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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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EXDIS

FIG. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR CH  
SUBJECT: CODEL FULBRIGHT LEADERSHIP DISCUSSIONS IN PEKING

SUMMARY. CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION LED BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT RECEIVED ACCOMMODATING WELCOME BY PRC HOSTS, HIGHLIGHTED BY NEARLY FOUR HOURS OF DISCUSSION WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA, AND TWO HOURS WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSHAO-PING. TOPICS INCLUDED BOTH BILATERAL RELATIONS AND SURVEY OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. CHIAO KUAN-HUA DREW FOR THE CODEL IN CLEAR TERMS THE VIEW THAT IF U.S. WANTS FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH PRC IT MUST BREAK FORMAL TIES WITH TAIWAN ON THE JAPANESE PATTERN. TENG AND CHIAO BOTH ELABORATED THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIET THREAT IS DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARD THE WEST, ADDING THAT THE PRC IS PREPARED TO IMPOSE PROTRACTED WAR ON THE RUSSIANS IF THEY SHOULD ATTACK CHINA. TENG INDICATED PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI WOULD VERY LIKELY HAVE RECEIVED THE GROUP WERE HE NOT MORE GRAVELY ILL THAN DURING THE VISIT OF SENATOR JACKSON. END SUMMARY.



1. CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION LED BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT A GENERALLY RELAXED AND ACCOMMODATING RECEPTION CAPPED BY LENGTHY EXPOSURE TO VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA AND VICE PREMIER TENG HSHAO-PING. FOUR DAYS OF SIGHTSEEING

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AND OFFICIAL TALKS IN PEKING WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A TWO DAY TRIP BY TRAIN TO TAIYUAN AND TACHAI PRODUCTION BRIGADE, THEN TO CHANGSHA BY PLANE WITH VISIT TO MAO'S BIRTHPLACE AT SHAOSHAN, A FURTHER PLANE TRIP TO RESORT AREA OF HANGCHOW FOR TWO DAYS, WITH FINAL TIME IN SHANGHAI BEFORE DEPARTURE ON MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 14.

2. FIRST SESSION WITH CHIAO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, BEGAN WITH THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTING THE CONTRIBUTION FULBRIGHT HAD MADE TOWARD IMPROVING U.S.-PRC RELATIONS. HE COMMENTED ON THE GREAT CHANGES IN OUR RELATIONS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT YEARS, DESPITE REMAINING TRACES OF THE POLIGIES OF THE TRUMAN ERA. REPRESENTATIVE FRELINGHUYSEN ASKED IF THERE WAS AN INTEREST IN THINGS AMERICAN IN THE PRC EQUIVALENT TO AMERICAN INTEREST IN CHINA, AND INVITED THE PRC TO SEND DELEGATIONS EQUIVALENT TO THE CODEL TO THE U.S.

3. CHIAO THEN WENT INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE OBSTACLE TO SUCH VISITS--TAIWAN, AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE ROC. HE SAID THE PRC DID NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN, BUT THAT IF THE U.S. WISHES TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE PRC IT MUST "GO IN THE DIRECTION OF THE JAPANESE SOLUTION" AND SEVER ITS TIES TO THE ISLAND. SENATOR FONG ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE TWO CHINESE SIDES NEGOTIATING THEIR DIFFERENCES. CHIAO REPLIED THAT WHILE THIS WAS HIGHLY DESIRABLE, IT WAS THE BASIC VIEW OF THE PRC THAT "PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION IS AN IMPOSSIBILITY". HE ADDED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH THIS PROBLEM, BUT TAKE STEPS TO ASSURE THAT THE CHINESE CAN SETTLE THE TAIWAN ISSUE AMONG THEMSELVES.

4. REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI OBSERVED THAT CHIAO'S VIEW ON A SOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION SEEMED TO BE IN CONTRADICTION WITH THE PRC'S SUPPORT FOR PEACE. THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER THEN RECALLED OFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE U.S. SINCE 1955 WHERE THE AMERICAN SIDE TRIED TO GET THE PRC TO COMMIT ITSELF TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION. HE NOTED THAT THE PRC HAD REFUSED TO DO SO AS THIS IS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR FOR THE CHINESE THEMSELVES TO RESOLVE. HE ADDED THAT THE PRC IS NOT IN A



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HURRY AND IS PREPARED TO WAIT A HUNDRED YEARS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. CHIAO NOTED THAT THE U.S. TREATY WITH ROC WAS SIGNED IN THE EISENHOWER ERA AND BORE THE MARK OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES. THE DISCUSSION CONTINUED WITH CHIAO OBSERVING THAT "THE COMMITMENT" (OF THE U.S. TREATY WITH THE ROC) IS YOUR AFFAIR AND IT IS YOUR PROBLEM WHAT TO DO WITH IT. BUT TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE PRC IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE A COMPLETE BREAK WITH TAIWAN."

5. SENATOR HUMPHREY COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON CHIAO'S EXPRESSION OF PATIENCE IN RESOLVING THE TAIWAN ISSUE, AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT U.S.-PRC RELATIONS WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IN THE MEANWHILE. THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER REPLIED THAT THE FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN U.S.-PRC RELATIONS EXISTED IN THE TERMS OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, WHICH SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT MORE FULLY. FINALLY, SENATOR FONG EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PROMOTING THE REUNITING OF CHINESE WITH THEIR RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES. CHIAO WAFFLED ON THE REPLY, NOTING THIS WAS ONE OF THE DIFFICULT ISSUES IN OUR RELATIONS FOR WHICH THERE WAS NO EASY SOLUTION UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE FIRST SESSION CONCLUDED WITH CHIAO COMMENTING THAT HE HAD NOT INTENDED TO FOCUS SO EXCLUSIVELY ON BILATERAL MATTERS, AND LOOKED FORWARD TO A SECOND SESSION ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

6. SECOND SESSION WITH THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ON SEPTEMBER 4 WAS DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. CHIAO POLITELY DERIDED FULBRIGHT'S EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS COULD BE STRENGTHENED AS AN ORGANIZATION FOR PEACE. HE SIMILARLY DERIDED THE POSSIBILITY OF DETENTE IN VIEW OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR. CHIAO DETAILED AT LENGTH THE PRC'S EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE SAID THERE WERE TWO CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE: THE SOVIETS WERE PERFIDIOUS; AND THEY BULLY THE WEAK AND FEAR THE STRONG. IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR HUMPHREY'S COMMENT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A STRONG NATO, CHIAO OBSERVED THAT WHILE IN PRINCIPLE THE PRC CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR HOME TERRITORY OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS, THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS MAINTAINED A TROOP PRESENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST PROVIDED A VALID REASON FOR THE U.S. MAINTAINING ITS





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MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE AND JAPAN. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE U.S. TO MAINTAIN A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN.

7. RAISING THE ISSUE OF VIETNAM, SENATOR FONG INQUIRED ABOUT CHINESE AND SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM AND THE VIETCONG. CHIAO COMMENTED THAT PRC AID TO ITS FRIENDS IN VIETNAM AMOUNTED TO ONLY A "SMALL HILL" IN COMPARISON WITH THE "HIGH MOUNTAIN" OF AMERICAN AID. HE NOTED THAT THE PRC HOPES THE PARIS AGREEMENT WILL BE CARRIED OUT, AND CALLED ATTENTION TO PRC RESTRAINT ON THE VIETNAM QUESTION.  
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8. RETURNING TO THE ISSUE OF THE SOVIET THREAT, THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER OBSERVED THAT CHINA DID NOT FEAR THE RUSSIANS, AND INDEED MAY HAVE OVERESTIMATED THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE PAST. HE SAID CHINA WOULD NOT PROVOKE THE RUSSIANS, BUT WAS PREPARED TO FIGHT IF NECESSARY. HE FURTHER DEPRECATED THE SOVIET PROBLEM BY COMMENTING THAT RUSSIAN TROOP STRENGTH IN THE FAR EAST WAS BARELY ENOUGH FOR DEFENSE LET ALONE AN OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. CHIAO DISPARAGED THE FIRST SALT AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERPRETATION THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BROKEN IT BY GOING AHEAD WITH QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION CONCLUDED WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIDING THE DELEGATION FOR DEBATING STRATEGIC ISSUES SO PUBLICLY. HE CITED THE ISSUE OF DIEGO GARCIA, WHICH HAD DRAWN SOME OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS. CHIAO CONTRASTED THE AMERICAN APPROACH WITH THE SOVIETS, WHO HAD QUIETLY GONE AHEAD AND ESTABLISHED THREE OR MORE NAVAL FACILITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

9. THE TWO HOUR SESSION WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING ON SEPTEMBER 5 WAS HELD IN THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTERS CHIAO KUAN-HUA AND WANG HAI-JUNG, FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS LIN PING, TING YUAN-HUNG AND CHAO CHI-HUA, AND PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE LEADERS CHOU CHIU-YEH AND KING TAI-SHA IN ATTENDANCE. TENG BEGAN BY OBSERVING THAT "IF PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI WERE NOT ILL, I'M SURE HE WOULD HAVE MET WITH YOU." HE ADDED THAT "SENATOR



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JACKSON MET BRIEFLY WITH PREMIER CHOU IN THE HOSPITAL, BUT HIS ILLNESS IS GRAVER NOW, SO IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO RECEIVE YOU EVEN IN THE HOSPITAL."

10. ALMOST THE ENTIRE DISCUSSION WITH THE VICE PREMIER FOCUSED ON THE SOVIET UNION. TENG BEGAN BY RECALLING THE LINE OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" WHICH HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD BY KHRUSHCHEV. HE THEN QUERIED THE GROUP AS TO WHO HAD GAINED AND WHO HAD LOST BY THE "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" OF THE PAST TWO DECADES. HE NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD TRIED TO PUT CHINA ON THE SPOT BY SIGNING THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY IN 1963, AND OBSERVED THAT THEY WOULD NOW TRY TO DO THE SAME THING TO THE U.S. WITH THE SALT AGREEMENT. HE COMMENTED ON THE ASTOUNDING SPEED WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS WERE PROCEEDING TO DEVELOP STRATEGIC WEAPONS. HE POINTED TO THE INCREASING SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, MIDDLE EAST, PERSIAN GULF, INDIAN OCEAN, AND IN THE PACIFIC AND SAID THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE HEED AND MAINTAIN VIGILANCE. HE DEBUNKED "DETENTE" AND THE CONCEPTS OF "A GENERATION OF PEACE" AND "LASTING PEACE."

11. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM SENATOR FULBRIGHT ABOUT WHY THE CHINESE MEDIA LUMPED "U.S. IMPERIALISM" TOGETHER WITH "SOVIET SOCIAL-IMPERIALISM", TENG SAID A CLOSE READING OF PRC STATEMENTS WOULD SHOW A DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS. HE COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE "ARE MORE AT EASE WITH THE U.S. (THAN THE RUSSIANS) FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE." THE VICE PREMIER DUCKED AN INQUIRY FROM REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI ABOUT HOW LONG "THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE" MIGHT BE. TENG REITERATED CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S THESIS THAT THE SOVIET THREAT WAS DIRECTED TOWARD THE WEST, NOT THE EAST. HE RIDICULED WHAT HE SAID HAD BEEN REPORTS FROM A "RELIABLE SOURCE" THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PLANNING TO ATTACK CHINA IN THE SPRING OR SUMMER OF THIS YEAR. HE SAID THE SAME "RELIABLE SOURCE" WAS NOW PREDICTING AN ATTACK IN THE FALL. HE DETAILED THE PRC'S ANALYSIS THAT THREE-QUARTERS OF THE SOVIET TROOPS WERE DEPLOYED TOWARD THE WEST, AND THAT THESE TROOPS WERE QUALITATIVELY SUPERIOR TO THOSE ON THE CHINESE FRONTIER. TENG ADDED THAT THE PRC WAS, HOWEVER, PREPARED FOR A PROTRACTED WAR WITH THE RUSSIANS



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AND HAD CONFIDENCE THEY COULD COPE WITH AN ATTACK IF IT SHOULD OCCUR.

12. REPRESENTATIVE FRELINGHUYSEN CALLED ATTENTION TO AN APPARENT DEBATE IN THE PRC PRESS ON THE QUESTION OF IMPORTING FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY. HE ASKED IF THE CHINESE WERE RECONSIDERING THEIR TRADING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST. TENG COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS NO DEBATE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF "SELF RELIANCE" IN CHINA'S NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, BUT THAT THE PRC WOULD CONTINUE TO ABSORB FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ACCORDING TO ITS ABILITY TO PAY FOR IT, OR WITH DEFERRED PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS WHERE CHINA HAS THE ABILITY TO GUARANTEE ITS ABILITY TO MAKE A REPAYMENT. HE PREDICTED THERE WOULD BE A SLOW EXPANSION IN THE VOLUME OF THE PRC'S FOREIGN TRADE.

13. IN CONCLUSION, TENG ASKED THE DELEGATION TO CONVEY THE GOOD WISHES OF CHAIRMAN MAO AND PREMIER CHOU TO PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER.

14. COMMENT: THESE FORMAL DISCUSSIONS HAVE DRAWN FOR THE CODEL IN SHARP RELIEF PRC CONCERNS ABOUT BOTH BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. CHIAO'S DISCUSSION OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION EXPLICITLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-ROC MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, ALTHOUGH HE HELD BACK FROM MAKING THE EXPLICIT ASSERTION THAT THE U.S. MUST ABANDON TAIWAN TO ITS FATE. THE COMMENTS BY CHIAO AND TENG ON THE SOVIET THREAT DREW IN ALMOST STYLIZED TERMS A PICTURE OF A RELAXED CHINA FACING A PROBLEM THEY NOW ASSERT "THE WEST" WILL HAVE TO COPE WITH. THE FULL IMPACT OF THESE THEMES IN THE OFFICIAL TALKS ON THE THINKING OF MEMBERS OF THE CODEL WILL PHERHAPS BECOME EVIDENT AS THE REMAINING DAYS OF THE TOUR PROCEED. THE DELEGATION GIVES A RETURN BANQUET FOR THE CHINESE THIS EVENING. ALL THE OFFICIALS THEY HAVE MET WERE INVITED TO ATTEND. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY LIST OF ACCEPTANCES PRESENTED THIS NOON HAD VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG THE HIGHEST RANKING OFFICIAL TO ATTEND. ONE HOUR BEFORE THE BANQUET THE DELEGATION WAS INFORMED THAT WANG, AND INTERPRETER NANCY TANG, HAD SOME UNAVOIDABLE WORK OBLIGATION THAT WOULD PREVENT THEM FROM ATTENDING THE DINNER. IT WAS





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INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD APPEAR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE BANQUET TO AT LEAST GREET THE DELEGATION. WE RESIST ANY INTERPRETATION OF WHAT THIS MIGHT MEAN FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CHAIRMAN. END COMMENT. BRUCE



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AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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F.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINT CH  
SUBJECT: CHOU EN-LAI'S HEALTH

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *TD 9/27/02*  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/4/03

REF: PEKING 1399

1. INFORMATION FROM POLISH AND JAPANESE SOURCES HERE NOW SUGGESTS THAT LANGUAGE USED BY TENG HSIAO-PING IN DESCRIBING CHOU EN-LAI'S HEALTH TO CODEL FULBRIGHT WAS CAREFULLY NUANCED LINE WHICH HAS BEEN USED ON AT LEAST THREE OTHER OCCASIONS. DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL TENG TOLD CODEL FULBRIGHT THAT CHOU'S CONDITION WAS "GRAVER" THAN WHEN SENATOR JACKSON VISITED PEKING IN EARLY JULY, AND PREMIER THEREFORE UNABLE TO RECEIVE FOREIGN VISITORS. WE TREATED TENG'S REFERENCE TO CHOU'S HEALTH WITH SOME RESERVE AT THE TIME BECAUSE IT WAS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF EXPRESSING REGRETS THAT THE PREMIER WOULD NOT MEET THE GROUP. WE SUSPECTED THEN THAT TENG WAS SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY THE GROUP WOULD FEEL SLIGHTED AT NOT RECEIVING THE SAME TREATMENT ACCORDED SENATOR JACKSON.

2. JAPANESE HAVE INFORMED US THAT TENG HAS USED ALMOST IDENTICAL LANGUAGE RECENTLY WITH TWO OF THEIR DELEGATIONS, THE PARLIAMENTARY GROUP WHICH JUST DEPARTED CHINA AND THE

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OWN RIGHT. BASED ON PERSONAL APPEARANCES, LI HSIEN-NIEN CONTINUES HIS PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON THE ECONOMY AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, WHILE TENG APPEARS TO EXERCISE A PRIMARILY POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY ROLE. ALTHOUGH MAJOR DECISIONS UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO BE CLEARED WITH CHOU AND WHEN NECESSARY THE CHAIRMAN AS WELL, THE TWO VICE PREMIERS PROBABLY ARE THE PRINCIPAL EXECUTORS OF PRC GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES. BOTH APPEAR TO ACT WITH CONFIDENCE, ALTHOUGH THEY SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN FEW INITIATIVES IN POLICY MATTERS.

3. WITHIN THE POLITBURO, SPECIFIC POLICY AREAS APPEAR TO BE UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF VARIOUS DESIGNATED INDIVIDUALS ACTING AS A SORT OF SUPER CABINET. FOR EXAMPLE, A RECENT SWEDISH AGRICULTURAL DELEGATION MET WITH HUA KUO-FENG AND WERE TOLD THAT HE WAS THE POLITBURO MEMBER RESPONSIBLE FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY. THE ACTIVITIES AND APPEARANCES OF CHI TENG-KUEI INDICATE HE EXERCISES THE SAME FUNCTIONS IN THE LABOR FIELD. THE FIELD OF CULTURE IS CLEARLY THE DOMAIN OF MADAM MAO AND HER PROTEGE YAO WEN-YUAN WHO ALSO HAS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH MAJOR FOREIGN MEDIA CIRCLES. BASED ON RECENT PUBLIC APPEARANCES, CHANG CHUN-CHIAO SEEMS TO HAVE A MAJOR PARTY FUNCTION AND MAY BE ACTING AS DE FACTO SECRETARY GENERAL, ALBEIT WITHOUT THE TITLE.

4. PROBABLY THE MOST CRITICAL LEADERSHIP FUNCTION IS IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THE YOUTHFUL WANG HUNG-WEN HAS FIGURED WITH INCREASING PROMINENCE IN MILITARY AFFAIRS, AND IT IS REPORTED THAT HE, POSSIBLY ALONG WITH TENG HSIAO-PING, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PARTY CONTROL OVER THE PLA WITHIN THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION. FROM THE RANKS OF THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY COMMANDERS, CHEN HSI-LIEN SEEMS TO HAVE ASSUMED A CENTRAL LEADERSHIP ROLE, AND IT IS RUMORED THAT HE MAY BECOME THE NEXT MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

5. BASED ON THE VOLUME OF THEORETICAL WRITINGS ON THE SUBJECT OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT A KEY REMAINING UNSOLVED ISSUE FOR THE PRC IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE ARMY. THE SUCCESS WITH WHICH WANG HUNG-WEN EXERTS PARTY CONTROL OVER CHINA'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WILL BE AN IMPORTANT TEST OF HIS ABILITY TO ASSUME THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE PARTY AFTER MAO, A POSITION FOR WHICH HE



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NOW SEEMS TO BE UNDERGOING A PERIOD OF TUTELAGE. THIS ROLE COULD LEAVE HIM EXPOSED, PARTICULARLY SHOULD HE BE CONFRONTED WITH AN EARLY TEST OF STRENGTH.

8. THE POSITION OF CHIANG CHING CONTINUES TO BE SOMETHING OF A MYSTERY. CLEARLY HER STATURE HAS GROWN DURING THIS TRANSITION PERIOD, OR AT LEAST A DEFINITE EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO BUILD HER UP. RECENT APPERANCES WITH VISITING HEADS OF STATE AND OTHER INDICATORS STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT MADAM MAO, LONG A MAJOR FACTOR IN BEHIND THE SCENES PARTY POLITICS, HAS NOW BEEN ALLOCATED A POSITION OF AUTHORITY IN THE OFFICIAL STATE HIERARCHY AS WELL. RECENT DISCUSSION OF THE TANG DYNASTY EMPRESS WU APPEARS TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY A NEW AND MORE IMPORTANT ROLE FOR CHIANG CHING, ALTHOUGH IT MAY ALSO REFLECT CONTINUING OPPOSITION TO THIS MOVE.  
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7. IN SUM, A LEADERSHIP COALITION APPEARS TO BE FORMING, THUS FAR SUCCESSFULLY. THE DISPLAY OF UNITY ON OCTOBER 1, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS IMPRESSIVE. IT CLEARLY IS NOT A LONG TERM SOLUTION, HOWEVER, AND JOCKEYING FOR POSITION IN A POST-MAO AND, PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, POST-CHOU ERA WILL CONTINUE. MANY OF THE TRANSITION LEADERS ARE THEMSELVES ELDERLY. TENG IS SEVENTY, AND LI HSIEN-NIEN SIXTY EIGHT. MANY IN PEKING POSTULATE THAT CHANG CHUN-CHIAO IS THE LOGICAL EVENTUAL SUCCESSOR TO THE PREMIERSHIP. A MAJOR IMPONDERABLE AFFECTING THE SUCCESS WITH WHICH CHINA CAN MAKE THE TRANSITION TO A NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS IS THE LONGEVITY OF MAO AND CHOU. THEY ARE THE GLUE THAT HOLDS THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT TOGETHER, AND THEIR EARLY DEMISE WOULD SERIOUSLY INTENSIFY EXISTING POWER RIVALRIES. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MILITARY MIGHT MOVE TO REGAIN ITS POWER POSITION AND WOULD BE A CRITICAL FACTOR TO WATCH.

8. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS TRANSITION PERIOD FOR THE UNITED STATES? FIRST, WE SEE NO MAJOR SHIFT AWAY FROM THE COURSE OF NORMALIZATION SET IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, REGARDLESS OF WHO EVENTUALLY EMERGES AS PRIMUS INTER PARES AMONG CHINA'S LEADERS. WE CAN FIND NO ELEMENTS WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP WHO WOULD FIND IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO VEER SHARPLY AWAY FROM SINO-U.S. DETENTE AND THE POLITICAL/STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES IT OFFERS. THAT SAID, WE MAY FIND CHINESE POSITIONS ON TAIWAN AND OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO U.S. INTERESTS SOMEWHAT LESS FLEXIBLE



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THAN PREVIOUSLY. THIS MAY IN PART BE TACTICAL. GIVEN TAIWAN'S GROWING POLITICAL ISOLATION, PEKING PROBABLY SEES LESS NEED FOR HASTE IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS. IF OUR ASSESSMENT IS CORRECT THAT CHINESE CONCERN OVER THE THREAT OF A SOVIET ATTACK HAS DIMINISHED, THIS WOULD ALSO BE A FACTOR IN DECREASING THE SENSE OF URGENCY WITH WHICH THE LEADERSHIP APPROACHES THE IMPROVEMENT OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, TO THESE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE ADDED THE PROBABILITY OF INCREASED CAUTION ON THE PART OF CHINESE LEADERS DURING THIS TIME OF UNCERTAINTY AND TRANSITION.

9. WE MAY ALSO BE IN FOR A PERIOD OF AMBIGUITY IN CHINA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LINE, A PHENOMENON WHICH WE THINK IS ALREADY OBSERVABLE. THE NECESSITY TO REACH A CONSENSUS WHEN NO SINGLE ACTIVE LEADER HOLDS A CLEAR-CUT POSITION OF PREMINENCE WILL PROBABLY PRODUCE CONFLICTING AND SOMETIMES CONFUSING INDICATORS. THE PROLONGED DEBATE OVER PRC FOREIGN TRADE POLICY AND RELIANCE ON FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY IS A CASE IN POINT.

10. IN CONCLUSION, A COALITION RESUMBLING THE THREE WAY COMBINATION OF YOUNG, MIDDLE AGED AND OLD CALLED FOR DURING THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS SEEMS THUS FAR TO BE WORKING AND PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO WORK AS LONG AS THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS FEEL THAT THEY NEED EACH OTHER. DECISION MAKING HAS BECOME MORE DIFFICULT, A SITUATION WHICH WILL BE EXACERBATED BY THE DEMISE OF CHINA'S TOP TWO LEADERS. THIS IS A FACTOR WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN U.S. PLANNING OF THE PACE OF DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONS.  
HOLDRIDGE



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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2591

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PEKING 1835

R.O. 11652: N/A *HR 5714101*

TAGS: PFOR, CH

SUBJECT: BUSH CALL ON ACTING PROTOCOL CHIEF

1. MR. BUSH AFTERNOON OCTOBER 23 PAID INITIAL CALL ON MFA PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT ACTING DIRECTOR CHU CH'UAN-HSIEN. ALSO PRESENT ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT FUNCTIONARIES T'ANG LUNG-PIN AND CHENG HO-K'ANG. CHU CONDUCTED ENTIRE 25 MINUTE INTERVIEW HIMSELF IN CAREFUL ENGLISH. HE SAID HE HAD REPORTED MR. BUSH'S ARRIVAL TO VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO KUAN-HUA, FOREIGN MINISTER CH'PIENG-FEI, AND VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG (HE NAMED THEM IN THAT ORDER), OFFERED THE FULL FACILITIES OF THE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT, ESPECIALLY IN ARRANGING VISITS AND TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF PEKING, AND SAID HE WOULD SET UP A PROGRAM OF COURTESY CALLS, BEGINNING IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS WITH MFA AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN P'ING AND THE OTHER MFA DEPARTMENT DIRECTORS AND THEN GOING ON TO "OTHER OFFICIALS."

2. BIOGRAPHICAL COMMENT: IN RESPONSE TO A COMPLIMENT ON THE HIGH REPUTATION OF HIS DEPARTMENT AMONG U.S. OFFICIALS, CHU NOTED THAT BOTH HE AND T'ANG LUNG-PIN HAD BEEN CONSTANTLY ENGAGED IN PROTOCOL WORK FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS. CHU SEEMED COMFORTABLE USING ENGLISH AND HAD NO DIFFICULTY FOLLOWING U.S. SIDE'S SOMETIMES FAST-PACED DELIVERY.

BUSH

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2825

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 2117

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR SCALI FROM THE SECRETARY

SECTO 201

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR  
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA'S BEHAVIOR ON THE KHMER AND KOREAN QUESTIONS

1. I FIND BOUTEFLIKA'S BEHAVIOR ON THE KHMER AND KOREAN QUESTIONS OUTRAGEOUS. ON TOP OF ACTIONS IN THE CHAIR IN PREVIOUS DEBATES, HE IS NOW MAKING A FURTHER TRAVESTY OF WHAT SHOULD BE IMPARTIAL BEHAVIOR. THE IDEA THAT HE CAN FEEL FREE TO ADJUST AND MANIPULATE DEBATE AND VOTING PROCEDURES SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GO UNQUESTIONED AND UNCHALLENGED.

2. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO MAKE OUR OBJECTIONS CLEAR ON EACH OCCASION THAT HE USES HIS AUTHORITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE GA IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO WHAT WE HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT. IF YOU THINK IT APPROPRIATE, YOU SHOULD CHALLENGE HIS RULINGS AND EVEN FORCE A VOTE IN FLAGRANT CASES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY SO IF HE WIN FIRST KHMER VOTE AND HE TRIES TO FORCE A SECOND VOTE ON OPPOSITION RESOLUTION. LET ME KNOW IF YOU DO NOT AGREE.  
KISSINGER



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SECTO 205

TO EAGLEBURGER FROM BREMER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: SCALIGRAM ON CERDS

REF: T0SEC 477

1. THE SANDBAGS ARE PILING UP HERE TO THE POINT WHERE WE COULD LAY THEM END TO END AND WALK BACK TO WASHINGTON.
2. SECRETARY'S INITIAL REACTION TO REPTEL IS THAT THESE IDEAS WERE ADVANCED BEFORE HAVING BEEN CAREFULLY SCRUBBED CLEAN AND THOUGHT THROUGH.
3. BEFORE CONSIDERING THIS MATTER FURTHER, WE WILL THEREFORE NEED TO HAVE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW ON SCALI'S SUGGESTIONS RE THE RABASA GAMBIT. CAN YOU ARRANGE THIS?
4. RE SCALI'S PROPOSAL OF APPROACHING DORRYNIN, IT WILL COME AS NO SURPRISE THAT THE SECRETARY WANTS THIS MOVE QUASHED. WILL YOU SEE TO THIS.  
KISSINGER

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HR 5/14/01







Department of State

TELEGRAM

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2841

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EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR SCALI FROM THE SECRETARY  
FOR MR. SISCO FROM THE SECRETARY

SECTO 216

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, UN  
SUBJ: UNDOF RESOLUTIONS

REF: USUN 5433

1. I AM GRAVELY CONCERNED WITH REPORT THAT UNDOF RESOLUTIONS  
MAY BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO RESOLUTIONS 344.  
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THIS BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.  
THIS TEXT HAS BEEN FULLY WORKED OUT WITH THE EGYPTIANS  
AND ISRAELIS. YOU SHOULD STICK CLOSE TO THIS LINE.  
KISSINGER



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SECTO 221

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) PFOR CB IC UN  
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO ICELANDERS ON KHMER REPRESENTATION

REF: TOSEC 513

SECRETARY APPROVES PROPOSED MESSAGE IN REFTEL.  
KISSINGER



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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2965  
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR CH US  
SUBJECT: SENATOR MANSFIELD'S MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI

1. SENATOR MANSFIELD, ACCOMPANIED BY MRS. MANSFIELD, HAD 55-MINUTE MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI EVENING OF DEC 12. SENATOR MANSFIELD HAD ASKED BEFOREHAND HOW LONG MEETING SHOULD LAST AND WAS TOLD ABOUT 10 TO 15 MINUTES; HE HAD THEN ASKED CHINESE TO LET HIM KNOW DURING SESSION WHEN HE SHOULD BREAK OFF. LENGTH OF MEETING HAD BOTH SURPRISED AND PLEASSED HIM.

2. ACCORDING TO SENATOR MANSFIELD, CHOU EN-LAI APPEARED TO BE IN QUITE GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION. CHOU LOOKED THIN, BUT NO MORE SO THAN AT MANSFIELD'S LAST MEETING WITH HIM IN 1972. CHOU'S MIND WAS ALSO VERY CLEAR. THE TWO REMINISCED ABOUT THEIR WARTIME EXPERIENCES IN 1944-45 AT TIME WHEN SENATOR MANSFIELD, THEN A REPRESENTATIVE, HAD BEEN SENT ON SPECIAL MISSION TO CHUNGKING BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT. CHOU HAD BEEN OUT OF CHUNGKING IN YUNNAN PROVINCE DURING THAT PERIOD, BUT THEY SPOKE OF MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCES.

3. NO MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE WERE DISCUSSED. WHEN SENATOR MANSFIELD ASKED CHOU IF THERE WERE ANY PROBLEMS



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EXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR PINS CH  
SUBJECT: ESPIONAGE ALLEGATION BY PRC AGAINST WILLIAM STOKES

REF: (A) STATE 281801 (B) PEKING 2252

1. AT END OF CALL ON TING YUAN-HUNG ON ANOTHER SUBJECT JANUARY 3, USLO OFFICER REFERRED TO TING'S COMMENT ON DECEMBER 4 ABOUT WILLIAM STOKES (REF B), AND AFTER NOTING THAT HE WAS ACTING UNDER DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS, READ THE STATEMENT IN PARA 2 REF A.

2. IN REPLY, TING SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS. HE SAID HIS COMMENT ON STOKES REPRESENTED THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. HE ADDED "THE FACT THAT STOKES WAS INVOLVED IN ESPIONAGE CANNOT BE DENIED." IT WAS OUT OF CONSIDERATION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, TING SAID, THAT THE PRC AGREED TO STOKES' ENTRY THIS TIME. REFERRING TO HIS DECEMBER 4 COMMENT ON STOKES, TING SAID HIS DEPARTMENT WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE USR THAT "PEOPLE OF THIS KIND ARE NOT WELCOME TO CHINA." IN ORDER TO AVOID UNPLEASANT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE FUTURE, TING SAID, HE WISHES TO REMIND US OF THIS AGAIN. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE MAY WANT TO MAKE SOME FURTHER COMMENT TO US.

3. USLO OFFICER CLOSED DISCUSSION BY SAYING HE DID NOT WISH TO SAY ANYTHING FURTHER AT THIS TIME EXCEPT TO EMPHASIZE



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PAGE 02 PEKING 00011 040312Z

THAT THE STATEMENT HE READ TO TING EXPRESSED THE USG'S POSITION IN THE MATTER VERY CLEARLY.

4. COMMENT: TING'S REMARKS, WHILE FORCEFUL IN TONE, DID NOT GO BEYOND SUBSTANCE OF HIS EARLIER COMMENTS. IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME FURTHER STATEMENT FROM THE CHINESE SIDE, WE WOULD NOT RECOMMEND THAT WE SAY ANYTHING FURTHER ON THE MATTER.

RUSH





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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3088  
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINT, CH  
SUBJECT: CHOU EN-LAI COMMENTS ON HIS HEALTH

DUTCH AMBASSADOR HAS INFORMED US THAT DURING FONMIN  
VAN DER STOEL'S CALL ON PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI HIS APPEARANCE  
IMPRESSED DUTCH VISITORS AS BEING ABOUT THE SAME AS USUAL  
ALTHOUGH HE WAS PERHAPS SOMEWHAT THINNER. CHOU TOLD DUTCH THAT FOR THE

LAST TWO YEARS HE HAD BEEN SUFFERING FROM AN AILMENT WHICH COULD  
NOT BE COMPLETELY CURED EVEN THOUGH HIS OUTWARD APPEARANCE WAS  
NOT BAD. HIS MENTAL VIGOR WAS UNIMPAIRED, VIXSEBOXSE SAID,  
AND HE WAS FULLY ON TOP OF ALL SUBJECTS WHICH OTHER CHINESE OFFICIALS  
HAD DISCUSSED WITH VAN DER STOEL.  
BUSH

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CH, US  
SUBJECT: PRC VIEWS ON THE "JAPANESE FORMULA" AS APPLIED TO  
US-REPUBLIC OF CHINA MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

1. NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR HARLAND TELLS US THAT AT RECENT RECEPTION ATTENDED BOTH BY HIM AND LIN PING, DIRECTOR OF MFA AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT, HE ASKED LIN FOR EXPLANATION OF WHAT CHINESE MEANT WHEN THEY SAID US SHOULD FOLLOW THE "JAPANESE FORMULA" IN HANDLING THE TAIWAN PROBLEM. SPECIFICALLY, IN ADDITION TO BREAKING OFF ALL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN, WOULD THE US NEED TO FOLLOW THE JAPANESE PATTERN IN ITS TREATMENT OF THE US-ROC MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY?

2. LE PING'S ANSWER WAS EMPHATICALLY "YES." HE DID NOT ELABORATE FURTHER, BUT HARLAND TOOK THIS TO MEAN THAT WITH RESPECT TO THE US-ROC MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY THE PRC WOULD REQUIRE THE US TO FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE SET BY JAPAN (IN THIS CASE REGARDING THE PEACE TREATY) IN TAKING SOME SORT OF FORMAL, OVERT ACTION TO DECLARE IT NULL AND VOID. WHEN HARLAND SAID THAT THE SITUATIONS IN THE US AND JAPAN WERE DIFFERENT, LIN PING REPLIED TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS ALL A QUESTION OF POLICY, AND THAT THE US COULD CERTAINLY FIND A WAY.

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AEMBASSY TAIPEI 413  
AEMBASSY TOKYO 606  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2047  
CINCPAC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 200

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINT, CH  
SUBJECT: TEN HSIAO-PING DEFINES HIS RELATIONSHIP TO MAO  
TSE-TUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI  
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. DEPARTING FRENCH AMBASSADOR MANAC'H PAID CALL ON  
TENG HSIAO-PING FEB 1 TO BID FAREWELL, AND DURING CONVERSATION  
CONGRATULATED TENG ON HIS APPOINTMENT TO NEW INFLUENTIAL POSTS  
IN PRC GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES, TENG REPORTEDLY BECAME RATHER  
AGITATED AT THOUGHT HE WAS NOW IN A POSITION TO EXERCISE ANY  
SPECIAL DEGREE OF INFLUENCE, WHAT FOREIGNERS FAILED TO UNDERSTAND,  
HE SAID, WAS THAT POLICY WAS DETERMINED BY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG  
AND EXECUTED BY PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI, HE, TENG, WAS MERELY A "COLLAB-  
ORATOR" OF CHOU EN-LAI'S.

2. SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION WAS CHARLES MALO, THEN DCM, AND NOW  
FRENCH CHARGE, WHO ACCOMPANIED MANAC'H, MALO FELT THAT TENG'S  
REMARKS FAIRLY ACCURATELY SUMMED UP TENG'S POWER RELATIONSHIP TO  
OTHER TOP CCP LEADERS, HE THEORIZED THAT TENG, HAVING BEEN  
RESTORED TO A LEADERSHIP POSITION FOLLOWING DENUNCIATION DURING  
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS A "CAPITALIST ROADER," WAS VERY MUCH  
BEHOLDEN TO THOSE WHO RAISED HIM UP--PRESUMABLY MAO AND CHOU--  
AND WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP ANY INDIVIDUAL AUTHORITY, MALO ALSO  
FELT THAT "WHEN THE SUCCESSION BEGINS" TENG WOULD BE AT A DISADVANTAG-  
E  
IN COMPETING WITH LEADERS SUCH AS CHANG CHUN-CHIAO WHOSE POLITICAL  
CAREERS HAD BEEN DISTINGUISHED BY STEADY PROGRESS UPWARD WITHOUT ANY

\*\*\*\*\*WHBR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/4/03



SPECTACULAR SETBACKS OF THE NATURE SUFFERED BY TENG,

3. COMMENT. THERE MAY BE SOMETHING TO WHAT MAO SAYS, ALTHOUGH IT IS CERTAINLY TOO SOON AFTER TENG'S NEW APPOINTMENTS TO MAKE FIRM JUDGEMENTS. ONE PURPOSE OF TENG TAKING LINE HE USED WITH MANACIM MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN TO ESTABLISH MAO TSE-TUNG AS ENDORSER OF TENG'S POSITIONS DESPITE MAO'S ABSENCE FROM PARTY PLENUM AND FOURTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS. IN THIS RESPECT, ACCORDING TO JAPANESE AMBASSADOR OGAWA, TENG TOLD VISITING LDP LEADER HORI THAT MAO TSE-TUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF FOURTH NPC.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3689  
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

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E.O. 11652; XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR CH US  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO PRC - CLARE HOLLINGWORTH STORY  
REF: PEKING 844

1. LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH CORRESPONDENT CLARE HOLLINGWORTH ACCOMPANIED PERRIGRINE WORTHORNE DURING HIS CALL ON MR. BUSH MAY 4. IN THE COURSE OF A DISCUSSION OF CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S REMARKS TO BRITISH JOURNALISTS MUCH ALONG LINES REFTEL, HOLLINGWORTH SAID, ALMOST IN PASSING, THAT A "SENIOR PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL" HAD TOLD HER THAT UNLESS THE U.S. WAS PREPARED "TO COMPROMISE" ON THE CHINESE THREE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION, PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO PEKING MIGHT NOT MATERIALIZE. WHEN IT WAS NOTED THAT "A SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL" SOUNDED LIKE CHIAO KUAN-HUA, HOLLINGWORTH DID NOT DISSENT AND APPEARED TO WANT TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS CHIAO. MR. BUSH INDICATED HE HAD NO SUCH INDICATIONS FROM ANY SOURCE WHATSOEVER.

2. IN STRICT CONFIDENCE WE HAVE CHECKED WITH THE BRITISH HERE TO DETERMINE A) WHETHER THEY HAVE HEARD A SIMILAR STORY FROM HOLLINGWORTH OR OTHERS ON THE BRITISH PRESS DELEGATION (THEY HAVE NOT); AND B) WHAT CREDIBILITY THEY WOULD ATTACH TO SUCH A STORY FROM HOLLINGWORTH. BRITISH EMBOFF, WHO IS AN OLD FRIEND OF HOLLINGWORTH'S

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PAGE 02 PEKING 00851 050814Z

SAID THAT SHE DOESN'T HAVE ENOUGH TO DO IN PEKING AND OCCASIONALLY "TENDS TO FANTACIZE". HE NOTED THAT HOLLINGWORTH DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS TO CHIAO KUAN-HUA, BUT NORMALLY SEES OFFICIALS OF THE MFA INFORMATION DEPARTMENT. HE ADDED THAT SHE HAD RETURNED TO PEKING ONLY TWO DAYS AGO AFTER A RATHER LONG ABSENCE, AND THAT THE ONLY TIME SHE WOULD HAVE SEEN CHIAO SINCE HER RETURN WOULD HAVE BEEN WITH THE JOURNALIST DELEGATION, NONE OF WHOM HAVE COME UP WITH A SIMILAR STORY. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WHILE HE FINDS IT USEFUL TO DISCUSS EVENTS IN CHINA WITH HOLLINGWORTH, HE TREATS HER MORE SENSATIONAL STORIES WITH GREAT SKEPTICISM.

3. WE ARE REPORTING THE ABOVE INFORMATION A) BECAUSE HOLLINGWORTH MAY TRY IT OUT ON OTHERS IN THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AND IT MAY APPEAR IN THE PRESS; AND B) IT IS AN INDICATION THAT CLARE HOLLINGWORTH IS CAPABLE OF MANUFACTURING "INFORMATION", BOTH IN PURSUIT OF A STORY AND TO BUILD UP HER OWN REPUTATION AS A REPORTER HAVING INSIDE SOURCES IN PEKING. BUSH

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR VN US  
SUBJECT: CONTACT WITH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES

1. DURING GENERAL DISCUSSION OF SITUATION IN EAST ASIA WITH USLO POLITICAL OFFICER, ROMANIAN EMBOFF MENTIONED HANOI'S DESIRE TO ESTABLISH TIES WITH THE US AND ASKED IF USLO HAS CONTACT WITH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS STATIONED IN PEKING. WHEN HE WAS TOLD THAT WE DO NOT, HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE VIETNAMESE WOULD LIKE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT AND OFFERED TO SET UP A MEETING. USLO OFFICER SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CHECK WITH HIS SUPERIORS.

2. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS. BUSH

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FOR EA/PRCM GLEYSTEN FROM AMB BUSH

F.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP CH US  
SUBJECT: SCHEDULING OF CONGRESSIONAL TRAVEL TO PRC

1. DO YOU HAVE ROSTER OF PERCY/JAVITS GROUP?
  2. I HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY CONGRESSMAN MONTGOMERY (DEM-MISS) AND CONGRESSMAN HAMMERSCHMIDT (REP-ARK) ABOUT VISITING CHINA. WOULD THERE BE ROOM FOR THESE TWO FIFTH TERM CONGRESSMEN TO BE ADDED TO THAT DELEGATION?
- BUSH



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