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# Department of State

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5146

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: SDS

TAGS: OVIP (NIXON, RICHARD M.) CH US

SUBJECT: VIP VISIT: FORMER PRESIDENT AND MRS. RICHARD  
M. NIXON: USLO ROLE

1. IN ABSENCE OF INFORMATION TO CONTRARY, WE ASSUME THAT HAN HSU'S CONTACT WITH THE WHITE HOUSE IS THE ONLY DISCUSSION (EXCEPTING ON SUCH TECHNICAL MATTERS AS SECURITY AND AIRCRAFT) PROLO HAS HAD WITH US OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON ABOUT FORTHCOMING VISIT OF FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON. GIVEN "PRIVATE" NATURE OF THE VISIT, WE HAVE NOT BEEN SURPRISED THAT THE CHINESE HAVE TAKEN NO INITIATIVE WITH US HERE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR IT BEYOND REQUESTING VISAS FOR AIR CREW AND PROTOCOL OFFICERS. STARTING WITH THE APPROVAL HERE OF THE ADVANCE SECRET SERVICE TEAM, HOWEVER, USLO MAY NEED AT ANY TIME TO INDICATE TO MFA WHAT WE WOULD EXPECT OUR ROLE IN THE VISIT TO BE.

2. WE, OF COURSE, HAVE NO PRECISE PRECEDENT FOR A VISIT OF THIS NATURE AND, EVEN IN THE CASES OF THE SUPERFICIALLY-SIMILAR VISITS LAST YEAR OF THE UK'S SMITH AND WEST GERMANY'S STRAUSS, THERE WERE DIFFERENCES IN THE WAYS THE TWO EMBASSIES PARTICIPATED. IN BOTH CASES THE MISSION CHIEFS TOOK PART IN AIRPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE AND IN DINNERS, BUT THE UK AMBASSADOR ATTENDED MEETINGS WITH PRO LEADERS AND GERMAN AMBASSADOR DID NOT. AT ANY RATE, THE VISIT OF FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON IS SUI GENERIS AND WILL, OF COURSE,

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BE A MAJOR NEWS EVENT, WITH THE ROLE OF USLO UNDERGOING CLOSE SCRUTINY FROM VARIOUS QUARTERS AS AN INDICATION OF, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE USG ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VISIT.

3. THE NATURE OF USLO PARTICIPATION WILL BE DEPENDENT, FINALLY, ON THE DESIRES OF THE CHINESE AND OF MR. NIXON. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE THE DEPARTMENT'S REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS, WHICH ARE DESIGNED PRINCIPALLY TO SERVE THE US-PRC RELATIONSHIP WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THIS IS A PRIVATE VISIT WHICH NEVERTHELESS WILL BE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED:

A. AIRPORT ARRIVAL. ACTING CHIEF WOULD (1) BE PRESENT AT PEKING AIRPORT TO GREET THE FORMER PRESIDENT ON ARRIVAL, AND (2) TAKE INITIATIVE, IF NECESSARY, TO INSURE THAT THE PRC MAKES APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS.

B. CEREMONIAL DINNERS. (1) WE WOULD NOT SEEK INVITATION FOR ACTING CHIEF'S ATTENDANCE, BUT (2) WE WOULD ACCEPT IF INVITED.

C. MEETINGS WITH CHINESE LEADERS. (1) WE WOULD NOT TAKE INITIATIVE FOR ACTING CHIEF'S ATTENDANCE BUT (2) WE WOULD ACCEPT IF INVITED.

D. ACTING CHIEF WOULD OFFER USLO COURTESY OF ANY PRIVATE TYPE DESIRED (E.G., VISIT TO USLO).

E. AIRPORT DEPARTURE. PARTICIPATION SAME AS ON ARRIVAL.

4. IF DEPARTMENT CONCURS IN ABOVE PROPOSALS, WE HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ADVISE FORMER PRESIDENT OF A AND E, WHICH SEEM TO US TO BE ESSENTIAL MINIMUM PARTICIPATION. IT OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE ADVANCE GUIDANCE IN REGARD TO D. CONCERNING B AND C, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S WISHES WOULD DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT CHINESE INVITE ACTING CHIEF, AND IF DEPARTMENT WANTS ACTING CHIEF TO ATTEND, THIS WOULD BEST BE RAISED WITH MR. NIXON BEFORE HE

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
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PAGE 03 PEKING 00250 131025Z

MEETS WITH PROTOCOL CHIEF CHU.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: EARLY INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH WILL  
ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE VISIT TO  
THE DEGREE AND IN THE MANNER THE DEPARTMENT DESIRES.  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5147

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGSI OYIP (NIXON, RICHARD M.) CH US  
SUBJECT: VIP VISIT: FORMER PRESIDENT AND MRS.  
RICHARD M. NIXON: COURTESIES TO PROTOCOL  
CHIEF CHU

REF: PEKING 231, PEKING 250

1. PEKING 231 REPORTED THAT CHIEF OF PROTOCOL CHU CHUAN-HSIEN WILL HEAD THREE-MAN PARTY ACCOMPANYING FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON TO CHINA ABOARD CAAC AIRCRAFT. CHU NOT ONLY WILL BE AMONG HIGHEST-RANKING CHINESE TO HAVE VISITED US ON BUSINESS UNRELATED TO PROLO AND UN, BUT HE ALSO HAS PLAYED MAJOR AND VERY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN VISITS TO CHINA BY THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT.

2. WHATEVER POSTURE WE ADOPT IN RESPECT TO OTHER ASPECTS OF VISIT OF FORMER PRESIDENT, WE BELIEVE THAT COURTESIES APPROPRIATE TO CHU'S POSITION AND ROLE IN US-PRO RELATIONS SHOULD BE ACCORDED HIM BY DEPARTMENT ON HIS ARRIVAL AND WHILE HE IS IN UNITED STATES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S INFORMING US AS SOON AS DECISIONS ON HANDLING CHU'S VISIT ARE MADE SO THAT WE CAN HAVE THEM IN MIND DURING ANY CONTACTS WITH CHINESE HERE.  
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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP (NIXON, RICHARD M.) CH US  
SUBJECT: VISIT TO PRC OF FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON:  
INVITATIONS FROM CHINESE

1. MFA PROTOCOL OFFICE TOOK INITIATIVE MORNING FEB 20 TO INVITE USLO TO BE AT AIRPORT FOR FORMER PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL FEB 21 AT 8:20 PM. WE HAVE INFORMED MFA THAT ACTING CHIEF AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS (PROBABLY ECON CHIEF THOMAS AND WIFE) WILL GREET MR. NIXON.
2. EARLY AFTERNOON FEB 20 PROTOCOL OFFICE TELEPHONED US TO INVITE "TEN PLUS" SENIOR USLO DIPLOMATS AND WIVES TO ATTEND WELCOME BANQUET SUNDAY NIGHT AND CULTURAL EVENT MONDAY NIGHT. CHINESE HAVE THUS NOW TAKEN INITIATIVE TO WHICH PEKING 250, PARA 3B ADDRESSED BUT ABOUT WHICH STATE 39739 LEFT DEPARTMENT'S ATTITUDE UNCLEAR.
3. WE MUST REPLY TO CHINESE BY MORNING FEB 21 PEKING TIME, UNLESS DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTS OTHERWISE, WE WILL INFORM MFA THEN THAT ACTING CHIEF AND THREE USLO COUNSELORS AND WIVES (A TOTAL OF SEVEN) ACCEPT INVITATION TO BOTH BANQUET AND CULTURAL EVENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS NUMBER IS ADEQUATE TO AVOID COMPLICATING RELATIONS HERE WITH CHINESE.
4. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE BY 1000 AM FEBRUARY 21 PEKING TIME ON USLO PARTICIPATION IN BANQUET AND CULTURAL EVENT. THAYER

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR CH US  
SUBJECT: NOMINATION OF NEW USLO CHIEF

REF: STATE 55655

1. IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH USLO WIVES AND FEMALE STAFFERS AT WOMEN'S DAY EVENT MARCH 8, NANCY TANG NOTED MATTER OF FACTLY: ". . . YOU HAVE A NEW CHIEF NOW."

2. WE SURMISE THAT CHINESE OFFICIALS WILL NOW BE MENTIONING THIS ALSO TO OTHER IN THE PEKING COMMUNITY AS OCCASIONS PERMIT.  
THAYER



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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CH, US  
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH PRC LEADERS

REF: PEKING 837 STATE 109863

1. THIS SUPPLEMENTS REPORT IN PEKING REPTEL ON MY CALL MAY 8 ON MFA PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR CHU CHUAN-HSIEN,

2. IN VIEW OF HIS CONSIDERABLE STATURE IN PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS SYSTEM AND UNDOUBTED RELIABILITY, I DECIDED TO TELL CHU THAT FOLLOWING MY CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER I HOPED TO CALL ON THE PREMIER, I NOTED THAT I HAD A LETTER TO THE PREMIER FROM THE PRESIDENT THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTED ME TO DELIVER, AND THERE WERE ALSO SOME MATTERS THE PRESIDENT WANTED ME TO DISCUSS WITH THE PREMIER. (NOTE: WE HAVE THE PRESIDENT'S TO HUA LETTER IN HAND.) CHU SAID HE WOULD REPORT THIS PROMPTLY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE PREMIER, HE PUT SOME STRESS ON BOTH "PROMPTLY" AND "TO THE PREMIER".  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5651

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: FPR CH US  
SUBJECT: ALL ON PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG: GATES/CHIAO MEETING MAY 15

1. DURING USLO CHIEF'S CALL ON HIM MAY 16 FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO SAID "WE CAN ARRANGE AN APPOINTMENT" WITH THE PREMIER. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF TIMING, BUT WE SENSE THERE WILL NOT BE A LONG DELAY.
2. CHIAO OBVIOUSLY HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY HIS PROTOCOL DIRECTOR ABOUT USLO CHIEF'S DESIRE TO MEET WITH HUA, AND WAS READY WITH THE ANSWER. THE SUBJECT OF THE MEETING WITH HUA -- AND THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO HUA -- CAME UP NATURALLY AS PART OF USLO CHIEF'S RESPONSE TO CHIAO'S EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS WOULD CONTINUE ALONG LINES OF SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.
3. CHIAO DID NOT ASK FOR THE LETTER. WE PLAN TO SEND IT TO MFA A DAY OR SO BEFORE APPOINTMENT WITH HUA.
4. OTHER MATTERS COVERED IN 35 MINUTES OF FRIENDLY CONVERSATION WITH CHIAO ARE BEING REPORTED IN SEPTELS.  
GATES

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CH US

SUBJECT: CALL ON PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG; GATES-WANG MEETING MAY 22

REF: STATE 100063; PEKING 0892; PEKING 0912

1. DURING DINNER CONVERSATION MAY 22 WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG, USLO CHIEF NOTED HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING WITH PREMIER HUA. WANG COMMENTED THAT THAT MATTER WAS IN THE HANDS OF MFA PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT, ALSO THAT THE PREMIER HAD BEEN VERY BUSY AND THAT PAKISTAN PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO WAS ARRIVING LATER THIS WEEK.

2. COMMENT: WANG'S MENTION OF BHUTTO VISIT (SCHEDULED FOR MAY 26-30) COULD WELL BE A SIGNAL THAT HUA WILL NOT RECEIVE USLO CHIEF BEFORE NEXT WEEK AT THE EARLIEST. WE CONTINUE TO HOLD THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, DATED APRIL 27.  
GATES

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DEPT PLEASE PASS ISLAMABAD

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR KW US PK  
SUBJECT: BHUTTO OFFER OF ASSISTANCE ON KOREA

DURING MY INTRODUCTORY JUNE 1 CALL ON PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR ALVIE, HE PASSED ON A MESSAGE TO ME FROM PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO. BHUTTO HAD INSTRUCTED ALVIE TO TELL ME THAT BHUTTO VOLUNTEERS HIS SERVICES TO BE HELPFUL ON THE KOREAN SITUATIONS AND HE BELIEVES HE CAN BE HELPFUL IN PROMOTING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH. ALVIE MENTIONED THIS AS BEING SIMILAR TO THE PAKISTAN PLAYED IN SMOOTHING THE WAY FOR OUR IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING. HE LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT BHUTTO HAD DISCUSSED HIS AVAILABILITY FOR THIS PURPOSE WITH THE NORTH KOREANS. HE ALSO SAID THAT BHUTTO WOULD OR HAD ADVISED AMB BYRGADE ALONG THE SAME LINES.  
GATES

NOTE: NOT PASS ISLAMABAD

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02 ~~SECRET~~  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/6/03



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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, CH, US  
SUBJECT: JUNE 10 MEETING WITH HUA KUO-FENG: WORLD ISSUES  
REF: PEKING 1048

1. IN DISCUSSING WORLD ISSUES AT OUR JUNE 10 MEETING, PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG BEGAN WITH THE COMMENT THAT VERY LITTLE HAD CHANGED ON THE MAJOR ISSUES SINCE PRESIDENT FORD MET WITH CHAIRMAN MAO. HE THEN DISCUSSED PRC POSITIONS ON ANGOLA, AND DETENTE, WESTERN EUROPE, JAPAN, ASEAN, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, SOUTH ASIA AND EGYPT. A STRONG ANTI-SOVIET THREAT RAN THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION: HE SPOKE OF THE SOVIET THREAT TO EUROPE AND JAPAN, ETC., BUT NOT TO CHINA. HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOW.

2. SOVIET HEGEMONIC AMBITIONS AND WESTERN EUROPE. HUA COMMENTED THAT PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES WERE COMING AROUND TO SEE THE TRUE HEGEMONIC FEATURES OF THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET ACTIONS IN ANGOLA HAD BEEN INSTRUCTIVE IN THIS REGARD. HE SAID THAT IN CONVERSATIONS WITH BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER CROSLAND, FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF MERY, AND VARIOUS WEST GERMAN VISITORS, HE FOUND A BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS ARE USING DETENTE AS A SMOKE SCREEN FOR A "FINLANDIZATION" OF EUROPE AND WESTERN EUROPE HAS RAISED ITS VIGILANCE, DEVELOPING UNITY, AND IMPROVED TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES. TO MY REITERATION OF THE ENCOURAGING RESULTS OF THE RECENT NATO MEETING, HUA SAID THIS WAS WELCOME. TO MY REITERATION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD REMAIN STRONG

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *TD 9/27/02* ~~SECRET~~

NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/6/03*





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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AND OPPOSE SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, HE SMILINGLY MENTIONED THE "SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE" AND ENDED HIS REMARKS ON EUROPE AND DETENTE.

3. JAPAN: IN A LONG DISCOURSE ON JAPAN THAT APPEARED TO EMBARRASS HIS AIDES, HUA CHARACTERIZED SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AS "GENERALLY-SPEAKING GOOD", NOTED CHINA HAD TOLD JAPAN TO LOOK FIRST TO THE U.S. AND THEN TO CHINA, AND THEN PROCEEDED TO COMPLAIN THAT PRIME MINISTER

MIKI HAD NOT FOLLOWED THROUGH ON FORMER PRIME MINISTER TANAKA'S AGREEMENT TO SIGN THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY. HE SAID THAT THE TREATY REMAINED UNSIGNED BECAUSE OF THE HEGEMONY ISSUE BUT THEY AGAIN CHARACTERIZED SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AS "STILL GOOD" AND REAFFIRMED STANDARD PRC SUPPORT FOR RETURN OF JAPAN'S FOUR NORTHERN ISLANDS.

4. ASEAN: HUA NOTED VISITS TO PRC BY ASEAN LEADERS, HE COMMENTING THAT THE PRC HAD NOT ESTABLISHED RELATIONS WITH SINGAPORE DURING LEE'S VISIT BUT THAT THE DISCUSSIONS HAD GONE "NOT BADLY" AND NOTED RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA REMAIN SUSPENDED. HUA SAID THE PRC "GENERALLY SUPPORTS" ASEAN AND WAS GLADDENED BY THE RAISED VIGILANCE TO "KEEP THE TIGER FROM ENTERING THE BACK DOOR WHILE THE WOLF WAS BEING DRIVEN OUT FROM THE FRONT".

5. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: HE SAID THAT THE PRC "FAVORS AND ADMIRES" INCREASED VIGILANCE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AGAINST THE THREAT OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND INCREASED ATTENTION TO DEFENSE. HE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND HAD BOTH EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. ON THE BASIS OF QUALITY AND THAT THE TALKS WITH MULDOON HAD GONE WELL.

6. SOUTH ASIA: TAKING A TOUGH AND WARY LINE AGAINST INDIA AS SEEKING "PETTY HEGEMONY" IN THE REGION, HE CRITICIZED INDIAN ACTIONS TOWARD BANGLADESH AND NEPAL. HOWEVER, WHILE INDIA WAS PUSHING "PETTY HEGEMONY" AND THE SOVIETS WERE INVOLVED IN BIG POWER HEGEMONY, HE SAID THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND THEY WERE NOT MONOLITIC. ACCORDING TO HUA, CHINA DOES NOT BELIEVE

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INDIA WILL BECOME A COMPLETE "RUNNING DOG" OF THE SOVIET UNION, BUT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO USE INDIA AND SEEK OVERLAND ACCESS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. HE SAID CHINA HAD AGREED TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS WITH INDIA AND WILL WORK TO DEVELOP SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS, BUT THAT CHINA WOULD UPHOLD ITS PRINCIPLES IN THIS PROCESS. HE CHARACTERIZED RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND NEPAL AS "VERY GOOD" AND VOICED SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, AND TURKEY AS WELL AS WITH INDIA. HE NOTED THAT CHINA BELIEVED THE U.S. SHOULD HELP PAKISTAN WIN OVER INDIA FROM THE SOVIETS.

7. EGYPT: IN A POINTED DIFFERENCE WITH MY CHARACTERIZATION OF THE REASONS FOR EGYPT'S MOVE AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION, HUA SAID THEY BELIEVED EGYPT'S ACTIONS RESULTED FROM SOVIET TEACHING BY NEGATIVE EXAMPLE.

8. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT THIS AND REFTEL TO HONG KONG.

9. FULL TEXT WILL FOLLOW JUNE 11.  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12058, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02  
BY HAR, NARA, DATE 2/7/03

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, CH, US  
SUBJECT: JUNE 10 MEETING WITH PREMIER HUA

1. I MET WITH PREMIER HUA FOR ONE HOUR AND THREE QUARTERS JUNE 10. I PRESENTED ALL TALKING POINTS PER INSTRUCTIONS STATE 109863 AND 139556. IN RESPONSE, HUA, FIRST SPEAKING FROM PREPARED TEXT, COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON PRESIDENT'S LETTER (DELIVERED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY THREE HOURS EARLIER) AND SOLIDLY CONFIRMED CONTINUITY OF CHINESE VIEW OF SINO-US RELATIONS. HE REFERRED TO CHAIRMAN MAO'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY AND CHARACTERIZED BILATERAL ISSUES (INCLUDING TAIWAN) AS MINOR, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AS MAJOR CONCERN. HUA THEN DELIVERED HIS OWN "EXTEMPORANEOUS" VIEW OF WORLD SCENE, STARTING WITH ANALYSIS OF HEIGHTENED THIRD COUNTRY AWARENESS OF SOVIET THREAT AND LENGTHY SUMMARY OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS. HE DISPLAYED SHARP WARINESS AND CONTINUED DISTRUST OF INDIA AND SAID LITTLE ABOUT AFRICA DESPITE LONG SECTION OF MY PRESENTATION DEVOTED TO THAT AREA.

2. HUA'S POSTURE WAS MARKEDLY FRIENDLY. HE APOLOGIZED NO LESS THAN THREE TIMES FOR NOT HAVING MET WITH ME EARLIER. MEETING, LASTING FROM 5:00 P.M. TO 6:45 P.M. IN GREAT HALL, WAS PRECEDED BY PHOTOS OF ME AND ACCOMPANYING USLO STAFF. FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO WAS NOT PRESENT. HUA WAS FLANKED BY AMERICAS AND OCEANIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR LIN, PROTOCOL DIRECTOR CHU, US DESK

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CHIEF TING; NANCY TANG INTERPRETED.

3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF HUA'S OPENING REMARKS ON SINO-US RELATIONS (OTHER ASPECTS WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY): QUOTE THANK YOU FOR INFORMING US OF THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. I HAVE RECEIVED PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER WHICH YOU CONVEYED. THANK YOU FOR BRINGING IT. IN THE LETTER THE PRESIDENT GAVE A GOOD INTRODUCTION OF YOU WHICH INCLUDED HIGH PRAISE. HE EXPRESSED HIS HIGHEST CONFIDENCE IN YOU AND THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS. HE SAID YOU WOULD EFFECTIVELY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION. PRESIDENT FORD ALSO SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA HAVE DIFFERENCES ON MAJOR ISSUES THEY HAVE COMMON INTERESTS. HE ALSO GAVE HIS VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND BILATERAL RELATIONS. PRESIDENT FORD EXPRESSED HIS GOOD WISHES TO ME. I WANT YOU TO THANK HIM FOR ME. HE ALSO ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS REGARDS TO CHAIRMAN MAO. I CERTAINLY WILL.

4. YOU HAVE CONVEYED YOUR GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, STRATEGIC ISSUES AND BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE DISCUSSED BY CHAIRMAN MAO WITH PRESIDENT FORD IN DECEMBER AND WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER IN HIS EARLIER VISIT. THESE DISCUSSIONS WENT VERY WELL. IN HIS LETTER PRESIDENT FORD FURTHER REITERATED U.S. COMMITMENT TO FURTHER DEVELOPING SINO-US RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HE SAID THIS WAS THE FIRM POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

5. AS FOR SINO-US RELATIONS, WE BELIEVE AS LONG AS BOTH SIDES ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE RELATIONS WILL DEVELOP FORWARD. THERE DO EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS, BUT ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WE HAVE MANY POINTS IN COMMON. WE SAY THAT IN SINO-US RELATIONS THE MAJOR ASPECTS CONCERN INTER-

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NATIONAL ISSUES. THE MINOR ASPECTS CONCERN BILATERAL  
ISSUES. FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN  
WHICH REMAINS OUTSTANDING. WE HAVE MENTIONED THIS  
PROBLEM ON MANY OCCASIONS. END QUOTE  
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E.O. 11652: XGDS'9  
TAGS: PFOR CH US  
SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMB GATES JUNE 10 MEETING WITH PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG  
REF: PEKING 1048

1. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMB GATES MEETING WITH PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE ON JUNE 10, 1976. MEETING LASTED FROM 5-6:45 P.M. IN ADDITION TO THE PREMIER CHINESE PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED MFA AMERICAN AND OCEANIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING, PROTOCOL DIRECTOR CHU CHUAN-HSIEN, AND MFA AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIVISION CHIEF TING YUAN-HUNG, AND NOTE TAKER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR ADA DEPARTMENT TANG WEN-SHENG (NANCY) INTERPRETED, AMB GATES WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM THAYER, ECON COUNSELOR THOMAS, ACTING POL COUNSELOR PASCOE AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT PERITO. THE MEETING BEGAN AT 5:00 PM AND LASTED FOR ONE HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTES. BEGIN TEXT:

2. GATES: I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR SEEING ME, ESPECIALLY SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN SO BUSY.

3. HUA: I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR WELCOME TO YOU. I AM SORRY I HAVE TAKEN SO LONG TO SEE YOU. YOU ARRIVED ON MAY 6 AND IT IS NOW JUNE 10. SINCE YOU ARRIVED WE HAVE HAD MANY VISITORS. FIRST I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO, AND THEN I MET WITH THE KING OF NEPAL IN SZECHWAN AND TIBET. (WHEN WALKING WITH AMBASSADOR INTO MEETING ROOM, HUA ALREADY HAD APOLOGIZED ONCE FOR THIS DELAY.)

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STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02  
BY WJC, NARA, DATE 2/7/03



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4. GATES: I HAVE RECEIVED A WARM WELCOME. I HAVE ALREADY SEEN FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, AND I HAD DINNER WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER.

5. HUA: AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE?

6. GATES: YES, OF COURSE. IF YOU WILL PERMIT ME, I HAVE A FEW REMARKS WHICH PRESIDENT FORD HAS ASKED ME TO MAKE TO YOU.

7. I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU. I LOOK FORWARD TO MY STAY IN PEKING AND TO WORKING WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT TO PROMOTE THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE REGARDING BOTH VARIOUS GLOBAL MATTERS AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

8. PRESIDENT FORD HAS ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU PERSONALLY HIS CONGRATULATIONS AND GOOD WISHES ON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS PREMIER. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD MY OWN CONGRATULATIONS.

9. I BELIEVE YOU HAVE RECEIVED THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD WHICH I BROUGHT WITH ME, IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE COULD EXCHANGE VIEWS ON BOTH INTERNATIONAL MATTERS AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

10. AS PRESIDENT FORD HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ON MANY OF THESE MATTERS DURING HIS VISIT TO PEKING IN DECEMBER, I WILL NOT COVER ALL OF THE SAME GROUND AGAIN. HOWEVER, HE HAS ASKED ME TO REITERATE SEVERAL BASIC POINTS, AS WELL AS TO COMMENT ON SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD.

11. IN HIS LETTER AND IN HIS MESSAGE TO YOU UPON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS PREMIER, PRESIDENT FORD REAFFIRMED OUR COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THROUGH JOINT EFFORTS BASED ON THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HE HAS ASKED ME TO REITERATE THAT THIS IS OUR FIRM POLICY AND TO SAY HE IS CONFIDENT THAT THOUGH WE CAN ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF FULLY NORMALIZED RELATIONS.

12. WE RESPECT YOUR VIEW THAT UNTIL THAT TIME, THE FURTHER

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DEVELOPMENT OF SOME ASPECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE, NEVERTHELESS, WE WILL WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING WAYS IN WHICH OUR RELATIONSHIP CAN BE STRENGTHENED IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST. I AM PREPARED ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES AT ANY TIME.

13. ON INTERNATIONAL TOPICS, I WOULD FIRST LIKE TO REFER TO OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, BECAUSE OF DIFFERING CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT POLICIES, AND WE RESPECT THE DECISION YOUR COUNTRY HAS MADE REGARDING YOUR POLICY. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE A DUAL POLICY. WHILE WE WISH TO IMPROVE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND STABILIZE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM--AN OBJECTIVE WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHARE EVEN IF OUR TACTICS MAY DIFFER.

14. AS YOU MAY KNOW, SOME YEARS AGO I SERVED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INCLUDING A PERIOD AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IN FACT I WAS THERE FOR EIGHT YEARS AND I HAVE MAINTAINED MY INTEREST IN US DEFENSE MATTERS. I CAN THEREFORE SPEAK FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE ABOUT THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN A STRONG MILITARY POSTURE. PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER ARE ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO THIS GOAL WHICH IS REFLECTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S CURRENT DEFENSE BUDGET. DESPITE SOME OF THE RHETORIC IN OUR ELECTION PROCESS, THE US CLEARLY REMAINS THE NUMBER ONE POWER IN THE WORLD IN TERMS OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POWER. WE INTEND TO REMAIN SO, AND IT APPEARS THAT THE CONGRESS IS NOW INCREASING ITS SUPPORT TO THIS END.

15. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, AND ON THIS POINT ALSO, THERE IS GROWING AWARENESS AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S HEGEMONIC AMBITIONS.

16. AS YOU KNOW FROM YOUR OWN COUNTRY'S EXPERIENCE, IN A COMPLEX AND GLOBAL MATTER SUCH AS THIS ONE, THERE WILL BE OCCASIONAL SETBACKS AS WELL AS SUCCESSES. THE OUTCOME IN ANGOLA WAS SUCH A SETBACK TO OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS. IF WE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT OF THE ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS IN ANGOLA, THE

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OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.

17. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, THAT WE WILL REACT STRONGLY TO FURTHER EFFORTS BY THE SOVIETS TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE BY MILITARY MEANS OR MILITARY PRESSURE WHETHER DIRECTLY OR, AS IN ANGOLA, THROUGH SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT OF THE CUBAN TROOPS. WE HAVE ALSO STATED THAT FURTHER SOVIET ACTIONS LIKE THEIR INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA ARE BOUND TO HAVE A SERIOUS EFFECT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

18. WE HAVE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ACCEPT FURTHER CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION ABROAD. WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA AND BY A POSSIBLE EFFORT TO USE THEM ELSEWHERE.

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19. IT IS ENCOURAGING TO NOTE THE CUBAN INTENTION TO REDUCE THEIR PRESENCE IN ANGOLA, AS INDICATED IN CASTRO'S LETTER TO THE SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER. THE REFLECTS OUR FIRM EFFORTS BOTH IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS. HOWEVER, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW RAPID AND COMPLETE THIS WITHDRAWAL WILL BE AND WE PLAN TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ISSUE. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET/BUKAN ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

20. SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TRIP TO AFRICA WAS DESIGNED IN PART TO AVERT AN INCREASE IN SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AND INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH AFRICAN LEADERS, THE SECRETARY AND THEY WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT DIRECT SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION WAS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA. THE SECRETARY'S PUBLIC STRESS ON AFRICAN SOLUTIONS AND AFRICAN UNITY WAS DESIGNED TO UNDERLINE THIS POINT.

21. THE AFRICANS SAID THEY WISH TO SOLVE THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM THEMSELVES. THIS IS THE US VIEW AS WELL. THE US INITIATIVES ON THE RHODESIA PROBLEM ARE ESPECIALLY IMPOTANT SINCE THEY CAN HELP CONTRIBUTE TO A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE RHONESIAN PROBLEM AND PRECLUDE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD BE TO THE SOVIETS' ADVANTAGE. AS SECRETARY KISSINGER RECENTLY INFORMED AMBASSADOR HUANG CHEN, HE PLANS TO TALK WITH BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA TO HELP FIND A WAY TO ACHIEVE EARLY MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA WHEN HE IS IN EUROPE LATER THIS

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MONTH AND THESE CONVERSATIONS WILL CONTINUE.

22. THE FURTHER CHANGE IN EGYPT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS IS A MAJOR FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT. IT WAS A COURAGEOUS AND STATESMANLIKE MOVE BY PRESIDENT SADAT, AND IS UNDOUBTEDLY VIEWED BY THE SOVIETS AS A MAJOR SETBACK. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST WHICH WE HAVE BUILT WITH EGYPT HELPED TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR PRESIDENT SADAT TO TAKE THAT STEP.

23. WE ARE GRATIFIED THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE THAT AID. WE ARE PROVIDING SOME TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, AND PRESIDENT SADAT UNDERSTANDS WHY WE CANNOT DO MORE THIS YEAR. WE HOPE TO PROVIDE MORE MILITARY AID IN THE FUTURE.

24. WITH RESPECT TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE, WE ARE QUIETLY CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER STEPS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. IT REMAINS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM, AND WE DO NOT EXPECT A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, THE US REMAINS DETERMINED TO HELP MAINTAIN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND REALIZED THE DANGER OF STAGNATION--BOTH IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT AND THE SOVIET ROLE. IT REMAINS OUR PURPOSE TO PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM INJECTING THEMSELVES INTO THE PROCESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE.

25. OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES REMAIN VERY STRONG. IN ADDITION TO OUR JOINT DEFENSE EFFORTS, THE ALLIANCE IS BEING STRENGTHENED BY AN UNPRECEDENTED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND COORDINATION. THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AND CLOSE

TRANS-ATLANTIC TIES ARE PARAMOUNT US INTERESTS AND WILL BE VIGOROUSLY UPHELD.

26. THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN OSLO DEMONSTRATED JOINT DETERMINATION AMONG THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN DEFENSES AND VIGILANCE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THE SECRETARY REAFFIRMED THE US COMMITMENTS IN THIS REGARD, AND THERE WAS SOLID SUPPORT AND COHESION AT THE MEETING.

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27. THE SOUTHERN EUROPE SITUATION IS THE MOST TROUBLESOME. PORTUGAL IS NOT YET STABLE, BUT THE INFLUENCE OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND THEREFORE SOVIET INFLUENCE, HAS BEEN FURTHER REDUCED. IN SPAIN, FRANCO'S DEATH HAS CREATED LESS INSTABILITY THAN SOME EXPECTED. WE HAVE NEGOTIATED A RENEWAL OF OUR AGREEMENT WITH SPAIN ON OUR MILITARY FACILITIES, AND THIS MATTER IS AT THE MOMENT UP FOR RATIFICATION BY OUR CONGRESS.

28. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS THAT WE WOULD VIEW INCLUSION IN THEIR GOVERNMENTS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES LINKED TO MOSCOW AS SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

29. WE HAVE RECENTLY NEGOTIATED AN OVERALL AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY REGARDING OUR MILITARY FACILITIES THERE AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND ARE NOW NEGOTIATING A SIMILAR AGREEMENT WITH GREECE. BOTH AGREEMENTS WILL REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, AND THIS MAY TAKE SOME TIME. HOWEVER, THESE DEVELOPMENTS, AND A BETTER PROSPECT FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, SHOULD STRENGTHEN SIGNIFICANTLY NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK.

30. I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION SEVERAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA. WE HAVE OF COURSE NOTED YOUR RECENT AGREEMENT WITH INDIA TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS. WE ASSUME THIS DID NOT PLEASE MOSCOW, BUT WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THIS POINT, AS WELL AS WHETHER YOU EXPECT INDIA TO SUGGEST OTHER STEPS TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR COUNTRY.

31. WE NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO'S VISIT SERVED TO REAFFIRM THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND YOUR COUNTRY. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS.

32. WITH RESPECT TO JAPAN, OUR RELATIONS ARE IN VERY GOOD SHAPE AND OUR CONSULTATION HAS NEVER BEEN CLOSER. THERE IS SOME TROUBLE ABOUT WHATS CALLED THE LOCKHEED AFFAIR, BUT WE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL NOT HAVE A LASTING EFFECT ON OUR CONTINUING CLOSE RELATIONSHIP.

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33. AT THE REQUEST OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT, WE ARE WITHDRAWING OUR MILITARY PRESENCE TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY FOR THOSE UNFRIENDLY TO THE US, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS, TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION. THE DETAILS OF ANY RESIDUAL US FACILITIES IN THAILAND ARE BEING NEGOTIATED WITH THE THAI GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE PHILIPPINES REGARDING OUR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN RESOLVE SOME ISSUES WHICH HAVE ARISEN WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PHILIPPINES WILL REMAIN STRONG.

34. SOME WEEK AGO, AS WE INFORMED YOUR GOVERNMENT THROUGH YOUR LIAISON OFFICE IN WASHINGTON, WE MADE A PROPOSAL TO NORTH VIETNAM TO HLD TALKS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. OUR PROPOSAL WAS A SERIOUS OFFER. HOWEVER, HANOI'S RESPONSE, BY RESURRECTING THE PARIS AGREEMENT CLAUSE ABOUT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AFTER HAVING KILLED THE AGREEMENT BY ITS MILITARY ACTION LAST YEAR, SUGGESTS TO US THAT HANOI IS NOT NOW INTERESTED IN IMPROVING RELATIONS. OUR OWN ATTITUDE WILL OF COURSE BE STRONGLY INFLUENCED NOT ONLY BY BILATERAL MATTERS BUT ALSO BY WHETHER NORTH VIETNAM ACTS WITH RESTRAINT TOWARDS THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS POINT.

35. REGARDING KOREA, OUR PRIMARY CONCERN REMAINS THAT THERE BE NO DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WOULD HEIGHTEN TENSION BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND SOUTH KOREA. WE CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT WAYS CAN BE FOUND OVER TIME TO REDUCE THOSE TENSIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN OUR MILITARY PRESENCE AS WE BELIEVE IT CONTRIBUTES TO STABILITY IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

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
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36. LET ME CONCLUDE BY MENTIONING A SUBJECT OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE AT THE PRESENT TIME. DURING THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, SOME CANDIDATES APPEAR INTENT ON RAISING EMBARRASSING ISSUES ABOUT OUR CHINA POLICY. AS SECRETARY KISSINGER SAID TO AMBASSADOR HUANG CHEN IN THEIR MEETING ON MAY 29, IF ANYTHING COMES UP IN THE CAMPAIGN THAT RAISES SOME QUESTIONS ON YOUR SIDE, WE HOPE YOU WILL CONSULT US BEFORE DRAWING CONSLUDIONS. PERSONALLY, I MIGHT ADD, I CONSIDER A GREAT DEAL OF THIS CAMPAIGN CONVERSATION IRRESPONSIBLE.

37. I WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS ON ANY OF THESE OR OTHER MATTERS. PRESIDENT FORD HAS ASKED ME TO REITERATE THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO CONTINUING THE FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTERST. WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR PATIENCE AND COURTESY (END OF GATES PREPARED PRESENTATION).

38. HUA: THANK YOU FOR INFORMING US OF THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. I HAVE RECEIVED PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER WHICH YOU CONVEYED, THANK YOU FOR BRINGING IT. IN THE LETTER THE PRESIDENT GAVE A GOOD INTRODUCTION OF YOU WHICH INCLUDED HIGH PRAISE. HE EXPRESSED HIS HIGHEST CONFIDENCE IN YOU AND THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS. HE SAID YOU WOULD EFFECTIVELY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION. PRESIDENT FORD ALSO SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA HAVE DIFFERENCES ON MAJOR ISSUES THEY HAVE COMMON INTERESTS. HE ALSO GAVE HIS VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND BILTATERAL RELATIONS. PRESIDENT FORD EXPRESSED HIS GOOD WISHES TO ME. I WANT YOU



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TO THANK HIM FOR ME. HE ALSO ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS REGARDS TO CHAIRMAN MAO, I CERTAINLY WILL.

39. YOU HAVE CONVEYED YOUR GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, STRATEGIC ISSUES AND BI-LATERAL RELATIONS WERE DISCUSSED BY CHAIRMAN MAO WITH PRESIDENT FORD IN DECEMBER AND WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER IN HIS EARLIER VISIT. THESE DISCUSSIONS WENT VERY WELL. IN HIS LETTER PRESIDENT FORD FURTHER REITERATED U.S. COMMITMENT TO FURTHER DEVELOPING SINO-US RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HE SAID THIS WAS THE FIRM POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

40. AS FOR SINO-US RELATIONS, WE BELIEVE AS LONG AS BOTH SIDES ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE RELATIONS WILL DEVELOP FORWARD. THERE DO EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS, BUT ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WE HAVE MANY POINTS IN COMMON. WE SAY THAT IN SINO-US RELATIONS THE MAJOR ASPECTS CONCERN INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THE MINOR ASPECTS CONCERN BILATERAL ISSUES. FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN WHICH REMAINS OUTSTANDING. WE HAVE MENTIONED THIS PROBLEM ON MANY OCCASIONS.

41. AS FOR THAT CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, IT IS OUR FEELING THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND NEW ISSUES, FROM THE LONGER VIEW THERE HAVE BEEN NO GREAT CHANGES SINCE THE MEETINGS OF CHAIRMAN MAO AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS STILL THAT THE WORLD IS ADVANCING IN TURMOIL. IN THE WORLD TODAY, ESPECIALLY IN THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE, MORE PEOPLE HAVE COME TO SEE THE TRUE FACE OF SOVIET HEGEMONIC AMBITIONS. FOLLOWING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, THERE WAS ANGOLA WHICH ENABLED MANY TO SEE THE TRUTH ABOUT SOVIET SHAM DETENTE, ARMED EXPANSION AND THE FEATURES OF CONTINUED EXPANSIONISM OF THE USSR. IN SECRETARY KISSINGER'S LAS VISIT, WE DISCUSSED WITH HIM THE DANGERS OF THE MUNICH MENTALITY. THROUGH OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH FRIENDS FROM THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE, WE HAVE FORMED THE VIEW THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE DEEPENED THEIR AWARENESS OF THIS MENTALITY AND RAISED THEIR VIGILANCE AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE'S AWARENESS OF SOVIET HEGEMONISM HAS ALSO

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BEEN RAISED.

42. IN OUR RECENT MEETINGS WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN FRIENDS, SUCH AS GENERAL MEPEY, FOREIGN MINISTER CROSLAND, AND SEVERAL WEST GERMANS, THEY HAVE ALL EXPRESSED THEIR BELIEF THAT THE USSR IS USING DETENTE AS A SMOKE SCREEN TO CARRY OUT THE FINLANDIZATION OF EUROPE. OUR WESTERN EUROPEAN FRIENDS HAVE RAISED THIS VIGILANCE. WE FEEL EUROPEANS ARE PAYING MORE ATTENTION TO STRENGTHENING THEIR DEFENSES, WHILE OF COURSE MAINTAINING AND DEVELOPING THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. OF COURSE IT IS OUR HOPE TO SEE EUROPE UNITED AND STRONG. THIS WILL NOT BE EASY, AND WILL HAVE TO GO THROUGH QUITE A PROCESS.

43. GATES: WELL, I THINK THE CURRENT SITUATION IN EUROPE IS ENCOURAGING, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT NATO MEETINGS. AS I SAID, REGARDLESS OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION, THE U.S. SHARES YOUR VIEWS, WILL REMAIN STRONG, AND WILL TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. I TOLD YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER THAT ANYONE WHO THOUGHT THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE AS STRONG THREE YEARS FROM NOW THAN IT IS TODAY IS FOOLISH.

4. HUA: (AFTER CHECKING WITH HIS AIDES) WE SAW FROM THE PRESS THAT THE SONNELFELDT STATEMENT AROUSED A LOT OF TALK IN WESTERN EUROPE.

45. ON THE ASIAN SIDE, SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS ARE GENERALLY SPEAKING, GOOD. AWHILE BACK WE ALSO DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER. WE EXPRESSED OUR VIEW THAT IN JAPAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS THE US COMES FIRST AND CHINA SECOND. DURING SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO JAPAN WE ASKED HIM TO STAY OVER FOR A FEW DAYS.

46. DURING TANAKA'S TERM, CHINA AND JAPAN SIGNED A JOINT STATEMENT, AND AGREEMENTS ON TRADE, AIR, FISHERIES AND MARITIME RELATIONS. DURING MIKI'S TERM, WE HAVE MET OBSTACLES IN NEGOTIATING A PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY. ACTUALLY, THIS IS NOT A GREAT ISSUE BECAUSE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT WE HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO HEGEMONY. PRIME MINISTER MIKI AND HIS GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, ARE OPPOSED TO PUTTING IT INTO THE TEXT OF THE TREATY. WE SAY IF WE DON'T PUT THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE

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INTO THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY IT WOULD MEAN A RETREAT FROM THE JOINT STATEMENT. AT A MINIMUM, IF WE SIGN A TREATY IT SHOULD MOVE A BIT FORWARD. ACTUALLY, THE CLAUSE AGAINST HEGEMONISM WAS FIRST RAISED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. IN ANY CASE, THE SINO-JAPANESE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY REMAINS UNSIGNED. OF COURSE, IN GENERAL, OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN REMAIN GOOD, ESPECIALLY THE FRIENDLY CONTACTS BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE PEOPLE. CHINA STILL SUPPORTS JAPANESE DEMANDS FOR THE FOUR NORTHERN ISLANDS.

47. AS FOR CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH ASEAN, THERE HAS BEEN SOME MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. THE PRIME MINISTER OF THAILAND, KUKRIT PRAMOJ, AND LEADERS OF MALAYSIA AND THE PHILIPPINES HAVE VISITED CHINA. PRIME MINISTER LEE KUAN-YEW VISITED US NOT LONG AGO, BUT CHINA AND SINGAPORE HAVE NOT YET ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WENT ON NOT BADLY. THEY HAVE THEIR SPECIFIC TIMING AND IDEAS, AND WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT CHINA WAS NOT PUSHING. AMONG THE FIVE ASEAN NATIONS, ONLY INDONESIA HAS NOT RESTORED

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RELATIONS WE HAVE RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA BUT THEY ARE SUSPENDED. GENERALLY SPEAKING, WE SUPPORT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES WE ARE GLAD TO SEE THEY ARE RAISING THEIR VIGILANCE AND THEY WILL NOT OPPOSE THE TIGER AT THE BACK DOOR WHILE LETTING THE WOLF IN THE FRONT.

48. MOVING TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC, PRIME MINISTER MULDOON OF NEW ZEALAND RECENTLY VISITED US, AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA IS COMING SOON. WE FAVOR AND ADMIRE AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND FOR RAISING THEIR VIGILANCE AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND INCREASING THEIR DEFENSE. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO IMPROVE AND DEVELOP THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY. OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH MULDOON WENT WELL.

49. IN SOUTH ASIA, DEVELOPMENTS ARE ALSO GOOD. IN BANGLADESH, THE NEW SITUATION IS A BLOW TO SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, AND INDIAN PETTY EXPANSIONISM. AFTER PAKISTAN ESTABLISHED RELATIONS WITH BANGLADESH, CHINA ALSO ESTABLISHED THEM. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS HAS GONE QUITE WELL, BUT BANGLADESH STILL HAS DIFFICULTIES. WITH SOVIET SUPPORT INDIA HAS MADE PROVOCATION ON THE BANGLADESH BORDER AND TRIED TO PUT BANGLADESH ON THE SPOT WITH THE GANGES DAM.

50. RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN ARE QUITE GOOD. PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO VISITED CHINA AND AFGHANISTAN IN A EFFORT TO IMPROVE PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS. WE LOOK VERY FAVORABLY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTANI-AFGHAN RELATIONS BUT WE MUST WAIT TO SEE

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HOW IT COMES OUT.

51. RELATIONS WITH NEPAL ARE VERY GOOD. THE KING JUST VISITED CHENGTU AND LHASA. INDIA HAS CONTINUED TO HARASS NEPAL'S TRANSIT TRADE WHICH MUST CROSS INDIAN TERRITORY. THROUGH CONTACTS IN SOUTH ASIA, WE FEEL INDIA IS ENGAGED IN PETTY EXPANSIONISM. WE SAY THAT THE USSR IS ENGAGED IN BIG POWER HEGEMONISM, AND INDIA IS ENGAGED IN PETTY EXPANSIONISM. THERE ARE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. THEY ARE NOT MONOLITHIC AND INDIA IS NOT WILLING TO BECOME A COMPLETE RUNNING DOG OF THE SOVIETS. THE USSR WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO MAKE USE OF INDIA TO HAVE OVERLAND ACCESS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. INDIA IS BORROWING SOVIET STRENGTH TO BULLY ITS NEIGHBORS, SUCH AS THE DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN AND THE ANNEXATION OF SIKKIM. WE HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO CRITICIZE THESE ACTIVITIES.

52. LATELY, THEY EXPRESSED THE DESIRE TO SEND BACK AN AMBASSADOR, AND WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT "IF INDIA IS WILLING TO SEND AN AMBASSADOR, WE WILL ALSO SEND ONE". WE ARE WILLING TO DEVELOP SIND-INDIAN RELATIONS, BUT WE MUST UPHOLD PRINCIPLE; THAT IS, WHEN INDIA BULLIES ITS NEIGHBORS, WE WILL MAKE OUR ATTITUDE CLEAR. THEREFORE, ON RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE. INDIA HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN. WE SUPPORT THIS. DURING HIS VISIT, PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO SAID HE PAID GREAT ATTENTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT ON PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND TURKEY.

53. WHEN KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT FORD CAME, WE ALSO DISCUSSED OUR FEELING THAT THE U.S. SHOULD HELP PAKISTAN AND TRY TO WIN OVER INDIA. OF COURSE, WE WILL HAVE TO KEEP AN EYE ON DEVELOPMENTS.

54. IN THE MID-EAST, VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK VISITED US RECENTLY. EGYPT ANNULLED ITS TREATY WITH THE USSR RECENTLY, AND WE BELIEVE THIS IS THE RESULT OF THE SOVIET'S TEACHING BY NEGATIVE EXAMPLE TO THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE ON SOVIET EXPANSIONISM.

55. WE HAVE DISCUSSED AFRICA MANY TIMES BEFORE, AND I DON'T THINK IT IS NECESSARY TO DWELL ON THIS SUBJECT NOW.

56. THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS ARE A U.S. DOMESTIC AFFAIR, BUT WE

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HAVE NOTICED THAT THE CHARACTER OF THE ELECTION THIS TIME IS MORE DEBATES ON FOREIGN POLICY. WE HEAR THE PRIMARIES ENDED JUNE 8, AND PRESIDENT FORD NOW HAD 959 DELEGATES, REGAN 868 DELEGATES, AND THE DEMOCRAT CARTER 1,125. AS THIS IS AN INTERNAL MATTER, IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO COMMENT.

57. GATES: EVERYONE ELSE HAS.

58. HUA: IN COMPARING THIS YEAR'S ELECTIONS WITH PREVIOUS ONES, THE DISCUSSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES ARE MORE ACUTE, EVEN FEROCIOUS.

59. GATES: I THINK FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS ARE GETTING MORE ATTENTION THAN THEY DESERVE. WHAT THE ELECTIONS ARE PROVING, AND WHAT THE POLLS SHOW, IS THAT MANY PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES ARE SIMPLY AGAINST GOVERNMENT AND BUREAUCRACY. THIS IS A NON-PARTISAN ISSUE. SINCE THERE IS LITTLE ELSE TO FOCUS ON, FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES ARE GETTING UNDESERVED ATTENTION. I MUST POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT IN DISCUSSING FOREIGN POLICY ALL CANDIDATES FAVOR A STRONG U.S. DEFENSE.

60. WELL, IT IS NEARLY SEVEN O'CLOCK AND PERHAPS WE SHOULD END THIS MEETING. UNFORTUNATELY WE WERE UNABLE TO DISCUSS ALL THE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, BUT IN THE FUTURE, IF YOU ARE INTERESTED, YOU MAY CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH OUR FOREIGN MINISTRY.

61. AFTER HUA NOTED THAT THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE LIAISON OFFICE, MR. THAYER, WILL SOON LEAVE CHINA, THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH AN EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES ABOUT THE AMBASSADOR'S YOUTHFUL APPEARANCE AND WHETHER HE HAD ADJUSTED TO LIFE IN PEKING. UPON LEAVING THE HALL, HUA AGAIN APOLOGIZED TO THE AMBASSADOR FOR NOT RECEIVING HIM EARLIER.  
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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFDR CH US  
SUBJECT: AMB GATES' MEETING WITH HUA KUO-FENG

REF: PEKING 1048

1. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD SHARE HUA'S COMMENTS TO ME ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WITH THE AUSTRALIANS (PM FRAZER ARRIVES ON JUNE 20), NEW ZEALANDERS (IN RETURN FOR THE TRANSCRIPTS OF MULDOON'S CONVERSATIONS), AND BRITISH (IN RETURN FOR CROSLAND VISIT INFORMATION.) WE SHOULD ALSO PASS HIS COMMENTS ON SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS TO THE JAPANESE HERE, PARTICULARLY SINCE I HAVE PLEDGED ESPECIALLY CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THEM.
2. REQUEST PERMISSION TO PASS THIS INFORMATION--WITH APPROPRIATE CAUTIONS AS TO ITS SENSITIVITY--TO THE RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES IN PEKING.  
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02  
BY NR, NARA, DATE 2/7/03

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FOR THE SECRETARY

PASS ALSO TO SCOWCROFT

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CH US

SUBJECT: JUNE 10 MEETING WITH PREMIER; LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I INTEND TO SEND A LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA EXPRESSING GRATIFICATION FOR JUNE 10 MEETING WITH THE PREMIER. PURPOSE OF DOING THIS THROUGH CHIAO IS TO SHOW PERSONAL COURTESY TO HIM.
2. WHILE NOT LIKELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY "TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE" WITH HUA OR TO PROVIDE HUA WITH SOME PERSONAL SUBSTANTIVE REACTION TO THE JUNE 10 MEETING. JUST IN CASE THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO USE THIS OCCASION FOR (1) A LETTER OF IMPORTANCE, (2) A LETTER FOR THE RECORD SHOWING CONTINUED PROGRESS IN OUR RELATIONS, OR (3) A LETTER WHICH PERHAPS COULD BE USEFUL TO PUBLICLY REFER TO AFTER THE NOMINATION, I THOUGHT IT WORTH MENTIONING TO LET YOU CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY BEFORE I SEND MY LETTER TO CHIAO.
3. I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR I AM NOT RECOMMENDING ANOTHER LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THERE IS A CHANCE THAT A LETTER WITHOUT SUBSTANCE WOULD RISK GILDING THE LILY AND CHEAPEN THE CHANNEL. IF I DO NOT RECEIVE A REPLY BY COB JUNE 23, I WILL SEND THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO CHIAO:

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TO: FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

I AM SURE THAT YOU HAVE HAD A REPORT OF MY MEETING ON JUNE 10 WITH THE PREMIER. I WANT TO TELL YOU HOW MUCH I, AND MY GOVERNMENT, VALUED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH A DISCUSSION WITH HIM. KNOWING THE PREMIER'S OTHERWISE DIFFICULT SCHEDULE, ESPECIALLY IN THIS SEASON OF FOREIGN VISITORS, I ESPECIALLY APPRECIATED BOTH HIS WILLINGNESS TO GIVE ME AS MUCH TIME AS HE DID AND HIS CORDIALITY TOWARDS ME AND MY STAFF. WHEN A OPPORTUNITY ARISES, I HOPE YOU WILL INFORM THE PREMIER OF MY SINCERE APPRECIATION.

I, OF COURSE, HAVE REPORTED FULLX TO THE PRESIDENT, AND HE HAS ASKED ME ALSO TO EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL GRATIFICATION.

MY WIFE AND I ARE FINDING OURSELVES QUITE AT HOME IN PEKING, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO A PLEASANT-- AND WE HOPE PRODUCTIVE-- SERVICE HERE.

WITH MY BEST PERSONAL WISHES,  
SINCERELY,

THOMAS S GATES

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FOR THE SECRETARY AND SCOWCROFT ONLY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR VACH  
SUBJECT: SENATOR SCOTT'S VISIT

1. WE NOW HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS FROM VARIOUS WASHINGTON SOURCES INDICATING THAT SENATOR HUGH SCOTT IS COMING HERE WITH PRESIDENTIAL LETTER ON SPECIAL PLANE TO NEGOTIATE VARIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES WITH THE PRC AND TO PREPARE REPORT TO PRESIDENT ON POLITICAL SITUATION.

2. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ASAP AUTHORITATIVE CLARIFICATION. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW CONTENTS AND ADDRESSEE OF ANY LETTER SCOTT WILL BE CARRYING AND WHAT HE HAS BEEN ASKED TO DO ON BEHALF OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

3. CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY, I HAVE CAREFULLY AVOIDED DISCUSSION OF A NORMALIZATION PACKAGE OR PARTS OF IT IN MY MEETINGS HERE. I AM SATISFIED THIS POLICY IS NOT ONLY CORRECT BUT MATCHES PRESENT PRC POLICY AND TIMETABLE AS WELL. WITH THE IMPLICATION OF A PRESIDENTIAL MISSION BEHIND SENATOR SCOTT, IT WILL BE EASIER FOR THE CHINESE TO USE HIS VISIT FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. I WANT TO BE SURE THAT WE MINIMIZE THIS RISK.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES T O 9/27/02  
BY UR, NARA, DATE 2/7/03

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS HONG KONG

E.O. 116571 XGDS-3  
TAGS: PFDR, PINT, CH, US  
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF PRC PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG

REFS: PEKING 1048, PEKING 1049, PEKING 1054

1. SUMMARY: DURING OUR 1 HOUR 45 MINUTE CONVERSATION ON JUNE 10, PRC PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG IMPRESSED ME AND USLO OFFICERS PRESENT AS AN INTELLIGENT, BUT COLORLESS INDIVIDUAL WHOSE HALLMARK IS CAUTION. HE HANDLED HIS MATERIAL WELL ENOUGH, BUT HE GAVE OFF NO SPARKS OR UNUSUAL INTELLECT OR CHARISMA. HUA CAME ACROSS AS AN IDEAL TRANSITION FIGURE WHO IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE ANY DRAMATIC STE IN EITHER INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND IS THUS UNLIKELY TO HARM U.S. INTERESTS. WE HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE DEBATE IN USLO OVER WHAT HUA'S CHANCES ARE OF LASTING PAST AN EARLY TRANSITION PERIOD. SOME THINK HUA CAN PUSH HIS COMPETITION ASIDE LIKE BREZHNEV DID, BUT BASED ON THE MEETING, I DOUBT HUA HAS THE VISION OR THE LEADERSHIP QUALITIES NECESSARY TO MAKE IT OVER THE LONG TERM. I EXPECT HIM IN TIME TO BE SHOVED ASIDE BY A MORE DYNAMIC LEADER. END SUMMARY.

2. HUA GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF BEING PHYSICALLY SOFT WITH THE CHUBBY, WELL-FED LOOK CHARACTERISTIC OF MANY CHINESE BUREAUCRATS. HE IS ABOUT 5FT. 10 IN. AND WEIGHS PERHAPS 180 LBS. HIS FACIAL EXPRESSION IS MOSTLY IMPASSIVE BUT ON OCCASION IT CHANGES FROM A BENIGN, BUDDHA-LIKE COUNTENANCE TO THE TOUGH,

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SOMEWHAT SINISTER APPEARANCE CAUGHT EXCEEDINGLY WELL IN THE APRIL 19 ASIAN EDITION NEWSWEEK COVER. WHEN THE EYES NARROW, HUA LOOKS EVERY INCH THE CHINESE SECURITY CHIEF. HE SPEAKS WITH A HEAVY SHANSI ACCENT THAT USLO OFFICERS, AND EVEN INTERPRETER NANCY TANG AT SOME POINTS, HAD TO STRAIN HARD TO FOLLOW.

3. THE PREMIER CONDUCTED THE MEETING WITH AN AIR OF CALM, EVEN SERENITY, AND CONFIDENCE. THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF NERVOUSNESS--HE DID NOT FIDGET AND SMOKED MODERATELY BY CHINESE STANDARDS (PERHAPS FIVE CIGARETTES). HUA AVOIDED ANY BUT THE BRIEFEST EYE-CONTACT WITH ANY OF US, CHOOSING INSTEAD TO STARE FORWARD OR AT THE CEILING BOTH WHEN TALKING AND LISTENING. WHILE DOING THIS, HOWEVER, HE CONVEYED THE APPEARANCE OF THINKING, NOT BOREDOM. HIS DELIVERY WAS CAREFUL, DELIBERATE, AND UNANIMATED, DEMANDING SOME PATIENCE FROM HIS LISTENERS. HE SHOWED LITTLE EMOTION DURING MY PRESENTATION AND DID NOT ONCE RAISE HIS OWN VOICE FOR EMPHASIS OR TO DISPLAY INTENSE INTEREST. HE WAS POLITE, BUT FORMAL, AND THERE WAS NO EASY BANTER. EVEN HIS "SMALL-TALK" FOLLOWED A PREDETERMINED SCRIPT.

4. HUA IMPRESSED US AN INTELLIGENT MAN, ALTHOUGH HE IS OBVIOUSLY STILL FEELING HIS WAY ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. HE TOOK FOUR PAGES OF NOTES DURING MY PRESENTATION AND REFERRED TO THEM IN HIS EXTEMPORANEOUS REPLY. HE HAD BEEN GIVEN A SHORT BRIEF ON THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WHICH HE USED WELL AND THEN APPARENTLY DREW THE REST OF HIS REMARKS FROM RECENT BRIEFS PREPARED FOR VISITS BY OTHER FOREIGNERS. HE DID NOT ADDRESS OTHER CHINESE PRESENT EXCEPT TO ASK FOR THE NAME "SONNENFELDT" AND TO CHECK HIS INTERPRETER WHEN HE DID NOT CATCH THE CHINESE TERM FOR NORTH VIETNAM.

5. HUA SEEMED IMPRESSIVE IN PICKING STRATEGIC POINTS OF MY PRESENTATION, PARTICULARLY THE REFERENCE TO GROWING UNDERSTANDING BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OF SOVIET HEGEMONIC AMBITIONS. HOWEVER, HE DID GET INTO TROUBLE ON A FEW DETAILS: LIN PING SEEMED UNCOMFORTABLE WHEN HE DWELT OVERLY LONG ON SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS; HE MENTIONED THE "SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE" BUT THEN DID NOT SEEM TO KNOW WHAT HE SHOULD SAY ABOUT IT; HE APPEARED TO OVERSTATE WHAT CROSLAND AND MERY HAD SAID ON DETENTE; AND HE SEEMED TO LOSE HIS TRAIN OF THOUGHT TOWARD THE END ON EGYPT. ALL IN ALL, HOWEVER, HUA SHOWED HE COULD STAND ON HIS OWN FEET IN THE SESSION AND HIS PRESENTATION WILL PRE-

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SUMABLY BECOME MORE POLISHED WITH TIME.

6. WHILE INTELLIGENT, HUA STRUCK US AS COLORLESS AND BY NO MEANS AN INTELLECTUAL. HE WAS METHODICAL AND CAREFUL IN HIS NOTE TAKING AND PRESENTATION, BUT THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE MEETING WHICH APPEARED TO SPARK HIS PARTICULAR INTEREST; THERE WAS NO INCLINATION TO EXPLORE NEW GROUND AND NO INTEREST IN ANY AREAS BEYOND THE BRIEF. HUA DEFINITELY DOES NOT HAVE THE PERSONALITY QUALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH CHAIRMAN MAO OR CHOU EN-LAI, NOTEVEN THE PEPPERY, DECISIVE VITALITY OF TENG HSIAG-PING. DURING THE MEETING, HE ALSO DID NOT DISPLAY THOSE QUALITIES WESTERNERS NORMALLY ASSOCIATE WITH A CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND DID NOT APPEAR THE KIND OF MAN WHO WOULD ATTRACT A DEVOTED FOLLOWING.

7. PUTTING TOGETHER WHAT WE SAW OF HUA IN THE MEETING WITH WHAT IS KNOWN OF HIS BACKGROUND, WE CONCLUDE THAT HE IS A CAUTIOUS MIDDLE-ECHELON TYPE WHO WOULD BE MOST AT HOME COORDINATING POLICIES. WE SUSPECT HUA IS A COMPETENT ADMINISTRATOR--HE APPEARED TO EXHIBIT THE RIGHT QUALITIES IN OUR MEETING--AND AVOIDS GIVING OFFENSE BY MASKING HIS OWN VIEWS AND EMOTIONS BEHIND A BLAND EXTERIOR. ON OCCASION, HOWEVER, HUA LOOKED LIKE HE COULD BE TOUGH AS NAILS AND THE WAY HE HAS MOVED UP IN THE PRC STRUCTURE SUGGESTS HE KNOWS HOW TO ACQUIRE AND USE POWER. WE SUSPECT HE UNDERSTANDS THE VALUE OF CUNNING AND TIMING AS SUBSTITUTES FOR INTELLECTUAL SPARKLE AND ATTRACTIVENESS. A MEMBER OF MY STAFF WITH CONSIDERABLE SERVICE IN TAIPEI COMMENTED ON HUA'S SIMILARITY TO CHIANG CHING-KUD IN THIS RESPECT.

8. FROM THE MEETING, IT IS HARD TO SAY ANYTHING DEFINITIVE ON HUA'S VIEWS OF AMERICANS OR SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. IN DUCKING BI-LATERAL TOPICS, HUA PROBABLY MEANT TO SUGGEST NOTHING MORE THAN THE PRC WOULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER NOVEMBER BEFORE TALKING SERIOUSLY ON THE ISSUES. HE WAS CORDIAL IN THE MEETING BUT MADE NO PERSONAL FRIENDLY REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES NOR DID HE PASSIONATLY DENOUNCE THE SOVIET UNION. HE WAS CAREFUL, HOWEVER, TO EMPHASIZE THAT HE WAS CARRYING OUT CHAIRMAN MAO'S POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES. GIVEN HUA'S GENERALLY CAUTIOUS APPROACH WE THINK HE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO RADICALLY CHANGE CHINESE POLICY TOWARD EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION FOLLOWING MAO'S DEATH. HE WOULD BE MORE INTERESTED FIRST, IN ANY CASE, IN CONSOLIDATING HIS POWER OR, AT LEAST, ENSURING THAT HE REMAINS NEAR

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9. WE ARE OF TWO MINDS ABOUT HUA'S CHANCES OF STAYING AT THE TOP OF THE PRC POWER STRUCTURE. ALL OF US AGREE THAT HUA SEEMS AN IDEAL TYPE FOR CARRYING OUT THE TRANSITION THROUGH MAO'S DEATH AND FOR SOME TIME THEREAFTER. IN THIS PERIOD, HUA CAN BE EXPECTED TO COORDINATE POLICY, WORKING WITH A STEADY HAND TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO WHILE DISPUTES AND PROPAGANDA ARGUMENTS SWIRL AROUND HIM. SOME MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WHO WERE IN THE MEETING WITH HUA THINK HE HAS A FAIR CHANCE OF ELBOWING OUT THE COMPETITION AND MAKING THE NECESSARY ALLIANCES TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER LIKE BREZHNEV HAS IN THE SOVIET UNION. THEY FEEL HE HAS THE NECESSARY TOUGHNESS AND SHREWDNESS TO BRING THIS ABOUT. THE COURSE OF CHINESE INTERNAL AS WELL AS EXTERNAL POLICY WOULD THEN REMAIN FAIRLY STEADY WITH VERY LITTLE INNOVATION. MAO MIGHT FIND THIS SORT OF OUTCOME DISTASTEFUL BUT IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE BAD FOR EITHER CHINA OR THE UNITED STATES.

10. HOWEVER, BASED ON MY IMPRESSIONS OF HUA FROM THE MEETING, I AM MORE NEGATIVE ABOUT HUA THAN MY STAFF. I DOUBT THAT HE HAS WHAT IT TAKES TO BE THE REAL NUMBER ONE. HE DID NOT APPEAR TO ME TO HAVE THE VISION OR LEADERSHIP QUALITIES NECESSARY TO MAKE A COUNTRY WITH SUCH SEVERE PROBLEMS RUN AND DEVELOP. I THINK NEW AND BETTER QUALIFIED LEADERSHIP WILL ARISE CENTERING ON DEMANDS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMY AND DEFENSE CAPABILITIES, AND THE COLORLESS MR. HUA, HAVING FULFILLED HIS HISTORICAL PURPOSE, WILL BE FORCED TO STEP ASIDE.  
GATES

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