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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Israel

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister  
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense  
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to U.S.  
Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff  
Amos Eran, Director General, Prime  
Minister's Office  
Avraham Kidron, Director General,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United States

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political  
Affairs  
Malcolm Toon, Ambassador to Israel  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff  
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian  
Affairs  
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PWR*

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, August 27, 1975  
9:45-11:48 p. m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office  
Jerusalem



~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept*  
EXEMPTED 25 *Review*  
*3/9/18/03*  
*HR* *10/20/03*

[The beginning of the meeting was delayed by a dinner the Prime Minister gave for 320 American Jewish leaders.

Photographers were admitted and then dismissed.]

Rabin: Well, the floor is yours.

Kissinger: We spent most of the day and the evening on the agreement and on a general discussion, partly produced by the fact that Gamasy was still under the illusion that there might be some adjustments possible in the line, which I had to convince him was impossible.

Now, my general impression is, and I hope you keep this in mind in the deliberations, that the Egyptians feel pushed to the extreme, and that it won't take much to get this negotiation aborted. And they make many comments, such as to show them one line in this document that was drafted by them.


But at any rate, we presented all your changes. Let me just run through them and tell you what they propose.

[At Tab A is a draft of the Agreement with the Israeli-proposed changes the day before, and a copy of the draft as revised in the talks in Alexandria earlier in the day.]

Their reaction to the part that says "The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed as follows", is that to put such a paragraph after a heading called "Agreement between Egypt and Israel" is about as sensible as having Article 1 of an agreement saying the preamble is part of the agreement. And they rejected it because they said it was idiotic.

Then that means that in the next paragraph [para. 1 of Article I] they will accept the word "shall" instead of "should".

And then you wanted "but only by peaceful means." I think they have accepted the "but only", but I am checking that. I had one more discussion with Fahmy before I left, and he made a wave of the hand which I interpreted to mean yes; But I am checking it. So probably yes. At any rate, I don't believe it will fall on this.



In the last paragraph [of Article I] they accept your change ["this Agreement being a significant step..."]. It is not a substantive change but an editing point.

Allon: Accepted.

Kissinger: Accepted. It's no great deal, but I am just going through everything.

On Article II, they accept the wording "military blockade" instead of "armed blockade." They will not use just the word "blockade." Then, where you want "peaceful means", they offered two suggestions either of which they will accept but nothing else. To read "military blockade against each other" and still as part of the same sentence "but to resort to peaceful means or negotiations provided for in UN Security Council resolution 338." Or alternatively, they will end the sentence after "each other," and have another sentence which says, "They undertake to settle their differences by peaceful means or negotiations as provided for in UN Security Council Resolution 338." They wanted to say "in accordance" and I suggested "as provided for." I suggested splitting it into two sentences. At any rate, it is your choice, if you want either one.


In Article III, they accepted "shall continue scrupulously to observe, etc." In Article III they will not put in the words "and assurances" because they will be asked what these assurances are and they feel the leakages that have already occurred are killing them.

Allon: They will give assurances.

Kissinger: But they will not put something in the public agreement which will then force them to say what the assurances are.

Article IV is a problem. They say what you have there is absolutely unacceptable and they must have their lengthy paragraph or some variation of it in it.

Allon: Did they insist on the original draft or make some new suggestion?



Kissinger: No, on the original draft, because I had no counterproposal. But they say there absolutely has to be a military clause or they will never be able to present it, since all the other clauses are political.

In Article V, they will not agree to say "the parties agree", because of their view of the Sinai. They accept saying "The UN Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually."

Peres: Just drop "the parties agree."

Kissinger: Yes.

Dinitz: Does it include our requested "for the duration of the agreement?"

Kissinger: In Article VI, they were prepared to move "for the duration of the agreement" to the first sentence. And they agreed it should be "under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator." But they warn you that if you say "under the aegis" it may require a Security Council vote. I don't know.

Allon: And they are ready to accept a word which does not necessitate....

Kissinger: They are ready to accept any word which pleases you -- "auspices," "chaired by."


Allon : Good offices"?

Kissinger: "Good offices" they didn't want. They said they would accept almost anything that has a definable meaning. And it is fine with them to say "under the aegis", and it may not require a Security Council vote.

Allon: Did you ask your Legal Adviser?

Kissinger: We haven't asked our legal adviser yet. Will you ask yours? They weren't sure this is what it would require. I think we can get by with that.

Sisco: I wouldn't start asking about that.



Kissinger: Let me read to you how it will read: "The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the UN Peacekeeping Missions. . . . " All the rest is as it was.

Peres: You prefer "function" to "operate".

Kissinger: If you want "operate", it is not a problem. I don't know how the word "function" got in there. It is of no importance. They will accept "auspices"; they will accept anything.

Rabin: And "auspices" doesn't call for a Security Council vote?

Kissinger: He didn't think "aegis" would either.

Sisco: I think "auspices" is more apt to stimulate the Council than "aegis". I think your suggestion was a good one. We should let it alone.

Kissinger: In the last sentence [of Article VI], they accepted the word "procedures" which you wanted, instead of "precepts." They suggest just to say "The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with the Annex to this Agreement. But they will accept "with procedures established in the Annex." No problem.


On Article VII, they will accept "non-military cargoes". And it will now read "Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal." And they said the easiest way to handle the question of what is non-military is to reaffirm the other letter where they said "all cargoes" and to get an understanding from you that you won't ship military cargoes, which is military equipment.

Allon: I have a legal question: can this raise any problems in the future about who owns the cargo, Israeli nationals and so on?

Sisco: I would think not. It isn't qualified.

Allon: They didn't say anything about that?

Sisco: No.



Kissinger: It isn't qualified by anything. After some extended struggle -- I mean each of these things takes some time -- it said of a "non-strategic nature", and now it says "non-military cargoes."

Allon: It is better.

Kissinger: It is much better. He said to me nothing will be stopped unless it is weapons. Which you wouldn't ship anyway.

Peres: Unless they buy from us!

On the paragraph 2 we had, they wouldn't go for anything?

Kissinger: No. In Article VIII, there was no change proposed, except that you wanted "in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338" at the end of that, and they accepted that.

The old Article IX, on Article 51 of the UN Charter, they want in.

The duration article was left out in the re-typing. We left out "of the Protocol." I am sure they will accept it: "The Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol..." Now they give you two choices: They will say "and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement." Or, if you want to continue that "between the Parties", then it has to be "in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338." Because otherwise it sounds like another separate agreement.

[Silence]

Peres: Did you go into the American presence?

Kissinger: Yes, I discussed the American presence. They do not want a trilateral agreement because they don't want Israel to have the right to determine posts on Egyptian territory, I mean to establish a right with us. There are two ways of handling it. One is, I suggested we handle it like last time with the Disengagement Agreement: make it an American proposal which both sides sign, and which of course is first worked out with both parties. And that Sadat accepted. The other possibility is that we make an annex to the agreement and separate protocols with each party for the United States.





Peres: Then they accept that nobody can cancel without agreement by both sides?

Kissinger: Whatever we put in the American proposal, yes. I didn't go through the provisions of the thing yet because we don't have an agreed text with you.

Peres: And the second possibility?

Kissinger: Is to make an annex to the agreement. And the annex would define the operation of the warning station, and then there would be a separate protocol between us and them and between us and you. I think the American proposal would be by far the neater. Which we will then of course submit to the Congress for approval.

[Silence]

Rabin: I would like to understand it very clearly. They want to delete the opening stuff? At the beginning.

Kissinger: Yes. And Article I would read "The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel: Resolve" They claim that this is the first agreement between the Government of Israel and the Government of Egypt.

Rabin: That is not true. There was the armistice agreement. And what is written in the Disengagement Agreement?


Kissinger: It only says "for Egypt" and "for Israel." It was not a governmental agreement.

Peres: It was never titled as an agreement.

Sisco: They claim this is a real agreement.

Kissinger: I don't know about the armistice agreement. Maybe it is the first since then.

On the letter [on duration], they think it should be left unchanged because they dropped out all their changes.



Peres: Have you an Egyptian draft so we don't have to....

Kissinger: There is no Egyptian draft. There is a draft with your changes.

Peres: The latest draft.

Rabin: Let me read. [He reads through Article I: ] "The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel:

"Resolve that the conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but ...."-- "only" is not there.

Kissinger: I'm not sure but I think he agreed.

Rabin: [resumes reading:] "...by peaceful means."

Article II: "The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other but to....."

Kissinger: There are two options: "but to resort to peaceful means or negotiations provided for in UN Security Council Resolution 338," or put a period after "each other" and say: "They undertake to settle their differences by...."

Dinitz: The first possibility is a comma after "against each other."

Sisco: We don't even have a comma.


Dinitz: "....but to resort...." The other possibility is: "They undertake...."

Kissinger: The second one is my proposal. So I hope you'll accept that.

Peres: Did they add the words "at least"?

Kissinger: I think I can get it. I quite honestly forgot to raise it. I raised the bracket; I didn't raise the "at least."

Peres: Why did they announce that it is impossible to conclude it by Friday?



Kissinger: Because it is impossible to conclude it by Friday. It is totally impossible. We haven't done any of the annexes. We haven't even got a text of an annex. I think it is better not to let that speculation go that it should be signed on Friday.

Rabin: We haven't done it.

Peres: What is your estimation on the timing?

Kissinger: Sunday, or at the latest Monday. We can do it by Sunday if we can do it at all. There is no greater wisdom we are going to acquire.

Dinitz: With regard to Article II, just for my curiosity, isn't the traditional phrase "peaceful means and negotiations" and not "or negotiations."?

Kissinger: I put in "or" so that perhaps the Security Council resolution qualifies the negotiations and not the peaceful means.

Sisco: That's right, and from your point of view it is a good thing.

Kissinger: They would be delighted to put in "and". I put in "or" to have the reference to 338 apply only to the negotiations.

Sisco: It's an excellent paragraph from your point of view.

Kissinger: This makes clear that 338 qualifies only "negotiations."

Rabin: Article IV is the same except for "assurances".

Peres: On Article III, would they agree to call the assurances annexes?


Rabin: Annexes have to be published as part of the agreement. Assurances are a different thing.

Kissinger: They say they are taking an unbelievable beating in the Arab world because your radio says every day that there are going to be secret agreements made.

Rabin: Article V is without "the parties."

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: "The United Nations force is essential...."



Kissinger: In Article V, quite honestly they wanted to take out either the "essential" or "shall continue its function". They said it is ridiculous to say that "it is essential and shall continue its function," and said to tell you to pick one or the other. I didn't present this to you because I figured it's stylistic, and if you want to be redundant... And they are not going to reject the agreement for that.

Rabin: Article VII: "Non-military." And paragraph 2 is out.

Allon: But it is still suggested that instead of the second paragraph of Article VII, they will give a letter.

Kissinger: Yes, they will reaffirm the disengagement letter in a specific letter to the President.

Rabin: [reads Article IX:] "...will remain in force until superseded by a new agreement." They don't want "by the parties."

Kissinger: If it's "by the parties," they want "in accordance with 338" as we had it.

Dinitz: And Yitzhak, Article IX will be reinserted with regard to Article 51.

Allon: I am sure you explained to them why you didn't want Article 51. What was their answer?

Kissinger: I didn't explain it with quite the precision you gave it to me.

Rabin: I understand.

Kissinger: I think it is in your interests that I didn't. Their answer is that they have to have something in there to show that this isn't a separate peace treaty, because almost every other clause sounds like a peace treaty.

Allon: Did they accept what Zadok suggested?

Sisco: That was in the letter. We left it in brackets.

Rabin: I will tell you with all frankness, the method of the negotiations in which we negotiated the territorial issue without relation to what we will get in return, I believe has produced a kind of result that I am really worried about.



Kissinger: Then you shouldn't make the agreement.

Rabin: And I will tell you, I have question marks in my mind. I am really worried.

Kissinger: Then don't make the agreement.

Sisco: I would just make one observation on that, Mr. Prime Minister. Looking at this piece of paper, the agreement itself, I think from the point of view of emphasis that you have given, that this is not a purely disengagement agreement. With the political aspects of this--peaceful settlement, non-resort to force, the commission, all the rest of these things--this is a very political document from your point of view, and wholly justified in terms of the approach you have taken over the months that this is not limited to merely disengagement. I think the document does this very well indeed. That is for you to decide.

Kissinger: I think if we were to go back and say everything except Article IX--about Article 51--is acceptable, that we could probably do it. I have no reason to say this. Or any other one or two things, I think. Except Bab el-Mandeb. I think we have a chance. But if we go back with another 14 points, then there isn't a chance. And after all, they have accepted -- I don't want to count the changes. It's up to you to decide. I think you have a large number of political points in it -- blockade, reference to cargoes through the Suez coming to and from Israel.

Sisco: Personally I never felt that blockade would ever have been included in this document by Sadat.


Kissinger: Joint commission, non-resort to force. It is about what we told you was attainable. I didn't think the blockade would be in the agreement.

[Silence]

Sisco: Henry, all I want to say is that I don't think we can do a lot better than this, based on today.

Rabin: I would like to be clear about the American presence.

Kissinger: The American presence we will establish by means of an American proposal which will be accepted by both parties, which will be drafted in some legal language, rather than by a trilateral agreement. That is how we did the disengagement provisions.



Dinitz: You are not referring to the content, but just to the form?

Kissinger: Oh, yes. There is no agreed substance. I think the basic points we have discussed remain unaffected by the form of an American proposal.

Rabin: Are they aware now about the whole scope of it?

Peres: The third posts?

Kissinger: They are aware of it. I think they have accepted two. I frankly have to tell you that the atmosphere there is one of-- if you think you are not getting much--it is of rather severe humiliation there, so I have to judge what I can present at any session. I did not present the idea of a third post today, but I think they will accept it if I put it in relation to their station.

Allon: Did they make a reference to the location of the station?

Kissinger: Of the two stations they absolutely will not take the 180. They want now hill 716.

Rabin: That is no problem. We said to you it is either one of the two.

Kissinger: They will take 716 and I have told Gamasy that I want to put a post in relation to it. That I have already told him. But I have not yet proposed to them that there will be a third manned station.


Rabin: They have agreed to six posts; two manned. And you are trying to sell them the third one.

Kissinger: That is exactly correct. And they are agreed to the American presence obviously in each of the big stations. They have agreed to personal arms but not other arms.

Rabin: I talked with three Congressmen today. I had a problem, I must tell you.

Sisco: Who were they?

Rabin: Obey, Koch and Early. The met with Sadat and Sadat claimed that he doesn't want the American presence. It is only at Israeli insistence, that he is ready to accept.



Kissinger: That is true.

Sisco: That is true. He doesn't want it, and I wouldn't say the US is very enthusiastic about it either.

Rabin: I told them it is not true, that one has to distinguish between the strategic and the tactical. I put it this way.

Kissinger: And we can also explain the record of it, once we start briefing, that Sadat had the idea of putting some Americans in.

Rabin: I didn't say that. I said we wanted Israeli and Egyptian, and then came the idea of an American station. They asked me who put it forward, and I said I don't know, not we. I didn't know that Sadat put it. I didn't want to say it.

Kissinger: He didn't but we asked Sadat when the President talked to me before we put it forward to you.

Rabin: I said when it comes to strategic warning, to the first appearance of Americans' presence at the big stations, I said it came as a result of Sadat's rejection of having two, Egyptian and Israeli, stations.

Kissinger: That is exactly right. Good.

Rabin: I said when it comes to the other tactical ones, it is true we did it. I can't lie.

Kissinger: Although I have to say that Sadat has been briefing our press that they asked for the stations.

Rabin: I didn't know that.

Kissinger: No, you did very well. But I want you to know it is my impression that if an agreement is reached, Egypt in its own interests will advertise the American presence as being partly its own idea. That is my impression. They will not want to say that it was imposed on them by Israel.

Rabin: To these three Congressmen he said he was forced by Israel. It is an Israeli demand.



Kissinger: But he cannot say that to the other Arabs in my judgment.

Peres: Al Ahram came out yesterday saying the annual renewal was an Egyptian concept accepted by the Israelis.

Kissinger: I am not so worried about what they will say, except on the American proposal.

Allon: If there is an American proposal, and both countries sign it, it is binding legally and not just politically?

Sisco: We have to submit it to the Congress in the same way. The form does not affect the legality.

Kissinger: This is how the disengagement provisions are established.

Allon: And the President of Israel will have the right to withdraw in case of vital national interest.

Kissinger: What provision is that?

Allon: That was just a joke. The President of Israel has no executive power.

Kissinger: I know. I'm of German origin. First you have to tell me it's a joke.

Rabin: Do you have anything more from Egypt to tell us?

Kissinger: No.

Rabin: That is to say, you concentrated on the paper, the letter and the American presence.

Kissinger: Well, Gamasy went through with me at exhausting length his concept of the annex, the military limitations. I refused to accept it and bring it here because I told him it could not be done.

Rabin: What were his ideas?

Kissinger: To increase the artillery I think to 100 pieces in the new zone.





Rabin: 100? It's now 36.

Kissinger: Well, I went to Sadat and told him this was out of the question and senseless to take to Israel, and to wait to see what the Israeli proposal was, and there wouldn't be any major changes. And Sadat called Gamasy over and said the agreement will not fail because of the military provisions.

Peres: Did I understand correctly that the Article 51 is not a crucial point?

Kissinger: No, no, don't misunderstand me. They consider it a crucial one, in the sense that it is one thing they can say distinguishes it from a peace agreement.

Rabin: Where is it written that it is a peace agreement?

Kissinger: Well, in their terms they say the clauses sound very much like a permanent agreement. But what I said was that if it were one thing, or maybe even two things, that you say are absolutely necessary, like deleting Article IX, or the reference to Article 51, I would have a chance of doing that, if, say, everything else were accepted. What I don't think will work is to come in with ten changes, including deleting Article IX. That is a personal judgment of what the margin is.


Peres: Now Article IV can become a very lengthy article, because then we shall have to go into so many details.

Sisco: No. It is what we submitted to you. You have the text. It is patterned on the Disengagement Agreement. All it is is "the forces are from line A to B, C, and D, etc." It is a description.

Kissinger: And then with respect to that old Article VIII, they are agreeable to make that either paragraph (B) of Article IV or to make it an Article V, if it makes Article IV too long. In the old draft it was Article VIII; now it's the second paragraph of Article IV.

Rabin: Now when it comes to the assurances conveyed by the US to Israel, have you had the time to discuss it with them?

Kissinger: We have had the time to discuss the boycott, the political warfare propaganda.



Rabin: I am much more interested in regard to Syria.

Kissinger: You mean about going to war with respect to Syria? I have discussed it but I need to discuss it again alone with Sadat.

Rabin: With regard to terroristic activities, with regard to the Geneva Conference?

Kissinger: I would have to do that tomorrow night. I mean, to get the precise formulation.

Rabin: They published in El Ahram yesterday that the US has given Egypt assurances that Israel will not attack it. I took that as a sign.....

Kissinger: It happens not to be true.

Rabin: But it happens to be true in terms of the agreement. The question is what was the purpose of publicizing it.

Sisco: I think this is a positive sign myself. That is the way I took it.

Rabin: I thought so. I explained it to everyone as a positive sign.

Eran: The Prime Minister read it to the Party meeting.


Allon: May I suggest we let our guests have a rest and we will sit together about an hour, and tomorrow morning we will be in a better position to react.

Rabin: Because we have to have a long session.

Kissinger: That is fine. May I say one other thing, while you are considering the situation, so you can get the full range of problems. I have read the military protocol that you people submitted.

Rabin: The old, or the new?

Kissinger: Today's. And I simply want to state a number of things in relation to it. One, I had made clear to your ambassador on innumerable occasions that the area from which you withdrew, what



is it called, where that warning station was supposed to be --Hamam Faroun--that the idea of putting a UN zone between the Egyptian zone would certainly prove unacceptable to the Egyptians and made no sense whatsoever. And it is one of those issues where, again, I can't complain that you ever said you would do it, but you certainly also never said you wouldn't do it. And I have made very clear that this seemed to me an absolutely impossible position, and I can tell you this is one on which the agreement will certainly break up, in my view.

Secondly, as I understand the military agreement that you proposed, there is another area where I said to your ambassador also on innumerable occasions that we have to create at least the appearance of contiguity to Abu Rodeis, and therefore some concept of UN control, that's under UN and not Egyptian control, should be created in that area where the road is used jointly. Between the southernmost sliver of the Egyptian territory and Abu Rodeis, I think that is about 17 kilometers. We were discussing having a sliver along the road.

Rabin: I would like to understand it. There are two parts of the road which are supposed to be used by both sides, Abu Zneima and south to Abu Rodeis. Yesterday you said you don't want to put them in the Egyptian side.


Peres: You said they will be Israeli controlled territory with the UN presence. You said as far as you are concerned the use of the road would be without any limitations.

Kissinger: Yes, there is no question about any limitations of the road. What I want to create is the impression of contiguous territory to Abu Rodeis.

Peres: We were quoting you yesterday. Maybe we misunderstood each other.

Rabin: Let's explain it so that we will understand it. What will be the status of this road, East, West....

Kissinger: Can we get a map? Now, while he is getting the map, there is another section which had never occurred to me would happen, namely that Israel would patrol off the coast that is under Egyptian administration all the way up the Gulf of Suez. Now I must say, to present that to the Egyptians is unthinkable. That is a thought



that had never occurred to me, and therefore I never discussed it with anyone. I know you don't think it is possible to make peace with the Egyptians, but you are well on the way to proving it if you make such a proposal to them, which they will consider an unbelievable insult.

Those were the two points on the protocol that stuck in my mind. The others we can argue about. These are the two outrageous things. Oh, and letting Israeli planes fly into the middle of the buffer zone.

Peres: Not only Israeli, also Egyptian. We suggest that both parties have the right.

Kissinger: I know, but they consider....Have we got one of our maps here? I have learned our map. [He goes over to the map on the wall]. In this area here.

Peres: Hamam Faroun. Okay, I understand.

Kissinger: Which you're obviously taking. And then in this area, I would have recommended putting some sort of UN thing in here, without prejudice to your right to use the road. So that it can be shaded in a certain way. It is a point I had made to Simcha on innumerable occasions.

Dinitz: Without prejudice to our right to use the road.

Kissinger: There is no question that you have the unrestricted right to use the road on the days you are using it. Every two weeks. [Laughter]

Sisco: Never on Sunday!

Kissinger: Only on Saturday. [Laughter]

Rabin: And the same applies to the South?

Kissinger: I suppose here too. [on map]

Peres: You were referring yesterday to the fact that this would be an Israeli-controlled area.

Kissinger: I probably didn't express it very well. I meant it would be an unrestricted Israeli right to use the road. I have not discussed this at all with the Egyptians. I wanted to see your military protocol first.



Peres: I told our military people that this was the discussion the day before yesterday and that is why they put it in.

Kissinger: But the major thing they apparently put in is Hamam Faroun. And also they shaded it in the area in such a way that it looks like Israeli-controlled territory, and that has to be in some way avoided.

Peres: We can make a new area.


Rabin: Let me say something. The method of the negotiations has taken the course that we first discussed with you a proposed draft agreement, a draft of assurances that will be conveyed to us by Egypt, and then the bilateral arrangements. Before the shuttle, we discussed all the territorial problems. It might be that Egypt feels that it hasn't gotten all they wanted. But we feel that we have given much more than we intended to at the beginning. Now, once the territorial issues are almost settled, we start now with what Egypt has to give to us in terms of the open agreement, in terms of the assurances that will be conveyed to us through the U.S. And I must admit that there is a correlation between the two.

It might be that I was wrong, that I assumed that the draft of the agreement, the draft of the assurances -- I am not blaming Joe, I am not blaming anyone. I am trying to explain myself -- created expectations. It is not because we reported to the Cabinet, it is not because we reported to the Foreign Affairs Committee, but I am talking about myself, that we will get something in return.

The more we go into the process, into the talks, I feel that we went on the territorial issue very far, regardless of what we get now. After all, we get words; we give something tangible. And I bear in mind, of course, what might be the other options. And I must admit that I expected more on these two questions. Because it has not been done in a way as a quid pro quo in terms even of words vis-a-vis territory.

And I don't believe it would be advisable either for the U.S. or for Israel to be in a position that the agreement was made with Egypt at the so-called expense of the U.S. or in terms of getting the return from the U.S. It has to be based on Egyptian-Israeli relations and no one should present it as a deal that we give to Egypt to get from the U.S.

Again, it might be that it was my mistake, but we assumed even in March that the open agreement would be different, and with all



frankness, it puts us, at least it puts me, in a quite awkward situation.


Kissinger: I must say frankly, Mr. Prime Minister, I didn't believe it was possible that we could within the space of five months twice wind up in the same place for substantially the same reasons. And I don't think there is any point in . . . .

Rabin: I don't blame anybody. I am trying to put what I . . . .

Kissinger: I understand your point. There has never, clearly, been an agreed strategic position between us, it is becoming increasingly clearer to me. And therefore we constantly run up against exactly the same problem every time we get to a decisive point. From the time I met the Foreign Minister in Camp David [August 1, 1974], I tried to develop an agreed strategy in which the isolation in which Egypt now finds itself, or the separation of Egypt from other Arab countries, the time that is gained, the possibility of some fluidity in the situation, cannot be simply disregarded whenever one comes to the concrete issues. But this is the strategy I had planned on numerous occasions, always believing we had agreed on it. It is not necessarily even the optimum strategy from a purely ruthless U.S. point of view, but we have pursued it, even in a period of some difficulty. And we have tried to restore it.

Secondly, if I look at the list of things that Egypt is giving, it is of course true there is an inherent inequality between what you give and what they give -- inherently, no matter what they write on paper. Because the return of territory is less revokable than promises, however solemnly given. This, incidentally, will be your problem throughout the peace process, and will be the case in a final peace settlement signed in blood, which is one of the reasons I have never participated with any enthusiasm, as you know better than anyone, in efforts to push you to a final peace. Because that inequality will exist no matter what the formality of the document.

I don't think that Israelis understand the depth with which the Egyptians feel that Sinai is their territory. And that therefore to them to have to make any concessions to get it back is already considered a concession. This is a fact. It wouldn't be hard to talk them into a negotiation for final peace any time you want to talk about the international border, but until they are ready to talk about the things you have in mind. . . . So I cannot exaggerate for you the sense of humiliation that the Egyptians feel on their side at this process, which cannot be all fake.



Now, in the context of what Israel gets out of it, we may have had different expectations. I consider in the open agreement that more was put in than I thought was likely in the open agreement. We have the non-resort to force, the reference to peaceful settlement, the reference to blockade; we have the reference to cargoes; we have an open-ended agreement; we have the UNEF. We have the very important principle of a return of a territory to Egyptian control with no military forces. We have the Joint Commission. We have the first government-to-government agreement since the armistice or ever. You have to check that.

Rabin: The armistice was government-to-government.

Kissinger: Then the first one in 27 years.

Rabin: I didn't realize that the Disengagement Agreement was not a government-to-government agreement.

Sisco: It is a grey area.

Kissinger: It is a grey area but it was not signed for the governments, and the documents did not say the "Government of Israel" and the "Government of Egypt." I wouldn't attach monumental importance to it. You have the reconfirmation of the assurances of the Disengagement Agreement, plus the other assurances we will have.


Now, if this is presented in this attitude in which you presented it here, it isn't worth making the agreement. Then it will be a disaster for all of us. Because if it is a document that both sides feel is a result of pressure, they from you and you from us, it is not worth making. But then I hope everyone knows that we will have come to a complete dead end, to a complete discrediting of what has been attempted to be done in the area by the U.S.

Now, it never occurred to me that what Joe and Gazit were working on would be anything other than something to submit to Egypt. It couldn't possibly have been checked with Egypt, because it was only completed on Monday.

Sisco: Everyone knew that.

Kissinger: Joe tells me he said it repeatedly.

Rabin: I didn't say it was coordinated with Egypt, by no means.



Kissinger: We tried to put in anything that was halfway reasonable that we could submit to Egypt, so that we wouldn't negotiate the Egyptian position. I mean, why should we refuse?

I have heard the argument here that you are giving away the best part of the Sinai, which is a sort of contradictory argument. Because if you gave the best part of the Sinai and they wouldn't want any more, you have scored a spectacular achievement. If you wanted to sell the Sinai it would be a good argument, but since I don't have the impression that you stay awake at night thinking how you can give it away -- if they don't want the rest badly, it is no problem. If they do want it badly, you have something to negotiate with for final peace negotiations.

My judgment is that the reason they want the Sinai has to do with their concept of national honor. And the reason he is willing to make great concessions, from his point of view, is to be the first Arab to have gotten some civilian rule back in some territory that has been occupied for some length of time.

But we don't need the agreement so badly from an American point of view. The worst tragedy of the last year is that the strategy that might have exhausted your antagonists, at least one of them, and given them a high incentive to settle, has been more or less destroyed anyway, whether or not the agreement is made. In fact, the whole bilateral agreements are designed to destroy that. So it would be a personal embarrassment to me [if it fails], but I am here to represent the United States, and it is entirely up to you to tell us what you want to do.


Peres: Did you say you had a chance to go over the problem of the boycott?

Kissinger: I did, and I confirmed that I will get a letter. Which again took several hours, because they are very ticklish on the problem of letters now in light of all the publicity that has occurred in the last few weeks. But we have confirmed that we will get a letter to the effect that all American companies who are prepared to do serious business in Egypt or business in Egypt would be permitted.

Allon: What about all other parts of the world?

Dinitz [explains to Allon that it can't be achieved].

Kissinger: I have to tell you that they don't consider these military dispositions as such a tremendous achievement for themselves. Gamasy





explained to me at great length this afternoon that basically your lines are drawn for offensive operations not for defensive operations, for a very rapid thrust. I have to give you their perception of it.

Sisco: What the Prime Minister really is saying is that your expectations were higher as it relates to the political aspects, and what we are hearing at the other end, quite frankly, is that in many respects their expectations were higher in terms of the military aspects.

Kissinger: I don't want to argue that if you went back farther that they could do an enormous amount more, in their perception of their national dignity. I believe that the next step will have to be real non-belligerency. Because they think they are giving most of the elements of it now. And it is hard to argue, you know -- non-resort to force, no blockade ...

Peres: Are you in a mood for an historical question?

Kissinger: Yes.

Peres: Did you have a chance to submit to the Egyptians the plan of El Arish - El Tur against non-belligerency, in a settled way, not just en passant?

Kissinger: I never felt I was authorized to submit it in a formal way.


Peres: Not in a formal way, but in a serious way. Because we felt that you usually brushed it aside, feeling there is no sense in it.

Kissinger: I felt that once you raised the El Arish-El Tur, you would face all the problems you are facing now and without getting non-belligerency.

Peres: Did you have a chance to discuss it with them?

Kissinger: I once raised it with Sadat in March, and he said if you would go to within 20 kilometers of the border, then they would consider it. Fahmy said to me once--but I wouldn't expect that you could even hold him to that--at the very end of the negotiations when he was taking me to the airport, I raised this with him and he said he would be prepared to declare the elements of non-belligerency and the intention toward non-belligerency, and it seemed to me quite honestly that I could never recommend that as a negotiation to you.

Rabin: I think you are right. You told us about it.



Kissinger: Why don't we go back to the hotel and let you deliberate.

One of my colleagues [Mr. Lord] sent me a note with a question which I would like to read to you: "How can they have been so optimistic yesterday, ask for 14 changes, get 10 out of 11 of them, and now be in a quandary? What has changed except for the better since yesterday?"

Peres: Because it is a matter of quality and not quantity. We don't count them; we weigh them.

Rabin: Out of 14, only three or four <sup>are</sup> of real importance. There was the question of Article II, the question of superseded and the question of the UN.

Kissinger: What is the issue on superseded?

Rabin: The attachment of 338.

Kissinger: And we removed it. We removed the attachment to 338. It is no longer there.

Peres: The crossing of "between the parties."

Kissinger: I want to explain what they say: it creates the impression of a separate peace, and, therefore, if they say "between the parties" they want to tie it to 338. If you want to get rid of 338....

Rabin: But agreement between the two parties, it doesn't mean that they have to agree to do it separately from us.


Kissinger: Not separately from you.

Rabin: You remember in March we proposed that "until it will be superseded by a peace agreement"; that they refused, and I understood that the idea then was because of having a separate peace agreement. If it is mentioned only by a new agreement, there is no purpose to refuse to have it "between the parties".

Kissinger: You are saying no new agreement with them is possible. That the next step will be a final peace.

Rabin: But we have never claimed --

Kissinger: At any rate, they are willing to remove the conditionality of "superseded" in relation to 338. On the UN, you will no doubt study the precise significance of that. On Article II, they have made an effort to



give something. "They undertake to settle their differences by peaceful means or by negotiations" -- and not "in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338", but "as provided for," so "as provided for" is the method and is not the content.

Rabin: Will they agree to add to it "only by peaceful means" and skip the negotiations and 338?

Kissinger: No. I am sure not. That isn't what we asked them to do. They will probably give the "only" up there.

Rabin: You don't know for sure yet?

Kissinger: I don't know for sure. I give you my judgment, and you shouldn't scream treason if I come back and don't succeed. If I were to be able to get the word "only" and get rid of reference to 51, I think that is attainable. I have the impression that he already agreed to "only" but I am just not sure.

Peres: Gamasy's taking the territory and Fahmy's giving the words.

I want to ask: the last paragraph, an "acceptable agreement", will they go for?

Kissinger: An agreement by definition has to be acceptable.


Peres: It says "by agreement" without saying by whom. That's the point.

Sisco: Really, Shimon, it is an agreement between you and Egypt. You have any doubts?

Kissinger: It can't be superseded by a new agreement between Syria and Lebanon. The amusing thing is that Fahmy considers taking this "in accordance" away from him as a great defeat. And I think "between the parties" is something he is giving his legal department. I don't know why. I am sure you will get a legal analysis this evening. I don't want to analyze. To my untrained mind, it has to be an agreement to which Israel agrees. What other agreement could conceivably supersede?

Rabin: It is not a question of "acceptable." It is a question of between whom.

Dinitz: That's the point. Between whom? Therefore, having an agreement has to be acceptable or you don't have the agreement. I think the weakness, and there is a certain weakness of this last formula, is not in the sense that it won't be acceptable. It can be an agreement between us and Syria and then it will be superseded.



Rabin: If it is cosmetics, we have given much more than cosmetics in territorial things.

Kissinger: I think you have to consider that in their view they have a hell of a time explaining the map too. So you may have a hell of a time explaining the map... And I haven't shown them this elegant thing you have done in the Giddi Pass, because I haven't got an answer yet to what I said to you the other day. So I am just trying to explain to you their point of view. I do not believe that when you mention the map to them, they will feel wildly jubilant.

Rabin: They can't get such a map but by agreement.

Kissinger: Yes, but I can't believe that it is in Israel's interest for the word to get around that the only way to get agreement from you is by assembling such brute force and such overwhelming outside support.

Rabin: We had only one failure, in the 1973 war.

Kissinger: Well, if that's your strategy, then you will have to pursue it. Then you have to make your judgment of how important this is.

Can we know, just given the mood here, and since things keep having a way of getting into the press here unintentionally, what is going to be told the press?

Allon: All you have to say now, since you came back from Egypt, we heard the Egyptian proposals.

Rabin: And we'll continue the discussion tomorrow.


Kissinger: I think if suddenly, the mood here changes, it is going to have an effect there too. You should keep it at whatever level of mood you have established. I don't think you ought to raise it but I don't think you ought to lower it.

Dinitz: Why not say we discussed the points you brought from Egypt and we will continue.

Rabin: Don't talk about mood.

Since you're seeing Golda at 8:30, should we meet at 10 here?

Kissinger: It will take her an hour to tell me all my sins.



Rabin: She's really a courageous woman. In her book, the way it comes out, no one else is blamed more than herself.

Kissinger: Then I'll go to Egypt tomorrow afternoon.

Peres: Mr. Secretary, for the continuation of the negotiations, I want to understand: We haven't agreed on the American presence until now, that this will be an American proposal signed by both sides; and (b) that the American-Israel stations will be on two or three stations. You said three; we said six.

Kissinger: They have agreed to two.

Rabin: Two manned and four sensors.

Kissinger: I might be able to get it to three.

Peres: On that, we shall have to renegotiate it? Or is this a final statement as far as the Egyptians are concerned?

Kissinger: Two is final.

Peres: Two and four, I meant.

Kissinger: Two and four is final. We will fight to get it to three and three.

Peres: And patrolling the roads?

Kissinger: I haven't put. What I am presenting is a warning zone.

Peres: Did you present it to them and they have accepted it?

Kissinger: Yes.

Peres: On that we don't have to renegotiate, and this will be an American proposal signed by both sides?

Rabin: May I suggest: can you prepare some draft that we will be able to negotiate tomorrow with us, knowing that it still has not been presented to the Egyptians?

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: Then we will save time. If you can prepare for tomorrow morning at 10 o' clock what you mean by the option that you have proposed.



Peres: And I suggest we will start with the zone, that it will be a warning zone.

Kissinger: Could we say it's manned by the Peace Corps?

Just to prevent hysteria in Washington, where there has now been a considerable euphoria, I would really urge that since every other time something excessively positive, even from my point of view, was said--that we do not just say that he came with proposals and we are studying them? I could have done without some of the stuff that has been put out, but now that it has been done, I think we ought to say the process is still continuing and no unexpected difficulties. But if you want to start preparing for a possible break up....

Peres, Rabin: No, no.

Kissinger: I have to know because I have to answer to the President.


Peres: For our own consideration, I understood that at least on two points you feel that you can insist upon changes, one of them being the 51. Because we really want--I mean, not to negotiate in the air.

Kissinger: I have no reason to say this except my impression. With Fahmy, I cannot get it out. I can tell you that right away. And Fahmy has consistently taken the position, even on any change on blockade and so forth -- even changing it from "armed" to "military"--that he will not do it; he will not want to be blamed for having put this into the agreement; it has to be done by Sadat. And their hierarchy is much sharper and he can't play with Sadat like this. He can't arrange that with Sadat ahead of time, in my view. So I cannot get it from Fahmy. If I see Sadat alone and tell him "everything else is agreed to if you take this out and put in the word 'only'," he is apt to agree.

Sisco: I would underscore--you have made the point--I think you have to be in a position if you try this and say, "if this change is made or these three changes are made, then the text is frozen." If it is approached that way, there is a possibility.

Kissinger: The agreement. It doesn't mean you've agreed to the annex.

Peres: Second question. Supposing that we shall take the Egyptian expression "to employ peaceful means or negotiation as provided" and so forth and so on, to say, "employ peaceful means in order to settle all disputes between them, or negotiations?"



Kissinger: If they mention the word "negotiation", they feel they have to add 338 to it.

Peres: I am not asking that. I am asking, the expression: "all disputes settled."

Rabin: I asked first if we can get rid of "negotiations" in Article II and say, "all disputes will be settled by peaceful means," and your answer was negative.

Kissinger: It's already in Article I.

Sisco: Which is an operative paragraph and no longer a preamble, Mr. Prime Minister.

Rabin: I must admit that there is a problem, because we started with a preamble and now it's Article I.

Sisco: You have what you really want, but you are not quite used to the fact. You are still thinking of Article I as a preamble.

Rabin: I didn't want to say it yesterday: if we had known that it would be a problem of preamble and an article, we could have combined it in a different way.

Kissinger: But, on the other hand, you must have attached some importance to the preamble when in the draft you gave us, Article I specifically said the preamble is part of the agreement. So making it Article I gave you more than you asked for. Putting it into operative language gave you more than you asked for.

Rabin: In a way you are right.

Kissinger: And it was intended as a concession by the Egyptians.

Rabin: We started with the preamble and the operative. Now we are, in a way, forgive me for saying so, mixed up.

Kissinger: Only if you want to put things down twice, because you got substantially what you wanted.

Rabin: What I wanted and I believed that we would get is the basic principle, after the preamble, no use of force, no threat of use of force.

Sisco: You got that.



Rabin: And in relation to that, that all disputes will be solved by peaceful means.

Kissinger: You have to consider their perception of the problem. I mean, if they don't tie at least the negotiations to something of their only problem they have got with you, namely their perception that you are occupying their territory, they feel it is a total sell-out. The fact that they have separated the two sentences took me.... You know, if you wanted it in one sentence, that's fine. I thought by separating it into two sentences you got practically everything. That "they undertake by peaceful means or by negotiations as provided for..." can then be read to apply to negotiations. And not "in accordance with" but "as provided for". You know, you are not required to take it. But for them it is very hard to accept the proposition that they have to settle, that when they talk about negotiations they can't link it to the peace process, which is the only problem they have got with you. They keep saying, "what issue do we have with Israel except that?"

Sisco: You are essentially really talking about a problem of form. The reason why it came out this way was really to meet your view. I want to say to you--and I mean no criticism of anybody--I have never seen any agreement ever write an Article I saying "the preamble is part of the agreement" but one has to look at the history of this to see why we are where we are in terms of the form.

Kissinger: But in any event you are a hell of a lot better off having the preamble as an article, compared to having an Article I that says that.


Rabin: I just don't want to come back tomorrow.... Because we don't have the sense of the Egyptians you have. If it will be said that "the parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other." And to put Article II: "the parties undertake to settle all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means as provided by...."

Kissinger: You mean as a separate article?

Rabin: As a separate article. I'm just asking.

Kissinger: Never from Fahmy; depending what else we have, possibly from Sadat.

Sisco: I think that's a fair statement. Never from Fahmy but possibly if Henry talks to Sadat alone.





Rabin: I am just asking.

Kissinger: But don't give me eight like this.

Peres: What I want to ask you, can we put in Article I: "resolve that the conflicts and disputes between them? "

Kissinger: If you do, then don't monkey with Article II.

Peres: And then we shall make a point, just here: "the parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of peace..." [laughter]

Kissinger: The worst threat you could utter. [laughter]

Peres: "...the use of force or military blockade against each other." Period.

Rabin: This they have agreed.

Peres: Not without continuing. If we shall put a period here....

Rabin: We were told yesterday.

Kissinger: That's right, but you asked me to bring you back a sentence on peaceful settlement of disputes.

Dinitz: Shimon wants to add "disputes" in Article I. I have also a question to ask, just for our consideration of ideas. If you think, to Article I, to read the way it is written now, "resolve the conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force"--period--and take the "peaceful means" to Article II and read Article II: "the parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other and to settle the disputes by peaceful means"--period.


Kissinger: If you put it that way, they will bring in 338.

Dinitz: I didn't use the word "negotiation".

(General discussion)

Rabin: I asked the same question: "to settle all disputes between them by peaceful means" away from Article I and putting it only in Article II, where we want it. This is the difference between our two suggestions.

Rabin: All right.



Peres: I'm sure our lawyers will ask you: "The Government of Egypt and the Government of Israel;" and then Article I.

Kissinger: I think that is possibly doable.

Peres: They "resolve" and then "undertake".

Rabin: It was proposed to us yesterday.

Kissinger: They claim...

Rabin: I would propose--but they wouldn't agree--that instead of "agreement between Egypt and Israel," "agreement between the government of Egypt and government of Israel" in the heading and then we won't have to repeat. But they will never agree.

Kissinger: I wouldn't be so sure. The only point I would like to raise is how wise it is to keep playing around with a title which they have not yet challenged. Supposing they then say, "all right, Disengagement Agreement between the governments"?

Rabin: Because once we put it this way, then all the points later will become simpler.

Kissinger: If they what?

Rabin: If the title will be "Agreement between the Government of Egypt and Government of Israel."

Kissinger: What if you put it in that first sentence: "The Government of Egypt and the Government of Israel agree: paragraph I".


Rabin: Not in Article I.

Sisco: Outside; the opening paragraph.

Peres: That's all right. The point is, the lawyers claim that if it comes under Article I, it doesn't cover the other articles. That's why you have to have the opening statement above Article I.

Sisco: The lawyers don't know what the hell they are talking about.

Kissinger: If it's only in Article I, it doesn't cover the other ones?



Dinitz: If the "Government of Egypt and the Government of Israel agree," etc., appears only in Article I, it doesn't cover the rest.

Rabin: I will have to check with the lawyers. If they will agree to this beginning, as it is written now proposed, instead of "the parties", "they resolve", "they recall", "they are determined".


Kissinger: I would really urge you not to play around with so many changes. I can get one or two big things sold to Sadat. Sadat has no detailed knowledge at all, and if I start playing around with them with a lot of drafting changes. Just one or two big changes. Or I have to go back to Fahmy.

Peres: This is discrimination. You gave us two or three.

Kissinger: Two or three, it makes no difference. If I go drafting through the whole document with Sadat, then it goes back to Fahmy. Fahmy has to sell it in his own bureaucracy. Though he has more absolute control than most leaders.

Now, there are two aspects in this agreement. One is how to sell it at home, which is very important, and the other is the practical significance. And I find it hard to persuade myself that the nuances we are now discussing will determine whether in fact Egypt will behave peacefully. And I would think that whether Egypt behaves peacefully depends a great deal, if there is an agreement, on how we go from here and to the end, and even more how we go from the end to the implementation. I think that is going to determine more decisively whether Egypt behaves, really moves towards peace than some of the nuances here.

[Whereupon the meeting adjourned at 11:40 p.m. Remarks to the press outside the Prime Minister's office and at the King David Hotel are at Tab B.]





~~SECRET~~

8/27/75

102

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(A)

ARTICLE I

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel:

Resolve that the conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means;

Recall that the Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

Are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other but to resort

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.6  
STATE DEPT. GUIDANCE  
BY *HR* NARA DATE 10/20/03



to peaceful means or negotiations provided for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 338.

OR

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other. They undertake to settle their differences by peaceful means or negotiations as provided for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE III


(1) The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map.



(2) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines A and D and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines B and C shall be limited in armament and forces.


(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached annex .

(5) In the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines A and B, the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the land connection between the city of Suez and the line terminating at the coast south of Abu Rodeis on the attached map, the following principles will apply:

(a) There will be no military forces.

(b) The United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military forces; it will establish check points and have freedom of movement necessary to perform this function in this area.




E. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations, the UN functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the





execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Annex to this Agreement.

ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

ARTICLE X

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.



(Alternative:...between the Parties in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338. )

Done at \_\_\_\_\_ on the \_\_\_\_\_  
1975, in four copies.

For the Government of Israel

For the Government of the  
Arab Republic of Egypt

\_\_\_\_\_  
WITNESS  
\_\_\_\_\_



August 26, 1975

~~SECRET~~

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

[The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties

Resolve that the conflict between them and in the Middle East shall be resolved by military force only but/by peaceful means;

Recall that the Agreement concluded by Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and


Are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution this Agreement being 338, and as/a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

(1) the Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or armed military blockades against each other and to settle all disputes between them by negotiations or other peaceful means.

*and*

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 10/20/03



(2) The Parties have given a further written assurance to the Government of the United States of America to this effect.

(Alternative: put "assurances" in Article III.)

ARTICLE III

(1) The Parties ~~will~~ shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.


(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annexes [and assurances] and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

(U.S. version replaced with more general language, and former Article VIII moved here.)

In conformity with the provisions of this Agreement, the military forces of the Parties shall be redeployed along the new lines; buffer zones and an Egyptian civilian administered area with a United Nations presence shall be established; areas of limited forces and armaments shall be delineated; and early warning and surveillance installations shall be erected.

The details concerning the new demarkation lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the




early warning and surveillance installations, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annexes and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annexes and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

~~Egypt~~ The Parties agree that the United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its function and that its mandate shall be extended annually for the duration of this Agreement. (Alternative: "each year for a year.")

ARTICLE VI

~~The Parties hereby establish~~ A Joint Commission of the Parties/~~hereby established~~ for the duration of this Agreement.  
~~to be presided over by~~ It shall operate <sup>Administered by</sup> through the good offices (Alternative: under the aegis) of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East ~~for the duration of this Agreement,~~ in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures ~~precepts/established~~ in the Annex.



ARTICLE VII

All non-military cargoes ~~of non-strategic nature~~ destined for or coming from Israel ~~shall~~ will be permitted through the Suez Canal.

(2)

ARTICLE VIII

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

(Israel wants to delete the Article on Article 51.)

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement between the Parties ~~in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 338.~~

Done at \_\_\_\_\_ on the \_\_\_\_\_  
1975, in four copies.

For the Government of Israel


For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

WITNESS

\_\_\_\_\_





10156

28 Aug 75  
2 30am

10

# DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE  
 COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

(B)

FROM USDEL SECRETARY IN JERUSALEM CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652:  
TAGS:  
SUBJECT:

N/A  
PFOR, IS  
COMMENTS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON  
FOLLOWING MEETING AT PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, AUGUST 27, 1975

ACTION:

SEC STATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO:

- Ambassy AMMAN - IMMEDIATE
- Ambassy CAIRO - IMMEDIATE
- Ambassy DAMASCUS - IMMEDIATE
- Ambassy JIDDA - IMMEDIATE
- USDEL ALEXANDRIA - IMMEDIATE
- Ambassy TEL AVIV - IMMEDIATE
- Amconsul JERUSALEM - IMMEDIATE

4835

UNCLASSIFIED SECTO 10156

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN


Secretary Kissinger: We reviewed the clarifications that I brought back from Egypt today. We are in the process of working on a draft agreement and its annexes. The number of issues that remain to be settled is relatively small. Therefore, it is not possible every day to give a detailed progress report. We are continuing to make ~~xxx~~ progress and we are working in a good atmosphere.

DRAFTED BY: USIS:J Vogel:jcc	DRAFTING DATE 8/28/75	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: USIS:J Vogel
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Amb. Anderson <sup>67 160</sup>  
S/S: S:R Sherman

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION





**TELEGRAM**

INDICATE  
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 CHARGE TO

FROM

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED - PAGE 2

E.O. 11652:  
 TAGS:  
 SUBJECT:

Foreign Minister Allon: As Dr. Kissinger said, we  
 listened with great interest to the details which he  
 brought back from Egypt, and in spite of making  
 further progress, some further clarifications are needed.  
 But the progress is encouraging and there is work to be  
 done on the basic document as well as the additional  
 papers. Tomorrow we shall concentrate on this work  
 with the hope that we shall achieve further progress  
 in the forthcoming couple of days.

ACTION:

Q: How many more shuttles do you think it will take  
 to get the agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, I do not want to estimate it.  
 I am beginning to enjoy myself here so I may stay around  
 a bit. That was a joke now. Do not repeat that as a  
 headline. (Laughter) I do not know. I do not want to  
 estimate.

Q: Has the question of the technicians been ~~at~~ settled?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to go into details.

10156

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DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT.

KISSINGER  
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CLASSIFICATION



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# TELEGRAM

on 10154  
28 aug 75  
2 15 am

INDICATE  
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FROM	CLASSIFICATION
USDEL SECRETARY IN JERUSALEM	UNCLASSIFIED

N/A  
PFOR, IS  
SECRETARY KISSINGER'S REMARKS TO PRESS AT KING DAVID HOTEL  
AFTER MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER, AUGUST 27, 1975

ACTION: SEC STATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO: AmEmbassy CAIRO " "  
AmEmbassy AMMAN " "  
AmEmbassy DAMASCUS " "  
AmEmbassy JIDDA " "  
USDEL ALEXANDRIA " "  
AmEmbassy TEL AVIV " "  
AmConsul JERUSALEM " "

SS 15

UNCLASSIFIED SECTO 10154

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN


Q: Mr. Secretary, I remember you told us there were one or two issues that were not settled before you got here. Are those settled now -- as a result of your meeting tonight?

Secretary Kissinger: A number of issues before I got to Jerusalem today? I presented tonight some of the Egyptian ideas. We had a full discussion on them. We are continuing to move forward. The number of issues that

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USIS:JVogel;ajg	8/28/75		USIS:JVogel

CLEARANCES:  
S/S:R Sherman

UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASSIFICATION



# TELEGRAM

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FROM USDEL SECRETARY IN JERUSALEM	CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
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E.O. 11652  
 TAGS:  
 SUBJECT:  
 ACTION:

remain<sup>is</sup>/~~are~~ relatively small. Therefore, it is not possible 7  
 to give a detailed progress report every day. But we are  
 continuing to move forward on them. The Israeli nego-  
 tiating team is now studying some of these ideas. We will  
 meet again tomorrow.

Q: Have you started work on the annexes of the agreement?  
 Secretary Kissinger: We have started on them but we have  
 not worked on them in the same detail as on others. We  
 plan to work on them tomorrow.

Q: When are you going to finish all these?  
 Secretary Kissinger: When am I going to finish? My  
 colleagues and I enjoy the shuttle so much that -- as  
 soon as possible.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how serious are these problems? Can  
 we take these seriously, or are these just in the realm  
 of details?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, they are problems of detail  
 of  
 but they are/some significance.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, will you have a chance to meet

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USDEL SECRETARY IN JERUSALEM UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652:  
TAGS:  
SUBJECT:  
ACTION:

Richard Burton and Liz Taylor?

7

Secretary Kissinger: I hope so. Yes.

*#10157*

KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE


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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION I





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON*Pres. has seen*  
INFORMATION~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

August 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report....

"After six hours with Sadat today, I brought to Rabin tonight a clean text of the agreement which in our judgment meets all of the essential points which the Israelis have underscored over the past months. It is a further improvement of the text sent yesterday. However, the reaction was one of caution, and it is clear that when we meet again tomorrow morning, we will be receiving additional suggestions from the Israelis for changes, reflecting the maneuverings which are going on within the power structure, and in particular between Peres and Rabin. There is even a chance that they will turn it down.

"From the point of view of logic, both sides are so far committed that this agreement should be achievable. I regret to say that this remains uncertain, not because of any particular substantive point, but rather due to a combination of factors on the Israeli side comprised of insecurity, inexperience, and domestic maneuvering. Rabin's statement tonight after we presented the clean text of the agreement, meeting all of Israel's essential points, was that "he was not blaming anyone" but that his expectations were greater than the political returns which he believes they are getting. There is, of course, the point that Israel is giving up something tangible such as the passes and the oil fields in exchange for less tangible, but no less important, political concessions. Our most optimistic assessments never included the possibility that Sadat would be willing to commit himself in a public document, contrary to the mainstream of the Arab world, against blockades and in favor of cargoes going through the Suez Canal -- yet he has done so. He has met another principal Israeli demand -- namely, an American technical surveillance presence in the passes. We were quite perplexed by Rabin's approach tonight -- a deep pessimism, in sharp contrast to euphoric pronouncements to the press by Allon last night. We can only assume that Peres is giving him a difficult time and upping the ante, and that he is not sure he can sell the agreement that is


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US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 O 280-100

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

NR 10/20/03




emerging to his cabinet -- particularly now that Dayan has spoken out against it.

"However, since we have Sadat's agreement in principle to the American role in the warning stations, we believe Peres' main political thrust has been met. It is he who has made an American presence in the passes a precondition of the agreement. It is equally clear that Rabin does not like, or at most is ambivalent about, the idea of bringing Americans into the situation, and this view apparently was reinforced tonight when he met with some congressmen and some prominent American Jewish leaders, and in the aftermath of negative statements regarding the American presence by Manfield and Jackson and a neutral one by Senator Humphrey, who over the years has been one of the firmest supporters of Israel.

"I urged tonight that we try to review the text of the agreement tomorrow and if the Israelis have any changes, that they be kept to an absolute minimum on points of substance. We will also be going over our respective concepts of the warning system in the passes; Sadat has agreed to this on the understanding that he would not enter into a tripartite agreement because it would derogate from Egypt's sovereignty in the Sinai, but he would be willing to have the concept put in the form of a U.S. proposal to which he would agree as well as Israel.

"There are many other detailed aspects of the documentation which will be most time-consuming, and if there is to be agreement, the earliest initialing which could now take place would be either Sunday or Monday."

Warm regards.





*Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum*

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