT which



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- 2 -

is to begin Friday. Although I have continued to get some positive noises regarding our proposal, Brezhnev's evident desire to delay discussion suggests he does not expect conclusions during my visit. This is speculation, but he may want to await our election outcome and clarification of our domestic situation before he commits himself to a SALT approach."

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the  
Central Committee, CPSU  
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign  
Affairs of the USSR  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA  
Andrey M. Aleksandrov - Agentov, Assistant  
to General Secretary Brezhnev  
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Depart-  
ment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European  
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(Interpreter)  
Mr. Kochetkov (Notetaker)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State &  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department  
of State  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff  
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of  
State for European Affairs  
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intel-  
ligence and Research  
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, October 25, 1974  
11:05 a. m. - 1:28 p. m.

PLACE:

Old Politburo Room  
Council of Ministers Building  
The Kremlin, Moscow

SUBJECT:

SALT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

*NR 98-23, #5 NSC et. 3/26/99*

By *KBH* NARA, Date *7/10/00*

SECRET/NODIS



Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I just received a complaint against you from the President [President's letter to Brezhnev, October 24, at Tab A.]. It must be about you. Who else does he have to complain about? Me? Gromyko?

Kissinger: I'm working against your getting together, because once you do, I have no possibilities any more.

Brezhnev: I'm glad you have had time to rest. Because you can go to the theatre... Once again, you will not go to Leningrad. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Never. I've never been in the theatre. I have to bring the President here in order to do it.

Gromyko: The trouble is, by the time we finish, the theatre is finishing. The swans are about to wave their wings for the last time.

Brezhnev: I was honest when I said I haven't had time to read this, because it just arrived a few minutes before.

Kissinger: Once when I was on my way here, President Nixon sent a message giving me complete authority, depriving me of any possibility of delaying. It was a great diplomatic triumph.

Gromyko: You told me.

Dobrynin: The Communique we gave you yesterday is okay? [The announcement of the Vladivostok summit meeting November 23-24]

Kissinger: Yes, and we will release it tomorrow at noon Washington time. Seven o'clock Moscow time.

What does the phrase "in vicinity of Vladivostok" mean? Are you building a new city?

Gromyko: It means the same as "in vicinity of Washington" would mean.

Kissinger: We had a message from the Chinese saying they want to send someone to greet us, to welcome us to Chinese territory. [Gromyko and Dobrynin smile; Kissinger laughs.] A formal diplomatic note.

We won't be in Vladivostok?





Gromyko: If you would like to . . .

Kissinger: I understand the night life is very good there. That's where the Dutch want a cabaret too.

Gromyko: It's the taiga. It's the only place where we have taiga.

Dobrynin: A nice house in the taiga.

Brezhnev: Let us continue, Dr. Kissinger. I'm waiting for replies to my questions of last night.

Kissinger: You asked, Mr. General Secretary, first: What is the meaning of the American statements about military power? And can I conceive of the possibility of an atomic war?

Brezhnev: Not exactly that. My first question was not regarding military might but whether the United States had to be stronger. And the second question wasn't about atomic war generally but atomic war between us.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Someone else could trigger it -- Burma, or someone.

Kissinger: It is the Burmese nuclear arsenal that we're concerned about. No, I understood your question.

The General Secretary said we wanted to be superior. This isn't, strictly speaking, what is being said. What is being said is that the United States should be second to none.

Brezhnev: I want a specific answer to my question: What do you mean by the statement that the United States has to be stronger for there to be peace in the world? And Henry, please don't think I'm in any way irritated when I say that; I ask in a friendly way.

Kissinger: I understand. But first I want to say what is being said, and second is the objective reality to which it refers. First, what is being said is that the United States should be second to none. But I won't stick on that quibble; I now want to explain the objective realities of American defense planning.



Kissinger (cont.): With respect to the first point, for many years American strategic policy was dedicated to the proposition of stability. It doesn't make any difference -- whether we said we should be stronger or not, I want to explain to the General Secretary the realities of American strategic planning. For many years, our strategic policy was dedicated to the proposition of stability. By stability we meant a force that was large enough to pose a plausible threat to the Soviet retaliatory force. Now the General Secretary has often referred to the number of warheads we have, but the General Secretary also knows that the vast majority of these warheads -- nearly two-thirds of them -- are on submarines. He knows that the size of the warheads on the submarines is relatively small. And very small compared to the Soviet warheads. And finally the General Secretary knows that to coordinate an attack from submarines dispersed all over the ocean -- to coordinate a plausible attack -- is so difficult as to be virtually impossible. In fact, I think the General Secretary should understand that even the number of warheads on the submarines was in reaction to the Soviet program; they were developed when we wanted to be able to penetrate anti-ballistic missile defenses and we wanted to have enough warheads on the submarines to survive these defenses.

Now, therefore, basically our strategic forces are still designed not for an attack but to prevent an attack. We are now -- I have to be very frank -- at the point where . . .

Brezhnev: Against France? Against Germany?

Kissinger: Against the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev: We have no intention of attacking you.

Kissinger: But you have a force capable of it.

Brezhnev: Even if you take the period of 20 years ago, you couldn't find a document in which we intended to attack the United States. I must admit, however, that Nikita Khrushchev sometimes allowed himself certain liberties. One of his favorites was that we had rockets that could hit a fly. It didn't mean anything.

Kissinger: The question was whether it could hit anything else! When one of our generals says he has a plane that can shoot down another plane, at 70 miles, I say, "Fine, but can it hit another plane at two miles?" But since, to speak frankly, twenty years ago you had no capability to attack the United States, but now you have the capability . . . . I'm not saying you have the intention, but you clearly have the capability. And I'm not



Kissinger (cont.): arguing with you, Mr. General Secretary. I'm trying to describe in a dispassionate way the reasoning behind our strategic forces. It is one of the features of the current period that our two countries cooperate more than others, and I'm planning to say this in a speech I'm planning to give. But we also build some forces designed to destroy each other. It is one of the paradoxes of our relationship.

So our present force is not a force designed for attack on the Soviet Union. Now, when we look at the Soviet force, we observe some disquieting phenomena. Your missiles are larger than ours; the warheads of each missile are larger than ours.

Brezhnev: Not bigger, but fatter, thicker.

Kissinger: They weigh more.

Brezhnev: They are fatter.

Kissinger: All right, fatter. They can deliver a heavier payload.

Brezhnev: I'll reply to that later.

Kissinger: They can deliver a heavier payload, and as Minister Grechko explained to me the last time I met him, they have greater accuracy than we expected.


Brezhnev: If it's a missile, it has got to be accurate.


Gromyko: How else do we hit a fly?

Kissinger: With accuracy of 200 meters, Mr. Foreign Minister, and a one megaton warhead, you'll kill every fly. And you'll give a nervous breakdown to every fly within 10 kilometers. I think they would notice something has gone off.

At any rate, the design of your strategic forces is such that they represent a very grave threat to our land-based forces, whether you plan to use them that way or not.

In this generation, say until 1981 or '82, you still don't have as many warheads as we do. But that's essentially irrelevant, because beyond a certain point there is no conceivable use you could have for them. But after 1981 or '82, you can multiply your number of warheads because you have this great throw-weight.





Kissinger (cont.): Now let me go back to our forces. Within the next six-to-nine months we have to make decisions on the designs of our strategic forces. If we're in a situation of essentially unrestrained competition, then we protect ourselves against the dangers I've described to you. This is not for purposes of superiority but for the purpose of defense. We will then build much larger missiles, and probably larger numbers. And you remember, if you look back to the late 1950's, Mr. General Secretary, your predecessor made certain threats growing out of his somewhat impetuous nature. When we perceived that we might be threatened by a possible missile gap, we began a very large program of missile production which produced several thousand missiles in a few years. And this genuinely occurred because we thought we were falling behind. And there is a similar possibility now.

Brezhnev: You mean you were indulging in autosuggestion.


Kissinger: In a way this is true.

Brezhnev: It happens some time.

Kissinger: I think you had only about 50 missiles in all of Russia. At that time. In 1958. It was, you are quite right, a case of autosuggestion. This time it's not autosuggestion because we know what you're building. And the reason I've been so insistent on promoting an agreement on strategic arms is that if we don't, I know what is going to happen. We will certainly increase our forces and modernize them dramatically. You will certainly increase your forces. At the end of this process, neither of us will be decisively ahead. But while we go through this process, it will be very difficult to keep detente going. Because each side will have to tell its public that the other is threatening its survival in order to justify the large military expenditures.

So this is the meaning of the first question. We do not aim for superiority. In fact, I said in Moscow, when I was here with President Nixon, that I don't believe significant superiority can be achieved by either side. And therefore our problem is to see whether we can find some means of stabilizing the situation.

Now, with respect to your other question: Do I believe in the possibility of atomic war between us? I do not believe, with the present forces and with foreseeable forces, that a leader can make a rational decision for an all-out attack on the other. Whether, if conditions of unrestrained competition would resume, either side would ever get into a position where it might be possible -- I don't think it's possible. After all, in every war, the military



Kissinger (cont): plans of one or the other side turn out to be wrong. And in a thermonuclear war, a military leader would have to convince a political leader that missiles that have never been fired, whose accuracy is untested against real targets, would have to be fired against targets whose hardness is unknown, and be assured that the targets would not be launched on warning -- and I think this requires a degree of confidence that could hardly be achieved.

On the other hand, it's conceivable that if local tensions continue and if local conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union develops, given the arsenals on both sides, such a war could develop, even without the intention. Because presumably neither side will let itself be defeated.

So these would be my answers to your questions.

Brezhnev: Any conversation on any subject is always useful because it gives each side the benefit of the other's experience. So whether the question is cooperation in building a dam or in irrigating lands, or about aircraft, any conversation is useful. All the more so, any conversation about thermonuclear war is useful. I can fully apply that to our conversation, because I feel I've been enriched to a certain extent.

I've often thought about the difference between the politician and the diplomat. One is often hard pressed to see the difference, because their aims and problems are the same. But it is clear to me that a politician in the proper sense of the word should be straightforward in pursuing a line of policy. But the diplomat sees the task as passing over the subject in silence or shrouding the question so as to prevent the other side from seeing his thoughts. I see you're a skillful diplomat, and from every meeting I see it's more and more the case. Instead of giving me a direct answer, you give me a long train of thought.

In our Interim Agreement we didn't include anything about MIRV's because we had none but you did, although you didn't tell me anything about it. You tell me you know what we're doing, and we know what you're doing. Though we know nothing about intentions. So you dodged my questions and switched over to warheads. And I'm not loathe to do that.

You explained that in locally-developing situations, atomic war between us is conceivable. But if such a war breaks out -- and I can assure you a war like that would never break out from our starting it -- it would be the last holy war for the Soviet Union, if not for Latin America or Africa. I would say from my part, very directly, there can be no such war between us. So if you were to address my question back to me, whether I believe in the possibility of atomic war between us, I would reply I do not believe in such a possibility. I would say that regardless of who heads the American Administration, because it depends not on who leads a country

Brezhnev (cont. ): but the people of a country. Because there are many people, including scientists, who know what such a war would mean and how many would die. So I don't admit the possibility of either side taking a decision to launch such a war, of the possibility of such a war. There are some insane people who might say, "Let's commit suicide," but they're a minority of the world's population.

So that is my answer. When I asked it of you, I said I would be prepared to give my answer.

Of course we have to discuss other issues. I am prepared to discuss them today and tomorrow. Indeed, let's do that.

Let's talk about the number of warheads available to either side, and what advantage there is -- whether it is better to have one or five, or to put them on aircraft or whatever. After all, several years ago, in negotiating and concluding the first provisional agreement on strategic offensive arms, it was not fortuitous that you were prepared to give us a certain apparent outward advantage in, say, the number of submarines -- 62 and 41. Because you did this deliberately, and you at that time had MIRV's, though you didn't tell us anything about it.

Then you began to reproach us for building weapons of this type. And you said that since we've tested them we already had them. But you know from your experience what the distance is between testing it and having it. An engineer has to test 200 engines before it is reliable or operative. You know we have begun to deploy MIRVs, but you'll complete that process much sooner than we have.

So it's quite wrong to say we have more missiles than the United States. We shouldn't mislead the other side. I'm prepared to vote in favor of a new strategic arms treaty. The first one has played a useful role and I'm sure a new one will play a useful role, and not from the point of view of giving any advantage over the United States.

Dr. Kissinger, if you agree, we could end this general debate and pass to a discussion of the specific issues concerning the form, content and substance of a new strategic arms limitation agreement, first agreeing that our first one will continue to be valid until 1977 and that the new one will, so to speak, cover the old one, and be a new factor restraining both sides.



Kissinger: I agree. And I agree the old agreement with these numbers will remain in effect until October 1977.

Brezhnev: Yes, we can consider that is agreed. The old agreement remains in force until it runs out in October 1977.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Let me just say this paper I received just before I met you is a message from President Ford [Tab A] in which he says he has been busy travelling around various states, which is why he didn't send a message with you, but he does now to confirm the invariability of the line between the United States and the Soviet Union to make it irreversible. And while there may be various difficulties and ups and downs, he is committed to continue it, and Dr. Kissinger has instructions to negotiate. And I will of course reply to it. And I appreciate the constructive spirit of it.

Kissinger: I will report that. And let me say the President appreciates the special channel that exists between the President and the General Secretary.

Brezhnev: I certainly appreciate that too. The channel certainly has demonstrated it is very useful indeed. Unless something really untoward happens, I will not complain to the President about you.

Kissinger: I'm terrified.

Brezhnev: I'll make no final conclusion yet, because there are two days left.


Kissinger: That's blackmail.

Brezhnev: No, it's diplomacy. There has to be some differences between the politician and the diplomat.

Gromyko: Politics covers diplomacy the way the new agreement covers the old one.

Kissinger: We also praise Gromyko, which is why he feels so secure.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, we're therefore beginning a serious discussion on what is to be a new agreement between us on a very important issue. And here it is important to reach agreement on quantities, time limits, a new approach, and concrete formulations.



Kissinger: Right.

Brezhnev: I would like you to set out your considerations on these issues, and I'll give you my views.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have submitted to you on basic ideas on this subject, to permit you to study it before my arrival. [The U.S. note of October 19, Tab B.]

We attempted to take into account the difficulty of defining unequal numbers, one for MIRVs and one for total numbers, as we did in the Crimea. Now what we therefore attempted to do is define three periods -- the period between now and October 1977, the period between October 1977 and October 1982, and the period between October 1982 and the end of 1983 -- although this can be summer of 1984; we're not set on this.

Between now and October 1977, in effect the Interim Agreement would continue. With the existing numbers.

From 1977 to October 1982, the following situation would arise: By October 1982 both sides would be entitled to have 2350 total systems, that is, ICBMs, submarine missiles and long-range bombers. However, since both sides would be introducing some new systems and still have some old systems, in the interval between October 1977 and 1982, the number can be as high as 2500. So in other words, between October 1977 and October 1982 it can go up to 2500 and then down to 2350. For that five-year period. At the end of that five-year period it will be 2350, but in between it can be 2500. In that five-year period, the limit of the 1300 MIRVed systems would be reached, that is, October 1982.

Sukhodrev: The figure of . . .

Kissinger: 1300 MIRVed systems. It's not compulsory; you can have less! By the end of 1983, or June 1984 . . .

Dobrynin: For both sides?

Kissinger: Yes. We've tried to base it on equality throughout. By the end of 1983 -- or June 1984; we're willing to talk about this -- the total number on both sides should reach 2200 systems. By that time too, heavy systems of both sides should be limited to 250. That means we would not deploy more than 250 B-1, and you would not deploy more than 250 of what we call your heavy missiles -- what we call the SS-18, or SS-9.





Kissinger (cont.): You would agree not to put MIRV on heavy missiles and we would agree not to put long-range air-to-surface missiles on our heavy bombers.

And then we're also proposing that both sides agree not to deploy more than 175 missiles or bombers in any one year, and this provision would go into effect immediately.

And finally we propose that the provision of the Interim Agreement prohibiting the construction of new ICBM silos should be incorporated in the new agreement.

Brezhnev: Very simple proposals. It is a very serious question. Could we not perhaps complicate it a bit in substance? How many MIRVs -- you're completing your MIRV program next year -- would the United States have next year?

Kissinger: No, we will not complete our MIRV program until the 1980's. In fact, it depends on what you call our MIRV program. Our presently planned MIRV program we will not complete well into the 1980's. In the absence of an agreement, we will plan many more MIRVs, so it depends.

Brezhnev: And also what sense will there be in all that?

Kissinger: Sense in what?

Brezhnev: Ultimately we can, acting in that way, reach a situation where we'll have one MIRV for every human being.

Kissinger: Without an agreement, that 's theoretically possible; but that's why we are proposing to limit them.

Brezhnev: I don't remember who it was, maybe an American scientist, who said the Soviet Union already has seven warheads for every locality in the United States. Dr. Kissinger knows full well that is not so. Why don't you go out and expose such inventions?

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I have been the leading figure in America arguing for the limitation of strategic arms.



Brezhnev: That's who I am.

Kissinger: So I have tried to explain the situation as I saw it and why I believe limitations are necessary.

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, this is generally so delicate a subject that without complete frankness and straightforwardness in stating one's position, neither side can sign any treaty. And I'm sure you yourself agree with that proposition. And we neither of us can allow each other to give differing interpretations to one and the same fact. We had a discussion on this subject in March. We don't consider that conversation a waste of time. But we were not at that time able to reach an understanding, because quite a few of the facts were unknown to us. You kept on reproaching me for our so-called heavy missiles, and we talked about the United States doing something new to your old rockets. That was the kind of conversation we had at that time, the kind that can't lead to any specific results. We have to speak on this subject in the spirit of frankness and confidence.

Let's say if instead of Minuteman I you deployed your Minuteman III, how are we to treat that? One can interpret it as one and the same kind of missile, or can interpret it as deploying a heavy missile.

Kissinger: No.

Brezhnev: Otherwise what sense would there be in doing it?

Kissinger: If we're going to use that kind of argument, we would treat your SS-17 and SS-19 as heavy, and you would have nothing but heavy missiles. We both know the characteristics of the missiles and can make distinctions according to weight.

Brezhnev: No, because the weight is not yet an indication of the capacity of that missile, and weight only indicates power capacity and range -- whether it can shoot longer or shorter distances. Of course distance is also a factor to be taken into account. If I want to shoot shorter distances I can put a greater payload on that missile. If, for instance, a Minuteman I can carry MIRVs with a capability of 0.2 megatons, Minuteman III can carry MIRVs with a capability of 0.4 megatons.

Kissinger: Well . . .



Brezhnev: A lot depends on the type of fuel, the quality of metal that is used in building the fuel tanks, and so forth. So it would be wrong simply to say that if one rocket weighs 36 tons and another weighs 37 tons, the second is the more powerful weapon. And there are different guidance systems, and so on.

Kissinger: And that's why we have defined heavy missiles as ones with throw-weight of 10,000-15,000 pounds, which includes the SS-9. And we did not count your SS-17 and 19, which are three times as large as your SS-11. So we were not playing games.

Secondly, it is true that weight can be translated into range. But once a missile has intercontinental range, it would be foolish to use its weight for range, and from then on, weight is used for payload. So while you can't make a distinction of a few hundred pounds or one ton, you can make some approximate distinctions.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, under the old agreement, we agreed that each side could, within certain limitations, improve its missile systems, that is, but not increase beyond a certain limit the diameter of the silo and increase the number of missiles. You're improving your missiles and we're not saying anything about it, but when we start to improve our missiles, including not increasing the diameter of the silos and even decreasing the diameter, why do you say we're developing new heavier missiles?

Kissinger: No, Mr. General Secretary, there is a misunderstanding. Let me explain where this misunderstanding is. There is always an explosion when I explain to my Soviet colleagues what they're building.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: You're putting new missiles into the SS-11 holes -- slowly, not very rapidly -- missiles which we call either [SS-] 17 or [SS-] 19. Even though those missiles are heavier than the SS-11, we are not treating them as heavy missiles for purposes of our proposal. Among your 1300 MIRVed missiles, you could include as many [SS-] 17's and [SS-] 19's as you want.

Brezhnev: Yes, but we're doing that just as you're replacing your Minuteman I with Minuteman III. And we're doing it openly.

Kissinger: That's right. And we're not criticizing you either.



Brezhnev: But you're covering it with netting, and we're not doing that. We made one representation -- 3, 4, or 5 -- so you could be doing anything. [He gets up.] As soon as I cover one of my silos with netting I'm sure I'll get a representation from you that I'm violating the treaty. But I'm not doing that.

Kissinger: He's got a point there.

Brezhnev: And I certainly have all the grounds to wonder why Dr. Kissinger has suddenly started covering his silos with netting. We make a representation through Dobrynin, and all we're told is that it's the result of some kind of misunderstanding. We could do all sorts of misunderstandings. I don't think it's just to ward off rain.

Kissinger: Strangely, that's what it is for. They're putting in a new type of concrete.

Brezhnev: Excuse me, I'll call Grechko and tell him to put new netting on.

Kissinger: It's new concrete being put on, and until it's dried, they put netting on.

Brezhnev: Also something is being done to those silos. And we place whatever rockets into the same silos.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I'm not arguing with you. I'm not sure Viktor's translation makes that clear. I'm not accusing you of violating the Interim Agreement. I'm not trying to limit the number of missiles you can put into the SS-11 holes according to the Agreement. The 250 heavy limit that we put on applies only to those that are already limited to 300 by the Interim Agreement. And on our side we're applying it to heavy bombers, or heavy missiles.

Brezhnev: What is the limit of the range of air-to-surface missiles on your heavy bombers?

Kissinger: We said it would be 3,000 kilometers.

Brezhnev: And how many Trident submarines do you want to build?



Kissinger: Within the total limitation of the 1300 MIRVed missiles, we would have the right to put all on Tridents if we wanted. The Trident is smaller than your SS-17 and SS-19. [Brezhnev's bell goes off in the center of the table.]

Brezhnev: Excuse me.

[Sukhodrev finishes his translation of Kissinger's statement above.]

You know, all these names you give our rockets, SS-17 and 19, etc., confuse me a bit, because we have basically three types of rockets, as I told you, and we have no intention of deploying new types. And so I call Grechko and ask him if he is deploying new missiles and he says, "No, I'm complying with the Agreement." And Grechko doesn't have the right to deploy even a new bullet without my approval.

[He gets up.] I will leave you for three minutes; I have to talk to Kosygin about the meeting I have later with Bhutto.

Kissinger: Bhutto has a new proposal. Maybe we should bring him into the meeting.

[Brezhnev goes out quickly. There is a break between 1:08 and 1:18 p.m., then Brezhnev returns and the group reconvenes at the table.]

Kissinger: [to Dobrynin]: Between this and the Jackson debate, I don't know if I can keep sane.

Dobrynin [to Kissinger]: Now he will be short, and on substance.

Brezhnev: Will they criticize me for calling you Comrade Henry?

Kissinger: They'll criticize me. They are already doing it.

Brezhnev: That's something I'd like to see.

Dr. Kissinger, you have set your views on the provisions of a new agreement. Naturally I have seen the proposals you've handed to us beforehand. As they are now, we don't believe them to be appropriate.

Let me make two comments:



Brezhnev (cont.): -- I'm against having an interim period; I'd like to have it run from 1977-1982.

-- And secondly, for the upper limit we would propose for the United States 2000 and for the Soviet Union 2400, taking into account all the factors known to you.

This is something I'd like to leave to you for food for thought. I'd like to recess now to meet Prime Minister Bhutto, and we can meet tonight, and I'll leave the whole day for you tomorrow.

Kissinger: All right.

Brezhnev: And also, the last time we didn't discuss limiting the number of bombers and limiting our Typhoons and your Tridents. That's something we can leave until later. I believe out of these very difficult negotiations will come a very good treaty.

Kissinger: With slightly different numbers.

Brezhnev: That's your desire too, I trust.

Kissinger: That's my desire, as I've expressed publicly on many occasions -- to the great displeasure of many of our military people.

Brezhnev: I won't comment. They're insatiable.

Kissinger: You've noticed that we have agreed to limit the number of heavy bombers in our proposal.


[The U. S. side confers.]

I've explained to my colleagues what the Typhoon is. I explained it was your counterpart to our B-3.

When the General Secretary said 2400 and 2000, did he mean missiles? Or all strategic systems?

Brezhnev: Total systems.

Dobrynin: Do you prefer otherwise?



Kissinger: I don't think the President will be pleased that I obtained this on the first attempt. Without a struggle.


Brezhnev: So, bon appetit. Did Mrs. Kissinger go to Leningrad?

Kissinger: By tomorrow we will have confirmed the existence of Leningrad. Thank you for arranging a plane for her.

My children too are still talking about their visit to Moscow.

Brezhnev: I remember your son very well, especially. My great granddaughter resembles him a little bit.

[The meeting thereupon ended.]



3  
Oct. 24, 1974

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As you proceed with your conversations with Secretary Kissinger, may I share with you some of my views on the future course of Soviet-American relations.

First of all, I wish to make clear that Secretary Kissinger is speaking for me with the same authority as on all previous visits and I hope with the same good results. He has, as you know, my full confidence.

I recognize that in recent weeks we have encountered certain difficulties, but these are not fundamental in nature. What is fundamental is our mutual agreement that the improvement of Soviet-American relations is in the mutual interest of our two countries and must and will be continued under my presidency. This is the main point in my instruction to Secretary Kissinger.

The talks you are beginning will, of course, be frank and candid and may even reveal areas of difficulty, but whatever temporary obstacles may arise, I am confident that, with patience and devotion to our joint objectives, we can make substantial progress; I recently asked Secretary Kissinger to set forth in considerable detail the view of my Administration on Soviet-American relations. Whatever else may be said or written about Soviet-American relations, my posture is clear: We believe that a positive, constructive relationship can be made permanent, and thus irreversible. I have instructed Secretary Kissinger to conduct his negotiation in this spirit.

I will not go into the details of your agenda, but permit me to underscore one basic point. As you may know, I have had several meetings with my National Security Council on matters of strategic arms control. On this I have emphasized to my advisors the necessity to bring competition under control through agreements that are equitable and realistic: for we cannot hope for, or expect that our relations will flourish in an atmosphere of unrestrained military tensions. Thus, I have authorized Secretary Kissinger to discuss with you the cardinal elements of a new agreement which we might address in our forthcoming meeting. No other action would demonstrate the transitory nature of our differences and the permanent character of our mutual interest.

Indeed, I am looking forward to our meeting in Vladivostok. It is a testimony to the new course of Soviet-American relations that this meeting is regarded on both sides as a natural development.






I have been travelling recently and unfortunately did not have the occasion to convey these thoughts to Ambassador Dobrynin before he left, but I wanted you to have my views personally.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

His Excellency  
Leonid I. Brezhnev  
General Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the Communist  
Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow





MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

The President<sup>3</sup>  
Has Seen

4

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION  
October 25, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report of his meeting with Brezhnev this morning.

"I had another two and a half hours with Brezhnev in the Kremlin with the same participants as yesterday. He had just received your message which he read through in my presence and then commented on very positively. He said he liked its positive spirit and would answer, probably after our current meetings are finished. He reverted to the message a second time later in our session, again with favorable comment saying he laid great stress on his relationship with you.

"Brezhnev today was in a dark blue suit and white shirt, probably because he is to meet Bhutto later today. He was not at his most cogent or precise and in fact at times seemed almost frivolous in his banter. He failed to focus seriously on our SALT proposal, though I finally had an opportunity to give him a detailed summary of it. Before that I spent about an hour answering Brezhnev's "two questions," whether we wanted strategic superiority and what I thought of the prospect for nuclear war. I explained our strategic force planning and concerns about Soviet weapons developments and noting the irrationality of initiation of nuclear war by either side, I stressed that if the Soviet strategic build-up continued in the absence of a SALT agreement we were certain to match it and, given our technological lead, probably exceed it. Thus, this was a crucial moment for coming to an agreement. I did point out the danger of local conflicts resulting in escalation.

"In his typical debating style, Brezhnev complained of the technical nature of my responses and then launched into a rambling response of his own, the upshot of which was that there can be no nuclear war. In the process he complained about our MIRV programs and rejected the assertion that the Soviets have more missiles than we. It was rather defensive and amateurish performance, though delivered without rancor.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, SEC. 1.6  
NSC MEMO, 11/20/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 149, NARA, DATE 12/17/03




"Brezhnev raised virtually no serious and systematic issues about our SALT proposal but what he did say seemed to reflect a misapprehension that we are trying to curtail Soviet SS-17 and SSA-19 programs by our proposed restriction on "heavy" Soviet missiles. He was also apparently leading up to rejecting MIRV prohibition for the SS-18. Again in typical style, he diverted our discussions to complain about our placing netting over our silos.

"Finally, after his desultory comments he did make two specific comments on our proposal: (1) he did not like our breaking up the period until 1984 into stages and wants a single stage from 1977-1984; and (2) he objected to our equal 2200 aggregates and proposed instead 2000 for us and 2400 for them. He will take this up later this afternoon in greater detail.

"We are to continue at 6:30 this evening but I must say from Brezhnev's performance today I find it very difficult to see how even a set of principles can be worked out before your meeting with him in November. Brezhnev has stalled and his comments have been unfocussed, sometimes even frivolous and uninformed. So far, they have not even been calculated to draw me out. This may change in three remaining sessions but even then we would have to break all past records to arrive at meaningful conclusions by Saturday night. I do intend to impress on Brezhnev the need for concrete progress if we are to avoid new U.S. programs in reaction to major Soviet building programs now underway, a point I have already made explicitly. If this remains the Soviet position it is clear that we are paying a price for our domestic disarray, especially the Congressional irresponsibility. The Soviets may calculate (1) that Congress has circumscribed our ability to give them credits and trade by placing a ceiling on credits and by the Jackson Amendment which they consider a profound insult; and (2) that Congress will not vote increases in the Defense Budget so that they risk nothing by stonewalling on SALT.

"In these conditions a \$1 billion cut to meet our \$300 billion goal would reinforce their convictions."





MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, General Secretary and  
Member of the Politburo, CPSU Central Committee  
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
Member CPSU Politburo  
Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the United  
States  
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to General  
Secretary Brezhnev  
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Department,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European  
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs  
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to USSR  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department,  
Department of State  
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European  
Affairs, Department of State  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,  
Department of State  
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence  
and Research, Department of State  
Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, National Security  
Council  
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security  
Council *ADL*

TIME AND DATE: Friday, October 25, 1974  
7:30 p.m. - 10:00 p.m.

PLACE: Old Politburo Room, Council of Ministers Building  
The Kremlin, Moscow, USSR

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 98-24, #C NSC 44, 5/12/99

By KBH NARA, Date 7/10/00



Introductory Remarks

SALT

Brezhnev: (Autographs photograph taken during first day's meeting for Secretary Kissinger) I'll write out the figures of the missiles we're supposed to have and that you're supposed to have. In the meantime, I've received another complaint about you from the President! I think that that augurs well for Vladivostok.

Kissinger: At least you and the President are united.

Brezhnev: Yes, we're agreed.

Kissinger: One item for the communique is agreed.

Brezhnev: Basically. Now, we agreed that at this meeting we would talk about specific figures. You have named the main figures on your side, figures based on your own plan rather than as you said they would be based on the possibilities of our plan. Well then, in that case, how many warheads are in your arsenal, and how many are we supposed to have in ours?

Kissinger: That depends on how many warheads you put on your missiles.

Brezhnev: Well, you put five or six on yours; we will put two on ours.

Kissinger: That's up to you. Since each side is to have the same number of missiles, there is no reason why they should not have the same number of warheads. But, we would be prepared to discuss limitations on the number of warheads.

Brezhnev: Well, today, due to the lack of time, I was not able to talk these matters over either with Grechko or our other comrades. Therefore, I am talking on the basis of my own calculations which, however, I am sure are 99.99% accurate.

Kissinger: As I told the General Secretary, he opened a new approach to me on this subject last March. I am serious. He raised considerations I hadn't even analyzed before.

Brezhnev: Which considerations are those?



Kissinger: There were two. First, I hadn't analyzed the warhead problem sufficiently. Second, I hadn't analyzed your deployment of submarine MIRVs in terms of the time period before our discussion.

Brezhnev: I don't recall our discussion on that in too great detail.

Kissinger: No, no, but we mentioned it.

Brezhnev: You're right in saying that that was the time it arose, when you learned that we, too, had the secret.

Kissinger: I knew it six months before.

Brezhnev: You're a very penetrating man. I envy you. I can only be pleased with myself for having a good memory. And, my health isn't too bad. Otherwise, I have quite a few problems, first with Dobrynin, then with Gromyko or Grechko, and Kissinger keeps coming up with something that causes me trouble. You won't even let me die quietly.

Kissinger: We have an interest in keeping you alive!

Brezhnev: I realize that I may not be the best possible man to have across the table, but there can be worse. I have goodwill.

Kissinger: Seriously, Mr. General Secretary, you have demonstrated your devotion to improving US-Soviet relations. That is recognized and appreciated in Washington.


Brezhnev: If what you say were in the form of a winning card, you could lay any stake on it. Rockefeller wouldn't stand a chance with you.

Gromyko: You could live on the interest.

Kissinger: I'm not too modest. I will settle for what Rockefeller has.

Brezhnev: I'm not all that interested in the material side of things either. I've wanted to get a winter coat made now for the third year running, but I have no time for the tailor. Two years ago, I was having a jacket made by a tailor, but there was no time for a fitting. Now, for the meeting with the President I will need a new suit, but I'm not sure I'll make it.

Kissinger: He'll insist on a new suit.





Brezhnev: I'd like to have something, if I don't (he looks at and fingers his suit) maybe this will do.

When I worked earlier in Moscow, at the Supreme Soviet, I had to meet the President of India -- who was he, yes, Radhakrishkan. I put on a new dark suit, double-breasted were in fashion then and I never liked them. But, I had one made -- it was in the summer -- and we were driving from the airport in an open car with jump seats. And, you know the kind, the backs of the seats fold up and down. There was the movement of the car; we were standing; and the back of this seat was down. I sat down and tore my pants. I got worried about how I was going to get out of the car at the Kremlin. I had to hold the tear in my pants when I got out. I needed two suits (laughter).

Kissinger: Or two pairs of pants (laughter).

Brezhnev: And then what happens if you sit on another hook? Well, the facts of the situation are that the United States, at present, has a very big advantage in MIRVs. We will gradually be fulfilling our own program in that field, which you can readily conceive of. And, as the years go by, provided the United States does not go still further ahead in the development of the MIRV program, we may even out the situation.

But, here we must bear in mind one circumstance we cannot bypass. And, that is the fact that in calculating the number of missiles that we can install on our submarines, we are allowed a total of 950 warheads. To have this we will have to remove a certain number of land-based missiles and report to the United States that we have done so.

Now, if we accept your proposition (offers sausages and mustard to Secretary Kissinger), apart from those missiles we will have to remove to compensate for those we are installing on our submarines, we will also have to remove a certain quantity of land-based missiles. Therefore, not only from the arithmetic point of view but even from the point of view of the principle we have agreed upon, that is something we cannot do.

And, this is not even to mention the question of third countries, for example, Great Britain, or the question of forward bases which appear to be a certain given quantity which up to now are not even mentioned.

Kissinger: Let me understand: The figures which we gave the General Secretary say that you have to dismantle missiles beyond those which already have to be dismantled?



Brezhnev: Yes, indeed!

Kissinger: But those would all be old missiles -- and so do we have to dismantle missiles.

Brezhnev: Well, what rockets would you have to dismantle? You are modernizing your rockets and we have stated no objection.

Kissinger: . . . Under our proposal . . .

Brezhnev: You can't dig any new holes, but neither can we.

Kissinger: No, no. But we would have to dismantle. . .

Brezhnev: At present, you have more bombers than we have.

Kissinger: We have 429 B-52s -- maybe more counting those in storage. We would have to eliminate all of those under this proposal. And, we would keep -- rather we would confine our B-1s to 250, not build more than 250.

Korniyenko: But, then, you would increase your missiles. Otherwise you wouldn't get to 2,200. You have 1,700 missiles now. How do you get to 2,200?

Kissinger: By keeping our Polaris submarines when we put in Trident.

Korniyenko: So you would increase your numbers?

Kissinger: Yes, but without an agreement we are planning that anyway. By putting a limit on 1,300 MIRVs, we are putting a limit on the number of Tridents that can be deployed -- by putting a ceiling on the number of MIRVs, a ceiling on the number of Tridents and keeping 10 Polaris.


(Brezhnev gets up, goes to the telephone.)

Gromyko: Comrade Brezhnev mentioned two factors, and correctly so: first, forward-based weapons, and second, third countries -- many of your allies.

Surely we are entitled to raise the issue of compensation.

Kissinger: We are not asking compensation for your allies.

Gromyko: But you know that your question is wide of the mark, because our allies don't have those means of warfare -- as does, for example, Great Britain.



Kissinger: But you have allies which have these means of warfare.

Gromyko: That is a subject I am approaching. That does have to be taken into consideration. We will raise that. Its O.K., if you wish, to joke, even with that ally, but take the year 1983 and the figures you propose. This would mean a reduction of our weapons and an increase of yours. You don't say that the question of heavy missiles doesn't exist? Let us discuss the question of heavy missiles. You introduced a second figure. You know the numerical figure you are suggesting. That is why Comrade Brezhnev says it is a double figure: one, submarine-based, and two, heavy air force. How can we be optimistic about that concept?

Kissinger: There are already limits on heavy missiles.

Gromyko: But now we're dealing with new figures going beyond the provisional agreement. Surely, now we're dealing with new figures going beyond the provisional agreement. Surely, now there is more to resolve since there are more factors involved, the time limit is longer, and there are a greater variety of combinations possible. You mentioned this when you were here with your former President. Now we are going beyond this and the figures are different.

Then there is the question of third countries -- what about forward bases? Has that factor disappeared? If you took that factor into account in the first agreement, why not now? Has it disappeared? Surely forward bases haven't disappeared. You haven't reduced allies. If the situation has changed, it has changed in reverse -- take Great Britain. The figures are different than when the first agreement was negotiated. The situation has changed for the worse for us. Try to look at the situation through our eyes. Try to sit in our seats and look through our eyes.

Kissinger: As a factual matter, Great Britain has not changed its force at all since the first agreement.

Gromyko: When we discussed the first agreement, we spoke in terms of Great Britain having two or three, now they have five or six.

Kissinger: The UK has four submarines and 64 missiles of an old type.

Gromyko: Our information is five or six.

Kissinger: I assure you that the UK has four submarines.

Gromyko: But, how many launchers?



Kissinger: Sixty-four. Just a minute. The UK has 64 missiles, and we could come to an understanding about not counting them MIRVed. They're not MIRVed now.

Gromyko: Take the geographic factor; consider the distances involved -- the distances your floating objects have to cover and ours.

Kissinger: Not your new missiles. They have a range of 4,300 miles. You can hit the United States from port. To me the miracle of technology is that the longer the range of the missile, the more complicated becomes the submarine to carry it -- and it can fire from port!

Gromyko: But such miracles cannot happen overnight.

Kissinger: We're talking 10 years.

Gromyko: We're talking seven.

Kissinger: The only thing to remember is that you have to remove the covering from the submarine before you fire from port. Geographic range is not important after 1980. Both sides will have missiles that can fire great distances. Why would you come all this way across the Atlantic?

Gromyko: This is a process!

Kissinger: I said 1980.


Gromyko: I'm sure you won't say we could do it in a month's time.

Kissinger: By 1980. By the time these numbers become effective, there will be no significant geographic advantages.

Gromyko: It's not a convincing argument if for no other reason than the fact that all cannot be reduced to submarines.

Kissinger: No, but we're talking about submarines.

Gromyko: That's true. Then, of course, you are omitting from view the existence of different kinds of third countries. I have mentioned one; there may be others. You did, in fact, mention this as a factor in the past.



Kissinger: Let's take the case of China. Right now, in the United Nations they attack you more than they do us -- two unfavorable sentences for you to every one for us.

By 1985 -- or '83 or '82 -- that can change.

Gromyko: But the difference is that you are taking a hypothetical case. We are talking reality.

Kissinger: You can solve your nuclear problem with China by means of weapons that would not be counted in the agreement, shorter range weapons.

Gromyko: We understand, but you also know that the Chinese have a plan to build an underwater fleet -- a big fleet.

Kissinger: We don't know their plan. We have only seen one boat. We have been told that they may accelerate.

Gromyko: Maybe you've failed to collect the necessary information.

Kissinger: Our information is that we know of one submarine they are building that has strategic missiles. What is your information? Do you think they have more than one?

Gromyko: China has a very big program. Since that is so, surely our leadership has to take it into account.

Kissinger: If China is building a fleet -- I'm not going to debate the point with you -- that subject would be useful to exchange information on.


Gromyko: That's another question. But that is my reply to your remark about our using weapons other than strategic weapons against the Chinese.

Kissinger: It doesn't make any difference how many submarines they have. If you have 2,000 missiles you can cover most of China.

Gromyko: That's true, but we're talking about Chinese submarines operating beyond Chinese territory. The types of weapons you are referring to wouldn't do.

Kissinger: If you are planning to hit submarines with missiles, it's a new approach to strategic warfare.





Gromyko: Well, they have to be based somewhere.

Kissinger: Yes, but you can hit the bases. (Looks at the U.S. side)  
Some of my colleagues may have heart attacks over this discussion.

Gromyko: In short, there are very serious problems involved that have to be answered, that have to be buttressed by weighty answers not brief replies, because they have to be based on material factors. We could broaden the list of third countries; I'm sure you know what I mean. Let me just mention . . .

Kissinger: I admit that the argument regarding the UK and France has validity, but to take countries like China and India, we should understand that they are equally dangerous to both of us.

Gromyko: Yes, but you have to consider them in combination with the state's policy. There are no statements from China about war against the United States, but there are different kinds of statements about the Soviet Union. Surely the Soviet leadership, responsible for Soviet security, has to reckon with this.

Kissinger: On our side, as a practical matter it is politically impossible to agree to a final figure that either gives equality in numbers or that compensates for inequalities, for example in MIRVs.

On the other hand, our proposal has complicated aspects, but it permits certain advantages. For example, if you accept the various time limits we have given, you, for example, would be permitted to have 2,500 total systems until 1982. And, while we would have the same right, we could achieve an understanding that we wouldn't build to 2,500. This is the reason why we put a bulge in the figure.

Gromyko: You didn't comment on the proposal made earlier by Comrade Brezhnev on the difference of 400.

Kissinger: That's out of the question.

Gromyko: But even that is less than enough; even that wouldn't amount to a solution. The next question is that of heavy missiles.

Kissinger: Each side has its own realities. Your Ambassador would agree that it would be quite impossible for the United States to agree to such an inequality in numbers. The only basis on which we can agree to inequality in total numbers is if there is an inequality in other aspects such as MIRVs. You see, if there is no agreement, we will achieve equality in numbers in any event. Each side can do what we want.

Gromyko: Well, what you're suggesting for the period up to 1985 is that we eliminate the numerical advantages that we have by way of compensation for the factors you mention.

Kissinger: We gave you a numerical advantage in the provisional agreement because it was provisional.

Gromyko: Not only because of that.

Kissinger: Secondly, as I testified before a Committee of the Congress, we had multi-warheads while you had only single warheads.

Brezhnev: Well, that is exactly why at that time you gave us a numerical superiority in launchers.

Kissinger: That's correct. I said so publicly.

Brezhnev: You didn't say so then.

Kissinger: But, you knew that we had been installing MIRVs since 1971.

Brezhnev: But, we didn't know! We would have talked a different language.

Kissinger: I said so publicly in June 1972. It was in our budget, which your Ambassador studies more carefully than I do. It was part of a public debate which caused one of Ambassador Dobrynin's friends to introduce a resolution banning MIRV testing -- Senator Humphrey -- and we have defeated him every year. So, it couldn't have been unknown to you.

Brezhnev: We learned about it after the signing of the agreement. Your public statement was made after the agreement.

Kissinger: Whenever you learned about it, Mr. General Secretary -- it must have been a slowness in the Soviet system -- the fact is that we could afford a differential in numbers because . . . (Korniyenko brings a paper to Kissinger; they discuss the joint statement to be issued at the end of this session of talks) . . . Do you realize that our press says that you said the first day's talks were constructive and businesslike and I said they were friendly. Now they say that you are taking a cooler approach than we are?

Gromyko: This will be unilateral, for the sake of atmosphere. . .

Kissinger: If I say friendly and you don't they'll say that I exaggerate



Korniyenko: Let's say nothing about atmosphere.

Kissinger: We'll take care of it at the lunch. We'll have some correspondents there. (Again, looking at paper) This is fine. Everyone knows that if Sonnenfeldt is at a meeting it couldn't be friendly. (Gromyko and Brezhnev consult for seven minutes).

Kissinger: (Aside to Sukhodrev) Lord has a Chinese wife. We have to be careful about Chinese submarines. He absolutely denies that they exist. You know, we get our press excited by bringing them over here and then not letting them in on the picture.

Brezhnev: If I might have a respite from these figures and return to a question: I want to get clear in my mind if we need an interim period until 1983, and then 1985, or perhaps just one phase until 1985. We would then rid ourselves of the need for further discussion.

Kissinger: We don't insist on the end of 1983. We could say the summer of 1984. Let me explain our reasoning. The final level shouldn't be reached at the same time that the agreement expires, because then there would be great uncertainty for the first two years of the agreement as to whether either side will, in fact, go down to the numbers agreed upon. It can be October 1984; that's possible.

Dobrynin: October -- three months?

Kissinger: Well, six months. When would the agreement lapse; the middle of 1985?

Brezhnev: There would be the same time period for both.

Kissinger: My idea is that the agreement should be signed when you visit the United States next year -- May or June.

Brezhnev: Good.

Kissinger: It would then be approved by the Senate in July -- that would take four-to-six weeks. So, the agreement would lapse in August or September, 1985. I'm just estimating. So, on that assumption, we could have the final level reached in October 1984.

Brezhnev: Well, what happens, in what way would it be bad if we reach the final levels in October 1985.





Kissinger: Because, for the whole last year there would be accusations about not reaching the final level. Then both sides might keep more missiles as insurance against the agreement lapsing. There would be no penalty once the agreement has expired.

Look, if you say you can keep 2,500 but in the last month you will pare down 300, at the precise moment you would be in violation the agreement would lapse. I don't think we're at the decision point for six to ten months. It depends on the factor of how big the bulge is. (To Dobrynin) We're troubled by one thing. You propose 2,400 while we accept 2,350 by 1982. You say 2,400, and we say 2,350 by 1982. It's not a huge difference. Since I have said that while we go down the road we might agree that when we reach the 2,200 level, we might then not exceed it.

Dobrynin: The problem is still third countries.

Kissinger: The British and the French together have 112 missiles. Our estimate is a total of five boats.

Dobrynin: They have four already.

Kissinger: Their boats will be obsolete. They are worse than our first Polaris boats.

We will have twice as many warheads on one Trident boat as the entire British and French warheads! If we go to war, these boats will make no difference. If we don't go to war, they are useless.

Dobrynin: Doesn't Great Britain have a special targeting role in NATO?

Kissinger: Look, you have told us we have 15,000 warheads. If we have a general war, what will be left to shoot at? France has a survival of exactly six minutes! (To Sukhodrev) Victor, please explain this to the General Secretary: My point is that he has asked for 2,400 and we have said 2,350 -- this difference is no problem. We are willing to have an understanding that we won't go above 2,200 although we would have that right. So, you would have nine years to get down to that figure.

(A break for five minutes)

Brezhnev: Well, so by way of continuing, let's assume we agree that as of October 1982, we could have a total number of launchers amounting to 2,400 -- ICBMs and SLBMs. What would the figure be for the United States?



Kissinger: 2,200. We would have to do it the way we did with President Nixon. That is, we had the right, but we didn't exercise it. We would find some binding formula to express it. I would have to look into it.

Gromyko: It would be juridically valid?

Kissinger: Yes. We'll find a formula -- either as a letter or as part of the agreement.

Brezhnev: And, this could be incorporated in some way?

Kissinger: I will have to study this Mr. General Secretary, but clearly as it goes beyond the Presidential term, there will have to be a written expression. If we agreed on the principle, we would find the formula, and we would let your Ambassador know prior to the Vladivostok visit.

If we agree on a final figure of 2,200, we will even include it as part of the agreement. But, I will have to check that.

Brezhnev: Well, assuming that we pursue this line, what will be the situation regarding MIRVs?

Kissinger: The same number can be MIRVed by both sides.

Brezhnev: Any kind of missiles -- land-based or sea-based?

Kissinger: Yes. Except with one exception. We will not put MIRVs on U.S. bombers, and there will be no USSR MIRVs on the SS-18 -- what we call the SS-18.

Brezhnev: I can't suggest anything better for now than to announce a recess. The positions are so far, so very far apart I don't see evidence of a desire to achieve equality for an agreement. In line with the question I asked yesterday: Why does the United States want to be stronger than the Soviet Union -- to have an advantage? Even though Dr. Kissinger has replied skillfully, the situation hasn't changed.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we are in no sense seeking superiority over you. I think we have gone quite far. Any analysis of the U.S. scene would show that I alone have kept open the possibility of an agreement. Every proposal made to you in the last year has been made by me against the opposition of the majority in the U.S. Government.



This is my third visit to the Soviet Union this year. If there is no progress now, it would without any question be described as a failure in the United States. We will certainly not make a more forthcoming proposal. My prediction is that there will be an interval while we both see what happens. I say this with great regret because I am dedicated to coming to an agreement. But, if you have a counter-proposal we are prepared to study it to see what we can do.

Brezhnev: I said yesterday that an agreement is necessary. But, I don't think anybody could accept an agreement on this basis; we certainly cannot. Why shouldn't I be allowed to put a MIRV on a certain type of missile? By what right am I denied the right of this possibility?

Kissinger: We are giving up the possibilities of air-to-surface missiles and heavy missiles.

Brezhnev: But you have no need for them.

Kissinger: But, you have asked us not to build air-to-surface missiles.

Korniyenko: Our proposal was that you not build air-to-surface missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Now you are considering 3,000 kilometers.

Kissinger: If we accept the principle, we can negotiate the distances.

Gromyko: I don't understand, Dr. Kissinger, how you could have lost sight of the geographic factor and the factor of third countries even though we have drawn your attention to it. Because, if you take the Chinese factor, you say why do we need long-range missiles to parry the Chinese. But, if that factor is taken into account, we need numbers to counter the Chinese. What you say about military strategy is not appropriate. And also (he laughs wryly) to build that type of submarine in connection with the Chinese, we would have to make big outlays. It's no pleasure for us.

Kissinger: There is no law of strategy which says if you are attacked by a submarine you have to retaliate with a submarine.

Gromyko: Yes, but I'm answering your argument as to why we need to build land-based missiles for use against submarines. It makes a certain degree of sense, but there are several components -- land-based, sea-based and strategic air force.



Brezhnev: Now, before we recess, I would like to introduce another element. When we signed the first provisional agreement, we both agreed and mentioned in subsequent statements that both sides would convert the agreement into a permanent agreement. Now we are taking a different stance. We are prolonging the agreement. Who will believe us when we say we want to seek ways to limit dangerous weapons, thermonuclear weapons? Under the new agreement, the number of weapons will be higher and it will be another interim agreement.

Kissinger: The ceiling's lower. Under the interim agreement, the ceiling for the Soviet Union is 2,350. We might be prepared to seek a longer agreement than 10 years. We are prepared to consider looking at it for 15 years.

Brezhnev: When you talk of levels and say they will be lower under the new proposal than they were under the interim agreement, you are leaving aside the question of MIRVs.

Kissinger: True, but we're prepared to consider 2,000 if the General Secretary agrees. That would be significantly lower.

Dobrynin: The point he (Brezhnev) wants to make is that if you take the interim agreement and the new agreement, overall they offer nothing for public opinion.

Kissinger: When we talked to you in Yalta you were willing to give us a differential on MIRVs for a differential in numbers. Now you want a differential in missiles for an equality in MIRVs!

Brezhnev: A question: How many Tridents would there be under your program?

Kissinger: It depends on whether or not there is an agreement.

Brezhnev: Yes, under an agreement.

Kissinger: If we do have an agreement, we can consider a limit on the number of Tridents.

Brezhnev: What, roughly, would be the number? If you're going to spend so much money to build the Trident surely it wouldn't be just two.

Kissinger: The Chinese have just one. Under the agreement we might limit Tridents to ten.



Brezhnev: As I see it personally -- not speaking officially on behalf of my comrades -- whatever kind of agreement, whether to your advantage or not, it would not be in line with our responsibility to assure the security of the peoples, our responsibilities to counter the possibilities of thermonuclear war.

(Brezhnev speaks again. Sukhodrev pauses, questions him concerning what he has said, then translates.) I trust you are familiar with a certain idea I put forward in my discussions with former President Nixon in the Crimea. Then, I discussed it at the Embassy (Spaso House) in your presence.

Kissinger: Yes, I remember.

Brezhnev: Now, that would be a stroke of genius, because anything else we do or reach agreement on would merely look in the eyes of those who know like we are doing an arms balancing act. I had a general discussion with President Nixon on this. I don't know if there was greater detail. If so, I would like to discuss it tomorrow in a smaller group -- on our side, that is. Of course, you could have anyone you wish.

Brezhnev: Then, if I could suggest that we resume our conversation at 11:00 a.m. tomorrow?

Gromyko: There is too little time in the morning. Let's have lunch (at Spaso House) at 2:00 p.m.

Kissinger: (To Sukhodrev) Do you think that if I presented my case well, you would accept 300 MIRVs in return for our 1,400?

Gromyko: We'll stick to our original procedure. We'll have the luncheon at 1:00 p.m.

Kissinger: We'll start the toasts the moment we get there.

Gromyko: Forty-five minutes for me; 10 for you.

Brezhnev: We'll start at 11:00; a 1:00 p.m. lunch; and then we'll proceed.

Kissinger: Should Korniyenko and Sonnenfeldt get together on the communique?

Brezhnev: Good.

( A U. S. text is passed to the Soviet side)



Gromyko: How many pages, 16?

Dobrynin: We should publish all our figures in the communique (laughter).

Kissinger: I must say seriously that if the press sees the third trip as a failure it will have serious consequences. (To Dobrynin) You know this. We will have to say something on background.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I would like you tomorrow to explain your thoughts as to the possibilities and versions of concluding an agreement for 15 years -- to see what we can build.

Kissinger: (Laughs) I'll do it, but I'm afraid that every time we meet we will extend the deadline. The next time it will be 20 years.

Brezhnev: I would agree in Vladivostok to speak in terms of 15 years.

Kissinger: Let me make some observations tomorrow.

(Meeting concludes)





MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

INFORMATION  
October 25, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

*BO* *MS*

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report of his meeting with Brezhnev this evening.

"After an hour's delay I had another two and a half hours with Brezhnev this evening. Meeting was again in a paneled Kremlin conference room with green felt conference table and pictures of Marx and Lenin watching. Brezhnev was more serious and to the point than this morning. His briefings on our SALT proposal clearly have predisposed him to see it as designed to freeze Soviets into a disadvantage. Gromyko, who has only slightly better grasp of technical issues involved than Brezhnev, reinforces Brezhnev's prejudice. The main thrust of Soviet comments on our proposal was that they ignored special Soviet requirements due to capabilities of their countries -- especially China -- geographic position and our forward bases. They also saw our 2200 aggregate as allowing us to increase our present numbers while they would have to cut theirs -- a statement which is essentially true. They continued also to stress our warhead advantages. Thus basic Soviet response was quite negative, even after I noted that under our concept Soviets might have 2-300 missile/bomber advantage over us in 1982 before both of us go to equal 2200 level. Brezhnev reacted with special emotion against our proposed prohibition on MIRVed SS-18s. Judging from Gromyko's almost obsessive references to Chinese threat, Soviets may be looking to SS-18 as their long-term weapon against China.

"After about two hours of argument on above issues, during which Soviet group huddled several times, Brezhnev folded up his papers and announced we were far apart because U.S. was seeking an advantage. I responded that we had no such intention and stressed that this would be third Moscow meeting in a row that would end in failure. I said this was regretful for me personally since I had been staunch advocate of a new agreement and had labored hard on our proposal despite much opposition in our government. I said there was bound to be a hiatus in efforts to find arms limitations and we would just have to see what happens next.

SECRET/NODIS

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.6  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/80, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *hki*, NARA, DATE *10/17/03*





"This produced somewhat more positive manner in Brezhnev but he again flatly rejected our proposal. But he then asked whether we might consider a 15-year agreement. I agreed to consider it. Brezhnev then alluded to a proposition he had raised alone with President Nixon at the last Summit and said he wanted to discuss it with me privately tomorrow. Scowcroft can brief you on essence of that proposition which Brezhnev might possibly view as precondition to any SALT agreement this year and he may try to get you to approve it at Vladivostok. This is a matter I will have to discuss with you orally on my return.

"For now I see little prospect of progress on SALT for the reasons mentioned in my previous reports. But we will have several hours more tomorrow which may give me a clearer basis for an assessment. It is clear to me that if the deadlock remains, our only possibility of getting the Russians to move will be through a substantial increase in strategic budget in the coming fiscal year."





# PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 26, 1974

No. 440-A

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS  
BETWEEN THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
AND HIS EXCELLENCY ANDREI GROMYKO  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE U.S.S.R.  
AT A LUNCHEON  
MOSCOW  
OCTOBER 26, 1974

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Foreign Minister, Mrs. Gromyko, Distinguished Guests:

The reason for the slight delay at the beginning was because the Foreign Minister and I were negotiating how to allocate the hour and 45 minutes we set aside for the toast. [Laughter]

First of all, on behalf of all of my colleagues and of Mrs. Kissinger, I would like to express our profound gratitude to our Russian hosts for the very warm hospitality we have been shown here. Nancy returned from a trip last night and has definitely confirmed the existence of Leningrad. But until I have been shown it myself, I will reserve my judgment.

We have spent three days here on this my third visit to the Soviet Union in one year. The frequency of these visits and the intensity of our talks reflect the enormous importance the United States attaches to the relationship with the Soviet Union. Through changes of Administration there has been one constant recognition — that the peace of the world depends on the degree to which the United States and the Soviet Union can cooperate for common objectives. So when we meet we review all topics. We know each other well enough now so that we speak with total frankness about exactly what we think, and yet the atmosphere is both businesslike and friendly and cordial. I think we have on this trip made good progress in a number of fields and we have set a course which we hope and expect will be to the benefit of our two peoples and for the benefit of mankind. We intend to continue these frequent contacts and to find common points of view across an increasing range of activity.

And so with this attitude, I would like to propose a toast to Foreign Minister and Mrs. Gromyko, to the friendship of the Soviet and American people, and to peace in the world.

Foreign Minister Gromyko

Mr. Secretary of State, Mrs. Kissinger, Ladies and Gentlemen, Comrades:

I wish to note as a very significant achievement right from the start the fact that the doubts that the Secretary of State had entertained as regards the existence of Leningrad have now been removed. He did

**For further information contact:**



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not believe anyone except his own wife, but that is all too understandable.

We sympathize with what Dr. Kissinger has said just now as regards the role played by the two powers. Although this is perhaps a repetition, it is not out of place to say this several times. The more often statements of this sort emanate from both Moscow and Washington — and better still from other world capitals too — the better it will be. And it will be better still if these statements are buttressed by the practical actions of these two nations in the interest of detente and peace. And it is to promote that objective that we are now holding these talks in Moscow during this visit by Secretary of State Kissinger.

As regards the prevalent atmosphere, I would say — and I trust that this does not differ from Dr. Kissinger's assessment — that it is good, friendly and businesslike, and this too is a good augury. The second point that I would like to make is to stress that the questions which are under discussion during these talks are of exceptional complexity and there is really no need to dwell on that because this is indeed universally known. And, of course, during their discussion there do at times appear certain difference of views, if perhaps not in the ultimate objectives, then in the means and methods to be used to achieve them. Such differences do sometimes occur. But there are no important and complex problems, at least among those existing since the end of the last war, which could be resolved, so to say, at one go without any difficulties. We would perhaps like to see such an ideal situation come about, that that situation has not existed and does not exist. Such is the state of affairs both in Europe and in regards to questions concerning other parts of the world and questions which cannot be allocated to various geographical localities. But the important thing is that the two sides should not end their efforts to achieve agreement and that they should not weaken their desire or their determination to find a common language on the questions under discussion. As regards the Soviet Union, we do have both the desire and the determination to find a common understanding with the United States and with the leaders of that country on the questions that we are discussing. Frequently negotiations have to go through several stages and the important thing is that there should indeed be movement from one stage to the next, and secondly, each new advance from one stage to the other should bring with it new success at every stage — new success leading towards ultimate agreement and accord. That is how we see the necessary approach to the outstanding issues of the day and to those questions that are under discussion between the United States and the Soviet Union.

So if in the course of this present stage of exchange of opinions some questions are not resolved to their very end, we believe — and we trust that this does not run counter to the opinion of the Secretary of State — the two nations must continue their search for a final solution; we are prepared to do so. The very fact that taking part in these talks from beginning to end is the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, who has met with the Secretary of State several times, speaks for itself and most emphatically so. We should like to look ahead with optimism towards the future generally and in particular towards the future of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The Soviet Union and our leadership, and I have already had

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an opportunity to draw your attention to this, Mr. Secretary. The Central Committee of our Party and the Soviet Government and personally the General Secretary of our Central Committee are fully determined to pursue the line that has been taken in Soviet-American relations, the line that we are following and the line which we intend to follow in the future. Improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States is necessary not only in the interests of our two peoples, it is indeed in the interests of all the world. And this improvement should not be feared by any countries or by any people. I believe we can say with full grounds that the results of the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union which have been held on several occasions and their positive outcome have been met with broad understanding and appreciation the world over, and I would venture to say almost everywhere in the world. That we feel is only too understandable, and this certainly heartens the Soviet people and the Soviet leadership. We trust this also evokes a positive attitude on the part of the United States leadership. This certainly goes to confirm the correctness of the path that we have jointly charted aimed at improving relations between our two nations.

To the further development and improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union; to both powers displaying determination to seek ways to resolve unresolved issues; to the useful and positive results of this new Soviet-American meeting in Moscow, even though it has not yet reached its conclusion; to your health, Mr. Secretary of State; to Mrs. Kissinger; to the health of all the representatives of the United States of America present here today, first and foremost the American Ambassador and his wife in whose house we are all guests today; to all this I would like to ask all of you to raise your glasses and, if possible, drain them.

\* \* \* \* \*





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