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
EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, UR
SUBJECT: TIGHTENING OF SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY

1. SUMMARY. A NEW, MORE RESTRICTIVE POLICY GOVERNING EMIGRATION HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN THE UKRAINE. IF ADOPTED ELSEWHERE, POTENTIAL EMIGRANT POOL WILL BECOME SMALLER. END SUMMARY.

2. DISSIDENT MOSCOW JEWISH SOURCES TOLD US OF A NEW OVIR POLICY OF REFUSING TO ACCEPT EMIGRATION APPLICATIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD LEAVE PARENTS OR SIBLINGS BEHIND ON EMIGRATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION (PREVIOUS POLICY WAS TO REQUIRE PERMISSION FROM PARENTS NOT EMIGRATING). OUR SOURCES SAY THAT THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC OVIR HAS INFORMED SEVERAL KIEVAN JEWS THAT THE NEW POLICY WAS ADOPTED EFFECTIVE SEPT 1, "PURSUANT TO MOSCOW DIRECTIVE". THE ODESSA OVIR REPORTEDLY PUT THIS POLICY INTO EFFECT AS OF SEPT 10, AND OVIRS IN OTHER UKRAINIAN CITIES ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO APPLY THE NEW REGULATIONS.

3. OUR SOURCES ADD THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ISOLATED AND UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF ADOPTION OF A SIMILAR POLICY IN TASHKENT AND DUSHANBE. OUR SOURCES SAY THAT THUS FAR THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET CONFIRMATION FROM THE ALL-UNION OVIR THAT THE EMIGRATION GROUND RULES HAVE IN FACT BEEN CHANGED, BUT SEVERAL APPEALS FROM



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DECISIONS TAKEN UNDER THE NEW POLICY ARE CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW AT THE ALL-UNION LEVEL.

4. OUR SOURCES SAY THAT THE JEWISH DISSIDENT COMMUNITY HAS BEEN QUITE DISTURBED BY THE REPORTS OF THE CHANGED POLICY IN THE UKRAINE, BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF JEWS LIVING THERE, AND BECAUSE THE POLICY DECISION MAY BE EXTENDED SOON THROUGHOUT THE USSR. SOURCES ALSO ADMIT THEY HAD LONG ANTICIPATED AN INCREASE IN EMIGRATION (AND EASING IN APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS) IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. THEY CONFESSED TO BEING SOMEWHAT SURPRISED AT THE TIMING OF THIS RESTRICTIVE MOVE. THEY OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ISOLATED CASES IN THE PAST OF OVIRS REFUSING TO GRANT EMIGRATION PERMISSION IN CASES IN WHICH A PARENT OR SIBLING WOULD BE LEFT BEHIND ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO A BREAKUP RATHER THAN A REUNION OF A FAMILY.

5. COMMENT: SOVIET AUTHORITIES COULD INDEED INTERPRET THE NEW REGULATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT BY ARGUING THAT IT IS WRONG TO BREAK UP ALREADY EXISTING FAMILIES. GIVEN THAT A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE JEWS EMIGRATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION HAVE RELATIVES WHO WISH TO STAY, THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL FIND THIS A USEFUL TACTIC TO REDUCE EMIGRATION WHILE TRUMPETING THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
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
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F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, CH, UR
SUBJECT: A SOVIET GESTURE TO POST-MAO CHINA?

REF: HONG KONG 6887

1. IN THE EXCELLENT FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT POST-MAO CHINA PROVIDED BY REFTEL, HONG KONG SUGGESTS THAT SOVIET INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE PRC IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF MAO'S PASSING SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED (PARA 7). FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT, IT WOULD APPEAR TO MAKE BOTH POLITICAL AND TACTICAL SENSE FOR THE SOVIETS TO MAKE A GESTURE OF SOME TYPE. THE SOVIETS HAVE A VARIETY OF OPTIONS LARGE AND SMALL, BUT THEIR MOST LIKELY APPROACH WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NORMALIZATION OF STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS AND A SETTLEMENT OF THE BORDER PROBLEM.

2. IN CHINA ITSELF, WE SUSPECT THE SOVIETS WILL BE APPEALING TO WHATEVER FUTURE LEADERSHIP MAY EMERGE AFTER A RATHER PROLONGED SHAKING-DOWN PROCESS WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE UNDER "MAOIST" AUSPICES, AND THEREFORE UNDER THE SIGN OF CONTINUING ANTI-SOVIETISM. THE SINOLOGISTS WE TALK TO HERE ARE OF A NUMBER OF MINDS AS TO NOW DEEP "MAOISM" GOES IN THE



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
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CHINESE BODY POLITIC, BUT THEY HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT PERMEATES AHT LEADERSHIP CADRE AND PROBABLY WILL FOR YEARS TO COME. THEREFORE, THEY DO NOT EXPECT A RAPID EVOLUTION FOR THE BETTER IN CHINESE ANTI-SOVIETISM. AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WHATEVER GESTURE THE SOVIETS MAKE WILL BE DESIGNED FOR THE FARTHER RATHER THAN THE NEARER FUTURE, WHEN PEKING MAN BEGINS TO REAWAKEN FROM THE LONG DARK NIGHTS OF MAOISM.

3. BEYOND CHINA, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO BE WRITING A RECORD OF REASONABLENESS AND GOODWILL FOR "WORLD PUBLIC OPINION," FOR OTHER ASTANS, AND FOR COMMUNISTS EVERYWHERE, I.E., IN EVERY AREA OF POLITICS WHERE THEY ARE CURRENTLY LOCKED IN STRUGGLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS WITH THE "MAOISTS."


4. AND FINALLY, A STANCE OF REASONABLENESS, IN A FRAMEWORK OF FIRMNESS IN THE RIGHT, IS PART AND PARCEL OF THE CURRENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S SELF-IMAGE, WHICH IT FINDS ADVANTAGEOUS AND SEEKS TO PROTECT TO ITS OWN PEOPLE. THE CHINESE RE GENUINELY UNPOPULAR HERE, BUT WAR-- AND TENSIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TOWARD WAR-- IS EVEN MORE UNPOPULAR. SO LONG AS MAO LIVES, THE EASY WAY TO BALANCE THESE UNPOPULARITIES IS TO CAST THE "MAOISTS" IN THE VILLIAN ROLE OF LEFTISTS AND WARMONGERS, AND HUG THE MIDDLE ROAD BETWEEN "LEFT" AND "RIGHT" IN WORLD COMMUNISM AND "MAOISM" AND "IMPERIALISM, IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. UNCE MAO IS GONE, HOWEVER, IT WILL BE HARDER TO KEEP "MAOISM" ALIVE AS THE SELF-EVIDENT VALIDATION OF SOVIET AND CPSU "STATESMANSHIP." THE SOVIETS WILL OWE IT TO THEMSELVES TO REINFORCE THIS IMAGE, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM, BY AN APPROPRIATE GESTURE. AND IF THE CHINESE RESPOND, ALL THE BETTER.
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EXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, AO
SUBJ: SOVIET POLICY IN ANGOLA

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THOUGH OUR INFORMATION ON SUBJECT IS FAR FROM COMPLETE, OUR ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POLICY ON ANGOLA CONCLUDES THAT IN SOVIET VIEW THEIR ACTIONS TO DATE ARE JUSTIFIED AND ON BALANCE SUCCESSFUL, EXCEPT IN REGARD TO THEIR IMPACT ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. WE CAN DISCERN NO STRONG U.S. LEVERAGE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, HOWEVER, WHICH DOES NOT IMPINGE ON U.S. INTERESTS AT LEAST AS MUCH AS SOVIET. IT APPEARS TO US, THEREFORE, THAT--UNLESS PRESSURE CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR IN WASYS NOT APPARENT TO US HERE--THE BEST SOVIETS WILL BE WILLING TO DO IN ORDER TO SHORE UP DETENTE IMAGE IN U.S. WOULD BE TO REFRAIN FROM LARGE ADDITIONAL INCREMENTS IN SOVIET AND CUBAN ASSISTANCE TO MPLA, TO PAY LIP SERVICE TO IDEA OF COALITION (UNDER MPLA HEGEMONY), AND PERHAPS TO PROMISE GRADUAL REDUCTION IN SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE IF SOUTH AFRICA WITHDRAWS. EVEN THESE LIMITED CONCESSIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPLICITLY CONTINGENT ON MPLA MAINTAINING MILITARY INITIATIVE. END SUMMARY.

2. ALTHOUGH WE ARE MISSING SEVERAL IMPORTANT PIECES OF THE PUZZLE, IT MAY BE USEFUL AT THIS POINT TO PUT DOWN OUR IMPRESSIONS AS TO THE REASONS FOR MOSCOW'S



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ACTIONS IN ANGOLA AND TO ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY OF A KREMLIN RETREAT FROM A POLICY WHICH HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS ON THE GROUND IN AFRICA BUT WHICH HAS INEVITABLY RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

3. REASONS FOR SOVIET ANGOLA POLICY. WE CAN THINK OF EIGHT INTERTWINING CAUSES WHICH IMPELLED THE SOVIETS TO ACT IN ANGOLA:

A. SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. GROMYKO'S SEPTEMBER KOMMUNIST ARTICLE, WHICH LAID OUT THE PRINCIPLES AND FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN PREPARATION FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS, STRESSED THREE MAJOR FOUNDATIONS OF THAT POLICY--I.E., 1) CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP; 2) DETENTE WITH THE WEST; 3) SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. THE SOVIETS HAVE STATED REPEATEDLY THAT THEY SEE NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION AND DETENTE. ANGOLA WOULD SEEM TO BE A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF THAT THESIS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS AT PRESENT JUSTIFY THEIR ASSISTANCE TO THE MPLA AS AID TO A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, THE FOUNDATION OF THEIR ANGOLA POLICY--IN THEIR EYES AS WELL AS IN THEIR PROPAGANDA--IS IN THEIR ASSERTED RIGHT TO ASSIST A NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT THE WIND AT ITS SAILS.

B. SUPPORT FOR AN ALLY. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN BACKING THE MPLA SINCE 1956. ONE OF THEIR CLEAR AIMS IN ANGOLA IS TO DEMONSTRATE TO OTHERS THAT THE USSR IS A RELIABLE FRIEND AND THAT IT WILL NOT LET DOWN AN ALLY. IN THIS REGARD, IT MIGHT BE OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO NOTE THAT NETO WAS PRESENT AT THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE CPSU.

C. MAINTENANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR MOSCOW TO KEEP UP ITS REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT ASPIRES TO LEADERSHIP IN THE THIRD WORLD AND IN THE COMMUNIST AND "PROGRESSIVE" CAMPS, BUT FOR PURPOSES OF MAINTAINING ITS OWN INTERNAL LEGITIMACY AS WELL. THE



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
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MESSAGE THAT THE USSR ADOPTS A "PRINCIPLED" POSITION IN ITS SUPPORT FOR "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIETS BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY.

D. THE CHINA FACTOR. PEKING AND MOSCOW ARE LOCKED IN WHAT BOTH SIDES REGARD AS A "ZERO-SUM" GAME WHEREBY WHAT IS GOOD FOR MOSCOW'S NATIONAL INTERESTS IS THOUGH TO BE BAD FOR PEKING'S, AND VICE VERSA. THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE WERE SUPPORTING A GROUP OPPOSED TO THE MPLA MADE IT ALMOST A CERTAINTY THAT MOSCOW WOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO TAKE SOME STEPS TO BOLSTER ITS CLIENT IN ANGOLA. THE SOVIETS DESIRE TO DIMINISH CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE IS NO TRUTH IN PEKING'S ASSERTION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE A STATUS QUO POWER BASICALLY IN OPPOSITION TO THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD.

E. ENHANCE THE SOVIET IMAGE IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE. THE SOVIETS SAW THE APRIL 25 COUP IN PORTUGAL AS AN EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY TO STEP UP THEIR INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE IN AFRICA. IN THIS REGARD, THEY WERE UNDOUBTEDLY ALSO ENCOURAGED BY THE SUCCESS OF FRELIMO IN MOZAMBIQUE AND WERE ANXIOUS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TIDE WAS MOVING IN THEIR DIRECTION IN AFRICA. THE KREMLIN REGARDS ITS FORTUITOUS URECT OPPOSITION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN 433, CE IN ANGOLA AS A MAJOR POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA TRIUMPH. THE FACT THAT THIS HAS STRUCK A SYMPATHETIC CHORD IN COUNTRIES AS IMPORTANT AS NIGERIA MAY WELL BE CONSIDERED BY THE KREMLIN AS AMPLE JUSTIFICATION IN ITSELF FOR MOSCOW'S ANGOLA POLICY.

F. SOVIET INTERNAL IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS IN ANGOLA. GIVEN RECENT FOREIGN POLICY REVERSES, PARTICULARLY EGYPT BUT PORTUGAL AS WELL, MOSCOW PROBABLY FELT THAT IT COULD NOT AFFORD ANOTHER OBVIOUS SETBACK, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE THE U.S. WAS SEEN TO BE THE "WINNER." THIS IS DOUBLY THE CASE IN VIEW OF STRONG U.S. CONGRESSIONAL AND



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PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA. (OUR GUESS WOULD BE THAT LOCAL EXPERTS ON THE U.S. ADVISED THAT OUR DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS WRE SUCH THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY WE WOULD FACE UP TO A "TOUGH" SOVIET POLICY IN ANGOLA.) WITH THE PARTY CONGRESS APPROACHING, ANGOLA THUS OFFERED A CONCRETE FOREIGN POLICY GAIN IN SUPPORT OF ORTHODOX IDEOLOGICAL THEMES AT AN OPPORTUNE TIME FOR BREZHNEV.

G. COUNTERING THE U.S. WHETHER THEY ACTUALLY BELIEVE IT OR NOT IS ANOTHER QUESTION, BUT OUR VARIOUS CONTACTS AS WELL AS SOURCES FOR LOCAL NEWS- MEN HAVE CONSISTENTLY ARGUED THAT, IN INCREASING ASSISTANCE TO THE MPLA ABOVE MODEST LEVELS, THE USSR WAS MERELY REACTING TO US. MOVES IN ANGOLA. FURTHERMORE, THE CLAIM IS PUT FORTH THAT THE USSR HAS NO DESIRE TO MAKE A PUBLIC ISSUE OF ANGOLA AND THAT THE SOVIETS "CANNOT UNDERSTAND" WHY THE AMERICANS HAVE BROUGHT ANGOLA TO THE FOREFRONT. THE MOST RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT OF THIS THESIS WAS AN ARTICLE IN THE JANUARY 16 NOVVOYE VREMYA DEVOTED TO ALLEGED CIA INTERFERENCE IN ANGOLA. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, BASED ON AMERICAN PRESS SOURCES, A FORTY COMMITTEE MEETING IN JANUARY 1975 APPROVED A CIA PROPOSAL TO BUY FNLA AND UNITA AGREEMENT TO TORPEDO THE THREE FACTION ACCORD ON COALITION GOVERNMENT SIGNED IN KENYA JANUARY 5. THE ARTICLE STATES THAT ROBERTO HAD BEEN IN THE CIA PCKET SINCE 1961 AND THAT SAVIMBI WAS "ALSO LINKED TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE." THESE LEADERS THERE- FORE "CAME OUT AGAINST" THE MPLA IN FEBRUARY AND THE TWO GROUPS THEN RECEIVED 10 MILLION DOLLARS FROM THE CIA IN JUNE. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT A SOVIET READER IS INTENDED TO DRAW IS THAT IT WAS THE U.S. WHICH FIRST UPPED THE ANTE IN ANGOLA. WHILE MANY SOVIETS WILL BE MORE THAN SKEPTICAL OF THEIR OWN PROPAGANDA, THE FACT THAT THIS RATIONALE HAS BEEN WIDELY CIRCULATED WITHIN THE USSR WILL MAKE IT THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW FROM OR TONE DOWN THEIR EFFORTS IN ANGOLA UNLESS IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THEY DERIVE CLEAR BENEFIT THEREBY.



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
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H. ECONOMIC-STRATEGIC FACTORS. GEOPOLITICS IS STILL TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN MOSCOW AND THE SOVIETS ARE NOT INSENSITIVE TO THE FACT THAT ANGOLA IS A COMPARATIVELY RICH, UNDERPOPULATED COUNTRY WITH SUBSTANTIAL NATURAL RESOURCES, INCLUDING CABINDAN OIL. THE SOVIET NAVY WOULD PROBABLY, AT THE VERY LEAST, FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE ACCESS TO ANGOLAN PORTS ON A BASIS SIMILAR TO THAT AVAILABLE IN GUINEA. IN ANY CASE, WE DO NOT FIND CHONA'S THESIS ON THE SOVIET GRAND STRATEGY FOR AFRICA (LUSAKA 115) TO BE ENTIRELY IMPLAUSIBLE, EVNE THOUGH THE INITIAL SOVIET IMPLUSE MAY FLOW MORE FROM EXPLOITING TARGETTS OF OPPORTUNITY THAN EXECUTING A MASTER PLAN.

4. THE CUBAN FACTOR. FOR A COMBINATION OF THE ABOVE REASONS THE POLITBURO PROBABLY FELT IT HAD LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO TAKE ACTION IN ANGOLA TO SUPPORT THE MPLA. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A QUICK POWERFUL STROKE THAT WOULD TURN THE TABLES IN FAVOR OF THEIR OWN CLIENT AND THUS PUT THE SOVIETS IN A STRONGER BARGAINING POSITION. SINCE THE MPLA ITSELF WAS PROBABLY IN NO POSITION TO UTILIZE THE MASSIVE SOVIET AID ACCORDED TO IT, THE SOVIETS DECEIDED TO MAKE USE OF A CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. OUR GUESS WOULD BE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WELL AWARE OF THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION IN



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ANGOLA AND PROBABLY SEE THE DANGER OF THE CUBANS REMAINING FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME IN HOSTILE TERRITORY AS AN OCCUPYING FORCE. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, SEVERAL OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS HAVE ASSERTED STRONGLY THAT THE USSR DOES NOT DESIRE A "MILITARY SOLUTION" IN ANGOLA, WHILE OTHERS HAVE RECENTLY HINGTED THAT AN MPLA/UNITA COALITION MIGHT BE THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION.

5. MOSCOW'S OBJECTIVES. THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR COMMITMENT TO ENSURE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED BY THE MPLA, ASSISTED AND SUPPORTED BY THE USSR, WHICH WOULD DERIVE A FAVORABLE POSITION COMPARABLE TO WHAT IT CURRENTLY ENJOYS IN GUINEA AND SOMALIA. A "COALITION GOVERNMENT" UNDER MPLA HEGEMONY IS QUITE CONSISTENT WITH SUCH A SOVIET AIM SO LONG AS THE MPLA WOULD REMAIN THE DOMINANT FORCE. WHAT THE SOVIETS PROBABLY DESIRE IS A VICTORY IN ANGOLA WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE GRADUALLY ENOUGH SO THAT SOVIET DETENTE INTERESTS ARE NOT AFFECTED THEREBY. IF THE SOVIETS SAW GOOD PROSPECTS FOR SUCH A GRADUAL VICTORY THEY WOULD PROBABLY RESIST PRESSURE FROM THE MPLA ITSELF, OR PERHAPS FROM THE CUBANS, TO GO FRO BROKE IN ANGOLA.

6. FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA. IN THIS REGARD, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS DID NOT ACHIEVE THE OPTIMUM AT THE RECENT OAU CONFERENCE, THEY ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY PLEASED WITH THEIR LONG RANGE AFRICAN POLICY OF PATIENT SUPPORT FOR "NATIONAL LIBERATION," AND REGARD OVERALL TENDENCIES AS MOVING IN THEIR DIRECTION. RELATIONS WITH CERTAIN KEY COUNTRIES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED, E.G., NIGERIA, CHANA, TANZANIA, AND MOZAMBIQUE (WHICH PREVIOUSLY LEANED TO CHINA). NETO HIMSELF IS GENUAINELY POPULAR WITH SEVERAL IMPORTANT AFRICAN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS TANZANIA WHICH MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO RIDE ON HIS COATTAILS TO A DEGREE. IN SOVIET EYES THE U.S. IS PAYING THE INEVITABLE PRICE OF BEING POPULARLY IDENTIFIED IN AFRICA (NO MATTER HOW



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
UNJUSTLY) AS A FORMER SUPPORTER OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM AND A PRESENT SUPPORTER OF WHITE REGIMES IN THE SOUTH. FINALLY, IF THE MPLA RACKS UP FURTHER MILITARY VICTORIES, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY HOPE TO GARNER ADDITIONAL BACKING IN AFRICA.

7. UNEXPECTED EVENTS. ESPECIALLY INLIGHT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT, THE SOVIETS WERE, HOWEVER, PROBABLY SURPRISED AT THE VEHEMENCE OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE AFRICAN MODERATES WHO CONTINUE TO OPPOSE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERFERENCE IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS. THEY WERE ALSO SEEMINGLY GENUINELY SURPRISED BY THE PUBLIC REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND BY THE PRIMACY WHICH THE ANGOLA SITUATION NOW HAS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. IN FACT, THIS DETENTE CONNECTION HAS PROBABLY BEEN THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT MISTAKE MOSCOW POLICYMAKERS HAVE MADE REGARDING ANGOLA. WHILE IT IS STILL ONLY ONE OF MANY FACTORS IN THEIR CALCULATIONS, IT HAS CLEARLY BECOME AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS ONE.

8. THE U.S. ANGLE. IT THEREFORE SEEMS TO US THAT EXCEPT FOR ITS EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. THE SOVIETS HAVE NO REASON TO FEEL DISSATISFIED WITH THE POLICIES THEY HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING IN ANGOLA. FURTHERMORE, IT IS PERHAPS IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AT LEAST SOME KREMLIN "AMERICA EXPERTS," AS NOTED ABOVE, POSSIBLY SINGED ON TO THE ORIGINAL DECISION TO STEP UP THE SOVIET EFFORT IN ANGOLA ON THE GROUNDS THAT DOMESTIC PRESSURES IN THE UNITED STATES PRECLUDED A TOUGH U.S. RESPONSE TO SUCH SOVIET MOVES. IF THIS IS THE CASE, "EXPERTSZ WILL FIND IT BUREAUCRATICALLY DIFFICULT AT THIS STAGE TO TURN AROUND AND ARGUE THAT ANGOLA COULD HAVE A LASTING HARMFUL EFFECT ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. MORE IMPORTANT, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN OUR DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES, THE VARIOUS CONCRETE LEVERS AVAILABLE TO US FOR DEALING WITH THE KREMLIN OVER ANGOLA ARE NOT VERY IMPRESSIVE. UNLESS WE ARE CAPABLE OF RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY ON THE GROUND, SALT IS TOO IMPORTANT TO CONNECT WITH ANGOLA, WE HAVE

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ALREADY RULED OUT GRAIN, MFN WAS ONLY A DISTANT HOPE ANYWAY, AND CUTTING DOWN EXCHANGES WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE AND PERHAPS INAPPROPRIATE. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE TOP LEADERS IN THE KREMLIN PROBABLY DO NOT REALLY UNDERSTAND THE POSSIBLE LONG TERM EFFECTS WHICH ANGOLA COULD HAVE ON U.S. VIEWS OF THE USSR.

9. THE SOVIET DILEMMA. WHILE INTERNAL PRESSURE TO CHANGE POLICY IN ANGOLA IS THEREFORE NOT LIKELY TO BE VERY GREAT, MOSCOW DOES NOT WANT ANGOLA TO IMPINGE ON DETENTE, TO AFFECT U.S. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS, AND ESPECIALLY TO INFLUENCE THE U.S. ELECTIONS. BUT IT CANNOT AFFORD A DEFEAT OR A WITHDRAWAL UNDER OBVIOUS PRESSURE. AT THIS STAGE THE KREMLIN OBVIOUSLY WOULD NOT WANT TO BE CHARGED WITH "SELLING OUT" ITS CLIENTS AND IT COULD BE TO SOME EXTENT IN PAWN TO NETO, AS IT WAS TO HANOI FROM 1965-1975.

10. THE LIMITS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE KREMLIN DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE THE U.S., OR ANYONE ELSE, THE IMPRESSION THAT WASHINGTON HAS SIGNIFICANT LEVERAGE BECAUSE OF MOSCOW'S DESIRE TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS OF PROPONENTS OF DETENTE IN THE UPCOMING U.S. ELECTIONS. GIVEN THE EXTENT



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E.O. 11652: GDS

OF THEIR COMMITMENT, ANY MOVE THE SOVIETS MAKE TO REDUCE THEIR (AND CUBA'S) PRESENCE, IF ANNOUNCED AT ALL, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE JUSTIFIED ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS--I.E., THE ASSISTANCE IS NO LONGER NEEDED--RATHER THAN ON GROUNDS OF PRINCIPLE. IN ANY CASE, A SETTLEMENT WITHOUT QUICK AND CLEAR SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA APPEARS MOST UNLIKELY. BUT THE DEPARTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT POSSIBLY FORM THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD BUY SINCE IT COULD BE PORTRAYED AS A CLEAR VICTORY -- I.E., RESOLUTE SOVIET ACTION FORCED THE RACIST AGRESSORS OUT OF ANGOLA. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE TO WITHDRAW, SOVIET SUPPLIES OF NEW EQUIPMENT COULD BE SCALED DOWN, AND IF THE U.S. SUPPLY LINEK RUNS DRY, NETO WOULD BE LEFT IN A FAVORABLE MILITARY POSTURE. SOME CUBANS COULD ALSO BE WITHDRAWN WHILE OTHERS COULD BE LIMITED MORE AND MORE TO SUPPORT AND ADVISORY ROLES, IN ORDER TO AVOID CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS. AT SOME POINT, THE CUBANS WOULD HAVE TO GO. BUT THE SOVIETS, HAVING DEMONSTRATED CONVINCING WILLINGNESS TO COUNTER ANY MOVES TO DISPLACE THE MPLA, COULD WITHDRAW INTO THE BACKGROUND AND ALLOW FOR AN "AFRICAN" SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLA PROBLEM, AT THE SAME TIME GUARANTEEING MPLA CONTROL OF AT LEAST THE CENTRAL AND CABINDAN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, AND PERHAPS OF THE NORTH AS



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WELL. SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD CLEARLY LEAVE THE MPLA IN A STRONG POSITION TO EXTEND ITS POWER MILITARILY. THIS, IN TURN, COULD CREATE STEADY PRESSURE IN AFRICA FOR ADDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA REGIME. IN OTHER WORDS, ANY NEGOTIATED OUTCOME WHICH SEEMS FEASIBLE TO US WOULD NOT BE A HAPPY ONE FOR U.S. POLICY. BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CANNOT CONCEIVE OF THE SOVIETS SETTLING FOR LESS, AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE.

11. IN SUM, THE CURRENT SOVIET ASSESSMENT IS PROBABLY THAT THEY HAD AMPLE REASON FOR TAKING RESOLUTE ACTION IN ANGOLA AND ARE OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. GIVEN THE EXTENT OF THEIR INVESTMENT, THEY CANNOT NOW AFFORD TO ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION WHICH WOULD SEEM TO ENCOMPASS A LOSS OF FACE. HOWEVER, FOR REASONS OF DETENTE AND THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE INDUCED TO BUY SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE WHICH FAVORED THE MPLA. WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES (WHICH COULD BE IN OUR INTERESTS AS WELL) IS POSSIBLY THE KEY TO REACHING SOME SORT OF SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN DILEMMA.

12. DEPARTMENT PASS OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED.
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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CASC, UR (SHARDIN, NICHOLAS GEORGE)
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE OF US CITIZEN

REF: MOSCOW 18551

CONSULAR COUNSELOR CALLED ON MFA'S CONSULAR ADMINISTRATION COUNSELOR G. BOSIKOV JANUARY 7 AT LATTER'S REQUEST. BOSIKOV REPEATED ORALLY AND BY NON-PAPER INFO TELEPHONED EARLIER PER REPTEL THAT AS RESULT OF INQUIRIES IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT (1) CITIZEN OF USA NICHOLAS GEORGE SHADRIN BORN 1928 IN LENINGRAD HAS NOT ENTERED USSR.

(2) THERE ARE NO SOVIET OFFICIALS IN AUSTRIA BY NAMES OF OLEG KOZLOV AND MIKHAIL KURYSHEV.

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, AO, UR
SUBJ: ANGOLAN RECOGNITION

REF: STATE 265503

IN ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS AND TALKING POINTS
KEYED TO LOCAL SITUATION, I ASSUME THAT DEPARTMENT DOES
NOT RPT NOT DESIRE EMBASSY TO MAKE DEMARCHE HERE ON ANGOLA.
IF, HOWEVER, APPROACH IS DESIRED, PLEASE ADVISE BY
IMMEDIATE AT WHICH LEVEL MEETING SHOULD BE SOUGHT AND
WHAT SHOULD BE MAIN THRUST OF PRESENTATION, GIVEN
PRESUMPTION PARA ONE REFTEL (WHICH WE SHARE) THAT USSR
INTENDS TO RECOGNIZE MPLA REGIME IMMEDIATELY.
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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 16100

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F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US
SUBJECT: THE CURRENT SOVIET VIEW OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS

REF: STATE 261650

1. SUMMARY. THERE HAS BEEN A DISTINCT COOLING IN SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE U.S. IN THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, COUPLES WITH GREATER EMPHASIS ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST CAMP AND ON MOSCOW'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORLD "PROGRESSIVE" AND "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS, WE ATTRIBUTE THIS LARGELY TO SOVIET DISAPPOINTMENT AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL SPHERES, INCLUDING MOST NOTABLY WESTERN BACKLASH ON CSCE, EXCLUSION FROM LATEST MIDDLE EAST DISENGAGEMENT, AND DELAY IN CONVERTING VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT INTO SALT II TREATY. IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSION PHASE, THEN BREZHNEV'S UPCOMING DEMISE MIGHT ALSO HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS CHANGED EMPHASIS, BUT WE SEE NO CLEAR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A SUPPOSITION. WHAT IS EVIDENT TO US IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S., APPREHENSIVE ABOUT WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE GROWING CHORUS OF ANTI-SOVIET AND ANTI-DETERENTE SENTIMENTS BEING EXPRESSED THERE, AND WORRIED ABOUT THE IMPACT WHICH OUR ELECTION CAMPAIGN MAY HAVE ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. A SALTII AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON SUMMIT WOULD, HOWEVER, BRING RELATIONS BACK TO A MORE EVEN KEEL. IF BREZHNEV IS TO MAKE THE TRIP TO WASHINGTON, THIS WOULD IMPLY AN INTENTION TO CONTINUE HIM IN POWER FOR



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SOME TIME AFTER A MEETING, SINCE A LAME DUCK SUMMIT WOULD MAKE LITTLE SENSE FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. IN ANY CASE, WE MAY WELL BE MOVING INTO A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY, WHICH MIGHT ALSO IN THE LONG RUN TURN OUT TO BE A PERIOD OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. END SUMMARY.

2. THE MEDIA. WE DETECT A PERCEPTIBLE COOLING OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS IN THE RELATIVE STRESS IN THE SOVIET MEDIA ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. CONCOMITANTLY, HEAVY COVERAGE OF RECENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION WITHIN "THE SOCIALIST CAMP" HAS BEEN MARKED. IN ADDITION, MORE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE KREMLIN'S SUPPORT FOR "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS AND ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO SUCH MOVEMENTS. THE SOVIETS' PUBLIC POSITION TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST HAS RECENTLY TOUGHENED AND CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ROLE THERE, BOTH IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT, HAS INCREASED. TREATMENT OF CHINA, ALWAYS HARD, HAS GOTTEN HARDER. THE FIGHTING IN ANGOLA HAS OCCASIONED INCREASINGLY FREQUENT CHARGES OF U.S.-CHINESE COLLUSION AS HAVE VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY CHINESE LEADERS THAT MOSCOW IS LESS TRUSTWORTHY THAN WASHINGTON. IMPLICIT CONTRAST HAS BEEN DRAWN BETWEEN THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO PEKING AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN THAT SCHMIDT'S DEFENSE OF DETENTE AGAINST CHINESE ATTACKS WAS JUXTAPOSED AGAINST WHAT THE LOCAL MEDIA PORTRAYED AS THE SECRETARY'S SILENCE ON THIS SUBJECT. COVERAGE OF THE U.S. ITSELF, TEMPORARILY BRIGHTENED BY APOLLO-SOYUZ AND THE ASTRONAUTS' TRIPS, HAS RECENTLY TENDED MORE AND MORE TO DIGGING AND JABBING IN INNUMERABLE PETTY WAYS.

3. WHILE DETENTE WITH THE WEST RETAINS ITS THEORETICAL PRIMACY, EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR IT IS NOW USUALLY ACCOMPANIED BY WORRIED SORTIES AGAINST DETENTE'S WESTERN ENEMIES OR THEIR CHINESE HELPMATES. THE DRUMBEATING FOR "MILITARY DETENTE" AS A NEXT STEP ON THE PROCESS, INTENDED AS A MAJOR POST-HELSINKI PROPAGANDA THEME, HAS BEEN BROUGHT UP SHORT BY THE UNEXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCE. TREATMENT OF CSCE



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ITSELF HAS TURNED CONSISTENTLY OFFENSIVE AND SOMETIMES SURLY. DETENTE IS NOW USUALLY PAIRED WITH THE NEED FOR ATTENTION TO THE "WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM" AND THE "WORLD COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' MOVEMENT."

4. THE TROUBLED GISCARD VISIT RECEIVED ONLY MODERATE AND CORRECT MEDIA TREATMENT AND WAS FAR OVERSHADOWED BY THE PLAY GIVEN TO HONECKER AND LE DUAN. EVEN HUNGARIAN PREMIER LAZAR LOOKED GOOD IN GISCARD'S WAKE. THE RECEPTION FOR LE DUAN WAS LAVISH IN ITS SYMBOLIZATION OF THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO "PROGRESSIVE" FORCES AS WELL AS NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS EVERYWHERE. DURING THE VISIT THE PAGES OF PRAVDA WERE OPENED TO THE KIND OF ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS BY LE DUAN THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS IN SEVERAL YEARS. DETENTE EMERGED A VERY POOR SISTER IN THE PROCESS.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE NOTICEABLE SLACKENING OF SOVIET LIP SERVICE TO THE OVERALL CONCEPT OF DETENTE. THE PEACE POLICY OF THE 24TH CONGRESS IS STILL SINGLED OUT AS A LANDMARK. VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND OTHER AMERICANS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE RECEIVED PROMINENT SPACE IN THE PAGES OF THE CENTRAL PRESS. DETENTE, THE KREMLIN CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN, BUT IN A MORE TROUBLED TONE, MUST BE MADE "IRREVERSIBLE". (PERHAPS SYMBOLIC OF THE IMPORTANCE STILL ACCORDED TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IS THE RECENT ELEVATION OF KORNIYENKO, HEAD OF THE USA DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, TO THE RANK OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER).

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6. DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE U.S. IN THE PRESS HAS EXTENDED BEYOND THE USUAL SNIPING AT THE ILLS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY--UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIME, RACIAL PROBLEMS, ETC. -- TO INCLUDE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE INHERENT STRENGTH OF "ANTI-SOVIET" POLITICAL FORCES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN POINTING WITH CONCERN AT WHAT THEY SEE AS A RISING CHORUS OF UNJUSTIFIABLE ANTI-SOVIET CRITICISM. THEY ARE WORRIED AT THE EFFECT SUCH CRITICISM MAY HAVE ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND DETENTE AS A WHOLE AND FEAR THAT OUR UPCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN COULD LEAD TO A FURTHER EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS. WHILE SUCH STATEMENTS ARE AT LEAST IN PART SELF-SERVING, THEY HAVE BECOME SO FREQUENT AND SO POINTED THAT THEY RAISE LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER WE MAY BE IN FOR A SWITCH IN EMPHASIS IN SOVIET POLICY. THIS COULD CONCEIVABLY BE SEEN AS PART OF A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY PRECEDING BREZHNEV'S DEPARTURE FOR VALHALLA, ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE IS FAR FROM CLEAR ON THIS.

7. OUR OWN VIEW, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE CHANGE OF EMPHASIS DESCRIBED ABOVE HAS BEEN LARGELY DETERMINED BY CONCRETE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE IN RECENT MONTHS. THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY LINE DOES NOT SEEM TO US TO BE IN QUESTION. SUSLOV LECTURED THE SENATORS ON IT THIS SUMMER; GROMYKO GAVE A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP'S INTENTION TO WRITE IT



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
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INTO THE RECORD OF THE 25TH CONGRESS IN HIS SEPTEMBER KOMMUNIST ARTICLE; BREZHNEV REAFFIRMED IT AT HELSINKI AND IN HIS TOAST TO GISCARD OCTOBER 15; AND THE MEDIA PROMOTE IT WITH INCESSANT VIGOR. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS "GENERAL LINE" IN THIS HIERARCHICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

B. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES. BUT BREZHNEV'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE WAY THINGS HAVE WORKED OUT SINCE HELSINKI SEEMS APPARENT. HE CLEARLY HAD A DUAL-TRACK MASTER PLAN WHICH CALLED FOR CONCENTRATION AFTER HELSINKI ON MILITARY DETENTE IN POST-CSCE SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND, SIMULTANEOUSLY, DEVOTION OF MORE TIME TO CEMENTING RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. HIS TIMETABLE CALLED FOR RUNNING UP TO THE 25TH CONGRESS ALONG BOTH FOREIGN POLICY TRACKS--I.E., HE HOPED TO SYMBOLIZE THE TRIUMPH OF HIS "PEACE POLICY" BY HAVING SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED A SALT AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON SUMMIT, ON THE ONE HAND, AS WELL AS AN ECPC CONFERENCE ON THE OTHER. WHATEVER SUCCESS THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD, HOWEVER, HAS THUS FAR ONLY BEEN ALONG ONE OF THESE TRACKS. FOR THIS THEY LARGELY BLAME THE US AND THE WEST EUROPEANS, WHOM THEY SEE AS HAVING SABOTAGED THE FRA OF GOOD FEELING THAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN USHERED IN AFTER HELSINKI. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES WOULD INCLUDE:

A. CSCE BACKLASH. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, THE SOVIETS WERE UNEASY ABOUT THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND THIS UNEASINESS HAS BEEN FED AND COMPOUNDED BY THREE MAJOR SURPRISES DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE FIRST WAS THE TOTALLY UNEXPECTED WAVE OF CRITICISM IN THE U.S. AGAINST THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. THE SECOND WAS THE FAILURE OF THE "VLADIVOSTOK SPIRIT" TO HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE TRADE/EMIGRATION IMPASSE. THE THIRD HAS BEEN THE UNEXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE AND THE CONSEQUENT BASIC QUESTIONING OF THE VALUE OF DETENTE BY MORE AND MORE PEOPLE WITHIN AMERICAN SOCIETY. IN ANY CASE, THIS POST-CSCE BACKLASH HAS CLEARLY THROWN A MONKEYWRENCH INTO THE SOVIET SCENARIO WHICH CALLED FOR A TRIUMPHAL CSCE CULMINATION LEADING UP TO AN EQUALLY TRIUMPHAL REAFFIRMATION OF DETENTE AT THE 25TH CONGRESS.

B. THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO DISTURBED THAT



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
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THEY HAVE BEEN FROZEN OUT OF THE LATEST PEACE AGREEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING CUT INTO THE ACTION -- AS THEY THINK THEY SHOULD BE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP -- IN WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE A VITAL AREA. THE DIRECT ATTACKS BY SADAT IMPUGNING SOVIET MOTIVES AND DISPARAGING THEIR AID WERE CLEARLY REGARDED HERE AS A CHALLENGE. THE SOVIETS MAY WELL FEEL THAT SADAT'S DISTRESSING BARBS COULD PERHAPS HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF WASHINGTON HAD INFORMED THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT THAT SUCH BLATANT ANTI-SOVIET BAITING WOULD BE UNWISE.

C. PORTUGAL. HACKLES HAVE ALSO BEEN RAISED IN THE KREMLIN BY CONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS IN THE WEST THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VIOLATING THE RULES OF DETENTE BY THEIR ACTIONS IN PORTUGAL. MOSCOW'S VIEW IS THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS BEEN OPERATING WITHIN DETENTE GUIDELINES AND HAS BEEN DOING LITTLE WHICH COULD BE DESCRIBED HONESTLY AS DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN LISBON'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR AS IMPERILING DETENTE. POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO A FOREIGN CP IS, IN THEIR VIEW, PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE, AND THEY PROBABLY CONCEDE OUTRIGHT TO DO THE SAME IN RESPECT TO OUR FRIENDS, EVEN THOUGH THE LATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED GRIST FOR THE PROPAGANDA MILL.)

D. CHINA. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY NOW REGARD THEIR RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND ITS EFFECT THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNIST AND THIRD WORLD AS THEIR MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM. THEY ARE DEEPLY WORRIED THAT WE MAY BE MANEUVERING TO HAVE CHINA BECOME ALMOST AN ALLY OF THE U.S. THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT AT THE VERY LEAST A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD ENSURE EQUAL TREATMENT OF MOSCOW AND PEKING. THEY ARE THEREFORE PROBABLY DISTURBED AT THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO CHINA AND THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING ONE.

F. BILATERAL IRRITANTS. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL DIFFICULTIES HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSED THEM INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AS TESTIFIED TO BY THEIR FAILURE TO PUBLICIZE THE LONG-TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. OUR ATTEMPTS TO USE THIS GRAIN DEAL AS A LEVER TO EXTRACT SIGNIFICANT PRICE CON-



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SSIONS ON SOVIET OIL, ALTHOUGH UNDERSTANDABLE, WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE SUBJECT OF HEATED POLITBURO DISCUSSION, AND MAY HAVE RESULTED IN SOME REAL RESENTMENT. A WHOLE RANGE OF OTHER BILATERAL IRRITANTS -- SOMETIMES PETTY, SOMETIMES LESS SO -- CONTINUE TO TROUBLE THE SOVIETS. AMONG THEM ARE DIFFICULTIES REGARDING VISAS, SOME OF WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE REAL DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING. OUR FAILURE TO ALLOW A CPSU DELEGATION TO ATTEND THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS, FOR EXAMPLE, DESPITE PLEAS AT VERY HIGH LEVELS, UNDOUBTEDLY GALLED THE SOVIETS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN OUR FAILURE TO MOVE AHEAD ON CONSTRUCTION OF BOTH EMBASSY PROJECTS.

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
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F. SALT AND MRFR. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE EXPECTED PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS INTENDED TO MOVE DETENTE ALONG AND BRING BREZHNEV TO WASHINGTON IN TRIUMPH, HAS NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING. THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE MADE LARGE CONCESSIONS AT SALT ON VERIFICATION WHICH HAVE BEEN NEITHER MATCHED NOR EVEN SUITABLY RECOGNIZED BY THE U.S. (WE CAN CONCEIVE OF NO SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH ANY VOICE IN THESE MATTERS, NO MATTER HOW GREAT HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, WHO WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE USSR SHOULD AGREE THAT LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED STRATEGIC WEAPONS OR THAT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER SHOULD BE WITHIN THE VLADIVOSTOK CEILING.) IN ADDITION, THE EXPECTED OFFER OF OPTION III IN MRFR HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE. WHILE SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT LACK OF PROGRESS IN THESE MATTERS ARE CLEARLY SELF-SERVING, WE SUSPECT THAT MOSCOW IN FACT STRONGLY RESENTS BEING DRIVEN UP AGAINST ITS OWN CONGRESS DEADLINE BY ITS U.S. NEGOTIATING PARTNER. THE OTHER SOVIET GRIEVANCES, HOWEVER, PALE IN IMPORTANCE AS COMPARED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SECOND SALT AGREEMENT AND A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON SUMMIT. ACHIEVEMENT OF BOTH THESE OBJECTIVES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESTORE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS TO AN EVEN KEEL.

9. THE PARTY CONGRESS. ANOTHER FACTOR EXPLAINING INCREASING SOVIET PUBLIC COOLNESS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES IS THE PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON PAST



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PERFORMANCE IT WAS PREDICTABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO CONSOLIDATING AND GARNERING SUPPORT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS THEY PREPARED FOR THE CONGRESS. (THE HOMESTRETCH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO PROBABLY HAVE OBLIGED THEM TO DO SO, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER FACTOR.) IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE CONGRESS WE EXPECT TO SEE A NARROWING SOVIET FOCUS ON A SHRINKING NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY AREAS, WITH SOVIET DECISION-MAKING EFFICIENCY DECLINING AS THE CONGRESS APPROACHES. SUCH A FREEZING OF THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS WILL PROBABLY BE HEIGHTENED IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSION PERIOD, AS POSTULATED IN REFTEL.

10. THE BREZHNEV FACTOR. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY AT LEAST SOME OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN REFTEL (A FULLER EXPOSITION OF OUR VIEWS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTTEL), OUTWARD INDICATORS HERE ARE THAT BREZHNEV REMAINS NUMBER ONE FOR THE PRESENT. HUGE PHOTOS OF HIM HAVE BEEN MOUNTED ALL OVER MOSCOW. FOR EXAMPLE, AS PART OF THE PREPARATION FOR THE 58TH OCTOBER AND HE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE DAILY ECOMIUMS IN ALL MEDIA. EVEN IF HE IS SHORTLY TO STEP DOWN FROM THE TOP SPOT, WE REMAIN CONVINCED IT WOULD BE FOR HEALTH RATHER THAN FOR POLITICAL REASONS. HOWEVER, HIS REMOVAL FROM THE SCENE WOULD OBVIOUSLY COMPLICATE PLANS FOR THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS WELL AS FOR THE PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON NEITHER OCCASION WOULD IT BE USEFUL FOR THE CPSU TO HAVE A LAME DUCK PRESIDING AND MAKING VITAL DECISIONS. WE THEREFORE EXPECT THAT AT THE NEXT CPSU/CC PLENUM, PRESUMABLY DECEMBER 1, THIS SHOULD BE A FIRM INDICATOR OF BREZHNEV'S PLANS, OR, CONCEIVABLY, THE PLANS BEING MADE BY OTHERS FOR BREZHNEV.

11. IN ANY CASE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF NUANCE (SUSLOV AND PODOGORN, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEM TO TAKE A TOUGHER LINE THAN OTHERS TOWARD THE VALUE TO BE DERIVED FROM DETENTE), WE HAVE THUS FAR DISCERNED NO IDENTIFIABLE POLICY DIFFERENCES WITH THE POLITRURU WHICH WOULD SIGNIFY A LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AND THEREFORE CONTINUE TO ASSUME THAT IF BREZHNEV IS REPLACED FOR HEALTH REASONS IT WILL BE BY A COLLEGIUM OF PARTY ELDERS



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
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CONSISTING OF KIRILENKO, PODGORNYY, KOSYGIN AND SUSLOV, RATHER THAN BY A YOUNGER LEADER. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF BREZHNEV MOVING INTO SOME HONORARY POSITION AS A FACE-SAVING DEVICE WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR HIM TO STEP DOWN FROM OFFICE BUT THAT IF A REAL SHAKEUP IS IN STORE WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE HAD SOME INKLING OF IT BY THIS TIME. IN ANY CASE, HE HAS HAD A BUSY OCTOBER, AND THE SCHEDULE SHAPING UP FOR THE BALANCE OF THE YEAR PROMISES TO BE EQUALLY BUSY (THE CEMA MEETING, THE POLISH CONGRESS OF DECEMBER 8, THE FIRST CUBAN CONGRESS AND POSSIBLY AN ECPC). HIS STAMINA, THEREFORE, IS LIKELY TO BE SUBJECTED TO A SEVERE TEST.

12. FUTURE PROSPECTS. IN CONTEXT OF OVERALL US-SOVIET RELATIONS, A FADING AWAY OF BREZHNEV AND HIS INFLUENCE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT IN INCREASING CAUTION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD. TESTED AND TRIED SOVIET BUREAUCRATS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WAIT TO SEE WHICH WAY THE WIND WAS BLOWING BEFORE MAKING LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS FOR WHICH THEY WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE LATER. THERE WOULD ALSO PROBABLY BE A MARKED OBDRACY WITHIN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY, WHICH WOULD RESIST SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE HISTORIC IMPORTANCE OF A LAME DUCK.

13. IN FACT, WE HAVE NOTED JUST SUCH A MARGINAL, BUT STILL PERCEPTIBLE, CHANGE IN OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY ON A SERIES OF MATTERS - MOST MINOR - OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS. DECISION MAKING, NORMALLY TORPID AT BEST, SEEMS TO BE EVEN SLOWER THAN USUAL AND IN SOME CASES WE HAVE RECEIVED NEGATIVE REPLIES WHEN WE EXPECTED POSITIVE ONES. THESE PHENOMENA COULD BE SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED AWAY AS PAVING NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN AND OF THEMSELVES. ALTERNATIVELY THEY COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO A SLIGHT COOLING OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS, TO PRE-CONGRESS RIGOR MORTIS, OR PERHAPS TO THE FACT THAT WE ARE IN A PRE-SUCCESSION PERIOD. WHILE WE SEEM TO BE SOMEWHAT LESS CONVINCED THAN THE DEPARTMENT THAT THE LAST HURRAH IS IMMEDIATELY UPON US AND STRONGLY DOUBT THAT -- BARKING A COLLAPSE--THE GENERAL SECRETARY MIGHT BE STEPPING DOWN OR MIGHT BE MOVED OUT EVEN BEFORE THE CONGRESS. BREZHNEV'S AGE AND PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKE IT PROBABLE THAT 1976, HIS 70TH YEAR, WILL BE HIS LAST IN POWER. THUS, EVEN IF THE DANCE



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OF SUCCESSION HAS NOT YET ACTUALLY BEGUN, ALL THE DANCERS CAN HEAR THE MUSIC PLAYING JUST OUTSIDE THE ROOM. THIS LENDS EVEN MORE IMPORTANCE, WE WOULD ARGUE, TO ACHIEVING A SATISFACTORY SAI AGREEMENT AND TO ARRANGING A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON SUMMIT WHILE THIS CURRENT LEADERSHIP IS IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE NEXT ONE, AND THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS MAY BE CRUCIAL IN THIS RESPECT.

14. WE ARE, IN ANY CASE, CLEARLY MOVING INTO A TIME OF TRANSITION. LIKE ALL SUCH PERIODS, IT COULD BE ONE OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. THUS, ARBATOV'S METAPHOR (MOSCOW 15962) THAT WE HAVE NOW REACHED A TIME WHEN A "WINDOW/ MAY BE BRIEFLY OPENING IN RELATIONS -- JUST AS A WINDOW OPENS FOR A PLANETARY PROBE AND THEN CLOSES AGAIN--MAY BE ENTIRELY APT.

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
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US
SUBJECT: THE CURRENT SOVIET VIEW OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS

REF: STATE 261650

1. SUMMARY. THERE HAS BEEN A DISTINCT COOLING IN SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE U.S. IN THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, COUPLES WITH GREATER EMPHASIS ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST CAMP AND ON MOSCOW'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORLD "PROGRESSIVE" AND "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS, WE ATTRIBUTE THIS LARGELY TO SOVIET DISAPPOINTMENT AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL SPHERES, INCLUDING MOST NOTABLY WESTERN BACKLASH ON CSCE, EXCLUSION FROM LATEST MIDDLE EAST DISENGAGEMENT, AND DELAY IN CONVERTING VLAJIVOSTOK AGREEMENT INTO SALT II TREATY. IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSION PHASE, THEN BREZHNEV'S UPCOMING DEMISE MIGHT ALSO HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS CHANGED EMPHASIS, BUT WE SEE NO CLEAR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A SUPPOSITION. WHAT IS EVIDENT TO US IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S., APPREHENSIVE ABOUT WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE GROWING CHORUS OF ANTI-SOVIET AND ANTI-DETENTE SENTIMENTS BEING EXPRESSED THERE, AND WORRIED ABOUT THE IMPACT WHICH OUR ELECTION CAMPAIGN MAY HAVE ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. A SALT II AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON SUMMIT WOULD, HOWEVER, BRING RELATIONS BACK TO A MORE EVEN KEEL. IF BREZHNEV IS TO MAKE THE TRIP TO WASHINGTON, THIS WOULD IMPLY AN INTENTION TO CONTINUE HIM IN POWER FOR



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SOME TIME AFTER A MEETING, SINCE A LAME DUCK SUMMIT WOULD MAKE LITTLE SENSE FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. IN ANY CASE, WE MAY WELL BE MOVING INTO A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY, WHICH MIGHT ALSO IN THE LONG RUN TURN OUT TO BE A PERIOD OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. END SUMMARY.

2. THE MEDIA. WE DETECT A PERCEPTIBLE COOLING OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS IN THE RELATIVE STRESS IN THE SOVIET MEDIA ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. CONCOMITANTLY, HEAVY COVERAGE OF RECENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION WITHIN "THE SOCIALIST CAMP" HAS BEEN MARKED. IN ADDITION, MORE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE KREMLIN'S SUPPORT FOR "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS AND ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO SUCH MOVEMENTS. THE SOVIETS' PUBLIC POSITION TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST HAS RECENTLY TOUGHENED AND CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ROLE THERE, BOTH IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT, HAS INCREASED. TREATMENT OF CHINA, ALWAYS HARD, HAS GOTTEN HARDER. THE FIGHTING IN ANGOLA HAS OCCASIONED INCREASINGLY FREQUENT CHARGES OF U.S.-CHINESE COLLUSION AS HAVE VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY CHINESE LEADERS THAT MOSCOW IS LESS TRUSTWORTHY THAN WASHINGTON. IMPLICIT CONTRAST HAS BEEN DRAWN BETWEEN THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO PEKING AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN THAT SCHMIDT'S DEFENSE OF DETENTE AGAINST CHINESE ATTACKS WAS JUXTAPOSED AGAINST WHAT THE LOCAL MEDIA PORTRAYED AS THE SECRETARY'S SILENCE ON THIS SUBJECT. COVERAGE OF THE U.S. ITSELF, TEMPORARILY BRIGHTENED BY APOLLO-SOYUZ AND THE ASTRONAUTS' TRIPS, HAS RECENTLY TENDED MORE AND MORE TO DIGGING AND JABBING IN INNUMERABLE PETTY WAYS.

3. WHILE DETENTE WITH THE WEST RETAINS ITS THEORETICAL PRIMACY, EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR IT IS NOW USUALLY ACCOMPANIED BY WORRIED SORTIES AGAINST DETENTE'S WESTERN ENEMIES OR THEIR CHINESE HELPMATES. THE DRUMBEATING FOR "MILITARY DETENTE" AS A NEXT STEP IN THE PROCESS, INTENDED AS A MAJOR POST-HELSINKI PROPAGANDA THEME, HAS BEEN BROUGHT UP SHORT BY THE UNEXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCE. TREATMENT OF CSCE



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ITSELF HAS TURNED CONSISTENTLY DEFENSIVE AND SOMETIMES SURLY. DETENTE IS NOW USUALLY PAIRED WITH THE NEED FOR ATTENTION TO THE "WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM" AND THE "WORLD COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' MOVEMENT."

4. THE TROUBLED GISCARD VISTIT RECEIVED ONLY MODERATE AND CORRECT MEDIA TREATMENT AND WAS FAR OVERSHADOWED BY THE PLAY GIVEN TO HONECKER AND LE DUAN. EVEN HUNGARIAN PREMIER LAZAR LOOKED GOOD IN GISCARD'S WAKE. THE RECEPTION FOR LE DUAN WAS LAVISH IN ITS SYM- BOLIZATION OF THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO "PROGRESSIVE" FORCES AS WELL AS NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS EVERYWHERE. DURING THE VISIT THE PAGES OF PRAVDA WERE OPENED TO THE KIND OF ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS BY LE DUAN THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS IN SEVERAL YEARS. DETENTE EMERGED A VERY POOR SISTER IN THE PROCESS.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE NOTICEABLE SLACKENING OF SOVIET LIP SERVICE TO THE OVERALL CONCEPT OF DETENTE. THE PEACE POLICY OF THE 24TH CONGRESS IS STILL SINGLED OUT AS A LANDMARK. VARIOUS STATE- MENTS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND OTHER AMERICANS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE RECEIVED PROMINENT SPACE IN THE PAGES OF THE CENTRAL PRESS. DETENTE, THE KREMLIN CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN, BUT IN A MORE TROUBLED TONE, MUST BE MADE "IRREVERSIBLE", (PERHAPS SYMBOLIC OF THE IMPORTANCE STILL ACCORDED TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IS THE RECENT ELEVATION OF KORNIYENKO, HEAD OF THE USA DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, TO THE RANK OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER).

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6. DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE U.S. IN THE PRESS HAS EXTENDED BEYOND THE USUAL SNIPIING AT THE ILLS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY--UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIME, RACIAL PROBLEMS, ETC. -- TO INCLUDE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE INHERENT STRENGTH OF "ANTI-SOVIET" POLITICAL FORCES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN POINTING WITH CONCERN AT WHAT THEY SEE AS A RISING CHORUS OF UNJUSTIFIABLE ANTI-SOVIET CRITICISM. THEY ARE WORRIED AT THE EFFECT SUCH CRITICISM MAY HAVE ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND DETENTE AS A WHOLE AND FEAR THAT OUR UPCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN COULD LEAD TO A FURTHER EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS. WHILE SUCH STATEMENTS ARE AT LEAST IN PART SELF-SERVING, THEY HAVE BECOME SO FREQUENT AND SO POINTED THAT THEY RAISE LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER WE MAY BE IN FOR A SWITCH IN EMPHASIS IN SOVIET POLICY. THIS COULD CONCEIVABLY BE SEEN AS PART OF A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY PRECEDING BREZHNEV'S DEPARTURE FOR VALHALLA, ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE IS FAR FROM CLEAR ON THIS.

7. OUR OWN VIEW, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE CHANGE OF EMPHASIS DESCRIBED ABOVE HAS BEEN LARGELY DETERMINED BY CONCRETE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE IN RECENT MONTHS. THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY LINE DOES NOT SEEM TO US TO BE IN QUESTION. SUSLOV LECTURED THE SENATORS ON IT THIS SUMMER; GROMYKO GAVE A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP'S INTENTION TO WRITE IT



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INTO THE RECORD OF THE 25TH CONGRESS IN HIS SEPTEMBER KOMMUNIST ARTICLE; BREZHNEV REAFFIRMED IT AT HELSINKI AND IN HIS TOAST TO GISCARD OCTOBER 15; AND THE MEDIA PROMOTE IT WITH INCESSANT VIGOR. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS "GENERAL LINE" IN THIS HIERARCHICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

R. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES. BUT BREZHNEV'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE WAY THINGS HAVE WORKED OUT SINCE HELSINKI SEEMS APPARENT. HE CLEARLY HAD A DUAL-TRACK MASTER PLAN WHICH CALLED FOR CONCENTRATION AFTER HELSINKI ON MILITARY DETENTE IN POST-CSCE SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND, SIMULTANEOUSLY, DEVOTION OF MORE TIME TO CEMENTING RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. HIS TIMETABLE CALLED FOR RUNNING UP TO THE 25TH CONGRESS ALONG BOTH FOREIGN POLICY TRACKS--I.E., HE HOPED TO SYMBOLIZE THE TRIUMPH OF HIS "PEACE POLICY" BY HAVING SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED A SALT AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON SUMMIT, ON THE ONE HAND, AS WELL AS AN ECPC CONFERENCE ON THE OTHER. WHATEVER SUCCESS THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD, HOWEVER, HAS THUS FAR ONLY BEEN ALONG ONE OF THESE TRACKS. FOR THIS THEY LARGELY BLAME THE US AND THE WEST EUROPEANS, WHOM THEY SEE AS HAVING SABOTAGED THE ERA OF GOOD FEELING THAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN USHERED IN AFTER HELSINKI. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES WOULD INCLUDE:

A. CSCE BACKLASH. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, THE SOVIETS WERE UNEASY ABOUT THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND THIS UNEASINESS HAS BEEN FED AND COMPOUNDED BY THREE MAJOR SURPRISES DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE FIRST WAS THE TOTALLY UNEXPECTED WAVE OF CRITICISM IN THE U.S. AGAINST THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. THE SECOND WAS THE FAILURE OF THE "VLADIVOSTOK SPIRIT" TO HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE TRADE/EMIGRATION IMPASSE. THE THIRD HAS BEEN THE UNEXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE AND THE CONSEQUENT BASIC QUESTIONING OF THE VALUE OF DETENTE BY MORE AND MORE PEOPLE WITHIN AMERICAN SOCIETY. IN ANY CASE, THIS POST-CSCE BACKLASH HAS CLEARLY THROWN A MONKEYWRENCH INTO THE SOVIET SCENARIO WHICH CALLED FOR A TRIUMPHAL CSCE CULMINATION LEADING UP TO AN EQUALLY TRIUMPHAL REAFFIRMATION OF DETENTE AT THE 25TH CONGRESS.

B. THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO DISTURBED THAT



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
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THEY HAVE BEEN FROZEN OUT OF THE LATEST PEACE AGREEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING CUT INTO THE ACTION -- AS THEY THINK THEY SHOULD BE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP -- IN WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE A VITAL AREA. THE DIRECT ATTACKS BY SADAT IMPUGNING SOVIET MOTIVES AND DISPARAGING THEIR AID WERE CLEARLY REGARDED HERE AS A CHALLENGE. THE SOVIETS MAY WELL FEEL THAT SADAT'S DISTRESSING BARBS COULD PERHAPS HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF WASHINGTON HAD INFORMED THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT THAT SUCH BLATANT ANTI-SOVIET BAITING WOULD BE UNWISE.

C. PORTUGAL. HACKLES HAVE ALSO BEEN RAISED IN THE KREMLIN BY CONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS IN THE WEST THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VIOLATING THE RULES OF DETENTE BY THEIR ACTIONS IN PORTUGAL. MOSCOW'S VIEW IS THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS BEEN OPERATING WITHIN DETENTE GUIDELINES AND HAS BEEN DOING LITTLE WHICH COULD BE DESCRIBED HONESTLY AS DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN LISBON'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR AS IMPERILING DETENTE. POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO A FOREIGN CP IS, IN THEIR VIEW, PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE, AND THEY PROBABLY CONCEDE OUTRIGHT TO DO THE SAME IN RESPECT TO OUR FRIENDS, EVEN THOUGH THE LATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED GRIST FOR THE PROPAGANDA MILL.)

D. CHINA. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY NOW REGARD THEIR RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND ITS EFFECT THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNIST AND THIRD WORLD AS THEIR MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM. THEY ARE DEEPLY WORRIED THAT WE MAY BE MANEUVERING TO HAVE CHINA BECOME ALMOST AN ALLY OF THE U.S. THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT AT THE VERY LEAST A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD ENSURE EQUAL TREATMENT OF MOSCOW AND PEKING. THEY ARE THEREFORE PROBABLY DISTURBED AT THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO CHINA AND THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING ONE.

E. BILATERAL IRRITANTS. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL DIFFICULTIES HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSED THEM INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AS TESTIFIED TO BY THEIR FAILURE TO PUBLICIZE THE LONG-TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. OUR ATTEMPTS TO USE THIS GRAIN DEAL AS A LEVER TO EXTRACT SIGNIFICANT PRICE CON-



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SESSIONS ON SOVIET OIL, ALTHOUGH UNDERSTANDABLE, WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE SUBJECT OF HEATED POLITBUREAU DISCUSSION, AND MAY HAVE RESULTED IN SOME REAL RESENTMENT. A WHOLE RANGE OF OTHER BILATERAL IRRITANTS -- SOMETIMES PETTY, SOMETIMES LESS SO -- CONTINUE TO TROUBLE THE SOVIETS. AMONG THEM ARE DIFFICULTIES REGARDING VISAS, SOME OF WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE REAL DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING. OUR FAILURE TO ALLOW A CPSU DELEGATION TO ATTEND THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS, FOR EXAMPLE, DESPITE PLEAS AT VERY HIGH LEVELS, UNDOUBTEDLY GALLED THE SOVIETS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN OUR FAILURE TO MOVE AHEAD ON CONSTRUCTION OF BOTH EMBASSY PROJECTS.

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
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F. SALT AND MRFR. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE EXPECTED PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS INTENDED TO MOVE DETENTE ALONG AND BRING BREZHNEV TO WASHINGTON IN TRIUMPH, HAS NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING. THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE MADE LARGE CONCESSIONS AT SALT ON VERIFICATION WHICH HAVE BEEN NEITHER MATCHED NOR EVEN SUITABLY RECOGNIZED BY THE U.S. (WE CAN CONCEIVE OF NO SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH ANY VOICE IN THESE MATTERS, NO MATTER HOW GREAT HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, WHO WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE USSR SHOULD AGREE THAT LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED STRATEGIC WEAPONS OR THAT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER SHOULD BE WITHIN THE VLADIVOSTOK CEILING.) IN ADDITION, THE EXPECTED OFFER OF OPTION III IN MRFR HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE. WHILE SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT LACK OF PROGRESS IN THESE MATTERS ARE CLEARLY SELF-SERVING, WE SUSPECT THAT MOSCOW IN FACT STRONGLY RESENTS BEING DRIVEN UP AGAINST ITS OWN CONGRESS DEADLINE BY ITS U.S. NEGOTIATING PARTNER. THE OTHER SOVIET GRIEVANCES, HOWEVER, PALE IN IMPORTANCE AS COMPARED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SECOND SALT AGREEMENT AND A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON SUMMIT. ACHIEVEMENT OF BOTH THESE OBJECTIVES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESTORE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS TO AN EVEN KEEL.

G. THE PARTY CONGRESS. ANOTHER FACTOR EXPLAINING INCREASING SOVIET PUBLIC COOLNESS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES IS THE PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON PAST



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PERFORMANCE IT WAS PREDICTABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO CONSOLIDATING AND GARNERING SUPPORT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS THEY PREPARED FOR THE CONGRESS. (THE HOMESTRETCH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO PROBABLY HAVE OBLIGED THEM TO DO SO, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER FACTOR.) IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE CONGRESS WE EXPECT TO SEE A NARROWING SOVIET FOCUS ON A SHRINKING NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY AREAS, WITH SOVIET DECISION-MAKING EFFICIENCY DECLINING AS THE CONGRESS APPROACHES. SUCH A FREEZING OF THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS WILL PROBABLY BE HEIGHTENED IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSION PERIOD, AS POSTULATED IN REFTEL.

10. THE BREZHNEV FACTOR. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY AT LEAST SOME OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN REFTEL (A FULLER EXPOSITION OF OUR VIEWS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTTEL), OUTWARD INDICATORS HERE ARE THAT BREZHNEV REMAINS NUMBER ONE FOR THE PRESENT. HUGE PHOTOS OF HIM HAVE BEEN MOUNTED ALL OVER MOSCOW, FOR EXAMPLE, AS PART OF THE PREPARATION FOR THE 58TH OCTOBER AND HE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE DAILY ENCOMIUMS IN ALL MEDIA. EVEN IF HE IS SHORTLY TO STEP DOWN FROM THE TOP SPOT, WE REMAIN CONVINCED IT WOULD BE FOR HEALTH RATHER THAN FOR POLITICAL REASONS. HOWEVER, HIS REMOVAL FROM THE SCENE WOULD OBVIOUSLY COMPLICATE PLANS FOR THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS WELL AS FOR THE PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON NEITHER OCCASION WOULD IT BE USEFUL FOR THE CPSU TO HAVE A LAME DUCK PRESIDING AND MAKING VITAL DECISIONS. WE THEREFORE EXPECT THAT AT THE NEXT CPSU/CC PLENUM, PRESUMABLY DECEMBER 1, THE SITUATION MAY BE SOMEWHAT CLARIFIED BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MAIN SPEAKER AT THE CONGRESS AND ITS AGENDA. THIS SHOULD BE A FIRM INDICATOR OF BREZHNEV'S PLANS, OR, CONCEIVABLY, THE PLANS BEING MADE BY OTHERS FOR BREZHNEV.

11. IN ANY CASE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF NUANCE (SUSLOV AND PODGORNYY, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEM TO TAKE A TOUGHER LINE THAN OTHERS TOWARD THE VALUE TO BE DERIVED FROM DETENTE), WE HAVE THUS FAR DISCERNED NO IDENTIFIABLE POLICY DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE POLITBUREAU WHICH WOULD SIGNIFY A LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AND THEREFORE



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CONTINUE TO ASSUME THAT IF BREZHNEV IS REPLACED FOR HEALTH REASONS IT WILL BE BY A COLLEGIUM OF PARTY ELDERS CONSISTING OF KIRILENKO, PODOBORNYY, KOSYGIN AND SUSLOV, RATHER THAN BY A YOUNGER LEADER. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF BREZHNEV MOVING INTO SOME HONORARY POSITION AS A FACE-SAVING DEVICE WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR HIM TO STEP DOWN FROM OFFICE BUT THAT IF A REAL SHAKEUP IS IN STORE WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE HAD SOME INKLING OF IT BY THIS TIME. IN ANY CASE, HE HAS HAD A BUSY OCTOBER, AND THE SCHEDULE SHAPING UP FOR THE BALANCE OF THE YEAR PROMISES TO BE EQUALLY BUSY (THE CEMA MEETING, THE POLISH CONGRESS OF DECEMBER 6, THE FIRST CUBAN CONGRESS AND POSSIBLY AN ECPC). HIS STAMINA, THEREFORE, IS LIKELY TO BE SUBJECTED TO A SEVERE TEST.

12. FUTURE PROSPECTS. IN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL US-SOVIET RELATIONS, A FADING AWAY OF BREZHNEV AND HIS INFLUENCE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT IN INCREASING CAUTION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD. TESTED AND TRIED SOVIET BUREAUCRATS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WAIT TO SEE WHICH WAY THE WIND WAS BLOWING BEFORE MAKING LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS FOR WHICH THEY WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE LATER. THERE WOULD ALSO PROBABLY BE A MARKED OBSCURITY WITHIN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY, WHICH WOULD RESIST SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE HISTORIC IMPORTANCE OF A LAME DUCK.

13. IN FACT, WE HAVE NOTED JUST SUCH A MARGINAL, BUT STILL PERCEPTIBLE, CHANGE IN OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY ON A SERIES OF MATTERS - MOST MINOR - OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS. DECISIONMAKING, NORMALLY TORPID AT BEST, SEEMS TO BE EVEN SLOWER THAN USUAL AND IN SOME CASES WE HAVE RECEIVED NEGATIVE REPLIES WHEN WE EXPECTED POSITIVE ONES. THESE PHENOMENA COULD BE SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED AWAY AS HAVING NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN AND OF THEMSELVES. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO A SLIGHT COOLING OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS, TO PRE-CONGRESS RIGOR MORTIS, OR PERHAPS TO THE FACT THAT WE ARE IN A PRE-SUCCESSION PERIOD. WHILE WE SEEM TO BE SOMEWHAT LESS CONVINCED THAN THE DEPARTMENT THAT THE LAST HURRAH IS IMMEDIATELY UPON US AND STRONGLY DOUBT THAT BARRING A COLLAPSE--THE GENERAL SECRETARY MIGHT BE STEPPING DOWN OR MIGHT BE MOVED OUT EVEN BEFORE THE CONGRESS, BREZHNEV'S



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AGE AND PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKE IT PROBABLE THAT 1976, HIS 70TH YEAR, WILL BE HIS LAST IN POWER. THUS, EVEN IF THE DANCE OF SUCCESSION HAS NOT YET ACTUALLY BEGUN, ALL THE DANCERS CAN HEAR THE MUSIC PLAYING JUST OUTSIDE THE ROOM. THIS LENDS EVEN MORE IMPORTANCE, WE WOULD ARGUE, TO ACHIEVING A SATISFACTORY SALT AGREEMENT AND TO ARRANGING A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON SUMMIT WHILE THIS CURRENT LEADERSHIP IS IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE NEXT ONE, AND THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS MAY BE CRUCIAL IN THIS RESPECT.0

14. WE ARE, IN ANY CASE, CLEARLY MOVING INTO A TIME OF TRANSITION. LIKE ALL SUCH PERIODS, IT COULD BE ONE OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. THUS, ARRATOV'S METAPHOR (MOSCOW 15952) THAT WE HAVE NOW REACHED A TIME WHEN A "WINDOW" MAY BE BRIEFLY OPENING IN OUR RELATIONS -- JUST AS A WINDOW OPENS FOR A PLANETARY PROBE AND THEN CLOSES AGAIN--MAY BE ENTIRELY APT.

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