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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4195 (redo)

Pen 5 outbox 9/10/76
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HH~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDSACTION

August 3, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES *JB*

SUBJECT: Contingency Messages on Mao Tse-tung's Death

State has sent a contingency plan (Tab C) to Secretary Kissinger for use at the time of Mao Tse-tung's death. Based on the precedent established in connection with Chou En-lai's death, State believes the President should send condolence messages to Premier Hua' Kuo-feng, to Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), and to whomever is fulfilling the protocol functions of PRC Chief of State following Chu Te's death.

We have slightly amended the suggested texts that State drafted for the President's signature. The revised texts are at Tab A; the State originals form part of Tab C. We have also slightly edited the State proposed text of a separate White House statement on the Chairman's death. The revised text is at Tab B; the State original forms part of Tab C.

Official Delegation

It is probable but not certain that in the case of Mao's death the Chinese will adhere to their past practice of not inviting foreign governments to send delegations to the funeral. Should the Chinese indicate that they are prepared to receive an official U.S. delegation, the EA Bureau believes that Secretary Kissinger would be the most appropriate person to head it. The Bureau also recommends that the delegation include Senator Mansfield, Congressman Rhodes, and Ambassador Gates.

On the other hand, the Bureau believes that should it become evident that the Chief-of-State or head-of-government will head a substantial number of other delegations, Vice President Rockefeller should head the delegation "provided the risk of domestic political opposition to his selection is considered manageable."

I believe that in any event you would wish to recommend to the President that Vice President Rockefeller not lead a U. S. delegation to Chairman Mao's funeral. As State's memorandum points out, the Vice President

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HR 5/10/01



attended the funeral of Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975. Many Congressmen and others would probably oppose his attendance at Mao's funeral for that reason. Peking would also have reservations because of the Vice President's role at Chiang Kai-shek's funeral.

Other possibilities for head of the delegation would be: David Bruce, the First Chief of our Liaison Office in Peking, and Ambassador Scranton.

Douglas Smith, of Robert Hartmann's office, has cleared the texts of the condolence messages and the White House statement.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the text of the contingency messages at Tabs A and B.

APPROVE RM/BS DISAPPROVE _____

That you discuss with the President the question of a possible U. S. delegation to Mao's funeral indicating that you believe that we should not consider the Vice President on this occasion, but that the Secretary of State would be the most appropriate delegation head.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Done





DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: The Secretary
From: EA - Robert H. Miller

Contingency Plans for Mao Tse-tung's Death

In view of the increasing likelihood that Chairman Mao Tse-tung's death may occur soon, you may wish to review the contingency plans we have prepared for that eventuality. Mao was 82 on December 26, 1975 and has been in frail health for some time. The PRC announced June 15 that Chairman Mao will no longer meet foreign visitors, providing further evidence that his health may be failing.

On Mao's death, we will need to move promptly on four matters:

- the release of appropriate statements in the name of the President and the Secretary of State;
- the despatch of condolence messages;
- the selection of an official delegation if foreign governments are invited to send representatives to the funeral; and
- the determination of the level of USG participation in Washington observances of Mao's death, such as signing the condolence book at the PRC Liaison Office.

US Government Statements

The proposed texts of appropriate statements (fully cleared at the working level) to be released by the White House and the Department of State are at Tabs 1 and 2.

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Condolence Messages

Based on the precedent established in connection with Chou En-lai's death, we believe the President should send condolence messages to Premier Hua Kuo-feng, to Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), and to whomever is fulfilling the protocol functions of PRC Chief of State following Chu Te's death. Suggested texts of these messages are at Tabs 3, 4, and 5. (In Chou's case, the President sent condolence messages to Chu Te, Mao Tse-tung, and Madame Chou. The President also included a brief expression of regret over Chou's death in his letter to Teng Hsiao-p'ing following his visit to the PRC in December 1975.)

In addition, you should send a condolence message to PRC Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua. A proposed text is at Tab 6.

If the Chinese adhere to the practice followed in the case of Premier Chou, we can anticipate that these messages will be made public by the PRC and published in the PRC press.

Official Delegation to Mao's Funeral

This question may not arise, but we should be prepared for it if it does. The Chinese did not invite foreign governments to send delegations to the funerals of either Chou En-lai or Chu Te. In both cases they announced that this decision was "in accordance with China's customs and reformed protocol." It is probable but not certain that they will adhere to this practice in the case of Mao.

Should the Chinese indicate that they are prepared to receive an official US delegation, we should bear in mind the following considerations:

-- Regardless of formal titles, Mao has no real protocol equivalent in this country. Officially, he is simply Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China. As such he is Commander in Chief of the armed forces and Chairman of the Party's Military Commission, but he holds no formal governmental position.

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- 3 -

-- Mao is still identified in the minds of some Americans as a radical revolutionary who sent troops to fight us in Korea, has fomented revolution around the world, and is noted for his antagonism to our way of life. At the same time, by meeting personally with top US leaders, he has given his stamp of approval to the new turn in US-PRC relations. We would wish to remember him in this latter role without forgetting the former.

-- The funeral would probably not provide a good occasion for substantive talks with the Chinese on the future of our relations.

-- In selecting the senior representative to attend the funeral, we would wish to demonstrate the importance we attach to the US-PRC relationship, and to Mao's personal role in achieving the breakthrough, without doing so in such an ostentatious fashion as to set undesirable precedents, to unsettle US-Soviet relations, or to arouse domestic criticism.

Delegation Head

Attendance by the President would probably be undesirable in any perceivable circumstances.

Sending Vice President Rockefeller would symbolize the importance we attach to US-PRC relations, but his attendance at the funeral of Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975 would dramatize the "two Chinas" aspect of our concurrent relations with both Peking and Taipei. On the one hand, Ambassador Gates has strongly recommended that the Vice President head our delegation despite the Chiang Kai-shek precedent. On the other, there is the possibility that a few extreme supporters of the Republic of China in this country, including Members of Congress, could oppose the Vice President's attendance on the grounds that we should not treat Mao on the same level as our long-time friend and ally Chiang Kai-shek.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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- 4 -

You yourself have had more contact with Chairman Mao than any other US official. Your attendance at the funeral would be symbolically fitting for this reason and would demonstrate the importance we attach to our ties with the PRC. There is the possibility, however, that other delegations will be headed at a higher level in a strict protocol sense.

Problems of protocol and the anomalies introduced by the absence of full US-PRC diplomatic relations could be reduced by sending a prominent figure outside the Executive Branch as the President's personal representative. Preferably, this person should have some connection with China and, particularly, with the breakthrough in US-PRC relations.

Former President Nixon's selection for this purpose would presumably be acceptable to the Chinese but would obviously be unacceptable to Americans.

Former Secretary of State Rogers accompanied President Nixon to China in 1972, but the Chinese recognize that he was not a principal architect of the shift in our policy, and he did not accompany the President to his meeting with Chairman Mao.

Other Delegation Members

While the delegation should be small, we may wish to include several Congressional leaders to symbolize the broad bipartisan support in this country for our policy toward the PRC. A list of Members of Congress who have visited the PRC is at Tab 7. To provide appropriate balance, the best choices might be Senate Majority Leader Mansfield and House Minority Leader Rhodes.

The Chief of our Liaison Office in Peking should also be designated an official member of the delegation. One or both of our former Liaison Office Chiefs in Peking - David Bruce and George Bush - could also be included. We do not consider this necessary or desirable, however,

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

since their inclusion could tend to undercut the position of Ambassador Gates in Peking. Moreover, it would not be appropriate to include the Director of Central Intelligence on a delegation of this sort.

Bureau Views

If a delegation is required, we feel that on balance you would be the most appropriate person to head it. The delegation might also include Senator Mansfield, Congressman Rhodes, and Ambassador Gates. On the other hand, should it quickly become evident that a substantial number of other delegations will be headed at the chief of state or head of government level, we would favor having Vice President Rockefeller head the delegation, provided that the risk of domestic political opposition to his selection is considered manageable. You could also appropriately be a member of the delegation under these circumstances.

Participation in Washington Observances

As in the case of Premier Chou, the PRC Liaison Office in Washington will probably open a condolence book for signature. You were the ranking person to sign the book for Premier Chou, and we believe you should also sign the book for Mao.

Other Actions

A circular telegram should be sent to field posts with instructions on how to observe the occasion. A draft is at Tab 8.

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Suggested White House Statement
- Tab 2 - Suggested Statement by the Secretary.
- Tab 3 - Suggested Message to Hua Kuo-feng
- Tab 4 - Suggested Message to Madame Mao Tse-tung
- Tab 5 - Suggested Message to Acting Chief of State
- Tab 6 - Suggested Message to Ch'iao Kuan-hua
- Tab 7 - Members of Congress who have visited PRC
- Tab 8 - Draft Circular Telegram

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Suggested White House Statement on Mao's Death

The People's Republic of China announced today the passing away of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Chairman Mao was a giant figure in modern Chinese history. He was a leader whose actions profoundly affected the development of his country and whose ideas were influential well beyond the borders of China.

Americans will remember that it was under Chairman Mao that China moved together with the United States to end a generation of hostility and to launch a new and more positive era in relations between our two countries. We are confident that the trend of improved relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, which Chairman Mao helped create, and to which he imparted authoritative direction, will continue.

The United States offers its condolences to the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 5/10/01



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Suggested Statement by the Secretary on Mao's Death

The death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung marks the passing of one of the major figures of our time.

It was my privilege to meet with Chairman Mao over a period of nearly four years, during which the United States and the People's Republic of China established a new and more positive relationship based on the principles of the Shanghai Communique. From these conversations, I came to know Chairman Mao as a man of broad vision with a deep concern for the future of his country and its place in the world. The creation of a durable relationship between our two countries based on mutual understanding and a perception of common interests will stand as a lasting tribute to Chairman Mao's foresight and boldness of purpose.

I extend my deep sympathy to the Government and people of the People's Republic of China on this sad occasion.

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EO 12812, OCT 67

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HR

5/10/01



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

His Excellency
Hua Kuo-feng
Premier of the State Council
Peking

Dear Mr. ^{Premier:} ~~Chairman~~

Please accept my personal condolences, and those of the Government and people of the United States, on the occasion of the passing of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Few men in any era are destined to leave a deep imprint on the course of development of a great country and fewer still to achieve historic greatness. Chairman Mao was one of these rare men. His leadership has been a decisive element in the shaping of the Chinese nation over the past several decades. He was truly a major figure of our times.


I was privileged to meet Chairman Mao during my visit to Peking in December 1975. Our discussion furthered the development of US-China relations along the lines that he had earlier envisaged. Let me affirm now, as I did then, the determination of the United States to complete the normalization of our relations on the basis of the Shanghai Communique. This would be a fitting tribute to his vision, and of benefit to the peoples of our two countries.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY KJR, NARA, DATE 5/10/01



Madame Mao Tse-tung
Peking
People's Republic of China

Dear Madame Mao:

Mrs. Ford joins me in extending to you our deepest sympathy on the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Chairman Mao had a profound impact on his era. During my visit to Peking in December 1975, I was privileged to hold wide-ranging discussions with him. Our talks confirmed that we shared a common belief in the importance of strengthening the relations between our two countries. Chairman Mao will be remembered in this country for his leading role in restoring the traditional ties of friendship between the American and Chinese peoples.

Please accept my personal condolences.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford



(Contingency Message to be sent, on an optional basis, to whomever is fulfilling the protocol functions of PRC Chief of State)

Dear Mr. _____:

On behalf of the Government and people of the United States, I wish to extend to you my condolences on the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Chairman Mao was one of the remarkable men of this age. In his life and actions, he demonstrated the power of ideas, and under his leadership the face of China was profoundly altered. He has left an indelible imprint on the history of China and of our times.

We shall always remember Chairman Mao as a leader who had the vision to recognize that strengthened ties between our two countries would serve the interests of both our peoples, and the courage to translate this vision into practical steps that should be of long-term benefit to the evolution of a more secure world.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford



His Excellency
Ch'iao Kuan-hua
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Peking

Dear Mr. Minister:

Please accept my sincere condolences on the passing of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Chairman Mao was a towering figure on the world scene. During the meetings which I was privileged to have with him, I was deeply impressed by his wide-ranging intellect and profound commitment to his country. Under his leadership, China joined the United States in shaping a new and durable relationship. We are determined to continue on this course, which will stand as a monument to his foresight.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Kissinger



CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

APRIL, 1972 -- to Present

(CODEL Leaders underlined)

April, 1972

Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Hugh Scott

June, 1972

Rep. Hale Boggs
Rep. Gerald Ford

July, 1973

Sen. Warren Magnuson
Sen. Robert Griffin
Sen. John Sparkman
Sen. Gale Mcgee
Rep. Thomas Morgan
Rep. John McFall
Rep. William Maillard
Rep. Jerry Pettis

July, 1974

Sen. Henry Jackson

September, 1974

Sen. William Fulbright
Sen. Hiram Fong
Sen. Hubert Humphrey
Rep. Peter Frelinghuysen
Rep. Clement Zablocki
Rep. William Broomfield
Rep. Barbara Jordan

December, 1974

Senator Mike Mansfield (second visit)



March, 1975

Rep. Carl Albert
Rep. John Rhodes

August, 1975

Sen. Charles Percy
Sen. Jacob Javits
Sen. Claiborn Pell
Sen. Adlai Stevenson III
Rep. Margaret Heckler
Rep. Paul Findley
Rep. Paul McCloskey

August, 1975

Rep. John Anderson
Sen. Robert Byrd
Sen. Sam Nunn
Sen. James Pearson
Rep. John Slack
Rep. John Derwinski

December, 1975

Rep. Margaret Heckler
Rep. Patsy Mink
Rep. Gladys Spellman
Rep. Bella Abzug
Rep. Corinne Boggs
Rep. Yvonne Burke
Rep. Cardiss Collins
Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman
Rep. Patricia Schroeder
Rep. Millicent Fenwick
Rep. Helen Meyner



April, 1976

Rep. Mel Price
Rep. Bob Wilson
Rep. Samuel Stratton
Rep. Richard Ichord
Rep. William Randall
Rep. William Dickinson
Rep. Lester Wolff
Rep. J. Herbert Burke
Rep. G. William Whitehurst

July, 1976

Sen. Hugh Scott



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT CABLE

To: All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:

SUBJECT: Guidance for US Involvement in Commemorative Activities on the Death of PRC Chairman Mao Tse-tung

1. The PRC has announced the death of Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung. This message provides guidance for participation by US officials in commemorative activities organized by PRC missions at third-country posts.
2. If a condolence book is opened and the US post is either specifically invited to sign or is included in a circular note or other general invitation, the chief of mission, charge, or principal officer should sign for USG. Individual US officials may also sign, at the discretion of the chief of mission.
3. A number of posts reported that they were omitted from general invitations to sign condolence books on occasion of Chou En-lai's death. In those cases where posts nevertheless persisted in efforts to sign, Department is unaware of any Chinese rebuff. Accordingly, posts

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HR 5/10/01



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-2-

which do not initially receive such invitations are authorized to use their own discretion in probing Chinese intentions and in deciding, if situation still ambiguous, whether or not to sign.

4. Regardless of official condolence posture, if personal relations warrant the chief of mission may seek an appropriate opportunity to convey his personal condolences to his PRC counterpart.

5. Posts may also participate in other forms of observance (we are not aware of any such official activities in case of Chou, but cannot rule it out in Mao's case) at an appropriate level if invited to attend. In the majority of cases, even if such observances take place, US representatives will probably not be invited.

6. Department would appreciate brief reports on PRC handling of funeral observances, particularly any unusual aspects.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Premier:

Please accept my personal condolences, and those of the Government and people of the United States, on the occasion of the passing of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Few men in any era ~~are destined to leave a deep imprint on the course of development of a great country and fewer still to~~ achieve historic greatness. Chairman Mao was one of these rare men. His leadership has been a decisive element in the shaping of the Chinese nation ~~over the past several decades~~ ^{for and his works have left a deep imprint upon our civilization} He was truly a major figure of our times.

I was privileged to meet Chairman Mao during my visit to Peking in December 1975. Our discussion furthered the development of U. S. - China relations along the lines that he had earlier envisaged. Let me affirm now, as I did then, the determination of the United States to complete the normalization of our relations on the basis of the Shanghai Communique. This would be a fitting tribute to his vision, and of benefit to the peoples of our two countries.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

His Excellency
Hua Kuo-feng
Premier of the State Council
Peking



OK
J. J. Smith
8/22/76

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY KTR, NARA, DATE 5/10/01

CONFIDENTIAL

A

Dear Madame Mao:

Mrs. Ford joins me in extending to you our deepest sympathy on the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Chairman Mao had a profound impact on his era. During my visit to Peking in December 1975, I was privileged to hold wide-ranging discussions with him. Our talks confirmed that we shared a common belief in the importance of strengthening the relations between our two countries. Chairman Mao will be remembered in this country for his leading role in restoring the traditional ties of friendship between the American and Chinese peoples.

Please accept my personal condolences.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

Madame Mao Tse-tung
Peking
People's Republic of China

OR
8/2/76



(Contingency Message to be sent, on an optional basis, to whomever is fulfilling the protocol functions of PRC Chief of State)

Dear Mr. _____:

On behalf of the Government and people of the United States, I wish to extend to you my condolences on the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Chairman Mao was one of the remarkable men of this age. In his life and actions, he demonstrated the power of ideas, and under his leadership the face of China was profoundly altered. He has left an indelible imprint on the history of China and of our times.

We shall always remember Chairman Mao as a leader who had the vision to recognize that strengthened ties between our two countries would serve the interests of both our peoples, and the courage to translate this vision into practical steps that should be of long-term benefit to the evolution of a more secure world.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

OK
J. Smith
8/21/76



A

Taylor

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tom;

Can we get all of state

memo -

Hpl



Rec. 7/28/76 - 11:35 am
mm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 28, 1976

TO: DOUG SMITH
FROM: JAY TAYLOR
SUBJECT: Contingency Messages on Mao Tse-tung's
Death

The attached Presidential letters and White House
statement are forwarded for your clearance.

Please call 3044 when cleared.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/2/68, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY AR, NSC, DATE 5/10/01



CONFIDENTIAL

Suggested White House Statement on Mao's Death

The People's Republic of China announced today the passing away of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Chairman Mao was a giant figure in modern Chinese history. He was a leader whose actions profoundly affected the development of his country. His influence on history will extend far beyond the borders of China.

Americans will remember that it was under Chairman Mao that China moved together with the United States to end a generation of hostility and to launch a new and more positive era in relations between our two countries. We are confident that the trend of improved relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, which Chairman Mao helped create, and to which he imparted authoritative direction, will continue.

The United States offers its condolences to the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

*OK
WJ Smith
8/21/76*

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
HSC MEMO, 11/24/99, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 5/10/01



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

phonetyping only

OK AH 4195

CONFIDENTIAL GDS

July 20, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

Tom can we have all of late memo

SUBJECT: Contingency Messages on Mao Tse-tung's Death

not part of which is included

State has sent a contingency plan (Tab C) to Secretary Kissinger for use at the time of Mao Tse-tung's death. Based on the precedent established in connection with Chou En-lai's death, State believes the President should send condolence messages to Premier Hua Kuo-feng, to Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), and to whomever is fulfilling the protocol functions of PRC Chief of State following Chu Te's death. Suggested texts of these messages are at Tab A.

whom?

The proposed text of a separate White House statement on the Chairman's death is at Tab B.

Official Delegation

It is probable but not certain that in the case of Mao's death the Chinese will adhere to their past practice of not inviting foreign governments to send delegations to the funeral. Should the Chinese indicate that they are prepared to receive an official U. S. delegation, the EA Bureau believes that Secretary Kissinger would be the most appropriate person to head it. The Bureau also recommends that the delegation include Senator Mansfield, Congressman Rhodes, and Ambassador Gates.

On the other hand, the Bureau believes that should it become evident that the Chief-of-State or head-of-government will head a substantial number of other delegations, Vice President Rockefeller should head the delegation "provided the risk of domestic political opposition to his selection is considered manageable."

I believe that in any event you would wish to recommend to the President that Vice President Rockefeller not lead a U. S. delegation to Chairman Mao's funeral. As State's memorandum points out, the Vice President

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HR 5/10/01



Vertical handwritten notes on the left margin: 'The revised text one of 1975... we have drafted the message...'

attended the funeral of Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975. Many Congressmen and others would probably oppose his attendance at Mao's funeral for that reason. Peking would also have reservations because of the Vice President's role at Chiang Kai-shek's funeral.

Other possibilities for head of the delegation would be: David Bruce, the First Chief of our Liaison Office in Peking, and Ambassador Scranton.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the text of the contingency messages at Tabs A and B.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

That you discuss with the President the question of a possible U.S. delegation to Mao's funeral indicating that you believe that we should not consider the Vice President on this occasion, but that the Secretary of State would be the most appropriate delegation head.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
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7	20	7	22	14	7604195

INITIAL ACTION 0

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: SECSTATE _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT _____
 SCOWCROFT X SECDEF _____ LOU _____ NO FORN NODIS _____
 HYLAND _____ DCI _____ X REF _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS _____
 DAVIS _____ STATE EXSEC _____ S _____ CODEWORD _____
 OTHER Barnes TS. SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Contingency map for use at time of MAO TSE-TUNG death

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR
ADV CYS S'CROFT/WGH	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO	
STAFF SECRETARY					
CONGRESSIONAL					
ECONOMIC					
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS					
FAR EAST/PRC					
INTELLIGENCE					
LATIN AMERICA					
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA					
NSC PLANNING					
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					
SCIENTIFIC					
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN					

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. ()

MEMO FOR PRES. ()

REPLY FOR _____ ()

APPROPRIATE ACTION. ()

MEMO _____ TO _____ ()

RECOMMENDATIONS. ()

JOINT MEMO. ()

REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()

CONCURRENCE. ()

DUE DATE: _____

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
7/22		Scroft	X	Decision	7/29	
7/26		Taylor	S	FURTHER ACTION		
7/10		NSC/S	C	See 7605027 for action		
8/3		Scroft	X	Decision		
9/10			C	See 7605027 for final action		

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: 7605027

SPECIAL INDEXING: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MARSH

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Hanoi's Attack on the President

There is no question that Hanoi's personal attack on the President goes substantially beyond what we usually see. Ordinarily, Hanoi attacks some aspect of the President's policy rather than his personal character. The harsh tone is also inconsistent with other more authoritative commentaries which Hanoi has disseminated recently. For example, its reaction to the President's July 24 remarks at the MIA Convention was more measured than this diatribe. Ordinarily the sharper attack could be expected to follow the President's taking a tough line on the MIA problem.

The best explanation I can think of is that this commentary was meant for internal consumption in Vietnam. It seems obvious that the information the article uses came from some "research" which an American commentator compiled. We believe Hanoi regularly receives all such material, and probably jumped on this item as a "good foreign source" on which to base an attack on the President. Moreover, it is in the Vietnamese language and it was a wire item. The words which Hanoi really wants us to hear are sent in English over its international radio service.

Since there is no clear evidence that Hanoi meant to pick a fight with us directly by publishing this item, I recommend that we not make an issue of it now. Rather we should save it for use as a rationale for being tough with Hanoi when critics suggest we are not being sufficiently forthcoming to the Vietnamese.



Staff wky up
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: JACK MARSH *Jack*

Brent, I would appreciate your thoughts on the attached.
Many thanks.



AUG 3 1976
2d

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 3, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: RUSS ROURKE
FROM: MILT MITLER

~~SECRET~~

Russ, you may have already seen this transcript of a diatribe against the President by Hanoi. This was released on July 22, 1976, before the League of Families speech. It represents an unusually harsh attack against the President and unlike the normal run where the President's policies are attacked. It was also in Vietnamese and so intended primarily for consumption within Vietnam.

Attachment (transcript - "Ford's True Nature")



MEMORANDUM


26 74
4392 (add-on)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

August 6, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES 

SUBJECT: Memorandum to Jack Marsh on Hanoi's Attack on the President

I have prepared a memorandum for you to send to Jack Marsh (Tab A) commenting on Hanoi's recent diatribe against the President.



24

were deeply touched at hearing Prime Minister Pol Pot saying: "The friendship and solidarity between the Kampuchea and Vietnam revolutions, between Kampuchea and Vietnam constitute a problem of both strategy and sacred feelings. Should that friendship and solidarity go well the revolution in our two countries would develop finely. There's no other way".

The Vietnamese press and television delegation on visit to the Democratic Kampuchea shall keep forever the nice and profound recollections and shall do its utmost to contribute even a small part to keeping the two countries, as the first secretary of the Vietnam Workers Party said: "Already bound to each other in the struggle for national liberation, to be forever attached to each other in the national reconstruction and protection, for the sake of the independence and prosperity of our respective country and for the revolutionary interests of the people in southeast Asia and the world over." [sentence as received]

VIETNAM

VNA DESCRIBES FORD AS CORRUPT, REACTIONARY POLITICIAN

Hanoi VNA in Vietnamese to VNA Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) 1320 GMT 22 Jul 76 OW--
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[VNA document: "Ford's True Nature"]

[Text] In reality, what is Ford? Following are some features on him:

--Ford started his political career by jumping into the U.S. House of Representatives with the assistance of the Western family, one of the wealthiest and most influential families in Michigan and having relations with the well-to-do uppercrust families in the United States.

--Ford has the past of a reactionary. In a letter addressed to his friends in 1971, he considered the liberals in the Democratic Party as dangerous elements with regard to the U.S. way of life and philosophy.

--Ford assisted Nixon in selecting ultrarightist judges such as Carswell and Hainesworth to the Supreme Court.

--He is well-known racist in the United States.

--He is an advocate of increasing the Pentagon's inherently huge national defense budget.

--He is a defender of corruption in the United States. As confirmed by sources from Washington, Ford took large payoffs at his office in Washington from an employee of the General Electric Co. who asked him as the House minority leader to help Thomas O. Paine, director of the monopolist company, win the post of NASA deputy director. A few days after Paine was appointed to hold this post, the General Electric Co. signed a contract with NASA worth \$50 million to carry out a satellite project. This contract was approved by the Federal Government.

--Ford has close relations with the major financial companies in the United States. On 22 January 1968, he was appointed director of the old Kent Bank and Trust Company in Grand Rapids, a big bank of [words indistinct] which sent him to run in the congressional elections. This bank possesses assets worth \$500 million. In the United States, the banks have big interests in all problems related to the laws concerning banks and finance. Thus it is not surprising that many Federal projects have been carried out through the Kent Bank.

According to a U.S. law, a state official such as a congressman and the U.S. president are not allowed to assume functions in any private organs.



But Ford has had no trouble when he violated this law.

Robert Winter Berger, one of those specializing in seeking persons who wish to sign contracts with the company which he represents, wrote in his book "Washington Payoff" about the bargain between him and Ford on the purchase of the title of U.S. ambassador to France for Francis Kellog, president and main share holder of the International Mining Corporation in New York.

Winter Berger said to Ford: "He is ready to offer \$30,000 more to the Republican National Committee." Ford replied promptly: "All right, please tell him that he can come and see me at any time as he pleases."

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JAPAN

KANEKO READS JCP CC REPORT ON DRAFT RESOLUTION

Tokyo JPS in English 1512 GMT 29 Jul 76 OW--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[All figures at beginning of paragraphs are as received]

[Text] Tokyo, July 30 JPS--On the first day of the 13th extraordinary congress of the JCP (July 28), the Central Committee proposed the draft resolution; Mitsuhiro Kaneko read the report on behalf of the Central Committee. Some points are added to the draft resolution by consideration of the development in the subsequent situation and adoption of the contents of discussions in the entire party. Kaneko read out the report, which includes the added parts.

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1. The correctness of the draft resolution saying that the dangerous maneuver of the Miki cabinet for hush-up of the Lockheed scandal is starting too, was endorsed again.

1. We should not belittle the danger that maneuvers for hushing-up the Lockheed scandal will gain success.

1. The Liberal-Democratic Party and the Miki cabinet are attempting to divert the criticism of the people under the new cloak of "rebirth of the LDP."

1. We should not [be too] lazy to pay attention to various political moves resulting from the aggravated crisis of the LDP.

1. (Such LDP political moves) do not mean that the straight retrogression in the LDP's rule and its rapid approach to "the alliance of conservatives and progressives", the modernization of the LDP body, etc. are inevitable.



MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MARSH

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Hanoi's Attack on the President

There is no question that Hanoi's personal attack on the President goes substantially beyond what we usually see. Ordinarily, Hanoi attacks some aspect of the President's policy rather than his personal character. The harsh tone is also inconsistent with other more authoritative commentaries which Hanoi has disseminated recently. For example, its reaction to the President's July 24 remarks at the MIA Convention was more measured than this diatribe. Ordinarily the sharper attack could be expected to follow the President's taking a tough line on the MIA problem.

The best explanation I can think of is that this commentary was meant for internal consumption in Vietnam. It seems obvious that the information the article uses came from some "research" which an American commentator compiled. We believe Hanoi regularly receives all such material, and probably jumped on this item as a "good foreign source" on which to base an attack on the President. Moreover, it is in the Vietnamese language and it was a wire item. The words which Hanoi really wants us to hear are sent in English over its international radio service.

Since there is no clear evidence that Hanoi meant to pick a fight with us directly by publishing this item, I recommend that we not make an issue of it now. Rather we should save it for use as a rationale for being tough with Hanoi when critics suggest we are not being sufficiently forthcoming to the Vietnamese.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT INFORMATION

August 2, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT


FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT: Hanoi's Attitude Toward President Ford

Jack Marsh sent you a memorandum (Tab C) July 30 transmitting a copy of a memorandum he sent to the President the same day. The second memorandum included the text of a July 27 Radio Hanoi commentary criticizing the President's July 24 remarks on MIAs. We had sent Marsh the text in the first place, and did a Presidential brief (Tab B) of it July 29. Marsh's notification to you thus forms a round robin.

We prepared another Presidential brief August 2, the day we received it, of Hanoi's vicious July 22 attack on the President (Tab A) which describes him as a "corrupt ... racist," and accuses him of receiving bribes while in public office. The Vietnamese News Agency (NVA) published the attack in a Vietnamese language transmission from Hanoi to Saigon.

This biting attack on the President's personal probity is unusual. While Hanoi has never hesitated to refer to U.S. officials in caustic terms, it usually linked its acerbity to some element of U.S. policy which it did not like. Hanoi's milder reaction in English on July 27 following the President's remarks on July 24 is also confusing. One possible explanation is that the sharp personal attack in Vietnamese was meant only for internal consumption, while the more measured criticism in English was intended for our ears.



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We were deeply touched at hearing Prime Minister Pol Pot saying: "The friendship and solidarity between the Kampuchea and Vietnam revolutions, between Kampuchea and Vietnam constitute a problem of both strategy and sacred feelings. Should that friendship and solidarity go well the revolution in our two countries would develop finely. There's no other way".

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012926

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Report

CREATION DATE 07/1976

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400146

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 14

FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (15)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/11/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: JACK MARSH *JM*

Please note the attached. The President may ask you about this statement.

Many thanks.



2k

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 30, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JACK MARSH 

I thought you would be interested in seeing what Hanoi said concerning your remarks to the League of Families.

I have sent a copy of this to Brent for his consideration and interpretation, should you desire.

cc: Brent Scowcroft



"GERALD FORD'S UNSUCCESSFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACK"

(TEXT) On Sunday U.S. President Gerald Ford summoned the representatives of 800 families of Americans registered as Missing in Southeast Asia to the White House to hear his words of sympathy.

While talking nineteen to the dozen, the U.S. President did not mention a word about the reason for the deaths or Missing in Action of hundreds of thousands of American youths in a region half a world away from the states. He also went to lengths making slanders against the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with regard to the Missing in Action problem. By so doing, Gerald Ford probably wanted to incite the chauvinistic feelings among Americans to buy votes in the November Presidential elections.

However, Ford's psychological blow has missed the target because he uttered ambiguities and failed to provide any concrete evidence. At this White House meeting, Gerald Ford also missed his mark when he said that there is no normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam so long as the Missing in Action problem has not been settled.

Ford's blackmail is too obvious to take anybody in. Everybody in the world knows that he is eating the U.S. promise to contribute to the healing of the wounds of war and reconstruction in Vietnam. The question is how the United States could break its solemn promise to contribute to healing the wounds of war and to the rebuilding of Vietnam, which is the responsibility and obligation and a point of honor for America.

It is certain that the compatriots of Mr. Gerald Ford, the Vietnamese people and the world public will not let him do what he likes.



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
73	8/2/72				7604392	

INITIAL ACTION 0 *Barne*

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: SECSTATE _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT _____
 SCOWCROFT F _____ SECDEF _____ LOU NO FORM NODIS _____
 HYLAND _____ DCI _____ X REF _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS _____
 DAVIS _____ STATE EXSEC _____ S CODEWORD _____
 OTHER _____ TS SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Handwritten Commentary on Res Remark to the League of Families (MIA)*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR
ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO		
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH					
STAFF SECRETARY					
CONGRESSIONAL					
ECONOMIC					
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS					
FAR EAST/ PRC	<u>F</u>				<u>X</u>
INTELLIGENCE					
LATIN AMERICA					
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA					
NSC PLANNING					
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					
SCIENTIFIC					
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN					

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. _____

MEMO FOR PRES. _____

REPLY FOR _____

APPROPRIATE ACTION. _____

MEMO _____ TO _____

RECOMMENDATIONS. _____

JOINT MEMO. _____

REFER TO _____ FOR _____

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? Yes


CONCURRENCE. _____

DUE DATE: 8-9

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
8/2		Scowt	CIX	Info		
8-6		J. Croft	X	Sen memo to Marsh		
8-7		NSC/S	C	Scowt's sen memo to Marsh		



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH D AD WB _____ NOTIFY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

SPECIAL INDEXING: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED _____

MICROFILM & FILE FORMS

M/F/D _____ BY _____

IF _____

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AM/SA/FP _____

PA _____

AUG 12 1976

MEMORANDUM

76-4392

2m D AH

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT INFORMATION

August 2, 1976

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FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES *X* *[Handwritten Signature]*

SUBJECT: Hanoi's Attitude Toward President Ford

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
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MICROFILM DATA
DO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
TYPE _____
DATE _____
ORIG) _____
TO) _____

SUPP _____

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5461



B



22

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Quinn*
FROM: James Fazio
SUBJECT: President's Daily Brief

The attached items in your area of interest were submitted in the
President's Daily Brief of 7/29/76.

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

HR 5/11/01

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD

12

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012927

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Report

CREATION DATE 07/1976

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400146

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 14

FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (15)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/11/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

~~Handwritten notes and scribbles~~
4392
JK

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MARSH 

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C

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 25, 1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MARSH

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Shanghai Communique

As you requested, I am attaching a one-page summary of the major provisions of the Shanghai Communique (Tab A).

In addition, you may find the following classified comments useful background in dealing with the Shanghai communique and "normalization":

-- Although we explicitly disagreed with the Chinese on many issues, a crucial international factor which binds our relationship with the PRC was expressed in the three-line anti-hegemony clause (which was expanded in a later communique to cover the entire world, not just Asia). This common perception has been the centerpiece of most of our discussions in recent years.

-- The Chinese position on Taiwan in the communique was consistent with their line since the Korean War; i. e., they will not establish full relations with us while we maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei, while our Mutual Security Treaty is in force, or while we have military forces and installations on Taiwan.

-- For our part, we did not fully endorse the "one China" principle, but we came very close to it; and the direction of our policy was clear, including our troop drawdowns and eventual removal of our military presence.

-- There is some real and semantic conflict between the U. S. and PRC positions over the final settlement of the Taiwan question. The PRC asserts that "liberation" of Taiwan is an entirely "internal" question, quite separate and distinct from the "international" question of official U. S. presence in Taiwan. As expressed in the Shanghai Communique, the U. S. agrees that any settlement should be worked out by the Chinese (on both sides) themselves, but we have also expressed our interest in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *SW 9/26/02*

BY *hr*, NARA, DATE *2/3/03*



a peaceful settlement. This U. S. position on a peaceful settlement conflicts to some extent with the Chinese argument that once we have settled the "international" aspects of the Taiwan question, the modalities of resolving the "internal" aspects; i. e., whether or not they use force, is strictly up to them.




Major Provisions of the Shanghai Communiqué

On the international front, each side gave its own separate statement of its goals (e. g. the U. S. stressed just and secure peace, individual freedoms, etc. while the PRC emphasized the need for small and weak nations to escape the bullying of the big and strong). Each side also gave differing positions on Indochina, Korea, Japan and South Asia.

The two sides acknowledged that there are essential differences in their social systems and foreign policies, but they agreed on certain principles for the conduct of international relations (non-interference in internal affairs, non-aggression, etc.). They specifically agreed that neither would seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and that each would oppose efforts by any other country to establish such hegemony.

On the bilateral side, aside from agreeing to facilitate trade and cultural and scientific exchanges and to hold periodic high-level discussions, the key portions were separate statements on Taiwan. The PRC noted that the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing normalization of our relations and stressed its view that there is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part. It said that the PRC Government is the sole legal government of China, that the liberation of Taiwan is an internal question, and that the U. S. must withdraw all military forces and installations from Taiwan. It opposed any efforts to create "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," etc.

The United States acknowledged -- and did not challenge -- the view that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China". The U. S. reaffirmed its interest in "a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." With this prospect (i. e. of a peaceful settlement) in mind, we affirmed the ultimate objective of withdrawal of all U. S. forces and installations from Taiwan and stated that, in the meantime, as tension in the area diminishes, we will progressively reduce those forces and installations.



3c D

MEMORANDUM

4538

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION
August 13, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM GLEYSTEN *WJ*

SUBJECT: Jack Marsh's Request for a Summary of
the Shanghai Communique

Jack Marsh asked you for a one-page summary of the major provisions of the Shanghai Communique which is attached at Tab A.

I don't know what use he intends to make of it, but on the assumption that he might be talking with others about China, you may wish to provide him an interpretive guide to the key provisions and, in the case of the Taiwan question, a description of the dilemma we face. I have incorporated these points into the memo from you to him (Tab I) and classified it "confidential".

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I which forwards the Shanghai Communique to Jack Marsh.



3d

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
8	9	8	9	18	7604538

INITIAL ACTION O
Banner

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: SECSTATE _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT _____
 SCOWCROFT X SECDEF _____ LOU NO FORM NODIS _____
 NYLAND _____ DCI _____ X REF _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS _____
 DAVIS _____ STATE EXSEC _____ S CODEWORD _____
 OTHER Marsh, J TS SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Status rpt on major provisions in Shanghai Communiqué

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADV CYS SCROFT/WGH	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO		
				<u>X</u>		MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. <u>X</u>
STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES. ()
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR ()
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS						MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
FAR EAST/ <u>ARC</u>	<u>X</u>				<u>✓</u>	RECOMMENDATIONS ()
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO ()
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE ()
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: <u>8/18</u>
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN						

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
8/13	<u>X</u>	SCOWCROFT	<u>X</u>	Sgn memo to Marsh (8/18)		
8-25	<u>X</u>	NSC/ARC	"C"	2' draft sgd memo to Marsh		



NSC/S INSTR

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 SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____
 SPECIAL INDEXING: _____
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED X

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