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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Israel

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister  
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense  
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.  
Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff  
Amon Eran, Director General, Prime Minister's  
Office  
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs  
Professor Barak, Attorney General  
Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser, Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs

United States

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State  
for Political Affairs  
Malcolm Toon, Ambassador to Israel  
Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State  
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of  
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, August 29, 1975  
11:52 a.m. - 6:40 p.m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office  
Jerusalem



~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
EXEMPT FROM **GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION**  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

[Photographers were admitted and then ushered out.]

Rabin: Can we start?


Kissinger: Yes. Let me make a general comment of where I think we are now in this process. I think we are at a point where basically there is no realistic choice to an agreement because everyone has gone too far. The only one who has a chance of pulling out is us -- on the ground that the price is getting too high, in my judgment. And I think therefore we should stop fencing and get to the points that should be settled, on which there is a history that they must be settled. When we are in practice so close to an agreement.

I would like to stress one other thing, in addition to what I said. Everyone now seems to be at a point where an agreement must be made; everyone has an urgent need -- and that includes us -- to get back to its domestic structure before it disintegrates. And if this agreement is to be sold in America, there is no place where I can do more than in America, and the same is true of Dinitz or anyone else you may want to get over there. Because I have a very uneasy feeling about the way this thing is being perceived in America. I don't know whether you have seen the Harris Poll, where only 9% of the Protestants, 53% of the Jews and 40% of the Catholics are in favor of what we are doing. And 49 to 20% of the public believes that by interposing American technicians, the risk of direct involvement of American manpower in the future of the Middle East increases sharply.

Atherton thinks this is a typo.

Oakley: It is 39% of the Protestants.

Kissinger: Well, that makes me feel a little better because the gap between Protestants and Catholics startled me. But be that as it may. Let's not play this game. We now have Jackson coming out in public against it, in the Washington Post, not just at a Jewish rally. And he will perform the great feat of appealing to the anti-Jewish and anti-Communist sentiments in the name of protecting the Jews. And again I say I am not concerned with Jackson as a presidential candidate; I am concerned with Jackson as the legitimizer of feelings that no one would dare to express unless Jackson, with his record, had done so. You [Eran] will as an expert on the Hill agree with that. That is my worry about Jackson. Presidentially it will hurt him again, because he's been fluctuating on Vietnam and everything else. I am worried about him on the



Hill, particularly if they can tie it to a Soviet presence.

So we don't have to go into the fine points, although we ought to discuss it if there is an agreement, before I leave, how we are going to handle the Congress. Some have come out for it, like Humphrey, and that is positive, and Sparkman. Stennis will support it if the President wants it. But we will have more of a battle than I thought. And it will get worse with every passing day. Once we are back and can explain the positive elements we can handle it. But the longer this thing simmers in a state of suspense, the worse it will be.

That is another thing. On the Egyptian side, and on our side, and in our relationship, on every side, how this agreement gets made is also important, not just what is in the agreement. And I think we ought to begin thinking now of not squeezing the last drop of blood out of everyone at every stage, so there isn't such a feeling of hostility when it all ends that many of the paragraphs are defeated.


Now let me state the Egyptian views. The procedure was that I first talked to Sadat alone. Then to Fahmy and Gamasy on the agreement. Then to Gamasy on his military considerations, then to Sadat again alone. So we have different levels of views here to represent.

Let me first go through the agreement. My point to them was the same as the point to you the night before. I don't care if they like or dislike it. If they want to get it finished, they will have to confine their comments to an absolute minimum or we will never finish.

Now, going through the agreement.

They agreed to Article I, just as it is. They say it is the weirdest drafting they have ever seen, but if it pleases you, they agree.

They agreed to Article II. Article III they agreed. In Article IV they want to make two changes, which don't seem to be significant. In paragraph 5, they don't want to say "inaccessible to the parties." But "The zone between lines designated on the attached map as lines E and J will be a buffer zone. In this zone the UN Emergency Forces will continue to perform its functions." They say "buffer zone" will take care of it and it is less offensive to them. They first wanted to say "zones of disengagement," but on the theory that you didn't want the word "disengagement" in there, we argued with them and got them to say "buffer zone."



Allon: That is good.

Rabin: How would it read?

Kissinger: "The zone between lines E and J on the attached map will be a buffer zone." This is the central front. "In this zone the UNEF will continue to perform its functions...." No change.

In paragraph 6, where it says the "land connection between the city of Suez and the line terminating at the coast south of Abu Rudeis," they say that is inexact because from the city of Suez to some point down the coast it is a zone of limited armament.

Gur: That is true.

Kissinger: And therefore they want to say, "In the area from line E ...."

Rabin: They defined it first. This is the way it happened. We didn't try to....

Kissinger: They were not complaining, just pointing it out. For once they weren't saying it was a chisel. [Laughter] They just said it is badly drawn.

Let me explain what they wanted to do. They didn't want all this stuff, the long version. They wanted the short version, which you predicted. But I added to the short version something you didn't have in there, saying "in the area from line E to the line terminating at the coast south of Abu Rudeis on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached annex." I thought it was helpful to you to put into the signed agreement something about "no military forces."


In (B), there is no change.

Peres: Then the fallback positions fall out.

Rabin: There were two options. They took the short one.

Kissinger: I'm now talking about capital B.

Rabin: After such long acquaintance with us, you doubt our understanding of what we agreed?



Kissinger: No, whatever I think of your strategy.

Article V they accepted. Article VI is accepted. Article VII is accepted, and Article VIII is accepted.

Now with respect to Article IX, the situation is as follows. In the meeting with Fahmy, he says he will not sign the agreement, or he will not have the Foreign Office participate in the agreement, without a reference to Article 51. I have to tell you this is the point beyond which he cannot go. I talked to Sadat afterwards, alone, without Fahmy. I said to him: "Look, no one can take Article 51 away from you. You have it as a member of the UN, and no agreement abrogates Article 51. Why make it a specific point in the agreement? It is a point of great domestic importance to the Israelis."


He says I should handle it like the Mitla Pass. But he says he has one need that he wants to put to you, and then he repeated it before his colleagues in another context, which is that he would like the process to be completed in five months rather than in six months. So that he can show some movement. And he says that is politically of great importance to him, and that he wants me to urge it strongly on you, and this is without prejudice to anything else. But he feels that is one request that he is putting, which he would put independently of this, to have the process completed in five months.

Article X they accept. So the agreement, in other words, is completed.

I have to present this to you. Fahmy feels passionately on the inclusion of article 51. Gamasy feels passionately on the inclusion of article 51. They say it is not that we can do anything with it, but it is something they can use with their public opinion, and they say it would be extremely important for them. But I talked to Sadat afterwards. I don't want to play games with you. On a number of occasions he has given me his fallback position and I have given it to you right away. I think you can take this for granted.

Now let's go to the Proposal. I don't have a line-in-line-out version unfortunately. I have discussed the warning stations and I have their suggestions. We discussed it with Fahmy, with their legal advisor and with Sadat.

Rabin: Excuse me. [They confer briefly.]



Kissinger: Incidentally, can we make sure that this agreement doesn't leak before it is concluded?

Sisco: Please.

Rabin: We also have the same problem.

Kissinger: It would be mortifying for them at the other side.

Peres: For how many days?

Kissinger: Until it is all done and initialled.

Dinitz: Richard Valerani got a copy, according to the radio.

Kissinger: One thing you can be sure about....

Rabin: Why did he come up saying he has a copy?

Kissinger: Impossible.

Rabin: I would like to make it clear. What we have to do is that when we conclude the public agreement we will have to bring it to the Cabinet. But once the Cabinet will approve it, we have to immediately initial it, otherwise....

Kissinger: That gets us to a scheduling problem. Then we have to initial Sunday, in the afternoon.

Rabin: Or in the evening or Monday morning. We will have to see how we proceed.

Kissinger: On Valeriani, the Egyptians couldn't have given it to him, because the press never left the plane. They stayed on the airplane in the military airport at Alexandria. So the press could not have obtained it in Egypt. On the plane, I am telling them absolutely nothing. They are absolutely filled with details from Israeli sources. They keep checking with us, and I keep saying I cannot comment on this, and I am saying nothing. Documents are impossible. No one else of our group speaks to the press. And if they have a document, they must have it from Israel.

Allon: No one has the document outside the team here, but many sections will be leaked, I am sure, by Sunday afternoon.





Rabin: Why?

Allon: Because once we give it to the Cabinet....

Kissinger: I would like to report to you that our press expects the agreement to have infinitely less than it has. Which could be an asset, if you could just hold it long enough to have it come out all at once. If the Americans say "in an unexpectedly sweeping document," it would help enormously in the States.

Sisco: There are many more political things in this document than our press believes.

Kissinger: If they see it before the initialling, then Sadat may have to pull back.

Now let me run through the Proposal. No changes in paragraph 1. In paragraph 2, let me explain. They have two concerns. One is that Sadat says he is coming under violent attack in the Arab world for establishing American bases, something he had never done even with the Russians. Secondly, when the Russians were there he said he never had a written document, and for him therefore to have an agreement, he wants to make sure it cannot be misconstrued as American bases. But you will see his changes are not of major importance in this respect.

He does not want to say "under the custody." He wants to say "is entrusted to the U.S."

Rabin: "... on the attached map will be entrusted to...."


Sisco: It is your trusteeship idea.

Kissinger: From your point of view, I think it is better. No one knows what custody means.

Allon: No problem.

Kissinger: Paragraph 1 (a), no change; (b) no change. They want to use "attached" rather than "annexed."

Sadat -- he has not told this to Gamasy yet, so it shouldn't be in the papers yet -- has agreed to three manned stations and three unmanned stations.



Allon: Will that help convince President Ford?

Kissinger: I think we can sell this to President Ford. I haven't done it yet, but I think we can.

Paragraph 2 (a), no change; 2 (b), no change. In 3 they want to change it to read, "except for small arms required for their protection."

In the next paragraph, they want to say "shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the system." And they have already promised us diplomatic status in Ismailia if we want to establish a headquarters there for it.

Then in paragraph 5, their purpose was to cut down all the facilities that we'd be entitled to establish, in order not to make it look like a base, and say "shall be entitled to have such facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their function."

Then in 6, where it says "immune from local criminal and tax jurisdiction," which you fought for very hard, they want to say, "The U.S. and its personnel shall be accorded appropriate status under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations," which does all of this, but it doesn't spell out the immunity.


Paragraph 7 is unchanged. All they want there is "for the duration of the agreement." They want to drop "between Egypt and Israel."

Rabin: Why?

Peres: That is a little bit of a problem. Because here if it won't be said that it is between Egypt and Israel this agreement doesn't have a duration. Because this is a separate agreement.

Kissinger: This is not a maneuver. They mean for the duration of the basic agreement. Their problem is they don't want to accord in a document that is going to be published, a legal status for Israel. It says here at the beginning "in connection with the early warning system referred to in Article IV of the . . . . concluded on this date and is part of that agreement." And at the end of it it says "of the agreement dated. . . ." You can say whatever the date of the agreement is.

This thing is called a proposal; it's not an agreement.



In Article VIII we are having a massive problem. That they feel they cannot say, "No change without the agreement of both parties."

Peres: What do they suggest?

Kissinger: They haven't got a suggestion.

Rabin: What do you suggest?

Kissinger: We have something we haven't tried on them, which we worked on tonight. This has no status with the Egyptians. "In the event the U.S. wishes to change the terms of this Proposal or its status for reasons other than those provided for in paragraph 9, it will seek the consent of each of the parties to the Agreement." We tried to put it in terms of the U.S.


I had two ideas to deal with this. This is the first one. Then I was going to add in paragraph 9 -- they accept paragraphs 9 and 10, incidentally -- the following: "If it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their function is no longer in the national interests of the U.S. ..."

Then I thought of something like this: "In making the latter determination" -- namely, the national interests of the U.S. -- "the U.S. would consider a request by both parties as conclusive." This makes it clear that it would consider a request by one party not conclusive. You see what I mean? So we'd have both.

The difference between my Foreign Service colleagues and me is that they're trying to be more specific and I'm not.

Peres: Did the Egyptians agree to this?

Kissinger: No, not yet. I just don't want to have the word "termination" in the proposal. Then we will have to find a bridge to the advance part where the U.S. makes its own determination of the national interests. You can't say "in the latter case" without a successive sentence. Maybe we'd have to say "In the latter case, the parties will inform....," and "The U.S. would also consider a request by both parties conclusive." I think we ought to put at the end of the paragraph, "The U.S. will also consider a request for change by both parties as conclusive." So the Proposal, except for that one point....



Peres: And the other point where they crossed out "between Egypt and Israel," unless we find a substitute where our legal advisors will tell us there is an absolute reference to the basic agreement.

Leigh: There is no problem.

Kissinger: They are not trying to make an issue here. There is no problem about this. They are worried about the opposite that you are. They are worried as if this could then sound as if it were an agreement between Egypt and Israel on establishing warning stations. That is why they want to take out "between Egypt and Israel."

Peres: They have it in the preamble.

Kissinger: I did not think it wise to call their attention to that. [Laughter] So that is their problem. I don't point out their own drafting mistakes to them. I am sure if your legal people and ours can find a formula that will make clear we are referring to the basic agreement, this cannot be a problem.

Rabin: Can we suggest that the legal advisors of both sides go and try to do something along these lines? There are two basic problems.


Peres: Did you have a chance to go over the guiding lines for the protocol? On the military annex.

Kissinger: Well, they are under the impression -- which may come as a stunning surprise to the Israelis -- that I am basically negotiating on your side, Gamasy in particular is convinced that I am getting everything done first so that then he has no bargaining position left.

Gur: As a matter of fact, all the military problems were decided on the map before you came here. That is the problem with Gamasy.

Kissinger: No, he has a lot of things he wanted. He says if the Israelis thought about what he is proposing they would understand. When he says he wants something like 20,000 men across the Canal -- I am telling you his reasoning -- he says if he wanted to attack he has no problem, because he can then get very quickly across the Canal, and the number of forces he has across the Canal are playing no part in any attack plans he has. You can judge that.

Gur: That is correct.



Rabin: It is not true, if he has more infantry battalions or commando battalions there on a large scale.

Gur: Yes, but he has no problem to cross the Canal.

Rabin: That is true.

Kissinger: He says what he wants -- he won't get it; I have already settled it with Sadat, so I am not now defending it out trying to give you his reasoning -- he says what he would like since they are going to stay on these lines for years now is something that gives some security to the Canal. I had a talk with him; I think he is of all the Egyptians the most honorable. He said he has to sell this to his officers. He says he will sell anything that Sadat asks him to sell and he has enough prestige among his officers to sell it, but it is a problem for him. That is something I think any military man will understand, that to say he can defend the Suez Canal with 7,000 people.... That is not an outrageous proposition to make. That is his point.

I have told him that I have given his figures to you and that you are studying them and I am going to get your counterproposals today. In order to keep him off my back while we were negotiating the basic agreement and the Proposal. But I have to come back now with a specific, detailed idea.

I gave Sadat a slight hint privately of what your thinking was, and he thinks he can handle it, but he says whatever more you can do in men across the Canal would help him with Gamasy. He doesn't insist on that, but the one point Sadat feels he needs is the five months rather than six.


[Both sides confer.]

Peres: Mr. Secretary.

Rabin: There is a point about no reference to the American presence either in the agreement or in the protocol. The legal advisors believe there should be somewhere a reference because otherwise someone can say it is not part of the agreement.

Sisco: Well, Article IV(b) refers to the warning system.

Peres: The legal advisors suggest that in the Preamble of the Proposal, where it says "in connection with the warning system... of the agreement," to add here in brackets "hereinafter called the Agreement."



Kissinger: Fine. I am sure that solves the problem and that they will accept it.

Peres: And all the parties will sign it?

Kissinger: Yes, on separate copies. We will do it the same way as the proposal with the disengagement agreement. The agreement will be signed on the same sheet; the proposal will be signed on separate sheets. It will be the identical proposal. And when we submit it to Congress, we will submit both.

I am prepared to try "will be entrusted to the U.S. and will be manned by U.S. personnel," in the Proposal.

Peres: That's not necessary.

Rabin: In the agreement?

Peres: We had asked if in the agreement, instead of simply saying "warning system," to say "with American personnel."

Kissinger: My recommendation is that in the protocol there is one reference to the early warning system manned by Americans. There will be no problem.


Peres: The protocol is part of the agreement. It carries the same weight.

Kissinger: My judgment is that it presents no problem. The best is to put it in the protocol or in the annex. The best would be to put it into the annex. My understanding is that the annex and the agreement will be initialled and signed as a package. The protocol will be signed two weeks later. I would therefore suggest we put it into an annex in a one-sentence reference, and then it's finished, and doesn't have to be negotiated again.

Rosenne: We have it in the annex.

Kissinger: I think we do.

Rosenne: In article 6(b).



Peres: I still have one problem. On the number of the stations, can we have one of the three unmanned as a guarded station in the Mitla? I explained it already and I think it is very important for the future. Let's leave it as it is, but we shall have between us a gentlemen's agreement that one of the three unmanned will be guarded by five or ten Americans in the entry or exit of the Mitla.

Kissinger: Incidentally, I come to one other point which we did not discuss with the Egyptians, but which I believe we must include in this Proposal, which is to put a ceiling on the number of Americans in this system. I think that is essential for the Congress. And I think in our computation the ceiling should be something like 250.

Peres: The same as ours.

Kissinger: So you can fight one but not both.

Rabin: Eagleton said to me: "Don't bring about the number of 200 because that was the number that was first sent to Vietnam."

Kissinger: He is wrong. It was 2,000. Seriously, the first number to Vietnam was 2,000. I think it would help the Egyptians. They have not raised this. But it would enormously help us to say "the number of personnel in the warning system shall not at any time exceed 250."

Peres: You won't manage with 250.

Kissinger: We figured it out and we will manage.

Peres: What can we do about the fourth station?


Kissinger: Nothing. I think what sometimes happens in these negotiations is that you don't keep track of what you have already achieved and always focus on what you haven't achieved.

Allon: That's the correct way.

Kissinger: No. There was someone in the lobby of the King David Hotel who applauded. They had to carry him out in an ambulance. [Laughter]

Rabin: At the same time we bear in mind what we have had to give.

Kissinger: That's right, but this comes as close to a non-belligerency as you are going to get ever for any line.



Allon: The written agreement is good.

Dinitz: Do you have any idea about the location of these stations? That might help Shimon's suggestion, because then we will see if it covers our vital needs.

Kissinger: My idea was to have two in the Giddi because that was the most plausible place for them.

Peres: On the contrary, have two in the Mitla, because in the Giddi you are participating in the two stations of Egypt and Israel. Then to have one station at the entry to the Giddi pass, you participate in the two stations there, and the additional two we have to put in the Mitla.

Kissinger: But we have to check the Israeli traffic to Khisheiba and the Egyptian traffic to [their station].

Peres: Yes.

Rabin: [Gets up to the map.] What is our problem? If it is three, and you want to check the Israeli movement, that is to say somewhere from here [indicating on map] and the Egyptians somewhere from here, you have two stations here and you don't have any one where really the roads go to the stations.

Kissinger: I thought we would put one on the road.

Rabin: What Shimon suggests I believe is one here, one here and one here [indicating].

Peres: That's right.

Kissinger: Impossible. First of all, they are all facing Egypt.

Peres: No, you have two stations facing Israel, because the Egyptian and Israeli stations are close to the Israeli side.

Kissinger: [Gets up and goes around to the map.] And the Israelis can go freely in here?

Peres: No, you have the Americans in Umm Khisheiba.

Kissinger: If we put one here, first of all it can be plausibly presented to the American public as looking in both directions. But if they make





these things look like the beginning of a security guarantee for Israel....  
Incidentally, the less said about the beginning of an American security  
guarantee for Israel, the better.

Rabin: We say just the opposite, that it has no military significance.  
It is political.

If you can put one here and one here and one here, at the entrances --  
I understand your point -- and only one here....

Kissinger: What is the rationale for this one?

Rabin: Because the Mitla is not controlled by anyone. I am saying on an  
equal basis.


Kissinger: But it is facing Egypt.

Rabin: In the entrance here and the entrance here. If it is three -- one  
here and one here in the entrance of the two passes and then one here in  
the middle controlling the road.

Kissinger: General Brown believes that this whole thing is military  
nonsense. Excuse me, but that is what he is going to testify. The further  
forward we put these posts, the more vulnerable they are going to look.  
If we put them in the middle of the passes, with radar looking both ways,  
that is a plausible function. When President Ford agreed to two -- he  
hasn't agreed in fact to a third one, so we have only Sadat -- why did he  
say two? We thought they'd look both ways. They can't see a thing, as we  
both know.

Gur: [Gets up to the map.] I will explain why we have five, the three  
manned, and the Egyptian and Israeli stations. This is the western side  
of the Mitla, this is the eastern side of the Mitla. Then on the Giddi,  
the Egyptian station is going to be right on the Giddi pass, so the  
American station with the Egyptian early warning station can serve both  
missions, to be with the Egyptians and to keep that road. It is only three  
kilometers from the road. We have another road that comes from the  
north into Umm Khisheiba, so the American group that will be in Umm  
Khisheiba will also check that road that comes in.

Kissinger: Just a minute, that is another problem. That road apparently  
goes through the UN zone.



Rabin: Yes, two kilometers. What's the problem?

Gur: It gets to the main road here.

Peres: It passes the buffer zone.

Gur: No, the UN will have posts here, I have no doubt about it. I am talking about the Americans. So you will have points on all the main entrances into that area. On the Giddi, the Mitla, both sides -- that is the Israeli side -- and the Americans that will be with the Egyptian station. On our side in the Umm Khisheiba, which controls the Giddi from above. I think the third American group should be here in the middle of the Giddi.

Kissinger: That is exactly what Sadat said, and you denied it in March, that Umm Khisheiba controls the Giddi from above.

Gur: With early warning. I am talking about the third exclusively American point that will be on the Giddi itself when the Umm Khisheiba road goes up.

Kissinger: That is where I want to put it.

Gur: Then the sensor will be on that part.

Kissinger: There is no problem about the sensors. Where do you want the manned stations?

Gur: One, two, three [pointing to map.]

Kissinger: I doubt it.


Gur: Two of them are against Israel on the eastern side.

Kissinger: How is this against Israel? It is in the middle.

Peres: No, two kilometers from the road.

Gur: It is much closer by distance. What we consider the Giddi pass, and we showed you in March, is much more to the west than this pass.

Kissinger: The only thing I regret is that I didn't ask you for your definition of midway through the passes in March, because I am afraid it would have been very close to the Canal.



Gur: I am sure they will accept that proposal that I made.

Peres: The Egyptian station is two kilometers from our frontier, even less.

Gur: What I say about Umm Khisheiba is that it will check the northern limit, not the Giddi road.

Kissinger: It will be relatively easier to sell this thing if.... I have to talk to the President anyway about the two or three, but it is one thing to sell this in connection with the big stations, and it is another thing to sell it the way you are trying to, as a preventive to a big attack. Which puts the Americans right up against it. And the further back we can have the Americans, the better off we will be in the Congress. We can say all of this is a technical warning station -- this radar, this radar -- and that way we can sell it. If you make it a plate glass window, we will be in the most massive difficulty. Which is why the President went back to two.

Sisco: [To Gur] You have to be very careful, Motta, not to begin to give this thing the character of U.S. on-the-ground observation corps, instead of a technical surveillance operation, which is the political emphasis we are going to give in our country.

Kissinger: It will be the beginning of the end of Israel if Americans start wondering how to protect the Americans there, believe me.

Sisco: I think both you and we have underestimated the depth of opposition in our country to this.

Kissinger: This is six months after Vietnam collapsed.

Rabin: Don't make that comparison.

Kissinger: No, the point I'm making is how it looks to Americans.

Peres: We sincerely don't want Americans to become our protectors.

Sisco: That's right.

Peres: We feel this is a political positive service in favor of peace for the future. And the fact that people are interpreting it in a different way is completely meaningless. We have to deal here with a twist in public



opinion, not with a serious matter. I mean if we were asking for something else, we wouldn't be shy about it. There were so many people in the world who asked for American protection, except for Israel. And there is no shame in asking for it if we felt like it. We are not asking for it.

Rabin: Not in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Peres: And we don't look upon it as American involvement. But I believe if it will be arranged in the right way it will really serve a very serious purpose. The problem is in the case of bluff.

Kissinger: I have a hell of a time understanding why a post at the Mitla eight kilometers further forward is going to deter them more than one where that road goes in. They still have to go through the passes.

Peres: The passes have become a symbol and a center of the strategic concentration of both sides. The minute we say: "Forget about the passes; there is an agreement, a proposal, a presence,".... And it should be deployed in a way....

Kissinger: You are not forgetting about it; you are putting an American post right in the middle of the pass.

Peres: Let's have a look at the map and you will see our point.

[The parties move to the map. General Gur pins a map of the passes area on the wall on top of the big map. Peres points out the posts.]


Kissinger: This one is an insult to the Egyptians. Also to the President.

Sisco: It also proves you're not out of the passes.

Kissinger: This shows the Egyptians they're right. You know, I've gone along with a number of your chisels.

This one is in the pass; this one is in the pass [Indicating].

Gur: The Egyptian station will be there [indicating]. If they're going to build a big station, for three years they'll have free movement. It will make it almost an Egyptian road.



To build something for 250 people, just the building will take years. He's got reasons; he's not such a naive person.

Kissinger: The best solution would have been to move this [Umm Khisheiba] and drop theirs, and have a clear agreement.

Rabin: The Secretary tried to convince me.

Gur: What we see on the map is the real pass -- where the dunes and hills become much higher, the roads go into the deep wadi.

In the Giddi, the Americans here with the Egyptian station will be sitting on the road, much closer to the Israeli side than the Egyptian side. Most of the American personnel will be on the Israeli side. On the northern side.

Kissinger: Incidentally, in building this you should just put a terminal date on building it. Don't give an unlimited period. Just put it in the protocol.

Peres: Good idea.

Sisco: Your entire emphasis here is how these positions are going to survey people. The emphasis has been on a technical observation corps. We are not an observation corps. This is a major political issue in our country. It should be on manning our stations.

[There was a break from about 12:15 to 12:24 p. m.]

Kissinger: The sensors on the Giddi road will go crazy with all the traffic there.


Rabin: Mr. Secretary, can we agree as a matter of principle, that there are six, out of which three are manned?

Kissinger: I have not checked with the President.

Rabin: Let's assume that we agree between us. Secondly, that they will be stationed on the Giddi and the Mitla.

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: Third, the exact locations will be decided after the Congressional approval, between the Israelis and the Americans.



Dinitz: No, between the U.S. and the parties.

Rabin: And that way we save the argument now about where it will be. And you won't even be in a position in the Congress to argue about the exact location.

Kissinger: You want this in the U.S. proposal?

Rabin: Yes.

Kissinger: May I suggest, in paragraph 10, "Technical problems, including the location of the watch stations, will be worked out through consultation with the U.S." No number.

Rabin: Then you don't stress the fact that they are on the passes.

Peres: You can do it, but to say "the location on the Giddi and Mitla passes."

Kissinger: We will now say "Three watch stations will be established by the U.S. in the Mitla and Giddi passes." It's already in there. I would just like the last paragraph as vague as possible.

Sisco: Then at the bottom of the page, you take out "shown on the attached map."

Peres: Can we say instead of "the attached map," "as will be shown on an agreed map?"

Kissinger: I have no problem with that. And that "technical problems including the location of the stations will be worked out in consultation with the U.S."


Peres: Shall we say "Mitla and Giddi roads," instead of "Mitla and Giddi passes?"

Kissinger: One problem is we've got this already agreed.

Rabin: We know it's basically along the roads.

Peres: Okay.

Rabin: Okay. Now what about the military annex?



Kissinger: I have not yet raised some of your special projects with them like flying up to the middle of the buffer line.

Peres: We would like to add one sentence. Do you have the annex before you?

Kissinger: We haven't agreed yet to your annex. It is just a working paper.

Rabin: When will we work on it?

Kissinger: We have one we drafted which we have not yet discussed with the Egyptians.

That sentence in the Proposal will read: "The number of U.S. personnel assigned to functions at these stations will not exceed 200. The number of such personnel physically present at the early warning stations shall not exceed 100 at any one time."

Dinitz: You said 250.

Kissinger: My colleagues pointed out to me that on innumerable occasions I have said publicly that it will not exceed 200. We can handle some of the support personnel as part of our Embassy. The Egyptians have agreed to make what we do in Ismailia an outpost of the Port Said consulate. So we can put some of the administrative personnel into the Consulate.

[Proposal as later retyped by the Israelis is at Tab A.]

Rabin: Did you promise them that everything will be served from their side?

Kissinger: We didn't discuss it.

Rabin: Because I want it to be on a mutual basis. You can use the Embassy, whatever you want. I don't want it in writing. I am just talking about the arrangements.

Kissinger: You don't want it in there.

Rabin: I don't need anything in writing on it, if we have agreed between ourselves. I know it could add a messy problem to you and we don't need it now. It can be developed.



Kissinger: We can try to develop it. How does the UN handle it?

Rabin: We cannot be in a position that no Americans will go to our side.

Peres: The UN has a headquarters here in Jerusalem, and General Siilasvuo who now became the Commander of all the three different UN presences....

Kissinger: I think we will just hook ourselves to Siilasvuo.

Gur: He has a headquarters in Ismailia.

Rabin: And they have a detachment in Ismailia. It might be that you can cover it because of the need to coordinate. We have to discuss it because it will be too close to the UN.

Peres: Now, on the number. At the beginning we were talking about 200; then we have augmented it to 250. I think it would be wise for each of the three parties to have 250. The Americans can go to that figure and explain it by saying each of the parties will have 250.

Kissinger: The 50 men don't make any difference in practice to us. In the crazy mood in America they will say "Again Kissinger pulled a fast one. He keeps saying on the outside 200 and the next thing we know it's 250."

Peres: We don't insist on it.

Rabin: Try it if you can manage.


Kissinger: I mentioned 250 until my colleagues pointed out that I had said in a number of press conferences 200.

Rabin: I think you should try 250 and we will see what happens.

Kissinger: No, the Egyptians will accept 250. There is no problem with them, I think, on that. It is an American problem. Let me consult about that.

Rabin: The location we don't have to settle now.

Kissinger: All right. Now, where is the annex? Do you have a copy for the Israelis?





Sisco: We do. Do you want us to distribute that?

Kissinger: We put in your figures.

Rabin: Which has not yet been agreed.

Kissinger: Which has not yet been agreed, but in which I put to you the considerations that Sadat gave me. [To Sisco:] Give them the copy.

[Sisco hands them Tab B.]

There are a number of things not in there that you raised that we are prepared to discuss. There is one problem that Gamasy raised yesterday that I did not mention. I said: What is your idea of police forces? They say they have only one policy for this purpose which is something called the frontier police. That they have no other police force for that function.

Rabin: What does it mean, frontier police? The Syrians were kind enough as to have civil police. If Syria has agreed to civilian police, why shouldn't they? Frontier police are under the army.

Kissinger: That's right.

Gur: It's entirely a military unit.

Kissinger: It is my duty to convey it.


Rabin: I understand. It is a joke that they don't have civilian police. The Syrians in their disengagement agreement agreed to civilian police and not frontier police.

Kissinger: There is no dispute about limitations of numbers -- no tanks, no artillery, no heavy weapons. All of this is unchallenged. But I wanted to call this to your attention.

Rabin: We'll get to that later.

Kissinger: But I wanted to put it in.

Peres: Did you try the idea of allowing each party to fly to the middle of the buffer zone?



Kissinger: Not yet. Because I frankly wanted them to accept the agreement first.

We spent most of the time on the agreement. I then listened once again to Gamasy's ideas and then went to Sadat to tell him they would not work. And I have gotten Sadat's agreement that he will not press Gamasy's ideas. I thought it would be more than the traffic would bear.

Rabin: Why did they put this point about the frontier police? Even the Syrians understood that. Believe me, we don't write this just to harass. To say they have no police is a joke.

Kissinger: They claim they have no civilian police for this purpose.

Rabin: They have the biggest police force in this area, in the Middle East. I will show you pictures of the police in every city of Egypt.

Allon: For instance, our frontier police is like a military unit, except for the name, and it is under the Minister of Police.

Rabin: It's under the Command of Police.

Allon: But it is a real tough, well organized, well trained military force.

Rabin: The name given here in the annex is "Egyptian frontier guards."

Sisco: What is yours called?

Rabin: Border police, but they come under the police commander.


May I suggest we give this paper to our people, the military people and others? They will work on it in the meantime and put down whatever comments they have.

Kissinger: Within rational limits.

Sisco: Could you instruct them to focus on points of substance rather than everything? Seriously. We'd like to finish.

Kissinger: We don't like to; we must.

Gur: [getting up] A half hour is too much?



Rabin: No, an hour and a half. We have to see it.

Kissinger: Just to save time; we have taken out of the annex some points which are now in the agreement in Article IV, but if you want them back into the annex, that is no problem. I just want you to understand that doesn't mean anything.

Peres: We shall just look into the substance.

Rabin: Can we go, in this forum or a smaller one, into the question of Egyptian assurances?

Kissinger: It's smaller now. Would you like equivalence? On our side?

Rabin: It doesn't matter.

Kissinger: Can we take a two-minute break to consult in the other room?

Rabin: We want to go to the assurance on bilateral issues, then the annex and the maps.

Kissinger: I understand. I just want five minutes.

[At 12:44 p.m. Secretary Kissinger goes into the Prime Minister's inner office to confer with Sisco, Toon and Atherton, and comes out at 12:58 p.m.]


Kissinger: Look at this. [He gives Rabin the Jerusalem Post, showing the front page article, Tab C, "U.S. Won't Need Congress Okay for Guaranteeing Israel's Oil."]

Rabin: But you don't see the Hebrew press: "Rabin Resigns!"

Dinitz: Mr. Secretary, yesterday the opposition press attacked us for being hoodwinked by the Americans because you need Congressional approval to guarantee the oil. To have this today doesn't hurt the negotiations.

Kissinger: Except what it does to the Congressmen who are in town.

We're clear on the legal point.



Kissinger: [reading from a cable] Fahmy has asked for a clean text of the agreement, and we will have to put Article 51 in brackets.

Dinitz: I have the full Harris Poll now, Mr. Secretary. 53% of the Jews, 39% of the Protestants and 42% of the Catholics.

Kissinger: It is still no great help. It's better, but there is no clear majority except among Jews.

Dinitz: It's a plurality everywhere. You must understand that none of us has worked on it!

Kissinger: I agree, but it also indicates we'd all better get back as fast as we can.

Dinitz: But under the circumstances. I don't think it's bad.

Kissinger: It will be such a startling event if we both say the same thing in Washington, that that alone.... [Laughter].


Rabin: Can we go now to the assurances? The Egyptian commitments or assurances.

Kissinger: Which do you want to work from, in the Memorandum of Understanding?

Rabin: Yes, you wanted now to have it separately. Simcha and Joe did a lot of work on it, and I would prefer that Simcha will start with it.

Dinitz: I will read from the text Saunders handed to us when we came: "Egyptian commitments or assurances made to Israel through the U. S. Government." I am reading from page 11 of the document because the Prime Minister suggested we first go to those assurances that relate to what we get from Egypt.

"1. The USG has received assurances from Egypt, which it hereby conveys to the GOI, that in the event of a Syrian attack against Israel or the event of a war of attrition initiated by Syria, Egypt will not participate in hostilities and will refrain from the use of force." The Israelis want the following added: "The USG will seek an assurance from Egypt that its commitments on duration are not conditional upon any acts or developments between the other Arab states and Israel."



Kissinger: Before we go into any of them. First, this is a correct statement of what I conveyed to you, so we do not debate the correctness of this. It was tied to the fact that we would convey to Egypt an Israeli assurance that it will not launch an attack on Syria, as I pointed out at the time.

Secondly, we now have a problem which applies not just to this but to all of these assurances. First of all, I want to point out that two events are casting a new character on the way we can handle these assurances. One is the unprecedented amount of leakage that has already occurred, which creates massive problems in obtaining assurances with any formality. The second is that the American presence will produce an amount of scrutiny in the Congress which is equally unprecedented, so that our possibility of keeping anything secret is extremely limited, keeping aside the leak problem here. I remember I got you assurances from Asad which were conditional at the time on being kept secret, and which in fact have been kept secret.

Allon: On terrorist action.

Kissinger: Which proves the Israeli government can keep secrets if it wishes.


But we have a quandary now, which is quite different from anything previous to this. On top of the fact that undoubtedly people like Jackson in the U.S. will try to prove that I promised everything to everyone and that therefore this agreement isn't any good, to make it a personal attack on me.

This presents very serious difficulties. Because there are a number of these things which if they become public like this one, there is no question that Egypt will have to disavow. I don't see how Egypt can survive in the Arab world with a public commitment of this nature.

Rabin: By the way, they even made it public that they will not attack on the assumption that Israel will not attack.

Kissinger: It is one thing for them to have it in the press, another thing for them to have me say it in the Congress. I want to say that while the statement the Prime Minister repeated is a correct statement of the Egyptian point of view, as my colleagues may attest....

Allon: Why should this document be placed with the Congress? There is no American commitment here. You are giving us assurances you have received from Egypt for us.



Kissinger: Well, we will be asked. The procedure will be like this. People will say: "Is there anything else to this agreement that we do not know?" I will say, "Well, yes, there are some assurances we conveyed from one party to the other." They will say, "Can you produce these?" I will say, "No, I don't want to produce all of them." They will then say, "Since these assurances will affect the degree that the Americans are involved here, we have to know them." Don't you think so, Joe?

Sisco: Yes, because of our American presence. If it had not been there, it would have been another matter.

Kissinger: In the last one I took the position that there were certain assurances that had nothing to do with the U.S. and I was just a post office.

It is a very serious problem.

Rabin: How do these assurances affect the Americans?

Sisco: They will say it affects the degree of danger that Americans run. First they will say that since they don't know what they are, they can't judge it.

Kissinger: Secondly, they will ask me: "Are there any more assurances?" The minute I say there are more assurances.... If there were no American presence it would be no problem; I'd say it is none of their business, we are not involved, all we did was help the parties. They will say it is like the Nixon-Thieu letters.

Dinitz: Which, by the way, were never leaked.

Kissinger: Because they were in the White House. But since they got into the Pentagon. Les Gelb will have some articles on them next week, proving that the letters that have been published are not the full story -- which is not true -- but there are other letters that say more or less the same thing. So it is not a helpful time.

Allon: But since this is considered one of the basic elements upon which the agreement rests....

Kissinger: I understand that.



Allon: Do you have any suggestions as to how to cover it? We shall do our best to keep it secret. No question about it. If you tell Congress there is nothing else connected with America, you are telling them the truth.

Kissinger: First, I have never testified publicly on the agreements. I have always testified in Executive Session. Therefore, when I was asked at the Executive Session: "Are there any other assurances?" I could say there are other assurances but....

Dinitz: Which relate to assurances the Government of Egypt gave to Israel.

Kissinger: But since they do not bear on the subject or anything the U.S. has to do, I would prefer not to discuss them. In the Committees this was never challenged, and I think on one or two occasions I even told the Chairmen what they were. This time I will have to testify before at least four full Committees in open session.

Dinitz: On the American presence.


Kissinger: Yes. But the only way I can justify the American presence -- I have thought about it -- the only way is by explaining the agreement and the essential role the American presence played in the agreement. Otherwise, they will say, "What the hell are you doing there?" I have to explain first of all why the agreement is important, why it is an important step towards peace. All of this I have to say. Why Israel made such sacrifices.

Rabin: Be careful with that.

Kissinger: I mean why Israel made a big step. Forget about the sacrifices part. But I will have to explain the agreement, the history of the agreement. And then I will say this is the role the American presence plays. Then the whole debate will be: "Is this an American commitment to get involved?" Since 49% of the people seem to think it is. I will have to explain. I am not thinking so much of well-meaning senators like Case and Humphrey, or the opposition like Mansfield.

Rabin: He has always been against whatever you did.

Peres: Will the Egyptians agree to make public that in case of a Syrian attack, they won't attack, if we give up the American presence?



Kissinger: They can't. I am talking about the questioning I will get from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It will be hostile from Mansfield for sure. But the Foreign Relations Committee isn't what worries me so much. I am worried about the Appropriations Committee which will also have to hold hearings in both Houses.

Dinitz: That Committee is divided into three parts: Those who are friendly to us and to you; those who are friendly to you and not to us, and those who are only friendly to us. There is no one that doesn't fall in one of these three categories.

Kissinger: Except Mansfield.

Dinitz: Right. The only one.

Kissinger: I am worried about the public questions that will be asked in the public hearings. We won't get Mansfield with or without assurances. He will vote against the American presence no matter what we testify. That is not my concern. My concern is what happens in the public hearings. But the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, if Simcha and I talk to Javits, Symington and a few others.

Dinitz: They'll be for it.

Kissinger: I mean, to control the questioning, I think we can get through that. The House International Relations Committee will be tougher.

Dinitz: Yes.

Kissinger: I am just trying to be realistic. The Senate Appropriations Committee will be a disaster. But look at the Senate Appropriations Committee. McClellan is the chairman; Robert Byrd -


Dinitz: Byrd of West Virginia?

Kissinger: Yes.

Dinitz: He will be all right.

Rabin: Mr. Secretary, you are lucky that I don't have to describe to you our Foreign Affairs Committee!

Sisco: I once appeared before it, and I know of which you speak!





Rabin: Then what is your basic proposal?

Kissinger: I have no basic proposal. I want to tell you that I am in a serious dilemma now, especially with extremely sensitive things. With respect to the Syrian thing my proposal is just read it into the record as an oral statement.

Rabin: I can't.

Dinitz: I suggest that you tell the Congress that there are things that don't affect the U. S. and then take the leading Democrat, Church, and the Chairman, and Case....

Rabin: Let's have a short discussion.

[Rabin goes out with Peres for a brief private conversation, and then they return.]

Dinitz: Can you testify on the agreement and not on the American presence?

Kissinger: I would like to, and first in the Executive Session.

Rabin: Mr. Secretary, let us agree now on the agreement and not go to the assurances until it is approved by the Congress and signed only after the signature of the protocol, which anyhow has to wait. Then actually all the hearings in Congress will be done without these assurances being signed. What do you think?

Kissinger: I think it would be a trick. And in the next Golan book I'd be dead. What this is in effect is that I have given you some assurances but in order to avoid testifying before the Congress....


Sisco: That is a subterfuge and you will be accused of having misled them.

Kissinger: I'd become the hostage of Sisco. I trust you all completely, but just look at the people sitting on my side. Rodman could destroy me. [Laughter]

Rodman: It's already the case. This wouldn't add anything.

Sisco: It wouldn't help Israel.

[Dr. Kissinger confers briefly with Mr. Sisco and Mr. Leigh].



Kissinger: Leigh just explained to me that they now have bills before the Congress that force even oral assurances to be revealed.

Rabin: Not yet adopted?

Kissinger: Not yet adopted.

Dinitz: The Case amendment?

Sisco: Yes. Thank God it's not adopted, so it won't apply if we do it in a hurry.

Allon: There is a Yiddish expression that the best lie is the truth. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I have a lot of experience with that.

Allon: I think we have to tell Congress that there are some assurances but they are not related to America at all. I say even in spite of the presence, and you divulge them.


Kissinger: There are two problems. First, Egypt may deny that there are any such assurances, in the light of all the things that have happened. That I might be able to handle. Egypt can keep quiet when you talk; they may not be able to keep quiet when I talk in open session.

Incidentally, do you have a ship that can go through before the signing?

Rabin: When he is ready.

Kissinger: Whenever they know there will be initialling, whenever you want to go before the Knesset.

The second problem is that the Congress will take the position that what I say may be perfectly true but it also may be untrue, and that they can't tell whether it is true or not unless I let them see what these assurances are. The third position they will take is that since there are Americans involved, and since whether the agreement is considered breached or not will affect whether Americans are in danger, Israel or Egypt may consider as a breach the Egyptian violation of these assurances even if they were not given by the U. S., and therefore they have to know what they are.



Sisco: And there is no denying that if there would be an abridgement of these assurances, it would have most serious implications not only in terms of the agreement but of war and peace.

Kissinger: This is the least operational, from that point of view. Either Egypt will go to war if there is a war with Syria, or it won't.

Rabin: What kind of assurances could you convey that might serve the fear you have?

Kissinger: It also depends in part on the degree of sensitivity and the degree they might be disavowed if they become public. Let's take the Syrian one: It is a correct statement, and I am not challenging the correctness of the statement. But it has to have something reciprocal in there, which we have discussed.

Rabin: But if tomorrow Syria violates the agreement, moves its forces and opens fire? And we react?

Sisco: Well, I think this deals with two elements -- it is precise -- a Syrian attack on Israel, or a war of attrition against Israel. It is very precise.

Kissinger: Let's leave this aside for a minute, as an especially difficult political case.

Rabin: Allow me to say, one of the reasons for our readiness to go to the agreement is based on some of these assurances.


Kissinger: I understand.

Rabin: If you can give us advice, we can use it. What kind of assurances do you want from us about Syria? I want to be more clear. That we won't start a war against Syria? What is the assurance?

Kissinger: An assurance from you that you will not attack Syria. Under those conditions he has no problems at all.

Peres: It can be made public?

Kissinger: No, you can't make it public. There has to be a minimum understanding of the Arab world in these discussions.



Rabin: I don't see any problem in even coming out and saying we will not attack Syria as long as the agreement is valid.

Kissinger: Number 2 is all right.

Dinitz: Can we beef it up?

Rabin: What is number 2?

Kissinger: Three is absolutely correct. I just want to move through the other points to see whether there is a substantive problem.

Rabin: No, I want to deal with point 1. How do you want to deal with it?

Sisco: We suggested you set that aside for a moment -- paragraph 1 -- and we go to some others which we think may be less difficult. The first one is really difficult.


Kissinger: Given the basic structure of the problem, that you, even for a final peace, will have to give up territory in return for commitments, so that at every point, whenever you make any progress towards peace, you will be giving up territory against Arab words -- that is the nature of the problem. In that sense, I think in the basic document you have gotten as close to non-belligerency as you can get.

Rabin: Believe me, we will also try to sell it that way. Even though we know the difference.

Kissinger: Based on the questions they [the U.S. press] have asked me on the plane, they will consider reference even to cargoes, much less blockade, as a stunning achievement. Only by peaceful means, and so on -- they have not conceived any of this. The questions they ask me are: "Is it really right that the Israelis would blow up this agreement because you want to give them only a private letter on cargo?"

Now, let's get the text. Then let's get how it will be conveyed, and then let's decide how to handle it.

Now, 1 is a correct statement. It should be balanced by some sort of Israeli statement that it will not attack Syria. Because we also have to have something to convey to the Egyptians, which may make it easier.



Dinitz: Let me read number 2. "The USG takes Egypt's commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force, or from military or paramilitary action contained in the agreement to remain binding in the event of countermeasures undertaken by Israel against terrorist operations emanating from across any of Israel's frontiers. Should Egypt take a contrary view, the USG will support the above interpretation diplomatically." We added to it the Israeli language, instead of the above: "The USG has received commitments from Egypt that its commitment to refrain from the threat or use of military or paramilitary action, contained in the Agreement, shall remain binding in the event of countermeasures taken by Israel against terrorist operations emanating from across any of Israel's frontiers."

Kissinger: The trouble is that we haven't gotten that commitment and I don't see how Sadat can give that in an official document.

Sisco: If they take a different view, we will support you diplomatically, but the Israeli language would require us to go to Sadat and get assurances. But we can certainly give our Israeli friends an assurance that if they take this view, we are with them diplomatically.

Dinitz: Just to explain to my colleagues, whenever we differed on the language, we put in both versions.

Allon: A terrorist attack is more feasible than a Syrian attack. They can use it as an excuse.

Kissinger: They can use anything as an excuse.

Allon: Particularly since the leadership of the PLO made an official statement that they are against the agreement and will intensify their operations. So it makes it even more directly connected with the agreement.

Peres: The problem with this sentence is that the Egyptians may read it as though they really have the right to depart from it, so they get an open door.

Sisco: We wouldn't show this to the Egyptians.

Kissinger: We won't show this to them. Since it won't leak from here, how could they see it?



Peres: I want to tell you one thing, Joe. Let's distinguish between language and reality. We have evidence that the Syrians -- what they promised about terrorists they really fulfilled to the letter, including the last days. So I am saying just for the sake of language, I don't think we would put up a struggle. But we know what the importance of the commitment is in reality. Especially by the way on the terrorist issue, much more than any other issue. I must say to the credit of the Syrians, up to the very last days, what they have said about crossing they have fulfilled.

Rabin: They supported them in other ways but they prevented them from crossing.

Peres: So if you put in this open door, what is the point? Suppose it will leak and the Egyptians will read it. They will feel we are giving them an option not to fulfill it. I believe this is the main point, and I don't think it's necessary. Maybe by a clear-cut language we are really helping to create a new reality.

Kissinger: Let's go on.

Dinitz: [Reading]: "The USG has received an assurance from Egypt that it will not use lack of progress at the Geneva Peace Conference as a pretext for not fulfilling its obligations under the Interim Agreement." Our addition is to add after the Geneva Conference: "or elsewhere."

Kissinger: Where is "elsewhere"?

Dinitz: Suppose there are negotiations going on outside Geneva.

Kissinger: But there aren't.


Dinitz: But suppose there will be.

Allon: A new shuttle!

Rabin: It is not important. Let's call it "within the framework of the Geneva Conference."

Kissinger: This is no problem.

Rabin: Four is no problem. It just has to be adjusted to the new letter.



Sisco: That is no problem. Why can't we say "the U.S. will convey to Israel" or "transmit a letter to Israel conveying the Egyptian commitment on annual renewals of UNEF's mandate." Save a lot of space. And leave all the rest out.

Peres: Number 5 deals with duration. Number 4 deals with the situation if UNEF leaves.

Sisco: Both are covered by the letter.

Dinitz: There is one element in paragraph 5 that does not exist in the letter, and that concerns from when the annual renewals will begin.

Sisco: That we have to talk about.

Dinitz: Just so that we know.


Kissinger: After we settle it with the Egyptians, there is no problem. We have not yet because when I talked to the Prime Minister in June it was on the basis of a different theory. It was then on the theory I would tell the Egyptians before the start of the effort that they should renew for six months, and then the annual renewals would start. Since then in July we have had that blow-up, and it's renewed now for three months. It would have been a hell of a lot easier in July than it is now.

Dinitz: As long as we know the problem exists. Now 6 [reading]: "The USG's position is that UNEF cannot be removed without the consent of both parties, by mutual consent. If Egypt should take a contrary view, the U.S. will give its full support diplomatically to this position."

Rabin: May I ask: these are U.S. assurances, not assurances they have received from Egypt to convey to us?

Dinitz: Yitzhak, I want to explain. The reason it was put here you can see from the Israeli wording. We wanted it to say, "The USG has received an assurance from the Government of Egypt to this effect."

Kissinger: As the Prime Minister said, since this applies to interpretation....



Rabin: Simcha says we wanted to get it from Egypt.

Kissinger: It is impossible to get it from Egypt after what happened. After the blow-up.

Sisco: This is why we wrote it this way: if that happens, we are with you and will support you diplomatically.

Peres: You know the minute you say that, you almost invite such a happening.

Sisco: But we say it to you, not to them.

Kissinger: But he has a problem. Non-leakage here means three days.

Peres: We do have a problem. And contrary to what may be thought, it is not we who leak purposefully. It is not a matter of bad or good faith.

Sisco: You are making essentially the same point as Henry has been making in relation to our situation.

Peres: The problem is that if it will be leaked, it is almost an invitation. That is the problem.

Rabin: Since you tell us you haven't got such an assurance from the Egyptians, it is not related here.


Kissinger: I haven't got it, and I have no way of getting it.

Peres: Once we have the positive language, we don't need the negative language. We can drop the second sentence.

Kissinger: I agree. Just drop that sentence.

Peres: We trust that is your position and will remain so.

Dinitz: [Reading 7]: "The USG hereby conveys to the GOI the Egyptian undertaking that in its Government-controlled media it will reduce hostile propaganda. To this end, the USG will bring to the attention of Egypt the desirability of Egypt being restrained in its official pronouncements, on the understanding that Israel will be equally restrained."





Kissinger: You've gone to undertakings, from commitments and assurances.

Dinitz: In some cases we have put commitments, in some cases undertakings, and in some assurances, according to the degree of commitment you had from Egypt.

Peres: Unless it shall be requested that we attack them. Because sometimes the Egyptians prefer that. Once Asad was insulted because we praised him.

Kissinger: That's right.

Dinitz: We had a stronger language on this which read: "The USG hereby conveys to the GOI the Egyptian undertaking that in its government-controlled media and official pronouncements it will not advocate war, not call for the destruction of Israel or question the legitimacy of its sovereign existence. The Agreement is a significant step towards eventual reconciliation between the two states and peoples. The themes of official pronouncements will assume a positive character."

Allon: Is the American version acceptable to the Egyptians?

Kissinger: I am afraid we are getting ourselves into unbelievably deep water. We are not going to show the American version to the Egyptians.


Dinitz: But you have this assurance before.

Kissinger: That's right.

Sisco: Only the first part. What we had is an assurance back in March about hostile propaganda on government-controlled media. The other sentence was put in in Washington as our willingness on our part, in response to Simcha's instructions, that we would try to include the notion of official pronouncements. I am not sure we can even do that, Henry, and I may have gone too far in that sentence.

Kissinger: I am really very worried.

Dinitz: It was the Secretary who said we will be willing to try it. That's all he said.



Kissinger: I am worried about something entirely different. As a veteran of the Jackson Amendment. Everybody said to me, "Get the Jews out, do this, write a letter." Nobody stood by me when the whole thing blew up, as I predicted it would blow up. When it was pushed, I told everyone, "We have these understandings; if you keep them quiet, they will be honored. If you don't keep them quiet they will not be honored." I said it until I was blue in the face. Every super-clever fellow told me, "If you really want to, you can get 60,000," as if I was giving visas. No sooner had I said to Jackson: "The minute you publish these letters they will blow up," he ran out and announced them. There are things I can do that will lead to results. And there are things that we can do that will lead to publicity. If this were the disengagement agreement of January 1974, all of this would be relatively easy. My nightmare now is, with all these various considerations pressing on all of us, and you have... I see it every day; you don't get these paraders out on the street. I know your problems, and I have seen your Cabinet people at that reception you gave, so I know what you are up against. But when I see all of this... You know, we can write a great book on whether democracy can function under these conditions, if we have to tell everything to our Congress and you have to tell everything to your Foreign Affairs Committee, with the best of intentions. That is not even your worst outfit; I mean to the Cabinet, not the committee, plus others.


Rabin: That's true.

Kissinger: And if it all comes out, we are going to have an awful mess. There is nothing that Simcha and Joe wrote here that I could not live with if it were an exchange of letters between us or anything of this kind. Yes, we can go to the Egyptians and say, "You have promised us in Aswan and repeated in Alexandria that you will do this." Yes, this is what they repeated to us. It is absolutely accurate. It will not survive publicity, that I promise you now.

Rabin: Can we have it in an exchange of letters?

Kissinger: Let's think about it. Let's go through it now. But I am deeply worried.

Peres: I would prefer that we have an agreement that both sides agree to reduce hostile propaganda and will do their utmost to enhance the cause of peace. That's all. Nothing especially against Israel. I prefer



a mutual language, an honorable language, accepted by both of us so in case of leakage nobody will be embarrassed. I think it is better and fairer. I mean the governments are trying to make an agreement, as it says, that is a significant step towards peace. And "in accordance with this...."

Kissinger: Still, when it gets out....

Peres: Both governments will do their utmost to see that their official organs will support it", which is the fairest statement.

Kissinger: What is your official organ? Every newspaper?

Peres: The leaking organization. [Laughter] The Government spokesman. That is the only person we really control from time to time. I am convinced that is a fair statement, honorable, not insulting, on a mutual basis.

Allon: I am not against it, but I am sorry we bothered our American friends so much for nothing.

Peres: It came a little bit late, but when I see the problems we all face....


Kissinger: There is no problem here on the unilateral Egyptian assurance. We do have an assurance.

Peres: What happened since March, among other things, is that all of us have to go through Congress, etc.

Kissinger: What happened since March is a change in the domestic situation in America, in the sense that with the end of Vietnam, additional restrictions are being put on us; a massive leakage here that has created additional obstacles in Egypt. And the American presence. These are three major changes.

Peres: The Egyptians have a very easy way. El Ahram can publish that upon Egyptian insistence Israel has agreed to reduce the hostile propaganda, as they did on the annual renewal. Let them insist.

Dinitz: [Reading 8]: "The USG has received assurances from Egypt of its willingness to ease the boycott of American companies on a



selective basis. The USG has further received assurances from Egypt that it will not discriminate against any American company that wants to do business in Egypt, regardless of whether this company is on the boycott list. The U. S. will encourage the GOE to expand the above to include European and other companies. "

Peres: Can we say instead of "American companies, " "Western companies? "

Kissinger: We tried and they turned it down.

Sisco: Three times.

Allon: I suggest we cut the whole thing out. The Americans will do business anyhow, without any assurances. Why should we sign something like this which is discriminatory? I can't support this and betray friends.

Kissinger: That is one assurance we unambiguously have. You won't sign it?

Peres: Let's take it out.

Rabin: Let's wait.

Kissinger: You have no standing actually, with the conveyance of assurances, with all due respect.

Peres: Let's take it out. This is an American-Egyptian agreement.


Kissinger: We are not going to argue with you about that.

Rabin: Take it out.

Kissinger: I think you'll want to think about it.

Allon: If they could say something general. But by mentioning American companies, they make an exception of the rest of the world.

Kissinger: Don't, for god's sake, go to the Europeans and say you protected them against an American attempt to discriminate against them. Because they will come to us and it will be worse, you will be in a worse mess.



Dinitz: Shall we go to nine?

Peres: Shall we give it up?

Dinitz: I don't know yet. [Reading 9:] "The USG hereby conveys to the GOI an assurance of the GOE that it will refrain from all measures that might inhibit or obstruct the maintenance or resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and any other state. The USG will confirm to other states that the GOE will not object to their resuming diplomatic relations with Israel. On its part, the USG will confirm that Egypt has undertaken not to raise objections."

Kissinger: Wait a minute. There are a lot of things in there that are just not accurate. That the U.S. will confirm to other states that Egypt will not object to their resuming relations -- that is a totally inappropriate thing for us to do. I mean, Egypt speaks for itself. Who are we to tell other countries what Egypt is prepared to do? Besides, they will never let us do it. I wouldn't let a foreign government go to another government and say what our position is.

Allon: But one can't expect Cairo to go from one country to another and say, "We don't mind if you establish relations with Israel." If we tell them that, they won't believe us.

Kissinger: I don't know whether that is a fair statement of what Fahmy said. He didn't say "all measures." He said he will be quiet.

Sisco: That's right. I went too far. I should not have included the word "all."

Rabin: May I suggest a practical way? Could we find two or three African countries with your help, like Zaire?


Kissinger: Zaire we have some influence with.

Rabin: The Ivory Coast.

Kissinger: Not so much influence.

Rabin: Senegal. I don't know, several countries.

Kissinger: I will be willing to agree to that.



Rabin: That once the agreement will be signed, they will resume diplomatic relations.

Sisco: That we go to them? Is that what you are saying?

Allon: To encourage them by following the signature of the agreement with establishing relations.

Kissinger: From my limited knowledge of Africa, I think we have a chance with Zaire, because he (Mobutu) wants a number of things from us.

Peres: That is the best bet, by the way.

Kissinger: How are you doing with Zambia?

Allon: Very important and very friendly.

Sisco: Would you like us to go to several of these countries?

Allon: Oh, yes.

Kissinger: I'd have to be sure to pick them carefully. On Zaire I have no problem, because they gave a real reason to be friendly.

Dinitz: Why not change the last sentence to read: The U.S. will do its utmost to help Israel in re-establishing diplomatic relations."

Kissinger: Yes, but let's put it into a separate article. I don't want to make it look as if Egypt and the U. S. will work together, will help countries...."

Rabin: Let's distinguish what is written in your draft and.... You want to delete 'all measures.'"

Sisco: Why not substitute your suggested language?

Rabin: Let's distinguish, because this is from Egypt.

Kissinger: I agree with you, Mr. Prime Minister, to separate the two ideas. Draft the last sentence of 9 A and then have another paragraph, that the U. S. will approach certain countries.



Allon: Who is dealing with Africa in your department?

Kissinger: It is in a state of rapid flux. [Laughter]

Dinitz: With regard to the first paragraph we take out the word "all." Right? Then B. (Reading B): "The USG will seek an added assurance from the GOE that it will refrain from initiating or supporting actions in the UN directed against Israel or intended to bar Israeli nationals or delegations at the U. N. in UN bodies in international forums and events."

Kissinger: It is ridiculous.

Allon: Why is it so ridiculous?

Kissinger: We got it from Egypt. We got it for Lima [the Conference of non-aligned].

Allon: So continue, that's all. Because this diplomatic battle will continue.

Kissinger: I would much rather take the position and not say, "from the Government of Egypt." This is our basic position. We can say "re-affirms its basic position to keep other governments from..." But to single out Egypt as if it were an especially vulnerable case....

Peres: May I suggest it be written "from all governments."

Kissinger: I have no problem with that.

Peres: Then it will include Egypt as well.


Rabin: No. Then why do it here? We have such assurances from the U. S. Why put it in writing if it is not specifically from Egypt?

Kissinger: Then it's absurd. It's our declared policy.

Sisco: And it's been very effective, and you have had no doubt about the way we have acted.

Allon: Can we have a general expression on Egypt's behalf?

Kissinger: The fact is that Egypt has done very good work for us on this. The one thing that is maddening in some of these discussions is





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