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NOD497

**TELEGRAM**

PAGE 01 PEKING 00888 090911Z

CONTROL: 1729Q  
RECD: 9 MAY 75  
4:53AM

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

075619

R 090812Z MAY 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3723

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 888

NGDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB FROM AMBASSADOR BUSH

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: PINK PFOR CH CA  
SUBJECT: EXPULSION OF PRC EMBASSY OFFICER

REF: PEKING 827

1. KUO CHING-AN IS NOW BACK IN PEKING. RUMORS CONTINUE TO FLY. ALL RUMORS CONCERN SOME USA LINKAGE. AMB SMALL'S UNIVERSITY ATTENDING DAUGHTER, UNBRIEFED BY SMALL, RAISED THE QUESTION WITH HIM, SAYING THE WORD WAS ALL AROUND THE UNIVERSITY COMING FROM GERMAN SOURCES.

2. SMALL ASKED ABOUT GRAND JURY. I DID TELL HIM WE HAD LITTLE NEWS ON THIS MATTER BUT THAT WE DID NOT EXPECT GRAND JURY ACTION AS OF THIS TIME. I FELT SINCE HE CONFIDED IN ME I COULD NOT COMPLETELY STONEWALL HIM.

3. IS THERE ANY LIKELIHOOD OF ANY GRAND JURY ACTION WHICH OF COURSE WILL ATTRACT PUBLICITY? ARE THERE ANY OTHER INVESTIGATION CONTINUING ON THIS MATTER?

4. WHEN IF EVER I CAN DIVULGE TO SMALL SOME OF THE CONTENTS OF THE SPECIAL REPORT TO ME, PLEASE ADVISE.

5. WE ARE ESPECIALLY DEPENDENT IN PEKING FOR INFORMATION FROM OTHER EMBASSIES. TODAY FOR EXAMPLE, I CALLED SMALL

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TO 9/27/02  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/6/03





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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02. PEKING 00888 090911Z

REQUESTING FROM HIM BRIEFING INFORMATION RESULTING FROM  
BRIEFING GIVEN BY VIETNAMESE. I RECOGNIZE THIS IS SENSI-  
TIVE, HIGHLY SO, BUT IF ANY OF THAT EXCELLENT REPORT YOU  
SENT ME CAN BE SHARED WITH SMALL IT WOULD HELP A LOT.  
BUSH

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Z 130454Z MAY 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3740

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 913

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR CH CB  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE ON CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF U.S. SHIP

1. USLO OFFICER ANDERSON DELIVERED MESSAGE ON CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF U.S. MERCHANT VESSEL TO CAMBODIAN EMBASSY AT 1210 LOCAL TIME MAY 13. CAMBODIAN EMBUFF SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT IT. NO FURTHER DISCUSSION.
2. PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY SAID THAT MESSAGE COULD NOT BE RECEIVED BY AN OFFICER UNTIL 1600 PEKING TIME, BUT THAT IF MATTER WAS URGENT WE COULD DELIVER TO MFA MAIL ROOM. WE ARE DOING SO. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT MESSAGE WILL IMMEDIATELY BE PASSED TO RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS, BUT MFA APPARENTLY WANTED TO AVOID DIRECT CONTACT.  
BUSH

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HR 5/14/01





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FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3741

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 914

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR CH CB  
SUBJECT: CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF U.S. SHIP

REF: A. PEKING 911 B. STATE 110673

IN VIEW OF ACTION REQUESTED REF B WE HAVE CHANGED  
OUR REPLY TO PRESS QUERIES ON CONTACT WITH CAMBUDIANS  
TO "NO COMMENT". BUSH  
#0914

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HR 5/14/01



TRANSMITTED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

RECEIVED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

Ma

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

1975 MAY 16 AM 8:59

S/S #

'75 MAY 16 AM 10:04

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LDX MESSAGE NO. 553, CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NODIS, NO. PAGES 2

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. Peking 950

FROM: S/S, Officer, Office Symbol, Extension, Room Number

LDX TO: White House - General Scowcroft, DELIVER TO:, EXTENSION:, ROOM NUMBER:

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS:

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: JPM  
Executive Secretariat Officer





Department of State

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 PEKING 00950 161133Z

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FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3770

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 950

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR CH CB  
SUBJECT: PRC STATEMENTS ON U.S. RESPONSE TO SEIZURE OF "MAYAGUEZ"

REF: A. STATE 110673 B. PEKING 913 C. PEKING 925 D. PEKING 929

1. BY NOW THE DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE SEEN FBIS REPORTS OF LI HSIEN-NIEN'S STATEMENT AT THE MAY 15 VIETNAMESE RECEPTION IN PEKING IN WHICH HE DESCRIBED THE U.S. RESPONSE TO CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF THE "MAYAGUEZ" AS "AN OUTRIGHT ACT OF PIRACY" AND CLAIMED THAT THE SHIP WAS IN CAMBODIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE MAY 16 PEOPLE'S DAILY IN WHICH LI'S REMARKS ARE SUB-HEADLINED UNDER A REPORT OF THE RECEPTION. ON THE INSIDE PAGES PEOPLE'S DAILY ALSO CARRIES LENGTHY CAMBODIAN NEWS AGENCY REPORT OF U.S. ACTIONS AND AN NCNA ARTICLE WHICH TAKES THE SAME LINE AS LI HSIEN-NIEN BUT, IN ADDITION, ALLEGES THAT "MAYAGUEZ" WAS CARRYING ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AND ENGAGING IN SPYING ACTIVITIES.

2. PRC STATEMENTS ARE BEING REPORTED PROMINENTLY BY LOCAL FOREIGN PRESS CORPS, SO WE CAN EXPECT THE CHINESE POSITION TO BE WIDELY DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE OF CHINA. GIVEN THE PRC'S TOTAL UNWILLINGNESS TO TRY AND ASSIST IN PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM, INCLUDING HUANG CHEN'S REFUSAL EVEN TO LISTEN TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S REQUEST (REF A), I THINK IT IS TIME TO GO PUBLIC WITH AN ACCOUNT OF OUR EFFORTS TO REACH THE CAMBODIANS AND WARN THEM BEFORE IT WAS NECESSARY TO USE MILITARY FORCE. THE CHINESE ARE OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS ON THIS ONE, WITH TENG HSIAU-PIING

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*HR 5/14/01*



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PAGE 02 PEKING 00950 161133Z

MAKING IT CLEAR IN PARIS THAT PEKING WOULD DO NOTHING IF U.S. DID USE FORCE TO SECURE THE SHIP'S RELEASE, WHILE LI HSIEN-NIEN BLASTS US HERE FOR "PIRACY".

3. SINCE SOME OF OUR EFFORTS ARE ALREADY LEAKING OUT IN THE PRESS AND THE CONGRESS IS LIKELY TO ASK FOR THE WHOLE STORY, I THINK IT IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE BY PRESENTING THE FULL PICTURE FROM THE START.

4. I RECOGNIZE THERE ARE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN SUCH AN APPROACH, SOME MEMBERS OF MY STAFF HAVE ARGUED THAT THE CHINESE HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE BY OUR GOING PUBLIC AND THE EFFECT WOULD SIMPLY TO PROLONG THE ACrimonious EXCHANGES OVER WHO WAS AT FAULT. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK ON BALANCE THERE IS MERIT IN SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON THOSE EFFORTS WE MADE TO AVOID HAVING TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AND, IN ADDITION, LETTING THE CHINESE KNOW THAT THEIR PROPAGANDA WILL NOT ALWAYS GO UNANSWERED. THE CHINESE HAVE DIRECTLY CHALLENGED PRESIDENT FORD'S VERSION OF THE INCIDENT AND WE SHOULD AT LEAST SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT.  
BUSH

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PAGE 01 PEKING 00961 220440Z

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R 220300Z MAY 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3791

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TO 9/27/02  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/6/03

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGUS1  
TAGS: CH, PFUR, IR  
SUBJECT: CALL BY AMB BUSH ON PRINCESS ASHRAF

DEPARTMENT PASS TEHRAN AT DISCRETION - ALSO ASST SECY HABIB IN SYDNEY

1. ON MAY 21 AT 6:30 PM I CALLED ON PRINCESS ASHRAF WHO WAS LEAVING THAT EVENING FOR IRAN AFTER A VISIT TO NORTH KOREA AND PEKING. SHE WAS QUARTERED IN GUEST HOUSE 42, THE OLD AMERICAN LEGATION.

2. THE PRINCESS HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY PREMIER CHOU EN LAI AND TENG HSIAO-PING. SHE COMMENTED THAT CHOU EN LAI AND MAO TSE TUNG WERE CLEARLY NOT RUNNING THINGS. I TOLD HER THAT RECENT VISITORS FOUND CHOU TO BE VERY SHARP AND ALERT. SHE AGREED THAT HE WAS SHARP AND ALERT, BUT THAT HE LOOKED BAD AND THAT HE HAD HAD A HEART ATTACK.

3. SHE FOUND TENG TO BE QUITE STRONG AND FORCEFUL AND COMMENTED ON CHIAO KUAN HUA'S GRASP OF WORLD AFFAIRS.

4. THE PRINCESS MENTIONED TWICE THAT THE CHINESE WERE ANGRY WITH US ABOUT THE MAYAGUEZ. I TOLD HER I HOPED I WOULD HAVE A CHANCE TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS TO THEM ON THIS QUESTION SOME TIME BECAUSE THERE WAS CLEARLY PROVOCATION THAT THE US COULD NOT STAND FOR. AT THIS POINT THE PRINCESS EXPRESSED HER CONCERN ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF THE US

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PAGE 02 PEKING 00981 220440Z

CONGRESS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I ASSURED HER THAT ON THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS WERE SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT OVERWHELMINGLY. (AFTER LISTENING TO TODAY'S VOA I HOPE THIS CONTINUES TO BE THE CASE.) THE PRINCESS FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAD SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT SO STRONGLY.

5. WE DISCUSSED THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT IN DETAIL AND SHE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT OUR STRONG ACTION WOULD CLEARLY BENEFIT OUR ALLIES AND IN THE LONG RUN MIGHT EVEN HAVE THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE PRC. THE PRINCESS TWICE MENTIONED THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP'S RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT NIXON. SHE ALSO SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THERE WAS NO UNFAVORABLE MENTION OF SECRETARY KISSINGER.

6. I ASKED ABOUT HER VISIT AND RECEPTION IN KOREA. SHE WAS CLEARLY PLEASED BY THE BIG TURNOUT AND RECEPTION IN KOREA. THE STREETS LINED WITH SMILING, WAVING DANCING PEOPLE GOT TO HER A LITTLE. SHE WAS REALISTIC IN HER ASSESSMENT OF THE KIM PERSONALITY CULT - NOT ENTHRALLED WITH THAT.

7. I DID NOT ASK HER ABOUT RUMORS THAT IRAN WAS BEING ASKED TO REFINANCE KOREA'S DEBT.

8. KIM IL SUNG STRESSED HIS DETERMINATION TO SEE KOREA UNIFIED, BUT SURPRISINGLY, HE KEPT STRESSING PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. THE PRINCESS MENTIONED THREE DIFFERENT TIMES KIM'S WILLINGNESS TO HAVE, INDEED DESIRE TO HAVE, FREE ELECTIONS TO DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF KOREA. IN SPITE OF THE OVERWHELMING NUMBERS OF PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH COMPARED TO THE NORTH, KIM EMPHASIZED THAT HE WANTED FREE ELECTIONS AND HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE WOULD OVERWHELMINGLY VOTE FOR HIM AND AGAINST THE LEADERSHIP IN THE SOUTH. I ASKED ABOUT INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION OF SUCH ELECTIONS BY THE UN. "NO" SAID SHE, THE KOREANS WANT THE UN OUT OF KOREA AND THE AMERICANS TOO. I ASKED ABOUT OTHER IMPARTIAL SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS. SHE WAS UNCLEAR AS TO WHETHER THEY WOULD ACCEPT ANY SUCH SUPERVISION. SHE USED THE WORD "PLEBISCITE" SEVERAL TIMES.

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PAGE 03 PEKING 00981 220440Z

9. RANDOM TOPICS: PRC LEADERSHIP: THEY DISLIKED THE USSR MORE THAN THE USA.

10. THE PRINCESS WAS VERY TIRED AND HAD A SEVERE MIGRAINE HEADACHE. WHEN I KNEW HER AT THE UN SHE WAS OFTEN PLAGUED WITH SUCH HEADACHES.

11. I CONGRATULATED THE PRINCESS ON THE ROLE OF WORLD LEADERSHIP THAT IRAN HAD BEEN PLAYING. SHE WAS PLEASED BUT SHE "KNUCKED ON WOOD" AS IF TO INDICATE THINGS WERE GOING WELL NOW BUT PROBLEMS LAY AHEAD.

12. INTERESTING THOUGH NOT FLATTERING COMMENT BY THE PRINCESS: "WHY ARE YOU IN CHINA? ARE YOU IN EXILE?" "NO," I SAID. "I LIKE IT HERE, WANTED TO COME HERE, AND THIS RELATIONSHIP IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE US AND TO THE PRC". SHE BELIEVES THE LAST PART AND MAY HAVE BELIEVED THE FIRST. BUSH

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NOD959

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 PEKING 01202 280106Z

CONTROL: 6123Q

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-20 /001 W

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FM USLU PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3966

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1202

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PFOR CH TW US  
SUBJECT: C.P.LI DISCUSSED TAIWAN ISSUE WITH CHOU EN LAI

REF: PEKING 1198

1. I OMITTED FROM REFTEL THAT DR. CHEN PIEN LI TOLD ME THAT HE CAME TO PEKING CHIEFLY TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE. HE CALLED ON ME JUNE 24, JUNE 26 AND THEN CAME BACK THIS MORNING (JUNE 27) AFTER HIS MEETING LAST NIGHT WITH CHOU EN-LAI. HE TOLD CHOU HE HAD MET WITH ME, AND PROBABLY THAT HE INTENDED TO SEE ME AGAIN TODAY.
2. OUR FIRST TWO MEETINGS CONSISTED MOSTLY OF GENERALITIES WITH LI ASSURING ME OF HIS DESIRE TO PROMOTE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA. HE DID, HOWEVER, REFER CRYPTICALLY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO VISITS OF A PHILLIP FUGH (LI'S SPELLING) TO THE PRC AND TO TAIWAN TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.
3. AT OUR MEETING FOLLOWING THE CHOU VISIT, LI ADDED A NEW WRINKLE. HE SAID THAT WHEN THE TAIWAN ISSUE CAME UP IN THE TALKS WITH CHOU, WANG HAI-JUNG COMMENTED THAT "MR. BUSH KNOWS WHAT OUR TERMS ARE FOR SETTLING THE TAIWAN QUESTION" AND CHOU HAD AGREED. LI SAID TO ME THAT HE FELT CHINA WOULD NOT ENTER INTO ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT RENOUNCING THE USE OF FORCE ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE AND ASKED "COULD THE TAIWAN QUESTION BE SOLVED IF THE CHINESE SIDE

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/6/03*





# Department of State

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PAGE 22 PEKING 01202 280105Z

MADE A STATEMENT FOR DOMESTIC PRC CONSUMPTION (E.E., WITHOUT LINK TO ANY BILATERAL AGREEMENT) SAYING THE REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN WOULD BE PEACEFUL?" I ASKED LI IF SUCH AS STATEMENT WOULD OR COULD, IN HIS VIEW, BE MADE VERY SOON. LI STATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE EXPLORED AT HIGH LEVELS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. LI WENT ON TO ADD THE DISCLAIMER THAT HE WAS NOT RAISING THIS AT THE INSTIGATION OF CHOU EN-LAI.

4. COMMENT: LI SUPPORTS THE BASIC PRC VIEW THAT TAIWAN IS A PART OF CHINA AND SEEMS TO BE SINCERELY INTERESTED IN PROMOTING NORMALIZATION OF US-PRC RELATIONS. LI OBVIOUSLY HAS ACCESS TO THE TOP PRC LEADERSHIP AND IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THEY ARE TRYING TO USE HIM IN A GO-BETWEEN ROLE LIKE THEY EARLIER USED EDGAR SNOW. I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER THE IDEA OF A UNILATERAL CHINESE STATEMENT THAT TAIWAN WOULD BE LIBERATED PEACEFULLY IS LI'S IDEA OR CHOU'S. I ONLY KNOW THAT HE HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY THE IDEA OUT ON ME BEFORE THE CHOU MEETING AND DID NOT DO SO. LI WILL BE IN TOWN ANOTHER WEEK.

5. AFTER TALKING WITH DR. LI ABOUT CHOU'S INTEREST IN FRUIT, PARTICULARLY HIS LOVE OF TREE-PICKED FRUIT, I SUGGEST THE PRESIDENT CONSIDER BRINGING SOME GREAT OREGON PEARS-- FRESHLY TREE RIPENED--OR SOME OTHER FRUIT THAT MIGHT BE IN SEASON AT THE TIME HE CAME TO CHINA. APPARENTLY, CHOU IS QUITE A FRUIT CONNISSEUR. LI SEEMED TO FEEL THE PREMIER WOULD APPRECIATE SOME VERY FRESH U.S. FRUIT.  
BUSH

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 PEKING 01570 181021Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4260

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1570

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR CH US  
SUBJECT: WANG HAI-JUNG ON PRESIDENT'S VISIT

DURING LUNCH TODAY AT THE RESIDENCE, VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF REITERATING THAT PRESIDENT FORD WAS WELCOME TO VISIT THE PRC WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. IN THE HEARING OF SEVERAL OF MY OFFICERS AS WELL AS MYSELF, SHE NOTED THAT THE IDEA OF THE VISIT HAD COME FROM THE U.S. SIDE AND SHE RECALLED WHAT TENG HAS SAID TO THE SECRETARY ON THIS SUBJECT LAST NOVEMBER, AS WELL AS TENG'S REMARKS TO THE ASNE GROUP. SHE FURTHER REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT FORD WAS INVITED ON ESSENTIALLY THE SAME TERMS AS PRESIDENT NIXON HAD BEEN; AND QUOTED MAO'S LIFE MAGAZINE COMMENTS TO EDGAR SNOW ABOUT THE TERMS ON WHICH NIXON WOULD BE WELCOME IN CHINA; I.E. AS EITHER A STATESMAN OR A TOURIST.  
BUSH

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 5/14/01



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PAGE 01 PEKING 01823 250402Z

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Review*  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *TD 9/27/02*  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/6/03

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFDR CH TW US  
SUBJECT: TENG HSIAO-PING ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE

REF: WELLINGTON 2744

1. ACCORDING TO NOTES PROVIDED TO US BY NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY, VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING'S REMARKS ON SEPTEMBER 5 TO NEW ZEALAND JOURNALISTS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTION OF A CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF CHINA'S THREE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION AND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE: "CHINA HOPED TO SETTLE THE TAIWAN QUESTION BY PEACEFUL MEANS ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE...THREE POINTS. IF IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SETTLE THESE THREE POINTS, NON-PEACEFUL MEANS COULD NOT BE RULED OUT." NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY SPECULATES THAT TENG MAY HAVE INTENDED TO IMPLY THAT IF THREE CONDITIONS WERE MET, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD BE GUARANTEED. INTRIGUING AS TENG'S REMARKS ARE, WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO READ THAT MUCH INTO THEM. BUT ASIDE FROM THEIR BEING GOOD CHINESE PR, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT TENG'S REMARKS MIGHT HAVE REFLECTED DISCUSSION WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP ABOUT A FORMULA RESPONSIVE IN SOME (THOUGH PROBABLY INADEQUATE) DEGREE TO U.S. CONCERNS. HOWEVER, TENG DID NOT USE A SIMILAR LINE IN HIS SEPTEMBER 20 TALK WITH HEATH (PEKING 1819), AND IN ANY CASE HIS REPORTED REMARKS TO THE NEW ZEALANDERS STOPPED WELL

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 PEKING 01823 250402Z

SHORT, AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT, OF SUGGESTING THAT CHINA WOULD BE PREPARED TO PLEDGE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE THREE CONDITIONS.

2. RELEVANT SECTION OF THE MEMCON FOLLOWS.

TENG WAS ASKED TO DISCUSS CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, PARTICULARLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON TAIWAN--HOW WAS THIS PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED AND WHEN? IN REPLY, TENG "DESCRIBED THE QUESTION AS COMPLEX. THE FACT THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT BEEN NORMALIZED WAS ENTIRELY DUE TO THE TAIWAN PROBLEM. THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE PROVIDED IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION. RELATIONS COULD NOT BE NORMALIZED WITHOUT, FIRST, THE ABRIGATION OF THE U.S. DEFENSE TREATY WITH TAIWAN; SECOND, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. TROOPS--4,000 (SIC) REMAIN AT PRESENT; AND THIRD, THE SEVERING OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. IF THE UNITED STATES MET THOSE THREE CONDITIONS THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN WOULD BE TREATED TOTALLY AS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR. THE MODALITY AND THE TIMING OF TAIWAN'S RETURN TO CHINA WERE ENTIRELY CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIR. NO OTHER COUNTRY HAD THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE. CHINA HOPED TO SETTLE THE TAIWAN QUESTION BY PEACEFUL MEANS ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE THREE POINTS. IF IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THESE THREE POINTS, NON-PEACEFUL MEANS COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR. IF THE UNITED STATES ACCEPTED THE THREE POINTS THE TAIWAN QUESTION WOULD BE SETTLED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES."

BUSH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 PEKING 01915 100509Z

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4538

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1915

NODIS  
CHEROKEE

E.O. 116521 GDS  
TAGS: AFSP CH  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S AND PRESIDENT'S VISITS;  
EXPANDED USLO

1. BY PEKING 1914, WE MENTIONED CERTAIN ADDITIONS TO THE USLO STAFF THAT COULD BE MADE IN THE NEAR FUTURE WITHOUT RISKING TOO MUCH REDUNDANCY BETWEEN THE FUNCTIONS OF USLO AND CONGEN HONG KONG. AS INDICATED IN THAT MESSAGE, WE ALREADY HAVE A SPACE PROBLEM AT USLO AND ARE HOPING TO MAKE SOME MODEST CHANGES IN OUR PRESENT BUILDING TO BETTER ACCOMMODATE OUR PRESENT STAFF PLUS MINOR INCREASES.

2. SINCE THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE WILL EVENTUALLY BE SHIFTING MUCH OF THE HONG KONG WORK TO PEKING, WE BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGE IN OBTAINING CHINESE AGREEMENT NOW TO EXPANDING OUR FACILITIES TO PUT US IN A POSITION, AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, TO MAKE THAT SHIFT. WE WILL BE NEEDING A BIGGER BUILDING AND MORE LAND, WITH RECREATIONAL FACILITIES-- IN OTHER WORDS THE SAME ARRANGEMENTS ENJOYED BY OTHER MAJOR COUNTRIES' EMBASSIES HERE AS WELL AS SOME MINOR ONES.

3. I BELIEVE THAT TO THIS END IT WOULD BE MUCH WISER, AND RELATIVELY SIMPLE, FOR THE BASIS OF THIS TO BE

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HR 5/14/01



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PAGE 02 PEKING 01915 100509Z

LAI DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT BY MEANS OF THE SECRETARY SEEKING, IN DIRECT BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH THE CHINESE, PRC HIGH-LEVEL AGREEMENT TO THE IDEA, SIMPLY, THAT WE SHOULD HAVE NEW AND LARGER FACILITIES AND THAT THE CHINESE WILL BE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH ME IN WORKING OUT AN APPROPRIATELY LOCATED AND APPROPRIATELY AMPLE PARCEL OF LAND. ONCE THIS IS DONE, WE CAN PROCEED MORE EFFECTIVELY TO NEGOTIATE THIS OUT WITH THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICES BUREAU. TO BEGIN TO DO SO AT THIS DATE WOULD HELP ALSO TO POSITION US ON THE GROUND TO OPERATE AS A "NORMALIZED" EMBASSY ONCE THAT DECISION IS MADE IN THE FUTURE.

4. THE CHINESE AGREED TO EXPANDING "SCOPE OF FUNCTIONS" OF THE LIAISON OFFICES IN 1973; AND PRCLD IN WASHINGTON HOUSES SOME SEVENTY STAFFERS. WE WOULD ENVISION, ONCE A DECISION IS MADE TO CENTER OUR CHINA FIELD OPERATION IN PEKING RATHER THAN HONG KONG, AN EVENTUAL DOUBLING, PERHAPS, OF OUR STAFF.

5. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DEVISE AN ANNOUNCEMENT PERTAINING TO USLO EXPANSION THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED CREDIBLY AS A SMALL FURTHER SIGN OF PROGRESS IN OUR RELATIONS.

6. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO CONGEN CROSS, WITH WHOM THIS MESSAGE HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED.  
BUSH

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1924

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02  
BY WR, NARA, DATE 2/6/03

NODIS  
CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CH  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S AND PRESIDENT'S VISITS: SIGNS OF PROGRESS

1. WE BELIEVE CHINESE WILL JUDGE IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO PERMIT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PRODUCE SOME OTHER VISIBLE MARKERS OF PROGRESS IN

SINO-US RELATIONS IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS REGARDING TAIWAN. WE IDENTIFY BELOW SOME POSSIBILITIES KNOWING -- WITHOUT BEING PRIVY TO DEPARTMENT'S PREPARATIONS -- THAT MOST MAY ALREADY BE AMONG THOSE DEVELOPED FOR THE TALKS, OR DISCARDED.

2. FAMILY REUNIFICATION: PEKING 1912 REFLECTS OUR CONCERN ABOUT ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE MORE TRAVEL ASSISTANCE TO AMERICANS AND THEIR RELATIVES WITHOUT FIRST TRYING FOR AN UMBRELLA UNDERSTANDING WITH THE CHINESE. WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH WE AND THE CHINESE WOULD FIND ADVANTAGES (INCLUDING THOSE RELATING TO MFN AND USSR) IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT RESULTING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, OR EVAN AN ANNOUNCEMENT OR AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, WITH DETAILS TO BE NEGOTIATED. ANY SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE COUCHED IN TERMS TO AVOID UNWARRANTED AND, FOR THE USG, INCONVENIENT EXPECTATIONS, BUT SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT, IT SEEMS TO US, WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIAL DOMESTIC US APPEAL.

3. FEDERAL BENEFITS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AS OF DECEMBER 1972, HAD IDENTIFIED 70 POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES NOW LIVING IN THE PRC. THE NUMBER IS PROBABLY CONSIDERABLY GREATER, AND IF WE

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE

ADD RETIREES LIVING IN HONG KONG SO, THAT THEY CAN RECEIVE BENEFITS, BUT WHO MIGHT PREFER TO LIVE IN THE PRC, POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES COULD BE IN THE THOUSANDS. ON THE US SIDE THE MAJOR IMPEDIMENT IS THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REGULATION PROHIBITING DISPATCH OF TREASURY CHECKS TO PAYEES IN COUNTRIES IN WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS UNABLE TO VERIFY THAT THE RECIPIENT WILL HAVE PERSONAL USE AND ENJOYMENT OF THE FUNDS RECEIVED. THERE ARE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS -- PRC BANKS REFUSE TO HANDLE US TREASURY CHECKS -- WHILE FOR POLITICAL REASONS PRC MIGHT DECLINE TO GIVE THE NEEDED ASSURANCES OR TO ALLOW US CONSULAR ACCESS TO VERIFY IDENTITY AND ELIGIBILITY. BUT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE PUBLIC RELATIONS, AS WELL AS HUMANITARIAN, BENEFITS (AND FOR THE PRC IT COULD BE A NOT INCONSIDERABLE SOURCE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE).

4. US-PRC EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENTS: CHINESE RELUCTANCE TO EXCHANGE CORRESPONDENTS, THOUGH COUCHED IN TERMS OF "PRINCIPLE" RELATING TO TAIWAN AND TO THE PRESENCE OF ROC CORRESPONDENTS IN WASHINGTON, MAY NOW BE LESSENERED. HOWEVER, EVEN IF THE CHINESE ARE NOT PREPARED TO HAVE OUR CORRESPONDENTS RESIDENT IN PEKING (AND THEIRS IN WASHINGTON), THEY MIGHT AGREE TO ADMIT US CORRESPONDENTS MORE REGULARLY FOR VISITS TO CHINA AND PERHAPS REGULARLY SEND CHINESE CORRESPONDENTS ON TRIPS TO THE US).

5. BICENTENNIAL INVITATION TO A PRC LEADER. THIS WOULD OF COURSE REQUIRE A CHANGE IN OUR POLICY ON CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN FEDERALLY-SPONSORED BICENTENNIAL EVENM, BUT THE BICENTENNIAL MIGHT PROVIDE US WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET AROUND THE CHINESE RELUCTANCE TO SEND A TOP-LEVEL VISITOR TO THE US BEFORE NORMALIZATION. THE CHINESE MIGHT FIND IT POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE THEIR "PRINCIPLE" AGAINST SUCH VISITS BECAUSE OF THE ONE-TIME AND OTHERWISE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE BICENTENNIAL (INCLUDING ITS ROOTS IN OUR REVOLUTION), PARTICULARLY IF THE VISIT WERE MADE TO PHILADELPHIA (WHICH HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING WITHOUT AN ROC CONSULATE) OR TO BOSTON.

6. ENLARGED CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM: THE CHINESE WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO A MINOR INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF FACILITATED EXCHANGES EACH WAY. WE MIGHT OBTAIN LONGER-TERM EXCHANGES OF SCHOLARS AND PERHAPS EVEN STUDENT EXCHANGES. THE CULTURAL PROPOSALS WE HAVE SEEN DO NOT INCLUDE AN EXTRAVAGANZA

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PAGE 03 STATE

COMPARABLE TO THE 1973 PHILADELPHIA ORCHESTRA VISIT. A MAJOR ORCHESTRAL OR BALLET PRESENTATION NEXT YEAR WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

7. HIGH-LEVEL AMERICAN VISITS: OUR CURRENT ECONOMIC EXCHANGE PROGRAM, WHILE SATISFACTORY, IS CONDUCTED AT THE TECHNICIAN AND MIDDLE GRADE BUREAUCRAT LEVEL. ONLY HIGH-LEVEL ECONOMIC VISIT TO CHINA HAS BEEN THE PRIVATE/INFORMAL ONE SECRETARY MORTON MADE IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE BECAME SECRETARY OF COMMERCE. SINO-AMERICAN TRADE HAS A VARIETY OF PROBLEMS, MANY OF WHICH ARE THE RESULT OF CHINESE UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT REGULATIONS OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS. IN SOME CASES, IN FACT, CHINESE BEGARD THESE AS NEGOTIABLE; IN OTHERS, AS DISCRIMINATORY AGAINST CHINA. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS (E.G., HAVING USDA INSPECTORS VISIT CHINESE SLAUGHTER HOUSES) MAY HAVE NO SOLUTION AT PRESENT, THERE

ARE MANY OTHERS, SUCH AS OUR REGULATIONS ON LABELLING, PACKAGING AND FLAMMABILITY, ON WHICH HIGHER-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS MIGHT SUCCEED WHERE AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN HAVE NOT. WE MAY WISH TO HAVE, FOR VISIBILITY PURPOSES, EVEN RELATIVELY MINOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS EMPHASIZED BY HIGH-LEVEL AMERICAN VISITORS IF THE PRC IS WILLING TO RECEIVE SUCH VISITORS AT THIS STAGE IN OUR RELATIONS. AN ARGUMENT AGAINST SUCH HIGH-LEVEL AMERICAN VISITS IS THAT THEY WOULD PERPETUATE THE ONE-WAY NATURE OF SINO-US HIGH-LEVEL VISITS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CHINESE WILL VISIT WASHINGTON AT THIS STAGE, BUT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR TECHNICAL CONFERENCE IN THE US TO ATTRACT A HIGH-LEVEL CHINESE VISITOR TO OTHER PLACES IN THE COUNTRY.

8. CLAIMS/ASSETS: THE CHINESE CERADINLY ARE AWARE THAT THIS PROBLEM IS A REAL IMPEDIMENT TO DEVELOPING RELATIONS IN SEVERAL AREAS. WHILE WE HAVE NO READING ON WHETHER OR NOT THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO MOVE, WE ASSUME SECRETARY'S VISIT WILL INCLUDE AN EFFORT TO FIND OUT. PARAS 9 AND 10, HOWEVER, COVER TWO STEPS WHICH IMPINGE ON THE CLAIMS/ASSETS PROBLEM BUT WHICH MIGHT STILL BE CONSIDERED AT THIS POINT.

9. SINO-AMERICAN SHIPPING: ONE REASON CHINESE SHIPS DO NOT NOW VISIT US PORTS IS FEAR OF SEIZURE BY AMERICAN CLAIMANTS WHOSE PROPERTY WAS EXPROPRIATED BY THE PRC SINCE 1949. AS A RESULT, CHINSESE PORTS ARE NOT OPEN TO AMERICAN SHIPS. THE PRESIDENT COULD PROPOSE LEGISLATION, SIMILAR TO THAT USED TO PROTECT THE CHINESE ARCHEOLO-

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PAGE 04 STATE

GICAL EXHIBIT FROM SUIT, TO EXEMPT SHIPS BELONGING TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM SUIT BY THESE CLAIMANTS FOR EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY AND BY THE ROC. (GENERAL EXEMPTION FROM SUIT SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TO MAKE SURE PRC SHIPS REMAIN LIABLE FOR THE ORDINARY ACCIDENTS OF NAVIGATION.) THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE MORE COMPLEX AND POLITICALLY MORE CONTROVERSIAL THAN ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ARCHEOLOGICAL EXHIBITION. BUT IF IT WERE POLITICALLY FEASIBLE, IT WOULD PROVIDE HIGHLY VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS IN OUR RELATIONS. (WHILE AIR TRANSPORT BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA WOULD BE AT LEAST AS VALUABLE AND MORE VISIBLE, WE BELIEVE THAT COMPLICATIONS WITH THE ROC AND WITH THE NEGOTIATION OF RECIPROCAL ROUTE RIGHTS WOULD RENDER IT IMPRACTICABLE.)

10. TRADE EXHIBITIONS: AGAIN, THE ABSENCE OF A CLAIMS/ASSETS SETTLEMENT IMPACTS ON THE CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO SEND TRADE EXHIBITIONS

TO THE US, AND PRESUMABLY TO RECEIVE US EXHIBITIONS. AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON AN EXCHANGE OF TRADE EXHIBITIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA WOULD BE A CONCRETE WAY OF DEMONSTRATING THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR TRADE. BENEFIT COULD BE DERIVED FROM A SERIES OF SPECIALIZED EXHIBITIONS OF EXPORT GOODS IN ONE OR MORE CITIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES: THE US, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD EXHIBIT OIL PROSPECTING AND DRILLING EQUIPMENT, SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS, MINING EQUIPMENT, AND FOOD PROCESSING AND PACKAGING EQUIPMENT; THE PRC COULD EXHIBIT CHINESE HANDICRAFTS, TEXTILES/RUGS. FOR BOTH SIDES, THESE SMALLER EXHIBITS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO THE COMPREHENSIVE EXHIBITS JUST HELD BY THE FRG AND SOON TO BE HELD BY JAPAN. THEY WOULD BE MUCH CHEAPER (THE FRG EXHIBIT COST AT LEAST US\$10 MILLION) AND COULD BE MOUNTED IN A MUCH SHORTER TIME (THE FRG EXHIBIT TOOK TWO YEARS OF PREPARATION), AND WOULD BE CALCULATED TO SHOW EACH COUNTRY'S MOST COMPETITIVE GOODS.

11. AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS: WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING IT, CHINESE HAVE MADE GOOD USE OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL TECHNIQUES AND EVEN CROPS (E.G., HYBRID AMERICAN CORN, WHICH HAS BECOME A MAJOR CHINESE CROP IN THE LAST FEW YEARS). US POLITICIANS OF BOTH PARTIES HAVE PROPOSED A SINO-AMERICAN SOYBEAN INSTITUTE, DESIGNED TO POOL CHINESE AND AMERICAN RESOURCES ON IMPROVING THE YIELD AND THE UTILIZATION OF SOYBEANS, BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT RESPONDED. IF RAISED AT A

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PAGE 05 STATE

POLITICAL LEVEL, HOWEVER, THE IDEA OF SINO-US COOPERATION IN CROP IMPROVEMENT OF NOT ONLY SOYBEANS, BUT ALSO CORN, COTTON AND OTHER MAJOR CROPS, MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRC. THE CHINESE WOULD BE THE NET GAINERS FROM THE STRICTLY AGRICULTURAL VIEWPOINT, BUT A PROPOSAL FOR SOME PERMANENT SINO-US ORGANIZATION FOR CROP IMPROVEMENT, WHETHER IT IS CALLED AN INSTITUTE OR COMMITTEE, OR SIMPLY A SERIES OF EXCHANGES OF SEED, TECHNOLOGY, OR VISITS, WOULD BE A SMALL SIGNAL OF IMPROVING RELATIONS. IT WOULD, WE BELIEVE, BE POPULAR IN THE CONGRESS SINCE IN A SENSE THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE TAKING OVER AND ENLARGING AN IDEA THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN PROPOSED THERE.

12. USLO EXPANSION: SEE PEKING 1915.  
BUSH

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
MR # 10-042-1228  
*State Dept Letter 5/6/10*  
By *dal* NARA, Date *6/24/10*

NODIS  
CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: CPAS, PFOR, CH, US  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT: AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP CASES OF  
BERTHA LIU AND DANIEL KELLY

1. USLO RECOMMENDS THAT BERTHA LIU CASE BE RAISED DURING SECRETARY'S VISIT, AND ON BALANCE WE THINK DANIEL KELLY'S CASE SHOULD ALSO BE RAISED.
2. WE HAVE ASKED MFA CONSULAR AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT FOR INFORMATION ON BERTHA LIU ON FIVE OCCASIONS, THE LAST DURING USLO CHIEF'S MEETING WITH DEPUTY DIRECTOR KAO SHIH-KUN ON JUNE 7 OF THIS YEAR. AS FAR AS WE KNOW, BERTHA LIU CASE HAS NOT BEEN RAISED AT A HIGHER LEVEL. WE HAVE YET TO RECEIVE A RESPONSE. WE WOULD BENEFIT FROM MAKING MFA AWARE THAT PRC CANNOT SIMPLY IGNORE OUR REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT PRESUMPTIVE U.S. CITIZENS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO LIKE LIU AND KELLY ARE UNDERGOING SOME FORM OF PENAL SERVITUDE, WITHOUT OUR EVENTUALLY ELEVATING THE LEVEL OF OUR REPRESENTATIONS.

3. IN CONTRAST TO CASE OF DANIEL KELLY - CHINESE HAVING TOLD USLO THAT KELLY IS A CHINESE CITIZEN- THE CHINESE HAVE NEVER STATED TO USLO THAT MRS. LIU IS A CHINESE CITIZEN, AND, IN FACT, MFA OFFICIAL YU CHUN MADE IT CLEAR TO THE BRITISH IN 1971 THAT

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CHINESE AUTHORITIES REGARDED HER AS A U.S. CITIZEN OF CHINESE RACE.

4. DEPARTMENT HAS AUTHORIZED USLO TO ISSUE HER A U.S. PASSPORT UPON SATISFACTORY APPLICATION. USLO RECOMMENDS WE ASK THE CHINESE TO GRANT HER PERMISSION TO SUBMIT APPLICATION AT USLO AND TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES UPON ISSUANCE OF A PASSPORT.

5. HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS ARGUE FOR OUR SUPPORTING KELLY'S DESIRE TO EMIGRATE; FURTHERMORE, IF KELLY CASE WERE TO BE RAISED DURING SECRETARY'S VISIT, DEPARTMENT WOULD BE IN A STRONGER POSITION TO HANDLE PRESS AND OTHER INQUIRIES ABOUT HIM. HOWEVER, TO LINK KELLY'S CASE WITH LIU CASE MIGHT REDUCE CHANCES OF CHINESE AGREEMENT TO RELEASE LIU; ALSO, WE HAVE NOT LAID THE GROUNDWORK OF REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PRC IN KELLY'S CASE THAT WE HAVE IN LIU'S. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATION IS OVERRIDING AND THAT IT JUSTIFIES RAISING KELLY CASE DURING SECRETARY'S VISIT.

6. SECRETARY MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER BRIEFLY RAISING BOTH CASES, LEAVING FURTHER DISCUSSION TO COUNTERPART TALKS.  
BUSH

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N O D I S

E.O. 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)  
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PEKING

1. AMB HARLAND OF NEW ZEALAND IS CONVINCED CHINA IS TRYING TO QTE GO OVER THE HEAD OF US OFFICIALS UNQTE AND TAKE ITS CASE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
2. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITES A CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH TIME CORRESPONDENT TALBOTT ON RECENT SECSTATE VISIT. TALBOTT WAS SUPPOSEDLY TOLD BY MA YU-CHEN THAT OUR POLICY IN EUROPE WAS SIMILAR TO CHAMBERLAIN AT MUNICH.
3. THIS REFERENCE INTERESTED ME BECAUSE OF SIMILAR REFERENCE IN SECSTATE'S TALKS WITH TENG. THERE HAS BEEN NO LEAKING ABOUT THE TALKS, AND INDEED HARLAND NEVER EVEN ASKED ME IF SUCH AREFERENCE HAD BEEN MADE IN TENG TALKS.
4. I WOULD SUGGEST SOMEONE TALK TO TALBOTT OF TIME ON THIS. PERHAPS WE WILL SEE MUCH MORE ON THIS CHAMBERLAIN AT MUNICH THEME.  
BUSH

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TO 9/27/02

BY UR, NARA, DATE 2/6/03



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NODIS/CHEROKEE

R.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR FR CH  
SUBJ: FRENCH VIEWS ON JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH PRC

FRENCH AMBASSADOR CLAUDE ARNAUD TOLD ME TODAY THAT THEY DO NOT PLAN TO HAVE A JOINT COMMUNIQUE AS PART OF PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING'S VISIT TO THE PRC NEXT YEAR. HE SAID THERE WAS A COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING POMPIDOU'S 1973 VISIT ON FRENCH INSISTENCE AND THE FRENCH WERE THEN DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULT. NEITHER FRENCH NOR CHINESE MENTIONED QUESTION OF A JOINT COMMUNIQUE DURING VICE PREMIER TENG HSIANG-PING'S MAY VISIT TO PARIS. ARNAUD ALSO NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT SCHMIDT HAD NOT SIGNED A COMMUNIQUE DURING HIS VISIT HERE LAST MONTH.

COMMENT: ARNAUD WAS CLEARLY MAKING THE POINT THAT FRENCH HAVE DECIDED COMMUNIQUE WITH THE PRC ARE NOT WORTH THE EFFORT.  
BUSH

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*HR 5/14/01*



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E.C. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP C.)  
SUBJECT: HABIB TRAVEL TO TAIWAN

REF: STATE 258822

VIA ENGLISH HEARD IN PEKING MORNING DEC 9 REPORTED  
HABIB'S ITINERARY, INCLUDING ROC VISIT. THEREFORE,  
PER INSTRUCTION, I AM NOT TAKING INITIATIVE TOWARDS  
LIN OR TANG.  
THAYER

NOTE: PASSED TO TAIPEI BY OC/T

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DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS TO GEORGETOWN

E.O. 11652; XGDS 3  
TAGS: PFOR, CH, AU, CU, GY  
SUBJECT: CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA: CUBAN USE OF GUYANESE FACILITIES

REF: STATE 300232

MFA ADVISED US ON DECEMBER 22 THAT LIN PING WAS ILL AND MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO RECEIVE USLO ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF "FOR SOME DAYS YET." POLCOUNS HAS REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH LIN'S DEPUTY TANG WEN-SHENG (NANCY TANG) AT HER EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.  
THAYER

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02

BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/6/03



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DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS TO GEORGETOWN

E.O. 11652: XGDS3  
TAGS: PFOR, CH, AO, CU, GY  
SUBJECT: CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA: CUBAN USE OF GUYANESE

REF: (A) STATE 300232, (B) PEKING 2454, (C) STATE 300511

1. MFA U.S. AFFAIRS DIRECTOR TING YUAN-HUNG (EXPRESSLY  
SUBSTITUTING FOR AMERICAS AND OCEANIA DIRECTOR YANG WEN-SHENG),  
RECEIVED POLCOUNS ON AFTERNOON DECEMBER 23. IN RESPONSE TO  
PRESENTATION PER REFTEL A., TING (IN A FRIENDLY MANNER), SAID THAT  
HE WOULD REPORT TO HIS LEADERS BUT MEANWHILE COULD COMMENT THAT  
CHINA HAD PRESENTED ITS VIEWS ON THE ANGOLAN SITUATION DURING THE  
PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

2. NEITHER SIDE MADE ANY REFERENCE TO THE NOVEMBER 19 EXCHANGE  
BETWEEN KREBS AND PRC AMBASSADOR WANG (REFTEL C). TING DID  
NOT COMMENT ON OBSERVATION BY POLCOUNS THAT WE OF COURSE  
DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN ANY DISCUSSION OF  
THIS SUBJECT BETWEEN PRC AND GOG.  
THAYER

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *TD 9/27/02*  
BY hr, NARA, DATE 2/6/03



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E.O. 11652: XGDS3  
TAGS: PFDR, CH, AO, CU, GY  
SUBJECT: TRANSIT FACILITIES FOR CUBAN MILITARY FLIGHTS

DEPT PLEASE PASS GEORGETOWN

REFS: (A) STATE 302692, B) GEORGETOWN 2196, C) PEKING 2461

WE INFORMED PRC MFA US AFFAIRS DIRECTOR TING YUAN-HUNG ON DECEMBER 30 THAT: A) THE UNITED STATES HAS DISCUSSED WITH GOG QUESTION OF CUBAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT USING GEORGETOWN TRANSIT FACILITIES IN SUPPORT OF CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA; AND B) SECRETARY

SENT A LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BURNHAM ON DECEMBER 26 REQUESTING HIM TO DENY USE OF GUYANA'S FACILITIES FOR THIS PURPOSE. TING EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OUR KEEPING THE PRC INFORMED AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO HIS SUPERIORS. IN RESPONSE TO OUR NUDGING, HE SAID HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO PASS ON TO US ON THIS SUBJECT AT THE PRESENT TIME.  
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/6/03



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